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Further Correspondence

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EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 56

January to March 1944

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUMMARY.	Page
Chapter I.—AFGHANISTAN.			
1 Mr. Squire No. 9	1944. Jan. 29 (Kabul)	Political situation in Afghanistan Political review of Afghanistan for the year 1943	1
Chapter II.—IRAQ.			
2 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 30	1944. Jan. 18 (Bagdad)	Political situation in Iraq Review of chief events which have taken place in Iraq during the period 18th November, 1943, to 12th January, 1944	5
3 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 57	Feb. 1	Situation in Basra Report to the Cabinet by Majid Mustafa on the Basra question. His recommendations for improving the situation	10
4 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 68	Feb. 8	Political and economic situation in Iraq Review of the major political and economic events in 1943	14
5 Sir K. Cornwallis No. 111	Mar. 14	Political situation in Iraq Summary of document drawn up by H.R.H. the Amir setting out the lines on which he wished the Government to work. Observation thereon	23
Chapter III.—PERSIA.			
(A) Miscellaneous.			
6 Report	1944. Jan. 6	Situation in Persia Report on tour in Bahari, Chehar Mahal, Farsidan, Khuzestan, Ali Gudarz and Guilan by the 12th Indian Division mobile dispensary	26
7 Sir R. Bullard No. 10	Jan. 7 (Tehran)	Situation in Persia Review of the events in Persia during period 24th November, 1943, to 7th January, 1944. All other events were overshadowed by the Tehran Conference	33
8 Sir R. Bullard No. 111	Mar. 10	Anglo-Persian relations Report on ceremonies in connexion with the presentation of his credentials as His Majesty's Ambassador	43
9 Sir R. Bullard No. 120	Mar. 17	Situation in East Persia Report by Consul-General Skrine, Meshed, on situation in East Persia, July to December 1943	45
(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.			
10 Sir R. Bullard No. 1	1944. Jan. 3	Summary No. 1, period ending 2nd January	50
11 Sir R. Bullard No. 32	Jan. 17	Summary No. 2, period ending 16th January	53
12 Sir R. Bullard No. 38	Jan. 24	Summary No. 3, period ending 23rd January	56
13 Sir R. Bullard No. 44	Jan. 31	Summary No. 4, period ending 30th January	59
14 Sir R. Bullard No. 56	Feb. 7	Summary No. 5, period ending 6th February	61

12432 [27851]

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUMMARY.	Page
Chapter IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.			
15 Sir R. Bullard No. 65	1944. Feb. 14	Summary No. 6, period ending 13th February	62
16 Sir R. Bullard No. 79	Feb. 21	Summary No. 7, period ending 20th February	66
17 Sir R. Bullard No. 92	Feb. 28	Summary No. 8, period ending 27th February	68
18 Sir R. Bullard No. 116	Mar. 15	Summary No. 10, period ending 12th March	71
19 Sir R. Bullard No. 125	Mar. 20	Summary No. 11, period ending 19th March	73
Chapter V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.			
20 Mr. Jordan No. 21	1944. Feb. 15 (Jedda)	Political situation in Saudi Arabia Annual report for the year 1943	75
21 Sir E. Spears (Beirut)	1943. Dec. 23	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	80
22 Sir E. Spears No. 45	Dec. 17	Syrian Constitution Observations on the debate in the Syrian Chamber on the terms of the Constitution. Demand for complete sovereignty of the Syrian people. Refusal to recognise the mandate	83
23 To Sir E. Spears No. 7	1944. Jan. 12	Lebanese independence Instructions to His Majesty's Representative regarding the views of His Majesty's Government on this question	85
24 Sir E. Spears	1943. Dec. 29	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	87
25 Sir E. Spears	1944. Jan. 5	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	90
26 Sir E. Spears	Jan. 12	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	93
27 Sir E. Spears	Jan. 19	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	95
28 Sir E. Spears	Jan. 26	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	98
29 Sir E. Spears	Feb. 2	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	102
30 Sir E. Spears	Feb. 9	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	103
31 Sir E. Spears	Feb. 16	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	107
32 Sir E. Spears	Feb. 23	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	111
33 Sir E. Spears	Mar. 1	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	115
34 Sir E. Spears	Mar. 8	Situation in Syria and the Lebanon Weekly political summary	119

No. and Name.	Date.	Subject.	Page.
Chapter VI.—GENERAL.			
35 Sir E. Spears No. 3	1944. Jan. 23	Lebanese attitude towards Arab Federation ... Text of Consul-General Furlong's despatch to Sir E. Spears. Conversation with Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs regarding his recent visit to Egypt. Identity of views of Egypt and the Lebanon towards question of Arab Federation	123
36 Sir E. Spears No. 10	Feb. 8	Frontiers of the Lebanon ... Memorandum by Col. G. W. Furlong	124

SUBJECT INDEX.

(The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.)

AFGHANISTAN— Political situation.—1.	SAUDI ARABIA— Political situation.—20.
IRAQ— Internal situation: Barzan.—3. Political situation.—2, 4, 5.	SYRIA AND THE LEBANON— Constitution, The.—21. Lebanese independence.—23. Weekly political summaries.—21, 24–24.
PERSIA— Foreign policy and relations: Great Britain.—9. Political situation.—6, 7, 9. Trade: Weekly political summaries.—10–12.	GENERAL— Lebanese attitude towards Arab Federation.—35. Frontiers of the Lebanon.—36.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 56.—JANUARY TO MARCH 1944.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN.

[E 951/951/97]

No. 1.

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th February.)

(No. 9. Confidential)

Kabul, 28th January, 1944.

Sir,
WITH reference to Viscount Halifax's circular despatch, dated the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to forward as an enclosure to this despatch a political review of Afghanistan during the year 1943.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, the Government of the North-West Frontier Province, the Baluchistan Administration, and to His Majesty's Consuls, Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1.

Political Review for 1943.

THE year 1942 left the Afghan Government in a state of perplexity. Reports had it that they, or at least the younger members of the Government, had been making overtures to our enemies as a reinsurance against an Axis victory which seemed not impossible. The closing months of the year, however, brought the defeat of Rommel in Libya and the German disaster at Stalingrad with the probability forecast for 1943 by Sir Francis Wylie "that the Afghan Government would resume their rôle of careful if somewhat nervous spectators of events." And they needed to be watchful, for our enemies were busy intriguing to cause us and our Russian Allies embarrassment on our frontiers as soon as the psychological moment should arrive. We know now that intrigues against Russia were in the hands of the German Legation while those being carried on on the Indian border were mainly the responsibility of the Italians. The German intrigues involved an attempt to use certain refugees from Bukhara to stir up trouble in Soviet Turkestan. The conspiracy was, however, discovered in early April by the Afghan Government and was broken up by numerous arrests. At the same time, the Italian Legation was sending considerable sums of money to the Faqir of Ipi in order to encourage him to create trouble for us on the Indian frontier. As it was felt that these conspiracies were not being handled sufficiently firmly by the Afghan Government in spite of their knowledge of what was going on, it was decided that the British Legation, in conjunction with the Soviet Embassy, should make a joint *démarche* demanding the arrest of certain individuals and *inter alia* the gradual reduction in the personnel of the

offending legations. These demands were made at the end of May and accepted, though with a very bad grace, by the Afghan Government. It was not, however, until the end of October that they were complied with sufficiently to enable the case to be considered closed.

2. Meanwhile, the German offensive against the Caucasus had made no progress. The Axis had been driven out of North Africa and Sicily, and early in October Italy collapsed. By this time it was clear that the Axis had lost all chance of winning the war. The Italian Government became co-belligerent with the Allies and the Italian Legation in Kabul was directed by the Badoglio Government to give us any information regarding its former activities which we might require. These revelations threw much light on the Axis intrigues and it is interesting to compare the statement made by the Prime Minister to Sir Francis Wylie at an interview on the 16th February (Kabul Express Letter No. C-22/41 of the 20th February, 1943) with the information given later by the Italian Minister. The Prime Minister had assured Sir Francis Wylie that "he had done his level best to discourage anti-British movements of every sort on the frontier; as soon as he detected any Afghan intriguing against Britain he had put him straight into jail. He had, at the present moment, practically every single individual who might be of the slightest danger to us in safe custody. The Axis Ministers, even though they might have diplomatic privilege, were in little better shape." Signor Quaroni has stated that, despite his best efforts, he failed to achieve anything on account of the consistent and determined opposition of the Prime Minister, that whenever he had, with difficulty, established contact with the Faqir of Ipi his links had been arrested and his efforts frustrated. His one success had been the despatch of his secretary, Signor Anzilotti, to interview the Faqir of Ipi in June 1942, an escapade for which the Prime Minister had never forgiven him.

3. But the certainty that the United Nations would now win the war brought fresh anxiety to the Afghan Government. What would be the fate of Afghanistan in the post-war world with a victorious Russia on her northern border and a Britain, friendly with Russia, to the south. Already on the banks of the Oxus River there were signs of increased Russian activities. What did this portend? It was too much to hope that Britain would intervene. Was there any chance of America doing so? At any rate America was worth cultivating; but as the United States and Great Britain seemed especially in Afghanistan to be working in the closest harmony a policy of playing off one country against the other was unlikely to succeed and a policy of cultivating them both equally seemed to be the most likely to produce good results. The Tehran Conference of December, with its Three-Power guarantee of the integrity of Persia, was a good augury and showed clearly that this policy was right, and the year ended on a rising note of confidence in the future.

4. 1943 has, in fact, brought about in Afghanistan, in its own small way, as complete a change as has come over the face of the world war. The year began in doubt and anxiety with reports of flirtations with the Axis and of the supply to them of information on a small scale, as a reinsurance against their possible victory. Protestations of friendship for Britain were, indeed, made, but there was a marked unwillingness to give any concrete evidence of trust. Gradually, however, with the increased certainty of an Allied victory these fears were dispelled and the Afghans are now no longer afraid to show their friendship in deeds as well as in words. The crew of a British aircraft, which made a forced landing near Jalalabad in June, were, after friendly negotiations, released from internment in the middle of October; new commercial regulations, which were aimed against Indian traders, have been recently modified; and two British textile experts have been engaged and are at work in Kabul and at Kandahar. There is an increasing demand to learn English. The Prime Minister and the Afghan Government are taking a great interest in Basic English and three English professors have now been asked for to teach in one of the principal colleges in Kabul. Even more significant perhaps is the conclusion, through the intermediary of the U.K.C.C., of a contract to supply 10,000 tons of Afghan wool to the U.S.S.R., a transaction at which the Afghan Government might well have boggled earlier in the year, as the wool will, in fact, replace an equivalent amount which His Majesty's Government were previously under an obligation to supply to Russia. Never, in fact, in all its relations with Great Britain has the Afghan Government been so forthcoming.

5. There are still questions to be settled before relations between His Majesty's Government and Afghanistan can be placed upon a basis of real friendship and mutual trust. These must, for the most part, await the end of the

war. There is a long road to be travelled before the Afghan people can be brought to share the friendly sentiments of their Government. But the Government realise their obligations in the matter and are believed, as a beginning, to be now taking one of the most essential steps which is to free their educational curriculum from any undue anti-British bias. In the interests of neutrality and in order to prevent Afghans from being drawn into either belligerent camp, severe restrictions have been placed on their contacts with foreign legations, which may be visited by only a very limited number of senior officials. The British Legation has suffered with the rest and the legation hospital is still out-of-bounds to Afghan subjects. The treatment of deserters from the Indian Army and of Indian prisoners in Afghan jails is still far from satisfactory, though the Afghan attitude to this troublesome question is showing a slight improvement and discussions are still continuing. The two British Consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad suffer from the same restrictions that have been the rule with foreign legations in Kabul. But in both places conditions, as a result of the war situation, have been reported to be much improved.

6. Afghan relations with foreign Powers show further developments during the year. The first Afghan Minister to Washington was appointed in February and left soon after with, it is believed, instructions to arrange for the engagement of American technicians, especially engineers, for the exploitation of Afghanistan's oil and other mineral resources, and for the extension generally of commercial relations. Negotiations with China which had been hanging fire since early in 1942 were brought to a conclusion in Angora in October 1943 and will involve in due course a treaty of friendship between the two countries, the opening of legations in Chungking and Kabul and the establishment of an Afghan Consulate in Sinkiang. Their relations with Turkey have always been of special importance to the Afghan Government who have always watched with close attention the Turkish attitude towards the war. In 1942 when it looked as if Russia might possibly collapse the Afghan Government despatched F. M. Abdul Ahad Khan (W.W. 5) as a special representative to Angora, probably to act as an additional observer of events and possibly to negotiate with the Germans should they succeed in breaking through the Russian defences. He was withdrawn in April 1943 when a German advance into the Middle East seemed no longer likely.

7. In Kabul relations with the Axis Missions have remained correct but not too cordial. The Afghans dislike the Italian Minister and were highly incensed at the discovery of the Axis intrigues to which I have already referred. As a result of these intrigues and of our subsequent *démarche*, three members of the German Legation have already been repatriated and a fourth is under orders to go, as is also Signor Anzilotti of the Italian Legation. The Japanese have been more careful and appear to be confining their activities, which are considerable, to the collection of information, but there is little doubt that the Afghan Government are fully aware of what is going on and are keeping a very close watch on their doings. Four Japanese engineers who were undoubtedly engaged in espionage were also returned, at our request, to their own country, their contracts having expired.

8. Except for the three Axis Legations, there has been an almost complete change in the heads of foreign missions in Afghanistan, and Mr. Engert, the American Minister, is the only one who has remained throughout the year. His enthusiasm for Anglo-American collaboration has been of the greatest help to us. M. Kepulu, the Turkish Ambassador and doyen of the Diplomatic Corps, left Kabul in August on leave and has not yet returned. It is a pity that Turkish representatives in this country are at the moment of such inferior quality. The Soviet Ambassador left at the end of July and it is not known when his successor, M. Bakulin, will arrive. The Persian Embassy was for the first half of the year in charge of M. Ghadimi as *chargé d'affaires*, and M. Najm, the new Ambassador, only arrived at the same time as myself at the end of July. General Khalid Al Zahawi took up his appointment as Iraqi Minister in January and M. Fouad Bey as Minister for Egypt in March. They have all been consistently friendly. M. Chataigneau, the French Minister, departed in January leaving M. Cassin in charge. M. Cassin in turn left for Beirut in May and the French Archaeological Mission under M. Ghirshman was closed in September. It must be admitted that Kabul is a more peaceful place since the departure of the Fighting French.

9. There have been few changes in the Government itself during the year. In January Muhammad Nauroz Khan was brought back from Tehran, where he was Ambassador, and appointed Minister of the Interior, probably in order to relieve the Prime Minister of work. In spite of a somewhat unprepossessing

appearance the new Minister is reported to have some ability for office work. Abdul Majid Khan (W.W. 73), Minister of National Economy, is still abroad though he has moved from Berlin to Switzerland. His Ministry is in temporary charge of Sirdar Muhammad Naim Khan, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, who is apparently being trained to become Prime Minister in due course in succession to his uncle. In pursuance of this policy Muhammad Naim Khan carried out an important and extensive tour of the country during the autumn. But his tour was cut short by the sudden illness of the Prime Minister in November, which for a time caused acute anxiety. Fortunately the Prime Minister is now on the road to recovery, and though until the end of the year he had not left his room the administration of the country does not appear to have been much affected.

10. Internal peace has on the whole been well maintained. In spite of the Axis intrigues with the Faqir of Ipi, the Indian frontier has remained unusually quiet though the Afghan Government sought to secure themselves against hostility from Ipi by maintaining friendly relations with him and avoiding interference with his activities on the British side of the border. There have been sporadic tribal quarrels in the Southern Province which the Afghan Government have failed to control, but these had only local significance. In the autumn there was a spate of robberies on the roads which are usually so safe. Stern action was successful in restoring security, and the close of the year seems to have found the Yahya Khel at least as firmly in control of the country as ever before. The Amanullah party seem to be losing what little importance they ever had, and Axis intrigues in Europe with the ex-King (which incidentally were quite incompatible with those set on foot by their own legations in Afghanistan) seem to have done his cause and that of his sponsors more harm than good. In fact, in the absence of any rival claimant to authority in the country and of serious tribal disturbances on either side of the Indo-Afghan border the barometer for 1944 seems to be set fair. The economic condition of the country, thanks largely to the forethought and generosity of the Government of India in maintaining as large a flow of supplies as possible has remained surprisingly stable, and the inevitable dearth and scarcity of imported articles is to some extent off-set by the abundance of cheap grain as a result of a bumper harvest. On the whole the Afghan Government can congratulate themselves on having safely weathered a difficult year.

11. The fair outlook for 1944 must not of course blind us to the possibilities of trouble which are ever present in this country. The Prime Minister's health is precarious and that of his brother, the Minister of Defence, is none too good. Nor are the Royal Family a happy team, and reports of differences of opinion between the Minister of Defence and his nephew, Sirdar Muhammad Daud Khan, are too persistent to be entirely ignored. In spite of their fourteen years of power the present dynasty have not succeeded in acquiring the loyalty and affection of the country, though recent efforts to achieve this object, such as Sirdar Muhammad Naim Khan's tour to which I have already referred, seem to have met with some measure of success. A single bad harvest or the failure of His Majesty's Government and Government of India to ensure the punctual arrival of essential supplies might cause a serious and rapid deterioration in the economic condition leading to tribal unrest and widespread disturbances. The end of the war may well see also the end of the unusual docility of the border tribes, causing trouble which may spread beyond tribal limits. We have still to maintain a careful watch against the unforeseen, but never altogether unexpected, in Afghanistan, while endeavouring to encourage any tendencies which make for stability and ordered progress.

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 519/37/93]

No. 2.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th January.)

(No. 20.)
Sir,

Bagdad, 13th January, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to my despatch No. 401 of the 12th November, 1943, an account of the chief events that have taken place in Iraq during the last two months.

2. The Regent returned on the 12th December from his official visit to the United Kingdom. His Royal Highness was delighted with the kindly welcome which he received everywhere he went, and especially pleased with the gracious friendship shown to him by the King and Queen while he was Their Majesties' guest at Buckingham Palace. On his arrival in Bagdad he was given a very hearty reception by the people of the capital, who thronged both sides of the streets through which he drove from the airport to the palace in company with the young King and the Amir Said.

3. The extraordinary session of Parliament which began on the 9th October was prorogued on the 30th November and the ordinary session for 1943/44 was opened by the Acting Regent on the 1st December. I have already reported by telegram the chief points of the unusually long speech from the throne, and need not recapitulate them here. The ambitious programme of administrative activity which it contained was well received in the press and by the public, though the latter, with some reason, are reported to have voiced doubts whether any considerable portion of the programme would, in fact, be carried out. The promises of a new electoral law and of encouragement for the setting up of responsible political parties aroused especial interest. The young men of the Left wing were pleased with the prospect of greater scope for political ability and have hopes of stronger representation when the next elections are held.

4. The arrest of the Lebanese President, Prime Minister and Cabinet on the 11th November by the French authorities in the Levant provoked a strong reaction in Iraq. All classes resented this action as an attack on the established liberties of the Lebanese State and despised it as an exhibition of clumsy brutality by a nation which, with its own country still occupied by an enemy army, is in their view little fitted to lord it over others. There was at once a demand for action to support the Lebanese Government. The Senate and the Chamber held special meetings on the 13th November, at which resolutions were passed and communicated to all the Allied and neutral Governments, protesting against the suspension of the Lebanese Constitution and the arrest of the President and members of the Government. At the same time the newspapers called upon the Allied Governments to intervene to compel the French National Committee to respect the pledges given to Syria and the Lebanon and to uphold the principles of the Atlantic Charter. The Acting Regent also made formal protests to myself and the United States Chargé d'Affaires.

5. The release and reinstatement of the President, the freeing of the arrested Cabinet Ministers on the 22nd November and their subsequent resumption of office brought tension to an end, but profound mistrust of French motives and methods remains. What is known of the part played by His Majesty's Government and what is guessed of what went on behind the scenes has generally redounded to the credit of Britain, but there are always a few people who are too clever to accept the obvious and who have ascribed a variety of Machiavellian motives to our policy during the Lebanese crisis.

6. The Iraqi Government were wise enough to restrain, rather than excite, public opinion. Demonstrations were prohibited and the exuberance of the press checked, but both the Government and thinking people have found in the Lebanese struggle with the French new and cogent reasons for closer political co-operation among the Arab States.

7. The Colonial Secretary's statement on the 10th November, that the 31,000 Jewish immigrants who could legally enter Palestine before the end of March 1944 will be allowed to enter after the expiry of the time-limit, was received in Iraq without adverse comment. I must emphasise that the reactions here, in Egypt and elsewhere to the Lebanese crisis illustrate clearly what is to be expected on a far graver scale if or when trouble starts in Palestine.

8. Soon after the Regent's return from his visit to the United Kingdom the Prime Minister took up with His Royal Highness the question of reforming his Cabinet. The discussions continued for some time, but the many permutations and combinations that were considered had only ephemeral interest and need no permanent record. The new Cabinet was eventually formed on the 26th December with the following members:—

Prime Minister and Acting Minister of Defence: Nuri al Said.
 Deputy Prime Minister: Taufiq Suwaidi.
 Foreign Affairs: Mahmud Subhi al Daftari.
 Interior: Umar Nadhmi.
 Finance: Ali Muntaz.
 Justice: Ahmad Mukhtar Baban.
 Communications and Works: Sadiq al Bassam.
 Education: Abdul Ilah Hafidh.
 Economics: Salman al Barrak.
 Social Affairs: Muhammad Hassan Kubbi.
 Minister without Portfolio: Majid Mustafa.

9. The novel features of the new Cabinet, made possible by the recent amendment to the Organic Law, are the inclusion of a Deputy Prime Minister and a Minister without Portfolio. I think Nuri Pasha chose Taufiq Suwaidi in the hope that he would relieve him of a lot of parliamentary work, but I fear that Taufiq will prove to be an uneasy colleague and I shall be surprised if he does not, before long, try to squeeze Nuri out. There are others, too, in the Cabinet who would be willing to take part in an intrigue of this kind. Majid Mustafa is a genuine Kurd and has the special task of appeasing the Kurdish areas and redressing their administrative grievances. Most of the other members have been chosen for their former experience, or for their skill in debate, while Mohammad Hassan Kubba is a new recruit to fill the usual Shi'ah quota of three Ministers. He has won a good reputation as a judge. No progressive men have been introduced and as a whole the Cabinet represents the old ruling class of established families rather than any of the new elements now knocking at the door of public life. The return of Salman al Barrak to the Cabinet left the office of President of the Chamber vacant. It was filled a few days later when a large majority of the Deputies voted for the Shi'ah Deputy, Saiyid Ridha Shababi. Only a few days after the new Cabinet had been got together the Prime Minister told me that the Regent had been criticising its members. His Royal Highness was in particular dissatisfied with the inclusion of Taufiq Suwaidi, Ali Muntaz and to a lesser extent Muhammad Hassan Kubba. In reply Nuri Pasha had, he said, suggested that it was only fair to give the new Ministers a chance until, say, the end of March when, if His Royal Highness was not satisfied, the Cabinet could resign. He had, however, begged the Regent to be sure that a better Cabinet could be formed before he broke up the existing combination.

10. The public reception given to the new Cabinet was far from good, though the reasons for its immediate unpopularity are not easy to see. In make up it is hardly distinguishable from innumerable earlier Cabinets and its promise, if no better, is no worse than the average of its predecessors. I am left to suppose that political enlightenment is spreading and that the Iraqi public are now applying more exacting tests to their Cabinets than were customary in the past. This in some ways is all to the good, but I fear that they will find it difficult to discover a body of Ministers who will come up to these new standards.

11. In Parliament, too, the Cabinet have had to face much criticism. The assault was launched during the debate on the reply to the Speech from the Throne which opened on the 3rd January and ended on the 6th January. In the Chamber bitter personal attacks were made on members of the Cabinet and every point of the Speech from the Throne was hotly discussed. In the Senate the constitutional legality of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister was the chief bone of contention, but there also many members found the opportunity convenient to mount their own particular hobby-horses and tilt at the Government. It is too early yet to assess what, if any, serious damage the Cabinet have sustained by these onslaughts, but with the Regent ill-disposed towards them and determined opponents in both Houses of Parliament the immediate outlook for the Administration is not bright. The continued indisposition of the Prime Minister is an additional handicap. He left for sanatorium treatment at Haifa on the 10th January and in his absence Taufiq Suwaidi, who has none of Nuri's personal popularity, will probably find his position as head of the Government anything but easy. In conversation with the Regent and other local personalities I have urged

that the country needs more than anything a period of political stability enabling Ministers to grasp the work of their departments and so get down to constructive action on the many problems awaiting attention. While His Royal Highness has reluctantly agreed to give the present Cabinet a trial, I fear it will be many years before Iraqis as a whole acquire sufficient public spirit to place country before self.

12. Three new Senators were appointed on the 30th December, Muhammad Amin Zaki, the veteran Kurdish politician, who has frequently held a Cabinet position; Muhammad Saihud, a wealthy tribal leader of Kut; and Abdul Razzaq al Mir, a notable of Basra.

13. In my despatch No. 397 of November 1943, I reported the frank talk that I had had with the Prime Minister about the deplorable decline in the administration of the country. Since then I have lost no opportunity of impressing upon his Excellency and other Iraqi personalities the urgent need of improving this state of affairs. The necessity for remedial measures with outside help is now widely accepted, but Nuri Pasha has been confronted, when considering bringing about reforms through the employment of British officers in the administrative inspectorate, by the very real difficulty of finding suitable men. To overcome this obstacle I proposed in early January that the existing political advisory staff created in 1941 might carry out in addition to its ordinary duties those of administrative inspection under the Ministry of the Interior for a provisional period of six months. The Cabinet are now studying this offer.

14. The Edmonds Committee on internees finished their work early in December. Their recommendations were adopted and on the 6th December, two days before the great festival of 'Id al Adha, it was officially announced that fifty-one men had been released from the internment camp at Amara. I should perhaps mention here that the publicity attending the release from prison in the United Kingdom of the Moseley couple will not make it easier for me to resist the importunities of local politicians who would like to open the gates of Amara.

15. I am pleased to be able to report that on this occasion no untoward incidents attended the committee's work and no attempt was made by any highly placed persons to influence the committee's recommendations.

16. During November the Prime Minister discussed with me the question of the return to Iraq of the Iraqi internees now in Southern Rhodesia. The upshot of our talks was that the Iraqi Government formally renewed their request for the surrender of all of these internees and gave me a written assurance that those not tried and sentenced for their offences would be interned again in Iraq. The Prime Minister also confirmed to me orally that all his colleagues agreed to this policy. When the Cabinet was changed at the end of December the Prime Minister again obtained the agreement of all the Ministers to the resolution adopted by their predecessors concerning these men.

17. For nearly a month after the fighting that ended on the 11th November there were no further engagements with the tribesmen in the Barzan area. The Iraqi army detachments remained in their camps and the tribesmen took no offensive action. On the 7th December, however, a strong tribal force opened an attack on a police post at Shaitana, situated about 8 miles off the Ruwanduz-Mergasur road, just to the north of Mazna. The post surrendered after holding out for only three days, though the garrison had suffered no casualties. The tribesmen are reported to have obtained twenty-three rifles, one light automatic and 10,000 rounds of small-arms ammunition from this post.

18. On the 8th December a small body of about ten to twelve policemen under an inspector was ambushed while moving from Sideka police post to Diyana. Most of them were killed after a spirited fight and about two days later the Barzani tribesmen began an attack on Kani Rash, the nahiyah headquarters of the Baradost nahiyah. About the same time sporadic attacks were started on the Iraqi Army camp at Mergasur.

19. In the meanwhile, the Assyrians who make up the bulk of the inhabitants of the village of Diyana, situated near Ruwanduz, had become anxious for their safety, and on the 10th December it was arranged in agreement with the Prime Minister, the Air Officer Commanding and General Headquarters, Persia/Iraq Force, that the Area Liaison Officer at Arbil should proceed to Diyana with four Royal Air Force armoured cars to give them confidence. A week later a small force consisting of four more Royal Air Force armoured cars, a company of British-Indian infantry, one mortar platoon and one Bren-carrier platoon was sent up to provide protection for both Diyana and the neighbouring village of Balikian. The arrival of these troops had an immediately steadying effect, and they were warmly welcomed by the inhabitants.

20. On the 14th December the Prime Minister, anxious to be conciliatory, persuaded Shaikh Ahmad Barzan (brother of Mulla Mustafa) to send his own son with a message informing Mulla Mustafa that if he would leave the area of hostilities and go elsewhere to live quietly until next spring, he would then be pardoned and permitted to return to live in his own villages. The reply received a week later was a refusal, and it was evident that Mulla Mustafa's recent successes had put him into an exalted mood. I thereupon thought it well with your authority to send him a warning that the situation in the Barzan area was becoming an embarrassment to the war effort of His Majesty's Government, and that if he continued his present disorderly activities, they would be obliged to consider his intentions as unfriendly and act accordingly. I received a reply on the 29th December. After reiterating his readiness at all times to obey the British Government, for whom he expressed his deep affection in eloquent terms, he went on to refer to his grievances and to appeal to me to "instruct" the Iraqi Government to pardon him and to release the other Barzan Chieftains and their followers now detained at Hilla. If this were done he pledged himself to keep the peace and maintain order. The composition of his letter was involved, but it was clear Mulla Mustafa sought to be left in undisturbed control of the Barzan tribal area. For the present I have thought it best not to continue the correspondence, but in a long talk which I had with Majid Mustafa, the new Kurdish Minister without Portfolio, on the 31st December, I explained Mulla Mustafa's attitude and discussed at length the chief aspects of the tribal situation in the North. Majid Mustafa indicated that his first aim would be to try to conclude an agreement which would end hostilities. He set out from Bagdad on the 1st January with the intention of going to Arbil to study the situation and to get into touch with many Kurdish Chiefs who are personal friends and thus to make direct contact with Mulla Mustafa. On the 5th January the officer commanding at Mergasur reported the receipt of a letter, in which Mulla Mustafa had stated that he would withdraw his men from the vicinity of Kani Rash and Mergasur, and would be pleased to meet Majid Mustafa at the latter place.

21. Colonel Bayliss (formerly of the Middle East Supply Centre) was appointed Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council and Director-General of Imports on the 22nd November with a staff of five officers, each of whom is in charge of a section of the reorganised Directorate-General of Imports with the title of Controller and with executive powers. At the instigation of Colonel Bayliss several new committees have been established including a Price Control Committee and a Traders Co-ordination Committee, Colonel Bayliss being chairman in each case. The second committee reflects the policy of the new directorate to keep in close touch with merchants, and to use trade channels as far as possible for distribution. The formation of a Joint Anglo-American-Iraqi Committee for the Co-ordination of Importing Supplies is under consideration, and may shortly be approved by the Government despite some opposition. Such a committee would, of course, facilitate tasks such as the screening of import requirements and the supervision of controls over imported goods. A further contemplated development is the establishment of a Ministry of Supply, in which supply organisations at present scattered over several Ministries will be concentrated. The further steps taken, since Colonel Bayliss's appointment, to control the prices of imported goods are best set out chronologically.

22. On the 25th November the Ministry of Finance published a notification calling upon all importers and wholesale and retail dealers in cotton and wollen goods of all kinds, both new and second hand, to register their stocks, and ordering the suspension of all wholesale dealing in those goods until further notice. A similar notification was published on the same day concerning tea and coffee.

23. On the 15th December a notification was published by the Price Control Committee fixing retail prices for the principal varieties of cotton cloth, grey cloth, white cloth, prints and flannelettes. This was followed soon afterwards by similar notifications fixing the prices of tea and coffee, second-hand clothing, certain steel building materials, carbon paper, typewriter ribbons and electric bulbs. Explanatory statements accompanied these notifications, making it clear in simple language their intention and scope, and calling upon the public to co-operate with the authorities in giving effect to the steps that were being taken to bring down prices. Heavy penalties were prescribed for retailers who refused to sell at the official prices.

24. At the same time the Ministry of Finance put out notifications subjecting all commercial imports, whether by land or sea (other than those of the Oil Companies holding concessions from the Iraqi Government) to licences and making it in addition necessary to obtain from the Director-General of Imports a

special permit for the release from Customs of all imported goods. The intention is to issue permits only when the Director-General is satisfied that the goods in question will be distributed at reasonable prices.

25. Tea and coffee were rationed with effect from the 1st January, the allowance being a monthly total of 90 grammes of both with a maximum of 60 grammes of tea for each member of a town family and 70 grammes a month for each member of a family living in the country with a maximum of 40 grammes of tea. It is too early yet to assess the efficacy of the scheme, but the first reaction of the public has been severe criticism of the small ration and the difficulty of securing rationed supplies immediately.

26. The general effect of these measures was, firstly to cause a large number of retailers to hide their stocks of controlled price goods, and secondly to bring about a run on those shops where the fixed prices were decently observed. In a few days tea, coffee and cloth of the controlled varieties were unobtainable in the bazaars of most towns and dealing was soon restricted to the black market where the prices rose rapidly. This state of affairs will, it may be hoped, be relieved so soon as arrangements are made for the proper distribution and sale of existing wholesale stocks which at present remain frozen. The most difficult problem will be equitable and efficient distribution especially in the provinces owing to the deterioration in the administrative machine mentioned in paragraph 13 above and the lack of experienced and honest supply officials. Despite directives to Mutasarrifs and explanatory statements in the press, there is inevitably much confusion over the rationing schemes, and it is being demonstrated once again that a scheme which is logical and carefully worked out on paper encounters many pitfalls and much obstruction in application in this country. Nevertheless Colonel Bayliss and his staff are tackling their difficult task with great energy and resource, so much so that their pace is at times proving too fast for the local tempo. It is, of course, highly important that they should be successful since we have to all intents and purposes imposed them on the Iraqis, and any failures on their part will reflect on British prestige here. Partly for this reason I am particularly glad to see that assistance is likely to be forthcoming over supplies of textiles from the United Kingdom and the United States to supplement the depleted local stocks and to facilitate the proposed rationing scheme. For the rest, neither I nor my staff have hesitated to advise Colonel Bayliss of the danger of "blitz" tactics in matters of this complexity and have at all times urged him to cultivate the assistance of the British advisers, the political advisory staff and other co-operative elements.

27. There is now more transport available for the movement of grain in the northern areas. On the Kurkuk-Sulaimani line progress has however been slow, largely owing to inadequate co-ordination between the supply and transport departments. Remedies are being applied, but it is to be feared that the available supplies of grain in these northern villages of the Sulaimani Liwa is far from sufficient for food and winter sowings.

28. The purchases of barley by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and their agents at the end of November, amounted to about 183,000 tons, and no further purchases have since been made pending conclusion of negotiations with one of the agents regarding additional purchases. At present, therefore, there is a balance of only 17,000 tons to make up the first target of 200,000 tons. Negotiations are proceeding on the assumption that substantial quantities can be bought at considerably lower prices than the present price of L.D. 20/500 per ton. Opinion is conflicting on this point. If, however, the time factor is disregarded and supply requirements permit the U.K.C.C. and/or the grain firms to play a waiting game it seems to be generally agreed that more barley could be secured at lower, but not drastically reduced, prices.

29. An official delegation representing the Syrian Government arrived in Bagdad on the 29th December. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jamil Mardam, led the delegation; the members were Abdul Rahman Kaiyali, Minister of Justice, Adnan Atassi, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Syrian Chamber, Ali Haidar al Rikabi, secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After a week's stay, during which they were the guests of honour at a large number of official and private functions, the delegation left Bagdad on the 7th January by rail to return home via Mosul and Aleppo.

30. According to Nuri Pasha his discussions with Jamil Mardam on Arab unity resulted in agreement between the two Premiers to work for the realisation of the Arab League envisaged in Nuri Pasha's letter to Mr. Casey last summer. I myself very much doubt, however, whether the Syrian Government are yet ready to go anything like so far towards federation as is contemplated in that document.

31. Mr. Loy W. Henderson presented his credentials as Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States on the 20th November. He is the first American Minister of this rank accredited to the Iraqi Government. His predecessors were only Ministers Resident. Relations with the American Legation continue to be most friendly and helpful.

32. Christmas provided numberless Iraqis with a new opportunity to express their good will towards their British Ally. Many subscribed handsomely to the fund which my wife and I opened to provide presents for the sailors, soldiers, airmen and merchant navy seamen in this command, hundreds sent telegrams and cards of greeting and good wishes to myself and members of my staff and official friendship was symbolised by a huge party given by the Prime Minister and the Iraqi Government to seven hundred British soldiers at the Town Hall, Bagdad. Addressing his guests the Prime Minister said "This happy gathering will I trust be a symbol of the unity and mutual understanding of our peoples which will endure long after this war has been brought to an end." The King and the Regent sent greetings and good wishes to the guests, and the Queen-Mother gave beautifully iced cakes for the Christmas party at Noah's Ark, one of the troops' restaurants run by voluntary workers from the British civil community. All these gestures were spontaneous expressions of friendly feeling, and make a happy contrast with the state of public opinion in this country at the beginning of 1941. At the same time, and while I do not doubt that Anglophobia is now at a heavy discount in educated circles, it may perhaps be wise to temper our satisfaction over this gratifying state of affairs by not forgetting that anxiety to be on the winning side is a striking feature of the Arab character.

33. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Angora, Tehran, Jedda and Beirut, the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Governor-General of India, General Headquarters India, General Headquarters, Middle East, Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Koweit and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

[E 1047/26/93]

No. 3.

Sir Kinahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th February)

(No. 57.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 1st February, 1944.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 74 of the 27th January, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a translation of Majid Mustafa's report to the Cabinet on the situation in Barzan, a copy of which he left with me after a recent visit.

2. His "Recommendations for Improving Conditions" have, he tells me, been accepted by the Cabinet in all essentials and he is himself ready to go back to the north in a few days' time to give personal attention to putting them into effect.

3. The somewhat difficult questions of the pardoning of Mulla Mustafa's followers and the surrender of the arms taken by them from the police are, as you will see from paragraph (e) of the Minister's paper, in effect left for future settlement. He himself is confident, however, of being able to recover in due course a considerable number of the weapons lost to the tribesmen. The subordinate leaders he hopes, I think, to have treated individually and sympathetically on their merits, after he has had time to study their records and sort out the sheep from the goats.

4. Meanwhile, he is thinking hard about what general measures are necessary to improve social and economic conditions in the Kurdish districts and is consulting the opinion of the Kurdish Deputies, the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, the Political Adviser, Northern Iraq, and others having special knowledge of Kurdish affairs.

5. If the vicissitudes of Iraq's political life allow him to remain at his post for a reasonable period, I hope that at least some measure of success will attend his efforts.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, Cairo.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Majid Mustafa's report to the Council of Ministers.

Barzan Question.

(Translation.)

I HAVE already orally communicated to the Council the result of my personal observations and my views as to how best to deal with the Barzan question. In my oral statements I pointed out that my exposition of the question did not cover all the problems and matters which called for examination and remedy throughout the north. Similarly, my present report is confined to a discussion of the Barzan question only. If required, I can on some other occasion submit another report dealing with other problems of the north.

Information available with certain official departments and other obtained from persons, other than officials, interested in or associated with the events (I in Barzan) indicate that the latest Barzan incident arose and developed as follows:—

1. Some time after the end of the first Barzan movement Mulla Mustafa al Barzani and the rest of Barzan leaders were removed to Sulaimani to reside there. Throughout their stay in Sulaimani they were so badly treated that the Government itself eventually felt that it was necessary to improve their condition. Owing to the smallness of their allowances and to the high cost of commodities the Mulla and his companions were in a state of extreme need. The Government, however, failed to do anything to improve their lot. Both the Government and most of those who came into contact with the exiles were aware that the latter had reached such a state of needfulness and financial hardship as was likely to induce them to resort to criminal acts. That such was the case is confirmed by certain statements of Mulla Mustafa himself in his numerous and strong representations and by certain reports. It was realised that failing any result to his representations Mulla Mustafa would be sure to attempt escape. At the same time fear from the Government and doubt of his succeeding in regaining personal control of his district, on one hand, and his brothers' opposition to his views, on the other hand, were among the stronger factors which at the time restrained Mulla Mustafa from carrying out his project. Eventually, however, bad administration in the northern liwas and the underlying factors afforded opportunity to many, including Mulla Mustafa, to decide their future by themselves. Feeling confident of the success of his contemplated attempt and having fallen into despair, Mulla Mustafa eventually made his escape.

2. Mulla Mustafa succeeded in reaching the Barzan district within a short time of his escape from Sulaimani. For some time he kept moving about the district, avoiding armed clashes and at the same time seeking to get into touch with the administrative authorities for the purpose of obtaining what he had been seeking to obtain while in exile. To that end he made threats with his ability to raise a force with which to offer resistance to the Government and with the harm that would follow if no attention was paid to his representations.

3. In their inability to appreciate the situation and the likely consequences, the administrative and police authorities in the Mosul and Arbil liwas did not attach due importance to the matter, nor did they take preparatory steps for the suppression of Mulla Mustafa's movement before assuming serious proportions.

The administrative authorities also failed to take into due account factors of which advantage was taken by Mulla Mustafa, and which proved helpful to him, such as the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants with the Government and with the acts and conduct of officials. As a result, the prestige of Mulla Mustafa grew and he gained general support. It was established to me that throughout his period of office and throughout the operations in their various stages the Mutassarif of Mosul never made one single visit to Barzan district. The same

is true in the case of the Mutessarif of Arbil. It is natural that other officials and the police should copy the example of these two mutessarifs. Strange as it may seem, I found out that grain allotted for the inhabitants of hill districts, as assistance for food and cultivation purposes, remained undistributed; whereas this grain could have been distributed as means for stopping a no small number of tribes from joining the movement. Moreover, I came to understand that the usual allotments of grain and sugar for that district were not reaching those to whom they are intended, except, however, in the case of certain favoured persons. I do not relate these facts by way of criticising any person in particular, but do so only in order to prove the neglect on the part of officials, in the liwas and districts, in matters of State administration and supervision of the conduct of junior officials and matters concerning the condition of the inhabitants. Many other factors and also considerable propaganda exist which have considerably helped to increase the followers of Mulla Mustafa and sympathy with his cause, and encouraged the Mulla and his followers to persist in their rebel activities. I must here point out in particular one strong factor which has worked to strengthen the determination of the Mulla and his followers to resist. This was the initial failure on the part of the police to prove themselves an organised Government force.

4. Both at the outbreak of the movement and in the course of its development the central Government failed to establish unity of command and responsibility (I in the force detailed to suppress the movement—translator), and as a result confusion characterised actions and views.

5. To summarise, the present conditions in the north in general and in the Barzan district in particular are bad. That the case is so is the result of misconduct, careless thinking and lack of sense of responsibility on the part of responsible "Government men" (I statesmen) and Government officials in the liwas and at headquarters. Therefore, I suggest that it would be wise for the Government to deal with the present situation by stopping further errors and rectifying old ones, and in their conduct of affairs to seek radical reforms calculated to yield for them results such as would not force upon them difficulties and sacrifices both moral and material. Before making any recommendations I give the Government below a concise general idea of present conditions in the Barzan district:—

- (a) Villages are empty of their inhabitants, some being in a state of ruin.
- (b) No trace of cultivation is to be found throughout the whole district.
- (c) Famine and destitution prevail among the inhabitants on a horrible scale.
- (d) Roads and means of communication are destroyed. So also are most Government buildings. The few undestroyed buildings are occupied by the army.
- (e) Sympathy with the exiled chiefs is considerable. This sympathy is among the main factors rallying the tribes to Mulla Mustafa and his leadership.
- (f) The complaints of the population are numerous. The people constantly enumerate the misdeeds of officials and their mishandling of situations.
- (g) I met Mulla Mustafa and the other chiefs clung to him. I found them (I still intent on) keeping themselves armed and not confident in the promises of the Government on account of their past experience of mal-administration and violation of promises. They told me that they had embarked on their rough course only because they had felt compelled to do so. They assured me of their loyalty to the Throne and the Government and of their willingness faithfully and devotedly to serve both. They said they placed their fate with the Government and her justice. I promised them that all would be well for them if they surrendered themselves unconditionally. Thereupon they gave in and went out to the Merga Sar garrison (house) and surrendered themselves, as verbally reported to you by me. I then called upon them to carry out the following terms:—

Firstly.—Armed clashes to be given up and the siege of posts and garrisons to be raised.

Secondly.—Quick co-operation to be given to the Government for the repair of roads and telephone lines.

Thirdly.—They, together with their families and livestock, to go back to their villages, there to engage in their normal vocations.

Fourthly.—Good relations should be established with army commanders and other officials in the district.

Fifthly.—They are to co-operate with the Government for the expeditious restoration of such posts as it may be decided to re-establish.

Sixthly.—Mulla Mustafa to keep away from the zone of operations; to calmly pursue his normal work, refraining from meddling in matters which are not his concern; to proceed to Bagdad, there to give himself up to His Highness the Regent in person, as soon as I shall be able to obtain the assent of His Highness to this arrangement.

I detailed three officers belonging to tribes of the district to observe the working of things and submit reports to me about the district pending a Cabinet decision in the affair. Information received hitherto confirms that the terms set out above have been observed and no action in contravention of them has taken place. It is likely for us to be confronted with some future difficulties. I, however, believe that any likely future difficulties could be overcome and peace established throughout the district if regard is had to my previous statements and the following recommendations which I make:—

Recommendations for Improving Conditions.

It may be suggested that disciplinary action against the district and re-establishment of tranquillity in it by force of arms and through imposition of fines on ringleaders might be advantageous and would serve to restore Government prestige. Ordinarily, such suggestions would appeal to me, but conditions in the district are at present such as make me opposed to it in principle. Other considerations to be taken account of are the rugged nature of the district, the impossibility of the Government attaining the object sought by them through the use of force, the unavailability of forces for the purpose, and the considerable number of the rebels, the unity of leadership they enjoy and their noticeable determination and preparedness to fight at present in view of their having evacuated their villages.

The idea may be put forward that the use of armed force might be conveniently put off to spring time. To this I would say that such postponement will make the matter more difficult, as it will enable the tribes to secure shelters and food and climatic conditions suitable for them, besides a likely increase in the number of rebels, an expansion of the rebel movement and a more complicated situation arising. For the foregoing reasons, I suggest that the following steps should be taken even in the event of a decision to settle the affair by force of arms:—

- (a) The exiled Barzan chiefs to be set free, regardless of the rebel movement and the present situation. Such step is calculated to benefit the Government in two directions as follows:—

Firstly.—It will create dissension among their ranks and undermine the leadership. For, although Mulla Mustafa, Shaikh Ahmad and Mulla Sadiq are brothers and although the first-mentioned openly pleads the cause of the latter two and exerts himself on their behalf, at no time the three were agreed in their views and they are constantly at dispute, each seeking exclusive power for himself.

Secondly.—With the return (home) of the exiled chiefs no common object to claim or seek will remain.

- (b) Immediate steps to be taken for the re-establishment of civil administration in the localities affected by the rebel movement, and suitable officials appointed to these localities. This will serve to re-establish (! Government) relations with tribes with no allegiance to the Shaikhs of Barzan and the influence of the latter will shrink in consequence.
- (c) Funds as necessary and on a liberal scale to be allotted for the repair of existing telephone lines and roads, the laying of telephone lines and roads from Belleh to Amadiyah and Agra, and the construction of strong posts along these roads, in order to ensure Government control and the association of the inhabitants of the district with the larger towns. Labour for the purpose to be obtained from the district itself with the initial object of establishing connexions of material benefit between the Government and the local population.
- (d) Food supplies already decided upon for distribution to be distributed expeditiously free of cost or at reduced prices, and also further quantities of such supplies to be allotted, in order that the inhabitants should feel the benefits of the presence of Government organisations in their midst.

With the help of the British, who will be properly acting with justice and mixing with the inhabitants directly, the civil administration would be able to control the district, pursue offenders, collect arms, and remove, either temporarily or permanently, such persons as it may be necessary to remove.

- (f) Mulla Mustafa to be directed to come over to Bagdad, where his surrender to His Highness the Regent should be accepted. Some time after which the Mulla to be allowed to return in order to remove suspicions held by the people on account of previous violation by the Government of her promises and pledges to the people.

I feel confident that, if the carrying out of the above recommendations should fail to secure our object in full within a limited space of time, it will not fail to lay open for us wider opportunity for future action for the suppression of the spirit of rebellion, on one hand, and the establishment of orderly and just administration, on the other hand. Rebellion will be eventually confined to certain specific localities and we shall be able to ensure the co-operation of neighbouring localities.

MAJID MUSTAFA
Minister without Portfolio

19th January 1944

E 1143/37 98)

No. 4

Sir Kinnahan Cornwallis to Mr. Eden—(Received 19th February)

(N. 69)

Bagdad, 8th February, 1944

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, in accordance with a request made by you in 1943, which has been prepared by Mr. G. H. Thompson, counsellor to this embassy.

2. I am in entire agreement with the views expressed by Mr. Thompson in the concluding two paragraphs of the enclosed paper.

3. Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India.

I have &c

KINNAHAN CORNWALLIS

Enclosure in No. 4

Political Review 1943

General

IRAQ provided little material for sensational head lines in 1943. With the exception of the Barzan troubles, to which further reference will be made, and the usual minor (but sometimes murderous) inter-tribal affrays of no political importance, internal order was well maintained. Relations between the British and Indian troops and the local population remained satisfactory. Although steadily rising prices imposed considerable difficulties on the urban populations especially, and upon officials and others in receipt of fixed incomes, a plentiful harvest of 1942-43, and the fact that the country was a whole a remarkable level of domestic prosperity. Except in neglected and remote Kurdish areas there was no unemployment and no starvation. The sudden accumulation of wealth, coupled with restricted imports, inevitably resulted in widespread speculation and soaring prices, and, owing to the impact of the high cost of living on the fixed income groups, corruption attained an all-time high. The persistent political squabbling and intrigues in high places reacted seriously upon an administrative machine insufficiently geared, in any case, to cope with unforeseen and novel economic problems arising from the war. As the months passed these problems of supply and distribution became more acute. In June the Administration, who in the previous October, under the influence of the then Minister of Finance, Saleh Jabr, had refused to contemplate such action, officially sought our help in recruiting a British expert who would function as Director-General of Imports and Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council,

it being understood that he and his staff would enjoy executive powers. Unfortunately serious delays occurred in finding a candidate for this important post, and it was not until towards the end of the year that Colonel Bayliss was obtained from the Middle East Supply Centre. A British officer, Colonel Le Blanc, had already earlier in the year been appointed Director-General of Transport and is still at work. In the summer a British official (Mr. Grice) became Director General of Local Products, one of his most important tasks being the application of the Cereals Control Scheme. In the purely political sphere General Nuri al Said remained Prime Minister throughout the year, and in doing so presided over several different Cabinets, each of which, however, contained personnel common to its predecessors. As the year waned his Excellency was being subjected to greater criticism than at any time since 1941 and the political horizon was distinctly clouded, with the Regent showing every sign of wanting a new deal not only in Iraqi politicians, but also in British advisers. Fortified by new and increased powers conferred upon the throne by the new Organic Law enacted in the autumn, His Majesty was expected to participate actively in the breaking and making of Cabinets. There is much to be admired in an attitude that reflects the Regent's patriotism and public spirit, at a time when it is so difficult to inspire confidence. In all these varied circumstances, the rôle of His Majesty's Embassy has been to act as a brake in matters political, advising steadiness and caution rather than rash experimentation and as an accelerator in things urging consistently the need for constructive action in lieu of inaction. As 1943 passed into history, no dispute ruffled the placid surface of the Iraqi scene. The war effort had been acquired to the limits specified, and the policy of the Iraqi Royal House and Administration, headed by Nuri Pasha, continued to be one of full co-operation with the British ally in all essential directions.

Iraq Enters the War

2. At midnight on the 16th January Iraq became an active participant in the Allied struggle against Nazi Fascist world revolution. A few days later she acceded to the United Nations Pact signed at Washington on the 2nd January, 1942.

3. Nuri Pasha would have liked to have taken these steps a year or so earlier. Allied reverses in 1942, and the general uncertainty of the situation until the tide turned against the Axis at El Alamein and Stalingrad, made it desirable to wait and see. When the moment finally came, the decision to enter the war aroused no opposition, but small enthusiasm. It was preceded by ten days or more of a press and radio campaign stressing the great benefits certain to accrue to Iraq from belligerency and there was much ado, in particular, about the Atlantic Charter. Nothing was said in all this propaganda about the new obligations Iraq assumed as a member of the United Nations, so that in ensuing weeks it proved necessary to remind the Prime Minister and other personalities of realities in this connexion, the columns of the *Iraq Times* and *Buena Times* also being used for this purpose. Once the masses in the towns, and particularly in Bagdad, had grown accustomed to the idea of involvement in the war—which, in the absence of any reaction on the part of the enemy, they did fairly rapidly—they probably gave the subject but few thoughts. To a great many other persons, however, including tribal leaders and the more solid elements who had remained quiescent in 1941, so that Rashid Ali then failed to enjoy anything like the major support he had expected. No doubt, however, was at least a partial atonement for the tragic errors of two years previously. It would be too much to expect that this feeling should make the idea of loss and sacrifice in the cause attractive, and it is, in fact, fortunate that, except for minor discomforts, the country has not so far been called upon to bear a very grave burden. Few men or women who are normal beings like war and it would be unnatural, indeed, if people as a whole here failed to register satisfaction that the threat of invasion, which in the summer of 1942 was so acute, has since receded almost to vanishing point.

4. While in certain unthinking quarters Iraq's declaration of war was greeted with the "loud guffaw that bespeaks the vacant mind," the event in fact caused a considerable impression throughout the Middle East and certainly redounded to our credit. In Egypt it created considerable surprise and annoyance for a time, chiefly because it seemed that somehow Iraq had stolen a

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No. 5

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th March.)

No. 111,

Bagdad, 14th March 1944

At the fourth paragraph of my telegram N 157 of 11 June 1944 I mentioned that the Regent had drawn up a long document setting out the lines on which he wished the Government to work

2 I have since had time to study this paper and to discuss it with His Royal Highness. It is divided into three parts, the first of which contains proposals for the improvement of a particular part of the administration in the political customs of the country. It is not a succinctly drafted paper, and in pursuing often leaves His Royal Highness a perfect blank, and what is in doubt. I am not therefore troubling you, Sir, with the full text, which would be tedious to read, but instead I shall endeavour to give you an outline of its contents. It is divided into three parts, the first of which contains proposals for the improvement of a particular part of the administration in the political customs of the country. It is not a succinctly drafted paper, and in pursuing often leaves His Royal Highness a perfect blank, and what is in doubt. I am not therefore troubling you, Sir, with the full text, which would be tedious to read, but instead I shall endeavour to give you an outline of its contents.

3 The first three paragraphs of His Royal Highness's paper deal respectively with the

It is his country to benefit from the services of British experts.

and relations with limitrophe States and to the necessity of leaving nothing undone to that end and, finally, declares that he regards the policy of Arab unity not as a limitation upon Iraqi sovereignty nor upon the rights of minorities in this country but as a means of promoting solidarity among all the Arab peoples. I see nothing to criticize in these three paragraphs--on the contrary.

4. The fourth paragraph discusses the improvement of the police, including the army and the police. His Royal Highness deplores the corruption and inefficiency which now discredit these services, and makes several proposals. These include the repeal of the Civil Service (Conduct) Act, 1917, and the Police (Conduct) Act, 1917, and the introduction of a new law to govern the police, and the introduction of a new law to govern the army. He further discusses the need for a new law to govern the police, and the need for a new law to govern the army.

5. I pointed out to His Royal Highness in the course of my audience on the 11th March the dislocation which the adoption of his proposals would cause. I agreed that the laws in question stood in need of revision, but their defects were already well known, and it appeared unnecessary, and indeed most undesirable, to have a period of five years' uncertainty. I therefore suggested that a strong committee should be appointed to study each of these laws and that he himself, in making known his wishes, should abstain from entering into unnecessary detail. It would, I thought, be enough for him to state shortly the ill-affecting the public services and to propose the setting up of strong official committees to study remedies. His Royal Highness seemed disposed to accept this idea.

6. The Regent's fifth paragraph proposes the equalising of army and civil pensions. I am fully satisfied that at the present time the scheme is sound in principle, but I have warned His Royal Highness that there will be trouble if any reductions in army pensions are made retrospective.

7 Paragraph 6 calls for more control over the army to be given to the King in order to stop political activity among the officers. His Royal Highness explained to me that it was not his idea to alter in any way the Constitution, nor does he hanker at all for dictatorial powers, but he feels that Royal agreement should be sought in many matters concerning which decisions now lay within the power of the Ministry of Defense. He thought that this end could be secured by a suitable amendment of the Regulations of the Ministry. He said that he wanted to keep in close touch with the head of the British Military Mission, and to ensure that the latter's advice were followed.

8. Paragraphs 7 and 8 were followed by His Highness's wails capricious grants of State property to influential people to be shown him his nobility and to be the rights of the cultivators and bringing distribution under the light of full publicity. He also urges that a constructive financial policy should be laid down for the development and exploitation of State lands. I regard both proposals as good and well-timed, and I also note with pleasure that His Royal Highness advocates the improvement and expansion of urban and inter-urban transportation and the protection of public enterprises. I agree with State assistance. In a neglected and primitive country such as this it is useless to rely upon private initiative and investment for internal development of this nature. The State must show the way and at any rate in the beginning, provide much of the capital which in turn implies official planning and control. The ninth paragraph of the Regent's paper advocates the creation of a Supply Ministry and a Ministry of Agriculture. The Cabinet are already studying a law creating a Ministry of Supply but, regarding a Ministry of Agriculture, I have pointed out to the Amir that although this idea is all right in principle, such a Ministry should not, I consider, be set up before the Ministry of Supply had got into its stride. Even then the plan would need careful consideration from the point of view of staff, since I doubted whether the requisite officials were at present available, and a Ministry of Agriculture staffed with incompetent and inexperienced men could do great harm. The paper goes on to propose a "five-year plan" for irrigation, to be accompanied by the encouragement of the immigration of Arab settlers from neighbouring countries to provide labour for the new areas to be brought under cultivation. This idea appears to me excellent, and I have encouraged the Regent to go ahead with it.

9 Paragraph 11 discusses the reorganization of elementary primary and secondary education. The Regent's ideas are, I fear, ill-digested and amateurish, but I believe I can persuade him not to press them on the Cabinet before he and I have had time to consult Mr Ritchie, the newly appointed British advisor to the Ministry of Education.

10 The paper concludes with a somewhat jejune advocacy of the advantages of political parties in a democratic State. A promise that encouragement would be given to the formation of such parties was included in the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the present Parliament, but none have yet been formed and His Royal Highness has, I think, the idea that Nuri is being obstructive. This may be so, but on the other hand it does not appear that any of the more important members of the single party have yet sought permission to form parties. I should perhaps take a leaf from Mr. Russell's words, "I want to assure me that he is not in favour of the single party State, as in Turkey. In this I believe his views to be well-founded."

11. Taking the programme as a whole, there is much sound sense in it, and I have told the Regent so. It is a good sign that he should take an interest in all

these things. I have pointed out to him, however, that it covers a great deal of ground and warned him that he must not

12. There are at least two subjects of importance which to my regret found no place in the Regent's draft, namely—

(a) public health, and (b) decentralisation

As regards the former, an early improvement in the Ministry of Social Affairs is vitally necessary. If there were adequate medical facilities within reach of all and if more attention could be devoted to the physical and mental health of the

[illegible][illegible]

14. Forwarding copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident at Basra, His Majesty's High Commissioner for the Persian Gulf, and to the Political Agent at Kuwait, the Political Agent at Muscat, the Government of India, and to His Majesty's consular officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have, &c

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

Enclosure in No. 5

[illegible]

2. Foreign policy, in so far as it concerns the Anglo-Iraq alliance, rests on three fundamental factors. —

Firstly.—The development of good relations between Iraq and her allies with whom Iraq is bound by the Atlantic Charter

Secondly—The establishment and maintenance of friendship between Iraq and limitrophe States and the removal of obstructions which limit (the scope of) these relations.

Thirdly—The combatting of any tyranny established or to be established, by the Axis Powers, the wiping out of any (remaining) influence of Nazism in Iraq, and the prevention of any further Axis influence in Iraq, in order to prevent Iraq from becoming a base for Axis operations in the Middle East, and from being used by the Axis to disturb its peace or corrupt the spirit and morals of its people.

2. The Arab alliance policy is not held by Iraq merely as a (plank of) foreign policy but as the very essence of domestic action among all Arabs: a special policy is envisaged and is well defined in the political domain. Iraq however does not object to the adoption of a common policy by the Arab League. It is on the contrary that Iraq is always ready to work for the Arab League to be able to take any decision which may be necessary for the Arabs of Iraq and for the Arabs of the Arab League. Iraq is ready to work for the Arab League to be able to take any decision which may be necessary for the Arabs of Iraq and for the Arabs of the Arab League. Iraq is ready to work for the Arab League to be able to take any decision which may be necessary for the Arabs of Iraq and for the Arabs of the Arab League.

(A) Miscellaneous:

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No. 6

Tour in Bukhara, Chahor Mahol, Ferrihan, Klumain, At Gudare and
Tulpariyen.—(Received 6th January, 1944.)

12th Indian Division Mobile Dispensary Report No. 4

(Secret.)

General.—During the first half of September the officer in command of the expedition, Mr. H. M. ... on a horse back with his Westerns (Chehar Mahal and in Bakhtiari country north of the Zarden kuh. Travelling as guests of Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, the party was accompanied by his third son Amir Rahmat Khan and by the Khan's ... the Bakhtiari ... Babai tribes, and by Dr. Foylesskuf, a Persian irrigation engineer.

Sick were treated among the Babadi and Baba Ahmed and ...
Shah Abbas's attempt to divert the headwaters of the Karun river into the
Zayendeh Rud, and to the Tang-e Garzi, where it is proposed to construct a
dam or the latter river ...
which crashed last January, but attempts to locate the box ...

During the third week of September the unit was delayed in Isfahan

During late September and October the unit accompanied His Majesty's Government officials, doctors and the more important landowners were contacted and sick were treated in twenty five villages on thirty different occasions. Six days were spent with part of the Mahmud Saleh and Moghul tribes of the Chitral

General Conditions Encountered—Coming into this country from S. and E. and N. and W. and by the sturdiness of the people. The absence or paucity of malaria consequent on the higher altitudes and on the lower rainfall which has led to the tibetan system of irrigation is an important factor in determining these differences. Also only tough mountain races are able to withstand the extreme rigours of winter, a fact which must have influenced Shah Abbas when he organised a mass migration of Armenians, Georgians and Turks etc.

The degree of prosperity or destitution varies from village to village and is determined by a number of factors. In some villages the land is so fertile and the weather so favorable that the peasants can afford to live in comfort. In other villages the soil is so poor and the weather so unfavorable that the peasants are forced to live in poverty. The degree of prosperity or destitution is also determined by the degree of feudalism. In some villages the landlord is a "big game" who lives there in feudal style and concerns himself in the welfare of his people, protecting them by his rifle, a formidable weapon of violence. He will provide them with such amenities as a public bath, will take an interest in the sick and pay their expenses to hospital, will take care of the education of their children. In other villages the landlord is a "small game" who is more concerned with his own pocket than with the welfare of his people. He will feed them only when it is to his advantage, will not take any interest in their education, and will not pay their expenses to hospital. The degree of prosperity or destitution is also determined by the degree of social organization. In some villages the peasants are organized into a strong community, which will protect them from the landlord and will help them in their struggles. In other villages the peasants are not organized and are therefore at the mercy of the landlord. The degree of prosperity or destitution is also determined by the degree of social justice. In some villages the peasants are treated with all the outward signs of respect by the villagers. Whether he is rich or poor, he is treated with the same respect. In other villages the peasants are treated with contempt and are regarded as the lowest of the low. The degree of prosperity or destitution is also determined by the degree of social progress. In some villages the peasants are living in a state of social progress, with all the amenities of modern life. In other villages the peasants are living in a state of social backwardness, with all the hardships of a primitive life.

Unfortunately the feudal ideal is seldom approached. The majority of privately-owned villages are in the hand of part-time or whole-time absentee

In Fereidan most are owned either by the leading villagers themselves or by a number of outside parties. Such villages may be fairly wealthy and prosperous, but unless a major share is owned by someone of influence they may suffer from the lack of a protector to push forward their interests. The Armenians in Fereidan with their remarkable corporate spirit are fairly well capable of looking after themselves.

Corruption.—So much does bribery enter into every transaction that an honest man finds no place in public affairs. A "straight" official is "a spoke in the wheel" because he interrupts the whole mechanism of bribery, both above him and below him, and every attempt is made by false accusations to remove him. Hence the majority, whether they like it or not, and however good their intentions, are forced to succumb to the system. Pages could be filled with the ways in which a Bakshdar is able to feather his nest from those under him, and one hears of quite minor officials, such as a corporal of the gendarmes, acquiring large fortunes in the space of less than a year. Some of the best people refuse to engage in public affairs, retiring to their villages and perhaps hoping for an opportunity to quit the country, for which they see no future after the war.

The false accusation is used by the unscrupulous as a means of removing rivals in office or of damaging the interests of enemies or neighbouring land-owners. Small fortunes will be spent on telegrams to high officials and on scurrilous pamphlets and propaganda, there being no law of libel whereby the unfortunate accused can clear his name. Genuine complaints become lost in a sea of lies, and arrival at the truth is a problem for the judicial expert.

The Army

The army in the Chelhar Mahal and Fereidan is demoralised and finished as a fighting force. Officials like Mortezā Qulī Khān and his Bakshdars rely upon their own tofaughis and sowars to enforce their will, with a nominal force of Persian army in the background. In villages like Akhūsh Bala, until recently the headquarters of a battalion, the army drained the population of supplies without payment, spread venereal disease by the habit of taking temporary wives and gave no security to neighbouring villages against Bakhtiari thieves and raiders. The general opinion is that nowadays military operations against the tribes serve only to arm the latter at the expense of the soldiery.

The state of the army is not surprising in the light of the iniquitous methods by which conscription is enforced, and the way in which the wretched conscripts are treated. If sick or injured, they are not brought to the hospital but are called up. If they refuse they may be ordered to proceed to Tehran for medical examination (although a doctor is available on the spot) in the hope that the prospect of the cost and discomfort of the journey will extract the necessary money. If they die on the way no one will care or worry. Lucky the conscript who receives his 12 rials a month, and hungry the one who refuses to steal for his meals. Eventually he will be discharged dirty disillusioned and cynical, and as likely as not sick from venereal disease.

Синтез

What little was seen of the gendarmerie was sufficient to confirm all previous impressions about them. Whether it be their slovenly untidiness or the men themselves, one feels that they have been recruited from the dirtiest scallywags and scoundrels that could be found.

Description of Areas Visited

(n) *Bailetiara*

Several tribes were visited north of the great mountain barrier which separates the Bakhtiari Pusht-i-Kuh to the south from the Chehar Mahal. From the A. G. Lang, streets to the north. It was a surprise and unsympathetic military governorships, the two rival sects of Haft Lang and Chehar Lang are now joined together for the first time since Reza Shah under the experienced rule of Morteza Quli Khan of the Ilkhami family of Haft Lang.

of sowars and tofangehis, who swagger about armed in the villages, and in the attempts their Khans are making to restore their old properties, some of which were bought by Khunsaris.

Scattered among Turki and Bakhtiari are twenty-four Armenian and nine Georgian villages. The Armenians are a genuine Persian people. The Turks and Caucasians were transplanted there by Shah Abbas at the beginning of the 17th century. The Turks, who still speak Turki, impress one as being taller, "rouser" and healthier than nearby Persians, especially the women, although in other ways they are little different from their neighbours. The easy-going Georgians, whose nine villages centre round Akhureh Bala in the west, were converted two centuries ago by the Mullahs of Shah Sultan Hussein, since when, whilst retaining their language, they have lost much of their individuality by inter-marriage with Moslems of other races. However, many are rosy-faced with a sprinkling of fair and blue-eyed, and some of their carpets are distinctly Caucasian in design. Their homes are substantially built and well embellished with woodwork, some of which is carved. Some of their Khans are men of influence and have a backing of sowars. Akhureh Bala serves as a market centre for the Bakhtiari tribes to the south, and has until recently harboured a Bakhshdar and a large garrison. An account of the Armenians in the Fereidan is being appended to the next report.

Fereidan is a rich granary and supplies Isfahan with part of its needs. The Government share of the crop is being collected by contractors, all of whom are local landowners, some with an armed backing like the Salar Shuja and Mohamed Ali Mardani, hence the usual tales of injustice and partiality are heard. By bribing the collectors some owners are able to retain most of their wheat, hoarding and selling it at a handsome profit in the bazaars if it can be smuggled to Nejasabad or Isfahan. To offset this tendency those who bring forward their wheat are rewarded by a proportionate allotment of monopoly goods such as tea (in theory) is confiscated by the Government without payment.

Carpets are woven in every village, and a high quality arak is distilled by the Armenians from sour green grapes and exported as far as India. Excellent potatoes are raised in the west, but the Moslem population is prejudiced against them, which is a pity as any amount could be grown. A similar reluctance is shown by Moslems to adopt oxen for drawing carts, a system of transport which is successfully exploited in most Armenian villages.

(c) Gulpaigan and Khunsar

Although Gulpaigan is the seat of a farmandar who governs a small district in which Khunsar is included, the latter is more important both in size of population and in the number of villages. The Khunsaris, who resent being governed from Gulpaigan, point out that their affluence lies more with Isfahan than with Gulpaigan and Sultanabad, as the bulk of their trade is with the East and with Northern Fereidan, for which Khunsar is the main market. Recently, when the election findings having just been announced with the result that Dr Shahidi, sore from the defeat at the hands of his opponent from Gulpaigan, was comforting himself with the usual complaints that the votes had been tampered with.

Gulpaigan and its satellite villages lie among fruit gardens in an otherwise exposed plain which suffers from a shortage of water which an elaborate system of ghanats is unable to offset. Besides wheat, opium and fruit, some cotton is grown. Much of the population is employed in the infant industries which is greater than a 6000-foot altitude would suggest.

Khunsar, the centre of a Bakhshdar, is strung out amidst orchards and greenery, in one of the most beautiful and well-watered valleys in Persia, separated from Fereidan by the great Khunsar range through a gap in which a well-trodden trade route passes. Among its exports are dried fruits, nuts, timber, gaz, wooden spoons, carpets, honey and castor oil. The gaz, a form of manna, is collected from the leaves of a wild tamarisk bush from which it exudes and is shaken off in autumn. Mixed with sugar, pistachios and a little white of egg, it is made into a sweetmeat which is exported to other parts of Persia. The sherbet spoons, carved from pear-wood for which Khunsar used to be famed, are now of the crudest workmanship. Wood carving and painting, like other arts, has degenerated and can only now be seen in the fine wooden ceilings of the older houses, whose panels are gaily painted with a variety of floral and animal designs.

To invest wealth and to offset the local shortage of corn, enough of which cannot be cultivated in so narrow a valley, a number of Khunsar merchants acquired land in Fereidan, bought cheaply from Bakhtiari and other exiles during the late Shah's reign. They are now finding difficulty in removing their corn, Bakhtiari rifles proving more powerful than their protests, and are inclined to sell back properties to their former owners.

(d) Khumain

The broad mountain valleys of Khumain would largely be desert were it not for the ghanats on the upkeep of which the whole fertility of the land depends. The people are a mixture of Turki and Persian with a few Armenian villages scattered about. They are hardy and have to struggle for a living in a climate only less severe than that of Fereidan, but largely free from malaria. A big proportion of the villages is privately owned, many by absentee landlords whose interests lie in Sultanabad, rather than in the country. Oppression from officials is extreme.

(e) Ali Gudarz

This district, which comes under Sultanabad for administrative and under Khorramabad for military purposes, was visited in its northern, eastern and south-western portions. In the north, around Dum-i-Siah, is some of the richest "daim" land in Persia. As one follows the railway from Azna towards Doroud along the Marhorn River the water supply is swelled by springs from the Ushleran massif and allows the growing of rice. This is the eastern border of the "red" malaria belt which extends west across Luristan. Many of the villages in this district are situated on the north of Ushleran Kuh.

Treatment was given in one of these Lur villages owned by Hamid Khan Bakhtiari of the Haji Ikhtari family of Haft Lang. Only since the departure of Reza Shah have he and others of his family been allowed to return to their villages, which have been subjected to unrestrained oppression during their absence, with a consequent falling off in the area under cultivation. In our party was the son of a Minister in the late Cabinet with whom the Kadkhuda had an amusing altercation. "It is not often," said the latter, "that such an important person comes to visit us. We will hold you as hostage until you give back the money and property which your father and the Government have stolen from us. Where is it?" When at the outset I told him we were only visitors, he was puzzled and could find no answer, whilst our host, Hamid Khan, tactfully changed the conversation.

The eastern Ali Gudarz area has been mentioned under the Chehar Lang Bakhtiari. If the numerous complaints we heard can be believed, oppression from the Bakhshdar and Government officials at Ali Gudarz rests heavily upon the whole of their area, whilst the Government wheat collector has acquired a stupendous fortune.

(f) Chehar Mahak

As this district is being visited again, it will be described in the next report.

Public Relations and Propaganda Value

There is no doubt that, until fairly recently, the majority of Persians were committed against the British cause and that, though much of this feeling has now been neutralised or driven underground by the recent changes in the fortunes of the war, a very appreciable anti-British feeling still exists. From conversation with friendly and enlightened Persians it is borne out that our initial support of Reza Shah has been distorted among the people into an idea that we approved of all his later doings and are therefore the cause of all the suffering which he brought about. This idea has found general acceptance among the masses, and has been skilfully played upon by enemy propagandists, both before and during the war. Again, when we entered the country in 1941 the release of the late Shah's restrictions gave rise to short-lived hopes that the millennium was at hand, instead of which conditions have steadily deteriorated. The people cannot believe that we are not directly responsible for this state of affairs, holding to a fixed opinion that, as we have entered the country, we are therefore, behind the scenes, if not openly, the approvers of all that goes on.

There is no doubt that the [redacted] can respond at once to opportunities of free trade in foreign goods. It is sometimes a puzzle for do-dit if a desire for further trade exists or not whenever one returns to them.

[27851]

was not made up to induce the President to leave his own mission for that of the Soviets, it was invented by the Soviet security authorities to show that it is not only the British security authorities who can discover plots. The latter, it is true, discovered not only a plot but the plotters as well, but you can't always have everything.

At the Moscow Conference the British and American representatives had made a great effort to secure agreement on the issue of a declaration which would reassure Persia as to the intentions of the Allies, but it was wrecked by the determined opposition of the Soviet delegates. This became known to the Shah and the Prime Minister apparently through the Americans here, who, however, also stated that in the course of the conference the Russians had made known their intention to remove their troops after the war in accordance with the terms of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty. On the 20th November when Mr Eden called on the Prime Minister, M. Sobelky stated that Tehran was expecting that some communiqué relating to Persia would appear as a result of the conference. The communiqué, he suggested, should (1) recognise that Persia had done her best to help the Allies, (2) confirm the assurances in the Tripartite Treaty of January 1942 as to the integrity and independence of Persia; and (3) say something about economic assistance. A

minor appeal was made by the Shah when Mr Churchill called on him. The Persians already knew that the British and the Americans were both sympathetic and that all they had to do was to secure the assent of the Russians. In the cordial atmosphere of the conference this assent was obtained, and a declaration embodying the three points was eventually issued. This declaration gave the greatest satisfaction to the Shah, the Persian Government and the Persian people, who seemed to attach almost as much importance to the recognition of their services (mainly afforded grudgingly under pressure) and their sufferings (largely the result of Persian incompetence and venality) as to the renewed guarantee by the British and Russians of Persian territorial integrity and political independence and its endorsement by the Americans, though there was certainly a feeling of relief that the Allies, who had been half expected to "carve up" Persia, should have, on the contrary, given the most specific assurances to the contrary.

4. It was agreed that the declaration about Persia should be published at the same time as the main declaration drawn up at the conference, viz. 2000 hours Moscow time (2030 hours Tehran time) on the 6th December, and every copy held by the Allies, whether in English or in Russian, was headed by a warning in that sense. In the event a Persian translation of the declaration appeared early on the morning of the 6th December in the Persian newspaper, *Friend of Persia*, which is published by the Soviet Embassy. The embassy, who failed to inform either the British or the United States Legation beforehand, declared that publication was forced upon them by the news that the Persian Government was about to issue the declaration. This is untrue. On the 4th December the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that he intended to publish the declaration next day, promised at least to delay the appearance of the Soviet newspaper until midday to give the Government time to announce the declaration at a meeting of Ministers, Deputies and officials at 1030, and then had the newspaper in the hands of the public by 0900 o'clock. This piece of sharp practice was presumably intended to counteract the general impression that the Russians, and the Russians alone, had been opposed to the issue of the declaration.

5. The Shah had wished to entertain the three delegations as guests of the State and had offered three palaces for the purpose, and he was rather ruffled that the demands of security made it impossible for the offer to be accepted. The success of the conference from the Persian point of view dissipated this feeling, but he felt some resentment that he was only able to see President Roosevelt by calling on him in the Soviet Embassy, and he was therefore the more flattered when Stalin paid him a visit at his palace and talked to him for over an hour. Fortunately, Mr Churchill's long talk with the Shah as long ago as September 1942 and Mr Eden's talk with him in October 1943 gave us a long priority, but, on the other hand, the Shah found a particular pleasure in his interview with Marshal Stalin partly because if the Russian bear purrs instead of growling the Persian is always ravished with relief, and partly because of the sympathy which the Shah thought he found in Marshal Stalin for his personal ambitions. According to reliable reports from persons to whom the Shah spoke about the interview, the Shah claims that Stalin advised him to keep a strong hold over his people and to maintain a strong army to defend his country's independence and offered to give him twenty tanks and twenty aeroplanes and to lead him

officers to teach the Persians how to use them. The Shah seems to have taken all this at its face value. A more sceptical listener would have said to himself that if the Russians had tanks and aircraft to spare, they might redouble their demands on Great Britain and the United States, that for the only kind of warfare that the Persian army has to face, viz., the suppression of tribal disorder, there is no need for tanks, of which, indeed, Persia already possesses 100, that the despatch by the Russians of a military mission with the promised tanks and aircraft would cut across the scheme for the reorganisation of the army by American advisers and also to some extent the practice by which Persia has looked to Great Britain (and not in vain) for aircraft and for assistance in the training of pilots, and, finally, that there is something phoney, i.e., "funny peculiar," about advice in favour of strong personal rule and a large army from a ruler whose local embassy is openly backing the Tudeh party, whose members are violently opposed to both.

6. The declaration about Persia gave a filip to the reputation of the Shah as well as to that of M. Sobelky. It is natural that the Prime Minister in power at the time should share in the glory. The attribution to the Shah of a share in the success is perhaps due to a communiqué by His Majesty's Legation devised in the first place to silence malicious rumours that Mr Churchill had not called on the Shah. It stated that "it could now be revealed" that Mr Churchill had called on the Shah in September 1942 and had a long and friendly conversation with him about the war and interests of Persia, similarly, Mr Eden, who had had discussions with the Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs on his way to the Moscow Conference, had also been received in audience by the Shah, who during the conference had been expressing his interest in the interests of his country. Let us hope that this revelation of the Shah's influence will not increase his determination to run the country himself. Like his talks with parties of Deputies at the time of the Millsapagh crisis, it should rather remind him of the considerable influence he can exert by constitutional means. The short cut to the perfect State must, however, be very attractive to the son of Reza Shah. A worshipper of his father the Shah does not realise that, whatever the people of Persia want, they want a strong and efficient government, a strong army and if he fails to take that into account he will fall into difficulties. He probably feels that, like his father, he can rule the army and through the army the country, but his practice of suspecting the honest critic and encouraging the flatterer, however corrupt, is discouraging to the well wishers of Persia, and he has not yet shown the strength of character which he will need if he is to be the master of the army and not its tool.

7. The 69th birthday of Mr Churchill was celebrated by a dinner which he gave in His Majesty's Legation on the 30th November. Mr Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin were present with the leading members of their respective staffs but without the diplomatic representatives of their respective countries. The occasion was remarkable, in particular for the generosity of Marshal Stalin and his tributes to Mr Roosevelt and Mr Churchill, especially to the latter, his "fighting friend." In the interests of history it is worth while to record this short conversation which occurred before dinner —

Voroshilov: "Whose portrait is that?"

His Majesty's Minister: "Our King George V."

Voroshilov: "He is very much like Nicholas II."

His Majesty's Minister: "Yes, they were cousins and much alike, though not in character."

Stalin: "No, indeed. Your King even allowed us to hold our conference in London in 1907." (This was, of course, King Edward VII but never mind.)

His Majesty's Minister: "Were you in London in 1907?"

Stalin: "Yes, I lived in Whitechapel."

It would be interesting to know whether this statement is true or merely part of the Stalin legend which is being built up. The general belief is that Stalin never left Russia before the revolution except perhaps to slip over the border into Persian Azerbaijan when things became too hot for him in the Caucasus in 1906. A remark which Voroshilov made at dinner may also be recorded. After the speech in which Mr Churchill proposed the health of Marshal Stalin, Voroshilov said to me: "I was very much interested in his speech. And in the civil war he was my commissar." This was said not cynically but thoughtfully. Perhaps Voroshilov was thinking of the official school of Soviet historians, which is doing

counted is that the pro-German mulla, Abul-Qasim Kashani, wanted by us for fifth-column activities, occupies quite a high place in the list. Dr. Mahmud Dastgiri, arrested at the instigation of the Russians, is also in the running. Elsewhere, particularly in Azerbaijan, and in Fars, the elections are mostly in suspense. Enough Deputies have been elected to form the quorum of sixty nine sufficient for the opening of the new assembly, but not more than sixty-two have yet reached Tehran.

15. There are definite signs that the Russians are taking a much greater interest in the elections in the northern area. It appears that Kambakhsh, the Communist, is after all going to be returned for Kazvin, Parvin Gunabadi for Sabzevar, Iraj Iskandari for Sari, and perhaps two or three similar representatives of the extreme left for Tahriz. Dr. Radmanish and Dr. Kishavarz, both active members of the Tudeh party, have already been elected for Lahijan and Pobleh respectively. The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, M. Maximov, appears to have been in the background of these manipulations. The Shah is taking an active interest in the elections also, his officers under royal instructions, and other candidates, such as Sheikh Ali Dastgiri, are evidently being backed by His Majesty. Seyyid Zia has had a considerable influence on the elections for the presidency of the Majlis, but his insistence on retaining his old-fashioned, un-European sheepskin hat, and his unyielding attitude on other points, have alienated some of his erstwhile supporters, he seems to have very definite ideas, but the definiteness seems to merge into an obstinacy which some find irritating.

Tribal Situation.

16. There is little change since my last despatch. In Fars the Germans are still at large, the Qashgai remain in possession of the arms taken from the Persian forces, and the Government has done little or nothing to increase its own prestige or to persuade any of the tribes that any advantage is to be gained by loyalty to the Government. There is little reason to hope that by the time of the spring migration the Government will have established any authority over the Qashgai tribes or that its forces will be able to suppress the lawlessness that is liable to accompany the migration and to continue through the summer if unchecked. The only alternative open to the Government may be to give more open recognition to Naur and Khourow Qashgai as the leaders of the tribe and to charge them with the responsibility for maintaining order—a responsibility which they would be willing to accept on their own terms. The result would inevitably be to increase greatly the difficulty of the task of disarming the tribes which the Government must eventually undertake if peace is ever to rest on a stable basis. The situation is causing some concern to the Shah and some members of the Government, and this may result in some restriction on General Dastgiri's easy-going policy of appeasement. But the Government is far from ready to make any definite terms to the Qashgai and Hour Ahmadi leaders.

17. Operations that were to have been undertaken against the Tayyibi tribes of Kuh-i-Galu have been virtually cancelled. General Amir Ahmed, before he was dropped from the Cabinet, discovered circumstances that necessitated a modification of his original plans, and it is now unlikely that even the modified plans will be put into effect, although some show of force may be made to induce the tribal leaders to surrender sufficient arms to save the Government's face.

Security

18. The tussle regarding the handing over to the Russians of the suspects detained at Sultanabad, who are on the Russian list, continued during the period under review. As foreshadowed in my despatch under reference, the Soviet authorities should be released unless the Soviet authorities either took part in their interrogation or took the responsibility for their detention. The Shah, it is said, stated that the reason why the Soviet authorities could not take over their suspects was the slackness of the Persian Governor at Resht, who was supposed to be responsible for their detention. The Soviet authorities agreed to a postponement until the 2nd December, but that it was contrary to the terms of the British agreement with the Persian Government regarding the arrest of

these suspects that we should detain any against whom we had no evidence, so we were not prepared to do so. The delay was further delayed but the Soviet Embassy expressed willingness to take over their suspects on or after the 6th December.

19. Early in December the British security officials decided that the evidence against some of the suspects on our list was not serious and I therefore suggested that any who would probably qualify for release shortly should be released at once, both as means of calming the rest and because I was not sure that the Soviet security authorities might not make a magnificent gesture—perhaps to signalise the conclusion of the Tehran Conference—and release some or all of the suspects on their list to avoid revealing the fact that the Russian evidence was of the most flimsy character. In their telegram No. 1178 of the 23rd December, the Foreign Office approved—subject to the views of the head of Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq—the proposal that those Persians should be released whose detention was not considered essential for security reasons.

20. The position at the end of December was still unsatisfactory. The suspects on the Russian list had not left Sultanabad, their transfer to Resht being still the subject of a wrangle between the Russians and the Persian Government as to accommodation, with a more fundamental but at first unacknowledged dispute as to whether the suspects should be transferred at all. The conclusion of the examination by the Anglo-Persian commission revealed to the remaining suspects that they were the prisoners not of the British but of the Russians, and while this diverted criticism from His Majesty's Government, it also raised such a howl of terror from the suspects affected and from their friends, that the Persian Government eventually instructed their

Persian commission at Sultanabad (a procedure which we had always stated our readiness to accept) instead of being sent to Resht in the Russian zone. The delay was so unreasonable that His Majesty's Minister had to speak to the

of a group of Persians who are accused of plotting against the Allies and the State and so indifferent to the interests of His Majesty's Government, and warning him that the enquiry into the conduct of the suspects on our list would be suspended until the suspects on the Russian list were removed from Sultanabad or their examination at Sultanabad by a Russo-Persian commission began. In point of fact, the examination of evidence by the British security authorities continued, but their projected meeting with the Persian commissioners with a view to the removal of the suspects from Sultanabad had to be postponed as there no longer seems any risk that the Russians will release their suspects. On the contrary, the Soviet Embassy seems to have become more intransigent, though there are indications that it is not the plot against the Allies that they are after so much as evidence of Armenian or Caucasian activities.

Economics and Finance.

21. There has been no marked improvement in the general economic situation. There are some signs of hope that the collections of customs and other taxes will be in excess of last year.

22. The grain marketing, which was expected to be completed by November, was not maintained in the following month. The wholesale price index, which stood at 809 in October, fell to 851 in November, but rose to 866 on the 23rd December. Similarly, the cost of living index in Tehran fell to 1,054 in November, from 1,068 the previous month, only to increase to 1,078 in December. The temporary lowering of prices was largely responsible for the temporary lowering of prices.

23. Current revenue, which was estimated at 5,195.07 million rials for the 14th December, 1943, by 280.90 million rials to 5,195.07 million rials. This was a decrease of 271 million rials between August and October, and although the continued need for "new money" must be considered serious, this reduction during the past two months in the ratio of circulation increase is satisfactory.

Gold sales in the open market on behalf of His Majesty's Government continued, in the form of Persian pahlavis and 5-tola gold bars. On the 30th December, 1943, the price of the pahlavi was 590 rials and the 5-tola bar 4,300 rials. During the five weeks ended the 30th December gold sales realised 60,576,790 rials, and were made at an average price of 2,358 rials (about £16 8s. 5d) per fine ounce.

39. In the reshuffle of the Cabinet General Amir Ahmed was dropped from the Ministry for War and replaced by the Shah's nominee, a civilian official of his court, Ibrahim Zaid. During his tour of the General Ahmed had given to us whole hearted, if not always effective, co-operation, and to the American Military Mission a measure of support with which General Ridley was well satisfied. Thereby he incurred the hostility of the Russians, and by his energetic, if not always tactful, exercise of authority over the army he aroused the suspicion and jealousy of the Shah, who accused him of attempting to be commander-in-chief as well as Minister of War. The Shah has not weakened his determination to be the effective commander of the army and to allow no authority to be established there that is not completely subservient to himself. In this as has been mentioned above, he claims to have found encouragement in his private interview with Marshal Stalin. The Shah is now acting as the commander of the army. He issues orders direct to the Chief of Staff without reference to the

Minister for War, and to the Minister for War and even to individual officers should again be independent of the Ministry for War and that the functions of the latter should be limited to the purely administrative and financial aspects of the war effort.

40. On the other hand, the Shah, according to General Ridley has recently shown a more sympathetic attitude towards the American Military Mission and has insisted that an urgent request should be sent to the American Government for at least nine more officers. I fear that this enthusiasm for the American. and supplies for the army are not likely to be forthcoming from America unless it is evident to the British and American authorities that the American advisers are being given support in their task. In the decree he recently signed defining the duties and responsibilities of General Ridley and the officers of his mission, he was, however, careful to limit their functions to the giving of advice in matters of administration without investing them with any authority to ensure compliance with that advice.

41 The central administrative and recruit training depots, which are an essential part of the scheme of administrative reorganisation have now been established at each of the divisional headquarters outside the Russian zone of occupation, with an American officer in an advisory capacity to every two depots. They are as yet to be expected meeting with resistance from the German commanders, since matters of supply and finance, from which they have been accustomed to derive considerable profits, have now been taken out of their hands and centralized in the administrative depots. In the face of this obstruction it is not surprising that General Ridley's administrative reforms have not yet shown convincingly good results.

Person Gendarmette

42 Colonel Schwarzkopf has been given in the gendarmerie a position of greater authority than has General Ridley in the army, and he appears to intend to exploit this fully. He may come into conflict with the Shah, since all present ~~gendarmerie officers~~ officers hold army commissions from the Shah, who wishes to retain their undivided loyalty and arrogates to himself alone the right of making promotions. Colonel Schwarzkopf is also likely to find that financial stringency, to which he appears to have given little consideration, may impose important restrictions on the plans he has in mind, but to which no visible effect has yet been given.

German Air Force

43. The reorganization of the Persian Air Force continues, particularly in the maintenance and supply branches. Lieutenant-Colonel Sirih Poosh, previously liaison officer with the Royal Air Force at Doshan Tappeh, is being recalled to his home country. His duties will be taken over by a British officer to the appropriate Royal Air Force establishments in the Middle East. A R.A.F. officer has meanwhile been advising the Persians in Tehran. This assistance has been valuable and the Persians have expressed appreciation of it. The adaptation of the Persian Air Force to something more like Royal Air Force procedure should not only increase the serviceability of their aircraft but make easier and more economical the supply to them of the British material on which they mainly rely.

44 Colonel Stodark, who is designated for the post of Chief of the Persian Air Staff, is also designated for duty at the Royal Air Force, Cairo, Egypt, Africa and Aden, and is about to attend the next course at the Middle East Staff College.

45. The offer of His Majesty's Government to supply Anson aircraft to the Persian Air Force as alternatives to Hurricanes or Oxfords has been accepted. The type is generally considered to be the best for the Persians' present requirements.

Р.И.И.

46. After bearing with patience the restrictions which were placed on it during the conference, the Tehran press, as soon as it was allowed to do so, expressed great satisfaction that the conference had been held in Tehran and that it had resulted in the signing of the Teheran Declaration. All sections of the press welcomed the declaration and considered that it clarified Persia's international position and would leave the Government free to devote its entire energies to the much-needed improvement of internal

affairs. Much credit was given to the Shah and to Mr. Sobhly for their skilful conduct of foreign affairs.

47. Comment on the Tehran elections consisted mostly of complaints of corruption, Government interference and public apathy. The papers of the Left were pessimistic about the results and saw little hope of any real reform as long as the present governing classes remained in power. There was increasing emphasis on the need for unity and personal sacrifice and several papers called for the establishment of a government that would put aside private interests and work for the good of the nation.

British Council.

48. In Tehran teaching of English in the institute, university, schools and teaching of English in the private schools is very poor. If the staff provided English is being indifferently or badly taught by many private individuals (Persians) in various parts of the town and it is obvious that the teaching must upon the whole be poor for those who find the main building inaccessible. This cannot be done until more staff are appointed. In the National Bank 400 members of the staff have applied to the Council of the Bank for a course but it is impossible to do this at present even by telephone and private mail course. A British professor was to have lectured at the university in December but his arrival has subsequently been cancelled. This is the sixth time during the past year that a professor has been proposed, but has not arrived.

About 250 students are for club activities only every week as in the Technical college by the institution.

in the technical college by the institution.

A few Ministers of Education have appointed who desires to promote the limited system of education and will not accept British teachers in all the primary schools. A law has been passed which should be taken while it exists.

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ad. The response has not been received, and the same has been reported in my despatch under reference. has not yet interminated.

54. I am sending copies of this document to the ~~Government of the Middle East~~ Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow, to the Government of India and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have &c
R W BULLARD

[E 1809 07/84]

No. 8

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 21st March.)

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Excluded, 1st of 10 1954

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"... his back brave with the needlework of Noodledom."

3. I now presented to His Majesty the members of the staff, several of whom were already known to him. He then put into execution a procedure recently devised to distinguish between ambassadors and ministers at the presentation of credentials, whereby ambassadors are to have a private interview with the Shah which is not to be granted to ministers. This enabled the embassy staff to enjoy tea and conversation for three-quarters of an hour while I had a rather inconclusive talk with the Shah and the Minister for Foreign Affairs which might have gone on for twice as long if, warned by experience, I had not picked up my gloves one by one and finally laid my hand on my hat. His Majesty began by referring to my approaching visit to the United Kingdom, and I said that I hoped that he and his ministers would raise before I left any questions which they would like me to discuss in London. At this the Minister for Foreign Affairs grinned, remembering, I think, the desiderata of the Persian Government as conveyed to the Foreign Office by Mr. Hayeri in a memorandum which I had described as the same length as the Shah Reza Avenue, a thoroughfare several miles in length. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then spoke about the difficulty of dealing with the Russians, who blamed the Persians if there was insecurity in the Russian area, and yet baggled for months about posting another hundred soldiers there or sending in a few more rifles and rounds of ammunition. The effect of this discourse was to show (what is perfectly true) that the British behave towards the Persians with greater consideration than the Russians. I spoke of our hope that the war would not last very much longer; that the retirement of the foreign troops would relieve the Persian Government of many problems, particularly a psychological problem of great importance; and that the assumption of entire responsibility for security by the Persians would be effected smoothly and effectively.

5. The Shah said that he thought that the British ought to have a more constructive policy. I mentioned some of the items of our programme for Persian help in feeding the country and in making the most of its transport and other resources, support for the American advisers, and so on, and asked whether His Majesty could mention anything more constructive that we could do. His Majesty could not, and I do not know what he was looking for.

4. When speaking of possible ways of absorbing the skilled Persian labour which will be set free when Persia ceases to be a road to Russia, the Shah said that some might be employed in the Persian navy. "if we have a navy. Thus

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I have, &c
R. W. BULLARD.

I have. &c
R. W. BULLARD.

No. 19

SECRET
His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and, with reference to Tehran
No. 331 of the 11th August 1943, has the honour to transmit herewith
a report from His Majesty's Consul General, Meshed, on the political
situation covering the period from July to December 1943

Enclosure in No. 9

Six monthly Political Situation Report, July-December 1943

Security

2 The improvement in security along the Zahidan-Mashed road was undoubtedly due in part to the appearance of British Indian forces in connection with the anti-locust operations near Burjand in July and again in September, when armed convoys of supplies for China went up the road as far as Turbat, Haidari. Credit, however, must also be given to his Excellency Amir Alam Khan, the Miri, who secured Russian aid in connection to the inhabitants of certain strategic and isolated villages in the Sander. Qaimat did encourage them to stay in the market town of Turbat, Babul of a Turbat. He had gendarmes who in November finally captured the Kurakch Bauch gags which had been

8. Elsewhere in the province the only serious disturbance was in the Kuchuk Shamagan area where Ali Khan B. T. and his followers, including the Ashkan Khan Nigaliban, and his followers, carried on a small private war in July and August. The British troops, however, were not engaged in any fighting. The British troops eventually restored order and collected a few rifles. A reconciliation between the rival headmen has since been effected by the Governor General during his tour of the district. There is every prospect, however, of further fighting in the future.

elections of political importance during the year
associations, and the reappearance of a certain amount of religious fanaticism
intruding on the Shrine.

The first of these is the fact that the majority of the population of the United States is now living in the South. This is a fact which has been recognized by the Government, and it is one which has led to the establishment of the Southern States Commission. The Commission has been set up to study the problems of the South, and to make recommendations to the Government as to how these problems should be dealt with. The Commission has been working for some time, and it has already made a number of important discoveries. One of the most important of these is the fact that the South is a region of great potential, but that this potential is not being fully utilized. The Commission has found that the South is rich in natural resources, and that it has a large and growing population. However, the South is also a region of great poverty, and it is one in which the majority of the population is living in conditions of extreme hardship. The Commission has found that the South is a region in which the Government has a special responsibility, and it has made a number of recommendations as to how this responsibility should be met. These recommendations include the establishment of a Southern States Commission, the creation of a Southern States Fund, and the establishment of a Southern States Council. The Commission believes that these steps are essential if the South is to be brought into the mainstream of the Nation's development.

But they are a powerful element, and, in no sense a majority of the

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Religious Matters

d. The visit to Meshed of Haji Agha Qumi, a noted Shia mujtahid of Meshed, whose attitude against the anti clerical policy of the late Shah had been evident for some time, and it was known that the object of the Haji's visit to Persia was to obtain certain concessions from the civil power concerning the management of the waqf property, religious teaching in Government schools, the wearing of the veil, and other such controversial matters. The Governor-General, however, handled Qumi and the local mullahs very cleverly—doubtless the Russian boy helped him—and there were no untoward incidents. But the Haji's visit undoubtedly gave a filip to the clerical reaction mentioned above. Veiled women are now quite a common sight in the streets; during Muharram and on days of mourning, processions have been on a larger scale than at any time since 1930; and the Governor General has been obliged to restore the functions and privileges of the *khodas* or "Servants of the Shrine" who take pilgrims round the Holy Shrine. He is adamant, however, about letting the mullahs have anything to do with the management of the Shrine's huge revenues.

9 Behind the facade of improved security and functioning administrative machinery the state of the middle and lower classes is little better than in the dark latter years of Reza Shah. Public Bandit No. 1 has gone, only to make way for a coterie of officials who, taken as a whole, exploit the masses nearly as thoroughly as he did. Not only is the man in the street and at the plough looted direct by local officials, police and gendarmerie in the good old way, but a new technique has been evolved by which he is squeezed dry by "big business" in the shape of the Monopoly Departments and officially-protected private racketeers. During the long months of scarcity before the last harvest we saw "bread" consisting chiefly of barley bran and poppy-seed meal being retained in strictly limited quantities at the controlled shops to half-starved queues, while tons of good bread made from hoarded wheat were hawked through the streets under their noses or retailed at "free rates" to the well-to-do at neighbouring bakeries. Another scandalous racket is the distribution of sugar. The province has its own officially-controlled sugar refinery and the best crop, last season, was exceptionally heavy; at least 70,000 tons of beet cut at the factory enough to make 7,000 tons of sugar; yet we see a few tons here a few tons there being dished out by the Finance Department at the controlled rate of Rupees 20 per kulg on a basis of 400 grammes a head monthly to the people of the towns, while the rest of the population either go without or pay Rupees 110 (37s. 6d.) a kulg in the fully stocked "free" market.

the Hizb-i-Tudeh, it is the large non-official "Russian party" of Armenians, Caucasians, Jews *mukajirs* (émigrés) and would be qualings in the future Soviet K. U. S. S. R. The Russians themselves certainly do not oppose British interests, though there is a certain amount of quite friendly rivalry in public matters. Mr. K. U. S. S. R. was definitely co-operative within the narrow limits of his discretion. Such trouble as we had, e.g., over road permits, was due to faulty liaison between civil and military. Social relations with the consulate-general officials and their families continued to be thoroughly cordial.

13. To sum up, Khorasan has for the last two years been ruled firmly but sensibly by a corps of officials, a Governor General backed by the Russians, whose military and commercial (but not political) ends he serves. What hope is there of reform?

4. The *intelligentsia* have ranged against them the Tudeh party, the younger *intelligentsia*, Sadjadi's Dadgustaran, or Justice party, and other "moderate opposition" elements but they have also in far Tehran the growing power of the American advisers, backed by the Allied Higher Command, to reckon with. The influence of the Hizb-i-Tudeh is discounted by the reflection that if and when the Red Army enters Persia, the Tudeh will be removed. It is too early yet to foresee the fate of the Gurus-i-Dadgustaran; their meetings and newspaper may one day be a power in the land, but they also rely rather too openly on an Ally—ourselves—and there is always the danger that they may slip into the respectable but ineffective rôle of a Moderate party of the London type, especially if their old associates refuse to ingratiate themselves with them. The younger *intelligentsia* are perhaps Khorasan's least forlorn hope. They tax the opportunity of Shahrivar," as they call it (") and fill the political vacuum we ourselves created by ejecting the Pahlavi tyrant. If these men were to join Sadjadi's organization, or start a better one, and set themselves to educate public opinion—of a new spirit of courageous patriotism and sympathy with the masses, their desire to overthrow the gang they hate. Khorasan might give the rest of Persia a lead towards real democracy. But this class, though as quick and intelligent as any in Asia, lacks courage and the capacity to unite. As a member of it said sorrowfully to the writer not long ago, "No sooner do we get together and begin to do something than we start squabbling among ourselves." Even if they found themselves in power they would not stay there a fortnight without powerful support and strong guidance. But whom?

15. Recent developments in the policy and activities of the American advisers, the M.E.S.C., and other Allied authorities at the Centre have given reason to hope that the guidance and help needed to bring the best and most progressive elements in Persia to the top may be forthcoming. Hitherto, it must be confessed, that policy has seemed, from the point of view of a remote but not unimportant province, somewhat over-centralized. The multiplicity of sections and bureaux and boards and secretariat and centres at Tehran and the usual (and woman-) power deployed in them has been impressive but somewhat bewildering, contrasted with the thin roll of Russian and American representatives in the provinces. Moreover, so far as the law is concerned, the law in Persia has been enacted perfunctorily and promulgated by the Shah or Reza Shah, a capital and its magnificently-housed bureaucracy. Dr. Millspaugh, remembering maybe the success of his former mission but forgetting that he then had a dictator at his back, seems to have thought that to call laws promulgated by Act of Parliament. During the year and a half since the first of them arrived not one of the civilian American advisers has found time to study on the spot the problems of Persia's eastern provinces. In May last (a year and a half too late, but that was not his fault) Dr. Millspaugh secured his promulgation of a long series of laws and regulations. They gave the impression of having been framed by someone with very little first-hand knowledge of present-day Persia. In this country an ounce of enforcement is worth a ton of enactment, yet the whole series contains about half a dozen perfunctory penal clauses, mostly threatening mere "confiscation."

(4) The occupation of Persia by British and Russian troops began on the 1st Shahrivar, 1320, in the Persian calendar (24th August, 1941).

without compensation" of the goods or means of transport concerned. Only in the Special Powers Act of the 4th May, 1943, is the possibility of official non-co-operation envisaged; erring Government servants are threatened vaguely with "dismissal" and "punishment according to the law." For the rest, Dr. Mills, in drafting his regulations, relied on his investiture by the Special Powers Act with certain "powers" granted by earlier Acts, including the Anti Hoarding Law of the 15th March, 1942. He was probably unaware that in most provinces even that law, with its commendably explicit and draconian provisions, has to be followed in all their leisurely detail make it in practice unenforceable anywhere except under the nose of a fully powered American or British official. It has at most a nuisance value in the nation's eyes. Dr. Mills' regulations have even a nuisance value. They are ignored alike by official, police, law courts, boarders, and the general public, and will continue to be so until American or British assistant advisers, inspectors, or departmental directors are sent to the main centres with strong staffs and full powers, and until the Allied High Commission, by its official whatever, from the Governor General downwards, who tries to sabotage the work.

10. The recent deputation by the British and American authorities of a mission to the provinces to investigate the problems connected with food-stuffs and other necessities augurs well for the future. We have had visits from Lieut. Colonel A. Macanu I.P.S., additional counsellor, Lieut. Colonel Atanullah Khan, I.M.S., Inspector General of Food-stuffs, and two Persians of integrity and ability Messrs. Salomon Asadi and Shabnam, of the Finance Department. Better still, the Road Transport Board have sent two very able Danes, Messrs. Von Steinhilber and Kahr, to clean up the Bucharai Rah black transport racket at Meshed and Captain Coupland on a similar mission to Zahidan, while the M.E.S.C. have lent the services of Lieutenant Joel to the Finance Ministry for work at Zahal in connexion with the barley crop, some 12,000 tons. Best of all, a full fledged American Director of Finance for Khuzestan has been promised us, though his arrival is being unaccountably delayed. It is to be hoped that the mission will bring matters to a head with the gang, and provided the officers are given sufficient staff and funds and supported strongly from the Centre, there is real hope of a new era of prosperity and decent administration dawning for Persia's eastern provinces.

C. P. SKRINE.

3rd March 1944

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

E 422 422 341

No. 10

Sir R. Bulford to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th January)

(No. 1)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the period of the 20th December, 1943, to the 2nd January, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 3rd January, 1944

Enclosure in No. 10

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 1 for the Period 20th December, 1943, to 2nd January, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The appointment of the new Cabinet has been on the whole received with apathy in the country, and the general expectation seems to be that it will not last long after the opening of the new Parliament. That has been announced for the 22nd January. The results of the Tehran elections should soon be available as voting has closed. In Azerbaijan voting has been suspended owing to the strong interference of the Soviet authorities on behalf of candidates of the Tudeh party.

2. Dr. Beneš arrived in Tehran from Moscow on the 25th December for a short visit, during which he was the guest of the Shah. Both the Shah and the Government laid themselves out to demonstrate how admirably they could entertain an important State guest. The University of Tehran conferred on Dr. Beneš the degree of Doctor *honoris causa*.

3. There is some unrest among manual workers in Tehran. There were threatened strikes of railway workers and of employees in the wireless station of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs and an actual strike in the ammunition factory at Sultanabad near Tehran. In all cases the cause of the discontent was alleged to be insufficiency of pay. Conditions of the working classes are generally sufficiently bad to make easy the work of the agitator. That agitators are at work there is no doubt, nor that the long-suffering Persian working classes are being awakened to a knowledge of their power. The Minister of Finance and Dr. Mills have issued a communiqué informing the workers that a commission has been formed to investigate and report on the pay of manual workers in Government employ.

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5. The statement alleged to have been made by Mr. Roosevelt on his return to the United States to the effect that Marshal Stalin had informed him that there were 100 German agents in Tehran during the conference and that a plot to murder the three statesmen had been discovered, called forth a denial in the press from the Persian Government. They stated that nothing had been said to the Persian authorities by any representative of the three Allies of the existence of any such plot either before or during the conference, and that high officials of all three Allies had thanked the Persian Government for their efficient security measures.

Appointments—Civil

6.—(i) Masud Muzid to be Persian representative at Beirut with the rank of Minister.

(ii) Abdullah Asbrafi to be Farmandar of Shahreza.

(iii) Sadiq Vasiqi to be director of the Mortgage Bank.

(iv) Adnan Qasbi to be Director-General of the Department of Rationing in the Ministry of Finance.

7. A personality note on the present Minister for War, Ibrahim Zand, is appended to this summary.

Persian Forces

Army

8. The recruit training and administrative depots, which are part of the reorganisation plan of the American advisers (see Summary No. 42 48/43, paragraph 9), have now been inaugurated at all divisional headquarters outside the Russian zone. An American officer has been allotted to every two divisions—one to the 1st and 2nd, one to the 4th and 5th, one to the 6th and 10th, and one to the 7th and 9th Divisions.

[27851]

9. General Ridley states that he has recently found the Shah more interested in American Missions. He is of the opinion that more officers should be obtained from America. An urgent request for at least nine more—making with the eleven already here twenty in all—has been made to Washington by the Persian Government.

10. The transport situation of the Persian army has considerably improved with the arrival of some 600 trucks from America. These have been organised into units under the supervision of one of the American advisers. Although the standard of driving and maintenance is low and the misuse of transport is rampant, General Ridley is not dissatisfied with the progress made in the circumstances that existed.

Appointments—Military

11. Army—Sartip Rohullah Keikavusi to be Military Governor of Tehran Gendarmerie. Sarhang Yamini to be commander of the 7th (Western) Gendarmerie District.

Retirements—Sarhangs: Yazdanfar, Muhammad Nawaz Safari Hassan Khudivi, Muhammad Ali Sadari, Yaddullah Azam Zanganeh (Air Force), Ali Reza Mansouri, Mustafa Mansur Ibrahim Timourian.

Internal Security

Fars

12. The situation remains outwardly calm, largely because the Persian authorities are careful to do nothing that might irritate Nasir and Khosrow Qashgai. Persian Government arms in the possession of the Qashgai tribes have not yet been handed back, nor has Khosrow Qashgai implemented his promise to apprehend and surrender the Germans, five of whom are known to be just outside the borders of Qashgai territory. The Mamaasand tribes, who have hitherto refused to ally themselves with Nasir and who might have formed a loyal pro-Government force in the middle of Qashgai territory, have been alienated by the Government's rejection of their claim to the ownership of certain lands. As far as can be judged the position of the Government grows weaker and that of the tribes grows stronger.

Ahmadabad

13. A band of brigands, variously reported to be Baur Ahmad or Tairiyshi, are reported to be operating in the vicinity of the Ahmadabad (Ahmadabad) a band of Pazanun. Company property and employees have not yet suffered but travellers have been held up and their goods looted.

Russian Affairs

14. The Shah has presented a medal to the Russian Colonel, Bourneir, as a token of appreciation of the assistance he gave in the work of completing the machine-gun factory for the manufacture of machine pistols.

15. Two Russian officers have arrived in Fars for the alleged purpose of investigating agricultural possibilities.

Appendix to Summary No. 1

(Reference: Paragraph 7)

Personality Note: Zand, Ibrahim (Ebrahim). Minister for War

Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France where he was a contemporary and friend of Jawad Amery. Towards the end of the last war became an active member of the Musawat party in Azerbaijan and in 1919 became a member of the short-lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia where he was employed in the Ministry of Justice as an advisor. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance and in 1938 became a member of the Board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Eftehaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed

at Court as Comptroller of the Royal Accounts. Minister of War in Soherly's third Cabinet, December 1943. Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahramy. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian. A harmless but weak man, who has not succeeded in making his mark in either politics, law or banking, and has obtained the post of Minister of War in order that he should enable others to run that Ministry.

E 604 422 341

No. 11

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th January)

(No. 32)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the period of the 3rd to 16th January, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 17th January, 1944

Enclosure in No. 11

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 2 for the Period
3rd-16th January, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Majlis is due to be opened on the 22nd January, invitations for the opening ceremony have been issued, and it seems probable that by that date there will be present in Tehran more than the sixty-nine Deputies necessary to form a quorum. The total number of Deputies elected to date is seventy-five. About one-third of the votes cast in the Tehran elections have been counted, and a list of the leading candidates is published daily in the press. These for some days included the names of Sa'iyid Abul Qasim Kashani and Matin Daftari, against whom charges are pending of having abetted German plots in Persia. The impropriety of advertising to the world the extent of the esteem in which these two candidates were held by the Government, and the fact that they were the only two who would thereby be made on Persia's allies was reluctantly recognised by the Government, and their names no longer appear in the lists of favourites.

2. Suleiman Muharrir Iskandari (Suleiman Mirza), leader of the Tudeh party, and for some years a professing Communist, has died. His funeral was attended by representatives of the Soviet Embassy.

Economic

3. In his monthly report for the month the 24th October-22nd November Dr. Millsaugh discusses the principles that should guide the framing of the budget for the coming year, and particularly the conflicting demands of agriculture and industry. He makes some pertinent remarks about the army and gendarmerie which will meet with no approval from the Shah. The army, he says, has no task except that of internal policing. In contrast, the Government and the Deputies are most anxious for an increased budget allotment for the army and urges them to consider the possibility of reducing its size in order to make funds available for its better equipment and its greater contentment. The Shah, as is well known, is demanding an increased budget for a larger army, whose task, he likes to think, is to maintain the independence of Persia and add to his own importance. The army is likely to be a first-class issue in the new Majlis, both as regards the share it consumes of the national revenue with very little benefit to the nation, and as regards the Shah's pretensions to make it the instrument of his personal policy.

4. Probably as a result of the influence of American advisers in various administrations, investigations are being made into large-scale embezzlements and frauds. Officers of the Road Transport Department, the Bread and Bread Department and other departments of the Ministry of Finance, and army officers have been in some cases dismissed and in others arrested for corrupt practices. Even a few convictions will have a good effect.

5. Unrest among workers continues to show itself. In Isfahan telephone operators went on strike for some days for higher wages. In accordance with the promise made to workers in Government employ after the disturbances reported in Summary No. 144, paragraph 3, an interdepartmental commission was appointed to fix minimum wages for unskilled workers. It recommended for the approval of the Council of Ministers that unmarried men should draw 9 rials a day, married men without families 12, and with families 15 rials.

6. Throughout the rural districts the people suffer from a shortage of tea, sugar and cloth. The Chief Administrator of the Price Stabilisation Section has recently published the fact that there are in Government stores 28 million yards of cloth and ample stocks of sugar. It is solely due to corruption and to the inefficiency of distribution that supplies do not reach the people who so badly need them.

Appointments—Civil

7. (i) Ghalam Hussein Ashrafi, formerly Director General in the Ministry of Industry and Mines, to be Under Secretary of State in the office of the President of the Council of Ministers.

(ii) Muhammad Saruri to be Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of the Interior.

(iii) Sa'yyid Ali Nasir to be Persian Minister to China.

(iv) Alimabadi Roshani to be Farmandar of Tabriz.

(v) Fathullah Nuri Isfandiari (F.O. 90) to be Persian Minister with the Polish Government in London.

(vi) Lisan Sepehr to be Inspector General in the Ministry of the Interior.

(vii) Qasim Hakimia to be Director of the Mortgage Bank.

(viii) Fazelullah Bahrami has resumed the appointment of Chief of the Municipality.

(ix) Khosrow Panah (Sardar Mufakham) to be Farmandar of Qazvin.

Persian Forces

8. It seems possible that the new Minister for War will not be content to be the cypher he was intended to be by the Shah. He has already made formal representations to the Shah, and in one case passed the Shah's orders to him in discourteous terms, and in another issued orders for the dismissal and replacement of the Military Governor of Tehran without reference to the Minister or the Government. He has invited the American advisers generally to take a more active part in the reform and supervision of administration, has authorised General Ridley to appoint an American officer to take executive charge of the administration of the Isfahan Division, where the divisional commander was being obstructive, and has demanded from the American advisers within ten days a scheme for the reorganisation of the Finance Branch of the War Office, to include a 50 per cent reduction in its staff.

9. Increases of pay have been sanctioned for military officers and civilian officials of the Ministry for War on the scale already approved for other Government servants (see Summary No. 44-43, paragraph 5). According to the Minister for War, these increases are "sufficient to enable officers to live on their pay." He now intends to insist that corruption shall no longer be condoned and that all officers guilty of dishonesty shall be brought to trial.

Internal Security

North Khorassan

10. Quarrels have again broken out between the leaders of the Zafarani and Bicharani Kurds in the neighbourhood of Shirvan, but no reports have yet been received of inter-tribal fighting. Hold-ups of U.K.C.C. lorries have occurred between Quchan and the Russian frontier, which may be connected with these tribal disturbances.

Fars

11. General Jahanbani has been expressing some anxiety regarding the possibility of a civil war arising from the hostility existing between Abdullah Zarghampur on the one hand and his brother Khosrow and Muzaffar Arn, another Boir Ahmadi chief, on the other. He has asked for reinforcements to be sent to

Behbahan to guard against possible threats to the area of the oil-fields, and it is probable that three battalions will be sent from Tehran. Khosrow Qashgai is now with Abdullah Zarghampur in Western Kuh-i-Galu, ostensibly to discuss the surrender of the Germans who are now in Boir Ahmadi territory. It is doubtful whether this is more than a pretence, and it is probable that the real purpose of his visit is rather to re-establish the alliance between Abdullah Zarghampur and himself and his brother Nasir.

12. General Jahanbani is also proposing to move a force through Mamassinni country to Basht for the purpose, he pretends, of exerting a restraining influence on Abdullah Zarghampur. It seems however, that the real object may be to coerce the Mamassinni, who are refusing to accept a recent decision of the Government on claims to tribal lands made by the Mamassinni chiefs. The Government may yet realize that they cannot afford to antagonise the Mamassinni and may forbid a move that might lead to hostility.

Khuzestan

13. Some of the Bahmai and Janeki chiefs, against whom it was intended to carry out operations (see Summary No. 43-43, paragraph 11), have visited the Persian commander in Khuzestan to make submission. They have promised to surrender some arms, and the Persian commander hopes that the show of force which he will be able to make if he receives the reinforcements referred to in paragraph 11 above will be sufficient to induce the fulfilment of this promise.

Russian Affairs

14. M. Mikailov, the new Soviet Ambassador in Persia, arrived in Tehran on the 11th January.

15. M. Kozlov, Soviet Consul General in Meshed, has been appointed a member of the Inter Allied European Commission.

16. The Ambassador of the Soviet Union in Persia, M. Mikailov, arrived in Fars for the alleged purpose of investigating agricultural possibilities, but it is probable that the real purpose of his journey is unknown.

17. An Irano-Soviet Cultural Society has been formed in Tehran as a counterblast to the British Council. The Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs figure on the committee, which includes several prominent Persians. Telegrams of mutual felicitation have been exchanged with the Soviet Society for Foreign Cultural Relations (VOKS).

18. For some months a strong drive has been in progress throughout Persia for the collection of funds for Soviet sufferers from the war. The methods used under the spur of Soviet representatives have savoured of blackmail. They have resulted in the collection of quite substantial sums and in bringing Russia prominently to the notice of many Persians.

Iraqi Affairs

19. Khadim al-Dujali has arrived in Tabriz as Iraqi Consul. He was formerly lecturer in Arabic at the London School of Oriental Studies.

Abyssinian Affairs

20. Dr. Tourenzo has arrived in Tehran to take up his post as Abyssinian Minister in Moscow.

French Affairs

21. M. Pierre Lafont has arrived in Tehran as representative of the National Committee for the Study of French Culture in Persia.

22. A society for the study of French culture has been set up in Tehran. The French have been for some time concerned about the decrease of their long established cultural influence in Persia, and this step may be an attempt to revive it.

Tehran, 16th January, 1944.

Tehran, 24th January, 1944

(Secret)

Person Affairs

All arrangements had been made for the opening of the Majlis on the 22nd January; invitations and programmes had been issued and the streets banded for the Royal procession. On the 21st January it was announced that the opening had been postponed. The pretext as an excuse to many people as it was well known that the Shah, the Russians and certain Deputies were in favour of delaying the opening for various reasons. The pretext given was that there were insufficient Deputies present to form a quorum. Sufficient Deputies could, in fact, have been collected, but some were induced to absent themselves from Tehran. For some days previous it had been evident that the Majlis would not be opened if the Shah could prevent it. He had disquieting reports of the temper of a number of the Deputies in Tehran; he feared criticism of the changes well known to have been due to his insistence, made in the Cabinet during the interregnum, and questions regarding the shooting of a striker at the munitions factory by General Shafiq, the chief of police, who was killed in the incident about which the public is exercised because no post-mortem examination was allowed. He is obsessed by fear of Seyyed Zia and the possibility of the setting up of a strong constitutional group of Deputies in the new Parliament that might be obstructive to his aspirations to autocracy. He has seen how easily the possibilities of finding persons to support him are exhausted. Since Zia and he had seriously considered the possibility of a coalition with him, he is very discontented, a new Ministry has been formed, and he will have to face all the elections to be held in the near future. He has decided that he will dissolve the new election law, and call for new elections. He has also decided to call for new laws. He has also decided to call for new laws. He has also decided to call for new laws. He has also decided to call for new laws.

3. The public and press are much excited by the publication of the news that a Persian plot was detected for the purpose of sending Ayub Khan to Mexico to be engaged with the Emperor. The description is not correct in many details, but it is the strongest protest ever made by the Government. Since Ayub Khan has been found that any compensation was not even mentioned even for the future safety of Persia or Persians. Government of Persia would post but the postage to Mexico for

4. Dr. Millspaugh finds that revenue is coming in better than he expected. He publishes the following figures.—

5. An official announcement in the press gives the following figures as regards cereals —

Appointments—Civil

(iii) Muhammad Zaid Neapur to be Farmandar of Qum.

Appointments—Military

Sarhanah Abdul Majid Faruq

Colonels: Hussain Shaibani, Qasim Vuydani; Amanullah Jalveh
(Medical)

Parr and Ambrose

8. A meeting recently took place near Behbahan of Khosrow Qashgai and Abdullah Zarghampur which was attended by His Majesty's Consul General for Khuzistan and Colonel Humayun, the officer commanding the Persian troops in Khuzistan. Ostensibly the purpose was to discuss with Abdullah Zarghampur the surrender of the Germans known to be in his territory. He denied that they were there, but also promised that he would expel them within twenty-twenty-five days. He gave assurances to the Persian commander of his desire for peace and promised to surrender some of the arms taken from Persian troops at Semirum. There is no particular reason to believe any of these assurances.

9 It does not appear that General Jahanbani's fears that Abdullnh Zarghampur may create trouble in the vicinity of the oil fields area have any substantial justification at present. His Majesty's Consul General considers that the reinforcements of three battalions which are being sent will exercise a sufficiently steadying influence.

10. In Fars the Mamassani are unsettled and will remain so until a settlement is made of their land claims. Jahanbani has been discussing with Nasir Qasligai the question of the latter's lands. He says he told Nasir that an essential condition of settlement was Nasir's submission to Government and the disarmament of the tribe.

11 It was feared that the long-standing jealousy between the two branches of the family of the Bakhtiari Khans—the Ikkhans and the Haji Ikkhans—might lead to trouble. Morteza Quli Khan, the Governor, has been appointing his own relatives to all available positions in the Bakhtiari to the exclusion of the other branch of the family who were beginning to show signs of restlessness. Morteza Quli, not content with the present boundaries of his governorship, tried to persuade the Government to extend them to include Feraiidan and the territories of the Bahmai and Western Janeki. This has been refused, but he has managed to get one of his sons, a military officer, appointed as Governor of Feraiidan and to have the two Chahar Lang Khans of influence in that area, Muhammad Jawad Shujai and Muhammad Ali Mordani, detained in Isfahan. Morteza Quli Khan claims that during a visit to Tehran he placated the senior khans of the other branch of the family by promises of benefits to come.

	Men	Women	Children	Total
In Tehran	815	2,732	792	4,339
Isfahan	84	611	1,705	2,410
Abwaz	333	1,529	907	2,769
Mashed	5	9	53	67
	1,247	4,881	3,457	9,585

Russian Affairs

Tehran, 23rd January, 1944

No. 19

(No. 40)

Tehran, 31st January, 1944

(Secret.)

Political.

(1) Loose-muscle

(iii) Insult to the seal of a foreign State or its officials or representative

(iv) Publications containing information relating to the activities of the Government of India, the Government of Madras or their officials, officials of the Court, Government of Madras or the Legislature, or any other members of Parliament or its members of either House or members of the Government of Madras or its members of either House, provided that the said information is connected with the official functions of the person concerned.

(v) Libels, slanders against any individual

3.—(i) Ibrahim Khajeh Nuri, Director of Press and Propaganda to be Under Secretary of State to the Prime Minister

(16) Abdul Valid to the Farmandar of Qasr i Shurin.

(iii) Abbas Quli Gulshayan to the Mayor of Tehran *vice* Bahrani, resigned

4. The Soviet Ambassador has now informed the Shah that the tanks and aircraft promised by Stalin are now ready for delivery (see Summary dated the 5th December 1943, paragraph 8). The numbers have been increased to 35 tanks and 30 aircraft—20 bombers and 10 fighters. The Russians suggest that a tank regiment should be formed at Qasvin and an aircraft regiment at Meshed, each to have a strength of 600-700 of which one-third would be Russians, provided and paid for by the Soviet Government. This proposal was valued since it will be the foundation of a force partially officered by Russians and wholly under Russian influence to be used, as was the old Russian-officered Persian Cossack Division, for the furtherance of Russian policy in Persia. The Shah has, however, decided that since the tanks and aircraft are a gift, the Russian suggestions must be agreed to. The Persian Government is to inform the Russians that the Persian army does not at present find more than 100-150 officers and other ranks of a type suitable for riding tanks and flying fighters. As a result of a statement made by the Shah to a reliable informant, the tanks are 28 tonners. These will not only be a useless encumbrance to the Persian army, but are likely to be expensive toys.

The above information should be treated for the present as most secret.

5 The Shah recently paid a visit of inspection to the Mechanised Brigade. This brigade has been a bone of contention for some time between him and the American advisers. The latter rightly regard it as a useless expense in present circumstances and recommended its disbandment. The Shah, on the other hand, wishes to expand it by the addition of armoured cars (which he has not got) and mechanised infantry. Its present constitution is—

One anti aircraft artillery regiment of eight 75 mm. Bofors A.A. guns

One battalion of four searchlights

One mixed artillery regiment of

Eight 105-mm long Skoda guns

Four 150-mm long Skoda guns

Four 150-mm. short Skoda guns.

One battalion of anti aircraft machine guns of 13, 15 mm. Besa machine guns.

4. At the annual ceremony for the presentation by the Shah of epaulettes to first-year cadets of the Military School the commandant announced that there were 398 cadets in the school.

7 Mr Timmerman, the American Director-General of Police, who has for some time been criticised in private, has recently been subjected to some criticism in the press. The number of thefts, assaults and robberies with violence in Tehran has been increasing, and Mr Timmerman, who has powers that carry responsibility, is being accused of laxness in his task of reorganising the police. In an interview given to the press, he stated that on the present wages of 1,000 rials a month it was impossible to obtain recruits for the police force; that in Tehran alone there was a deficiency of 800 constables; that the police force was seriously deficient in means of communication and means of rapid locomotion, and that he had demanded jeeps, motor cycles and telephones from the United States, so far without success. He went on to say that one of the greatest handicaps to the suppression of crime was the extreme leniency of the courts. He had also during the eight months of his official work in Persia had to deal with two Prime Ministers, seven Ministers of the Interior and three chiefs of police. Each change had meant that he had to get agreement all over again for his proposals.

Appointments—Military

—(1) Sarhang Gulshayan to command the 5th (Luristan and Kermanshah) Division on rice Sarpul Iravani, recalled.

On 11 September 1954, the 4th Infantry Division transferred the 4th Infantry Division to the 4th Infantry Division.

(iii) Sarhang Dehumi to be Chief of Staff of the Southern Forces vice Sarhang Muqbeli, relieved

- (iv) Sarhang Siassi to be Head of the 2nd Bureau General Staff *viz* Sarhang Delfini
 (v) Sartashgar Ali Asghar Naqdi (M.A. 196) to be Director of Conscription
viz Sartip Khosrow Panah, relieved.

Internal Security

9. Tribal areas remain quiet. In Fars the main interest centres around the elections and Nasir Qashgai's manoeuvres to secure the election of candidates favourable to himself. He is endeavouring by the expenditure of money and hints of his nuisance value to merchants and landowners, to persuade the people of Shiraz to elect him from that town. In this he has two objects - one to prove that he has influence outside the Qashgai tribe, the other to make sure of the election of at least two Qashgai candidates, since no one disapproved of by the Qashgai is likely to get elected from Firuzabad. The Shah has, however, sent orders to General Jahanbani that he is to prevent at all costs the election of Nasir from Shiraz and to tell him that he will be accepted as a candidate for Firuzabad, the centre of his influence, only after he has handed over the Germans and surrendered Persian Government arms in possession of the tribe.

Western Azerbaijan

10. Kurdish chiefs of Western Azerbaijan were recently summoned to Rezaiah by the Governor-General and admonished to keep the peace. The advice of the Governor-General was supported by the *Sanat* at Urmia. There is little disorder at present beyond occasional pillaging of villages, particularly by the Jalali Kurds of the Maku district.

Russian Affairs

11. Reports have been current in Tehran for some days of large increases in Russian garrisons in North Persia and of the impending arrival in Qazvin of several Russian general officers. No confirmation has yet been received of these reports. The Russian authorities say that fresh troops have arrived in Persia but that they are in relief of the troops now here.

12. The elections in Tabriz are still in suspense owing to the continued manoeuvres by the Russians to secure the election of their approved candidates. His Majesty's Consul-General considers that these candidates would have no success in free elections against the candidates put up by the landed and merchant classes, since Azerbaijan is still essentially conservative, but that, if the Russians were really determined on the election of their nominees, they might be successful, such is the fear of possible Russian reprisals. Azerbaijan still remains without a Governor-General owing to Russian opposition to every official suggested by the Persian Government.

13. Two prominent members of the Armenian Dashnak party have recently been arrested in Tabriz, one by the Persian police at the request of the Russians, the other by the Russians themselves.

14. The committee that was formed by the order of the Shah under the presidency of Sir Paul Aron Alford for the purpose of raising funds to relieve distress in Russia has announced that no further collections are to be made and that the committee will be dissolved as soon as the money collected and accounts have been received from the provinces. See also Summary No. 2, paragraph 18.

Polish Affairs

15. M. Henryk Strasburger, Polish Minister of State in the Middle East, has arrived in Tehran on a visit to the Polish refugees.

Free French Affairs

16. The report in paragraph 21 of Summary No. 2/44 that M. Pierre Lafond has arrived in Tehran is premature.

Tehran, 30th January, 1944

[E 1070 422 36]

No. 14

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 16th February)

(No. 54.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him Summary No. 5 for the period of 31st January to 6th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 7th February, 1944

Enclosure in No. 14

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 5 for the Period
31st January to 6th February, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political.

1. The date announced for the opening of the Majlis is the 26th February and not the 22nd as stated in paragraph 1 of Summary No. 4/44. Meanwhile there is much preliminary intriguing going on among the Deputies and by the Court.

2. The Tudeh party is being supported by supporters of Nasir Qashgai against alleged Government interference in the elections of Fars. The Government is endeavouring to secure the election in Fars of candidates favourable to himself. The Government is represented only in the Qashgai interest. The reason for the Tudeh, that is, Russian, encouragement of Qashgai candidates is not clear. It is certainly not helpful to British interests in Fars.

3. Several police officials have been put on trial on charges of having been concerned in the death of certain prominent Persians during the reign of Reza Shah. They include Colonel Radsar, lately chief of police and Mukhtari, his predecessor, who is already undergoing a sentence of imprisonment. Defending counsel alleged that Reza Shah, who he alleged was the man really responsible for the deaths, had been brought to trial.

4. The Central Committee of the Tudeh party has announced that every member of the party is to pay 10 per cent. of his income for one month to the party office as a contribution to the fund for the relief of distress in Russia.

Economic.

5. Dr. Milspough has published a regulation which calls attention to the fact that the Government has been put to heavy loss through contracts and agreements concluded by various departments of Government. He therefore orders that no convention or agreement involving Government revenues, financial commitments or the cession or use of Government property shall be concluded without the approval of himself as Administrator-General of Finance.

Two contracts where the Persian Government has lost heavily are those for the sale to the Russians of rice and of arms and ammunition manufactured in the Government factories.

6. It is stated in the press that in accordance with the terms of the Soviet-Persian Commercial Agreement the Soviet has delivered in exchange for rice —

1,485,000 metres of cloth
 55,000 metres of silk textiles
 Knitted goods to the value of 1,723,000 rials.
 Crockery and earthenware to the value of 2,075,000 rials
 Bottles to the value of 850,000 rials.
 Newsprint to the value of 1,757,000 rials.
 Thread to the value of 812,000 rials.

7. The Anti-Hoarding Department announces that 2,000 charges of offences against anti-hoarding laws have been laid before the courts. There have been forty-eight convictions and 127 acquittals.

B. Nasir Qasbi may be realizing that both the Shah and the Persian Government (some members of it) are considering measures to prevent him from

... He is aware that General Jahanshahi has ... Shiraz and the election of his nominees ... that General Jahanshahi is reporting to ... cannot succeed with Nasir and Khoarow ... overtures to His Majesty's Consul, but there is no ... are any more genuine than ...

10. The situation is likely to increase unrest in Fars. A band of robbers alleged to have been assisted by Qashgai tribesmen ... Kazerun, whose inhabitants had been expressing loyalty ... 8th February a punitive ... who are reported to have ...

... operations for the disarmament of ... Ali Ismail, the rebel leader, and ... hills and are ...

Kuk : Gulu

12. Dismissal of ... the Bahmai and ...

Azerbaijan

13. ... between the Turkmen and the ... of the ... reports that there had been some ... dispute has been settled by the inter- ... of the Zaidaranlu ... a notorious robber of the ... reported to have been killed in a fight with Persian gendarmes on the 27th February.

Western Azerbaijan

15. In the latter half of January Kurds from Persia ... a Turkish village of the ... result as the latter were powerless. The Turkish Consul then appealed to the Russians, who arrested the culprits and handed them over to the Persians.

British Affairs

16. His Majesty's Legation in Tehran has been raised to an Embassy, as also has the American Legation.
17. Lord Knollys, chairman of the British Overseas Airways Corporation, and other officials of the company visited Tehran from the 10th to the 12th February.

Russian Affairs

18. Reports regarding alleged large increases in the number of Soviet troops in Persia ... that it is natural to suspect that these reports are being deliberately put about for some definite purpose. Those who believe them attribute these increases to a Soviet desire to bring pressure on either Persia or Turkey. They have caused some alarm in Persian circles and there is information that the Russian Embassy has been showing some concern about them. The Soviet military attaché has stated that there is no truth in them, there have been some reliefs and exchanges of garrisons, but the only increase is a Pioneer Regiment for work on the roads. From other sources it is known that there has been no noticeable increase at Meshed, Tabriz or Kazvin.

19. The announcement recently made by the Soviet Government to the effect ... foreign relations and to maintain their own armica has awakened gloomy forebodings in Persian minds. They foresee that in the near future Soviet representation in Persia will be reinforced by Ministers from Soviet Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Turkmenistan. They expect to find Soviet Azerbaijan plotting to ... Turkmenistan holding out open arms to Persian Turkomans.

20. A formal meeting of the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society (see Summary No 2 44 paragraph 17) was held on the 6th February. The Soviet Ambassador, who is honorary president of the society, said that its purpose was to bring together the savants and intellectuals of the two countries with a view to increasing friendship and understanding between Persia and Russia. The Executive Committee of the society includes Saeed, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hamid Sayyah, Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Zand, Minister for War, General Yazdan Panah.

21. The Soviet Embassy recently introduced to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs a colonel of the Red Army as liaison officer with the Persian gendarmerie. This officer asked the commandant of the gendarmerie to provide him with office accommodation in gendarmerie headquarters to ensure that liaison was constant and intimate. The real purpose presumably was to offset the influence of the American Chief of Gendarmerie. The request was politely refused.

22. For some months past a Russian officer with a staff has been stationed at Turbat. Sheikh Jam (75 miles south-east of Meshed) where he has been buying horses. A reliable source estimates the number of horses bought and sent to Russia as 1,600-1,700. Another source says that 800 of these were smuggled into Persia from Afghanistan.

23. Queen Fowzieh attended the final meeting of the committee organised to raise funds for the relief of distress in Russia (see Summary No. 4 paragraph 14). The President, Sipahbod Ahmadi, announced that 6 million rials had been collected and the Queen authorised the remittance of that amount to the Soviet Embassy.

American Affairs

24. On the 11th February the Shah was flown via Isfahan and Ahadeh to Abadan in General Connolly's aircraft. At Abadan he visited the American Aircraft Assembly Plant and lunched with the staff before returning to Tehran. He was accompanied by General Connolly, the Prime Minister the Minister of Communications, General Yazdan Panah and Razmara and some American officers. This is only the Shah's second flight. His first was also in an American machine, with Mr Wendell Wilkie.

Tehran, 13th February, 1944

16. Largely through the inspiration of officers of the Indian Army Medical Services a medical society has been formed in Tehran which includes British, American, Indian, Russian, Persian and Polish doctors. They hold periodical meetings to the great benefit of Persian doctors.

Russian Affairs

17. There is still no confirmation of the rumours of large increases of Russian troops in North Persia referred to in Summary No. 6/44, paragraph 18. The Turkish Vice-Consul at Rezaieh, who may be relied on to have investigated the matter, reports that there has been no increase west of Lake Urmieh. He estimates the present Russian garrison at Rezaieh at 500-600 and approximately similar numbers at Shahpur, Khoi, Maku, Bazargan. He states that from the junction of the Turkish and Iraq frontiers to Shahpur there are not more than five Russian posts of thirty to forty men each in the vicinity of the Persian Turkish frontier. An unusually large number of junior officers has, however, been noticed in both Tabriz and Qazvin.

18. General Yusefovich has relieved General Gaidukov at Tabriz in command of Soviet troops in North West Persia.

19. M. Nikolai Klimov has arrived in Kermanshah as Soviet Consul.

20. The Soviet Civil Hospital in Tehran, to which reference was made in Summary No. 31/44, paragraph 18, is now advertising daily in the Persian press to attract the usual medical attention it offers physiotherapy, dentistry, treatment of venereal diseases (with a private door), bacteriological examination, beauty treatment, mud baths with mud from Lake Urmieh and private "luxury" maternity wards.

American Affairs

21. Following on his trip by American aircraft to the American aircraft assembly plant at A. V. ... the Shah, who was accompanied by the Queen, visited on the 18th February the very well-equipped camp of American troops at Amirabad near Tehran.

Tehran, 20th February, 1944

1525 422 341

No 17

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. — (Received 8th March)

(No. 92)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the period of the 21st to 27th February, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 28th February, 1944

Enclosure in No. 17

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 8 for the Period
21st 27th February, 1944

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Shah opened the Majlis on the 26th February. In his speech, after referring to the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, to Persia's declaration of war and to the Tehran Declaration, he stated that his first object was that the Constitutional Law should reign supreme throughout the whole structure of the country and that each of the three "powers" (he presumably referred to the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary) should within the spheres allotted to them by the Fundamental Law spare no effort to fulfil the duties legally imposed on them so that the Government could devote all its energies to the improvement of social and economic conditions, with particular regard to

public health and education. To this end it would be necessary to endeavour to develop the resources of the country, particularly its agriculture and its mines. His second object was to improve general security and to establish order throughout the country. This required the strengthening and increase of the security forces. It was also his object to ensure the independence of the Judiciary. These three objects were the basis of his policy between the Majlis and the Government. He, for his part, would always support progressive and patriotic parties and all those who strove for the happiness of the nation.

2. Amir Jang Bakhtiari was elected temporary President of the Majlis. A new election will be held as soon as the credentials of two-thirds of the Deputies have been accepted. This will probably take three to four weeks, and no legislation can be effected until it is completed.

3. The Soviet announcement that republics of the U.S.S.R. would in future have freedom in their foreign relations has aroused particular interest in Azerbaijan. His Majesty's Consul General at Tabriz reports that Moslem opinion generally regards it not as a change of heart but as a move of political expediency. Always sensitive to any sign of increasing Soviet penetration, the Azerbaijan Moslems fear that the new principle opens up possibilities of a greater Azerbaijan; Armenians, on the other hand, welcome the step. They are generally anxious to see the stabilisation of Soviet influence in Azerbaijan in the hope that it will bring about a more peaceful Persia.

4. The Ministry of the Interior has announced the release after investigation of twenty three of the *détenues* arrested at the request of the Allies (see Summary No. 6/44 paragraph 3).

5. The absconding priest, Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani got enough votes in the Tehran elections to put him among the successful candidates. In order to give the Persian Government good grounds for declaring him ineligible for election, if they wish to make use of them, the British Embassy has published a statement showing Kashani's intimate connexion with Mayer and with German plots in Persia.

6. The trial of certain officials of the police for complicity in the murder of certain Persian notables in the reign of Reza Shah is finished (see Summary No. 5/44, paragraph 3). One of the accused has been sentenced to death, three others to imprisonment for life ten and nine years respectively.

Economic.

7. Dr. Millspaugh has issued a circular to all officials of the Finance Department in the provinces stressing the Finance Ministry's policy on monopoly goods—that is, cloth, tea and sugar—should be distributed regularly and impartially. Where stocks are available, distribution should continue or begin at once. Demands should be forwarded to the Ministry for supplies necessary to maintain at all times stocks sufficient for six months' consumption. In each distribution centre a commission is to be formed of the Finance Agent, the Bakshdar and reliable local notabilities to control distribution in the villages and in tribal areas. The distribution within the village or the tribe is to be entrusted to a committee of local notabilities. These local committees will prepare a list of the inhabitants of their village or tribal units, with the number of their identity cards, which will form the basis for the supply of monopoly goods. Finance agents are to see that the people are aware of the quantity of goods issued for distribution and their prices.

8. The Ministry has created a special section for the Ministry of Finance which will control the Departments of Transport, Rationing and Distribution, formerly controlled by the Price Stabilisation Section. The duties of this section are: the rationing of all monopoly goods except grain and bread, the transport of such goods for distribution to the appropriate centres; their distribution to the consumer; and the administration of Government markets. Goods will be available from the day they are notified by the Procurement Department to be available, if produced locally.

9. The Minister of Commerce and Industry (General Shafai) has resigned on the ostensible grounds that the Administrator-General of Finance has refused funds for the payment of the wages of employees of the munition factories working for the Russians (see Summary No. 7/44, paragraph 3). Dr. Millspaugh, however, has advised the press that he would demand the payment of wages to employees of the factories of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry for the month that ended on the 21st February, but he considered that State

factories should be self-supporting and should not be dependent on subsidies, as were the munition factories. He hoped shortly to make arrangements that would render these subsidies unnecessary. The necessity for the subsidising of the State munition factories arises from the omission of the Russians to pay for any of the products they take.

10. The interest to be paid on the Treasury bonds, whose impending issue was reported in Summary No. 7/44, paragraph 5, is 4 per cent. per annum on the three-month bonds and 4½ per cent. on the six-month bonds.

11. His Majesty's Consul at Bandar Abbas reports that 25,000 tons of red oxide have accumulated at Hormuz awaiting buyers.

Appointments—Civil

12. (i) Ruhmut Atabegi to the Persian Consul at Beirut

(ii) The new chief of police, Muhammad Hussein Mirza Jahanbani, has been given the police rank of Sarpas, equivalent to brigadier.

Army

Persian Forces

13. One of the Russian inspired Persian papers recently commented on the alleged decision of the Soviet Government to present to the Persian army the full equipment for a motorised formation, consisting of aircraft, artillery, tanks, anti-aircraft guns and motor vehicles. One of the defects, it said, of the Persian army of to-day was that it had no experience of fighting or knowledge of modern weapons. If the news was true, then the gift would do much to remedy these defects and to inspire the officers with a new spirit. But officers should remember that, although discipline should inspire the army, it should never be allowed to develop into blind obedience. An officer was first a man and he must not allow himself to be used against the people. The training that personnel of the Persian army would receive from the Russians in these new arms would teach them the real spirit of soldiering and enable them to found a well trained military organisation.

14. There is as yet no reason to believe that the Russians have offered anything more than the thirty-five tanks and thirty aircraft mentioned in Summary No. 4/44 paragraph 4. It was stated in the presumably inspired press article that the Russians have the intention of offering to establish mixed Russian-Persian regiments of tanks and aircraft.

It may also be interpreted as an invitation to accept the authority of the American advisers should the Government decide to invest them with authority.

A Russian offer to establish mixed Russian-Persian regiments of tanks and aircraft. There is no reason to believe that the Russians have offered anything more than the thirty-five tanks and thirty aircraft even without conditions. It is likely that there would be violent opposition to the formation of mixed regiments if the suggestion were known to the public.

Gendarmerie

10. The contract for the engagement of Colonel Schwarzkopf and a mission of American officers for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie includes the following conditions:

- (i) The task of the mission is to advise and assist the Persian Ministry of the Interior in reorganising the gendarmerie.
- (ii) The period of the engagement of the mission shall be for a minimum of two years, i.e., until the 1st October, 1945. It can be cancelled at three months' notice on either side and it may be renewed after the expiry of two years.
- (iii) Officers of the mission will serve in the rank they hold in the American army or in any higher rank they may be given by the Persian Government. They will take precedence over all Persian officers of equivalent rank.
- (iv) The head of the mission shall have "control of gendarmerie organisation for the duration of this contract and he will take precedence over all officers of the Imperial Gendarmerie. He is in direct charge of the control and organisation (of the gendarmerie) and has the right to make proposals to the Shah, through the Minister of the Interior, for the promotion, appointment, degrading or dismissal of all ranks of the gendarmerie. No other person has the right to interfere."

- (v) The Persian Government agrees that during the period of this contract it will not engage officers of any other Power for work with the gendarmerie.
- (vi) All members of the mission undertake not to disclose to any national of a foreign Power official secrets learnt in the course of their duties.

Internal Security

Kuh-e-Nar

17. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, and General Jahanbani are now in Khuzestan concerting politico-military measures to induce the Bahmai to surrender some arms. Meanwhile, Persian troops have been concentrated at Rud-i-Zard. It is likely that the Bahmai will surrender sufficient arms to save the face of the Government authorities and avert military operations.

18. The Persian commander in Khuzestan reports that Abdullal Zarghampur Boir Ahmadi has handed over fifteen light machine guns, one mortar and some other equipment taken at Semirum, but only one rifle. In return, he was asking to be given authority over the Dushmanziari and one section of the Taivibi. He also reported that the Boir Ahmadi were handing the Germans back to the Qashgai.

British Affairs

19. During the last ten months a mobile dispensary, provided by Persia and Iraq Force, under a British officer, has been touring tribal areas. The result of this evidence of the interest of the British authorities in the welfare of the tribes has been wholly good. The visits of the dispensary have been welcomed and it has been hospitably received; genuine gratitude has been shown for the attentions of the medical officer. Much valuable information about conditions in the tribes has been obtained. The tribes visited include Arabs, Lurs, Kurds, Bakhtiari, Qashgai, Mamassanni and some sections of the Boir Ahmadi. Many more of these dispensaries could be employed with advantage.

Russian Affairs

20. In Tabriz there are many rumours of the impending arrival of large numbers of Russian civilians who, it is alleged, will be sent to Persia to take advantage of the plentiful supplies of food in the north. Some officers' families have arrived, and His Majesty's Consul General reports that the Russians are renting and requisitioning additional accommodation. There are large quantities of surplus grain, which should be, but are not, sent to Tehran, and of dried fruits, whose export from the province is prevented by the Russians. The latter are buying large numbers of animals and quantities of butter and vegetables for export, with the result that the prices of these commodities are rising.

21. M. Krusakov has arrived in Isfahan as Russian Consul.

Chinese Affairs

22. A Chinese goodwill mission, which has been in England and Turkey, has arrived in Tehran as guests of the Persian Government.

Tehran, 27th February, 1944

[E 1862 423 34]

No. 18

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th March)

(No. 116.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the period the 6th to the 12th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 13th March, 1944

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 10 for the period 0th March to 12th March 1944**Persian Affairs**Political*

1. The expected attack in the Majlis on the credentials of Seyyid Zia ed Din was made not by the Tudeh party Deputies, but by Dr. Musaddiq (Musaddiq or Sultaneh—FO 195, M.A. 184). It was based not on the legality of his recent election for Yazd, but on his unsuitability to be a Deputy owing to his having acted against the legally constituted Government of Persia by his participation in the *coup d'état* of 1921, which brought Reza Khan to power. Dr. Musaddiq at that time was Governor General of Fars, and refused to recognise the Government formed by Seyyid Zia. In the course of his speech and Seyyid Zia's reply much old history was retold, not always accurately. The old story which finds, and perhaps always will find, many believers, that the *coup d'état* was engineered by the British was brought out to show that Seyyid Zia must then have been a British tool and to support the suggestion that he had been brought back to Persia in the interests of British policy. In his reply Seyyid Zia made a good impression on the Deputies, and the result of the debate is to improve his standing in political circles. He was supported by the Tudeh party, but Dr. Musaddiq maintained his old reputation as an emotional demagogue, possibly well intentioned but certainly misguided.

2. Attempts were made during the two days' debate on Seyyid Zia's credentials to organise demonstrations against him by crowds assembled outside the Majlis. The Tudeh party is accused of organising these demonstrations. Seyyid Zia's supporters are also accused of having taken counter demonstrations.

3. Certain recent events have tended to disturb public opinion and to shake public confidence in Great Britain's ability to guarantee the fulfilment of the League of Nations Covenant. These events are: firstly, the announcement of the departure of the British Military Mission from Turkey and the knowledge that Turkey had refused to commit herself to the side of the Allies; secondly, Mr. Churchill's statement that the end of the European War might not come this year; and, thirdly, the British attitude to Poland and Yugoslavia, which is interpreted as an indignation of British subservience to Russian wishes.

Economic

4. Reports from the provinces of Isfahan and Fars indicate anxiety about the coming harvest owing to shortage of snow and rain. In areas of South-East Fars the crops are already considered to have failed and famine conditions to be imminent. See also Summary No. 9 44, paragraph 8.

Appointments

5. Afshar Sandlu to be Farmandar of Khorramabad.

*Internal Security**North-west*

6. A column of Persian troops, some 1,500 strong, has marched peacefully through the Bahmai country and was to go on to Izeh (Mafumir) in Janaki, the scene of a minor disaster to Persian troops in May 1943, since when the area has not known them. The column was accompanied by General Jahanbani and Mortaza Quli Bakhtiari. The Bahmai surrendered some arms and the military commanders have brought to notice at an appropriate moment, the Noruz promotions being under consideration, that they dare venture into tribal country. It is a serious situation in the Bahmai region, but it is a step towards peace.

Fars

7. There is further reliable evidence of the increase of Nasir Qashgar's influence throughout Fars. In addition to the Mamasani whose inclination towards Nasir was reported in last week's summary, the Khamseh tribes are now reported to be drifting into his orbit. It is true that General Jahanbani's policy, which is partly imposed on him by the weakness of the Government and partly by his own propensity to seek the immediate easy way, is keeping the peace for the

moment, but it is creating a serious problem which the Government will have to tackle some day. And if the tribes do not create disturbances during the spring migration it will be a proof of the strength of Nasir's influence over them rather than of their fear of reprisals by Government. It is a reasonable hope that Nasir will endeavour to show that he can keep the tribes in order.

Russian Affairs

8. The report in Summary No. 9 44, paragraph 17, to the effect that there is now to be a unified Soviet command in Persia has been confirmed. An officer Lieutenant-General Sovietnikov, senior to Lieutenant-General Gaidukov, has arrived to take up this command. Gaidukov remains as deputy Commander-in-chief and Major General Erishkevitch has been appointed Chief of Staff. It is understood that the Transportation command under General Kargin remains independent and continues to be under the direct orders of Moscow.

9. More authentic reports than the rumours recently circulating have been received of an increase of Russian troops along the Persian-Turkish frontier notably at Shahpur, Khor and Bazirgan. The reports come from two sources and speak of considerable numbers, but it should not yet be accepted that these are more than normal reliefs.

British Affairs

10. The Commander-in-chief, Persia and Iraq Force, visited Tehran during the week.

11. On the 9th March Sir Reader Bullard presented his Letters of Credence to the Shah on his appointment as ambassador.

Tehran, 12th March, 1944

E 1084 422 241

No. 19

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th March)

(No. 125)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Summary No. 11 for the period 13th to 19th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 20th March, 1944

Enclosure in No. 10

(Secret.)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 11 for the Period 13th 19th March, 1944**Persian Affairs**Political*

1. IN accordance with custom, the Government resigned as soon as the new Majlis was legally constituted. At a secret session a majority of the Deputies decided to recommend to the Shah that Muhammad Sa'ed, Minister for Foreign Affairs since June 1942, should be asked to form a new Cabinet. The Shah has accepted this advice. It is expected that the new Cabinet will not differ greatly from the old. Sa'ed is an honest and well meaning gentleman, without initiative, ambition or power of organisation or leadership. He, however, starts with a moral advantage, in that he did not, like the previous Ministers, at least not had to make promises for the future to Deputies and others to secure their support.

2. Mirza Mohammad Sadiq Tabataba'i has been elected President of the Majlis, narrowly defeating Dr. Musaddiq. Malikmadani and Amir Taimur have been elected Vice-Presidents.

3. The Tudeh press in a series of violent articles is venting the disappointment felt by the party at the failure of the attempt to unseat Seyyid Zia. Popular opinion regards Seyyid Zia's success as a defeat for the Shah and the Russians and a victory for the British.

Economic

4. Increases of pay have been sanctioned by the Government to sugar factory employees of 30 per cent., and to telephone workers, who were recently on strike, of 70 per cent. on salaries up to 1,000 rials per mensem with, in addition, a cost-of-living allowance. The workers in the Tehran Silo have now gone on strike as a protest against the delay in giving them certain promised concessions. They are preventing access to the Silo and the unloading of lorries bringing in wheat, thus dislocating the programme of the collection of grain.

5. The Persian press announces the arrival in Tehran of American and British oil concession hunters interested in that part of Persia not covered by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession.

Appointments—Civil

6. Shahab ud Douleh (Shams ud Mulk Ara) (F.O. 193 M.A. 31) to be Farmandar of Kurdistan.

*Internal Security**Fars*

7. Abdullah Zarghanpur, Boir Ahmadi, has written to Nasir Qashgai informing him that the Tayyibi and Bahmai tribes have appealed to him for help against the Persian military operations for their disarmament (see Summary No. 10 44, paragraph 8). He wanted Nasir's advice and to be assured of his support. A British officer was visiting Nasir when this message was received, and he reports that Nasir was greatly upset. He accused the British of instigating these operations as preliminary steps for the disarmament of the tribes, he threatened danger to the oil fields and lire and sword from Khuzestan to Persian Baluchistan. There is, in fact, no present intention of attempting to disarm the Tayyibi, but it is perhaps significant that the report that the Persian forces had even the hardihood to venture to challenge these relatively weak tribes was sufficient to cause Nasir so much concern. He may not be so confident of his position as recent reports have indicated.

Kurdistan

8. By agreement between Persian and Iraq authorities, Bani Lam tribesmen, suffering from a shortage of grazing in Iraq, were allowed to move their flocks into the Pusht-i Kuh area of Persian territory. Some clashes occurred with Persian gendarmes who attempted to confiscate the rifles which the Arab tribes had brought with them.

Western Azerbaijan

9. The disturbances near Shahpur, referred to in Summary No. 9 44, paragraph 15, were created by Shikak Kurds as a protest against the levy from them of 800 sheep to be delivered to the Turkish authorities as compensation for a recent sheep-stealing raid by Persian Kurds in Turkish territory. The Shikak pleaded that they were not the culprits. They, however, obeyed the order of the Soviet Consul to return to their homes.

Russian Affairs

10. Further reports have been received which tend to confirm that increases have been taken place in Russian garrisons in Khor-Shepur and Razangan on the Perso-Turkish frontier. Moreover, the Persian authorities have been asked to deliver urgently additional quantities of barley, much of which is being despatched to Khor. If increases have taken place, they do not necessarily have any particular significance. The Russians frequently charter their troops in Persia, and there are sometimes more, sometimes less. At the present moment there is a tendency to attach undue significance to any reports of Russian movements near the Turkish frontier.

American Affairs

11. The Government has sanctioned the engagement of an American with two assistants as expert advisers to the Tehran Municipality.

Tehran, 19th March, 1944

CHAPTER IV.—SAUDI ARABIA.

E 1293 1203 25]

No 20

Mr. Jordan to Mr. Euan.—(Received 20th February)

No 21)

Sir,

Jedda, 15th February, 1944

IN accordance with the instructions contained in Viscount Halifax's circular of the 4th November, 1939, I have the honour to transmit to you here-
w Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1943

I am indebted to Mr. T. Wikeley for his assistance in the preparation of this report.

I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East, and to the Political Intelligence Centre, Middle East.

I have, &c.

S R JORDAN

Enclosure in No 20

*Annual Report on Saudi Arabia for 1943**Introduction*

HIS Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Saudi Arabia were most cordial throughout the year and Ibn Saud gave multiple evidence of his friendship and complete trust in His Majesty's Government.

2. The high lights of the year were the departure of the Vichy Minister and the withdrawal of the Saudi Minister from Vichy, the departure of the German and Italian internees, both military and civil, Ibn Saud's attitude over the question of Arab unity, the greater interest being shown in this country by the United States, and, finally, a successful pilgrimage of some 42,000 persons, headed by the King, to the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina.

3. Mr. Stophewer Bird left Jedda on the 15th December, 1942, and Mr. T. Wikeley acted as His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires until the 2nd September, 1943, when Mr. Jordan arrived. The latter left for Riyadh soon after his arrival and presented his credentials to His Majesty the King in person on the 19th September, 1943.

Arab Affairs

4. The Arabs probably made more noise and caused more ink to flow (activities in which they are highly proficient) during 1943 than in any recent year. The ball of Arab unity, more or less quiescent at the opening of the year, was given a hefty kick in February by the Prime Minister of Iraq. The rest of the year was spent by the Arab leaders in pushing the ball back and forth in an indecisive and unco-ordinated manner. Never once did a team emerge capable of planting the ball firmly between the goal posts. Ibn Saud was, naturally, interested in the game, but his efforts were largely confined to pushing the ball of which he had taken possession away from those who were endeavouring to approach it. If, in spite of his efforts, it came too close, he appealed to the referee (His Majesty's Government) either to take it away from him or to tell him how and where to kick it. If other Arab leaders had shown the same faith in the referee's honour and wisdom, much unnecessary trouble would have been avoided.

5. Ibn Saud believes that Arab countries should be independent, but he is far too wise a statesman to allow his petty jealousies to prevent him from being able to sink their petty jealousies to form a strong federation for a long time to come. Until that distant day he considers that His Majesty's Government must continue to guide and control the destinies of the Arab world.

6. Ibn Saud is deeply sceptical of the efforts of Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt, and he realises they will be some distance off. This scepticism coloured all the King's reactions to the various proposals put forward during the year regarding Arab unity and allied matters. General Nuri's proposal, early in the year, for a joint *démarche* of the Arab States to His Majesty's Government and the United States Government regarding Palestine was being received by Ibn Saud, who refused to move unless given a lead by His Majesty's Government.

In particular, he was reluctant to bring the United States into the picture, though he eventually approached the United States Government himself in the shape of a personal letter to President Roosevelt (see paragraph 13 below). The various proposals for an Arab conference which were produced by several Arab leaders throughout the year found Ibn Saud equally reluctant, especially as, at the time, he was in a position to be left out in the cold. Apart from his innate suspicions of Nuri and Nabaa, he thought, and no doubt rightly, that such a conference would achieve nothing except general confusion and possible embarrassment to His Majesty's Government and the Allies in their war effort. It was only when the idea of a full conference was abandoned in favour of a series of confidential talks between Arab leaders in Cairo, and then only after repeated reassurances from His Majesty's Government, that Ibn Saud consented to move. In September he received an envoy from the Egyptian Prime Minister.

7. The general question of the future of the Arab States could not, of course, be discussed without particular reference to Syria and Palestine. Ibn Saud is particularly interested in Syria, in the hope, possibly, that a strong and independent Syria will provide him with a useful ally against Iraq and Egypt. Nuri's proposals for a "greater Syria," including Palestine and Transjordan, were regarded by Ibn Saud as a device to advance the fortunes of the Hashimite family, and were in consequence very distasteful to him. Throughout the year, however, he watched the course of events in Syria with the greatest care, and gave valuable advice to the Syrian leaders. In particular, during the Lebanese crisis at the end of the year he warned the Syrians and Lebanese to watch their step, and to avoid any action which might lead to a further oppressive action.

8. Palestine received its share of Ibn Saud's attention. He submitted to His Majesty's Government his fears regarding Zionist activities, and he received reassurances regarding His Majesty's Government's policy. He objected to Nuri Pasha's proposal to include Palestine in a "greater Syria," and he made his views regarding the Palestine question clear to the United States Government. The hope, which seems to have been held in some quarters in America, that Ibn Saud would be won over to the Zionist cause was shattered once and for all when Colonel Hoskins, President Roosevelt's personal representative, visited Riyadh. At the end of the visit, the King would receive Dr. Weizmann. The answer was in the categorical negative, and it revealed the King's attitude towards the Zionists through the intermediary of Mr. Philby with an offer of £20 million if he would disinterest himself in the fate of Palestine. The King had considered himself insulted by such an offer, and his answer had been scathing. It later transpired that this money was not intended wholly as a bribe to Ibn Saud, but rather to go towards the rehabilitation of Arabs who would be transferred from Palestine to areas under purely Arab control.

Relations with Foreign Powers

9. In all the mass of Arab intrigues, jealousies and mutual recriminations which were such a pronounced feature of the year, Ibn Saud took no step without consulting His Majesty's Government and following their advice. The same is true of his increasingly important contacts with the United States of America. Indeed, far from trying to play the United States off against Britain, a bait that any ordinary Arab would have swallowed with glee, he was reluctant to commit himself too far with the United States, and he had, sometimes, to be gently pushed by His Majesty's Government along the road to greater understanding and co-operation with that country. After Iraq's declaration of war against the Axis, a step which Ibn Saud regarded with an ironical eye, he enquired whether His Majesty's Government would like him to change his own attitude (of report for 1942, second paragraph), and he would no doubt have declared war against the Axis if His Majesty's Government had so wished, but they did not. He sent warm and undoubtedly sincere congratulations to His Majesty's Government on the capture of Tunis, and the capitulation of Italy, and which vindicated the faith he has always shown in an ultimate Allied victory, and which increased his already great reputation as a statesman in the Arab world. His speech to the people of Saudi Arabia at Mecca at the end of the year was full of praise for Britain and it will no doubt have beneficial effects far beyond the borders of Saudi Arabia. He behaved very well at the beginning of the year, a British army contingent entered Saudi Arabia from Transjordan

without permission or previous warning, in order to carry out certain observations in connexion with the survey of Transjordan. He waited patiently for an explanation and accepted it without demur. The activities of the survey party were called off by General Headquarters. He also permitted a locust mission composed chiefly of large army units to operate throughout his domains.

10. Ibn Saud's relations with other Powers were, on the whole, fairly good. His Majesty's Government regarding the way in which he was being treated by the British Government. He was particularly annoyed by the restriction in the summer of a zone along the Saudi-Iraqi frontier within which severe restrictions were imposed upon the movements of tribesmen and their livestock. He considered this an infringement of his treaty rights, which, *inter alia*, stipulate that Saudi tribesmen shall be free to move across and in the area in question. The other causes of friction were minor matters in themselves, but the continued failure of the Iraqi Government to pay any attention to any of Ibn Saud's protests produced an angry outburst in which the King even mentioned the possibility of resorting to force if he did not obtain satisfaction.

11. Relations with Syria were close, Ibn Saud playing the part of mentor in the Syrian world affairs. Egypt and Transjordan, with whom in the past Ibn Saud's relations have not been happy, gave him little cause for complaint in 1943. In particular there was a pleasing absence of recriminations with Transjordan about frontier violations, &c. The Amir Abdulla, however, by his ill-considered manifesto concerning Arab federation in April caused Ibn Saud great offence. Ibn Saud is watching the situation in that country with great care. There were some signs that the Imam is beginning to realise the value to the Arab world of Ibn Saud's prestige and statesmanship. Relations with the Persian Gulf States were normal and amicable. The ratification of the Kuwait Agreements were exchanged at Jeddah on the 1st May.

12. Ibn Saud's relations with the United States took a big step forward during the year. The King has all along been reluctant to travel either fast or far along the road leading to closer contact with the United States. The United States Government is still rather an unknown quantity for him, and he is anxious concerning the possible repercussions of extensive American activities in the Near East. He expressed his fears in at least one message to His Majesty's Government in which he said bluntly that he preferred Britain to guide the destinies of the Arab States rather than America. He considers Britain, with her long record of co-operation with and friendship for the Arabs, can manage the Near East quite well by herself and that there is no need for America to butt in. There is some evidence to show that he fears His Majesty's Government may decide to disinterest themselves in the Near East and allow their place to be taken by America.

13. Saudi Arabia has been declared eligible for Lend Lease. The announcement of this was made to Ibn Saud in Riyadh by Mr. Kirk in April, and the King immediately asked His Majesty's Government what it all meant and whether he should agree. He was reassured, and by the end of the year, after a certain quantity of badly needed Lend-Lease material had arrived, his anxiety at this new, and to him strange, development seemed to have worn off. United States interest in Saudi Arabia, which is, of course, based on the need for oil, was also shown by the promotion of their representative in Jeddah to the rank of Minister Resident, and by the unprecedented flow of American visitors, most of them official. Mr. Kirk, who was then the United States Minister to this country, visited Riyadh in April. He was followed by General H. H. Arnold and by Colonel Hoskins. These three questioned the King exhaustively on many subjects, but the main object of their visit was to discover the King's views on Arab questions, Palestine, Syria, &c. Ibn Saud made his views quite clear in many talks with these visitors and in a special message and a letter to President Roosevelt. The United States Government should therefore be fully informed of the King's views, and they have no further excuse for the ignorance which was displayed by the President's message to Ibn Saud regarding Weizmann (see paragraph 8).

14. Other American visitors were less important. They included, in the spring, a delegation from *Life* who eventually produced a long article about Saudi Arabia in their magazine which was notable for its inaccuracies and for the offence it gave by its references to the King's connubial affairs. Mr. Gunter, of the United States Treasury, visited the country in October to investigate

15. The Vichy Legation was closed by the departure of M. Baudouin on 19 February 1944.

FINANCE

Finch

17 His Majesty's Government subsidised Ibn Saud to the extent of

Riyala	+++	+++	+++	+++	+++	5,000,000
Suqumelona						200,000

A further 8 million riyals were supplied at the end of the year by the United States under Lend Lease and a further 7 million.

18. The Saudi budget for 1943 showed a deficit of 30 million riyals.

\$9 During the year the Saudi Government received an advance of 1 million

1871. 1872. 1873. 1874. 1875.

Pilgrimage

Pilgrimages

22. No Indian pilgrims made the pilgrimage, and Ibn Saud at the usual

23. Only one unfortunate incident marked an otherwise successful

Miscellaneous

Versilloneous

25 *Netherlands Trading Society*.—This firm, who act as bankers in Jedda, indeed the only real bank in the country, have for some years only been

28 *Meteorological*—Ibu Saud gave permission for a party operating under the control of the Royal Air Force to establish meteorological stations at Jauf

27 *Locusts*.—A greatly extended anti-locust campaign was planned and is being carried out in Saudi Arabia with the permission of Ibn Saud and the

26. *Arms.*—Ibn Saud has requested to be supplied with certain quantities of arms and ammunition for his soldiers. A great part of the year was spent in

29. *Royal Family* - The King continued in good health throughout the year and kept firm control of all his vast dominions. There was some trouble amongst

No. 21

(Secret.)

1 General

Two of our officers, a French Knight, have been invited to the forthcoming conference in Cairo on Arab Federation. They have been received with the greatest enthusiasm, and have been so pleased with their reception that they have twice postponed their departure (see also under "The Lebanon" below).

2. Heat

Early heavy rain has been falling in Lebanon and West Syria during the past few days, and there is consequently less anxiety about the prospects for next year's crop. There has, however, been very little rain as yet in North East Syria, and the outlook in that region is still gloomy.

3. Syria—Damascus

The question of public health is at last receiving much needed attention. At the parliamentary session of the 15th December a number of Deputies spoke with some heat of the scandalous lack of attention to the problem of combating malaria, and, as a result, the Minister of the Interior announced two days later that the Government would earmark a credit of Ecyf 200,000 to be spent on an anti malaria campaign. At the same time, he called upon local doctors to volunteer to assist, but so far hardly any doctors appear to have responded to his appeal. It is therefore now being suggested that the Government may requisition

4 Aleppo

General de Lavalade has been visiting Aleppo, and is believed to have been planning to bring certain functions of the Sûreté Générale more closely under military control.

9 Trial

The Syrian Parliament have appointed a Tribal Committee of twelve members to watch over tribal affairs. In this connexion it is worth mentioning that the Mobs of Aleppo, in conversation with the Political Officer recently, expressed their desire to the Syrian Government to equip the tribes who had to be put back to work by the French authorities to receive a dangerously large quantity of arms. The Government have undoubtedly much to learn in

this respect; but a beginning must be made some time, and in conversation with His Majesty's Minister General Catroux has indicated his readiness to make over the Contrôle Bédouin to the Syrian Administration subject to certain reasonable safeguards concerning the conditions of service of the existing French military personnel.

Light rain has now fallen in the tribal area and winter migration may be expected to begin.

11 The Lebanon

Lebanese optimism over the outcome of their discussions with the French remains undiminished. The unexpected absence of French opposition to their progress towards full independence has, however, allowed play to their natural tendency to internal dissensions. The Chamber has not met since the 1st December, and in the interval many of the Deputies have been engaged in constant intrigue with a view to improving either their own or their followers' fortunes, or to enhancing their personal prestige at the expense of the Government. The Opposition groups are still nebulous in character, but fall roughly into three main factions. These are:—

- (a) A number of North Lebanon Deputies, who are nettled at the non-inclusion of at least one of their number in the Ministry, and are convinced that the interests of their region are being neglected.
- (b) A group headed by Dr. Ayoub Tabet and Alfred Naccache, which comprises most of the pro-Eddé Deputies and is looking for any occasion to oppose the Government upon any issue; and
- (c) A number of South Lebanon Deputies headed by Ahmad el Assad, a man with a bad record, whose chief cause for complaint is at present the personality of the newly appointed Mohafez of South Lebanon.

The Government presented this opposition with a target for attack in the only noteworthy administrative act which has been performed during the past week, namely, the reshuffle of the Mohafezin and Directors. This measure, finally promulgated on the 18th December, had been delayed by disagreement within the Ministry as regards several of the posts. The Government's task was always, rendered infinitely more difficult by the tradition which has grown up, resulting from the confessional basis of the Constitution, that each community has a right to be represented in a certain proportion in each grade of administrative post; thus, when the excellent Greek Orthodox Mohafez of Sidon received well-deserved promotion and became Director of the Ministry of the Interior, it was considered essential to replace him by another member of the same community, as no really suitable candidate was available, the choice fell on a naientist, who is said to have already proved a failure in two minor judicial posts. But, even after making due allowance for this traditional handicap, it cannot be said that the majority of the Government's choices were good ones; and strong criticism of the appointments is widespread amongst all Opposition groups, centring particularly on the choice of an obscure cousin of the Minister of Defence for the important post of Mohafez of Beirut.

Opposition to the Government is thus concentrated solely on matters of personnel. On the one hand, the Government have been attacked by the Opposition groups, and, indeed, the population as a whole, are united, but, unless checked, these squabbles over less ideal issues are liable at any time to cause serious trouble. The Prime Minister has, in fact, already become so impatient of the criticism which is being directed at him as to talk privately of resigning when the Franco-Lebanese discussions have been concluded.

The Government have taken no steps in the matter of the punishment of Emil Eddé, regarding which a motion was presented in the Chamber at its last sitting. Some sixteen Deputies, mostly belonging to group (b) mentioned above, have urged the Government to take action against him. On the other hand, the better elements of the population generally consider that failure at least to deprive him of his membership of the Chamber will merely expose the Government's weakness and encourage similar treasonable actions in the future.

An official Egyptian delegation under Omar Fathi Pasha arrived in Beirut on the 18th December bearing a message of greeting from King Farouk to the Lebanese President and an invitation to the Lebanese Government to send a delegation to Cairo to discuss Anglo-Egyptian relations. The message was read by the Lebanese authorities to make them welcome; the streets were beflagged with

the Lebanese and Egyptian colours, an endless round of functions was arranged, and the elaborate precautions for the safety of the delegation made by the newly appointed Egyptian gendarmes were strictly observed. The delegation, however, as their lives were in danger from an incensed population.

Three prominent Egyptian journalists accompanied the mission. All three had written strongly critical articles on the Lebanese crisis, and the French authorities committed the tactical blunder of refusing them entry visas, maintaining their refusal even after the President of the Republic had personally intervened on their behalf. The journalists were thereupon attached officially to the delegation, and only arrived with it. Public knowledge of this incident has still further lowered French prestige, and has also made the Lebanese authorities more determined than ever to achieve a measure of independence in regard to the control of their own frontiers.

The French S.S.O. at Tripoli, another notoriously bad official, has now been replaced.

Three days' heavy rain over the week-end have somewhat improved the prospects for the cereal crops.

12 Press and Propaganda

Internal.—There has been an outcry on the part of a considerable number of Beirut Arabic sheets against the quotas of newsprint allotted to them by the Lebanese Government, and one or two have gone so far as to threaten to cease publication. The Press Bureau of the Government has been very busy in the matter. The Press Bureau—it is significant that the most vehement and vociferous of them come from pro-French papers. On the suggestion of the press attaché steps have been taken to ensure that the newspapers accept an announced inspection of their circulation at any time. In this connexion it is worth noting that, if the circulation figures provided by the various sheets were accepted, it would indicate a wider reading public in Beirut than in any other town in the Middle East.

[E 140-23/89]

No. 22

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th January, 1944.)

(No. 85.)

Beirut, 17th December, 1943

Sir,
WITH reference to my telegrams Nos. 773 and 778 of the 26th and 28th November respectively regarding the debates in the Syrian Chamber on the terms of the Constitution, I have the honour to submit the following report, compiled from accounts of the two sessions which I have received from His Majesty's Consul at Damascus—

2. Towards the close of the session on the 26th November the question of a revision of the Constitution was raised by Ahmed Sharabati, a Deputy for Damascus, who referred to the telegram No. 2438 to Foreign Office regarding negotiations to "reconcile the interests of France and the Levant States by the proclamations of 1941." He demanded a special sitting of the Chamber for the purpose of discussing whether article 116 should continue to be recognised as forming part of the Constitution. This article reads as follows:—

"Aucune disposition de la présente Constitution n'est et ne peut être en opposition avec les obligations contractées par la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie, particulièrement envers la Société des Nations."

Cette réserve s'applique spécialement aux articles qui touchent au maintien d'un ordre de la sécurité et la défense du pays et à ceux qui intéressent les relations extérieures.

"Pendant la durée des obligations internationales de la France en ce qui concerne la Syrie les dispositions de la présente Constitution qui seraient de nature à les affecter ne seront applicables que dans les conditions déterminées par accord à intervenir entre les Gouvernements français et syrien."

La conséquence les lois prévues par les articles de la présente Constitution dont l'application pourrait intéresser ses responsabilités ne seront discutées et promulguées conformément à la présente Constitution qu'en exécution de cet accord.

"Les décisions d'ordre législatif et réglementaire prises par les représentants du Gouvernement français pour et en vue de l'entente entre les deux Gouvernements."

Ahmed Sharabati's demand received the support of other Deputies, and the Speaker therefore enquired whether it was his intention to submit a motion in writing. Ahmed Sharabati thereupon produced a written motion from his pocket and handed it to the Speaker.

The terms of the motion were—

"The Chamber of Deputies request the Syrian Government to take decisive action with a view to taking over immediately the powers, with their attributes in full, in accordance with the provisions of the entire 115 articles of the Syrian Constitution, in order that we ourselves may administer our country and be able to make an effective contribution in aid of the Allies."

Several Deputies spoke in support of the motion, emphasising that the mandate had never been recognised by the Syrians, that the French National Committee of Liberation had no right to speak in the name of France; that the Committee, which existed only to secure the liberation of France, could not assume any responsibility towards the League of Nations, and that, in any event, the withdrawal of Vichy France from the League of Nations had vitiated France's mandate. A report of the speech made by Fakhri Barudi, a Deputy for Hamaseus and one of the most eloquent speakers in the present Chamber, is enclosed herein ().

In view of the insistent demand of the Deputies, the Speaker adjourned the discussion of the question to a special session which was held on the 27th November.

At that session the first speaker was Adnan Bey Alassi, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, who urged the Government to assume forthwith all the attributes necessary to complete independence. He was followed by others who discussed Syrian recognition of article 116 and of the mandate from the legal point of view.

The report of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber was then read. It stated that the reservations included in article 116 were not part of the Syrian Constitution promulgated by the Constituent Assembly in 1928, but were unilateral reservations made by the French High Commissioner in 1930. They were the effect of the French Government's policy of non-recognition of the mandate. It was accordingly recommended that article 116 should be judged not to form an integral part of the Constitution. The Foreign Affairs Committee advocated the complete implementation of the Constitution, including articles 48 and 70 regarding the taking of the oath to the Constitution by the President of the Republic and all the Deputies, and urged that a special session should be held at which the oath on the Constitution, consisting of 115 articles only, would be taken.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs then spoke. He claimed that the Government shared the views expressed by the Deputies, that they did not, and never would, recognise the existence of the mandate. They demanded complete sovereignty for the Syrian people. He agreed that article 116, being a unilateral reservation made by the French, imposed no obligations on the Syrians. He added that the Syrian Government were proceeding towards the realisation of independence more rapidly than many of the Deputies appeared to believe.

The Speaker, in summing up, emphasised that negotiations between France and Syria could only be on the basis of complete independence and equality. There could be no doubt that, legally, the Constitution comprised 115 articles only. He proposed, therefore, to have it printed in this form, and, when it was ready, to arrange for a special session, at which he would invite the President and members of the House to take the oath. The date of this session has not yet been fixed.

The House then approved the report of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East and the Resident Minister at Algiers.

I have &
F. L. SPFARS

() Not printed

[B 7712/27 89]

No. 23

Mr Eden to Sir E. Spragg (Beirut)

N. 7)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 12th January, 1944

I HAVE studied your despatch No. 79 of the 26th November last. I think you may be assured that, having read this despatch and the various telegrams which you have sent me, I am now fully apprised of the Lebanese case. But the Lebanese case, however strong and ably presented, must inevitably be an *ex parte* view. Just as there is a Lebanese case, there is also a French case. I have not, of course, had the French case so fully presented to me and must consequently form from such information as I have the best idea of the French case that I can. I think, therefore, it will be well if I now formulate the legal view of the whole position which I have received as complete. I have taken into account all the documents into account. I desire you to regard the following paragraphs as in the nature of instructions. I do not feel it is fruitful or necessary to continue the argument further with regard to this matter.

2. First of all, I wish to recall that it is His Majesty's Government's policy that the two Levant States should achieve independence in fact as well as in name either as the result of an agreement between them and the French or, at any rate, as the result of concessions by the French to these Governments, subject to the necessities of the war situation. General Catroux is now very wisely following this course, and in the circumstances it may be hoped that the question "mandate or no mandate" need no longer be a subject of constant discussion between the French and the Levant States. I do not propose, therefore, to answer and deal with every point which your raise in your despatch.

3. The mandate for the Levant was vested in the French State. The French State has never been a State without organs of government. At the beginning of May 1941 the French mandate was being exercised on behalf of France by the Vichy Government and by General Dentz, its High Commissioner in the Levant. After the conclusion of the British military operations in the Levant by the British forces assisted by certain French forces, the mandate remained vested in the French State, and only the organs through which it was exercised were changed. The Free French Committee replaced the French Government and General Catroux replaced General Dentz. There had been no change in the Power possessing the mandate and no formal recognition by the League of Nations was required if one French organ were substituted for another as the organ through which the mandate was exercised. France was at that time in a position similar to that of a State in civil war, there was no body recognised by His Majesty's Government as the *de jure* Government of France; the Vichy Government was recognised as the *de facto* Government of the territory which it controlled (though diplomatic relations were broken) and the Free French Committee was recognised as an organisation exercising governmental functions over the French territories which it controlled. The two bodies were at issue and the Free French Committee were our Allies. In their desire to remove the Levant from the control of Vichy and bring it within the Allied area, His Majesty's Government took action to substitute one French contending party for the other.

4. In General Catroux's proclamations of the 8th June, 1941, and the 26th November, 1941 (regarding the Lebanon) two promises were made by the French to the Levant States: (a) that a course would be set which would eventually lead to the termination of the mandate, (b) that the Levant States should become independent and sovereign immediately. His Majesty's Government associated themselves with these promises, and it became part of His Majesty's Government's policy that they should be honoured. It was also stated in both proclamations that (b) should be consecrated by treaties between France and the States. Pending the conclusion of the treaties, which presumably were to put an end to the mandate, the States were to enjoy substantial independence, and in the case of the Lebanon it was specified that this would be based upon the draft treaty drawn up in 1936 but subject to the limitations necessary for defence and security in war time. It was not made clear at that time and as never has been made clear at what time these treaties were to be concluded. It was, however, clear from the statements that the mandate was not to be a permanent one and that the States were to have the right to their independence as a result of the war.

5. There is, of course, no inconsistency between the existence of a treaty and the enjoyment by the mandated State of sovereignty and independence subject only to certain qualifications. There is also no inconsistency in the existence of an

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alliance between the mandatory and mandated State. Iraq called herself, and was recognised by His Majesty's Government as, independent and sovereign and, in fact, enjoyed substantial independence under a Treaty of Alliance with His Majesty's Government from 1922 to 1931, when she was still under mandate. Egypt was also independent and sovereign from 1922-36, when His Majesty's Government still retained many rights under the reserved points of 1922. Therefore, the promise of immediate independence and sovereignty did not mean the immediate end of the mandate nor did it mean the absence of all limitations and removal of all French reserved powers.

6. It is, of course, unfortunately true that the French were unjustifiably for that blame must rest upon them just as the French will now have to put up with the unfavourable position in which they have been placed as a result of the unjustified delay in fulfilling their promise. His Majesty's Government have exerted constant pressure upon the French authorities to persuade them to meet their obligations in this respect.

7. It is quite clear that there was legal continuity as regards the French. General Catroux stepped into the shoes of General Dentz and proceeded to act under the French decrees for the governance of the country and those bringing the Lebanese and the last parties who in the ultimate analysis are in a position to dispute this are those Governments which have only come into existence in virtue of these decrees. General Catroux was only in a position to make his proclamations promising independence because he was claiming to represent France as mandatory and His Majesty's Government could associate themselves with that promise only because they recognised him as having that position.

8. The British position in the Levant States was never that of conquerors or military occupants of enemy territory. They were in the position of having assisted one French authority to displace another in territory under French mandate. Having achieved their object, the position of British troops in the Levant States was promptly liquidated for the future, and their rights and powers were transferred to the French. Between His Majesty's Government and the Free French, whom His Majesty's Government now recognised as exercising French rights under the mandate. These agreements, in so far as they were possible, and the existence of these agreements renders it impossible for His Majesty's Government to put forward any view different from that indicated above as to the French position.

9. The above view of the legal position is based upon the principal points now quoted in paragraph 10 of your despatch, even if the statements are inconsistent with this position. The extract from General Catroux's letter of the 23rd June, 1941, which I had not seen before, seems to have contemplated an immediate treaty and an immediate termination of the mandatory régime. In any case, I have not the whole text of the letter before me.

10. As you state in your despatch, the word "mandate" has always been the most invidious expression to Arab peoples. It is understood that one of the reasons for this was the dislike of the word that references to the mandate were avoided in the proclamations of Syria and Lebanon in 1941 and His Majesty's Government have always advised that the French should make as little use of the word as possible. But when it was necessary to refer to the mandate by the French have been tactless and unfortunate this deliberate abstention from stressing a feature which was unpopular after May 1941 did not mean that it had ceased to exist or was obsolete when for the reasons indicated above it was in fact the foundation of the whole position.

11. So much for the legal aspects of the question. As regards its practical application while the mandate remains legally in force the French cannot now

use it as an excuse for refraining from giving the Governments of the States substantial independence in accordance with their promises. It is not in accordance with our policy or interests that the French should have used it as justification for the day-to-day conduct of Levant States affairs, as they did in recent months, still less of course did it provide any excuse for the arrest of the Lebanese Ministers last November. I am very pleased to see that General Catroux has wisely reverted to the policy which appeared to be agreed when he made his proclamations of independence in 1941. From every point of view I hope that he will proceed effectively to carry out this policy of making the provisional independence of the States a reality and that if either side shows any tendency again to argue about the technicalities of the mandate, you will be able to persuade them not to do so. The mandate remains, however, the basis of any reserved powers, including our own position under the Lyttelton de Gaulle agreements, but for the reasons given in paragraph 10 public references to it should be avoided.

I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister of State Resident, Cairo, His Majesty's representative with the French Committee of National Liberation, Algiers, His Majesty's representatives at Jeddah, Cairo and Baghdad and the High Commissioner at Jerusalem.

I am &c
ANTHONY EDEN

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No. 24

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 91, Syria and the Lebanon
28th December, 1943.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th January, 1944.)

1. General

ON the 22nd December discussions took place in Damascus between General Catroux and the States Governments regarding the transfer of powers. The two Governments were represented by their respective Prime Ministers, Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Ministers of Finance and the Syrian President was also present. General Catroux was assisted by M. Chataigneau and Count Orlonog. The general attempted at the outset to negotiate on the basis of France's mandatory rights, but both Governments refused to discuss matters on this basis, and thereafter he appears to have shown a most liberal and accommodating spirit. He issued a communiqué announcing that the services known as the "Common Interests" would be transferred to the control of the two Governments as from the 1st January, 1944. The Syrian and Lebanese authorities agreed for their part to safeguard the position of the Frenchmen employed in these services. Detailed provisions regarding the actual transfer of control will form the subject of special

These discussions also covered the question of the "Common Interests" and services, notably the Sûreté Générale, the Contrôle Bédouin, the levies (Troupes Spéciales and Gardes Mobiles). General Catroux is understood to have expressed in principle his readiness to cede all these services within the limitations imposed by war conditions, but no final agreement has yet been reached, and negotiations will be continued when he returns from Algiers towards the middle of January. Meanwhile the two Prime Ministers have made public pronouncements foreshadowing the early acquisition by their Governments of the attributions in question.

The communiqué regarding the transfer of the Common Interests, together with these pronouncements, caused great rejoicing throughout the two States. The public recognises in General Catroux's action not only the final liquidation of the Lebanese crisis, but also the beginning of that new era of real independence for which it has waited so long. Tributes to the general's statesmanship, it is satisfactory to record, have been ungrudging and numerous. Damascus and other Syrian cities have been beset and illuminated, and there have been many orderly demonstrations.

As regards the proposed transfer of the native levies, it is generally realised that this would involve the States in heavy expenditure at present borne by the French. The Syrian Prime Minister, in his speech to the Chamber, intimated that the whole question would have to be debated at a later stage, and there are

signs that the two Governments may prefer to leave matters as they are for the duration of the war or to take over control of small "token" forces only.

The Egyptian delegation, after visits to Damascus and Tripoli and an unbroken round of festivities, returned to Cairo on the 27th December. The Lebanese delegation to Egypt is expected to leave early in the New Year.

2. Homs

Purchases for the period the 15th-25th December were 750 tons, an average of 108 tons a day.

A serious situation has been created as a result of the delay in reaching a decision in London with regard to the purchase of surplus cereals held by the O.C.P. Encouraged by this delay, the French authorities have been attempting to acquire the surpluses for North Africa, and an application by them to this effect was made to the Cereals Commission. The French then tried to circumvent the control of the M.E.S.C. by inducing the O.C.P. to sell them 7,000 tons of barley for shipment on board a vessel which—for reasons as yet unexplained—was allowed to come to Beirut from Algiers, and arrangements were made for loading to be carried out by French troops. It was later discovered that the Cereals Commission had specifically authorised export to North Africa; and the minutes of the relevant sitting of the Commission were actually "cooked" to confirm this assertion. In fact, however, the president had merely authorised the sale and export of the surplus, leaving it to the French and British co-directors to settle between them who should be the purchaser. On his attention having been drawn to this falsification, Jamil Mardam Bey agreed to prohibit the export of Syrian cereals to any country outside the Middle East, and the minutes of the sitting have been duly corrected.

The whole manoeuvre is unfortunately typical of the French failure to co-operate willingly in economic matters, and of their hard-dying delusion that the Levant States can be treated as part of the French Empire. A protest has been lodged with M. Lyautey, the High Commissioner in Algiers, and preliminary soundings with a view to its purchase.

3. Syria-Damascus

The announcement that agreement had been reached between the Syrian and French Governments on the transfer of powers to the Syrian Government of the Funds of Common Interest evoked great enthusiasm. Damascus was bedecked and illuminated, and deputations besieged the Prime Minister to express their congratulations. The Prime Minister gave a banquet for the occasion, and was warmly thanked by the Prime Minister for the part which he had played in helping to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion.

On the following day, the Prime Minister informed the Chamber, amidst applause of the outcome of the negotiations, and enumerated the powers which would be acquired by the Government. One minute's silence was observed in remembrance of those who lost their lives fighting for the independence which has now been achieved. The Prime Minister then announced that Hassan el Atrash and Said el-Ghazzi, a deputy for Damascus, who, whilst calling upon the Chamber to express their thanks to the French Government for their support and referring to Hashim Atassi and the late Ibrahim Hanano, made no mention of the French Government.

The Greek Consulate has been raised to the status of a consulate-general. The Greek Ambassador in Beirut, Athanasios, came to Damascus on the 29th December, accompanied by the Iraqi Minister, on an official visit to Bagdad. In his absence, the Prime Minister will act as president of the Cereals Commission.

4. Aleppo

Reactions in responsible political circles to the announcement of the forthcoming transfer of powers to the Syrian Government are not yet known, but the successful outcome of the negotiations will almost certainly be regarded as a personal triumph for the Prime Minister. The town has been bedecked on instructions telephoned by the Prime Minister to the Mohafez—and there have been orderly crowds of cheerful Nationalists, but no demonstrations. Local Christians hope that the change-over will not be too precipitate.

M. Dementque, the unsatisfactory counsellor who was recently removed from the post of Deputy Assistant to the Delegue, which he occupied two years ago.

Colonel d'Assonville, Commander of the French Forces in this area, is to be transferred, at his own request.

5. Hama and Hama

Joyful demonstrations took place in Hama when the news of the agreement reached between the French and Syrian and Lebanese Governments became known. Unfortunately, the first public manifestations appear to have been staged by the "Mohafez" and his "homenes". With a view to countering this accusation, a large deputation representing the Christian community subsequently visited the Mohafez to offer him an "apology" in the course of which a pistol was fired. Two members of the deputation were wounded, and the man who fired the pistol fled, and has not yet been traced, but he is known to be a Moslem, and though the shooting is now stated to have been accidental, the worst possible impression has been caused. The Moslems are showing great concern for the wounded men, and deputations are continually visiting the hospital. The Mohafez is doing everything possible to prevent this incident from developing into a Moslem-Christian feud.

In Hama also demonstrations were held, but were supported by Christians and Moslems alike, and no incidents took place.

The persistence of malaria is causing anxiety to both Syrian and British authorities, and the Syrian Government, in response to an appeal by the Mohafez, have supplied some quantities of quinine and other medicaments.

7. Alawite territory

The recent visit to this area of Generals Moncler and François is reported to have given rise to serious apprehension. It was reported to the Mohafez that these officers were urging Nosairi tribal leaders to close their ranks and show a united front against the Syrian Government, but only one individual, namely, Munir Abbas, brother of the late Mohafez, was induced to give support to the French cause. He is reported to have attempted, but without success, to induce the Nosairis to join the French forces against the Syrian Government. On the other hand, counter-efforts made by the Syrian Government to induce Nosairi Deputies to petition the Government to annul an *arrete* issued in January 1942, whereby the semi-autonomy of this province was perpetuated, likewise failed.

The Mohafez states that he protested to the Delegue Adjunct about these activities, but was told that the French generals had visited the area without his advice. If this is true it reveals a curious state of affairs, in which the Delegue is supposed to be responsible for the security of the area, but is unable to prevent subversive activities in a territory for the security of which he is responsible. It is not therefore surprising to learn that the delegue has asked to be relieved of his duties on the grounds of ill health.

Other French officers whose activities have been causing concern to the Syrian authorities in this area are the Inspector of S.S. and the S.S.O. at Jebel. The former's intrigues in favour of separatism are now so flagrant that the Mohafez has ceased to have any official relations with him. In the case of the S.S.O. at Jebel, the Mohafez appears to have taken strong action, as a result of which this officer has been sent elsewhere.

The news of the Franco-Syrian-Lebanese agreement, regarding the transfer of the "Common Interests" caused jubilation. Throughout the area towns were bedecked, and for several days there was a succession of orderly demonstrations by all classes of the community. In Latakia, Christian and Sunni youths carrying Syrian and British flags paraded before the Sérail and British military administrative offices. No single instance has been reported of anti-French feeling having been manifested.

11. The Lebanon

On the 22nd December the Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs went to Damascus for the meeting described under "General" above. They returned on the 23rd December, and the same afternoon the

Chamber, hastily convened, was informed by the Prime Minister that full agreement had been reached with the French for the Intérêts Communs to be taken over as from the 1st January, 1944. Riad es-Sulh referred to his success in "glorifying" the Arab language and altering the Lebanese flag and Constitution, and paid tribute to the President's wisdom and firmness and to General Catroux for his statesmanship and comprehension. Various speakers, including the Government, at length congratulated the President on the successful outcome of the negotiations, and the Chamber unanimously passed a motion of thanks to the Government.

Signs of unrest amongst the workmen employed in large industrial concerns in the Lebanese towns have been increasingly evident for some time, and many of them have been demanding substantial wage increases and a shortening of hours of work. The "black-coated" workers of the DHP Railway are at present on strike; and the Kadisha Electricity Company, which supplies power to North Lebanon, has been successfully held to ransom by its employees, who, by threatening a sit-down strike and sending deputations to the Prime Minister, have now secured a 10 per cent. increase in wages. The unrest seems likely to spread, and may cause a serious problem in the future. It is not thought to be entirely caused, as the employees claim, by the cost of living, and is by some ascribed to the machinations of Communist agitators. Another and perhaps more plausible explanation is that it is an aftermath of the Lebanese political crisis of November, the outcome of which gave the workers the impression that their Government was now strong enough to squeeze the French concessionary companies. The result of the Kadisha strike will certainly reinforce this view. It is noteworthy that no unrest amongst employees of Lebanese firms has been reported although the latter, in general, pay substantially lower rates than foreign concerns.

The holidays, the visit of the Egyptian delegation and the Damascus negotiations have held up all important administrative work.

E 344 28 80]

No. 25

Extract from the Foreign Office Summary of Events in the Middle East, 1944
 31st January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 18th January, 1944)

1. General

THE formal transfer to the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments of two of the services of "common interest," namely, the Customs Administration and the Tobacco Monopoly, took place on the 3rd January at a ceremony held in Beirut. The protocols were signed in the presence of the Lebanese President, the French High Commissioner, the Syrian Minister of Finance, and the Syrian Minister of Finance. Immediately afterwards a joint commission comprising three Syrian and three Lebanese members visited the Customs Department and formally assumed control. This commission, over which the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers of Finance will preside alternately, will administer the services in question and determine the proportion in which expenditure and income are to be allocated to the two Governments.

Several meetings have been held between the French and Lebanese authorities to discuss the question of the transfer of other services, notably the control of concessionary companies and the Sûreté Générale. The French authorities did not invite British participation in any of the discussions, merely informing them on one occasion of the views of the British military authorities of certain of the services under discussion, notably those concerned with security and transport, it was found necessary on the 31st December to inform both French and Lebanese authorities that the British expected their views on these questions to be heard and taken into account before any definite agreements on the subject were made. A written notification in this sense has been sent to the French authorities. In addition, British and French military authorities have also been arranged between the British and French military authorities on certain technical aspects of the problems involved in order that the point of view of each may be clarified and if possible harmonised before negotiations with the States Government are begun. The Lebanese Government, for their part, have shown every desire to meet any demands which the British authorities may put forward, so soon as they are informed of exactly what is required.

2. H. Acet

Total purchases during the period the 26th-30th December were 182 tons, a daily average of 36 tons.

The French co-director of the O.C.P. has made a written offer to sell cereals for North Africa at prices averaging 1500 francs per ton higher than those offered to M.E.S.C. in November last. He has been informed that his offer cannot be considered as binding on the O.C.P., and that sales can only be made through the M.E.S.C.

It has been decided in London that surplus cereals are to be bought by the M.E.S.C. Buying of available quantities by the O.C.P. will be resumed as soon as the M.E.S.C. confirms the conditions of purchase.

3. Syria-Damascus

On the 30th December the Prime Minister announced to the Chamber, which was not in official session since no quorum was present, that as from the 3rd January the Syrian Government would take over from the French the Customs, the Sûreté Générale and Frontier control. Since no definite agreement had been reached with General Catroux about the transfer to Syrian control of the Sûreté Générale and Frontier control and, moreover, these matters were known to be of interest, not only to the Syrians and the French but to the British authorities as well, this statement caused some surprise.

In private conversation with the Political Officer some days later, the Prime Minister explained that what he had meant to say was that the French were in agreement in principle to hand over these powers, but that the question of modalities would still have to be worked out. Some time would therefore elapse before the Syrians could begin to exercise real control.

The Syrian Parliament has, meanwhile, passed a resolution to the effect that financial considerations shall not be allowed to be an obstacle to the taking over of the native levies. The press, too, is urging the question of a national army and encouraging the opening of public subscriptions to maintain it at the outset.

On the 26th December the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by the Minister of the Interior, left on an official visit to Baghdad. The Chamber and the Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires left on an official visit to Baghdad.

Two Frenchmen of some standing have been in Damascus during the past week, namely, M. Astier, an ex-Senator and a member of the French Consultative Committee in Algiers, and M. Boyé, Professor of Law in Cairo University. Both made allusion to a change of French policy in Syria. M. Astier says that the mandate had never suited the French and that he believed that French contact with the Islamic world would be strengthened by the increasingly important rôle played by the Syrians of French culture in Arab affairs. M. Boyé, quoting the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, maintained that in respecting the rights of small nations (Syria and the Lebanon) the French called upon others to respect their rights.

A delegation of Lebanese gendarmes is in Damascus to study ways and means of unifying the regulations and policy governing the Corps of Gendarmerie in Syria and the Lebanon.

On the occasion of the Moslem New Year (28th December), and again on the 1st January, the Syrian administrations were closed. On the former date, the President of the Republic had a message of goodwill to Moslems broadcast from the Damascus station. On New Year's eve the French delegate broadcast to Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, resident in Syria, a short message in which he alluded to the pending cession of powers to the Syrians by France and France alone, and reminded his French hearers that they were now guests in Syria who should aid and not hinder the new recruit to the concert of free nations.

4. Aleppo

There are no political developments to report.

The New Year celebrations in Aleppo were conducted with great simplicity and edification. Money-making is the principal preoccupation, and though trade is not very brisk, the money market is fairly plentiful, and the majority of people realise their good fortune. Opinion generally is favourable to the Allied cause, and optimistic about an early end to the war in Europe. There is much gratitude for the greater measure of independence which has been achieved, only a minority of Christians, who are

unable to shake off their inborn fear of Moslem control, and others who have in the past opposed the Nationalists are nervous about the future. Practically all leading Nationalists and heads of various religious communities called on the Political Officer on New Year's Day to express their appreciation of the help which they have received from the British authorities.

7. Alawite Territory

The visits to this area of Generals François and Moncler reported in last week's Summary have led to a revival of talk about Alawite autonomy, but it is not yet possible to judge how far this issue, which had recently appeared to be moribund, is likely to be revived in an acute form.

The Mohafex has been informed by the Délégué Adjoint that all S.S. officers will shortly be recalled to Latakia.

A speech made by the Délégué Adjoint at a New Year's Day reception held at the Residence was remarkable for the virulence with which the Délégué attacked Field Marshal Smuts. Despite the presence of British officers, the speech was loudly applauded by the Frenchmen present.

8. Tribes

Reports continue to come in of the distribution of arms by the French authorities. Investigation has shown that in certain cases the arms concerned are rifles which had previously been confiscated and have now been restored to their owners, and in other instances presents of rifles not exceeding four in number have been made to sheikhs. No confirmation has been received of any reports of alleged large-scale distributions.

Generally speaking the tribes in the area appear quiet. Reports of abnormal concentrations of Shammar in the Jazireh are being investigated, but are probably due to lack of rain, which is hindering migration.

10. Frontier

Levish frontier and customs guards have been increased but no incidents have been reported. The Délégué has proposed, with the provisional agreement of the Mohafex, that as a first step towards Syrian participation in frontier control the local gendarmerie officer shall attend Frontier Commission meetings with the Turks.

11. The Lebanon

The Lebanese Minister of the Interior has now taken in hand the general question of discontent amongst workers in concessionary companies. He considers that it will be necessary to arrive at some sort of uniformity of practice in order to prevent strikes caused by the envy of one set of workers of the more favourable treatment given to others. While this lack of uniformity is undoubtedly one of the causes of unrest, the solution proposed seems likely to involve a scaling up of salaries and will therefore tend to produce further inflation. Measures to tackle the problem by reducing the cost of living are under consideration by the British authorities. The workers in the Tobacco Monopoly went on strike for higher pay at the beginning of the week, but there has been no further unrest in either the D.H.P. Railway or the Kadisha Electricity Com.

Prior to the departure of the Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs for Egypt, the Lebanese Government disposed of certain arrears of business on the 31st December, amongst them a number of judicial appointments. The budget, a new rent law, and the Minister of Justice's new draft law on judicial reform were, however, amongst other measures left incomplete.

On the previous day a somewhat acrimonious debate had been held in the Chamber on a motion to announce a complete amnesty on criminals in honour of the transfer of the Intérêts Communaux. After a long debate the Government managed to shelve the proposal by raising the issue of persons condemned for breaking O.C.P. regulations, who, they maintained, could not be released without reference to the Allied authorities. The motion was finally passed to the Judicial Commission for further study.

12. Press and Propaganda

Internal—The Syrian press, both Arabic and French, has devoted much space to the question of a National Army. A paper argues that the question of cost should not be allowed to stand in the way of what they argue is an essential corollary of independence.

The agreement for the transfer of the Funds of Common Interest has filled the columns of the press ever since its conclusion, and great emphasis is laid on the necessity for their proper handling from the outset.

Irritation has been betrayed following a declaration made in responsible French circles in Algiers to the effect that the conclusion of the agreement for the transfer of "Common Interests" does not affect the legal aspect of the French mandate. The Lebanese and Syrian Governments have given the assurance that the negotiations were carried out on the basis of absolute equality.

The first open Communist party conference in the Levant States is taken as an indication that the party is confident of the soundness of its policy.

External—Russian successes have been given prominence. The choice of the invasion chiefs has been taken as an indication that big events are imminent.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda—Nothing of importance to report.

E 344 28 80]

No. 26

Extract from Weekly Political Summary (No. 93) Syria and the Lebanon
12th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th January)

Secret

1. General

NEGOTIATIONS continue between the French and the States' Governments for the transfer to the latter of further powers and attributions. The control of the electricity and water companies have now been made over, and that of other concessionary companies is under discussion. The commission which has been formed to administer the Funds of Common Interest has been in frequent session.

Agitation is increasing for the acquisition by the States' Governments of control over the armed forces. There is a profound mistrust of French intentions, and both Governments desire to obtain control of sufficient forces to checkmate any eventual attempt on the part of the French to reimpose the old régime. In view of General Catroux's recent statement in Algiers that the *Troupes Spéciales* were to be withdrawn, a new national army is now being urged by the Syrians. The latter are determined that financial considerations shall not stand in the way, but the Lebanese are more inclined to count the cost.

2. Wheat

Total purchases during the period the 31st December-7th January were 703 tons, a daily average of 88 tons.

The Resident Minister at Algiers has asked the French to refrain from competition with the M.E.S.C. in purchasing Syrian cereals.

Further explanatory telegrams were sent to London on the subject of the cereals surpluses, and authority to buy was received on the 11th instant. Even then the M.E.S.C. did not feel that they could give a firm order to recommence buying on a large scale. Consequently, in view of the urgency of the matter His Majesty's Minister decided to take the responsibility of authorising the resumption of purchases. The French will now provide necessary funds and purchases will be in full swing in a few days.

3. Syria-Damascus

The question of the control of the national armed forces has been much discussed both in public and in the Chamber. The suggestion which has found most favour is that a new army should be formed (see under "General" above). On the other hand, it is reported that French officers in the entourage of the Delegate are in a measure reconciled to the idea of the transfer to the Syrian Government of the control of the *Troupes Spéciales*.

At the Parliamentary sitting of the 3rd January, a Damascus Deputy brought up the question of the Mixed Courts. A statement by the Minister of Justice was read explaining that the Courts were in effect Syrian tribunals, specialising in cases concerning foreigners, and that judgments were issued in the name of the Syrian people. It was pointed out that the President, although a Frenchman, was employed on contract by the Syrian Government, and that his two assistants were Syrians. The Deputy who had raised the question then asked whether the

Attendance in Parliament has recently been so bad that on one occasion there was no quorum. A strong article prepared by a French-language paper suggesting certain means of remedying this state of affairs was however stopped by the Syrian censor.

There are no political developments of importance to report. A further procession in celebration of the promised transfer of powers toured Aleppo town on the 2nd January, but there was no undue excitement.

No changes have yet taken place in the local administration, though the Syrian flag now appears over the customs office. It is reported that a new information service is being organized, and that of the seven S.S.Os. in this area, five are to be retained on the frontier, and that the others will be employed in different capacities.

There are no political developments to report.

Popular feeling is solidly behind the Government and eager to see further advances made along the road towards complete independence. Local Nationalists are giving full support to the Government's efforts to gain control of the armed forces. The Christians are, perhaps not unnaturally, less enthusiastic about these developments, but are being careful not to show their sentiments in public. It is however satisfactory to record that the Moslems appear to realize that the Christians are apprehensive and that they are showing every desire to maintain good relations.

Complaints continue to be received about the political activities of the Inspector of S.S. He is now reported to have been seeking support amongst Alcaute Deputies in Dumasca for the continuance of the present régime of financial autonomy in the Alcaute province. Local Nationalists have protested to the Delegado Adjunto about this improper interference in matters of internal administration.

The Mohafex has now gone to Damascus to lay before the Government his proposals for administrative reform. He has hinted to the Political Officer that he may resign if his recommendations are not accepted.

The Syrian Government have sent a senior official of the Ministry of Justice to inspect and report on all courts in this province. It is hoped that the Government will avail themselves of the powers conferred upon them by the law recently passed raising the number of judges in the District Courts of Aleppo and Latakia to ten and twelve respectively.

The Labour unrest reported in previous summaries continues. A strike of typesetters, which would have deprived Beirut of newspapers, has been averted by the employers acceding to certain of the workers' demands, but the tramway employees are threatening to cease work, and the employees of the Tobacco Monopoly are still on strike. Alone among the members of the Government, Habib Abi Shahla, Vice-President of the Council and Acting Prime Minister in the absence of Riad es-Sulh, who has gone to Cairo to discuss Arab Federation), seems convinced of the necessity for firmness in dealing with these disputes if they are not to become a habit. At one time he had attempted to pacify the employees of the Tobacco Monopoly, but he has now refused to negotiate further until the strikers return to their work, but he nevertheless clearly fears that when the Prime Minister returns he will reverse this decision and give way on all points rather than risk incurring unpopularity.

The political situation in the country has been much on the minds of the people, and the political parties are active in the campaign. The political parties are active in the campaign, and the political parties are active in the campaign.

influence in the background, which is the nearest approach to an official Opposition which the present Chamber can produce. The President and the acting Prime Minister complain, however, that their chief difficulties arise not from the activities of this open opposition, but from those of Deputies who are regarded as their supporters, notably Yusuf Istephan of North Lebanon, Henri Pharaon of the Bekaa and Saib Slam of Beirut. Similar complaints are voiced by the new Commandant of the Lebanese Gendarmerie, who alleges that his attempts to improve his service are being systematically frustrated by inter-

There is considerable controversy about the proposed new rents law, which has not yet been drafted. The landlords, basing themselves on the decree recently published (but not yet promulgated) in Damascus are claiming increases up to 100 per cent. on residential and 200 per cent. on commercial premises, the tenants claim that their situation is already so bad as a result of the high cost of living that they cannot afford to pay any increase whatever. Habib Abi Shabla is apparently hoping to steer a middle course by granting the landlords a small increase, but is waiting to see what happens in Damascus, where the new rent law has been severely criticised.

passing the 1944 Budget after which it will go into recess. A parliamentary commission, under Hamid Bey Franjeh, which is at present studying the Budget is meeting with difficulties on account of the grossly swollen estimates of some of the Departments, an item of £Syr 8,000 for "the purchase of two typewriters" is given as an example.

It is reported in the press that a delegation of Greek Orthodox archbishops, headed by M. Saliby of Beirut, will shortly pay a visit to the Patriarch of Moscow, who was deposed in 1925. The archbishops were suspended after the Russian Revolution.

The press reports that on the 10th January a Consumers' Association, under the leadership of a former member of parliament and assisted by a number of lawyers, was formed in Beirut for the purpose of combating the cost of living. The association, if it comes to anything, deserves every support, since one of the primary causes of the fantastic prices ruling in the Lebanon clearly lies in the inability of the public to combine against the rapacity of shopkeepers.

The murder of a Druze policeman by a Christian outside the President's house on the 1st January threatened to cause a disturbance amongst the Druze, who, there is some reason to believe, were impelled by certain French elements to magnify the incident into a communal issue. A plain hint conveyed to the Druze leader chiefly responsible, Kamal Jumblatt, that the British authorities would not tolerate any disorder, assisted the Government to find a solution to the question of tribal lines, and it is thought that the matter is now closed.

An "Association for promoting Better Relations between Religious Communities," the foundation of which was recently announced in asking for Government recognition of their activities, which are stated to be non political. The association may well be destined to share the fate of many other enterprises in the Lebanon and come to nothing, but it is clear that the events of last November have given considerable impulse to the sentiments held in some circles, particularly amongst the youth of the Lebanon, that communal barriers must be broken down if the Lebanon is to emerge as an independent State, the present enterprise is therefore of some significance.

No. 27

Extracts from Weekly Postal Summary No. 94, Syria and the Lebanon
10th January, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 3rd February.)

(Secret)

1. General

THERE are no political developments of importance to report. In Syria political agitation centres on the question of the administration of control of the armed forces. This question has attracted less attention in the Lebanon, owing to the lower proportion of the Lebanese element involved; but the Government

are, nevertheless, persisting in their desire to take over at least a contingent of the national levies, but principally to prevent them from maintaining internal security, but principally to prevent them from maintaining internal security, but principally to prevent them from maintaining internal security.

The recent agreements of principle for the transfer of powers to the States Governments have not yet been followed by any radical administrative changes, and for the time being the French officials in the various services concerned continue to exercise their functions as before. The French Government has met to the Levant States on the 16th January, and has had preliminary talks with the Presidents of both Republics.

3. Syria—Damascus.

Public agitation continues for the transfer of the native levies to Syrian control. On the 10th January schools were closed and students demonstrated demanding conscription, the introduction of military training in schools and the institution of a national army day when subscriptions would be collected for the maintenance of the national forces. The demonstrators returned peacefully to their schools after being assured by the Prime Minister that the State would indeed take over the army, but the date when this event was to take place was left unspecified.

This question has also been discussed again in the Chamber, in fact a vote had to be taken on it to enable the discussions on the present budget to be continued, since certain Deputies demanded the withdrawal of the present estimates and their replacement by a new budget which should include estimates for the army. On the vote being taken, however, the majority were for continuing discussions on the present proposals.

Government circles continue to express the desire—and indeed the determination—to take over the levies, or at least a substantial proportion of them, and to declare that the necessary funds will somehow be forthcoming. It is, however, evident that the numerous practical difficulties of the transfer have not yet been fully realised, and that no detailed plan has yet been worked out. The Prime Minister has stated in Parliament that his Government have no official cognisance of General Catroux's alleged statement in Algiers that the *Troupes Spéciales* would not be handed over before the end of the war, and that even if the French publish an official communiqué to that effect, the Government will not consider themselves bound by it. The matter is now under discussion with General Catroux.

At a recent parliamentary sitting, Nejib Rayess, a Deputy for Damascus, objected to the continued censorship by the Allied military authorities of Syrian mail. He was sharply rebuked by the Prime Minister who said that this was a restriction of sovereignty to which Syria should gladly submit as part of the country's contribution to the Allied war effort.

4. Aleppo.

The passage through Aleppo of the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Education, M. Riad al-Sulh, was marked by a series of various banquets, to one of which French and British representatives were invited. The Minister for Foreign Affairs subsequently called on the Political Officer. He showed a satisfactory understanding of local minority problems.

Articles continue to be submitted to local newspapers urging the advantages of the early creation of a Syrian army, but many have been suppressed by the censor and it would appear that the Government now wish to put down this topic. A deputation of students of the Government school visited the Mhafez to offer themselves for recruitment, but no general enthusiasm has been aroused, and other processions have been discouraged by the Syrian authorities.

The French officials employed in the Customs administration and those in charge of Bedouin affairs have called on the Mhafez to inform him that they now regard themselves as officials of the Syrian Government, and to ask for instructions. The Mhafez has, however, so far received no instructions from Damascus about the transfer of these or other administrations.

The S.S.Os. employed in the frontier districts are now to be known as *Officers Frontaliers*. Their functions have not yet been defined, and for the time being they will continue to deal with security matters as before.

5. Homs and Hama.

The question of the creation of a Syrian army still monopolises public interest. A further deputation of students has visited the Mhafez of Homs to urge him to press the Government to take action, and notables of Hama have sent telegrams to the President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the Speaker of the House, requesting them to complete the independence of the country by the formation of an army.

There have been a number of demonstrations during the week to welcome pilgrims returning from Mecca. Gratitude has been expressed to the British authorities for making transport facilities available for the pilgrimage.

The Christians who were wounded during the demonstrations which took place in Homs (see Summary No. 91) have now returned to their homes. They continue to receive numerous Muslim visitors.

11. The Lebanon.

Labour troubles have continued to occupy the Government. The strike amongst the employees of the tobacco régime ended on the 14th January, when the Government induced the employees to return to work on the promise of a bonus of fifteen days' salary, an advance of a month's salary and an understanding that their other grievances would be sympathetically considered. Government employees have now presented a memorandum of grievances, and certain O.C.P. employees are threatening to strike for higher pay.

The question whether sanctions are to be taken against Emil Eddé for his action during the November crisis has again engaged attention. The President and four of the Ministers are more or less strongly in favour of his being unseated, on the grounds that failure to take such action will merely encourage him to intrigue against the Government. The Prime Minister and the Minister of Justice are inclined, on the other hand, to believe that a motion to this effect in the Chamber would not now receive the necessary two-thirds majority, as some of the Deputies have since rallied to Eddé and many others now feel that the issue has now been left in suspense too long and would split the country if brought up at this juncture. It is also argued that the motion would alienate certain Christian elements such as the Maronite Archbishop of Beirut and the Phalange party, who supported the Government during the crisis but are now nervous of its allegedly pro-Muslim policy, whereas Eddé is held to be the champion of the Christians. General Catroux is also understood to have undertaken after the crisis to induce Eddé to resign; as he has clearly failed to do so, the question will be taken up with him again.

Examination of the 1944 budget is still not completed. Revelations of extravagance, amounting to fraud, in the purchase of office supplies by the Petro Trad administration have caused a scandal, and a commission of enquiry has been set up to examine the matter. Petro Trad has disclaimed all knowledge of the proceedings.

The Minister of Supply has published the first of a series of measures designed by him to decrease the cost of living. They consist of the purchase by his department of the stocks of yarn, soap, oil &c., at present in the Customs, in order that they may be sold to the population at fixed prices. He is still working on his schemes for purveying meat, vegetables and fruit to the population through official subsidised chain stores, and has been consulting with his Syrian colleague on the best means of exercising adequate control over the sale of other imported goods. The attention of the public has also been drawn to the existence of a known and too little supported by the public.

The Government has decided to allow women to visit Government posts (except those of President, Prime Minister and Speaker) to women. This initiative, in what is generally regarded as an Arab country, is significant, and was doubtless inspired by the prominent part taken by Lebanese women in the protests which followed the November crisis.

12. Press and Propaganda.

The Beirut press decided on the 17th January to suspend publication of all newspapers forthwith on the grounds that the Lebanese Government's distribution of newspapers was unfair. The Government had refused to grant that established newspapers were thus receiving less than their due.

Considerable criticism was voiced in the Syrian Chamber recently of the censorship of political news by the Government censor. The Prime Minister agreed that the censorship of purely political news was undesirable, but condemned some newspapers as being parasites living by political and personal blackmail. He stated that the Government hoped shortly to introduce legislation to improve the quality of the press and to reduce the number of papers published in Damascus. This is a much-needed reform.

(E 875 28 89)

No. 28

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 95, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th January, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 8th February)

ANDIN political events of the week have been, first, the taking of the Syrian Constitution of 1928 by the President, Government and Deputies at a special meeting of the Syrian Chamber, and secondly, the formal approval by the two States Governments of the Lebanese-Syrian Common Interests Agreement which provides for the administration of the Common Interest Services by a Supreme Council.

In the Lebanon the political opposition to the Government encouraged by the failure to deal with Emil Eddé is growing gradually stronger though it is not yet at all formidable. Apparently with French assistance, it has bought up the newspaper *Ahrar* and has acquired large office premises. The President complained to General Catroux concerning these alleged French activities which, he said, appeared to have as their object to nullify the concessions made. The Lebanese are particularly anxious concerning the activities of a French stooge, Tausiq Awad, who is spending large sums in an endeavour to excite opposition to the Government by setting the Christians against the Moslems. The Prime Minister Riadh Sulh, told General Catroux that Awad appeared to be drawing large sums from the French. General Catroux told him that the French were not now financing him, but added that M. Helien had given him 150,000 L.S. In the Syrian Chamber the Ministry of Finance Minister that the sum in question is believed to amount to as much as £Syr 150,000, but no trace of any such payment figures in the accounts, so that the estimate must have been falsified. Criticism of the Government, and of Riadh Sulh in particular, for failing to cope adequately with the numerous administrative problems outstanding, has also contributed to the growth of opposition tendencies. Realising that the Prime Minister cannot usefully continue to function as head of the Ministry of Finance the President is said to have decided to entrust the work of that department to the Minister of the Interior, Nuri al-Sayid. Since, however, Carnille Shamoun already has his hands full it is likely that before long it will be necessary to call in Hamid Franzieh who is an able and experienced administrator to run the Ministry of Finance. This will, however, necessitate the inclusion of another Moslem in the Government.

General Catroux left Beirut for Algiers on the 26th January after a visit to the Levant States lasting ten days. Nothing positive in the way of further agreements appears to have emerged from his discussions with the two Governments in regard to the transfer of powers, but this is chiefly attributable to the fact that the Anglo-French staff talks have not yet been completed and that the local Governments are consequently still awaiting an indication of the British position. The Syrian authorities are eager to take over control of the Troupes Spéciales, but without any concrete plan. They asked him to put up proposals himself, and before his departure he handed them a document, the gist of which was that the local levies should be formally placed under the control of the Syrian Government, in the person of the Minister of Defence, but should immediately thereafter be made over with equal formality for service under the French Territorial Command for the duration of the war. The Syrian Government were to pay for these troops within the limits

of their capacity, the residue being paid by the French, who would continue to provide equipment. A French Military Mission would be entrusted with the task of elaborating, in concert with the Syrian Ministry of Defence, "the measures required for increasing the fighting value of the levies and improving their material conditions," and with studying plans for "the organisation of a national army in time of peace." General Catroux made it clear in conversation that failing acceptance of this proposal—which is, in fact, unlikely to appeal to the local Governments—the French could and would render the efficient functioning of the native levies impossible by withdrawing certain essential elements, at present staffed by French personnel, such as hospital and veterinary services, the artillery, the engineers, &c. He has also talked of denying the use of the existing barracks, claiming that these form part of what he vaguely

which were originally the property of the Turks, ever passed legally into French hands. However that may be, it is clear that the French are in an extremely strong bargaining position, since it is essential from the British military point of view that the transfer of control should not impair the efficiency of the levies.

2. Wheat

Total purchases during the period the 8th 20th January were 820 tons, a daily average of 56 tons. The news that the O.C.P. is purchasing is spreading to the villages, so that purchases from now on should increase considerably.

At the meeting of the Cereals Commission on the 20th January the President who is also the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that General Catroux had asked him if 40,000 tons of cereals could be exported to North Africa. He had replied that, while in principle he was not opposed to exports, the general

the trade of the Middle East countries

The recent rains have much improved the prospects for the 1944 harvest. The Syrian representative has agreed to the sale to M.E.S.C. of 15,000 tons of wheat from the 1943 harvest.

supply, the question of the relation of the O.C.P. to the Syrian Government was discussed. Several members took the view that the O.C.P. should become a Syrian organisation. There is, of course, no question whatever of permitting this

3. Syria—Damascus

General Catroux arrived in Damascus on the 18th January and immediately in discussions with the Syrian Government, who entertained him at various

dinner (see under "General" above). In Parliament, after various attempts to shipwreck the budget had been foiled, the Chamber approved the estimates for 1944 in its sitting of the 18th January. The budget amounts to £Syr. 40,895,000. The Chamber then turned its attention to the Ministry of *Ravitaillement*, whose budget is special and separate. In the ensuing debate this department was bitterly attacked, some members calling for its abolition and re-creation as a directorate under the Ministry of Finance. Agreement was eventually reached that it should continue to be a separate Ministry, but the Chamber refused to ratify its budget until certain conditions had been fulfilled, viz.: (a) the introduction of organic legislation and a proper establishment law to cover the Ministry, (b) the submission to tender and adjudication of bulk imports and exports of commodities where necessary in the interests of the country, (c) the submission of a new budget based on the establishment and organic law referred to above. The Chamber, in addition, requested the Government to put an end to the losses incurred in bread sales.

At a special meeting of the Chamber on the 24th January the President of the Syrian Republic and all the Deputies and members of the Government took the oath of allegiance to the French Republic (see Weekly Political Summary No. 87 of the 1st December), swearing also to maintain the independence of their country and its territorial integrity.

5. Homs and Hama

The merchants of Homs are on strike as a result of attempts on the part of the authorities to increase the assessments imposed were necessarily arbitrary. The merchants demand a return

to the old method, whereby a total of £Syr 35,000 was fixed for the whole town and apportioned amongst them by the local Chamber of Commerce.

As a result of this situation, enthusiasm for the taking over of the native levies has waned in Homs, the merchants, who a short while ago were offering to contribute all they had for the upkeep of a national army, would seem to regard the collection of income tax as an unsuitable method of preparing for the future. The Mohafez, an ardent nationalist, has been informed by the Délégué that France is prepared to hand over the levies "whenever the Syrians are ready to receive them".

7. *Alnousse Territory*

As a result of the proposals of the Mohafez for administrative reforms (see above), several officials have been removed. Two are retired for corruption, another is suspended and will be tried for selling sugar sent to him for official distribution, and the fourth is transferred to another district. Here, as in the Lebanon, confessional rivalries are a permanent bar to reform, each community is jealous of its own preserves, and tends to be more concerned with keeping its members in office than with improving the public services. Fortunately, however, the officials recently removed from office included representatives of each of the religious communities.

As regards the Judiciary, which is in even greater need of reform, it is under consideration by the responsible Minister, who has recently returned from Baghdad.

The Mohafez has stated that the Syrian Government intend to increase the gendarmerie force by 1,500 men. This would indicate a possible increase of 300 to 400 men for the Alnousse gendarmerie, the sanctioned strength of which is at present 210 mounted and 180 foot.

Colonel des Esars, the Délégué Adjoint, states that his transfer to Deir ez Zor is held up owing to the intervention of the President, who is anxious that he should remain where he is for the time being.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

Local uncertainty as to the extent of the agreement already reached in regard to the transfer of powers has been a contributory factor in an incident at Abu Komal which threatened at one moment to assume serious proportions. The local kaimakam, a hot-headed official with a reputation for xenophobia, assumed without instructions the responsibility for endorsing the passes of Iraqis from the neighbouring frontier area. The Sûreté maintained that, in the absence of any agreement, this was still a function within their exclusive competence. The local Sûreté inspector seems to have behaved with unnecessary tactlessness on his side, and his refusal to recognise the kaimakam's signature resulted in a brawl and the arrest of the former by the latter. Friction developed between the Gardes Mobiles and the gendarmerie, and serious trouble was only averted by the combined efforts of the Mohafez and the French Chief of the Sûreté at Deir ez Zor, both of whom behaved with tact and good sense. The question of the removal of the kaimakam is under consideration, the Sûreté Inspector has already been relieved of his functions.

M. Cassin, the Délégué Adjoint, left Deir ez Zor on the 15th January and does not expect to return. He is a sick and nervous man, and ever since the Lebanese crisis last November has shown himself very anti-British, notwithstanding his excellent start at Deir ez Zor only a few months ago. He took a highly coloured view of the incident described above, and his departure is clearly a loss to the Administration. A postscript to the above states that he is temporarily acting as Délégué Adjoint in his stead.

11. *The Lebanon*

The Lebanese Prime Minister, in a declaration made to the press on the 19th January, stated that, in their discussions with the Egyptians, the Lebanese delegation had exactly followed the lines of the Government's policy, which were to cultivate close relations with other Arab States without entering into any

private conversation, the Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed the view that Egypt, like the Lebanon, is determined to keep clear of any consortium of Asiatic Arab States.

During the delegation's absence numerous rumours, probably emanating from ambitious Deputies, had been circulating to the effect that the Prime Minister intended to resign and to form a new Government on his return. These reports, combined with the volume of destructive criticism of the Government heard on all sides, had led to a general impression that some change was, in fact, imminent. The President, however, informed the Political Officer on the 20th January that he considered any change would be disastrous at present, and Riadh es Sulh, at the same interview, said that although he had thought of resigning to make way for someone better versed in administration, he was prepared to agree that the moment was not opportune. The President told the

Minister of the Interior, particularly in the domain of finance, and it was agreed that the Minister of the Interior should, in addition to his already heavy burdens, take over the work of the Finance Ministry, although Riadh es Sulh would remain the titular Minister. This arrangement has the desired effect of relieving the inexperienced Riadh es Sulh of all administrative responsibility, but is not of course conducive to efficiency, and it seems likely that the President will before long have to call in an experienced administrator, such as Hamid Franjish, to run the Ministry of Finance.

General Catroux has informed the President that Emil Halde has refused to resign his seat in the Chamber (see Weekly Summary for the 19th January, paragraph 11), and consequently the Government must now decide for themselves whether or not to pursue the idea of expelling him.

Some interest has been aroused by the activities of a new group headed by Tawfiq Awad and Charles Amoun, who have formed an organisation with the avowed object of preserving the Lebanon's ties with France and its predominantly Christian character. The promoters, both notoriously creatures of the French, appear to be in close touch with the Délégation Générale through its oriental counsellor, Rozek; and their propaganda follows the lines currently believed to be adopted by Sûreté agents amongst the Christians, namely, that the present Government, under British pressure, are adopting a policy destined to place the Lebanon under Moslem domination, from which only French support can save the Christians. The Government view these activities with some concern, and are more than ever anxious to obtain control of the Sûreté at the earliest possible moment, thus putting an end to its subversive activities.

The Minister of *Ravitaillement*, in his attempts to bring down the cost of living, has had to meet a brisk fire of criticism from local commercial circles, by whom he is accused of favouring a few merchants at the expense of their competitors. On the 24th January he published a long apologia, but criticisms of him are rife, largely on account of his testiness and unnecessary rudeness towards petitioners, and the President has expressed anxiety lest his attitude should bring disrepute upon the Government.

The Government published a communiqué on the 19th January stating that the conditions of service of all officials were to be examined by a commission, and that, pending the findings, all promotions of more than two grades made since the 1st October, 1943, would be suspended. This measure is an attempt to meet widespread criticism of the wholesale promotions of their favourites in which the Government are alleged to have indulged since taking office, and has been well received by all except the officials immediately affected.

The Bekaa is at present without any effective administration. The Mohafez, appointed by the Government in December last almost immediately threw up his post. He was a Greek Orthodox (to which community, under the unfortunate confessional system still prevailing, the post must be allotted) to replace him. The attention of the Government is being drawn to the undesirability of leaving this important area without a Governor at the present juncture.

[E 1049 23 89]

No. 29

Extracts from weekly Political Summary (No 96), Syria and the Lebanon,
2nd February, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th February)

(Secret.)

1. General

LITTLE of importance has occurred either in Syria or in the Lebanon. The Governments of both States are still awaiting the results of the Anglo-French staff talks, without which it is not possible to proceed further in the negotiations for the transfer of the Sûreté and the Troupes Spéciales.

The Lebanese Government are adopting a firmer attitude towards the activities of Opposition elements led by Tawfiq Awad, and have banned the second meeting of his organisation. The successful handling by the Prime Minister of a petition from the Maronite Patriarch against the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement, and later of an attempted strike in Beirut, both evidently inspired by Tawfiq Awad, has further strengthened the Government's position.

The Syrian Government have declined to accept a letter from the Polish Government appointing the Polish representative in Syria, since that rank—held by the United States representative—implies partial recognition only. They have similarly refused to recognise the newly arrived Persian representative as a "délégué," though his predecessor was recognised in that capacity.

2. Beirut

Purchases for the period 20th to 26th January 1944, show an average of 39 tons of goods per day, and trucks between 10 and 15 per day.

The sale price covers costs to abolish this anomaly, but his proposals are only under consideration and the question is still under consideration.

The Syrian Parliament has voted a law which extends to a great number of Government and municipal employees the right to purchase bread at the low price fixed for the poor. This measure, which would have the effect of greatly increasing the bread subsidy, is likely to lead to a further rise in the cost of living, and alternative proposals have been put forward.

11. The Lebanon

The Lebanese Government showed more anxiety during the week at the activities of Tawfiq Awad's organisation (see last week's summary under "General" and "The Lebanon"). They consider that while the promoters are in themselves of little importance, their political danger is increased by the fact, seen against the background of known Sûreté propaganda, that they are subsidised by the French—a natural deduction being that these activities form part of a French-directed plan to overthrow the Government and to restore French influence. The Government, therefore, while impatiently awaiting the French on the handing over of the Sûreté have at last decided to take direct action against their opponents, and began by banning a second meeting of the organisation, which was to have been held on the 30th January.

In the meantime, the Maronite Patriarch, presumably inspired by Tawfiq Awad (who is his nephew) had on the 26th January addressed a letter to the President protesting against the Syro-Lebanese Agreement on the "intérêts communs", he appeared to think that the article of the agreement conferring on the Higher Committee of the "intérêts communs" the right to legislate would bind both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments without the consent of the respective Chambers, and would ultimately lead to a federation of the two countries. The Lebanese President on the 29th January replied admitting that the text of the agreement was not clear, but that the Government were proposing to prepare a law giving them the right to legislate in matters connected with the common interests.

On the 30th January, Riad-es-Sulh proceeded alone to the Maronite Patriarch's residence, where he found a number of deputations, including one composed of Opposition Deputies headed by Alfred Naccache, all apparently come to protest on the same point. He ignored the deputations, and in the course of a long interview with the Patriarch, in which there were some spirited exchanges, appears to have convinced him, at least for the moment, that the Government was pursuing the policy which the Patriarch had already proclaimed as his own namely, the realisation of Lebanese independence; and that the Moslems were at least no more fanatical against the Christians than the Christians were against the Moslems.

In order to ensure a parliamentary majority and to obviate the necessity of placating the Deputies by granting them administrative favours, the Government are contemplating the formation of a "Lebanese Independence Party," the title of which they hope, will be sufficiently attractive to secure the support, not only of those Deputies generally favourable to the Government, but also of some of the Opposition. The party has not yet been formed, but has at any rate reached the Chamber, but have at any rate reached the Chamber.

The Opposition, however, is not satisfied with the Government's policy, and has on the 29th January, passed a resolution to demand the resignation of the Government, and to vote a provisional sum to enable the administration to be carried on pending the passing of the Budget.

12. Press and Propaganda

The Beirut newspaper *L'Orient* (see last week's summary) was allowed to appear again after three days of its *silence* suspension, the Government having given way to pressure from the Press Syndicate and other bodies.

The greater part of the Lebanese press has shown, in varying degrees, approval of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement. A few newspapers, mainly French inspired, see in the powers vested in the Joint Administrative Committee an anomaly incompatible with national sovereignty, and have used to advantage the Maronite Patriarch's letter of protest to the President of the League of Nations. The French press has so far made no comment.

The Lebanese newspapers have protested unanimously against the Rents Bill, declaring that it would merely benefit the rich at the expense of the poor. They have appealed to the Chamber to reject the motion in its present form. There is also unanimous and bitter criticism of the two Governments' failure to cope with the high cost of living, which in the opinion of the press is the root cause of labour unrest.

The Beirut Communist newspaper *Saïd ash Shôab* of the 29th January quoted an article from the Cairo paper *al-Masri* of the 22nd January. The article, which was stated to be a quotation from the London *Times* correspondent in Damascus, asserted that Syria could not acknowledge the sovereignty of the Lebanese Government. The Syrian Government has recently issued a denial of this statement, pointing out that Syria had already recognised the Lebanese as an independent State.

[E 1136 23 89]

No. 30

Extract from Weekly Political Summary (No 97), Syria and the Lebanon,
9th February, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 19th February)

(Secret.)

1. General

BOTH Governments continue to await with anxiety and impatience the result of the Anglo-French staff talks, pending the completion of which no progress is possible in regard to the further transfer of powers. The Syrian Government

are chiefly concerned about the transfer of the "Troupes Speciales," the Prime Minister in particular having been subjected to much criticism on the score of his failure to implement the promise of the creation of a Syrian national army. The Lebanese are more preoccupied with the problem of the *Sûreté*, which, pending its partial transfer to governmental control, continues to serve as an instrument of French reactionary propaganda and subversive activities.

Owing to this and other causes, there are signs of a definite weakening in the position of the Syrian Cabinet, amongst which there are numerous internal dissensions. The Lebanese Cabinet, on the other hand, has succeeded in restoring its prestige to some extent by maintaining a relatively firm attitude towards the Opposition parties. The Government's failure to secure the passage of the new Rent Law has been offset by the almost unanimous passage, despite much artificial agitation, of the Syro-Lebanese Protocol regarding the *intérêts communs*, and of a draft decree-law giving the Government the right to legislate in matters relating to these services.

The most important external development affecting the two States has been the signature at Algiers, on the 8th February, of an Anglo-French Financial Agreement designed to replace that concluded by His Majesty's Government with General de Gaulle in August 1940. The new agreement, necessitated by the conquest of North Africa and the consequent need for unifying the rate of exchange within the whole area now controlled by the French National Committee of Liberation, contains special arrangements designed to safeguard the financial position of the Levant States. Although reducing the rate of the franc in terms of sterling from francs 176 625 to 200 in the pound sterling, it provides that sterling may still be freely purchased in the Levant States at the old rate of 883 Syrian or Lebanese piastres. It further lays down that no change in this rate of exchange will be made in future without prior consultation with the States. The French National Committee have also agreed to re-value certain franc assets of the States and to restore the gold formerly held by the Banque de Syrie and removed by General Dauterive. Lastly, in the event of any future devaluation of the franc, the Syrian and Lebanese currencies are guaranteed against loss.

This important development was announced by the Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers respectively at interviews with journalists and bankers. The first public reactions have on the whole been very good.

2. Beirut

Four cargo ships during the period the 30th January 5th February were chartered to carry a cargo of 90 tons.

The French Government, hoping to be allowed to export to North Africa, and have made enquiries through the French co-director of the O.C.P. as to the possibility of shipping 1,000 tons of bran. They have been told that permission will not be granted.

3. Syria-Damascus

There are signs of rising discontent with the Government and of dissension in its ranks. On the one hand the merchants, already critical of the Government's lavish expenditure on entertainment, fear an increase in taxation to meet the needs of the Syrian army. On the other, the politically minded, particularly the students, are attacking the Prime Minister for his failure to make good his promises concerning the creation of the army. The Minister of Defence is reported to have tendered his resignation on the same grounds, but it was not accepted. The Minister of Supply has been attacked both in Parliament and in the press for his blatant favouritism in the allocation of contracts, and his failure to defend himself against these attacks has annoyed his colleagues. Finally, the Minister of Justice is resentful of his exclusion from the political conversations which took place during the recent ministerial visit to Bagdad. There is thus much talk of the creation of a new Cabinet from which Saadallah Jabri would be excluded in favour of Lutfi Hafdar, Jamal Mardam or Khaled Azm.

General Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East, arrived in Damascus on the 7th February, where he met Nuri Pasha, who was on his way back to Iraq from Palestine.

First reactions in Damascus to the announcement of the Anglo-French Financial Agreement (see under "General" above) have been very favourable.

4. Aleppo

The Mohafez has returned from Damascus fortified with promises of greater support from the central Government. He is capable and honest, but the local

Nationalists are unlikely ever to work wholeheartedly with one who was a member of the Council of Directors in 1938.

Returning pilgrims from Mecca have warmly praised the arrangements made by the British for their journey. A good impression has also been created locally by the announcement of the impending return of several wheat boarders deported last year to an island in the Red Sea.

7. Al-Qunayr Territory

The Mohafez has notified all Mudirs of Nahiyehs that they will shortly be required to pass a written examination in the laws connected with their duties. He estimates that the necessary educational qualifications for this class of civil servant are possessed by only one out of the eight kaimakams in office, and by only one Mudir out of twenty-five.

Judicial proceedings against Sulaiman Murshid are still hanging fire, the central Government being evidently afraid to take action against this ruffian.

Colonel des Essars, the French délégué, is reported to be at last preparing to leave for his new post at Deir ez Zor. He is not, after all, to be replaced by Colonel d'Assonville, but by a Colonel Gossaud. Colonel des Essars has on the whole shown comprehension of the new Nationalist spirit and of the resulting need for political adjustment. This comprehension is not, however, shared by his subordinates, some of whom, and notably Capitaine Bousquet, have shown a regrettable tendency to follow the reactionary lead of General Monclard.

9. Tribal

A number of small tribal clashes have been reported. Such quarrels are always fairly common at this season of the year, but there is undoubtedly a dangerous tendency on the part of the tribes to find out by experiment just how far they can safely flout the authority of the Damascus Government in view of the changed status of the Bedouin Control.

It is reported that no steps have yet been taken in this area to disarm the Garden Mobs.

A fight has occurred between two sub-sections of the Abu Saraya (Agaidat) in the Jebel Buhari west of Deir ez Zor. One side lost five killed and two wounded, the other three killed and two wounded. The dispute concerns a land claim. Normally such internal feuds are of little importance, but both parties are reported to have been buying up ammunition at exorbitant prices since the affray took place.

The president of the new Committee for Tribal Affairs, which is composed of nineteen members from among the more important tribal Deputies, is Haj Mohammed Ayyash, an influential merchant and landowner from Deir ez Zor. He states that he has suggested to the committee the abolition of tribal law, but that a large majority of members are opposed to changing a system which has brought them arms and many concessions from the French, and that they prefer to wait until they know whether Syria really is to be independent. The representatives of the *salim* (nomads), who are at present partly under the jurisdiction of the ordinary civil courts, have demanded that if the nomads are to remain under tribal law they, too, should receive the same privilege.

10. Frontier

The Turkish authorities have introduced new visa regulations, by virtue of which, with the exception of transit visas for direct travel over the Turkish sections of the Bagdad Railway, all applications, including those of diplomats other than heads of missions and couriers, must be referred to Ankara. This has caused considerable inconvenience to official British travellers, and the question of retaliatory measures is under consideration.

11. The Lebanon

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 3rd February to discuss the ratification of the Syro-Lebanese protocol on the *intérêts communs* and a draft decree-law giving the Government the right to legislate in matters concerning these services. After a long debate, during which Riad es-Sulh trounced the Opposition, the

The Government, pursuing its policy of suppressing Taufiq Awad's organisation, has now suspended its newspaper, *Saif al-Akhar*, and the

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with the following results:

1. The first part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as $t \rightarrow \infty$. It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) tend to zero as $t \rightarrow \infty$ if and only if the matrix A is stable. The second part of the paper is devoted to the study of the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of the system (1) as $t \rightarrow 0$. It is shown that the solutions of the system (1) tend to zero as $t \rightarrow 0$ if and only if the matrix A is stable.

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1. (15%)	2. (15%)	3. (15%)	4. (15%)	5. (15%)	6. (15%)	7. (15%)

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* *See also* 100-101, 102-103, 104-105, 106-107, 108-109, 110-111, 112-113, 114-115, 116-117, 118-119, 120-121, 122-123, 124-125, 126-127, 128-129, 130-131, 132-133, 134-135, 136-137, 138-139, 140-141, 142-143, 144-145, 146-147, 148-149, 150-151, 152-153, 154-155, 156-157, 158-159, 160-161, 162-163, 164-165, 166-167, 168-169, 170-171, 172-173, 174-175, 176-177, 178-179, 180-181, 182-183, 184-185, 186-187, 188-189, 190-191, 192-193, 194-195, 196-197, 198-199, 200-201, 202-203, 204-205, 206-207, 208-209, 210-211, 212-213, 214-215, 216-217, 218-219, 220-221, 222-223, 224-225, 226-227, 228-229, 230-231, 232-233, 234-235, 236-237, 238-239, 240-241, 242-243, 244-245, 246-247, 248-249, 250-251, 252-253, 254-255, 256-257, 258-259, 260-261, 262-263, 264-265, 266-267, 268-269, 270-271, 272-273, 274-275, 276-277, 278-279, 280-281, 282-283, 284-285, 286-287, 288-289, 290-291, 292-293, 294-295, 296-297, 298-299, 300-301, 302-303, 304-305, 306-307, 308-309, 310-311, 312-313, 314-315, 316-317, 318-319, 320-321, 322-323, 324-325, 326-327, 328-329, 330-331, 332-333, 334-335, 336-337, 338-339, 340-341, 342-343, 344-345, 346-347, 348-349, 350-351, 352-353, 354-355, 356-357, 358-359, 360-361, 362-363, 364-365, 366-367, 368-369, 370-371, 372-373, 374-375, 376-377, 378-379, 380-381, 382-383, 384-385, 386-387, 388-389, 390-391, 392-393, 394-395, 396-397, 398-399, 400-401, 402-403, 404-405, 406-407, 408-409, 410-411, 412-413, 414-415, 416-417, 418-419, 420-421, 422-423, 424-425, 426-427, 428-429, 430-431, 432-433, 434-435, 436-437, 438-439, 440-441, 442-443, 444-445, 446-447, 448-449, 450-451, 452-453, 454-455, 456-457, 458-459, 460-461, 462-463, 464-465, 466-467, 468-469, 470-471, 472-473, 474-475, 476-477, 478-479, 480-481, 482-483, 484-485, 486-487, 488-489, 490-491, 492-493, 494-495, 496-497, 498-499, 500-501, 502-503, 504-505, 506-507, 508-509, 510-511, 512-513, 514-515, 516-517, 518-519, 520-521, 522-523, 524-525, 526-527, 528-529, 530-531, 532-533, 534-535, 536-537, 538-539, 540-541, 542-543, 544-545, 546-547, 548-549, 550-551, 552-553, 554-555, 556-557, 558-559, 560-561, 562-563, 564-565, 566-567, 568-569, 570-571, 572-573, 574-575, 576-577, 578-579, 580-581, 582-583, 584-585, 586-587, 588-589, 590-591, 592-593, 594-595, 596-597, 598-599, 600-601, 602-603, 604-605, 606-607, 608-609, 610-611, 612-613, 614-615, 616-617, 618-619, 620-621, 622-623, 624-625, 626-627, 628-629, 630-631, 632-633, 634-635, 636-637, 638-639, 640-641, 642-643, 644-645, 646-647, 648-649, 650-651, 652-653, 654-655, 656-657, 658-659, 660-661, 662-663, 664-665, 666-667, 668-669, 670-671, 672-673, 674-675, 676-677, 678-679, 680-681, 682-683, 684-685, 686-687, 688-689, 690-691, 692-693, 694-695, 696-697, 698-699, 700-701, 702-703, 704-705, 706-707, 708-709, 710-711, 712-713, 714-715, 716-717, 718-719, 720-721, 722-723, 724-725, 726-727, 728-729, 730-731, 732-733, 734-735, 736-737, 738-739, 740-741, 742-743, 744-745, 746-747, 748-749, 750-751, 752-753, 754-755, 756-757, 758-759, 760-761, 762-763, 764-765, 766-767, 768-769, 770-771, 772-773, 774-775, 776-777, 778-779, 780-781, 782-783, 784-785, 786-787, 788-789, 790-791, 792-793, 794-795, 796-797, 798-799, 800-801, 802-803, 804-805, 806-807, 808-809, 810-811, 812-813, 814-815, 816-817, 818-819, 820-821, 822-823, 824-825, 826-827, 828-829, 830-831, 832-833, 834-835, 836-837, 838-839, 840-841, 842-843, 844-845, 846-847, 848-849, 850-851, 852-853, 854-855, 856-857, 858-859, 860-861, 862-863, 864-865, 866-867, 868-869, 870-871, 872-873, 874-875, 876-877, 878-879, 880-881, 882-883, 884-885, 886-887, 888-889, 890-891, 892-893, 894-895, 896-897, 898-899, 900-901, 902-903, 904-905, 906-907, 908-909, 910-911, 912-913, 914-915, 916-917, 918-919, 920-921, 922-923, 924-925, 926-927, 928-929, 930-931, 932-933, 934-935, 936-937, 938-939, 940-941, 942-943, 944-945, 946-947, 948-949, 950-951, 952-953, 954-955, 956-957, 958-959, 960-961, 962-963, 964-965, 966-967, 968-969, 970-971, 972-973, 974-975, 976-977, 978-979, 980-981, 982-983, 984-985, 986-987, 988-989, 990-991, 992-993, 994-995, 996-997, 998-999, 1000-1001, 1002-1003, 1004-1005, 10

[illegible]

144-15. 144-15-1. 144-15-2.

Another sit-down strike has broken out amongst the office staff of the Kaduna

Electricity Works, on the grounds that the French director has failed to implement the agreement.

the intermediaries of the Government. The directors and...

employees have now been summoned to Hanoi to interview the Prime Minister

The unpopularity of the French director, M. Calmette, whose security record

is bad, is undoubtedly one of the causes of the trouble

The Minister of Supply has been showing considerable activity. At a press

conference on the 4th February he defended himself vigorously against charges levelled against him in regard to the

revealed against him in regard to alleged irregularities in the grant of export licences to some of his friends. He then expressed his regret that he had not

cost of living, these included the arrangement of buying instruments, medicine,

neighbouring countries which would secure the importation of cheap food stuffs and

the sale to the public as Government-controlled prices of certain important

commodities, such as cloth, which he was obtaining through the Office Farnographique

de Guerre and by purchasing stocks in the Customs. He referred also to the

Government's intention to increase the activity and effectiveness of the Anti-Prostitution Department, which has now been increased to 150 men.

instead of the Ministry of Security. It is also

With the rise of the Internet, the Internet has become an important channel for the dissemination of information. The Internet has become an important channel for the dissemination of information. The Internet has become an important channel for the dissemination of information.

co-ordinating the efforts of the two Governments in the economic field

The Prime Minister of Iraq arrived in Beirut on the 3rd February by air.

from Palestine and left for Damascus on the 4th February. He was entertained

by the Lebanese Prime Minister to a banquet, to which foreign representatives, Members and journalists were invited.

The newspapers have expressed almost unanimous approval of the ratification of the Syro-Lebanese Common Interests Agreement. The one exception, *al Hiraq*, made a feeble attempt to justify the ~~interests~~ of the single Lebanese Deputy who voted against it. The changed attitude of the Maronite Patriarch was also welcomed.

L'Orient, on its reappearance, accused the Lebanese Censorship Service of dictatorial methods and protested that if free comment on matters of internal policy were not to be allowed, the continued existence of the press would become unnecessary. There is some truth in these accusations, the Lebanese censorship, run by a thoroughly incompetent official with much interference by Cabinet Ministers, is proving both arbitrary and inefficient.

(Secret.)

BOTH Lebanese and Syrian Governments have reacted strongly against the announcement of the appointment of General Beynet in the dual rôle of Commander-in-chief of French Forces and Delegate-General. Their view is that the title of Delegate-General is no longer compatible with the independent status of Syria and the Lebanon, and that an Ambassador should be appointed, by agreement, in accordance with normal diplomatic practice. The two Prime Ministers have met to discuss the presentation to the French of protests in identical terms. While the attitude of the two Governments has apparently been fortified by encouragement from several members of the Diplomatic Corps, efforts are being made on the British side to prevent any unduly violent reaction.

The Franco-British staff talks on pending questions, such as security and the disposal of the native levies, are now practically completed, and it is hoped that within the next few days it will be possible to acquaint the two Governments in detail with the minimum British military requirements, thus enabling further progress to be made in regard to the negotiations for the transfer of powers. The long delay caused by these talks, though inevitable, has given much discouragement to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments, and this in turn has led to a certain laxity and confusion in the provincial administration, which have been fully exploited by disaffected French elements.

Rumours that the British troops are withdrawing from the Levant States in the near future and being replaced by large numbers of French troops from North Africa have been circulating freely and increasingly for the past few days.

position. An official *démenti* will be issued by Ninth Army Headquarters, and other measures are under examination to check this move, which is causing unnecessary alarm without doing the French themselves any good.

General Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East (see Weekly Summary No. 97 paragraph 3), who was presented with a gold sword by the Syrian President before he left Damascus, is stated by the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to have had a conversation with the Lebanese President during which he suggested that the Arab States should address a joint request to the Allied Nations, urging that the principles of the Atlantic Charter should be applied to the Arab States.

status of the Lebanon, he is reported by the same source as having proposed that in view of the large Christian element in the population, the country's independence and sovereignty should be especially guaranteed by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union as was done in the case of Persia during the Tehran Conference. A rather different account of this conversation has been given by the United States Diplomatic Agent, according to whom General Hurley's suggestion was that all the Arab States, at their forthcoming conference on Arab unity, might make a declaration expressing their determination to respect each other's sovereign rights and territorial integrity, following this up with a joint request to the United Nations to make in respect of all of them a declaration on the lines of that issued at Tehran in regard to Persia. According to Mr Wadsworth he added as a further tentative suggestion that the Arab States might declare their intention of themselves applying the principles of the Atlantic Charter to their relations with each other. The first of these suggestions, but not the second, was apparently made to the Syrian President also. Neither Shukri Quwath nor Beshara Khuri is reported to have returned any definite reply. It seems possible that the Lebanese President and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who are both Christians and who understand little English may have genuinely misunderstood the General's suggestions, or alternatively that they interpreted them in accordance with their own wishes.

The Lebanese Government have improved their position in regard to hostile elements, and are now showing increased activity in the field of administration largely owing to the encouraging efforts of the Prime Minister.

Total purchases during the period 6th to 13th February amounted to 783 tons, a daily average of 98 tons.

On the 7th February the Mohafez of the Jazirah received an urgent message from the Madras Standard, informing him that the Bedouins were gathering in large numbers about 25 kilom. north of Shaddadeh to attack the Feddagha in revenge for previous raids. The Mohafez, exasperated by the apparent inaction of the Contrôle Bedouin, to whom the matter had been reported a week before, wrote officially explaining his inability to quell the Jubbour with the insufficient gendarmerie force at his disposal, and disclaiming responsibility if the French authorities did not take action to expel the Feddagha to their normal

Governments, and the transfer to these services of a considerable number of functions hitherto exercised by the French Sûreté Générale, but inevitably it stipulates for the retention under Allied military control of a number of security subjects. The main instrument for dealing with these will be the French Sûreté aux Armées, which replaces the old French Sûreté Générale, but an important innovation is the creation of a Joint Franco-British Security Council which will make recommendations to the British and French commanders on general security policy. This innovation should go far to remove the fears of the local Governments lest in practice their nationals should be left exclusively at the mercy of the French security services, from whom they have suffered much in the past.

Although the paper was drafted with the primary purpose of indicating to the local Governments the precise extent of the British military requirements in respect of the subjects covered in order to enable the Governments to negotiate a settlement with the French *en connaissance de cause*, it is satisfactory to record that the French for their part accepted it in every detail while it was still in draft form. The Governments will however probably require explanations on a number of points before they feel it possible to get down to the business of detailed negotiations with the French.

Papers covering the remaining subjects of interest to the Ninth Army, viz., the future of the native levies, the trial of crimes and offences having a military aspect and "administration" (including requisitioning, communications and the concessionary companies) are in course of preparation.

On the 22nd February the two Governments delivered identically worded notes of protest to the French on the subject of General Bernet's appointment in the dual rôle of Délégué Général and French Commander in chief. Largely as a result of British advice given both in Damascus and Beirut, these notes were much milder and less uncompromising than the two Governments—and particularly the Lebanese—had originally intended to make them. The Lebanese Prime Minister had resolved to state categorically that the appointment was unacceptable, but in their final form the notes held out the possibility of an amicable agreement, provided that on the French side the necessary explanations and assurances were forthcoming. Furthermore, while the notes recorded the concern of the two Governments that they had not been consulted in advance, a passage was deleted which referred to the necessity for the Governments' actual agreement—which would inevitably have raised in an acute form the vexed question of the extent to which notwithstanding the technical continuance of the mandate, the representative of the French National Committee of Liberation can henceforth be regarded as possessing in his civil capacity a purely diplomatic status.

M. Chataigneau, though embarrassed by the connexion between this controversy and his own personal position, is known to have reported to Algiers in a sense sympathetic to the local point of view, and it is much to be hoped that this, coupled with informal representations which may be made on the British side at Algiers, will eventually lead to a satisfactory compromise on a question about which the local Governments undoubtedly feel very strongly. Nevertheless, the problem of General Reynet's dual rôle is a very thorny one, and it may prove difficult to devise an acceptable formula. The local Governments have emphasised that this arrangement is far too reminiscent of the days when a French High Commissioner was also commander-in-chief of the troops stationed in the Levant. The French on their side have put forward the argument, in private conversation, that only a commander-in-chief possessing in addition full political authority to act in the name of the Algiers Committee would be capable of forcing disgruntled French officers to accept the new and highly unpalatable situation arising out of the transfer of powers. Whether or not this argument is wholly ingenious, it cannot, unfortunately, be denied that neither the well-meaning M. Chataigneau nor the present light weight Commander-in-chief of the French forces has been able adequately to control such disaffected elements, which represent a real danger.

The Contrôle Belouin has now been handed over finally and completely to the Syrian authorities, and the Mohafezin have been informed that it is henceforth under their orders. This development had long been foreshadowed. Since, however, it involves the retention, under Syrian management, of a number of French officers, it provides an excellent example of the sort of field in which good will and positive co-operation are essential in the interests of efficiency.

It now seems fairly certain that, as suggested in last week's summary, Nuri Pasha did not, in fact, achieve any positive agreement concerning Syro-Iraqi co-operation during his stay in Damascus. It appears, moreover, that even the comparatively anodyne and non-committal remarks on the subject of Arab unity

which were attributed to him in the Syrian press have caused a certain amount of resentment in official circles. The Government are wholeheartedly in favour of a Greater Syria of their own choosing, i.e., ruled from Damascus by themselves. But most members of the Cabinet are convinced republicans, and it seems they did not much relish Nuri Pasha's remark that the component States of the Greater Syria of the future should be free to decide amongst themselves the nature of its constitution. Monarchist sentiment is believed to be strong among the Hedouin, and is also becoming increasingly marked in the Jebel Druze, where members of the preponderant Atrash clan are in close touch with the agents of the Syrian Government. It is stated that the Hedouin and Atrash are so far from openly espousing

In most districts the rumour campaign concerning the "impending withdrawal of the British from the Levant States" continues unabated, and is causing a considerable loss of business. The situation is particularly serious in the case of the British oil companies, which are being forced to suspend operations in many districts. The British oil companies are being forced to suspend operations in many districts. The British oil companies are being forced to suspend operations in many districts.

In the United States, the general situation is similar to the one in France. The new American Free Trade Treaty, which was concluded in 1890, is not only the only one of the kind in the world, but also the most advantageous one. In it we secured, at the United States, an enormous market. The fact that it had not been previously reached, was a great drawback to our export and restricted our rise in the revenue and our tax base. Further reflection has, however, convinced most people that the financial position of the States, if not quite what they had supposed, is still very advantageous.

3 Syria—Damascus

Jamil Mardouk, the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Khaled el Azmi, the Finance Minister, have left by rail, via Aleppo and Bagdad, on their long journey to the East. Jamil Bey said that he had been charged with conveying the thanks of the President for the congratulations received from King Abdul Aziz on the restoration of Syrian constitutional life. Naturally, too, he would pursue with the King the discussions already started in Cairo on the subject of Arab unity. He would be absent about a fortnight, and after a short stay in Damascus would leave again for Algiers.

Jamil Bey added that on his return from Riyadh he would proceed with the installation of embassies or legations at Cairo, Bagdad, Riyadh, Algiers, London and Washington, and of consulates-general at Jerusalem, Amman and Bombay. In addition, the Government were studying the question of opening several consulates in South America, beginning with Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires.

In reply to questions concerning the state of Syro-Turkish relations, the Minister for Foreign Affairs stated somewhat surprisingly that these were exceedingly cordial, and that "if certain conditions which have yet to be fulfilled" had been met, recognition of the new States would have been possible. Such a recognition was already accorded. Negotiations had even been started for the recognition of Syria and Armenia, but these had been interrupted. The action of Syrian consulates in Turkey—particularly at Adana—might well complicate the already difficult problem of frontier security. In all probability, however, the negotiations would be completed by the end of the year, and would be a long way from fruition. They can only have been conducted in Damascus, where the Turkish Consul appears to have been having difficulties with the Syrian authorities over newspaper articles criticising Turkish foreign policy and over the fulsome attention paid to Tefik Ruzû Aras, the former Turkish Ambassador in London, who was equally critical of his Government's " tergiversations." It is possible, indeed, that Jamil Bey's optimistic description of Syro-Turkish relations is attributable to conversations with the ex-ambassador but the latter seems to have visited Damascus in a purely private capacity despite the suggestions of the Damascus press to the contrary. In this connection it is only necessary to recall that only a very short while ago the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Ambassador at Angora that his Government did not propose to recognise any new States while the war lasted.

Dr Kayali, the Syrian Minister of Justice, and Dr Aractinji, the head of the Department of Health, were due to accompany Jamil Mardam as far as the Jezireh, in order to study respectively the malaria problem and the replacement of judges—two matters which have long needed drastic action.

4. Aleppo

The area remains quiet and there have been good rains. The reconciliation reached between the Jabri and Mudarree factions has caused a good deal of perturbation amongst the local Nationalists, who foresee that there will be fewer bones for them to pick. The Prime Minister's brother Hisan Jabri, has on this account been subjected to much criticism—which should benefit him, as ever since his release from *residence forcée* some months ago he has lived well up to his reputation for throwing his weight about.

As stated under "General" above, recent developments in Anglo-Turkish relations have given rise to a crop of damaging rumours, which have naturally been most prevalent in the Aleppo area. Frontier contacts with the Turks have however remained normal. Amongst the questions down for discussion at the forthcoming meeting of the "second degree" frontier commission, which will be attended by the Vali of Latakia, is that of the contraband trade in Turkish cattle which is connived at by the authorities on this side of the frontier in the interests of the Ninth Army.

7. Alaouite Territory

The trouble at Jebel has now subsided. There are no signs of any general disorder in the Alaouite Territory, but the present stage in the evolution of local government is fraught with difficulties. The gendarmerie force is small, the area is disunited, and unscrupulous tribal chiefs still hold great power. The French moreover have for some time been working for unity among the Alaouites, but not for unity with the rest of Syria. The Mobsat is endeavouring to check reactionary propaganda and to improve the standard of efficiency and integrity in the administration, and hopes by so doing to bring the Alaouites into line with the rest of Syria. Since his arrival however the Sunni element has shown a regrettable tendency to assert itself at the expense of the other communities. The future peace of the territory depends on the repression of this tendency on the degree of support lent by the Central Government in curbing the tribal chiefs, and most of all on the attitude of the local French officials. The new Délégué Adjoint appears to have made a good start, but some of his subordinates leave much to be desired.

11. The Lebanon

Some prominence has been given in the press to the activities of a group of Lebanese ladies who have instituted a campaign to boycott retailers in order to force down the prices of unessential commodities. Reports of the formation of fixed margin of profit, have contributed to alarm the merchants, as have also communications from the Minister of Supply announcing his intention to retail food-stuffs direct to the public at Government-controlled prices. It is, however, as yet far too soon to say whether any of these initiatives will have a more lasting effect on the cost of living than have various short-lived schemes propounded in the past.

The preparation of the Lebanese budget is likely to be much delayed by the transfer to the Government of the various common interests services, as no department can submit its estimates until it has been able to include those of the additional services now attached to it.

The Parliamentary Committee to examine the Rent Law has now reversed its previous conclusions, and has recommended increases of from 25 per cent to 100 per cent on 1939 rents, the division of premises according to tenants' professions is also to be suppressed. The Bill is to be debated on the 24th February.

The Lebanese Government's announcement of a five-year plan of public works has been received with scepticism by a public accustomed to the promulgation of grandiose schemes which come to nothing.

The Lebanese members of the Supreme Supply Council and of the seven Advisory Boards have been named, and the boards are now functioning.

On the 18th February the "Association of Friends of the Soviet Union" opened an exhibition in Beirut entitled, "The U.S.S.R. at War," to which considerable publicity was given. The Communist party also announced a public lecture on its new organisation in the Levant States.

12. Press and Propaganda

Internal—The press has commented extensively on the reports now circulating to the effect that Syrian and Lebanese business circles propose to form a large trust for the purpose of monopolising imports and controlling their sale at a profit of 15-20 per cent. With the exception of *al Qabas*, of Damascus which considers the scheme to be a satisfactory step towards the control of prices, the press in general maintains that its effect would be harmful, in that it would destroy a system of free trade and competition which is alleged to be in operation. The Supply Ministry to offer in the open market large quantities of woollen goods, has been criticised for having caused a fall in the prices of unessential commodities (see under "The Lebanon" above).

There are still many complaints about the unfair distribution of news print and recurrent suspension of certain newspapers. Amongst those recently suspended have been *al Anwar*, *Asma*, *al-Ahwar*, *al-Hadaf*, *al-Ahd*, and *al-Musa*. *Al-Ahwar* has reappeared under the direction of Tanfiq Awad, whose connexion with the Emil Eddé faction is well known. The first issue on re-appearance was censored extensively.

External—A section of the local press, in referring to the American oil project in the Arabian Peninsula, suggests that the Arab Governments should now realize the international importance of their countries' resources, and should obtain full measure of benefit from concessions granted to other Powers.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda—No significant change has been observed.

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No. 33

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 100, Syria and the Lebanon,
1st March, 1944 (Received in Foreign Office, 15th March)

SECRET

1. General

The Syrian authorities have reacted unfavourably to the Ninth Army paper (see last week's summary under "General") concerning military security in relation to the transfer of powers. They maintain that its practical effect would be to saddle them indefinitely with a thinly camouflaged variant of the old French regime, under which the country was misruled by the S.S.Os. with their Gardes Mobiles and by the *Sûreté Générale*. In their view the paper shows mistrust of

The first reactions of the Lebanese Government were apparently far less strong, but they cannot afford to get out of step with the Syrians in a matter of this sort. Various suggestions for the reorganisation of the Government, preserving its essential features, are now under examination.

A copy of the Syrian counter project concerning the transfer of the native levies (see last week's summary) has now been received. It is a badly drafted document, and contains several points which at first sight appear to render it unsuitable as a basis for negotiation. The Syrians maintain, however, that it was only communicated after explanations had been given verbally to the French military authorities regarding its contents, and these explanations, as repeated privately to His Majesty's Minister do, in fact, show the counter project to have misrepresented their attitude which is essentially reasonable.

There have been no further positive developments in regard to the appointment of a General Resident in the Lebanon. The French National Committee of Liberation is apparently still considering the protests of the two Governments and nothing is known here of the general's plans. Meanwhile the Lebanese Prime Minister, in the course of a somewhat provocative speech in the Chamber, has declared that "the general who is coming amongst us" can only be received as a friendly ambassador.

Rumours evidently inspired by the French concerning the coming of French troops and the evacuation of the British are still reported throughout Syria and

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12

In response to suggestions from Bagdad, both Syria and the Lebanon have reacted vigorously against the proposal, put forward by Senators Wagner and

2. H. Auer

The Lebanese Government offered to buy the surplus which the Cereals Commission had offered for sale. But when it was found that the surplus was needed for the Allied war effort the proposal was withdrawn.

After protracted agitation against the continuance of the O.C.P. monopoly, certain cereals merchants in Syria have proposed that they should be allowed to buy cereals from the producers at a fixed rate. They claim to be able to reduce operating costs but, on the other hand, producers would lose the benefit of stable prices for their crops. The Syrian Government has not yet decided on the merits of these proposals and has launched vigorous attacks against the merchants. Some strong leading articles have appeared which, in a country where public opinion is slow to give approval, constitute a considerable tribute to the O.C.P.

Public opinion in Damascus now seems to regard it as almost certain that there will be changes in the Government before the next session of Parliament, and that Tausif Shamieh, Mazhar Rostan and Nazim Hukhari, the three least important members of the Cabinet, will be amongst those to go. Jamil Mardam and Khaled of Azm, the two most likely rivals of Sandullah Jabri for the office of Prime Minister, are now the guests of Ibn Saud at Riyadh, but in view of the latter's influence over the President, this does not by any means signify that Sandullah Bey has been relieved even temporarily, of their intrigues to supplant him. Unlike Jamil Mardam Khaled el Azm has yet to make his mark abroad though he is intellectually the toughest and most outstanding member of the Cabinet. It is thought probable that his rôle is to keep an eye on Jamil Mardam, who is a born intriguer and of doubtful loyalty to Shukri Quwatli. He may also have been attached to the mission with a view to obtaining first-hand information of the American plans for oil development in Saudi Arabia, since he is the only member of the Government who understands and speaks English. The Government are known to be preoccupied with the political and economic implications of this question, and to be hoping that it will be possible eventually to bring a pipe-line up to Rutba (whence it will flow to the coast of the Mediterranean) rather than to construct a new one from the Persian Gulf of the Arabian peninsula to the Red Sea. They are also showing a renewed interest in the possibility of reviving the Hajar Railway.

4. *Airports*

117

With very little prompting, and as a result of canvassing which was left wholly in Syrian hands, the people of Aleppo have during the past week contributed a sum sufficient to purchase at least four Spitfires for the R.A.F. The Mohafez was the principal organiser, assisted by Ihsan Jabri, and three of the leading textile merchants contributed large sums. The R.A.F. gave exhibition flights over the town and there was a display of parachute jumping in the neighbourhood. The presence of the British forces has of course brought wealth to many of the inhabitants, but in view of the general reputation of the Aleppines for being tight lipped and provincial in his outlook, the results achieved has surpassed all expectations and are a striking tribute to the growing popularity of the Allied cause.

7. Algonquian Territory

Frontier administration remains virtually unchanged, security matters being now the responsibility of the Officer Frontalier. (Incidentally, this "change without a difference" constitutes one of the main objections of the Syrian Government to the security arrangements now under consideration—see under "General" above.)

6. Kephartas and Joseph

The Mohafez of the Jezireh has brought upon the Government and upon himself some loss of prestige through an abortive attempt to banish certain party leaders from the Mohafezat. Having received a telegram from the Prime Minister instructing him to take all necessary measures to ensure local security, he sent the police to arrest three persons, a Syrian Catholic, a Syrian Catholic, who is president of the Kamichlie Municipality and an old opponent of Syrian independence, a Chaldean Catholic landowner named Habib Meriamo, who is alleged to have spoken against the Government, and a certain Kurdish notable, Saleh Sheikhmas of Amouda, were arrested and taken under armed escort to Deir ez Zor, but were there told by the Mohafez of the Euphrates, on instructions from the Prime Minister, that their arrest had been a mistake and that they were free to return to their homes. The Mohafez of the Jezireh has now gone to Damascus to have it out with the Central Government. It is rumoured that he may not return. In his defence it must be said that all the three arrested men are well known as protégés of the French, and that Michel Dom, in particular, has long been a fomentor of separatist tendencies. There is reason to believe that the French Minister would not sympathize with a Mohafez who has shown violent opposition of the Minister of the Interior, who complained that Saadullah Bey was plotting to overthrow the Government. He was, however, not permitted to depart to Palestine, ostensibly on grounds of ill health, and is still sulking there.

[27851]

Commander in East Syria. He brought with him his Chief of Staff, Commandant Clapeau, and several changes are expected. The local reactions to this dual appointment are not yet known.

9. Tribal

The Bedouin Control, together with local gendarmerie, have forced the Baggara to give back a proportion of the sheep which they recently stole from the Assyrians, and have also taken action to settle the dispute between the Feddagha and the Jubbour (see Summary No. 98 of the 14th February). More rain has fallen, which should keep the farmers busy and contented.

11. The Lebanon

The position of the Lebanese Government remains relatively secure. Opposition outside the Chamber, routed by the Government's recent repressive measures, shows no signs of reforming, whilst the Prime Minister's forcefulness in dealing with all opponents during the parliamentary debates has so far sufficed to give the Government an overwhelming majority on every issue put to the vote.

Nevertheless, while it is recognised that the Ministers are all trying hard in their respective spheres, the Government are being increasingly criticised for their dilatoriness in dealing with the many administrative problems confronting them.

schemes have still not matured. The budget has not been presented, and the War Profits Tax remains uncollected, whilst the Administration in general is functioning little, if any, better than in the past, partly owing to the lack of suitability to resist interventions by their supporters in favour of protégés. It is

tive record, but from the belief that they are sincerely trying to shake themselves free of the mandatory shackles. The Government are thus obliged to give periodical proof of their determination to pursue a policy of independence, lest their popularity in and out of the Chamber sink to a dangerously low level.

It was clearly with this consideration in mind that the Prime Minister, in reply to a question in the Chamber on the 24th February, made a bold and provocative speech which earned him much applause at the time and has received since. He first stated, very prematurely, that the Lebanon would soon have its army under its own command, since the French had admitted the principle of the transfer of the Lebanese *Troupes Spéciales* to the Lebanon. He then referred to "another army which was said to be coming to take away Lebanese

that the British forces were leaving the Levant States and being replaced by many thousands of French troops, and declared his intention to defend the country against all odds. Finally, he dropped a strong hint that "the general who was coming amongst us" (referring to General Beynet, against the manner of whose appointment the Lebanese Government had protested) could only be received "by friendly ambassadors." "The newspapers," said Riad es Sulh, "say he is quick and energetic. I hope that he will be, so that he may hand over as quickly as possible the rest of our powers."

Meanwhile, the Government still cannot make up their minds to expel

are in process of forming a pro-Government party amongst the Deputies and do not wish to raise this controversial issue until they can be sure of support. Paul Eddé himself, after weeks of underground activities, recently informed one of the Maronite archbishops that he had received secret intelligence proving that the Lebanese President had agreed with His Majesty's Minister to absorb the Lebanon in Syria. This the archbishop, after conversation with His Majesty's Minister, was able to refute, and the incident did not redound to Eddé's prestige.

While security in the country as a whole is satisfactory, the situation in the Bekaa is giving grounds for anxiety. This turbulent region, composed partly of a few districts, has always been difficult to rule, since December it has no Mohafez, so that the Government's writ has hardly run in the outlying districts, which, in addition, have been subjected to some particularly intense French propaganda. A special committee has been set up by the Government to make an investigation, and they are now urgently considering how

to restore their authority in the area. Disorders would undoubtedly be worse were it not that the region is fertile and comparatively prosperous, so that the normal incentives to disturbances are lacking.

The 1944 Rent Law, after being for a second time examined by a Parliamentary Committee, was passed in an amended form on the 24th February. The Bill divides accommodation into three classes, residential, professional and commercial, and allows increases of from 30 per cent to 100 per cent, on 1939 rents, according to the class of accommodation and the amount of rent paid. Premises

employed by the State are exempt from all increases. A commission of enquiry on the strike at the Kadisha Electricity Works has concluded its work. It is understood that its report, which has not yet been presented, confirms that the manager M. Caluette, was the prime cause of the trouble.

to study the possibility of fixing tariffs for woollen goods, cotton goods, building materials, and fruit and vegetables.

The Iraqi Minister Tahsin Qadri, presented his credentials to the Lebanese President on the 24th February, thus becoming the first full diplomatic representative of an Arab State to be accredited to the Lebanon.

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No. 34

Abstract from Weekly Political Summary No. 101, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th March, 1944 - (Received in Foreign Office, 24th March)

(Secret)

1. General

NEGOTIATIONS for the transfer of powers (see last week's summary "General") continue. The details of Ninth Army's paper regarding military and the Syrian Government's counter project regarding native levies are still under consideration by the British authorities.

No reply has been received from the French to the protests made by both Governments regarding the manner of General Beynet's appointment, and they

retrogression while these negotiations are still held up. The general is due in Beirut on the 9th March, and the solution of an awkward state of affairs now appears to rest with M. Chataigneau, who may be able to induce him to adopt a reasonably conciliatory attitude.

Meanwhile the better French elements are extremely worried by the general situation. There are many undesirable French officers in the country and an unconfirmed report has been received of an impending coup, involving artificially created disorders as an excuse for French intervention. Before this report was received steps had been taken to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to replace a French battalion in the Levant States before the outgoing troops had departed. It is felt that the presence of both at the same time would be harmful to security, particularly in view of the rumours, reported in last week's summary, that French troops in the Levant were being increased.

The Lebanese for their part are particularly anxious, in view of increasing subversive propaganda, to avoid delay in the handing over of the régime. They

of the French after General Beynet's arrival, they may find themselves faced with a pro-French opposition throughout the country with which they will be unable to cope.

The newly appointed Persian delegate to the Levant States has sent his Government a report on the political situation in Syria and the Lebanon, and has apparently recommended that the time is now ripe for the Persian Government to recognise the two States.

3. Syria-Damascus

The statements made to the Damascus press recently by the Syrian Foreign Minister regarding the situation in the Levant States (see Summary No. 99)

(27851)

14

require some explanation. No written communication appears to have been conveyed by the Turkish to the Syrian Government on the subject, but the Turkish Consul, with the authorisation of his Government, informed the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs that his Government recognised, and would recognise, an "etat de fait" as regards any attributions transferred, or to be transferred, by the French to the Syrians. In all matters arising out of the transfer of any particular attribution the Turks would deal direct with the Syrian authority, and not, as hitherto, with the representative of the mandatory Power.

The latest manifestation of dissonance in the Cabinet is an alleged quarrel between the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior. After a somewhat prolonged absence in Tripoli in connexion with the death of his son-in-law, Lutfi Haffar returned to Damascus but not to his ministry. Allegedly confined to bed by a heart attack, he was nevertheless on one occasion at least seen driving his car in the town. He has since left for Jerusalem to see a specialist. There seems little doubt, however, that Lutfi Haffar did not appreciate the Prime Minister's intervention in the affairs of the Ministry of the Interior, and that recent administrative changes in the Jazireh and Euphrates districts were not to his liking.

A commission has been formed to examine, and where necessary to revise, legislative decrees passed by all former Governments.

There are several indications of Druze aspirations to the establishment of a King in Syria, in the person either of the Amir Abdulla or the Prince Regent of Iraq. On several occasions attempts have been made by various Atrash "circles", and by other Druze notables, to sound the political officer at Damascus as to the extent to which His Majesty's Government would favour such a turn of events. A report from a reasonably reliable source has also been received to the effect that Subhi al Omari (a recently released internee) is canvassing persons known to be in opposition to the present régime, with a view to setting up a headquarters in the Laja Mountain region north of Soueida in which to rally adherents to the Monarchist faction.

The President of the Republic, at an inspection of a newly built gendarmerie post, addressed the company of gendarmes on parade in a speech in which he referred to them as the precursors of the Syrian army, and called upon them to be worthy upholders of Syria's new found independence. A new decree provides for increases in the Syrian security forces by 1 000 police and 2 500 gendarmes.

One of two anonymous tracts displayed on Damascus walls, put out by the "Arab Youth and Labour party" (so far unidentified) warns the Syrian Arabs against the snares and machinations of the British in Palestine. Syrian police authorities are investigating, and in the meantime they suspect the Communist party of taking this action at the instigation of the French.

4 Aleppo

When the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance were in Aleppo on 11 February, the visit was largely a formality, the Madaniyya brothers and Edmund Hanna, but scarcely any of the Deputies or bloc supporters made any effort to meet them. This is thought to be due to rumours that these two Ministers are not working loyally with Saadallah Jabri, whose popularity in Aleppo is still high. The Madaniyya brothers, however, who have been in the city since the visit had not affected their loyalty to him. The Ministers apparently tried to dissuade Jabri from protesting against the French. He had said to have protested that he had already started to grow a beard in honour of Ibn Sa'ud, and that his tongue would be kept under control during the visit.

Jamil Mardam is reported to have caused some difficulty about the Frontier Commission meeting reported in last week's summary. Claiming that Syria had been recognised *de facto* by Turkey, he requested the *délégué* to let the Mohafez sign the *procès-verbal* as well as himself, and told the Mohafez that he should insist on signing as president of the commission. The Mohafez, however, had attended the meeting as a spectator, though it was held in his office, and French and Turkish enquiries by telephone from Damascus and Beirut produced no confirmation of any sort of Turkish recognition of Syria. After this awkward interlude the Turks agreed that the unfortunate Mohafez should add his signature to the *procès-verbal*, though that of the *délégué* should remain the official one.

The Turkish party left on the 27th February, crossing to Turkey at Tel Abiad after a visit to the tomb of Sulerman Pasha.

The subscriptions collected for the Spitfire Fund are now sufficient for the purchase of five aircraft. This excellent result reflects great credit on the Mohafez, and it is possible that his initiative may be imitated in other towns.

6 Jebel Druze

The area is quiet, but there is widespread discontent over the inefficiency of the local administration. With few exceptions, officials are accused of incompetence, apathy and dishonesty, and of concerning themselves more with their own interests than with the duties. The blame for this unsatisfactory state of affairs is generally laid on the Acting Mohafez, who even by his own kinsmen, is severely criticised for his weak and vacillating policy. In his efforts to enlist support for his continuance in office he seems to have adopted a policy of conciliation in all disputes, and to have condoned peculation and abuses, with the result that he is despised by all. He is not, of course, ignorant of the lack of esteem with which he is regarded, and it was probably with a view to seeking the support of the Syrian Government that he recently visited the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister in Damascus.

The views of the Government on the matter are not known, but if as at one time seemed likely the Emir Hassan el Atrash were to be appointed to the post of Mohafez, it is believed that such a step would be generally welcomed in the Jebel.

8 Euphrates and Jazireh

A tour by the political officer has further revealed the need for improvement in the administration of this area. At Tel Abiad on the frontier north of Raqqa there has been no mudir for over a year. The work is done by the officer commanding gendarmerie, a man of low calibre. He has thirty four gendarmes for an area as large as Wales with 30 kilom. of frontier, no transport, no telephone and no authority. At Ras el-Ain much the same situation prevails. It can almost be said that there is no government in the northern areas of this part of Syria. This is in marked contrast to the state of affairs on the Turkish side (see under "Frontier" below).⁽¹⁾

Lieutenant Colonel Roux has left Deir ez-Zor to be second in command of the coastal region. A new second in command, Lieutenant Colonel Rikari, has arrived.

9 Tribal

There are strong indications that a state of tension is developing among the important tribes in Northern Syria. This is partly due to a state of uncertainty as to who is supposed to be looking after them and partly to certain specific grievances. The chief of these is the amount of power and prestige acquired by the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa, and the fact that he has been able to exert his influence in particular by the section under Nuri Ibn Mujhim, who live north of Euphrates and have been able to exert their influence over the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa. This state of affairs is not improved by the apparent incapacity of the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa. A reported example of his methods is that when Nuri Ibn Mujhim shot up a solitary tent, wounding the owner and carried off 400 sheep, the Bedouin control officer forced the man's brother to go and live among Nuri's tents to show that his sheep had not been taken away from him. The location of the Bedouin control officer in Raqqa, instead of Deir ez-Zor alongside the Mohafez under whom he is now supposed to work, has displeased the Syrian authorities and the sheikhs other than the Fedaan. A neutral committee is being formed in Damascus to examine on the spot the various outstanding claims between the Fedaan and the Wulda.

The Assyrian leaders who went to Damascus to ask for protection against neighbouring tribes (see Summary No. 96) have now returned, apparently satisfied with the assurances of the Prime Minister, and hopeful of better protection in the future.

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

11 *The Lebanon*

The Lebanese Government have still not been able to screw up their courage to bring before the Chamber the motion for the unseating of Fmil Eddé. They have been assured by Abdul Hamid Kerami, of whose attitude they professed to be doubtful, that he and at least the majority of the North Lebanon Deputies would support the motion, and have similar promises of support from all other districts but they still appear unconvinced that Eddé's expulsion from the Chamber would not provoke an unmanageable reaction from the various groups throughout the country through which the French normally work.

In the field of administration the Government have achieved nothing concrete during the week, and criticisms of their apparent ineffectiveness are becoming more insistent.

The Chamber met on the 6th March and, after some discussion, voted the necessary credits to the Government to enable it to continue the administration until the presentation of the budget, which is still far from complete.

The motion presented to the American Senate regarding the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine has been widely discussed throughout the Lebanon, where strong approval has been voiced of the Government's protest to the American representatives in Beirut. The Christians of the Lebanon, whose minority status in the Arab world in some respects parallels that of the Jews, might have been expected to show less hostility to them than the Moslems, but this is by no means the case, the Christians as a whole being solidly at one with the Moslems on this question.

The recently formed Consumers' Association of Beirut is still pursuing its efforts to rally the public in opposition to the exorbitant cost of living but is having little success, since it is generally recognised that it is not the shopkeepers but the middlemen who are profiteering, and these the Association cannot touch. The Minister of Supply's various schemes for reducing the cost of living have still not materialised.

The Government appear to have decided that Camille Bey Shamoun shall be replaced by a comparatively early date, his place in the Ministry being filled by Hamid Fraagieh.

M. Chabert, hitherto known as Conseiller Légaliste, is now to be known as Conseiller Légaliste. The Ministry of Justice is no longer concerned with the promulgation of decrees.

12. *Press and Propaganda*

The protests made by all Arab countries against the proposal submitted to the American Senate regarding the creation of a Jewish national home in Palestine will not repudiate the principles of the Atlantic Charter. Britain, it is confidently stated, will not fail the Arabs, and will carry into effect the solution indicated in the British White Paper.

Comment on Anglo-Turkish relations is restricted to foreign quotations, but it is hinted that the Turkish Government is not satisfied with the present situation.

Army Wireless Propaganda has made play with American interference in the latest no question. Reference was also made to the demonstrations taking place in North Africa.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

(E 871 41 85)

No 33

Consul General Furlonge to Sir E. Sprays (Damascus).—(Received as enclosure to Beirut despatch No 5.)—(Received in Foreign Office 8th February.)

Sir,

Beirut, 21st January, 1944

THE Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day gave me an account of the recent visit of the Lebanese Delegation to Egypt. He said that they had had three interviews with Nahas Pasha, and had also returned replies to a questionnaire he presented to them on the various subjects connected with the Arab Federation. At the Egyptians' suggestion, both he and Riad es-Solh, as representing the Christian and Moslem Lebanon, had signed the document embodying these replies.

2. They had found, to their great satisfaction, that the Egyptian point of view towards Arab Federation was exactly the same as what Selim Tacla described as the Lebanese. The Egyptians were determined not to be drawn into the orbit of a pan-Arab consortium of Asiatic States, probably under Iraqi leadership, but thought that Egypt should have towards these States something of the same attitude as the South American Republics had to the United States (that is to

say, to exchange ideas on subjects of mutual interest, but would not form part of any Arab Federation or Confederation even if one eventually came about). They found also that the Egyptians, unlike the Iraqis and Syrians, were uninterested in the Palestine problem.

3. Riad es-Solh had had a brief conversation with King Farouk in which he observed that the King's views towards Arab Federation were even more moderate than those of Nahas Pasha. The whole delegation had commented on the obvious bitterness existing between King Farouk and Nahas, Hassan Pasha had even attempted to describe Nahas as "the Egyptian Emile Eddé," apparently on the grounds that Nahas had taken office on the 4th February, 1941, "under the flag of the British tanks." The Lebanese had had to point out to him the difference between the two cases.

4. On the return journey the delegation had seen Nuri Pasha in hospital at Haifa. They described his ideas on the future of the Arab States as vague and inchoate: he had, for example, expounded a scheme for the establishment of a Greater Syria without frontiers, but had seemed taken aback when Selim Tacla suggested that this meant that Jewish citizens of this Greater Syria would obviously have the right to circulate or reside in any part of it they chose.

5. One reason for Egypt's attitude towards the question of Arab Federation was perhaps provided by the action of the Turkish Government who, according to their Consul General in Beirut told Selim Tacla yesterday, had informed the Egyptian Government that they would raise no objection to the formation of an Arab Federation provided that it was on a political basis but would oppose any attempt to drag in the caliphate question or to give the federation a pan-Islamic, as opposed to a pan-Arab, character.

6. The above account lends colour to the theory recently expressed in some quarters that, as regards their relations with other Arab States, Syria and the Lebanon are in a similar position to that of Iraq and the latter with Egypt. It is clear in any case that the Lebanese visit to Cairo produced no tangible results. The Lebanese clearly think that a general Conference of Arab States, which it is understood may be held in April, will be equally unfruitful.

I have, &c.

G. W. FURLONGE, Colonel
Political Officer

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 17th February.)

(No. 10.)

2005

Beirut, 8th February, 1944

WITH reference to Eastern Department's note of the 30th November, 1943 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a memorandum on the frontiers of the Lebanon which has been compiled by Colonel G. W. Furlonger.

2 The delay in furnishing this report is regretted, it is due partly to great pressure of work and partly to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information. It is noteworthy that, in the course of his enquiries, Colonel Furlonge discovered that most Lebanese had no definite ideas as to the historical or political implications of the question and were indeed by no means clear as to what was meant by "the four cases" in which such frequent reference is made.

I have &c
E. L. SPEARS

Enclosure in No. 38

The Boundaries of the Lebanon

1111. present frontiers of the Lebanon were originally defined by article 2 of Arrêté No 318, issued on the 31st August, 1920 by General Gouraud, at that time French High Commissioner in Syria and Cilicia. Copies of the text of this Arrêté and of Arrêté No 290 of the 3rd August, 1920, which is referred to in its article 1 are attached. The definitions given in its article 2 were adopted word for word in the amended text of article 1 of the Lebanese Constitution, which was promulgated by the Constitutional Law of the 7th December, 1943.

2. The effect of General Gouraud's arrêtés was to incorporate in the Greater Lebanon one complete *caza* (Beirut) and parts of two others (Tripoli and Sidon) as follows: Beirut, which was formerly a *caza* in its own right, was by Arrêté No. 940 of the 27th July, 1921, divided into the present *caza* of Baalbek and Hermel; the latter region, formerly a *mudiriyeh*, being elevated to the status of a *kaimakamat* (i. e., *caza*). The *caza* of Bekaa, or Bekaa Moallaka, is now part of the present *caza* of Zahlé, as the town and immediate environs of Zahlé, which formed part of the pre 1914 "Little Lebanon," have been added to the former *caza* of Bekaa to form the present *caza*. The former *caza* of Hamaïya, to which was added by Arrêté No. 336 of the 1st September, 1920, the *caza* of Maïjidiyeh, is now a *caza* in its own right (see map of Lebanon South Lebanon).

3. The "four cazas," which are referred to by Syrians when putting forward claims for the "return of the four cazas" to Syria are, therefore, the *present* cazas of Hermel, Bualbek and Rashaya, the caza of Zahlé less the town and immediate neighbourhood of Zahlé, and that part of the present caza of Merdjeyoun which constituted the former caza of Hasbaya. Some Syrians also claim the cazas of Tripoli and Akkar, chiefly on the grounds of promises *alleged* to have been made at the time of the Peace Conference, to the effect that Syria should have Tripoli as a port.

4. On the attached map, the former autonomous province of the Lebanon has been shaded in red, the *vilayet* of Beirut in blue, and the portion of the *vilayet* of Syria added to the Greater Lebanon in 1920 in brown. The boundaries

located to the map opposite to page 19 of the 1937 Peel Report on Palestine (and 3470) which was roughly in the 1914 T. and a little to the east of the center of the country.

3. Second, I have found that the concept of the Lebanese have no historical justification, and that the French authorities, when defining them in 1920, were moved purely by political and strategic considerations. Certain Lebanese Christians have, however, contended that the French in so doing were merely restoring to the Lebanese the territories traditionally belonging to it.

6. Examination of these conflicting claims is difficult in view of the paucity of archival records. The following appreciation is based partly on the documents available here, but chiefly on the researches of Dr Assad Rustum, the eminent historian of the American University, Beirut.

7. It will be sufficient for present purposes to consider the position as from 1516 A.D., the date of the Ottoman occupation. From that time until 1841 the impression to be gathered from existing records is that the Lebanon *massif*, extending from just south of Tripoli to just north of Sidon, and including the town and immediate environs of Zahlé but excluding the town of Beirut constituted a recognised geographical entity commonly referred to as "the Mountain," which was populated almost entirely by Druzes and Christians (chiefly Maronites, with some Greek Orthodox). Over this Mountain a series of hereditary Amirs held uncontested feudal sway by special dispensation from the Porte. Their suzerainty had, however, no juridical basis other than tradition and personal privilege, and during the period under review the Mountain was not regarded by the Porte as having any separate administrative existence, its northern portion being included in the Pashalik of Tripoli and its southern portion part of the Pashalik of Sidon; the present Bekaa *cazas*, including Zahlé and its neighbourhood, in general depended from the Pasha of ~~Lebanon~~. The Amirs may thus be considered to have held their powers by delegation from the Pashas of Tripoli and Sidon, under the terms of the special privileges accorded to them by the Porte, the office of Amir of Mount Lebanon was reserved to a particular family (from 1516 to 1710 the Mūsāids and from 1710 until 1841 the Shēhābs), but the ruling Amir could always be deposed by the Pashas providing that another member of the family was put in his place. An exception to the general rule was provided by the Mūsāid Amir Fakhr ud-Dīn II who ruled at a time when the Ottoman Empire was at its greatest extent, and well beyond the boundaries of the Mountain and in fact ruled much of Syria and Palestine, but after his defeat in battle and subsequent death the authority of his successors appears again to have receded to within the boundaries of the Mountain.

9. In 1789 the Shehah Amir Bashir II acceded to power, and, like Fakhr-ud-Din before him, succeeded in extending his rule, until it covered most of the area of the present Lebanon. In 1841 as a result of his support of Ibrahim Pasha, the British authorities deposed and deported him. His cousin Bashir Kassar (Bashir III), who succeeded him, was soon afterwards deposed by the Turks and replaced by one of their generals, Omar Pasha. The line of hereditary Amirs thus came to an end, but as against this the Mountain (born of the Amir Bashir's accretions) was first recognised as an administrative entity. It was subsequently divided into two *kaimakamats*, which in 1846 were endowed with consultative councils. In 1861, after the massacres of Christians by Druzes in 1860 had provoked European intervention, the international Statute which governed the administration of the Lebanon until 1914 was signed between Turkey, France, Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia. The boundaries of the territory to which the Statute applied were not geographically defined in it, but its article 3

Administrative divisions which show clearly that the "Mountain" referred to in it corresponded, at least very closely, to the historical conception referred to above. It is this area which, shaded in red on the accompanying map, formed the "Little Lebanon" existing in 1914.

8. It seems thus clear that Lebanon claims to the territories now comprised within the Lebanon but which lie outside the boundaries of the Mountain are based on nothing more substantial than the almost accidental fact that the last effective hereditary Amir, Bashir II, had succeeded in bringing these territories under his suzerainty, contrary to the precedent of the previous three centuries.

10. The conflict regarding the boundaries of the Lebanon being largely based on confessional grounds, it is of some interest to examine the distribution of the various religious communities in the present Lebanon. The following table, based on the figures of the 1932 census, shows roughly this distribution, small minorities being ignored —

District.	Population (in thousands)					Druses.
	Maronites.	Greek Orthodox.	Greek Catholics.	Sunnis.	Shias.	
Mount Lebanon . .	120	17	11	14	13	42
Northern Lebanon . .	58	31	..	77
Beirut	16	10	17	24	42	..
South Lebanon . . .	19	..	12	17	82	..
Beirut	12	14	..	43

It will be observed that the present province of Mount Lebanon, which roughly corresponds with the "Mountain" or "Little Lebanon" (Zahlé excluded), contains an overwhelming preponderance of Maronites and Druzes. The Bekaa

contains a substantial majority of Moslems, and most of the 18,000 Maronites shown amongst its population are in fact, concentrated in the neighbourhood of Zahlé, which, as stated above, formed part of the Mountain. North Lebanon is divided between Sunni Moslems, Maronites, and Greek Orthodox, the Moslems being mostly in the town of Tripoli, the Greek Orthodox in the area between Tripoli and the northern frontier of the Lebanon, and the Maronites in the area between Tripoli and the northern boundary of Mount Lebanon. South Lebanon is overwhelmingly Shia, and the municipal area of Beirut has a large Moslem element.

11. It would thus be possible to draw new frontiers of the Lebanon, so as to reduce it to within approximately the limits of the Mountain, and so as to contain the vast majority of the Maronites and exclude the greater proportion of the Moslems, the important exceptions would be (a) the Moslems of Beirut (on the assumption that the town of Beirut could not nowadays be left outside the frontiers of the Lebanon) (b) the Greek Orthodox of North Lebanon, and (c) the Greek Catholics of the Bekaa and South Lebanon.

Arrêté No 314 déterminant l'Etat du Grand Liban

LE Général Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la République Française en Syrie et Cilicie, Commandant en Chef de l'Armée du Levant,

Vu le décret présidentiel du 8 octobre 1919

Attendu que la France en venant en Syrie n'a poursuivi d'autre but que celui de permettre aux populations de la Syrie et du Liban de réaliser leurs aspirations les plus légitimes de liberté et d'autonomie,

Considérant qu'il importe, pour ce faire, de restituer au Liban ses frontières naturelles telles qu'elles ont été définies par ses représentants et réclamées par les vœux unanimes de ses populations,

Que le Grand Liban ainsi fixé dans ses limites naturelles pourra poursuivre, en tant qu'Etat indépendant, au mieux de ses intérêts politiques et économiques, avec l'aide de la France le programme qu'il s'est tracé

Pour ces motifs

Arrête

Article 1^{er} Il est formé sous le nom d'Etat du Grand Liban un territoire comprenant

- (1) La circumscription administrative du Liban actuel.
- (2) Les cazas de Baalbek, Bekaa, Rachaya, Hachaya, ainsi qu'il a été ordonné par l'Arrêté No 290 du 3 août 1920.
- (3) Les parties du territoire du vilayet de Beyrouth ci-dessous indiquées
 - (a) Le Sandjak de Saïda, moins la partie de ce sandjak attribuée à la Palestine par les accords internationaux.
 - (b) Le Sandjak de Beyrouth.
 - (c) La partie du Sandjak de Tripoli comprenant le caza de Akkar dans sa partie située au sud du Nahr-el-Kébir, le caza de Tripoli (avec les moudiriches de Deonieh et de Minieh) et la partie du caza de Hama-el-Akkar située au sud de la limite nord du Grand Liban définie à l'article 2 du présent arrêté.


Art 2 Les limites de l'Etat du Grand Liban sont fixées ainsi qu'il suit, sans préjuger des modifications de détail des frontières qu'il importera de déterminer ultérieurement.

Au nord, de l'embouchure du Nahr-el-Kébir une ligne suivant le cours de ce fleuve, jusqu'à son point de jonction avec son affluent le Ouadi Khalid, à hauteur de Djar el Kamar.

A l'est, la ligne de faite séparant les vallées du Ouadi Khalid et de l'Oronte (Nahr-el-Assi) et passant par les villages de Mesnat-Harbaana, Hail-Ebbidj-Faïssan, à hauteur des villages de Brifa et de Matrebeh, cette ligne suit la route nord du caza de Baalbek, en direction nord-ouest-sud-est, puis les limites est du caza de Baalbek, Bekaa, Rachaya, Hachaya.

Au sud, la frontière palestinienne telle qu'elle sera déterminée par les accords internationaux.

A l'ouest, la Méditerranée.



Art 3. Les dispositions du présent arrêté entreront en vigueur à la date du 1^{er} septembre 1920.

Art 4. Le Secrétaire général, le Chef du Contrôle administratif sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Le Haut-Commissaire

GOURAUD

Beirut le 31 août 1920

Arrêté No 289

LE Général Gouraud, Haut-Commissaire de la République Française en Syrie et Liban,

Vu le décret présidentiel du 8 octobre 1919

Considérant qu'il y a lieu de donner satisfaction aux vœux des populations qui ont été exprimés en rattachant les cazas de Hasbaya, Rachaya, Baalbek et Moalaka au territoire autonome du Liban pour pourvoir à leur organisation administrative et en vue de la constitution future du Grand Liban.

Sur la proposition du Délégué administratif de la Zone ouest

Arrête

Article 1^{er}. Les cazas de Hasbaya, Rachaya, Moaliska et Baalbek sont rattachés en ce qui concerne leur statut administratif au territoire autonome du Liban.

Art 2. L'administrateur du Liban prendra toutes les dispositions utiles pour rattacher administrativement les cazas susmentionnés à l'Administration de la Zone ouest. En cas d'urgence au Délégué administratif toutes les dispositions utiles au point de vue de l'organisation administrative, financière et postale des cazas rattachés, qu'au point de vue des postes à pourvoir, pour assurer la bonne marche immédiate des services locaux.

Art 3. Le Secrétaire général, les Conseillers financier et judiciaire, le Délégué administratif de la Zone ouest sont chargés, chacun en ce qui le concerne, de l'exécution du présent arrêté.

Le Haut-Commissaire de la République Française

GOURAUD

Zahle, le 2 août 1920

CONFIDENTIAL

(16792)

File Number

T

TREATY

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 57

April to June 1944

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No and Name	Date	Subject	Page
Chapter I - AFGHANISTAN			
No. 33		action in Afghanistan evacuations during the latter part of 1943	
Chapter II - IRAQ			
No. 124			
No. 225			
No. 279		long permeation of Iraq part of existing permeation of Iraq for 1944	
Chapter III - PALESTINE			
No. 478, Tel			
Vincent H. Hays No. 1117, Tel	Mar		
Vincent H. Hays No. 1208, Tel	Mar		
No. 1381, Tel	Mar		
Vincent H. Hays No. 344	April 29	action in report on with the Government urging opening the doors of Palestine	
Chapter IV - PERSIA			
No. 116			
Mr. R. B. Hays No. 127	Mar 20	Report on events in Persia Report for the year 1943	
Mr. R. B. Hays No. 137	Mar 27	Situation in Persia Attache's report	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No and Name	Date	Page
No 147	rel to the 2nd Apr	147
No 148	re the 14th March	148
No 156		
No 160		
No 161	April to the 10th April	
No 182	by the Jm Captain General, R A M C as Prisoner Mobile Transport in I	
No 195	in April to the 20th April	
No 204	in n P the 1st May to the 5th May	
No 210	n l Attorney's Intelligence Bureau No X 7th May to the 24th May 1944	
No 221	Lt Col No Howard H. 1st May to the 14th to a North K	
No 23	on 2nd May 1944	
No 240	Situation in P At this time the Attorney's Intelligence Bureau No 22 was from the 2nd May to the 4th June 1944	
No 24	State Government's post war policy towards Persia to all countries in Persia regarding preparation of plans for entire reconstruction after the war for	
No 246	situation in Persia and of situation and suggest	
No 250		
No 255	the 9th June 1944	

No.	Subject	Page
Chapter V. SYRIA AND THE LEBANON		
No. 30		
No. 31		
No. 32		
No. 33		
No. 34		
No. 35		
No. 36		
No. 37		
No. 38		
No. 39		
No. 40		
No. 41		
No. 42		
No. 43		
No. 44		
No. 45		
No. 46		
No. 47		
No. 48		
No. 49		
No. 50		
No. 51		
No. 52		
No. 53		
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No. 83		
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No. 85		
No. 86		
No. 87		
No. 88		
No. 89		
No. 90		
No. 91		
No. 92		
No. 93		
No. 94		
No. 95		
No. 96		
No. 97		
No. 98		
No. 99		
No. 100		
No. 101		
No. 102		
No. 103		
No. 104		
No. 105		
No. 106		
No. 107		
No. 108		
No. 109		
No. 110		
No. 111		
No. 112		
No. 113		
No. 114		
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No. 119		
No. 120		
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No. 459		
No. 460		
No. 461		
No. 462		
No. 463		
No. 464		
No. 465		
No. 466		
No. 467		
No. 468		

CONFIDENTIAL.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EASTERN AFFAIRS

TABLE 7 APRIL TO JUNE 1944

CHAPTER 1. AFGHANISTAN.

E 3052 7 27

N. 1

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden (Received 10th May)

(No. 35.)

Sir,

Kabul, 5th May, 1944

IN paragraphs 1-7 of my despatch No. 98 of the 11th November, 1943, I described the situation in Afghanistan during the earlier part of that year. I propose now to describe briefly those that have taken place since that despatch was written.

2. For the greater part of this period the country has been peaceful and the position of the Government has remained satisfactory. The Prime Minister has to a great extent recovered from his illness of November last and is back at work again, but he seems to have surrendered the detailed work which formerly he retained in his own hands to his nephew and deputy, Sardar Muhammad Naim Khan. There have been no outward signs of any rift in the family, which has apparently drawn closer together as a result of trouble which has recently arisen in the Southern Province. This was caused partly by the Government's failure to put a stop to the practice of kidnapping and partly by the feature of conditions in that province for so long, and partly by the tactless handling of the situation, especially in regard to road building in tribal areas and to conscription, by F.M. Faiz Mubasamat Khan, the Governor of Khost. In an attempt to intercept a party of smugglers a minor official lost his life, and in order to reassert their authority the Afghan Government moved troops into the area. The move was purely precautionary, but their presence seems to have aggravated the situation and Mazrak, a Zadran tribal leader, has now taken to the hills. There has been a clash with the Government troops in which Mazrak's party suffered a set-back. But though the Government intentions are moderate and their position is apparently strong, the situation is still uncertain and the possibility of serious developments cannot be ignored. The situation in the Eastern Province has not been very satisfactory, and the Government has maintained outward tranquillity only by giving way on the subject of recruitment. There has also been minor trouble on the Baluchistan border where certain sections of the population have been engaged in construction on the British side of the frontier. The Afghan Government at one time showed an unusual readiness to co-operate in attempting to arrive at a satisfactory settlement, and sent special representatives to Chaman to discuss the case with the British Frontier Authorities. Unfortunately this experiment in co-operation seems to have proved abortive as the Afghan Government were in the end unwilling to consider any compromise which implied an admission that Daru Khan was in any way in the wrong. The case is therefore still unsettled.

3. Until the trouble in the Southern Province the Government's chief preoccupation had been with the economic situation. Recent sales of karakul to the United States and of wool to Soviet Russia have added to their reserves of foreign exchange, and though no reliable information is available as to the total of their foreign holdings, it is well known that they are considerable. I recently learnt that when the Germans occupied Luxemburg they were surprised to find that the Afghan Government had in that country a credit of no less than 18 million Belgian francs. The transfer of this sum to a Swiss bank was permitted. The Afghans have also large dollar holdings in the United States, but they do not seem to be satisfied with these, and it is reported that they have been influenced partly by German propaganda to the effect that the war, especially with Japan, will be ruinous to American credit, and partly by the example set in India where, as a result of the Japanese threat of invasion, endeavours have apparently been made to exchange bank credits into some more tangible form of security.

4. In their internal finances the considerable drop in the Customs receipts which used to bring them in nearly £2 million sterling a year has caused the Government some anxiety. To make good the deficiency, a new Income Tax Law has recently been introduced which, although it is only being applied to a small number of traders, is expected to yield more than half that amount. A further measure of importance has been the introduction of anti profiteering laws which are being rigorously enforced. The real reason for their introduction is not clear. Government supporters claim that the measure is what it appears to be and has been designed to stabilise the economic position of the country generally and specially to assist the poorer classes. Its critics maintain that it is nothing but a bid for popularity by the Government and an attempt to strengthen their position in the country. They affirm that there is no intention of applying the law except against a few petty traders, and that the big concerns in which the Government are themselves interested will in no way be affected.

5. The successful conclusion through the medium of the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation of the negotiations for the sale of 10,000 tons of Afghan wool to Russia in January was warmly welcomed alike by the Afghan Government and the Russian commercial representatives in Kabul and has encouraged

improving trade relations have apparently been encouraged by M. Bakoulin, the new Soviet Ambassador. The principal Afghan requirements are said to be petrol, cement, sugar and textiles. M. Bakoulin is reported to have said that the supply of the first two items was out of the question at the present time, but to have been more hopeful about the latter two. It is also believed that M. Bakoulin's attitude to the subject of difficulties on the River Oxus has been more sympathetic than that of his unpopular predecessor M. Mikhailov. As a result Afghan anxieties on the score of Soviet Russian policy appear to have been slightly mitigated, and they permit themselves an anxious hope that a better future for their country may after all be in store.

6. Afghanistan, however still looks mainly for help to America and Great Britain. General Hurley's visit in January greatly flattered the Government and the fact that the bulk of their imported supplies of necessity comes from the United States is a further factor inclining them to look to that country for support. Encouraged by the former American Military Attaché, they have undoubtedly been turning their attention to the possibility of obtaining military equipment, including aircraft, from the United States and of sending Afghan officers for training to America. It is rumoured that they are even contemplating the replacement of the present Turkish Military Mission by one from the United States in about three years' time when the contracts of the Turkish officers now in the country will have expired. But no decision on the subject is immediately probable. The Afghans are also looking to America to supply the engineers needed to carry out the many irrigation and other works of construction that are necessary for the country to make any real progress in the immediate post-war period.

7. In both these spheres of activity His Majesty's Government and the Government of India are really better qualified than America to help, both because of their more intimate knowledge of Afghan conditions, so similar in many ways to those of India. Fear of Russia's reactions and unwillingness to trust the country entirely

to British guidance are no doubt the principal reasons which cause the Afghan Government to look elsewhere. The old suspicions with which the Government

There have, however, recently been many welcome signs of greater confidence and goodwill than have been evinced in the past, and it is by no means to America alone that the Government have been looking for help. Requests have recently been made to the Government of India for assistance in training officers in survey work, and enquiries are on foot for advanced air training for certain Afghan officers. They have also been invited to India principally with the object of viewing and purchasing military equipment needed for the army. Attempts to discriminate against Indian traders have been dropped. The lack of water has now been granted a regular supply by order of the Prime Minister. A Swiss surveying instrument which the Government of India recently expressed a desire to hire or purchase has been readily offered on loan. A number of deserters from India who, in spite of protests, had been held for several months in Afghan jails, have recently been released and there is a definite advance in the matter of the treatment of Indian prisoners in Afghan jails. It is true that the British Legation in Kabul has not been immediately informed when British subjects are imprisoned, but orders have been given that the British Legation or consulates should be immediately informed when British subjects are imprisoned.

8. An even more significant proof of growing confidence has been the recent request for three English professors for the Ghazi College. The Afghan Government may try the experiment of introducing this generally into their school curriculum. Afghanistan, with its limited contacts with the outside world would be an ideal field for such an experiment, and there seems to be a good chance that it may be given a trial. The Afghan Government are also endeavouring to obtain copies of their own history on more reasonable lines. I am endeavouring to stimulate interest in cultural relations by arranging a visit from a British Council representative in the near future and also by encouraging direct correspondence between the Afghans and the British. Relations through the medium of propaganda are a more difficult subject. The Afghans are very suspicious of propaganda in all its forms, and, though India now produces literature well suited to Afghan tastes, far better in fact than any other country, and, if they are able to receive it, there is still no relaxation of the attitude officially adopted towards it. This is partly due to the opposition aroused by the over-enthusiasm of some of our officials to afford similar opportunities for Russian propaganda from the north. It must not be forgotten that too open co-operation with the British Government may well arouse the hostility of the Pathan tribes on whose support the stability of the Government still so largely depends. And indeed anti-Government propaganda in the Southern Province is already taking this theme as an inducement to the tribes to take up arms against the so-called puppets of the British Government.

9. Axis intrigues may also find the charge of such co-operation a useful weapon. The German Legation in Kabul is, however, comparatively inactive. Russia, the commercial attaché, who was formerly engaged in secret intrigues, has been withdrawn. The German Legation in Kabul is, however, still active in its part of the world to the Japanese, but the latter are undoubtedly very active in the world. Though we have no doubt the date point that they are doing more than establishing intelligence organisations and channels of communication with and through India, there is increasing evidence that they are meddling in frontier affairs, and it would be only prudent to assume that, as with the Germans and Italians in 1941-42, they are not averse to stirring up trouble for us wherever and whenever they may find a convenient opportunity. The Afghan Government are undoubtedly alive to this possibility and keep a close but not altogether efficient watch on Japanese activities; but the Japanese are a clever people, and it is certain that their legation in Kabul is up to no good. The Italian Legation is in process of being closed. Signor Auxilotti, the secretary, has recently left for Italy and the Minister is due to leave his work for Moscow. The Afghans made no secret of their satisfaction at his departure. There are a few rumours that they would like to reduce the strength of the Japanese Legation or even close it altogether.

10. In general the attitude of the Afghan Government has been reassuringly friendly. The approaching Allied victory makes them less cautious about showing on which side their sympathies lie, they are grateful for the assistance which, in spite of their own difficulties, His Majesty's Government and the Government of India have so consistently afforded in supplying the country's most primary needs, and they look forward to a continuance of that assistance which in the period immediately following the end of the war will be more than ever vital to them in the political as well as in the economic sphere.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India, to the Government of India, to the North West Frontier Province Government to the Baluchistan Administration and to His Majesty's Consuls at Jalalabad and Kandahar.

I have, &c.
G F SQUIRF

CHAPTER II.—IRAQ.

[E 2113, 37/93]

N 2

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th April)

(No. 124)

Bagdad, 23rd March, 1944

Sir,

THE following are the chief events that have occurred in this country since the issue of my despatch No. 20 of the 13th January:—

2. The inauspicious signs which attended the formation of the 20th December, were not belied and its members soon became involved in difficulties with the Regent. The Ministers wished Parliament to be prorogued for two months to give them time to prepare the Budget. The Regent was asked to sign the necessary Iradah. Hearing of this decision some of the Deputies went to His Royal Highness and represented to him that the Cabinet's request was only a manoeuvre to escape from the criticism of Parliament and that an adjournment would be inconvenient as the Deputies would then be obliged to come back to Bagdad at a time when it was important for them to be looking after the harvest. The Regent, who, from the beginning has disliked the Cabinet, was persuaded by their arguments and refused to sign the Iradah.

Prime Minister, Tausiq Suwaidi, but merely sent a telephone message through the Chief of the Royal Diwan. This action upset Tausiq Suwaidi and some of his colleagues and they began to talk of being unable to remain in office unless they had the Regent's support. They said that it was not fair of the Regent to disavow the Cabinet. On the 15th January, before leaving Bagdad for Basra, I had an audience with the Amir and discussed the situation with him. His Royal Highness told me that he was not satisfied with the Cabinet, though he did not want an immediate crisis. I warned him that the Ministers were not likely to

would provoke a crisis whether he wanted it or not. I also emphasised how badly the country needed a stable administration so that the Ministers might have time to give continuity to the work of their departments. I advised him that he should explain to Tausiq Suwaidi his reasons for not wishing to adjourn Parliament and to let it be known that he had not been influenced by lack of confidence in his Ministers.

3. His Royal Highness professed agreement with, but did not act upon, my advice. Contrary to the Cabinet's wishes, the President of the Chamber called a meeting for the 22nd January and included on the agenda a new and amended Iradah appointing Tausiq Suwaidi Deputy Prime Minister. The latter (who had been left in charge when the Prime Minister went off for yet another cure in Palestine on the 10th January) was indignant and talked rather heatedly of immediate resignation. Mr. Edmonds, the adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, persuaded him, however, that the proper course for the Government was to face their critics regardless of the attitude of the Palace and he and his colleagues thereupon took courage and prepared for battle in the Chamber. When the time came Tausiq Suwaidi made an excellent fighting speech, but his plan was to have the Chamber adjourned to the next meeting. In the meanwhile, the question of the constitutional legality of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister to be referred to the High Court under Article 83 of the Organic Law. We were of the opinion that the Chamber should not anticipate it and to put an end to further discussion by themselves referring the problem to the High Court. This was done at the sitting held on the 24th January. A month later the members of the court were, in accordance with the Organic Law, elected by the Senate. Of the four Senators chosen, three are generally considered to be of the opinion that the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister is unconstitutional, the opinions of the four judges are not known. At this stage Tausiq Suwaidi tendered his resignation in order that the High Court might be able to deal with the question of the legality of the appointment of the challenged appointment.

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4. Meanwhile, Nuri Said had returned on the 7th February from Palestine. A few days later he discussed the Cabinet's position with the Regent, and enquired whether His Royal Highness wished him to reform the Cabinet or whether he would prefer a new Prime Minister. On this point, the Regent has not yet really made up his mind. He has objections to every name that is put forward, but can suggest no suitable alternatives himself. Although the Cabinet contains some men of ability and is therefore, by Iraqi standards, fairly efficient, the Regent, not without reason, suspects the honesty and loyalty of three of its principal

the immediate and widespread unpopularity of the Cabinet, which has been noticeable since it first came into office, is in the main a reaction against the inclusion of these three "guilty men" who, as members of the last Cabinet of Taha al-

Ibrahim Kamal, the obvious candidate for the premiership, would want at least two of the politicians named above to whom the Regent has such strong objection while the Lord Mayor of Bagdad the only other aspirant who has been seriously considered, is too temperamental and hot headed to be successful. His Royal Highness's policy for the present is to give them a further period of trial and to

ministers which he himself considers should be urgently undertaken. How long the Ministers will be willing to continue in office on such terms is not yet but several of them have shown signs of wishing to resign rather than continue to work under threat of dismissal.

5. On his return from Palestine the Prime Minister spoke to me appreciatively of the kindness shown to him by a number of non-political Jews and told me also that he had had a not unfriendly talk with Mr Shertok. His Excellency was feted at both Beirut and Damascus. With the Syrian Government he claimed to have reached agreement in principle for the establishment of a close understanding between Syria and Iraq to include a common policy for defence and foreign affairs, whatever the other Arab States might agree to do. It was, he stated, also agreed that Nuh as Pasha should be asked to form in March a small

with which he had been in contact to draw up an agenda for the main conference which it was proposed should be held in Cairo in April or May. The conference would be attended only by official representatives and would decide on the form of federation to be adopted and the extent to which each country would conform. Reports received from independent sources indicate that Nuri's understanding

it appears that the Syrian Government are in fact unlikely to take any step of this kind without first being assured that it has the approval of the other Arab countries, particularly Egypt and Saudi Arabia. Early in February the Iraqi Government promoted their Chargé d'Affaires in Syria and the Lebanon to the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary. A small official Syrian delegation headed by Jamil Bey Mardam arrived in Bagdad on the 19th March on their return journey from Riyadh, where they visited King Abdul Aziz al Saud to discuss Arab

Jamil Bey told me that he was pleased and satisfied with the results of the visit but gave me no details of the results achieved. He and his party were cordially entertained by the Iraqi Government during their short stay in the Iraqi capital and were honoured with appropriate decorations by the Regent. They left for Syria on the 20th March, travelling by railway via Mosul.

6. About the middle of February the Prime Minister received news from the Iraqi Legation at Washington of a message from the President of the United States. The message was to the effect that the United States Government had decided to support the Iraqi Government in its efforts to maintain the integrity of the Iraqi frontiers. The message was also to the effect that the United States Government was prepared to supply the Iraqi Government with arms and ammunition. The Prime Minister was very pleased with the message and immediately telegraphed the President of the United States to express his appreciation. A few days later the Prime Minister received a message from the President of the United States to the effect that the United States Government was prepared to supply the Iraqi Government with arms and ammunition. The Prime Minister was very pleased with the message and immediately telegraphed the President of the United States to express his appreciation. A few days later the Prime Minister received a message from the President of the United States to the effect that the United States Government was prepared to supply the Iraqi Government with arms and ammunition. The Prime Minister was very pleased with the message and immediately telegraphed the President of the United States to express his appreciation.

Speaker of the House of Representatives at Washington, which was signed by the Presidents of both Houses of the Iraqi Parliament. This inter message was couched in more emphatic terms, contained exaggerated statements about the implications of the Wagner resolution and declared that its adoption would be tantamount to a request by Congress for an American declaration of war on the Arabs of Palestine. The Prime Minister explained to me that this further protest had been prepared after the receipt from the United States Minister of the full text of the Wagner resolution, the terms of which had caused the Presidents of the Senate and Chamber to feel that their earlier representations had not been phrased with sufficient emphasis. All these cables were shown to the Saudi Arabian Minister, who no doubt kept his King informed of the despatch. The texts were not, however, given to the Iraqi press, but on the 1st March, after the Egyptian Government had made public the fact that they had protested to the United States Government, the Iraqi Press Directorate put out a communiqué informing the public of the action taken by the Presidents of the Iraqi Senate and Chamber. Afterwards the Arabic press took up the theme and each newspaper contributed to the chorus of pain and indignation that ensued. On the whole, these articles were restrained in their language, and their

note was a call to the Governments of Great Britain and the United States speedily to make official pronouncements on their policy towards Palestine which would put an end finally to the present state of nervous tension and uncertainty.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me on the 6th March to speak about Ireland. This message, he told me, had been kept out of the Iraqi press and had been published in Egypt and a protest had been made by the Arab Club in Cairo. It was therefore bound to become known in Iraq. He explained that such a message from an honoured figure like Field Marshal Smuts was bound to be very disturbing to the Arabs, and especially to the Iraqis, who were at all times sensitive to news concerning Palestine.

7. Mulla Mustafa, the insurgent Barzani chieftain, came in to Mergasur on the 6th January to meet Majid Mustafa, the Minister without Portfolio charged with the improvement of the administration in the northern liwas. On the 14th January Majid Mustafa arrived in Bagdad to report to the Cabinet. He made the following proposals:

- That Mulla Mustafa should be allowed to live in a village to be determined by the Government, outside the Barzani tribal area.
- That his brother, Sheikh Ahmad, and the other Barzani chieftains and their families and followers, who had been sent to live in Hillah, should be permitted to return to their homes.
- That chosen Kurdish officers of the Iraqi army should be appointed to carry out special duties as "liaison officers" under Majid Mustafa and to continue the work of pacification in the disturbed area.
- That grain should be sent to the Barzani tribes and that relief works should be organised on the roads.
- That the Iraqi army detachments should be withdrawn from Mergasur but that certain police posts should be re-established.

Before the end of the month the Government had accepted all these proposals, and early in February Majid Mustafa went off again northwards to give effect to them. In the month of March all the Barzani chieftains and their families returned to their homes. A fortnight later Mulla Mustafa arrived in Bagdad to make formal submission to the Regent. With him came a dozen or more chieftains of tribes who are neighbours of the Barzani. They were sent down to Majid Mustafa apparently with the idea of giving Mulla Mustafa confidence. This object was no doubt achieved, but the effect of their coming was, in other ways, not altogether happy. Their presence in Bagdad naturally attracted a good deal of attention and comment and provided ammunition for the enemies of the Government. The Barzani chieftains were well received in the Senate. Majid Mustafa has been acting as Chief of the General Staff as Minister in the Senate and has been at the same time with a good deal of energy the distribution of grain to the hungry villagers in all of the three liwas of Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani. He has, moreover, succeeded in recovering a

considerable number of the rifles which the Government distributed to certain of the tribes in the hope of encouraging them to resist the Barzania. The constant effort to improve the Iraqi army has made it possible to withdraw the British Indian troops and armoured cars from Diyana, and the Iraqi army have also been able to recall most of the additional troops which they sent to Barzan and its neighbourhood last autumn.

the 1st January has made fairly good progress in the large towns, where the ration for January and February, and in the case of Bagdad and Mosul for March also, has been distributed to nearly all coupon-holders. In the smaller towns and country districts, however, distribution of tea and coffee, as well as sugar, is much behind schedule and there are numerous small districts where no distribution has yet been made. It was not to be expected that the scheme could operate from the outset except in the larger towns, and even in some of these, such as Basra, serious teething troubles were encountered. The provincial administration, inexperienced in detailed supply work and undermined by corruption arising mainly from the inability of officials to make their salaries cover the mounting cost of living, has inevitably been overwhelmed by the spate of instructions associated with the rationing scheme. Nevertheless matersarifs seem to be interpreting their instructions as best they can and, while uniformity is lacking, most of them are at least endeavouring to apply the rationing plan in the light of local conditions. The political advisory staff are giving the local administration all possible advice and assistance in this important matter and continue to help to clear up the many difficulties which arise.

9. Rationing of textiles began in Bagdad on the 1st March. In view of the greater complexity of the textile scheme, which is based on a form of points, it was decided to restrict it to the capital in the first place and extend it as the supply organisation permitted. Although stocks of textiles will as a result still remain frozen outside the capital and there is much grumbling concerning the delay in getting textiles in the provinces, it was prudent to make sure that the shops have been selected for retail distribution in Bagdad and they are said to

maintain in this respect by the propaganda both in the press and on the radio which has been undertaken by the Government on a scale hitherto unknown in Iraq.

10. In the case of commodities, the principles of fixed maximum selling prices or fixed profits being used according to the class of the commodity. In Bagdad at least the price control has had a salutary effect. A more cogent factor is probably a growing knowledge that the reorganised supply administration under Colonel Bayliss and his British staff really mean business. It is not surprising therefore that the prices of uncontrolled commodities have also shown a slightly downward trend.

11. In my despatch No. 20 of the 13th January I reported that there was a tendency for Colonel Bayliss to rush his fences as Economic Adviser to the High Supply Council and Director-General of Imports. He also gave the impression that he was trying to set himself up as "economic dictator of Iraq" an attitude which at one time caused considerable friction with the other British Advisers and eventually with the Minister of Finance. The issue became acute at the end of January as a result of a discourteous letter addressed to the latter by Colonel Bayliss. I was therefore obliged to intervene and spoke to Colonel Bayliss in private. On my recommendation he withdrew the offending letter and apologised to the Minister of Finance. He has since been more amenable and more willing to seek and accept advice. He continues to show commendable energy and resource and, despite staff difficulties, is pressing ahead with control measures with the promising results indicated above.

12. Colonel Bayliss is, of course, being bitterly attacked by the merchants who are making every effort to undermine his position. He has, on the other hand, enjoyed a good local Arab press which reflects the ordinary man's sympathy with the steps he is taking to reduce the cost of living. The Public Relations Section of the Embassy is co-operating with him in arranging publicity, but the generally good tone of the press seems to be quite spontaneous.

13. One of the most interesting economic features during the past two months has been the downward trend in the prices of local produce, except meat, poultry, vegetables and fruit. The decline has ranged from 10 to 20 per cent due to control measures, but mainly to the waiting policy which has been deliberately pursued in acquiring for His Majesty's Government barley and dates for export. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation or their agents have purchased 230,000 tons of barley or 30,000 tons more than the amount contracted for in the 1943-44 season. In India and elsewhere, there was no option but to fork out what local vested interests thought suitable. This year the boot, for the time being at any rate is on the other foot—the Iraqis want to sell their remaining surplus, and so far there has been no panic demand from Cairo or anywhere else. The United Kingdom Commercial Corporation have recently offered to buy at ID 16 per ton (the ruling market price), but the Government insisted on ID 18 500, with the result that the negotiations broke down and the Government freed the market, subject to the maintenance of the maximum price of ID 20 500, and also export though the latter facility is merely a nominal gesture to holders of barley since

at a price equivalent to about ID 17 per ton at collecting centres. It is regrettable and inconsistent that the Prime Minister, while giving every support to measures aimed at reducing the prices of imported goods, should have assured Parliament that the surplus Iraqi barley was worth less than the market price of ID 16.

14. The Iraqi Government have agreed to sell the remaining surplus of the 1943 crop to Messrs. Andrew Weir and Company for account of the Ministry of Food at a price of ID 20 per ton, which is more than 30 per cent lower than their demand six months ago.

15. With the substantial decrease in British military expenditure in Iraq and a considerable fall in the price of major local produce, there is some prospect of slowing down, if not checking, the inflationary trend, provided that heavy and urgent demands are not suddenly made, as they have been in the past, for the purchase of goods and services. The price of goods did not fall further, but remained at the present slightly lower levels, the reduction should prove in practice a more important deflationary factor than the issue of internal loans up to a total of ID 2 million now under consideration by the Council of Ministers.

16. Iraqi pilgrims returning from the Holy Cities have reported that the Saudi Government have accepted the official version that he had been punished for a disgusting sacrilege. In the Holy Cities there was a great stir and the Chief Mujtahid at Najaf Sayid Albi Hassan al Isfahani telegraphed to the Shah of Persia begging him not to be silent but to have the matter fully investigated. The more fanatical elements also brought pressure to bear on the former to make some form of pronouncement condemning the action of the Saudi Government. On the occasion of the Arabian pilgrimage to Kerbala on the 15th February many of the processions chanted slogans against Ibn Saud and against the Wahabias, but there were no disorders and interest in the affair is now waning.

17. The Saudi Government have been advised by the Iraqi Government to prevent the smuggling of sheep from Iraq to Syria and Transjordan via Saudi Arabia caused some tension in Saudi-Iraqi relations. The trouble began when the Iraqi Government gave notice to the Saudi Legation that all Saudi tribesmen entering Iraq to graze their flocks should register the number of their sheep with the Iraqi frontier authorities. The purpose of this measure was not only to put a check on the acquisition by these tribesmen of more sheep in Iraq which they could take away with them when they returned to Saudi Arabia, but also to safeguard bona fide Saudi grazers from coming under suspicion by enabling them at any time to show that the sheep with them had been brought into Iraq from their own country. Ibn Saud unfortunately did not understand

the scheme and quite wrongly regarded it as a new and ingenious plan for persecuting his tribesmen. His Majesty protested violently and threatened to take reciprocal "offensive" action against Iraqi tribesmen grazing their flocks in Saudi Arabia. So soon as the trouble was brought to my notice, I explained the Iraqi Government's purpose to the Saudi Minister and I also discussed the matter with the Iraqi Minister of Finance, whose department was responsible for the initiation of the plan to register sheep crossing the Saudi frontier. A few days later the Saudi Minister and the Minister of Finance talked the whole Government an alternative scheme to stop smuggling. Meanwhile, the original proposals do not seem to have been put into effect, and as, for purely economic reasons, it seems probable that the ban on the export of sheep will soon be lifted I think it is reasonable to consider the incident as now closed.

18. A Chinese Goodwill Mission arrived in Bagdad on the 29th February having travelled from London by way of Egypt, Turkey and Persia. The three members, Messrs. Wang, Han and Wen, were entertained to dinner by the Iraqi Government and lunched at the Embassy. They left Bagdad for Basra by air on the 2nd March. During their short stay they were treated as official guests and shown every courtesy and attention, creating themselves a very happy impression.

19. The Polish Minister of State in the Middle East also visited Iraq in February. The Iraqi Government gave a dinner party in his honour, and I also had the pleasure of entertaining his Excellency.

20. During the past few months a despatch by Sir K. Cornwallis has attracted a good deal of local attention. I have already mentioned the Wagner resolution on Palestine. Another event in the United States that has quite naturally been much discussed was the statement made by Mr. Ickes and elaborated in the American press about American plans for the further development of the oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain. Some doubts have been expressed here whether a big increase in American interests in the Arab countries would be beneficial to Arab nationalism and the suggestion was put about that Ibn Saud was making the mistake of trying to free himself from financial dependence on Great Britain and turn for help to the United States instead. Among the Jews, however, the prospect of the growth of American enterprise in Iraq and the neighbouring Arab countries seems to have been welcomed. Many Jews are greedily absorbing United States propaganda and are beginning to think that if America's Middle Eastern capital interests develop she will play a bigger part in Middle East politics and that the minorities will thereby benefit.

Increasing United States interest in this part of the world is very noticeable but must surely tend to undermine steadily the ingrained isolationism of the American people. I cannot but feel that the withdrawal of the Wagner resolution following the representations of the State Department, General Marshall and others, is a significant pointer in this direction.

21. A keen eye is always turned from Iraq towards Turkey and when in February it was seen that military consultations between Turkey and the Allies had been broken off the political gossip had an ideal topic to exploit. Generally, the sudden withdrawal of the British military experts seems to have been regarded as a set back for Allied diplomacy, and on the whole sympathy was with Turkey in her reluctance to enter the war. The later news that Great Britain and America had stood side by side in the war against Turkey stimulated still further interest in Turkey's relations with the Allies. It is generally considered here that Turkey's attitude has been influenced by the unfortunate set-back suffered by British arms in Samos, Cos and Leros, and the slow progress of the campaign in Italy.

22. The war review given by Mr. Churchill on the 22nd February provided many topics for talk from which people chose according to their fancy. The malicious tried to make much of his statement that he gave no guarantee that the war would end in 1944, the better-disposed retorted by pointing out that Mr. Churchill had been equally categorical in his statement that the war would end in 1943. The Prime Minister's statement that German retaliation for British air raids would increase, but the optimistic confidently relied on his assurance that the Allied air attacks on Germany would reach a degree of intensity far beyond anything yet achieved or imagined. Your own statement, Sir, replying to a question in the House of Commons on the 16th February, on the present situation of the Iraqi Government was a further source of animated discussion. Unfamiliar as they are with the astonishing

irrelevancy of many parliamentary questions, especially those dealing with the present situation in Iraq, you and ingeniously invented a variety of theories, all very far from the truth. Some decided that both the question and the answer were concerned with the competence of the present Cabinet, others thought that their purpose was to reveal dissatisfaction with Iraqi war collaboration, while among the minorities there were those who saw in your reply a sinister repudiation by His Majesty's Government of all interest in their fate. Talk on these lines did not last for long, though some of its effects may linger, nor was it active enough to influence to any considerable extent the ordinary course of local events. It was nevertheless significant because it showed how sensitive many people in Iraq are to any statements on high British places touching themselves or their interests, and also how much the field of public opinion has been widened in recent years by the expansion of broad casting and the development of other instruments of publicity and propaganda.

23. Rainfall this winter has been below the average throughout the country but its effects are particularly noticeable in the southern areas, where in many cases flocks have had to be grazed on growing crops. It is estimated that the harvest will be some 25 per cent. less than last season, and that livestock will suffer severely. It is also feared that the coming hot weather will be punctuated by frequent dust storms.

24. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, and to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Basra and Mosul.

I have &c

K. N. HAN CORNWALLIS

E 3640 37 93)

No. 3

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st June.)

(N. 22.)
Sir,

Bagdad, 8th June 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 124 of the 23rd March, I have the honour to submit the following summary of the principal events that have occurred in Iraq during the last two or more months —

2. The Cabinet formed by Nuri Pasha on Christmas Day remained in an uneasy situation throughout March and most of April. The Regent continued to withhold his active support and to look around for a means to get rid of the three Ministers whom he particularly disliked, namely, Umar Nadhim, Ali Muntaz and Sadiq Basmam. I repeatedly warned His Royal Highness that the prolonged uncertainty about the position of the Cabinet was harmful and advised him that if he were certain that something more satisfactory could be found, at once to replace them. He told me that he had decided to keep the present Cabinet in office. At this stage it seemed that it might prove to be possible for Nuri Pasha's Cabinet to carry on at least until the end of the summer, but events soon dissipated this prospect. The debate in the Chamber on the budget for 1944-45 was exploited as usual for the discussion of every branch of the work of the Administration and attacks were made on the Cabinet at all angles. A climax was reached on the 21st May, when abusive language was freely exchanged between Deputies, and the sitting had to be suspended in an atmosphere of some disorder. The Prime Minister and his colleagues were satisfied that their critics would not have dared to become so abusive if they had not been so sure of the support of the Regent. The Ministers decided that they could no longer remain in office in such circumstances and resigned. The Regent accepted their resignation a few days later, and called upon Hamdi Pachachi to form a Cabinet. The invitation was accepted, but as the new Prime Minister, who is elderly and is not very energetic, was indisposed at the time, it fell to the Regent to choose most of his colleagues for him.

3. This task was completed within a fortnight and the following Cabinet took office on the 4th June —

Prime Minister Hamid al Pachachi
Minister of Interior Mustafa al Umari
Minister of Finance Sa'ih Jabr
Minister of Defence Tahsin A.
Minister of Communications
Minister of Justice Ahmad
Minister of Education Ibrahim Akif al Alusi
Minister of Economics Tawfiq Wahbi
Minister of Social Affairs Muhammad Hassan Kaldan

Like most Iraqi Cabinets it has both good points and bad. Abdul Amir al Tazri, Tawfiq Wahbi and Ibrahim Akif al Alusi are newcomers who offer promise of good work. Arshad al Umari, for years a capable and progressive Lord Mayor of Baghdad, is a well known thruster and should, if he is not too temperamental, be able to give the new Ministry of Supplies a fair start, and Sa'ih Jabr, if he can resist temptation to sectarian favouritism, has it in him to be an adequate Minister of Finance. The Minister of Defence, Tahsin A., held this post in Jamil Madafai's Cabinet in the summer of 1941, and left it with reputation for corruption, bad even by Iraqi standards. It is a great pity that he should have been so. The Minister of Communications, Tawfiq Wahbi, need for support in the Senate that won him a place in the Cabinet at all.

4. The 'Edwards Committee' on political detainees was reassembled at the end of March by the late Minister of the Interior. They recommended the unconditional release of twenty five men and the release on security of four others. These recommendations were accepted by the Council of Ministers and the twenty five men concerned were freed on the 12th April. The Military Security authorities were kept fully informed of the committee's work and no attempt was made by the Minister of the Interior, or any other Minister, to influence the committee's decisions.

5. The Iraqis interned in Southern Rhodesia returned to Iraq on the 2nd April and were at once taken into custody by the Iraqi authorities. This trial began in May last but does not seem to have made much progress. The change of Government may possibly cause new delays.

6. In the financial field the major developments during the past two months have been the submission of a revised budget to Parliament, the participation of the Iraqi Government in the Middle East Financial Conference in Cairo beginning on the 23rd April, the approval of legislation for the flotation of two internal loans, and the payment of the debt of approximately £330,000 for the Hinaidi Corporation which had been outstanding for nearly six years.

7. The 1944-45 budget estimates contain several important innovations, including the amalgamation of the ordinary and capital works budgets, hitherto kept separate, and the creation of an emergency budget, covering the expenses of the Government in the event of a sudden stoppage of revenue. The total combined revenue is estimated at ID 17,712,740, which almost balances the total combined expenditure at ID 17,806,500. The latter figure is ID 1,555,843 higher than the corresponding figure for the preceding year and is more than twice the pre-war budget. The Government's policy, especially on supply matters. The estimates are now being discussed by the Council of Deputies with comparatively little modification, but only after lively debate.

8. The Iraqi Government sent a strong delegation, headed by the Minister of Finance, to the Middle East Financial Conference in Cairo. I understand that they acquitted themselves well. They were able to point out that Iraq was well in the van of the Middle Eastern countries as regards anti-inflation measures, having, for example, already raised income tax to a high level. The delegation also pointed out that Iraq was the only country in the Middle East where prices of food were not rising.

9. Legislation was submitted to Parliament on the 18th April authorising the flotation of two loans, one of short term for a total of ID 1,000,000

bearing interest at 3 per cent., and the other a long term lottery loan with interest at 4 per cent., of which 2 per cent. will be paid as interest and the remaining 2 per cent. in the form of prizes. The proceeds of the loans are to be reserved for railway and irrigation development. The Bill was finally approved by Parliament on the 25th May. Doubts continue to be held, however, in some quarters regarding the outcome of this venture into what is a novel form of investment in the financial field. It is also possible that the Government will be forced to withdraw the loans from the banks owing to malicious rumours to the effect that bank depositors would be forced to subscribe to the loans.

10. In the economic field the Government have decided to carry out crop assessments in respect of the 1944 wheat and barley harvests, but on different lines from last year. Instead of individual assessments, based on inspection of individual crops and the out-turn on the threshing floor, last year's assessments are to be adjusted in accordance with crop conditions in the various areas, a reduction of 20 to 30 per cent. being taken as a general guide. On balance, this new system should give fairly adequate, though by no means ideal, results. The Government will probably take over half the wheat crop again. Their policy regarding barley, on the other hand, will be largely governed by the volume and pace of purchases by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation. By holding off the market until prices broke in April the Corporation, after completing their 1943 contract to buy 250,000 tons at ID 20,500 a ton at collecting centres, were able to purchase substantial quantities of barley at a price equivalent to rather less than ID 16,000 a ton. They were, however, obliged to suspend purchases at the end of April as there seemed to be no immediate prospect of moving the barley from Iraq owing to shipping difficulties while storage was proving difficult for the 50,000 odd tons already on hand in Iraq. The Corporation have now decided to purchase further in view of the offerings of new barley. The suspension of purchases by the Corporation, coupled with the substantial fall in price, is naturally causing unfavourable comment among agricultural interests and, if serious resentment is to be avoided, it is essential that an early decision should be reached regarding the quantity of barley to be purchased and the price to be paid. While it is clear that the opportunity should be taken to get the price of barley down to a reasonable level in the general interest of Iraq, as well as our own, especially as other local products tend to fall in sympathy with it, the reduction should be made in a way which does not cause undue hardship to the producers. The Government's policy regarding the export of barley to the Red Sea, Suez area is at present under consideration in London and Cairo.

11. On the 1st May Parliament passed a law creating a Ministry of Supply and thus gave sanction to a scheme advocated by Colonel Bayliss ever since his arrival in Iraq. There is much to be said for the concentration in one Ministry of Supply organisations hitherto dispersed among five different State Departments. The new Ministry, which may also experience some difficulty in securing full cooperation from other Ministries unless the Minister of Supply is a strong personality, is being formed in view of the inevitable unpopularity likely to be attached to the incumbent.

12. Colonel Bayliss, who holds ambitious views and whose policy is all embracing, is anxious that all supply questions should come under the control of the new Ministry and even that the control of all local products should be transferred to it from the Ministry of Interior. I understand, however, that he has waived his insistence in this respect as regards wheat and barley. It is largely his anxiety to get his hands on everything that has caused him to set himself up as "economic dictator" of Iraq that has inevitably aroused serious opposition to him in Ministerial and British Advisory circles and has caused him to be regarded with greater caution generally. He has continued to display common sense and a realistic approach to the economic situation, but it is to be too fast for a country such as Iraq with a comparatively primitive economy and a weak Administration in which, moreover, corruption has, unfortunately, become rife in the past few years. Nevertheless, as a result of his efforts, the general level of prices of certain imported goods has shown an appreciable drop over the past six months.

13. The main supply problem remains the shortage of cotton piece-goods, which is causing widespread anxiety and growing discontent, particularly in rural areas. The latter have so far received no cloth under the rationing scheme. Releases are now beginning in the country districts, but only, for the time being, on half the meagre scale enjoyed by towns. Coupled with the delay in distribution and coming on top of the differentiation between town and country rations of sugar, tea and coffee, this discrimination is causing increasing resentment in tribal areas. I have impressed upon Colonel Bayless the need for the importance of not giving any other part of the country, e.g., Basra, earlier attention or more favourable treatment than the distressed Kurdish districts.

14. A development, which should promote ever closer co-ordination in supply matters between the Iraqi Government, the American Legation and this American-Iraqi Committee for Co-ordination of Supplies under the chairmanship of the responsible Iraqi Minister. Both the embassy and the American Legation (also the Foreign Economic Administration) are represented on the committee, which held its first meeting on the 13th May. Meetings are to be held fortnightly and judging from the first two meetings they should provide opportunities for frank and profitable discussion of Iraq's supply problems.

15. The post-war settlement with Mulla Mustafa had the unfortunate effect of disquieting the Cabinet from going steadily ahead with the plans propounded by the Kurdish Minister without Portfolio, Majid Mustafa, for the pacification of the disturbed Kurdish areas. After the latter's return to Baghdad from the north in February, no fresh instructions were given to him and he remained in the capital discouraged, disgruntled and constantly threatening to throw up the sponge. Meanwhile, the liaison officers, whom he had left behind to help the regular garrisons and mudirs to restore tranquillity and remedy administrative defects with the officials whom they were intended to assist. The Barzani tribal people were quick to sense that something had gone wrong. They heard of the outbreak of ill feeling in Baghdad, they put the worst interpretation on Majid's failure to return to continue his work and they mistrusted the Government's intentions because they persisted in keeping garrisons at Mergasur and Bille.

16. The result was that unrest increased. The Barzanis and their neighbours refused to surrender the rifles demanded from them and they began to show the familiar symptoms of sickening for an outbreak of violence of some kind.

17. On the 13th April I received, by the hand of a special messenger, a letter from Mulla Mustafa complaining that the improvements in the Administration which had been promised were not being carried out, and that Iraqi troops in the areas adjacent to Barzan were being reinforced instead of withdrawn, and finally declaring that, provided that His Majesty's Government had no objection, he and his people were prepared to win their rights with their own hands.

18. In reply, I sent him an oral message through Majid Mustafa stating that I was anxious to see that he was not interfered with in his efforts to restore tranquillity in his villages, and warning him of the serious consequences to himself of any further delay in doing so.

19. At this time the Minister of the Interior was away in the Mosul Liwa touring with the Regent, and, at my request, the Prime Minister spoke to him by telephone and invited him to make personal enquiries into the Barzani situation. Later on, the Prime Minister himself joined the Regent and accompanied His Royal Highness to Ruwanduz. It had been planned that the Regent should attend gatherings of the Kurdish clans, one near Amadiyah and the other near Ruwanduz. Unfortunately, the first had to be abandoned altogether, and the second curtailed owing to bad weather. The chief result of the Regent's tour was that, after His Royal Highness and Nuri Pasha had returned to Baghdad, the Prime Minister submitted a memorandum to the Emir in which he outlined the history of events in the Kurdish areas since the creation of the Iraqi Kingdom and summarised the measures which he considered should be taken to restore tranquillity and speed up the improvement of social services. The Regent approved this memorandum, and on the 12th May the Prime Minister took Majid Mustafa with him on another tour to the north. Together they visited Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil and Sulaimani. In each place the Prime Minister had talks with the officials and notables and set out the policy of the Government. He obtained

from the mutasarrifs a report on the administrative reforms desirable in their respective liwas and accepted petitions from the local chiefs explaining their grievances. He was also told that the Barzanis, who had said openly that they had heard fair words before but had waited in vain for years for their fulfilment. Nevertheless, I think that his talks did do something to improve the temper of the people. Unhappily, soon after his return to Baghdad the whole Cabinet fell and much of the good impression left by the tour was effaced.

20. On the 22nd May Majid Mustafa and Major Kuch (Acting Political Adviser, Northern Iraq) visited Mulla Mustafa at Barzan. Both of them admonished the Mulla for his political restlessness and urged him to settle down quietly, cultivate his lands and establish reasonable relations with the local authorities. Mulla Mustafa pressed for a general pardon for all his men including police and army deserters, and for the withdrawal of the army detachments.

It was not practicable to pardon all classes of offenders who had joined Mulla Mustafa, but undertook to see what could be done to arrange that, if these men surrendered, they should receive considerate treatment. The military force at Mergasur was withdrawn early in June, that at Bille may be withdrawn later. Since the meeting described above, Mulla Mustafa has handed in nine of the 172 rifles which it is estimated he captured during the fighting last winter.

21. Meanwhile, inter-tribal fighting broke out in the Bradost nahiyah north of Ruwanduz. On the 17th May Khalifa Samad of the Bradost tribe attacked a village belonging to Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq (son of Sayid Taha). The men of both clans rallied to their leaders and a week later there was a skirmish, in which there were a few casualties on each side. Police reinforcements were thereafter sent to Ruwanduz, and the Qaimmaqam is endeavouring to arrange a peace. Mulla Mustafa seems to have offered his help to both sides.

22. In the meantime, Sheikh Latif the son of Sheikh Mahmud has been persuaded to come back from Sardasht and arrived in Sulaimani on the 10th April. The people of Sardasht have written to many different quarters expressing their fear that Sheikh Latif's departure will expose them to depredations by the Pizder. Their fears are not altogether unfounded.

23. In the Mosul Liwa several troublesome tribal questions have worried the local authorities. A dispute between Sheikh Sfuq and his brother Ahmad of the Shammar about the division of their late father's estate divided the tribe into two camps, and the Mutasarrif of Mosul at one time felt obliged to take guarantees for good behaviour from the two protagonists and a number of lesser chiefs. This firm action had good results and at the end of April Sfuq and Ahmad agreed to a settlement. The terms of the settlement are, however, extremely vague and more is likely to be heard of this affair before long. The quarrel between the Aulad Faisal and the Aulad Shallal is another disturbing element in the internal affairs of the tribe and further action has been necessary to make the Aulad Shallal observe the settlement imposed by the authorities after the fighting.

24. Frontier difficulties arising from fighting that has occurred in Syria between the Agaidat and some sections of the Shammar, in which the Iraqi Shammar became involved. A tribal conference which was to have been held in April and which Sheikh Sfuq, the leading sheikh of the Iraqi Shammar, was to have attended was in the end postponed, but a second attempt to get tribal arbitrators together at Tel Khatib is being made. The Mutasarrif of Mosul is also endeavouring to bring about a settlement between the warring tribes. This is not, however, the final chapter of the story and more trouble is probable before the terms of the peace are implemented.

25. In addition to these difficulties with the Shammar, there are outstanding disputes between the Kurdish, Briskani and the Muzuri tribes started by the abduction of Nuri Briskani's daughter by the son of Haji Malo of the Maruri. Said Briskani, the son of Nuri, has murdered Haji Malo and is now defying arrest with a large bodyguard of armed men. Efforts to persuade him to come in to submit to a tribal settlement have been unavailing and the police have not yet been able to capture him. It is difficult to dispose promptly of affairs of this kind, and while they drag on they are harmful and disturbing to the Administration.

26. The Amir Abdullah arrived in Baghdad on the 9th April and, after taking part in four days of elaborate official entertainment, he left with the Regent for Amman on the 27th April. When I called to see His

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

6

Since then, he has taken his public duties seriously and has done his best to establish his position among the people. He has undoubtedly developed in character during the past two years and has, on several occasions, shown marked firmness and powers of decision, but he lacks the personality which appeals to the imagination of the public. Nevertheless, even if he has not won the affection of the Iraqis he appears to be steadily gaining ground. He is genuinely friendly to Great Britain.

He was made an Honorary Air Commodore in the Royal Air Force in September 1943. He caused a Cabinet crisis in September 1943 by injudicious

has, however, shown sound sense in his desire to reform the Administration and improve the general condition of the country. At the invitation of His Majesty's Government the Regent paid an extensive visit to the United Kingdom in December 1943. For three days he was the guest of Their Majesties the King and Queen at Buckingham Palace. He returned delighted with the hospitality shown to him and much impressed by Britain's war effort.

3. *Zaid, His Royal Highness the Amir*.—Born in Constantinople in 1900. King Faisal and the Amir Abdullah (of Transjordan). His mother was a Turk. Educated in Constantinople. Fought with the Arab Nationalist forces during the Great War, and won the good opinion of the British officers with the Sharifian army. Made a G.B.E. for his services in the war of 1914-18.

Accompanied by his wife, he came to Bagdad in November 1943 to act as Regent while the Amir Abdul Ilah was in England, and remained until May 1944, when he went back to Turkey.

Came to live in Iraq in 1922, and was commissioned in the Iraqi cavalry. Acted as Regent for a short time in 1924 during King Faisal's absence.

In 1925 he went to England and studied agriculture at Oxford for nearly three years. During the period he was a member of the University of Oxford. He returned to Iraq in 1928 and joined his father in Cyprus and remained there until King Hussein's death in 1931. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Ankara in January 1932.

In 1932 it became known that one of his sisters had contracted a clandestine marriage with Atta Bey Amin, some time first secretary at the Iraqi Legation at Ankara (and later at the Legation in London). The Royal Family were furious, and Zaid was transferred to Cairo in January 1934 as the first Iraqi Minister at King Fuad's Court. He did not, however, proceed to this post, which he ultimately refused to accept. At the end of 1934 he was busy in Athens engaged in litigation concerning extensive properties which he claims to have inherited in Greece. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. In the spring of 1937 it was suspected that he had been using his position as Iraqi Minister to give false certificates for arms destined for Spain. He was recalled to Iraq for enquiries, but apparently established his innocence and returned to Berlin.

He is a pleasant, well-mannered man, and speaks excellent English and French.

In 1938 he married a Turkish lady who had been divorced by her husband. He was withdrawn from Berlin in the spring of 1938 and came to live in Bagdad. It was counted against him locally. But for his wife he would probably have been made Regent after the death of King Ghazi in April 1939. In the summer of 1939 he went to live in Istanbul.

Came to Bagdad in October 1941 to meet his brother the Amir Abdullah on the occasion of his State visit to the capital and has remained, living quietly in a small house.

He returned to Turkey in June 1942.

1. *Abbas-Mahmud Agha*.—Chieftain of the Pizhder tribe (K.). Maintains a tradition of being at feud with Babekr Agha, but both take care that this enmity shall not weaken the strength of the tribe.

2. *Abbas Mahdi*.—Shah. Born 1898. Secretary to Iraqi Legation in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Tapu in October 1933.

Became Minister for Economics and Communications in February 1934, but resigned with Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Reappointed Director-General of Tapu, December 1934.

Appointed Master of Ceremonies in the Palace, March 1937. Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937 as Minister for Economics and Communications, and was appointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfa'i in August 1937 after Hikmat Sulaiman's resignation.

Transferred to the Ministry of Economics and Communications in October 1938, and resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938.

Appointed Principal Private Secretary at the Royal Palace in July 1941.

Appointed Minister at Tehran in January 1943. Pleasant but without personality.

3. *Abdul Amir al Ueri*.—Shia, born Kadhima in 1899. Educated Bagdad and United States, where he graduated from Michigan University as D.Sc. (C.F.). He returned to Iraq in 1929 and was appointed engineer in the Directorate General of Irrigation, in which he rose to the post of Assistant Director General in 1941. He acted as Director General on several occasions.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Hamdi Pashacha's Cabinet in June 1944.

4. *Abdul Aziz al Mudhaffar, M.B.E.*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1897. Speaks English, German and French well. Served as superintendent in Deputy Military Governor's Office, Bagdad Kasafah, under the Government of Occupation from March 1917, and in 1919 became Mudir of Kasafah. Secretary to the Ministry of Interior, December 1920 and Director of the Press Bureau in 1922. Department 1927.

He was accused of incompetence and tried for misappropriation of public funds. Found not guilty and appointed to be member of Muntafiy Land Court. Lost this post when the court was abolished in June 1932. In the summer of 1933 was appointed first to the Iraqi Legation at Tehran, and in May 1934 was transferred to be consul general in Beirut.

Appointed councillor to the Iraqi Legation in Paris, May 1945.

In the spring of 1937 he was accused of giving false certificates for munitions bought for Spain and recalled to Iraq. In Syria he was arrested, but extradition was refused and he was released but remained in Syria. He is married to a of Naji al Suwaidi and this family connexion brought about his full exoneration in December.

He returned to live in Bagdad in January 1938, and shortly afterwards it was officially announced that it had been proved that he was innocent of the charges made against him in 1937. On his return he went into business.

He in 1941 started a trans-desert transport service between Bagdad, Syria and Palestine. Was suspected of working for Rashid Ali. After the collapse of the "V" sign on his business stationery and press advertisements.

5. *Abdul Aziz al Qasab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Kammakam of Kut under Naqib's Provisional Government and did very well. In October 1921 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul on probation for six months, but refused to go without the salary of a full mutesarrif. In the beginning of 1922 he went as Mutesarrif of Karbala, was transferred to Muntafiy in January 1923 and to the Ministry of Interior as Director-General of General Administration in June of the same year. Appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul in January 1924. A capable and well-intentioned official without much strength of character. Minister of Interior, January 1928. Minister for Justice, November 1929.

Went out of office with the resignation of Naji Pasha's Cabinet in March 1930. Has not held any other Cabinet post since. Has an adequate pension. Appointed Chief Administrative Inspector, Grade 1 November 1935.

He was appointed Minister of the Interior in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al-Madfa'i in March 1935, but resigned with all his colleagues twelve days later. Elected a Deputy for Bagdad in the general elections of August 1935. Appointed Comptroller-General of Accounts in December 1937, in succession to Taufiq al-Suwaidi.

6. *Abdul Ilah Hafidh*.—Born about 1897 in Mosul. Son of the late Muhammad Ali Fadhal, who was for some time a Senator. Educated in Paris, where he qualified as a dentist. He also studied political economy. He obtained

a degree in political science. Became Deputy for Mosul in 1926 and afterwards lost his seat. He then set up a dental clinic in Baghdad. Again elected Deputy in 1933. In 1935 he was appointed Iraqi Consul in Paris, but did not stay there long, and in September 1935 he became Director-General of Commerce. His subsequent posts were Consul-General, Beirut, 1935-39; Consul-General Bombay 1939-40, Director-General of Revenue, 1941. In July 1942 he became Minister of Economics and Minister for Foreign Affairs in October 1942. A fatigued personality with wider horizons than most Iraqis.

Appointed Minister of Education in June 1943 and was well spoken of by his British advisers. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

7. **Abdul Latif Nuri.**—Born in Baghdad 1888. Gazetted as officer in the Turkish army in 1908. Joined the Iraqi army in 1921. Promoted *qaid* (lieutenant-colonel) in 1926 and *raim* (colonel) in 1929. He has held the command of the Northern and Southern Districts, and has passed the senior and junior officers courses, and was posted to the Northern District in 1933. Promoted *amir liwa* (brigadier) in 1932.

Joined General Bakr Sidqi as leader of the army revolt against Yasin al Hashimi in October 1936, and became Minister of Defence in the Government formed by Hikmat Sulaiman.

Resigned after the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 and was then placed on retired pay.

Left Iraq in the same year for medical treatment and lived abroad. While in hospital in Damascus he was placed under arrest by the British military authorities when Syria was occupied in June 1941 but was allowed to return to Iraq in September 1941, since when he has been living quietly in Baghdad on his pension.

8. **Abdul Mahdi (Sagid).**—Son of Sagid al-Mahdi, born in Baghdad 1904. Influential in the army and in the political scene. He was a strong partisan of Yasin Pasha and a member of the Executive Committee of the party of National Brotherhood (*Hizb al Ikha al Watani*). After the dissolution of the party in 1935 he played no part in politics, until he was elected Member of the Chamber in December 1937.

He was returned for this constituency in June 1939.

In February 1941 became Minister of Economics in the Cabinet of Taha al Hashimi. Resigned in April 1941.

Appointed Minister of Economics to the Cabinet formed by Nuri as Said in October 1941.

Made Senator October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in February 1942.

Resigned in November 1942 as a result of a personal quarrel with Taha Ali, the Minister of Education.

9. **Abdul Qadir-al-Gilani.**—Elder brother of Yusuf Gilani. Born Baghdad 1904. Entered Government service 1926, and shortly afterwards was appointed attaché in the Iraqi Legation in London. While in London he studied at the London School of Economics. Speaks good English.

Appointed third secretary at Iraqi Legation in Cairo 1934. Promoted second secretary 1935. On many occasions he was in charge of the legation and maintained excellent relations with the British Embassy. In Egypt he married an English girl, and was posted to the Legation in London. Appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Royal Palace, April 1940, where he appeared likely to exercise a good influence.

These hopes were, however, disappointed, and he associated himself closely with Rashid Ali when the latter became Prime Minister in March 1941, and during the rebellion led by Rashid Ali in May 1941. When it collapsed he took refuge in Persia. After the Allied occupation of Persia he was arrested by the British forces, and after some months' internment in Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Was sent back to Iraq with the other Iraqi internees for trial in April 1944.

10. **Abdul Qadir-al-Rashid.**—Sunni of Baghdad, related to the Gilani family. Born 1894. Speaks English well.

Appointed secretary to the Council of Ministers in 1924 in succession to Hussein Afnan. Remained in that post, the duties of which he discharged with

loyalty and efficiency. In November 1932 when he was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Naji Shawkat's Cabinet. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Was appointed an assistant manager in the Rafidain Oil Company in October 1933.

11. **Abdul Wahid Saad.**—Born in Baghdad 1900. Studied at Baghdad University. Deputy Minister of Education in 1932. Secretary of the Ministry of Education in 1932. Appointed Minister of Social Affairs by Nuri Pasha in 1941. Resigned in 1942. He became a Minister only because no other eligible Shu'ah could be found.

Lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in December 1943.

12. **Abdul Wahid Saadik.**—Chief of the Fatlah tribe, son of Haji Sukkar, once the most powerful sheikhs on the Euphrates. Abdul Wahid cultivated extensive properties on the left bank of the Miskab from Abu Sukhair to the Ibrahim. Throughout recent years he has steered his course with a view to maintain to the utmost his political and tribal influence. His support and loyalty were carefully cultivated by King Faisal, and all political parties have thought it worth while to try to make him an adherent. He has many friends and many bitter enemies, and is reputed to deal harshly with his fellaheen.

He was prominent as a leader of discontent in the Middle Euphrates area in the spring of 1935, working with Rashid Ali-al-Gilani to overthrow Ali Ja'afar's Cabinet.

He had much influence during Yasin al Hashimi's tenure of office, but so abused it that after Yasin's fall in October 1936 he was afraid to return to his tribe.

He was elected to the Chamber in February 1937, but in July 1937 he was arrested and imprisoned for fomenting tribal disturbances in Diwanayah. After the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government in August 1937 he was released from prison, but kept under surveillance first in Sulaimani and later in Samawa.

He was permitted to return to his home in July 1938 and elected Deputy for Diwanayah in June 1939.

In April and May 1941 he closely supported Rashid Ali. In August he was interned in Fao and in December transferred to Samarra. He continued, nevertheless, to keep touch with his friends and supporters, among whom Haman Suhail, of the Beni Tamim, was prominent.

Transferred to the internment camp at Amara in the summer of 1942.

13. **Abdullah al-Damluji.**—Formerly called Abdullah Said Effendi. Born 1895. A native of Mosul. Studied medicine in Constantinople and calls himself doctor, though it is believed that he did not graduate. Seems to have been serving in the Turkish army when Ibn Saud occupied Hausa in 1919, and to have transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Soon rose to a position of influence in Ibn Saud's Court, and came to Baghdad as his unofficial representative in 1921. Was Ibn Saud's Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1922 and signed the Uqair Protocol. Went with the Amir Faisal al Saud to London in 1926, and took part in the negotiations leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927. After this his influence waned owing to the intrigues of Fuad Hamza and Yusuf Yasin.

In August 1928 he represented the Court of Nejd, the Hejaz and its dependencies at the Medina Railway Conference at Hufuf. The conference was a failure, and he returned to the Hejaz. Appointed Minister of the Interior in the Hejaz in 1928. Appointed Minister of the Interior in the Hejaz in 1930. In October 1930, and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. This at first was a success, but the Iraqi Ministry for Foreign Affairs seemed likely to embarrass Nejd and Iraqi relations, but when Nuri Pasha visited Jeddah in April 1931 Ibn Saud stated that he no longer wished to raise any objection to Damluji's appointment. Was left out of office when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Director-General of Health, July 1932, and succeeded Safwat Pasha as Court Chamberlain at the end of 1933.

Returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jamil al Madfa'i's second Cabinet in February 1934, resigned in July and was reappointed Director-General of Health in September.

He was suspended in 1935 and tried for misappropriation of public funds. He was acquitted and reinstated in his post at the end of December, but resigned a few months later.

For nearly two years he remained out of public life, but in July 1937 he was appointed Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in succession to Abbas Mahdi.

He headed the Iraqi representatives at the funeral of Ataturk in November 1939. Soon after Nuri al Said became Prime Minister in December 1939 he was removed from the Palace to an obscure appointment in the Health Department, which was later abolished.

Appointed Director General of Social Affairs and Health in November 1941.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in February 1942.

Resigned in June 1942.

14. *Abdullah Qasab*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Saikh, Abbas Amin al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qasab, q.s. Educated in Bagdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Qasim of Samarra in 1939 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Kirkuk in October 1941 and was transferred to Diwaniyah a month later. Did well as a Mutesarrif and joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Interior in October 1943. Quiet and efficient with no marked political leanings. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943 and was dropped from Nuri's immediately following Cabinet. Appointed Mutesarrif of Mosul in March 1944.

15. *Abdullah al-Fayyaz*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1900, the son of an Alim Saikh, Abbas Amin al-Fatwa. Nephew of Abdul Aziz Qasab, q.s. Educated in Bagdad, graduated from the Law College in 1928 and entered the Civil Service. Became Qasim of Samarra in 1939 and later became Director of Tribal Affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

His tribal relations were established with him. In 1920 he was implicated in the control of two British officials. He and Faris Agha of Bera Kapra were declared outlaws with a price on their heads, and Barzan was destroyed by troops, but his country was not occupied. In 1922 he welcomed Turkish agents into Barzan and Mazul Bala, and in September 1922 his men made an unsuccessful attack on Amadiyah. A month later Barzan was again destroyed by the Royal Air Force co-operating with Assyrian irregulars. In 1923, the Turks having been driven from Rowanduz, Sheikh Ahmad turned on their retreating columns and came into Aqra to make

permitted to continue in unmolested control of his tribal villages and mountains.

Baranduz, Sheikh Rashid of Lolan. He was everywhere successful, drove Sheikh Rashid to flight into Persia and set fire to his villages. Government intervention became necessary to restore order. Iraqi troops were concentrated early in 1932 and after some sharp fighting, followed by intensive air action by the Royal Air Force, Sheikh Ahmad was defeated and driven across the Turkish border in June. He and his two brothers, Muhammad Sadiq and Mulla Mustafa, were interned for a time in Turkey but the two latter contrived to find their way back into their old haunts in the following winter. After holding out in the mountains for some months they surrendered and were pardoned in July 1933 and allowed to return to their villages. A short time afterwards the Turks surrendered Sheikh Ahmad to the Iraqi Government on condition that his life should be spared. For a little over a year he lived in comfortable and honourable detention in Mosul, but in November 1934 it was found that he was in collusion with Khali Khushawi, who was disturbing the peace of the Barzan area, and he was thereupon removed to Hilla.

Permitted to come to Bagdad in April 1935. A short while later he went to live in Sulaimani. After the escape of Mulla Mustafa from Sulaimani in the autumn of 1943 Sheikh Ahmad was removed to Hilla and remained there until a settlement was made with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944. Thereafter he was permitted to return to Barzan. He is now heavily overshadowed by Mulla Mustafa in local tribal affairs.

16. *Ahmad Mukhtar Baban*.—Born about 1895. Sunni of the Baban family which is Kurdish in origin. He, himself, knows no Kurdish and has no racial interest in the Kurds. A lawyer by profession, he served as a judge for many years. For a short time in 1942 he held the war time post of Director General of Supplies and in October 1942 he joined Nuri Said's Cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. A fortnight later he was transferred to Communications and Works, where he remained until the Cabinet was re-formed in December 1943 when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice. He kept the same Ministry in Hamdi Pasha's Cabinet of June 1944.

17. *Ahmad al-Rawi*.—Born about 1894. Sunni of Bagdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Mada'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

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for Bagdad in October 1933, and retained this seat in the elections of 1934. Lost his seat in August 1935.

He is now an ageing man and is unlikely again to play a prominent part in politics.

Made a Senator in May 1937. Resigned October 1937. Re-appointed to Senate January 1943.

His daughter Sabiha (a teacher on the Women's Training College) became the first woman student in the Bagdad Law College in 1937.

19. *Ahmad al-Rawi*.—Born about 1894. Sunni of Bagdad. Son of one of the leading Sunni Alims. Became a police officer soon after the formation of the Iraqi Government and after reaching the rank of commandant served in several liwas as a mutessarif. In February 1939 he was made administrative inspector and not long afterwards placed on pension. In June 1941, after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebel Government, he was recalled to duty by Jamil Mada'i and made Director-General of Police. In this position he co-operated energetically with the British officials in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda and intrigues and also gave his personal and official support to all plans for improving Anglo-Iraqi relations.

Transferred as mutessarif to Arbil in April 1935. Made an administrative inspector April 1939. Placed on pension in spring of 1940.

20. *Ahmad Zaki al-Ahagat*.—Shi'ah Bagdad. Born 1896. Educated in Bagdad Law School. Has held the following posts: Secretary of the Ministry of Education, consul general at Muhammarah and Bombay, kaimakam in several places, Mutesarrif of Kut and Hilla and Land Settlement Officer. Appointed Director General of Posts and Telegraphs in July 1937.

Dismissed from his post in June 1941 on account of the support which he had given to Rashid Ali's régime in May.

21. *Akram Mushtaq*.—Born Bagdad 1903. Moslem Sunni. Brother of Tahir Mushtaq (q.s.). Gazetted officer in army 1927. Passed through Cranwell and appointed to Royal Iraqi air force in 1930. Promoted captain 1932. Took an active part in the *coup d'Etat* of October 1936. Promoted major 1937 and lieutenant colonel in 1938. Appointed Commander of Iraqi air force in September 1937. Retained this post until April 1939, when he was relieved of his command and commission and appointed Director of Civil Aviation. Married a daughter of Sheikh Ahmad al-Sheikh Daud in spring of 1940.

22. *Ali Jaudat*.—Sunni, of humble Mosul origin. Born 1896. Officer in the Turkish army, fought at Shushah, subsequently surrendered to the British and spent most of 1915 at Basra. Was there employed to encourage Turkish prisoners to join the Sheriff. He was a member of the Ald al-Iraqi. After

the war he was Military Governor of Aleppo after the resignation of Jafar Pasha in 1920, and was subsequently in Dair. Returned to Bagdad with the Amir Faisal in June 1921, and in October 1921 was given the post of Mutassarif of Hilla which he held till September 1922. He took a very active part in the anti-mandate agitation, and was finally dismissed (on the advice of the High Commissioner) for defrauding the Treasury by underestimating revenue demands. In 1923 he was appointed Mutassarif of Karbala in the hope that he might be able to reconcile the *maytahids*. He was unsuccessful, and in May was transferred to Muntafiq, where he did very well. Minister of Interior in the Asfari Cabinet, November 1923-July 1924, and voted for the treaty. Appointed Mutassarif of Diyala, and later of Basra. In early 1930 was made Director of the Ministry of the Interior. Minister for Finance under Nuri Pasha, March 1930. Resigned from Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in September 1930, as a protest against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of that year, and his seat in the Chamber in 1931, together with Rashid Ali al-Gilani and Yasin al-Hashimi in March 1932. Re-elected for Mosul 1933. Appointed principal private secretary to the King March 1933. Became Prime Minister and Acting Minister of the Interior in August 1934. Was forced to resign in February 1935 on account of the agitation worked up against him throughout the country by Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ali al-Gilani. He was made President of the Chamber in March 1935 and appointed Iraqi Minister in London in August 1935. Transferred to Paris in December 1936.

He came to Bagdad on leave in October 1937 and decided not to return to his post at Paris.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Nuri al-Said's Cabinet in April 1940.

After Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in April 1941 he escaped to Basra, joined the British, and returned to Iraq after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion and was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941.

Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Has a son, Nizar, who was educated at Downing College, Cambridge.

Has interested himself in conducting propaganda in the United States to make better known the Arab side of the Palestine question.

23. **Ali Mahmud Shaukh Ali**.—Born 1902. Sunni Arab connected with the *al-Fatawa* movement.

He became well known as an extreme Nationalist and contributed many articles to the press. He was arrested in 1930 for a violent agitation against the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance signed in that year and sentenced to a short term of imprisonment. He has twice been elected to the Chamber of Deputies. He was one of the members of the delegation of Iraqi notables which visited Palestine and Egypt in 1936, and a short time after his return was appointed to a judgeship in the Court of Appeal. In this post he was

Appointed Minister of Justice in Hikmat Sulaiman's reorganised Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned August 1937 and returned to the Bar.

Banned from Bagdad by Jamil al-Madfai's Cabinet in November 1939, but was permitted to return when Nuri al-Said's Cabinet was formed in December 1939. In February 1939 he was appointed Mutassarif of Basra. He was then appointed to the post of Director General of Customs in Bagdad. After holding this appointment he was transferred to Bagdad to be Director General of Customs. He was then transferred to Basra to be Director General of Customs. He was then transferred to Basra to be Director General of Customs.

Appointed Minister of Justice in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. He was then transferred to the post of Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in May 1941. Handed over to the British after the entry of British forces into Iraq in May 1941. He was then sent to Southern Rhodesia. He was then sent to Southern Rhodesia. He was then sent to Southern Rhodesia. He was then sent to Southern Rhodesia.

24. **Ali Muntaz**.—Born 1901. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Daftari family. Graduated at Bagdad Law College and entered Government service in 1920. Married a daughter of Yasin al-Hashimi in 1933. Appointed Director-General of Revenues in 1935, but was obliged to leave Iraq for a time when Bakr Sidqi overthrew Yasin al-Hashimi's Government in 1936. In January 1939 he was reappointed Director-General of Revenues by Nuri al-Said's Cabinet.

Appointed Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Taha al-Hashimi in February 1941. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in April after Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat*. In May 1941 he was appointed director of the newly-created H. H. Bank, and in October he became Minister of Finance in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said.

Resigned in October 1942 largely on account of his inability to get on with Saleh Jabr, then Minister of the Interior.

Made Minister of Finance in Nuri Pasha's ninth Cabinet in December 1943. Headed Iraqi delegation to Middle East Financial Conference in April 1944. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

Passed out of the Military College in Bagdad in 1906 and then entered the Artillery School in Constantinople where he remained for three years. Gazetted second lieutenant in 1909 and posted to Adana. Later he served in 1910 in operations against the Shammar and in 1911 and 1912 against the tribes in the mawa. Abu Sukhair and Rumatha. Entered the Turkish Staff College in 1912 fought in the Balkan war and was mentioned in despatches for good work on the Chataljeb lines. After the war of 1914-17 he took part (with Jamil al-Madfai) in the Arab insurrections at Dair ez Zar and Tell Afar. He returned to Mosul after the general amnesty in 1920 and joined the Iraqi army at the time of its formation. He was promoted Assistant Chief of the General Staff in 1935 and General Officer Commanding the Northern Area in 1937. In August 1937 he refused to carry out the orders given to him by the Government to arrest a number of officers charged with co-operating in Bakr Sidqi's murder, and this

after, when Jamil al-Madfai came into office, Amin al-Umari was transferred to command of the Bagdad District.

Went to Europe on leave in the winter of 1938 to undergo medical treatment. As a soldier he is out of date and obstinately refuses to modernise his tactical ideas. Was relieved of his command and placed on pension in February 1940 because of the influence which he endeavoured to exercise in political matters outside his proper sphere.

Appointed C.G.S. in June 1941.

Placed on pension in November 1941 because it seemed that he was endeavouring to organise a new military clique to interfere in politics.

26. **Amin Zaki Sulaiman**.—A Muslim (Sunni) of Turkoman origin. Born 1887 in Bagdad. Received his military training in Istanbul and appointed second lieutenant in the Turkish army in 1905.

He joined the Iraq army in 1921 as a captain, and was promoted major in 1926 and lieutenant-colonel in 1930, when he was placed in command of the 4th Iraqi Infantry Battalion.

He was promoted colonel in 1934 and appointed to the command of the Northern Division with headquarters at Mosul, and a month later he was appointed quarter-master-general. In October 1935 he was given the command of the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

He was much opposed to the Bakr Sidqi régime in 1936. He remained with the British in 1937 when he was a political G.O.C. of the 2nd Division, Kirkuk, which position he was still holding when he was appointed acting C.G.S. in March 1940. Promoted major-general in June 1940.

He is now 53 years old and is the senior officer now serving in the Iraq army. Is a staunch supporter of Taha al-Hashimi, and is considered a capable officer and a strict disciplinarian, but is generally unpopular in the army with both officers and men. (Written in 1940.)

He was arrested from Mosul by the British in April 1941 and signed a proclamation charging the Regent with treason against the King. He then fled to Persia where British troops advanced on Bagdad at the end of May and fell into our hands when British and Russian troops occupied Persia in August 1941. After provisional internment in Abwaz, he was sent to Southern Rhodesia. Sent back to Iraq for retrial in March 1942, and in May was sentenced by a military court to five years' imprisonment.

27. *Arshad-al-Umare*.—Of the well-known Usari family of Mosul. Born 1898. Trained as an engineer in the days of the Turk. Municipal engineer in Constantinople. Staff officer during the war. Speaks French and understands English. Member of the first Iraqi Parliament and supporter of Abdul Karim. Appointed by latter first Iraqi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Made Amin-al-Asimah (Mayor of Bagdad), November 1931, and during his two-year tenure of that appointment did much for the improvement of the amenities of Bagdad. Was appointed Director of Irrigation in November 1933. Joined Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934 as Minister for Economics and Communications. Resigned with the Cabinet in February 1935 and remained without a post until May 1936, when he was appointed Director-General of Municipalities. In November 1936 he again became Mayor of Bagdad, in which capacity he is well known and liked by most of the foreign community. He has proved himself a good friend to Great Britain.

Following the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941, when Rashid Ali and his Cabinet fled to Persia, Arshad Beg formed a Committee of Internal Security to conclude an armistice with the British forces and to maintain order until the return of the Regent.

In November 1941 he was reappointed Lord Mayor of Bagdad. Has done much to embellish Bagdad by opening up new roads and laying out public gardens.

As president of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society he has shown himself very willing to co-operate with the organisers of all kinds of war charity work.

In June 1944 he joined Hamid al-Pachachi's Cabinet as Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Minister of Supplies.

28. *Amin-al-Naqib, Sayid*.—The fourth son of Sayid Abdul Rahman and Mahd al-Baghdadi. Born Bagdad, 1872. Appointed Naqib in the death of Sayid Mahmud in July 1930. A man of little character but he has successfully acquired the conventional appearance of a Sunni Alim and holy man.

29. *Ali Amin*. Born 1897. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation in London, September 1932, on transfer from a consular post at Angola.

In the summer of 1933 it was discovered that he had, while in Turkey, married one of the sisters of the Amir Zaid, a younger brother of King Faisal I. This was regarded as a scandal at the time, but later on he was forgiven. Appointed secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Rome, October 1934. Transferred to London as counsellor in August 1935. Transferred to Paris as chargé d'affaires in August 1938 and to Berlin in February 1939.

In July 1940 he returned to Rome and remained there until June 1940, when he was transferred to London as chargé d'affaires. Returned to Bagdad, and was appointed Director General at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in October 1941.

30. *Babekr Agha*. A powerful chief of the Pizhder (Kurdish) tribe of Qalah Diza (on the Lesser Zab River, north of Suleimani). Has always been honest and friendly in his dealings with the Government, whether British or Iraqi. An able and most estimable man, who has been liked and respected by all who have had close contact with him.

His rival for tribal influence is Abbas Mahmud Agha, who has always seemed to be against the Government. Both, however, visited Bagdad in October 1933 and protested their loyalty and obedience to the Iraqi Government.

He behaved well after the Iraqi Government established normal administration in the Pizhder area in 1934.

On the outbreak of hostilities between Rashid Ali's rebel Government and the British forces in May 1941, Babekr Agha, together with Sheikh Mahmud and many of the Suleimani tribal chiefs, planned a revolt against the Government. Rashid Ali's régime was, however, overthrown before their plans could mature.

He visited the ambassador in December 1941 and pledged himself to act always under British guidance.

31. *Daud al-Hudari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1850. Son of Ibrahim Effendi, ex-Sheikh-al-Islam. The family comes from Arbil, where Ibrahim Effendi has a small property. Daud Pasha was a Deputy and an aide-de-camp to the Sultan Abdul Hamid. Speaks Turkish better than Arabic. He was in Constantinople during the war and returned to Bagdad in 1921. Appointed, in October 1922, Amin-al-Umana (Chamberlain) in the King's palace. Member for Arbil in the Constituent Assembly, March 1924, and Vice-President. Voted for

the treaty 1924. Harb-al-Shah and opposed treaty of 1926. Member of the Council under Tawfiq Suwaidi, April-November 1929. Disliked and dismissed in 1931.

Re-elected to Chamber of Deputies to represent Arbil in general election of 1930, but has not held Cabinet appointment since Tawfiq Suwaidi's Cabinet resigned in August 1929. In 1930 became lawyer for the British Oil Development Company in Bagdad, and has done quite well out of this work. Was not elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1934.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran in June 1941. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1942. Resigned in 1943 because of his intrigues against the Prime Minister. He was immediately appointed a Minister (Grade I) in the Foreign Service *en disponibilité*. Posted to London as Minister in October 1943. He took an active part in founding the Anglo-Iraqi Society in England.

32. *Daud-al-Sadi, Sayid*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born about 1887. Prominent extremist. Lawyer. Usually connected with all Nationalist agitations and intrigues. Elected to the Chamber for Huslah in August 1935.

Appointed public prosecutor in August 1936 by Yasin-al-Hashimi's Cabinet. Resigned in December after Yasin's fall.

Elected to the Chamber for Kut in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Banished from Bagdad by Jamal al-Midfai in December 1939, but returned as soon as Nuri al-Said became Prime Minister.

An active supporter of Rashid Ali in 1941, he fled to Persia at the end of May after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. He was handed over to the British military authorities by the Persian Government after the entry of British forces into Persia in September 1941. Imprisoned at Ahwaz and then sent to Southern Rhodesia for internment. Brought back to Bagdad for trial in March 1944.

33. *Fakhri Jamali Dr.*—Born Kadhima in 1902. Shi'ah. Educated at the American University of Beirut 1921-27. Columbia University, New York, 1927-29. Wrote a thesis on education among the tribes for his doctorate. On his return to Iraq he was appointed to the Ministry of Education in 1933. He was made Director-General of Instruction. He has a natural predilection for American methods and is a disciple of Mr Dewey.

In early 1938 he was invited by the British Council to visit the United Kingdom to study British educational methods. He was well entertained and shown the best colleges and schools of all kinds. As a result he became far more favourably disposed towards British education.

Although he posed as pro-British and generally collaborated in a friendly manner with the British, in developing the work of the British Council he cannot escape responsibility for the deplorable state of education in Iraq. He was determined to resist British influence and to oppose the appointment of a British adviser and the establishment of a boarding school on the British model. He was made Director-General and appointed counsellor at the Iraqi Legation in London in January 1943. At the end of May he was still in England hoping to contrive somehow to return to a post in Education. A year later he was still in Bagdad as transport by air could not be found to take him and his family to the United States. He has a Canadian wife, and is on friendly terms with the United States Legation.

34. *Fahmi al-Mudarris*.—Born about 1874. Superintendent of the Government press under the Turkish régime. Joined the Amir Faisal in Syria and was with him in London in 1920. Appointed Chamberlain on King Faisal's accession. Was in close touch with the extreme Nationalists in 1922, and at the High Commissioner's request was dismissed from the Palace. In June 1924 he was appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College but lost this post in 1930 when the college was closed. In March 1932 he was expelled from Bagdad to Arbil on account of his subversive political activities, but was permitted to return to the capital a month later. Since then he has not been prominent in politics, but frequently contributes articles to the press in which he expounds Nationalist views.

Appointed rector of the Al-al-Bait Theological College in 1937. Was placed on pension a year later.

35. *Hamid Pachachi*.—Born about 1890. Sunni of Bagdad. Belongs to the Pachachi family, who are one of the richest families of the city. He himself

owns valuable property in the town and also agricultural land outside in the liwa. In the early days of the creation of the Iraqi State he had the reputation of being a young hot head and a leader of the extreme nationalists. Became Minister for Auqaf in June 1925 under Abdul Muhsin al Sadun, and resigned with the Cabinet in November 1926. After this he remained outside politics for many years but returned to public life as Minister for Social Affairs in Taha al Hashimi's Cabinet in February 1941. He took no part in Rashid Ali's adventures in May 1941 and in November 1941 was elected President of the Chamber. He was re-elected to this position in November 1942. Ceased to be President of the Senate when he became temporarily Minister of Economics in December 1943. When the Senate was reformed on the 25th December 1943, succeeded Nuri Said as Prime Minister in June 1944.

36. *Hamid al-Jabbari*.—Sunni. Born 1884. Medical diploma at Beirut and Paris, much medical and administrative experience and extremely able on both sides. Head of the Mosul Hospital under the Government of Occupation. Appointed Minister of Health 1921. When the Ministry was abolished in 1922 he accepted the post of Director of Medical Services. Speaks excellent French. Appointed Director General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs October 1931. Appointed Inspector-General of Health in 1933. Became director of the Baghdad General Hospital and dean of the Royal Medical College in September 1934. Appointed Inspector General of Health September 1937. Inspector-General of the Ministry of Social Affairs in December 1939.

Placed on pension at the end of 1940. Reappointed Director General of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Director-General of Health in July 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in January 1943.

Headed Iraqi delegation to Arab Medical Congress 1943. Elected a Deputy October 1943. Became an invalid in April 1944.

37. *Hikmat, Sulaiman*.—Sunni. Born 1896. Director of Education in Baghdad under the Turks. Also Assistant Governor. Member of C.U.P. Was in Constantinople at the time of the occupation. Returned in January 1921 and was a candidate for the Ministry of Education. Made Director of Posts in April 1922 and Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1923. Minister of Interior in the second Sadun Cabinet. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930, but became Minister for Interior in March 1933. Resigned from Cabinet with Rashid Ali in October 1933, and from Chamber in November 1933. He played a very important part in organising the opposition to Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in the early months of 1935, but refused office in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha after Ali Jaudat's fall. Paid a long visit to Turkey in the summer of 1935 and returned full of praise for modern Turkish methods. In the autumn of 1935 he was offered the portfolio of the Ministry of Justice, but did not accept it. Is very influential in political circles, whose his intelligence is much respected.

In October 1930 he joined with Bakr Sidqi in the plot which resulted in the successful military revolt against Yasin al Hashimi's Government and upon Yasin's resignation he became Prime Minister. He remained in office until August 1937 when, after the murder of Bakr Sidqi, he and his Cabinet resigned. As a Prime Minister he was unpopular. His energetic but his impatience with detail and administrative routine, coupled with the malign influence exercised by Bakr Sidqi over the Cabinet, prevented him from achieving anything of importance.

A well-mannered man of wide Liberal views.

In 1938, though he took no active part in politics, he was on the alert to keep Nuri al Said from returning to power. When Nuri al Said formed a Government in December 1938, he sent messages of goodwill to Hikmat and later calls were made for reconciliation. He was arrested early in March 1939, tried by court-martial for treason and sentenced to death. This was at the same time commuted to five years' imprisonment. In the summer of 1939 he was removed to Sulaimaniya, where he was interned in a comfortable house.

In April 1941 was released by Rashid Ali and allowed to go to Persia, where he remained throughout the May rebellion. He afterwards returned to Baghdad and gradually began to take part in social life.

He is now (1944) a flourishing farmer and apparently determined to give up politics altogether.

38. *Hasan F. al-Husseini*.—Sunni. Kurdish origin. Born in Baghdad in 1889. Entered the Army as a cadet and served in the Turkish army in 1909. Joined the Iraqi army in May 1922. He was promoted to 1927. He has passed the Senior Officers' Course at Baghdad in 1929 and 1930 and 1933. In 1934 he was appointed to the post of Chief of the General Staff. In 1936 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In 1937 he was appointed to the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Iraqi Army. In 1938 he was made G.O.C. of the 1st Army.

with good manners. He speaks good English. He had nothing to do with the military revolt of October 1936. After the murder of Bakr Sidqi in August 1937 he was appointed Chief of the General Staff. Relieved of his appointment and placed on pension in February 1940 for interference in politics.

39. *Ibrahim Akif al-Ahmedi*.—Sunni. Born Baghdad 1894. Educated in Baghdad and Turkey. Graduated from Medical College, Istanbul, 1916, and served in the Turkish Army. He worked in the Health Service, and served as Director of Health, Basra and Baghdad, with considerable success.

Was Director General of Public Health in May 1939 and afterwards Inspector-General of Health Services in Ministry of Social Affairs. He is secretary-general of the Iraqi Red Crescent Society.

Appointed Minister of Education in Hamdi Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

40. *Ibrahim Kamal*.—Sunni. Born 1895. Captain in the Sherifian army. A very good officer in the field, where he commanded a battalion. Wounded at the first battle of Mann. Legal officer to O.C., Damascus, under Feisal's régime.

Was afterwards at Dair, but not known to have participated in the attack on Tall Afar. He was in Damascus in April 1921, but subsequently returned to Iraq, and was said to be engaged in inciting people against any form of British control. Was appointed commandant of police, Baghdad, on the resignation of Abdul Latif Felahi. He did well in some ways and kept excellent discipline, but was removed after innumerable complaints of various kinds. After leaving the police he took up the legal profession. Entered Parliament as a Nationalist, but later gave up politics for a well-paid and influential post in the Ministry of Finance. Since then he has given no trouble. Appointed Director General of Customs and Excise in June 1934.

Proved to be a very efficient director. In November 1935, after Hikmat Sulaiman had had Rustam Haider removed, Ibrahim Kamal was appointed principal private secretary to King Ghazi. He was not happy in this post for long. In August 1937 he joined Jamil al Madfa'i's Cabinet as Minister of Finance.

Concluded convention for the south of Iraq with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

Resigned with whole Cabinet in December 1938 after the military coup made against them by Nuri al Said.

Tried by court-martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Haider and acquitted.

Appointed Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Justice in the Government formed by Jamil al Madfa'i in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. A realist with strong views, he became dissatisfied with the Government's weakness and vacillation in dealing with the removal of pro-Nazi elements in the army and Administration and resigned from the Cabinet in September 1941.

Made a Senator in January 1943.

In the Senate he has worked industriously on committees and has been an active member. His views on the Government have not, however, been realised, mainly because he is not able to attract colleagues to work with him.

41. *Jafar Abu Tammam*.—Shi'ah of Baghdad. Born about 1885. Well educated, with a good deal of influence. Always a strong Nationalist, he joined with Yusuf Suwaidi, Muhammad Sadr, Sheikh Ahmad Daad and Ali Bazargan in the independence movement of 1920 and actively incited the tribes to rebellion. He evaded an attempted arrest in August 1920 and fled from Baghdad to Najaf. Returned in September 1921 and was energetic in promoting all Nationalist

movements, especially the anti mandate agitation. Minister of Commerce from April 1922 till the end of June, when he resigned after a prolonged opposition to the terms of the treaty. He then organised the Hizb al-Watani (Nationalist party), of which he became general secretary. He was subsequently arrested and deported to Hengam, where he remained till May 1923. On his return to Bagdad he was pressed for a time into private life, and refused to join the Shihab Hizb-al-Nahdhab. Returned to politics on his election to the Chamber in a Bagdad by-election June 1925. Reformed the Hizb-al-Watani (Nationalist party) September 1928. Telegraphed congratulations to the Labour party on their success in the general election in England in 1929. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the election of 1930, but remained active as the secretary general of the Nationalist party. Resigned from the Nationalist party in October 1933, declaring that he was withdrawing from politics until there should be a change of heart among those in public life. He returned to active politics in January 1935 and joined with Yasin al Hashimi and Rashid Ali al Ghalani in attacking Ali Jaudat's Cabinet. He did not, however, join them in the Cabinet formed after the latter's resignation. Elected president of the Bagdad Chamber of Commerce in November 1935.

During the summer of 1936 he became an active critic of Yasin-al Hashimi's Administration and led a deputation to King Ghazi to protest against the severity of the measures taken by the Government to suppress tribal disorders in Diwaniyah. In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, he joined Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet as Minister for Finance.

In June 1937 he resigned as a protest against the influence of Bakr Sidqi in Cabinet affairs, and the undue severity with which he considered that the Government were conducting punitive operations against the tribes in Samawa. Made a Senator in February 1937 but lost his seat in the summer of the same year under article 31 of the Constitution. Since then he has withdrawn from political life.

Is chairman of the newly established Vegetable Oil Extraction Company in Bagdad.

42. *Jafar Hamandi*.—Born 1894. At the time of the outbreak of war in 1914 he was a school teacher in Bagdad. After the war he graduated at the Bagdad Law School and was appointed to a junior judgeship in Kadhumain. Later he was given an appointment in the Ministry of Justice. In 1930 he was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior and became kaimakam of Najaf, then after serving in several other districts he was made Mutesarrif of Kut in 1936 and was later transferred to the same post in Hilla. He was appointed Minister for Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in June 1937. Resigned in August 1937, and in September he was appointed Director General of tribal affairs in the Ministry of the Interior.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Kut September 1938, and transferred to Muntafik February 1939 to Kerbala in September 1939.

Appointed Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Bagdad in December 1941.

Resigned in October 1942. In early 1943 he received a substantial grant of Government land in the Hilla liwa. Saleh Jade as Minister of Finance helped him to obtain this.

43. *Jalal Baban*.—Kurd of the Baban family. Born 1892.

In the early days of British occupation he was actively associated with extreme Nationalists and was deported to Hengam in 1920. Released in 1921. Appointed kaimakam in 1923 and continued to serve in the civil administration holding the posts of mutesarrif in Nasiriyah, Kerbala and Arbil until November 1932 when he became Minister of Economics and Communications in Naji Shawkat's Cabinet. Became Minister for Defence under Rashid Ali al Ghalani in March 1933. Resigned with the latter in October 1933. Appointed Minister for Education in February 1934, resigned with Jamil-al-Madfai in October 1941. Appointed Director General of the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. Appointed Director General of Finance in December 1936.

In August 1937 he joined Jamil-al-Madfai's Cabinet as Minister of Economics and Communications. Made a Senator. Resigned from Cabinet in May 1938 on account of insinuations made by his colleagues (not without reason).

that he had made a corrupt agreement with a Government road contractor. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in September 1939, resigned with whole Cabinet in February 1940.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet of Jamil Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

In the sessions of 1941 and 1942 he was active in the Senate as a critic of Government measures.

Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1943, but resigned in October of the same year.

44. *Jamil Baban*.—A Kurdish lawyer. Born 1890. Served for some time as a judge in the Northern Liwas. Became Deputy for Arbil in the general election of 1925. Appointed Minister for Justice in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet March 1930. Resigned with Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice in the Cabinet of Nuri Pasha in October 1932. Reappointed Minister for Justice when Jamil-al Madfai reformed his Cabinet in February 1934 and remained at the Ministry of Justice in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet formed in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935, and in October joined the party organised by Jamil-al Madfai to oppose Yasin Pasha. Owed his continued presence in successive Cabinets perhaps more to the tradition that each Cabinet must have one Kurd than to his personal abilities.

Returned for Arbil in the elections of June 1939.

After practising as an advocate, returned to public life again by his appointment as Minister of Social Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al Sa'idi in October 1941.

Resigned in October 1942 and began practising again as an advocate.

45. *Jamil al Razi*.—A Haggadi, born 1892, officer in the Ottoman Army. Ali in Jedda, and came to Iraq with His Majesty after Ibn Saud's conquest of Hejaz. Elected Deputy for Dulaim in the general election of 1928, became vice-president of the party. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in Nuri Pasha's Cabinet formed in March 1930. Became Minister for Defence in January 1931, but lost his portfolio when Nuri Pasha reformed his Cabinet in October 1931. Appointed Mutesarrif of Kirkuk July 1932. Transferred to Kut in October 1933. His services were appreciated by the Hashimi Cabinet in March 1936. In December 1936 he was in Jerusalem and in touch with the Grand Mufti and the Arab movement in Palestine. Appointed Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires in Jedda September 1939.

Appointed consul general at Jerusalem in July 1941. Withdrawn in the autumn of 1941 and was appointed Iraqi Minister at Jedda in December 1942.

46. *Jamil-al Madfai*.—Of Mosul, born about 1886. Led the party which in June 1920 came from Dair and called upon the tribes to rise against the British in the name of the Shereef. Entered Tall Afar after the murder of Captain Stuart, which he had instigated. Styled himself leader of the Northern Mesopotamian army. On the approach of British troops from Mosul returned to Dair. Returned to Iraq 1923. Soon after, appointed mutesarrif and saw service in a number of different liwas. Appointed Minister for the Interior under Nuri Pasha in March 1931. Became President of the Chamber in December 1930, following Jafar Pasha's resignation. Resigned October 1931 at the same time resigning from Nuri Pasha's party as a protest against the high handed actions of Muzahim Beg Al Pachachi, then Minister for the Interior. Composed his quarrel with Nuri Pasha in November and was re-elected President of the Chamber on the 30th November. Again elected President in November 1932 and March 1933. Became Prime Minister in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but remained office with a reformed Cabinet about ten days later. Resigned again in August 1934, but accepted portfolio of Defence in Cabinet which was then formed by Ali Jaudat. Became Prime Minister in March 1935, but was forced to resign by Yasin Pasha's agitation in the Euphrates after being in office for only twelve days. In October 1935 he was elected President of the National Union in opposition to Yasin Pasha's Cabinet, but received little support. Declined an invitation to join the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936. In the winter of 1936-37 he went to the Yemen to obtain the adhesion of the Imam to the Pact of Arab Brotherhood, signed by Saudi Arabia and Iraq in April 1936, and in August 1937 after the resignation of Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet, he became Prime Minister.

He lacks administrative ability, but is a figure in the political world. Is generally popular because he expresses his opinion in an honest, downright manner.

Throughout 1938 he held his Cabinet together and carried on the government. On the 25th December, 1938, by a military demonstration organised by Husain Fauzi, the Chief of the General Staff, and Taha al Hashimi in favour of Nuri al-Said. Continued to enjoy considerable political influence.

When Rashid Ali seized power by a *coup d'Etat* at the beginning of April 1941. He escaped capture by the Iraqi rebel troops and took refuge on a British warship. Thence they were flown to Palestine, where Jamil Madfai remained during Rashid Ali's rebellion of May. He returned to Iraq with the Regent on the collapse of the rebellion, and after considerable hesitation was persuaded to form a Cabinet. Faced with the difficult task of restoring public confidence and security, he showed that he had lost his former resolution and energy. An ageing man, susceptible to the intervention of others, he inclined towards a policy of appeasement and refrained from drastic action against the pro-Nazi elements. Within these limits, however, he co-operated loyally with H. Majesty's Government, and during the four months of his premiership conditions in Iraq were largely restored to normal. Feeling unable, however, to carry out the policy of strong action which was pressed on him from many sides, Jamil Madfai, together with the whole Cabinet, resigned in October 1941.

Since then he has been active in the Senate. In March-April 1943 he visited Syria, Transjordan and Egypt at the request of Nuri Said to canvass support for the idea of an Arab congress to plan the closer union of all Arab States. He met with little success but was pleased to have had an opportunity to maintain his part as a veteran of the Pan Arab movement.

Elected President of the Senate in December 1943, in which position he used his influence against Nuri Pasha's Government.

47. *Jamil al Wadi*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Hamud al Wadi, aide-de-camp to the Amir Abdulah, and Shukir al Wadi, formerly aide-de-camp to the Amir.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry of Finance in 1931.

Appointed Minister for Justice November 1932. Resigned with Cabinet in March 1933. Appointed Director-General of State Domains Lands (in the Ministry of Finance) October 1933. Returned to the Ministry of Justice in June 1934 as member of the Court of Cassation, and a month later was appointed Chief Public Prosecutor. Appointed Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in April 1935.

Appointed principal private secretary in the Palace in July 1937, but lost this post when Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet fell, and was passed into obscurity as an inspector in the Ministry of Justice.

Appointed Director-General of Tapu in January 1938, and of Land Settlement in August 1939 when the latter Department was amalgamated with Tapu.

Land Settlement was taken away from him in the autumn of 1941. Dishonest and corrupt.

48. *Kamil Chadirji*.—Sunni, born Bagdad, 1901, brother of Rauf Chadirji. His sister is the wife of Mahmud Subhi al Daftari. Educated locally and graduated at the Law School. For a short time he held a minor post in the Ministry of Finance, but soon gave up the civil service for journalism and literature. His newspaper, *Al Akhbar*, was suppressed for its attacks on Nuri Said's Government. He later edited *Al Akhbar*, which suffered the same fate as *Al Ikha al Watani*. In May 1934 he was convicted and fined £20 for publishing false news in a third newspaper, *Sawt al Ahali* of which he was the responsible editor. In September of the same year he was arrested and charged with the publication of pamphlets attacking King Ghazi, but he was released a few days later as there was no evidence against him. He holds left wing views on social and political questions. He was appointed Minister for Economics and Communications in the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1936.

He resigned in June 1937 on account of his disapproval of the Cabinet's policy on the Euphrates and left the country for several months.

Returned in the autumn of 1937 and soon began to encourage communistic propaganda. He supports the moderate group among the "Communists" in Iraq and is the controller of the left-wing daily *Al Akhbar*.

49. *Khalid Sulaiman*.—Brother of Hikmat Sulaiman (q.v.). Born 1877. Was Minister for Education under Taubiq Suwaidi in April 1929. In the reshuffle of portfolios which followed Abdul Muhain Beg's suicide in November 1929, Khalid Beg was made Minister for Irrigation and Agriculture under Naji Pasha Suwaida. A pleasant, honest and likeable man, but has no influence in politics. Appointed Director-General, Public Works Department, January 1932. Transferred to be Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in September 1934. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Tehran March 1935.

Retired in March 1939 and now lives on his pension.

50. *Khalid Zuhawi*.—Sunni. Born 1889. Entered Military College at Constantinople in 1903. Served in the Turkish army until 1924. Joined Iraq army and was appointed aide-de-camp to the late King Faisal I. Promoted to the Staff College, Caterley, in 1934 and on his return was made a brigadier and appointed Director of Military Operations. Became O.C., R.I.A.F., in 1936. Appointed Director of Army Administration in 1937. Placed on p. February 1939. Appointed Mutassarif of Kut in October 1939. After the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 became Mutassarif of Bagdad but was relieved of his appointment in June.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Kabul in November 1942.

51. *Khalid Ismail*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Born 1903. Graduate of Law College, Bagdad. Held various positions under the Ministry of the Interior 1923-32. Appointed Secretary to the Cabinet 1932. Director-General of Ministry of Interior 1935. Director-General of Education 1936. Pleasant, reasonable, speaks English well.

Appointed Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1937, but in October he was sent to be Mutassarif of Amarah.

Director-General of Ministry of the Interior September 1938.

Appointed Director-General of Awqaf in 1940. Appointed Director-General of Census in October 1941.

Appointed Director-General of Revenues in December 1942.

Director-General of Finance, August 1943.

52. *Khushaba, Malik*.—Assyrian chieftain of the Lower Turi tribe, a romantic record as fighter and leader. Supported the Iraqi Government in their efforts to settle the Assyrians satisfactorily in Iraq and thereby incurred the bitter enmity of Mar Shimun. Many of his followers were, however, quite innocently massacred in August 1933 in spite of their friendly attitude towards the Iraqi Government. He desires to leave Iraq, but does not wish to be resettled in the same place as Mar Shimun.

Since hope of moving all the Assyrians from Iraq has been abandoned, Malik Khushaba has settled down to a quiet life in his village.

53. *Mahmud Subhi Daftari*.—Sunni of Bagdad. Lawyer. Born 1890. Went with his father to Constantinople during the occupation and returned in 1919. Resigned immediately after his appointment. Became Director-General of Tapu December 1932 and Amin al Asimah October 1933. Transferred to the Ministry of the Interior as Director-General of Municipalities in November 1935. He soon quarrelled with Atchad al Umari, the Amin al Asimah, and resigned. He was made a Senator in October 1937.

Pleasant, well intentioned and noticeably more moderate in politics than in his earlier days.

Became Minister of Justice in Cabinet formed by Nuri al-Said in December 1938, but devoted more attention to his entertaining than to his official duties. Resigned February 1940 with whole Cabinet.

Made a Senator in 1940.

Made Minister of Foreign Affairs in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943, a post which he obviously enjoyed enormously. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in June 1944.

54. *Mahrut bin Hadhdhal Shukh*.—Chief of the Amarat, Anaiza (Arab) tribe of Iraq. He succeeded his father in 1927. Born about 1890. Intensely

proud, but wiser than he appears to be. He has endeavoured to maintain good relations with the Iraqi Government, though the Nationalist element in Baghdad regard him with some suspicion on account of his father's close friendship with the British. His tribal area is from the Euphrates southwards to the Nejd border.

He obtained a good contract for the supply of labour on the Haifa-Bagdad road in 1940. During Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941 he lost control of his tribe, parties of which attacked and looted some of the road camps.

His estate at Razza, near Kerbala has been expropriated for the Abu Dibbis reservoir and Mahrut has experienced great difficulty in obtaining compensation from the Government.

55. *Mahmud, Shaikh*—Of the family of Barzinja Sayyidis. He has inherited from his father and grandfather great tribal and religious influence throughout Southern Kurdistan. He was made Hukmdar of Suleimani in 1918, shortly after the British occupation. In June 1919 he revolted against British authority, was wounded and deported to Henjam Island in the Persian Gulf. He was reinstated as Hukmdar of Suleimani in 1922 after the Turks had forced the British political officers there to withdraw. In 1923 armed action had to be fought at a number of places between the British and the Kurds in the Kirkuk and Arbil Provinces. Suleimani was reoccupied in 1924, but Sheikh Mahmud was not brought to terms until 1927. These were that he was to abstain from politics and live outside Iraq in one of his Persian villages close to the border. His close Nationalist feeling in Suleimani again tempted him into the political arena. He was arrested in 1927 and sent to the prison at Baghdad. In 1928 he was released and he surrendered at Panjwin. He was granted an allowance and sent to live at Hilla. From there he was later removed to Ramadi, and in the summer of 1933 he was permitted to take a house in Baghdad. He receives an allowance of 900 rupiahs a month from the Iraqi Government. He has three sons, Rauf, Baba Ali and Latif. Rauf is quiet and industrious and is a student in the Law College. Elected Deputy for Suleimani in December 1933 and again in June 1935. He is the pet of his father, and will follow closely in his footsteps, if he has a chance to do so.

His properties in Suleimani were confiscated in 1931, but restored by special Act of Parliament in December 1938.

Towards the end of May 1941, during Rashid Ali's rebellion, Shaikh Mahmud, who was then in Baghdad, raised a tribal force to attack Suleimani with the object of restoring the British. When Rashid Ali's rebellion collapsed and most of the chieftains returned home, Shaikh Mahmud himself endeavoured to exploit the occasion to obtain concessions to the Kurds, but he was persuaded in the end to disperse his followers and to settle down in Darikella, one of his villages in Barzin. His youngest and favourite son, Latif, is restless and unreliable and a source of anxiety to the Mutesarrif of Suleimani.

56. *Majid Mustafa*—A Kurd of Suleimani, born about 1894. During the war of 1914-18 he was an officer in the Turkish army and for some time after the Armistice of Mudros held pro-Turkish views. He was an active supporter of Shaikh Mahmud 1924-26. When Shaikh Mahmud submitted to the Government Majid was made a Mudir in the Kut lwa. His administrative ability was soon apparent. In 1928 he became Qaimaqam of Nasiriyah, and in 1935 he was promoted to be Mutesarrif. Two years later he was posted to Amara where he remained until 1941.

His attitude in the Rashid Ali disturbances of 1941 was equivocal, but he seems on the whole to have favoured Rashid Ali's cause rather than that of the Regent. Rashid Ali did not however trust him and brought him in to the capital so that he could be watched. After the Regent's return to Baghdad at the beginning of June 1941 Majid took leave in Turkey.

He returned in September and was then suspended for four years on account of his compliance with the orders of the Rashid Ali Government.

Nevertheless, in December 1943 he joined Nuri Pasha's Cabinet as Minister without Portfolio, with the special task of finding some means to stop the fighting

with Mulla Mustafa in the Barzan area and of redressing Kurdish grievances. The Regent disliked his appointment and only reluctantly agreed to it.

Majid succeeded in bringing about a peaceful settlement with Mulla Mustafa in January 1944 and remained in the Cabinet, without Portfolio, but charged specially with advising the Government on Kurdish affairs.

Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

57. *Mar Shimun*—Eshai, Mar Shimun, Patriarch of the Assyrians (Catholics of the Church in the East).

Born about 1909. Succeeded to the patriarchate in 1920 when a child. Educated in England at a seminary in Canterbury. Since coming of age and assuming the authority of his position, Mar Shimun has actively fostered discontent among the Assyrians. Whatever his position as the head of a spiritual community, his temporal authority is not acknowledged by a large number of Assyrians, estimated at a maximum at 12,000. His aim has been to establish the whole community in a compact enclave under his own spiritual and temporal authority. He was the inspirer of the mutiny of the levies in 1932 and of the exodus to Syria in 1933. Deported by the Iraqi Government in the summer of 1933 he was given asylum in Syria where his father, Patriarch Mar Yohannan, joined him. In October 1933 he went to Geneva to protest to the League of Nations against the deportation of the Assyrians. He was elected a member of the League of Nations on the Iraqi army at Dairabun (Faiskhahur) in August 1933, and in November went to England to obtain support from friends and sympathisers there. On his deportation King Feisal granted him and his family a provisional allowance of £750 a year, subject to his correct behaviour. This allowance was stopped by King Ghazi in the summer of 1934 on account of the propaganda which Mar Shimun persistently carried on against Iraq.

While paying lip-service to the League of Nations and always ready to state that he was in favour of the Assyrians, he has proved himself to be a man who is not to be trusted. He has been a constant source of trouble to the British Government in Iraq.

Less suffering on a deserving people. During the year 1934 he was mostly in England, paying several visits to Geneva when Assyrian affairs were under discussion. He remained in Europe throughout 1935 and 1936, spending much time in London.

In 1939 he was granted British naturalisation and went to live in Cyprus. Since 1940 he has been living in the U.S.A.

58. *Maulud Mukhlis*—Sunni. Born about 1873. A fine soldier, he behaved with great gallantry with the Sharifian army and was badly wounded. His exploits do not lose in the telling. Served in Syria and was sent in 1920 to Dair, where the agreement between the British Government of Occupation and the Arab Government was reached under his auspices in April. A hot Nationalist, he continued to spread anti-British propaganda among the tribes until he was arrested in 1921. He was released in 1922 and returned to Baghdad in July 1921. He lost no time in joining the extreme Nationalist group. There was no post to offer him in the Iraqi army but he was given some land near Tikrit and settled down to cultivate it, with occasional visits to Baghdad and Mosul to take part in Nationalist activities. In May 1923 he was appointed Mutesarrif of Karbala, to deal with the Ulama. He is no administrator, but he kept things quiet at the time of the exodus of the *mujtahids*. An impulsive man, who allows his pan-Arab sentiment to rule his actions. He was bitterly hostile to the Cabinet formed by Hikmat Sulaiman in October 1937 after Bakr Sidqi's *coup d'état* and openly condemned the murder of Jafar Pasha. In February 1937 an attempt was made to assassinate him and three of Bakr Sidqi's aides-de-camp were suspected. Maulud then went to live in Syria but returned to Baghdad in 1938 and was elected a Senator in 1935.

He was elected president of the Chamber in December 1937.

Attended the Arab Parliamentary Conference on Palestine arranged by Alubha Pasha in Cairo in the summer of 1938.

Re-elected President of the Chamber November 1938 and again in June and November 1939. Was not re-elected in November 1941.

In recent years his drunkenness has increased and discredited him.

59. *Munafiq al Aloui*. Born about 1894. Belongs to a learned family of Baghdad. He is a graduate of the Sorbonne whence he returned to Baghdad in 1926. Was appointed a professor in the law school and afterwards in 1928

Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Two years later he quarrelled with the Minister, Abdullah Damluji, and withdrew to Beirut. In 1931 he accompanied Nuri Pasha to Mecca to negotiate the Iraq-Nejd "Bon-Voisinage" Agreement. In the autumn of 1932 he went again to Mecca, this time to take up a post as judicial adviser to King Abdul Aziz. He remained in Arabia for about a year and then returned to Baghdad. In May 1934 he was appointed first secretary in the Iraqi Legation in Tehran. Transferred to be consul at Beirut in May 1935. Appointed consul general at Bombay December 1936. Dismissed from the Foreign Service in November 1937.

Remained in Syria until January 1939 when he returned to Iraq. Returned to Baghdad in March 1939. Transferred to be consul general at Damascus June 1939.

Transferred to Istanbul as consul general in July 1941. Recalled in November. A heavy drinker, with unsavoury habits, he is not a good consular officer and is suspected of pro-Nazi sympathies.

He was dismissed in April 1943 for insubordination and in the early summer was seeking official employment in Saudi Arabia. In 1944 he was living in Turkey on an allowance supplied to him by Ibn Saud.

60. *Muhammad Ali Mahmud Sunni*. Born 1895. A lawyer who has served in the Ministry, Director General of Taxes and judge of the Court of Appeal. Elected to the Chamber as Deputy for Baghdad in 1935 and for Arbil in 1936. Has twice been elected Vice-President of the Chamber and held the post of Hikmat Sulaiman's reformed Cabinet in June 1937. He resigned in August 1937 with the whole Cabinet.

Elected Deputy for Arbil December 1937 but lost his seat in June 1939. Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Rashid Ali in April 1941. On the collapse of Rashid Ali's rebellion at the end of May 1941, he fled to Persia and was handed over by the Persian Government to the British military authorities in September 1941. Imprisoned at Aden and subsequently sent to Southern Rhodesia to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

61. *Muhammad Amin Zaki*.—A Kurd of Sulaimani. Born 1890. Well educated and speaks French, German and English. Formerly staff officer in Turkish army. Was made Minister for Communications and Works in November 1926, and subsequently held the portfolios of Education and Defence. Exerted little influence in the Cabinets in which he has held office. His policy is to try to bring the Arabs into the Government. Lost his seat in the Chamber in the general election of 1930. Again Minister for Economics and Communications July 1931. Resigned October 1932. Appointed Director General of Economics and Communications March 1933, but became unemployed when this post was abolished in September 1934. Became Minister for Economics and Communications in March 1935 in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet. Resigned when the Cabinet fell in October 1936.

Elected Deputy for Sulaimani in December 1937 and again in June 1939. Became Minister for Economics in March 1940 in Rashid Ali's third Cabinet. Resigned in July 1940 on account of severe illness.

Appointed Minister of Communications and Works in the Cabinet formed by Nuri al Said in October 1941. Resigned in February 1942 on account of ill health. Made a Senator December 1943.

62. *Muhammad Hassan Kubba*.—Shah of Baghdad. Born 1891. Belongs to the old family of Kubba. In 1920 was associated with the Nationalist activities of Ja'far Chalabi Abu Timman. In 1923 he entered the service of the Ministry of Justice. Served as a judge in many parts of the country and also held posts in the Ministry of Education. 1933. 1934. 1935. 1936. 1937. 1938. 1939. 1940. 1941. 1942. 1943. 1944. Retained this position in the Cabinet of Hamid al Pachachi which followed Nuri's resignation in June 1944.

63. *Muhammad Husain Kashif al Ghata (Said)*.—Shah Alim of Najaf. One of the few Arab Divines of importance.

Attended the Moslem Conference at Jerusalem in 1931 as Iraqi delegate. Visited Persia on a prolonged tour in the summer of 1933, and returned to Iraq in February 1934. In the spring of 1935 he took a prominent part in the tribal insurrections on the Euphrates, and gave his full support to the tribes which took up arms against Yasin Pasha's Government. He hoped to persuade them to make

a united front with the Ulama in an attempt to force on the Government a series of sectarian demands intended to secure for the Shi'ah community a greater share in the government of the country. He was only partially successful and, after the defeat of the tribes by the army, he wisely withdrew to silence in the shrines of Najaf.

Declared a jihad for Palestine in the summer of 1938.

In 1939 it was suspected that he had accepted money from the German Legation in Baghdad.

Issued a fatwa against the British during Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. His nephew, Ahmad Kashif-al-Ghata, actively supported Rashid Ali and was interned in August 1941 at Fao.

64. *Muhammad Ridha al Shabibi*.—Shah of Baghdad, born about 1889. Belongs to a well known family. Member of Constituent Assembly and Minister for Education in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Again given the portfolio of Education in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935. His reactionary views soon brought him into conflict with his colleagues and with some of the permanent officials of the Ministry of Education. He was dismissed in August 1937. He is president of the Baghdad branch of the Pen Club and has a considerable reputation as a writer. He was elected to the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943.

Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfa'i in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed to the Board of Education created in April 1943.

Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies in December 1943.

65. *Muhammad Sa'ib al Qazzaz*.—Baghdad Mechanic. Born about 1898. Has recently come into prominence as a labour leader and agitator. A professional demagogue, he always thrusts himself in the van of any bazaar trouble, and has been especially conspicuous in encouraging discontent among the labour employed by the foreign companies operating in Iraq. Played a leading part in using the boycott of the Baghdad Electric Light Company in 1938.

During the premiership of Yasin al Hashimi he was not allowed to agitate. He became the treasurer of the Popular Reform League which was organised by Kamil Chahrji with a left wing programme. His activities became so tiresome that in February 1937 he was sent to live in Hamadi, where he remained until December 1937 when he was released. Little has since been heard of him.

66. *Muhammad al Sadr, Sayid*.—Born about 1885. An influential Shi'ah cleric, and played a prominent part in the insurrection of 1920. He fled to Syria when the insurrection was put down, but returned with the Amir Faisal in June 1921. Took an active part in the anti mandate controversy of 1922, but after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1924 greatly modified his views. Appointed a Senator in 1925, and elected President of the Senate in 1929. He has subsequently been re-elected to this position at each new session until February 1937 when Ridha al Shabibi was elected instead. He was re-elected President of the Senate in December 1937 and again in December 1938, June 1939 and November 1939.

Re-elected President of the Senate in November 1941 and November 1942. A dignified and picturesque personality. Ceased to be President of the Senate in December 1943 on the election of Jamil al Madfa'i.

67. *Mulla Mustafa*.—Born about 1898. Brother of Ahmad of Barzan (q.v.). Was rendered with Shaikh Ahmad and was banished to Sulaimani. There he lived for ten years in poverty on a small allowance from the Government. In the autumn of 1943 he bolted back to Barzan and a few months later became involved in the rebellion. Mustafa successfully resisted the considerable forces of police and Iraqi troops sent against him.

In the beginning he was concerned only with his own position, but later on he began to put forward political demands and to pose as a champion of Kurdish nationalism. He won a good deal of Kurdish sympathy and support. In January 1944 a settlement was arranged whereby he was "pardoned" after

31

fought at Maysalun, where Feisal was defeated by the French. He then returned to Bagdad and for some years was employed as a teacher in the secondary schools. During this period he graduated at the Bagdad Law College. He later returned to the army and was given rank as a senior captain. In 1935 he attended army manoeuvres in England. On his return he was made Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College. After two years in this post he was promoted brigadier and appointed Assistant Chief of General Staff. He was placed on pension in 1939 and became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet formed by Jamil Madfai in June 1941 after the flight of Rashid Ali to Persia. He made a pleasant if colourless Minister and resigned with the whole Cabinet in early October 1941.

74. *Hayib al-Rawi*.—Born about 1896. Sunni of Bagdad. Brother of Ahmad al-Rawi. Married to a sister of Mune Hikmat Sulaiman. Has for many years practised successfully as a lawyer and in 1942 was elected President of the Law Society. In 1940 he was elected a member of the Council of the ex Mufti of Palestine (then a fugitive in Iraq) and with the Italian Minister He was careful, however, to avoid becoming involved in Rashid Ali's *coup d'Etat* in 1941.

Sleek and *mondain*, he is a prominent figure in upper class social life in Bagdad. Elected a Deputy in October 1943.

75. *Nasrat al-Furati*. Lawyer of Bagdad, born about 1890. In the early days of the Iraqi Government he held somewhat extreme Nationalist views, which he later moderated. He served in the Ministry of Justice, where he served diligently for a number of years.

Minister for Finance, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Beg Shaukat in March 1933. Appointed Minister for Finance in Jamil Beg Al Madfai's Cabinet in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934. Appointed Director General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1935. Appointed Iraqi delegate at Geneva in June 1937.

Steady and intelligent, but inclined to be obstructive.

Was relieved of this appointment in the summer of 1938 when it was decided to withdraw the Iraqi delegation from Geneva. He then returned to the Bar.

Appointed Minister of Economics in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfai in June 1941. Resigned with the rest of the Cabinet in October 1941.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in April 1943, but did not proceed.

He was a leading figure in the protest against the Regent's interference in the choice of Government candidates for election to Parliament.

76. *Nisbat al-Sanawi*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1893. Studied in the School of Law, Constantinople. He was in Bagdad before the occupation, went to Mosul with the Turks, and was employed in various capacities there. Returned after the armistice and took service under the British Administration. Was appointed Director of the Law School when it was reopened in 1919, criminal magistrate, February 1922, judge in the Court of Appeal, March 1923. Amin al-Azimah, Bagdad, 1925-30. Appointed Director General in the Ministry of the Interior in April 1931. Reappointed Director General in the Ministry of the Interior, November 1931. Appointed Administrative Inspector, November 1933. Became Director-General of Municipalities in June 1935.

Appointed Chief Finance Inspector, May 1936. Placed on pension about end of 1938.

77. *Nuri al-Said*.—Sunni of Bagdad, born 1898 son of an accountant of Mosul descent. Educated in Constantinople, speaks Turkish, German, French and English. Served in Balkan War. He was one of the founders of the Ahd in 1913, and came from Constantinople to Iraq in order to start branches there. He was in Basra at the time of the occupation as a patient in the American hospital, joined the Arab army in the Hejaz in June 1916, and commanded the troops till the arrival of Jafar Pasha (his brother in law); served as C.G.S. till the fall of Damascus. A good strategist very receptive of ideas, clever, hard working, energetic. Was awarded the D.S.O. 1917 and the C.M.G. 1919, and accompanied King Feisal from offering resistance to the French on the ground that he could not hope for support from the British. When the break came in July 1920 he went with Feisal to England. Returned to Bagdad in February 1921 and took

charge of the Ministry of Defence during the absence of Jafar Pasha at the Cairo Conference. On his return he became C.G.S. and Director General of Police, and held these appointments till October 1922. Acting Minister of Defence from November 1922 to November 1923. Held the same portfolio in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet. Minister of Defence again in November 1926, and retained that portfolio with only short intervals out of office until he became Prime Minister in March 1930. Negotiated and signed the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of June 1930. Visited Jeddah in 1931 to negotiate a "Bon-Voiamoge" Treaty with Nejd and the Hejaz. Resigned with the whole Cabinet the 18th October 1931, but reaccepted office on the same day in a reformed Cabinet. Visited Angora with King Feisal July 1931, and again in December-January 1931-32. During latter visit he signed with Turkish Government an Extradition Treaty, a Treaty of Commerce and a Residence Convention. Resigned premiership in October 1932. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1933, but did not proceed. Became Minister for Foreign Affairs in Cabinet of Rashid Ali Gilani in March 1933. Resigned in April 1933. Appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence under Jamil al Madfai in November 1933. Resigned in February 1934, but returned to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in August 1934 under Ali Jaudat's premiership. Resigned in March 1935. Returned to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Jamil al Madfai, and returned again to the Ministry in the Cabinet formed by Yasin Pasha in March 1935.

In October, after Bakr Sidqi's successful military revolt, Nuri Pasha, fearing for his life, fled to Egypt with his family, where he carried on a restless agitation from Cairo to secure his return to Iraq. He came back in October 1937 after the murder of Bakr Sidqi and the fall of Hikmat Sulaiman's Government. He was offered the post of Iraqi Minister in London, but did not accept it. In early December he went to Syria with the intention of working privately for a restoration of the monarchy.

But for two short visits to Bagdad, Nuri al Said spent the whole of the year 1939 outside Iraq occupied principally in desultory conversations about Palestine with politicians in Syria, Egypt and London. On each of his short visits to Bagdad his presence gave rise to rumours concerning his political intentions, but these died away as soon as he left.

In December 1938 he came back to stay and a few days later a military revolution overthrew Jamil al Madfai's Cabinet and brought Nuri al Said into office as Prime Minister. He represented Iraq at the opening of the London conversations about Palestine in January 1939.

Resigned the premiership in February 1940 but at the Regent's request reformed his Cabinet and continued in office until the end of March, when with his own collaboration a new Cabinet was formed by Rashid Ali.

Remained in office as Minister for Foreign Affairs until the end of January 1941, when he and several of his colleagues resigned because of their opposition to the Regent's policy. Nuri Said wisely withdrew to Transjordan, where he remained until he was able to return to Iraq. In February 1941 he was appointed Iraqi Minister in Cairo, but was recalled to form a Cabinet on the resignation of Jamil Madfai at the beginning of October 1941. From that time onwards he collaborated closely with His Majesty's Ambassador in eradicating pro-Nazi propaganda in Iraq and it was due to his initiative that Iraq declared war on the Axis Powers in January 1943.

In the summer of 1943 Nuri Pasha visited Egypt to discuss Arab unity with the Egyptian Prime Minister Nahas Pasha. He also went to Syria and Palestine for talks with Arabs there. He remained Prime Minister throughout 1943, but there were many changes in his Cabinet, and he formed his ninth Government on the 25th December, 1943.

Resigned in June 1944 with his whole Cabinet after an unedifying brawl in the Chamber between some of his supporters and the Opposition, which convinced him that he did not enjoy the Regent's confidence and support. In any case he was tired and needed a rest.

78. *Rashid Ali al-Gilani*.—Sunni of Bagdad born 1892. A distant relation of the Naqib. In Turkish times was a clerk in the Waqf Department. Fled to Mosul with the Turks on the capture of Bagdad and after the fall of Mosul practised as a lawyer. In May 1921 he was appointed a judge in the Court of

Appeal. His work as a judge won him the good opinion of his advisers. Was appointed Minister of Justice in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in 1924. Resigned over the signing of the Turkish Petroleum Company's Concession in March 1925, which, at Yasin Pasha's instigation he strongly opposed. Became Minister of Interior in the second Saduniyah Cabinet in June 1925, but resigned almost immediately on being elected President of the Chamber of Deputies. From November 1926 to January 1928 was Minister of the Interior. Re-elected to the Chamber of Deputies in the general election of 1930, but resigned his seat in March 1931 in company with Yasin-al Hashimi, Naji al-Suwaidi and Ali Jaudat, as a protest against the conduct of Nuri Pasha's Government. Became a

Brotherhood). He encouraged the general strike in July 1931, hoping thereby to embarrass Nuri Pasha's Cabinet. Appointed chief private secretary to the King in July 1932. Became Prime Minister in March 1933. Resigned October 1933. Appointed Senator in summer of 1934. Helped to organise the disturbances on the Euphrates which forced Ali Jaudat to resign in March 1935 and, as Minister for the Interior, joined the Cabinet then formed by Yasin-al Hashimi.

After the death of Nuri Pasha in October 1936 Rashid Ali fled to Constantinople. He came back in October 1937.

During 1938 he made several speeches in the Senate attacking the policy of Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet.

Deported to Anah December 1938. Returned a few days later when Nuri al-Said succeeded Jamil al-Madfa'i as Prime Minister. Appointed chief private secretary to the Palace in January 1939, and remained in this post after Nuri's death in April 1939. Became Prime Minister in March 1940.

Throughout 1940 he moved steadily towards a break with His Majesty's Government and a closer understanding with the Axis. He refused to break off diplomatic relations with Italy when Italy entered the war, but remained in the closest personal contact with the Italian Legation. He also gave full support to the Mufti's intrigues with the Axis Governments and sponsored the overtures which Naji Shawkat made to the German Minister at Angora in October 1940. In Iraq he gave free rein to the Palestinian agitators and to the pro-Nazi elements of the Press, even allowing it to be stated officially that the policy of his Government was one of strict neutrality in the war in spite of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of Alliance. Pressure from the summary forced his resignation at the end of January 1941, but he returned to office by means of a military coup d'état on the 1st April. He then set aside the Regent and installed Sharif Shari'at in his place. At this juncture, as part of their war plan, His Majesty's Government began to move troops into Iraq, but Rashid Ali, backed by the army, refused to agree to the presence of more than one brigade.

At the beginning of May the Iraqi army attempted to surround the British air base at Habbaniyah and hostilities broke out. Throughout the month Rashid Ali and his colleagues endeavoured to unite the country in a campaign against us, but, though the townspeople were with him, he received little support from the big tribes and fled to Persia after a comparatively small British column had defeated the far larger Iraqi forces opposed to them. From Persia he contrived to make his way to Turkey and in December, having broken his parole, he escaped to Germany and joined the Mufti in Berlin, where he became a feature of the Berlin Arabic broadcast. Tried in absentia by court martial and sentenced to death in January 1942.

Throughout the years 1942-44 he continued to conduct an active campaign against Great Britain from Berlin and Rome and was recognised by the Axis as the legitimate Prime Minister of Iraq.

79. *Rashid al-Khojeh*. Sunni of Baghdad. Born 1884. Staff officer in Turkish army. Came to Damascus after the armistice. Prominent member of the Ahd al-Iraqi. He returned to Baghdad in November 1920 and was appointed mutessarif in January 1921. He is weak and much under the thumb of the extreme National group. In February 1922 he was appointed mutessarif of Mosul, where he was completely under the influence of Mustafa Sabunji. As his presence in a frontier division was considered inexpedient by the Iraqi Government, he was

at Cairo October 1926, and Director General of Education January 1930. Consul-general, Beirut, August 1931. Chargé d'Affaires and consul-general at Jeddah, 1931.

Naji Shawkat, November 1932. Resigned with Naji Shawkat's Cabinet in March 1933. Elected President of the Chamber of Deputies November 1933 after resignation of Jamil al-Madfa'i. Reappointed Minister of Defence in February

1934, resigned with Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in August 1934. Re-elected President of the Chamber in December 1934. Again appointed Minister for Defence in Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in March 1935, but resigned with the whole Cabinet after being only twelve days in office. Elected to the Chamber in August 1935 and appointed private secretary in the Palace in September 1937.

Appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Nuri al-Said's Cabinet in January 1939.

Placed on pension in the autumn of 1941.

80. *Rauf al-Bakrasi*.—A Shiah of Baghdad, born about 1897. Graduated at the Baghdad Law School and was appointed to a clerical post in the Ministry of Finance, where he rose to be Accountant-General (not altogether by merit). Appointed Minister for Finance in Yasin Pasha's Cabinet in March 1935.

Resigned October 1936.

Appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise January 1938. Became Minister of Finance in February 1940 and of Social Affairs in March.

He was appointed Minister of Finance in January 1941 and joined Rashid Ali's rebel Government in April 1941. Fled to Tehran when British forces entered Iraq in May 1941. He was arrested by the British forces which occupied Persia in August. After a period of detention at Ahwaz he was sent to Southern Rhodesia in December 1941 to be interned. Sent back for trial in March 1944.

81. *Rauf al-Chadiri*.—Sunni of Baghdad. He was Mayor of Baghdad at the time of the cutting of New Street and earned a great deal of personal unpopularity thereby. Left for Berlin shortly before the occupation, and subsequently went to Switzerland, returning to Baghdad in the summer of 1920, up to which time

well. He set up practice as a barrister and consorted much with British officials. He took no part in the nationalist agitation, nevertheless, when he was deported to Constantinople in August, he was asked to return with him. He came back in 1921. He has most of the business of foreign firms in his hands owing to his knowledge of English. He was in England on a visit during the summer of 1923, returning home in September. A retiring man of modernist opinions. Deputy for Hillah in the Constituent Assembly in March 1924. He was strongly opposed to the passage of the treaty without amendments and voted against it. Chosen director of the law school August 1924. Minister of Finance, Second Saduniyah Cabinet, and afterwards became Minister of Justice in Jafar Pasha's Cabinet in November 1926. Iraqi Minister to Angora autumn 1929. Resigned post as Minister at Angora in December 1930, and returned to Baghdad as legal adviser to the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A well-known Member of the Iraqi Parliament since 1936 and proceeded to his post in 1937. Resigned in 1941 and returned to England where he has a well-paid post with the Iraq Petroleum Company.

A cultured, likeable and intelligent man.

82. *Rauf al-Kubani*.—Sunni, of Kulaisah origin. Born 1885. He was commandant of gendarmerie in Aleppo under Jafar Pasha in 1919 and did useful work in keeping order before the advent of the French in July 1920. Refused office under the French and returned to Baghdad in 1921. He was appointed Kaimakam of Suq in November 1921, but was removed in June. He then for a time joined the extreme Nationalist group in Baghdad. Appointed Director-General of Prisons in 1924 and subsequently played no part in politics. Appointed Mutessarif of Basra January 1930. Dismissed for incompetence April 1931. Appointed Director-General of Anqaf in summer of 1933, and Director-General of Census in November 1937.

Mutessarif of Baghdad November 1938 and Director-General of Anqaf April 1939. Resigned June 1940.

Reappointed Director-General of Anqaf in November 1941 by Nuri Said.

83. *Sabih Naji*.—Born 1892. Gazetted to the Turkish army in 1912. Joined Iraqi army 1921 and reached the rank of lieutenant colonel 1929. Passed a staff course in England, and for some time was Commandant of the Iraqi Staff College in Baghdad. Speaks English and French and some German. Appointed Director-General of Police in March 1931. Represented Iraq on the Syro-Iraq Frontier Committee in 1933. Visited Berlin in 1935.

Transferred to Geneva as Iraqi delegate to the League of Nations in November 1935.

He was appointed Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in December 1937, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

Made Minister for Defence in October 1938. Resigned with the whole Jamil al Madfal Cabinet the 25th December, 1938.

Tried by court martial in February 1940 for being an accessory to the murder of Rustam Hardar, Minister of Finance. Acquitted on this charge and sentenced to one year's imprisonment for having used insulting language when speaking of the Government at a semi public gathering. Was pardoned by the Regent after serving only a few weeks of his sentence.

Appointed Iraqi Minister at Angora in December 1941.

Relieved of his appointment in February 1943 and now seems to be living on his pension in Turkey.

84. *Salih Jabr*—Shi'ah lawyer of Najaf born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and remarks. Appointed Minister for Education in April 1933. Resigned November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Minister for Education in April 1935. Resigned successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in H. K. Mat Solaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Fuphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil al Madfal formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

Became Minister for Education in Cabinet formed by Nuri al Said in December 1938. Elected for Diwanayah June 1939. Minister for Social Affairs in February 1940. Resigned in March 1940.

Appointed Mutesarrif of Basra in June 1940. Supported the Regent when His Royal Highness fled to Basra in April 1941 to escape from Rashid Ali and the "Golden Square." For this he was arrested and narrowly escaped a heavy sentence. He was in the end released on condition that he left the country. He withdrew to Tehran and returned in June 1941 after the fall of Rashid Ali.

Appointed Minister of Interior and Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties. Did not come up to expectations, and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

He is married to a strong minded tribal woman of Hilla, who causes her husband much trouble by interfering in the tribal politics of Hilla Lawa. Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al-Pacharbi as Minister of Finance in June 1944.

85. *Said bin Ali*. Mir (chief) of the Yazidis. Lives at Badra near Mosul. Weak character, drinks heavily and indulges in every sort of vice. Much under the control of his mother, Maryana, who is a woman of personality and was at one time a noted beauty. The Yazidis are dissatisfied with Said Beg on account of his profligate living, and from time to time there is a movement to depose him and substitute another member of the ruling family. So far, however, traditional loyalty has been strong enough to keep Said in his position.

86. *Salah al Din Ali al Sabbagh*—Born about 1896. Educated at Istanbul and served in the Turkish army. He fought in the Mesopotamian campaign in the war 1914-18 and released to join the Amir Faisal's army. Gazetted second lieutenant in the Iraqi army 1921. Has done courses at Belgium and Sheerness and also attached to British units. Instructor at Baghdad Military College 1924. Appointed Director of Operations in the Ministry of Defence September 1937. Resigned March 1940. Reappointed officer, but has the reputation of being a careerist with ambition.

With Fahmi Said, Kamil Shabib and Mahmud Salzman he formed the group of officers known as the Golden Square, which dominated Iraqi politics in 1940 and, in company with Rashid Ali, brought about the coup d'Etat of the 1st April 1941. He fled to Tehran with Rashid Ali at the end of May 1941 and evaded arrest and disappeared when British forces entered Persia in August.

Turned up again in Turkey in February 1942 and was placed under strict police supervision by the Turkish authorities. The Iraqi Government's request for his extradition was refused.

87. *Salman al Barak*—Shi'ah and a tribal notable of Hilla. Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President. Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942. Reappointed to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

88. *Salman al Sheikh Daud*. Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

A lawyer with a large practice and a forceful personality. Given to women and drink, but a staunch supporter of democracy. He was the first person of note in Iraq who openly and independently attacked the Axis in speeches and press articles.

Elected a Deputy in October 1943 and was prominent in debates as a critic of Nuri Pasha's Government.

89. *Salih Jabr*—Shi'ah lawyer of Najaf born about 1890. Employed for some time as a judge. Elected Deputy February 1930 and resigned from the bench. Acquired notoriety in the Chamber as a persistent asker of questions and remarks. Appointed Minister for Education in April 1933. Resigned November 1933. Resigned February 1934. Elected Deputy for Muntafiq December 1934. Appointed Minister for Education in April 1935. Resigned successful. In October 1936 he accepted the portfolio of Justice in H. K. Mat Solaiman's Cabinet. Resigned in June over the Fuphrates disturbances and went away for several months. He returned when Jamil al Madfal formed a Cabinet and was appointed Director-General of Customs and Excise.

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Appointed Minister of Finance in October 1942 with the special task of finding solutions for the country's economic difficulties.

Did not come up to expectations, and in June 1943 he was returned to the Interior. Resigned from the Cabinet in October 1943.

He is married to a strong minded tribal woman of Hilla, who causes her husband much trouble by interfering in the tribal politics of Hilla Lawa.

Joined the Cabinet of Hamdi al-Pacharbi as Minister of Finance in June 1944.

90. *Sami Shaukat*. Born Bagdad 1893. Sunni. Brother of Naji Shaukat. Served in the Turkish army in the Mesopotamian campaign. Joined the Arab army in Syria in 1918. Appointed to Iraqi Health Service 1921 and subsequently served for several years as Director General of Education. Became Director General of Public Health in 1936. An ardent Arab Nationalist.

Appointed Director General of Education in March 1939. He has done much to increase military education in the secondary schools. Became the first Minister for Social Affairs in September 1939 and Minister for Education in February 1940. Resigned in March with whole Cabinet and was reappointed Director-General of Education in April 1940.

Retained his position throughout the disturbances of 1941 and survived subsequent changes. Is believed by many to have pro-German leanings, but he is a moderate. He was the first to be elected to the Chamber of Deputies in 1943.

Appointed Director-General of Social Affairs and Health in January 1943.

91. *Salman al Barak*—Shi'ah and a tribal notable of Hilla. Minister of Irrigation and Agriculture 1928-29. Has been in the Chamber of Deputies for many years and has frequently held position of Vice-President. Appointed Minister of Economics in November 1942. Reappointed to the Cabinet as Minister of Economics at the end of the same month. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in June 1944.

92. *Salman al Sheikh Daud*. Sunni. Born Bagdad about 1900. Son of Sheikh Ahmad al-Sheikh Daud (q.v.).

At first he seems to have done well and kept in close touch with His Majesty's Legation. Later on, however, he seems to have yielded to the blandishments and bribes of the German Legation and, as *chargé d'affaires* during April and May 1941, he dutifully carried out instructions sent to him by Rashid Ali's Government. Duud Haidari, who was appointed minister at Teheran in June 1941, was asked to keep a close watch on Shakir.

Appointed consul at Jerusalem in November 1941.

92 *Sufuq al Ajil*.—Of the Shammar Jarba tribe. Born about 1910. Educated Beirut University. Once spoke English well, but is forgetting it. Eldest son of Sheikh Ajil al-Yawar, who became paramount sheikh of the Shammar in Iraq in the early nineteen twenties and died in November 1940. Ajil acquired much money from his relations with the B.O.D. Company and from supplying labour to the railways when the line was extended from Bagdad to Mosul. Sufuq inherited this wealth.

Sufuq's younger brother, Ahmed (born about 1923), is said to have the stronger character and may become influential when he grows a little older.

During the autumn of 1941 some of Sufuq's cousins, led by Mishan al Faisal, showed dissatisfaction with Sufuq's leadership, but the quarrel was patched up and the family now accept Sufuq's leadership.

In 1942 he obtained a number of contracts from the British military authorities which increased undeniably Shammar influence. Steps were therefore taken to curtail the number of contracts assigned to him and to check Shammar arrogance. By the middle of 1943 the situation had improved and Sufuq and his subordinate tribal leaders had become more amenable.

In early 1944 he had a serious quarrel with his younger brother Ahmed about the division of their inheritance from their father Ajil. A settlement was made in May, but its terms were so ambiguous that it is not likely to endure for long.

93 *Tahsin al Askari*.—Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces in 1920. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became *Katib* of Samarra in 1927 and *Mutesarrif* of Kirkuk in 1930. A year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Tahir al Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed Councillor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became Minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

He is devoted to the Pan Arab cause but at the same time well disposed towards Great Britain and the Anglo-Iraqi Alliance.

Transferred to the Ministry of Communications and Works in June 1943 and acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in November 1943. He resigned with the whole Cabinet in December 1943, and was appointed Minister at Cairo.

94 *Taha al Hashimi*.—Brother of the late Yasin al Hashimi. Born 1884. Served in Turkish army and was employed in Arabia and the Yemen during the war. Was given a post on the Turkish General Staff in Constantinople in 1920. Returned to Iraq in 1922. Appointed Chief of the General Staff and came to Bagdad in 1923. Was attached to Sir Percy Cox in May 1924 for the boundary negotiations with the Turkish Government which followed the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne. Shortly after his return in August 1924, and for a while he acted as tutor to the Crown Prince. Appointed Minister of the Interior in 1926 and Director of Education in 1928. In 1930 he returned as Chief of the General Staff. In 1931 he visited the Imam Yahya of the Yemen and concluded a treaty of friendship between the Yemen and Iraq.

In September 1935 he was appointed Acting Director-General of Education in addition to his other duties.

He was in Angora in October 1936 when Hikmat Sulaiman and Bakr Sidqi forced Yasin al Hashimi to resign and wisely did not return to Iraq. He came back in September 1937 and was offered the post of Director-General of Works. He refused this offer on the ground that it was beneath his dignity to accept any position lower than that of Chief of the General Staff.

Elected Deputy for Bagdad in December 1937. Opposed Jamil al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in the Chamber. Worked actively on the committee of the Palestine Defence League in 1938. On the 25th December, 1938, in collaboration with General Husain Fauzi, he organised a military demonstration against Jamil al-Madfa'i's Government, and became Minister for Defence in the Cabinet which Nuri al-Said formed when Jamil al-Madfa'i resigned. Became a Deputy for Bagdad in the Chamber of Deputies in January 1940. Resigned in January 1941 with most of the members of Rashid Ali's Cabinet and on the 1st February succeeded the latter as Prime Minister. On assuming office he feebly attempted to break the power of the military clique which during 1940 had been the dominant force in the Government. They defied him and overthrew him and his Cabinet after it had enjoyed office for only two months. Taha Pasha thereupon went to Turkey, where he remained throughout Rashid Ali's rebel regime. When the Regent had been restored Taha Pasha wished to return to Iraq but Nuri Said (the Prime Minister) did not want him back and it was arranged that a transit visa through Syria should be refused.

He was still in Turkey in May 1944.

95 *Tahsin al Askari*.—Sunni. Born 1892. Fought with the Arab forces in 1920. Returned to Iraq at the end of 1920 and was appointed to the police with the rank of commandant. Became *Katib* of Samarra in 1927 and *Mutesarrif* of Kirkuk in 1930. A year later he was transferred to Mosul, where he remained until 1935 when he became Director-General of Irrigation. When his brother Tahir al Askari was murdered by officers of Bakr Sidqi's staff at the time of the latter's *coup d'état* in October 1936 he left the country on three months' leave with Jafar's widow and later resumed his post at Irrigation. In May 1940 he was appointed Councillor in the Iraqi Legation in Cairo and became Minister in October 1941. In October 1942 he was recalled by his brother-in-law Nuri Said to become Minister of the Interior.

Not particularly clever, and apt to be pig headed. In Mosul he was too much under local influence and showed a strong prejudice against the Yazidis. He was slow to take action against Nazi sympathisers and favoured a policy of "appeasement". Appointed Minister of Education in the Cabinet formed by Nuri Said in October 1941.

Transferred to the Palace as *Rais* of the Royal Diwan in June 1943. Became Minister of Defence in the Cabinet of Ruzbihan Pasha in June 1944.

96 *Tahsin Qadri*.—Sunni of Damascus. Born 1893. Was with Faisal in Bagdad in June 1921, and was appointed an A.D.C. to the King in August. Married the daughter and heiress of Abdul Wahhab Pasha Qartas of Basra. Accompanied King Faisal on his State visit to England in 1933 and received the K.C.V.O.

In June 1936 he was compelled to resign from the palace on account of the scandal of the marriage of Princess Azzah. He was later appointed *conseiller* to the King. Appointed consul-general at Bombay in December 1937. Speaks English and French. Pleasant and clever.

In May 1941, like all Iraqi consuls, he seems to have carried out his orders from Rashid Ali without protest and his behaviour was strongly criticised by the British Government.

In September 1943 he was appointed *Chargé d'affaires* at Damascus, when the Iraqi Government recognised the new Syrian Government. On the 27th January, 1944, he was accredited as first Iraqi Minister to Syria and the Lebanon to reside at Beirut.

97 *Talib Mushraq*.—Sunni of Bagdad born 1900. Father was minor official. Took part in the anti-mandate agitation of 1922 and in the spring of 1923 was one of those responsible for anti-British posters issued over the signature of the Supreme Committee of Iraqi Secret Societies. Appointed Inspector of Schools in 1924 and held a variety of appointments under the Ministry of Education.

November 1934, when he was appointed first secretary to the Iraqi Legation at Vienna. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in November 1935. Appointed consul-general at Beirut in August 1937.

Withdrawn and dismissed from the service in February 1938. He remained for a time in Syria, but returned to Bagdad when Nuri-al-Said formed a Cabinet in December 1938. Appointed Accountant-General in January 1939 and Director-General of Propaganda, Publicity and Broadcasting in May 1939. Became consul-general in Jerusalem May 1940.

During May 1941 he carried on an anti-British propaganda campaign and zealously supported Rashid Ali's rebel Government. He was recalled in June and subsequently interned.

98. *Taufiq al-Suwaidi*.—Born 1889. Studied law in Bagdad and Constantinople and international law in Paris. In 1913 became first interpreter to the Ministry of Education, Constantinople. Represented Iraq at the Arab Conference held in Paris in July 1919. After the armistice went to Syria and was appointed judge in Damascus. Returned to Bagdad in October 1921 and in November was appointed Assistant Government Counsellor and Director of the Law School. Minister for Education January 1928. Prime Minister 1929. President of the Council of Ministers March 1931. Joined Taha al-Madfa'i's Ministry in 1934. Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1935. Minister for Education in 1936. Minister for Foreign Affairs in 1937. Appointed Ambassador to the League of Nations in September. There he handled the Assyrian and Palestinian questions with tact and moderation.

Again represented Iraq at the League of Nations in the autumn of 1939, and afterwards visited London as the guest of His Majesty's Government. There he had conversations with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and with the Secretary of State for the Colonies about Palestine.

Resigned with the whole of Taha al-Madfa'i's Cabinet on the 25th December 1939, as the result of a military demonstration made against them. Represented Iraq at the League of Nations in 1940 after Nuri al-Said had returned to Iraq.

Joined Taha al-Madfa'i's Cabinet in February 1941 as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He had established a stranglehold over the Government. Was forced out of office by Rashid Ali's rebellion in May 1941. He took no part in the events of May and would have been asked to join Nuri Pasha's Cabinet in October 1941 if the fact that his brother Najib had been summoned to stand his trial for treason had not made it difficult to include him.

He is aggrieved that he has not been appointed to the Senate and blames Nuri al-Said for this. Nevertheless, an attempt was made to get him into the Cabinet in 1942, but was unsuccessful owing to the exaggerated conditions he sought to make.

In the summer of 1943 he reached an understanding with Ibrahim Kemal to co-operate in political matters. But by the end of the year he was reconciled to Nuri and joined the latter's 9th Cabinet as Deputy Prime Minister in December 1943. He was violently attacked both in Parliament and outside, and the efficiency of his office was called in question. Resigned in March 1944, when a High Court was appointed to consider the constitutional validity of the appointment of a Deputy Prime Minister.

99. *Taufiq Wahbi Maronfi*.—Kurd, born Sulaimania 1897. Educated in Sulaimania and Turkey. Graduated from Turkish Military College in 1904, and thereafter served in many military stations in European Turkey. During the war 1914-18 he held a regimental command, and later a staff appointment with the 13th Corps, commanded by General Ali Ihsan Pasha.

After the war he returned to Iraq, and entered the Iraqi army. He was appointed Military Adviser and Staff Officer to Shaikh Mahmud in Sulaimania in 1923. He returned to Bagdad and re-entered the army, and with the rank of Colonel became Commandant of the Military College, Bagdad. In 1929 he was sent on a course to the United Kingdom.

In April 1930 he was appointed as Mutesarrif of Sulaimania, but lasted only until July, when as the result of election troubles he was removed.

For several years he remained unemployed, but ultimately obtained appointment to the post of Director General of Surveys. After the conclusion of the operations against Rashid Ali, Taufiq Wahbi resigned from Government service, took pension and made a comfortable fortune as a contractor for the British forces.

In June 1944 he was appointed Minister of Economics in Humdi Pacha's Cabinet.

Taufiq Wahbi is keenly interested in Kurdish culture, and has devoted much time to modernising the Kurdish language. He has given valuable help to the Public Relations Department in the production of propaganda in Kurdish.

100. *Thabit Abdul Nur*.—Born 1890. Son of Aziz Abdul Nur a prominent Jacobite Christian of Mosul. He was christened Nikola. Was an officer in the Turkish army, embezzled money and fled to Syria to join Shereefian cause. At this time he changed his name to Thabit, became a Moslem and performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Came to Bagdad in November 1921 and became prominent in extreme Nationalist politics. Elected Deputy for Mosul in general election of 1930, and appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1931. The post was abolished in March 1933. Tried in 1932 for misappropriating the funds of the Agricultural Exhibition (April 1932), but acquitted.

Appointed counsellor in the Iraqi Legation in London December 1933. This post was abolished in July 1934. Appointed Director of Oil Affairs in the Ministry of Economics and Communications in June 1935. His post was abolished in November 1936, and he remained without employment until December 1937, when he was appointed to the Iraqi Diplomatic Service.

Early in 1938 he was appointed to a post in the Iraqi Diplomatic Service in the Sudan, but he was given no authority by the Iraqi Government. The Saudi Government soon detected the folly of his schemes and gave up taking him seriously. In December 1938 and January 1939 he was in Sanaa visiting the King of the Yemen.

He was on leave in Germany on the outbreak of war in September 1939 and remained there rather than return to Iraq. It is alleged that he helped in the preparation of Arabic broadcasts from Berlin.

101. *Tamim Nuri*.—Born 1893. Graduated at the Bagdad Law School in 1913. Appointed Judge Khairi in 1913. Bagdad 1914. In 1915 he joined the Reserve Officers' School and was promoted to the rank of Captain. Appointed Judge in the Courts of Mosul 1921. Appointed Judge in the Courts of Mosul 1923. Appointed Judge in the Courts of Mosul 1924. Appointed Judge in the Courts of Mosul 1925. President, Civil Courts, Diala, Mutesarrif of Kirkuk 1927. Mutesarrif of Kut and Basra 1928. Administrative Inspector 1931. Mutesarrif of Mosul 1934.

Held other Government posts up to August 1937, when he was made to be Director General of Revenues. Became a Minister of Economics and Communications in December 1938 in the Cabinet of Nuri al-Said.

Made a Senator April 1939. Minister of Interior in September 1939 and Acting Minister of Justice in February 1940. Joined Rashid Ali's Cabinet in March 1940 as Minister of Communications and Works.

Resigned in January 1941 with most of his colleagues as protest against Rashid Ali's pro-Axis policy.

Since November 1941 he has been an active member of committees in the Senate.

Appointed Minister of the Interior in Nuri Said's Cabinet in December 1943. Resigned with the whole of Nuri Said's Cabinet in June 1944.

102. *Yusuf Bahri*.—Born about 1904. Of the Juhur tribe of Mosul. From his early days he has been well known for his unprincipled character and immoral private life. From 1923 to 1926 he held minor clerical posts in Government offices. In June 1926 he went on a journey round the world and was repatriated destitute from Paris after having served a term of imprisonment for a fraudulent scheme. Between 1929 and 1933 he travelled in Arab countries, visiting Tripoli, Tunis and the Hadhramaut, and also Java, India, Afghanistan and Iran. On his return to Iraq he took up journalism and gave his support to extreme

nationalism. He also published a newspaper called *Al Uqab*. He was subsidised in 1936 by the German Legation in Berlin. In April 1939 he went to Berlin and soon afterwards became the announcer of the Berlin Arabic broadcast.

In this position he has been very successful, and his broadcasts were a powerful instrument of German propaganda.

In the spring of 1942 he "went off the air" and it is rumoured that he was put into an internment camp in Germany.

Broadcast from Berlin in connexion with the Lebanese crisis of November 1943.

103. *Yusuf Ghanimah*—An intelligent and hardworking Chaldean Catholic of Bagdad, born about 1890. Diminutive and unimpressive, he mixes freely with Moslems and was made Minister for Finance in January 1928, after having shown industry and ability as *rapporteur* of the Finance Committee of the Chamber in the general election of 1930, and then began to take part in the nationalist parties, the *Hizb al Watan* (Nationalist party) and the *Hizb al Istiqlal* (Independence party). He was made Director-General of Revenue in the Ministry of Finance, December 1932, and Director General of the Ministry in 1933. Became Minister for Finance in Ali Jaudat's Cabinet in August 1934. Resigned with the whole Cabinet in February 1935. Appointed Director-General of Finance in June 1935.

Appointed general manager of the Agricultural Industrial Bank in December 1936.

Was made Director-General of Antiquities in November 1941.

104. *Yusuf Is al Din*.—Sunni. Son of Ibrahim Pasha, a Kurd of Sir. Born Bagdad 1891. Married to the daughter of Ali Agha of Sulaimani. Owns property in Bagdad, Amara and Sulaimani. Educated locally and entered the civil service in 1918. Graduated at the Law School in 1927. Became a finance inspector in 1928 and was promoted Assistant Director-General of Finance in 1930. Became Director-General of Land Settlement June 1934, Accountant-General June 1935. Appointed Minister of Education in Hikmat Sulaiman's Cabinet in October 1936. He resigned in July 1937 because of his dissatisfaction with the Prime Minister.

Obituary since last Report

Abdul Ghafur Badri

Faris Agha

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE.

E 663 95 31]

No. 5

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 30th January)

(N 478)
(Telegraphic)

Washington 30th January, 1944

ON 27th January there were put before the House of Representatives two resolutions proposing that the good offices of the United States should be used, and that appropriate measures should be taken, with the object of ensuring for the Jews unlimited entry into Palestine to the end that a "free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth" might be established there.

2. It is stated by the Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs that the resolution will be debated on 1st February. Then it is likely that the resolution will be debated in the House and that it will be adopted without much opposition.

3. On 28th January, Sir R. Campbell's attention was called to the resolution by Mr. Berle, who informed him that any expression of views which we might like to make about the manner in which this development might be handled would be welcomed by the State Department. On Monday I went to tell him that if the State Department wish to say anything, they might point out that the White Paper provides for the continuation of Jewish immigration if the Arabs agree, but that it is not for us to express any opinion on any action which the United States Congress may decide to take. Would Congress be prepared to use force if they consider that the position should be changed? Immigration should continue against the wishes of the majority of the Arabs.

4. If as is possible, these ideas are put into the minds of some members of the Foreign Affairs Committee by the State Department, the result may be to arouse doubts in the minds of the committee. This however, is election year and it must be remembered that there is no Arab vote in America.

E 1423 95 31]

No. 6

Viscount Halifax to Mr. Eden.—(Received 5th March)

(No. 1117)

Washington 5th March, 1944

(Telegraphic)

MY telegram No. 1030

I hear that the Zionists themselves are now in favour of shelving of the War resolution. McCloy said on the 2nd March that War Department are continuing to do their best to ensure that it does not emerge from the Congress. The impression on Capitol Hill is that most members of Congress and particularly the Republicans are not prepared to support it. It is to be seen whether some irresponsible congressmen will not introduce another resolution of a similar nature.

2. It is too early to say whether reactions from Arab countries will prove helpful or will revive otherwise flagging interest. I have lately been putting into the heads of a few key people the idea that Arab hostility to Zionism is hardly compatible with United States oil interest in the Middle East. The fact that a message has been received from Ibn Saud (though this has not been published so far as I know) reinforces this argument. The press has begun to use this argument, and it may prove to be one of the most helpful.

E 1890 95 31]

No. 7

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden. (Received 10th March)

No. 1208.)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 9th March, 1944.

(NIIID Press report of 2 p.m. to-day states that Wise and Silver, Co-chairmen of American Zionist Emergency Council made following statement after conference with the President—

"President has authorized us to say that American Government has never given its approval to White Paper of 1939. President is happy that doors of Palestine are to-day open to Jewish refugees, and that when future negotiations are reached, full justice will be done to those who seek a Jewish national home, for which our Government and American people have always had deepest sympathy and to-day more than ever in view of tragic plight of hundreds of thousands of homeless Jewish refugees."

E 1761 95 31†

No. 8

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden. (Received 20th March)

No. 1381.)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 19th March 1944

NY telegram No. 1315

Foreign Affairs Committee of the House voted on 17th March to defer action on Palestine Resolutions 418 and 419. This action followed testimony by McCloy and receipt of letter from the Secretary for War, which concluded "without reference to the merits of these resolutions, further action on this at this time would prejudice the successful prosecution of the war."

2. Representative Compton (Republican, Connecticut) and Wright (Democrat, New York) said the Committee's decision. Representative Sol Bloom (Democrat, New York) said he had voted against tabling the resolutions. There was a suggestion of introducing a watered down resolution omitting reference to a Jewish Commonwealth, and concentrating on the immigration question but the War Department believes that he has averted even that.

E 2670 95 31]

No. 9

Viscount Halifax to Mr Eden. (Received 2nd May)

(No. 344.)

Sir,

Washington, 8th April, 1944

IN my telegram No. 1381 of the 18th March I had the honour to report that the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives had on the previous day voted to defer action on Palestine Resolutions 418 and 419, (texts enclosed). Although these two specific resolutions may therefore be dead, the issue which inspired them, namely, the Zionist agitation over the future status of Palestine, remains. It may therefore be useful if I trace briefly the recent course of events in Congress.

2. House Resolutions 418 and 419 are defined as "urging the use of American good offices to the end that the doors of Palestine should be opened and that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth." The resolutions were originally introduced in the Senate by Senators Taft (Republican, of Ohio) and Wagner (Democrat, of New York), and in the House by Representatives Compton (Republican, of Connecticut) and Wright (Democrat, of Pennsylvania). Hearings took place in the House on the 9th and the 15th February, accounts of these hearings are contained in the second and third appendices to this despatch⁽¹⁾, which show that the resolutions were passed by a large majority. At the time of the passage of the resolutions provoking Arab disturbances was raised. The opposition case was finally beaten down by the energetic testimony of Rabbis Heller, Silver, Goldstein and Wolf Gold. The hearing on the 15th February (see Appendix 3⁽¹⁾) followed

⁽¹⁾ Not printed

more or less the course of the previous hearing, the ablest exponent of the opposition case, Emanuel Neumann, had the last word and demolished fairly completely the structure raised by the opposition. The main outcome of the hearings was the immense embarrassment of the chairman, Mr Sol Bloom, who throughout has been torn between the desire on the one hand to placate his many Jewish supporters and on the other to see the resolutions passed. Mr Bloom finds himself in the awkward position of a man trying to sit on the fence with both ears to the ground.

3. At this stage in the proceedings the Arab world began to raise its voice in protest (stimulated to some extent, I am informed, by the Military Attaché at the Iraqi Legation here). The President of the Iraqi Senate cabled to Senator Wagner, protesting against the resolution, he was joined in a second effort being considerably more violent in tone than the first one. The Syrian Foreign Office then joined issue and presented on the 24th February to the United States Consul at Damascus a note enclosing copies of telegrams despatched the day before by the Speaker and Chairman of the Syrian Foreign Affairs Committee to their counterparts in the Congress of the United States, protesting against the resolutions. The Egyptian Government was not slow to enter the fray and their example was rapidly followed by the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan and by the Arab National Bloc in Palestine. Finally, King Ibn Saud is believed to have made a contribution, though the form and contents of his intervention have not been divulged.

4. This series of Arab outbursts provoked mixed emotions in the United States. On the one hand the Zionist element in Congress indignantly protested against what Representative Compton chose to describe as "presumptuous dictation from foreign legislators"; in this he was supported by Senator Wagner's Olympian but in this context faintly humorous, dictum that "Congress for over a century has decided questions on its own without interference from foreign countries." On the other hand the more serious elements were given seriously to think by the prospect of disturbances in the Near East, for which responsibility might rest with the United States Congress. At the same time it became obvious that the Administration viewed without enthusiasm the prospect of the passage of the resolutions, on the 29th February the columnist, Constantine Brown, usually looked upon as a State Department mouthpiece, wrote an article in the *Washington Star* deploring the resolutions in particular and the irresponsible, unrestrained Zionist pressure in general. In the meantime, the fact that Mr Bloom was still in the chair, and that the Administration would come to his aid, rumours were gaining currency of the opposition of the War Department, most members of the committee were tired of the whole performance and, although too frightened to say so publicly in an election year, were secretly hoping that the War Department would kill the whole issue. Some members were also anxious that a particular settlement of the Palestine problem, might easily open the way for the various minority national groups to begin putting pressure on Congress in favour of their own specific solution of problems affecting their mother-countries. (This pressure from minority groups has increased in the last few weeks, and many Congressmen are distinctly worried over the possibility that it may considerably complicate matters for them in the coming elections.) Supporters of the resolutions, such as Representatives Wright (Democrat, of Pennsylvania), Rogers (Democrat, of California) and Celler (Democrat, of New York), felt that Mr Bloom's dilatory and unenthusiastic performance was the main cause for the failure of the resolutions to pass.

5. Protests continued to come in from the Arab world, acts of violence took place in Palestine, and the more serious elements even amongst the Zionists themselves began to feel that this was no time for resolutions of this nature. As I had the honour to inform you in my telegram No. 1117 of the 4th March, Mr McCloy, the Assistant Secretary for War, told me at that time that the War Department were doing their best to ensure that the resolutions should not emerge from committee. At the same time the impression was gaining ground in circles connected with petroleum interests that the unrest which the resolutions might well produce in the Arab world would not be conducive to the successful outcome of the Near Eastern oil projects then on foot. King Ibn Saud's reported protest was particularly significant in this respect.

6. On the 4th March the *New York Times* published a despatch headed, "Marshall Opposes Vote on Palestine," reporting that the Chief of Staff had

urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to postpone action on the resolutions for reasons of military expediency. The general's testimony was given at a closed meeting of the committee and further details were not available. The tone of the press on the next day was one of general expectation of indefinite postponement. Protests against this "administration interference" naturally followed, but the forces opposing the resolutions were gaining ground. The President at his conference on the 3rd March had declined to comment. Mr. Stettinius on the same day had confirmed the receipt by the State Department of protests from four Arab Governments, although he had not committed himself on them. Meanwhile, the German Ministry of Propaganda was enjoying itself over this "clash between Islamism and Americanism," and numerous rumours were set on foot to the effect that Great Britain had inspired the Arab protests. Although the hearings appeared to be suspended, the resolutions still provoked frequent comment in both Houses, on the 7th March Representative Compton (Republican, of Connecticut) made a brief statement protesting against "dictation to Congress by a few wealthy Arabs under British domination." This was the general tone of the protests, which included one of considerable length lodged on the 14th March by Representative Dickstein (Democrat, of New York).

7. Zionist protests had already lost a considerable amount of their appeal when on the 8th March the widely detested, but no less widely-read, columnist, How Pearson, asserted that the deferment of the Palestine resolutions was a result of Anglo-Arabic intrigues. The allegation of British pressure on the protesting Arabs was strongly rebutted by various organs of the Arab press and, as indicated above, the Zionists themselves were already getting cold feet. On the 14th March Representative Hamilton Fish (Republican, of New York) put forward a compromise suggestion, supported by Representative Celler, proposing that the word "Commonwealth" should be omitted from the resolution. On the 17th March, as reported in my telegram No. 1381, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House voted to defer action on the resolutions. Representatives Compton and Wright expressed strong disapproval and recorded their disappointment at the decision of the committee. Mr. Bloom, however, admitted to the press that he had voted against reporting the resolutions out of his committee. Even the modified form suggested on the 14th March had also apparently been indefinitely put on the shelf.

8. So far as Congressional action is concerned the resolutions may well be dead. The Zionists, however, do not intend to accept this state of affairs and are going to do everything within their power to revive the corpse, on the 22nd March the Interim Committee of the American Jewish Conference met in New York and adopted a resolution expressing the hope that the military authorities "will soon find it possible, consistent with the reality of the situation, to withdraw their objection so that Congress may proceed to express itself."

9. The President himself gave the Zionists a new lease of life when (as reported in my telegram No. 1203) he received Drs. Wise and Silver on the 12th March and authorized them to quote him as saying that "the American Government has never given its approval to the White Paper of 1939"; not only the Zionists but practically all American Jewry welcomed this unexpected windfall, which they interpreted as meaning that the President was on their side and had not inspired the War Department pressure which had led to the shelving of the resolutions. This manoeuvre by the President, possibly not unconnected with the failure of the New York State Primaries, has undone much of the good achieved by General Marshall's testimony and, by exposing so obvious a rift in the ranks of the Administration, has effectively revived an issue which we had begun to hope was dead. The enclosed copy of an article(*) written by I. F. Stone in *The Nation* of the 18th March will show you the sort of comment which this remarkable demonstration of Presidential subtlety has produced.

10. The State Department has been considerably embarrassed by the President's statement. At his conference with members of the Senate Foreign Relations Commission on the 22nd March Mr. Hull, I am reliably informed, was asked by Senator Vandenberg how Congress could comply with his request for collaboration with the Administration if the latter was divided within itself as shown by the contrast between, on the one hand, General Marshall's testimony on the military inadvisability of discussing at this juncture the question of immigration into Palestine and, on the other hand, the direct encouragement to

do just that thing given by the President on the 9th March to Drs. Wise and Silver. I have seen the following effect: "In all the twenty years that I have known you it is the first time you have asked me a deliberately painful personal question. A member of the State Department would not be expected to answer it. It is that the Palestine question would be all right 'if only we can keep Wise and Silver out of the White House'."

11. Since the foregoing paragraphs were drafted I have seen in this President's not very convincing explanation of his statement and of the speeches of the State Department, in the same paper

I have &
(For the Ambassador).
R. I. CAMPBELL.

Enclosure in No. 9

78TH CONGRESS, 2D SESSION H. RES. 418

In the House of Representatives, 27th January, 1944

Mr. Wright submitted the following resolution which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

Resolution

Whereas the Sixty-seventh Congress of the United States on the 30th June, 1922, unanimously resolved "that the United States of America favors the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people"; and whereas the Jewish people have been persecuted in many places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine

Whereas the ruthless persecution of the Jewish people in Europe has clearly shown that the Jewish people are in need of a national home in which they who have become homeless as a result of this persecution. Therefore be it

Resolved, That the United States shall use its good offices and take appropriate measures to the end that the doors of Palestine shall be opened to the Jewish people for colonization so that the Jewish people may ultimately reconstitute Palestine

(*) Not printed

140

(No. 118)

Tel Aviv, 14th March, 1944

2. The list has been compiled by Mr. Trott, oriental secretary, from the material accumulated since his return to Persia at the end of 1940. Since the departure of Reza Shah, in September 1941 the available material has greatly increased, both owing to the greater number of consular and other officials in the country who have been able to render reports, and owing to the lifting of the restrictions on intercourse with foreigners which was one of the most tiresome features of the regime of Reza Shah. I regret that the compilation of this record has been so greatly delayed - the delay has been due not only to the great increase in the available material but to the continual demands on the oriental secretary's time which have made it difficult for him to devote much time to

to see him, and to record all available detail about them in a series of files which will remain on record for his successor. To include them all would have swollen the Perennation List to unwieldy dimensions. He has, therefore, only included the most important in this list. It comprises 230 persons in all, three of the old names have been omitted as the persons concerned seemed of little or no importance; and twenty-seven of those on previous lists have died. Forty-six new names, including a fair number of promising members of the younger generation, have been added.

4. I am sending copies of this despatch and its enclosure to the Government of India and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD.

Enclosure in No. 10

Report on Personalities in Perma. December 1943

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| 20 | Amir Taimur Keish Mulkatunul Hwar |
| 21 | Amari (Amarie). Abdul Wahid Ali |
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- 1. Jatin (Djatin), Mahmud (Mudat-ul-Mulk)
- 2. Jahangir (Djehanghur), Nasru lah
haidah, see Amir To
- 3. Kamil Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasir
Mulk)
- 4. Kamil Hidayat, Mustafa Qasim Nasir-ul
- 5. Kamilullah, Abdul-Samad
- 6. Kasimu (Kasim), Baqir (Dagher
Mulk)
- 7. Kasimu (for Kasim), Sayyid Abul-Qasim
Keyhas, Jalal-ud Din
- 8. Kasim, Masud (Mamud)
- 9. Kasim-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Dagim u

- [illegible]

Dr. Ahmed Elmaghrabi (M.D.)

- 1 Mann (Mangy), Barshahkar Ahmad
 1 M khar (Makhar) ad Iny
 1 M key (Meyen)
 1 Magaddam (Magaddam), Muhammad Ahmad
 1 M ngdram, Barshahkar Hassan
 1 Mmadily, Dr. Muhammad (Mamadily-
 Sakrath)
 1 Madam Hassan (Mushar ad Madk)
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 1 Mawqar (Mawqar), Jalal
 1 Maffar, Hassan Quli (Prince Nur al us
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 1 Naim (Naimy), Abu-Ghassan
 1 Nafar (Nafary), Dr. Ali Angbar (Muadab-ad
 Dowlab).
 1 Nafin (Nafery), Fathallah
 1 Nafin (Nafery), Hassan (Mushar-ad
 Dowlab).
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 1 Nari Abul-Qasim (Abul-Ghassan)
 1 Nari, M. (Nari), Muhammad (Amir)

pay *Asadullah* see No 15d
Aspey *Manuchahr* see No 15b
Asrari *Qoragulu* see *Qoragulu*

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Asadullah (*Asadullah*)—Born in Tabriz about 1885. Went to the University of Paris where he finished his primary education and then went to the University of Paris where he finished his secondary education. In Paris he studied law and graduated from the University of Paris in 1903. At the University of Paris he was a member of the University of Paris Boundary Commission in 1903. Since then engaged principally as Under Secretary

at the Ministry of Justice until 1927. He became in that year legal adviser to the Ministry and drafted a number of new judicial codes. A member of the Supervisory Board of the National Bank from 1929-32, in 1933 Director of the Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, and professor in the Law Academy at Tehran.

Appointed Persian Minister at Berne in 1934. Recalled to Tehran, December 1935. Political Director-General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, March 1937. Under-Secretary, July 1937. Acting Minister, March 1938. Minister at Rome, July 1938, and also accredited to Budapest, September 1938.

Returned from Rome late in 1941. Director of the Faculty of Law 1941. Minister of Education in Soheily's Cabinet, March to August 1942. He was not conspicuous for help to the Allied cause in 1942 and if it is true that he has now retired from public service it will not be much loss. He was, however, appointed Minister without Portfolio in the reshuffled Soheily Cabinet of December 1943.

A quiet little man without much personality. A good bridge player. Speaks French.

2. *Afshar* (or *Afshar Ibrahim*), *Abdul Reza*.—Born in Tehran 1885, a son of the late Sultan Ali Khan Vazir-i Afshar, chamberlain of Muzaffar ed Din Shah.

Educated in Persia and in a military college in Austria. Joined the gendarmes in 1911, and by 1921 had risen to the rank of colonel. Has been a staff officer for many years. Served on Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission 1931. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934.

Military Governor of Tehran, April to June 1942. Very active in the relief among the poor of Tehran during the winter of 1942-43. General officer commanding of the Kerman Division, September 1943.

A rubicund face indicates a certain fondness for the bottle, but he has always been well disposed to us. A pleasant fellow, always ready for a joke. He gives the impression of being a competent soldier not interested in politics. Speaks English.

3. *Afshar*, *Reza*.—Born at Urmieh (now Reza'iyeh) about 1888. Joined the Ministry of Finance as a young man, and during Mirza Kuchik Khan's rebellion in Gilan acted as financial agent to him; and soon after the war he got away with some of the money. With these he bought carpets and took them to America for sale. Served also under Sir P. Cox, who paid him well. Returned to Persia in 1921, full of American ideas and education. Joined the staff of Dr. Millsapugh, the American financial adviser. A staunch supporter of the Pahlavi régime, elected to the 5th, 6th and 7th Majlis. Opposed Firuz Mirza when the latter was Minister of Finance. Governor of Gilan in 1929. While at that post he organised the Gilan Import and Export Company, which was founded in opposition to Russian trade monopoly methods. As a result he incurred the hostility of the Russian interests there. Governor-General of Kerman in 1931. Minister of Roads in February 1932. Resigned in the following July, being unable to build the Chalus road fast enough for the Shah. Governor of Isfahan September 1932 to December 1933. Since then unemployed. Was put under surveillance in Tehran in 1935 owing to supposed inefficiency (perhaps complicity) in connexion with the Bakhtiari plots in 1934. Sentenced to six months' imprisonment and permanent exclusion from Government service in June 1938 for accepting a bribe while Minister of Roads.

Not yet re-employed. Candidate for the Majlis 1943. Speaks Persian fluently. Full of ideas and energy. Very nationalistic, and rather anti-British and anti-religious.

4. *Afshar*, *Majid*.—Born in Tehran 1886. Educated in Persia and Moscow. Holds a degree in law from the University of Moscow. Returned to Persia in 1914 from Russia. Appointed Commissioner for the Lianoseff Fisheries 1915-18. Director-General of the Ministry of Education 1922-24. A judge of the Court of Cassation 1928-33. Governor-General of Fars, August 1933, where he did good and energetic work. Minister of Roads and Communications, January 1936. Received the 1st Class Order of Humayun on the completion of the Transiranian Railway, September 1938. Suddenly relieved of his duties and placed more or less under house arrest at the end of November 1938. He had been in the Ministry of Roads and Communications since he took to the road in 1938.

Minister of Roads and Communications, January 1940, and Minister of Roads and Communications, May 1941. Minister of Roads and Communications, May 1942. Minister of Roads and Communications, May 1943.

As Minister of Justice he was largely responsible for the details of the law concerning the restitution of the ex Shah's properties to their former owners. In

those discussions he showed more attention to detail than to principle and the resulting cumbersome and complicated enactment pleased few except the lawyers who tried to understand it and interpreted it in various ways.

Speaks Russian, French and a little German. Married a Russian or Polish Jewess. Able, hard-working, and friendly to foreigners in general.

5. *Ayrom (Ayrom), General Muhammad Hussein*.—Born about 1882. Son of an emigrant from Erivan. Educated in Tehran and in Russia. Commissioned into the infantry of the Cossack Division about 1901. In 1912 colonel and staff officer at the Cossack Division headquarters. Fell into disgrace in 1918 as the result of intrigues with women. A favourite of Reza, he was re-employed in 1922 and appointed to command the Northern Independent Brigade at Resht. While in that command he showed enterprise, energy and some power of organisation, and kept Bolshevik intrigues under severe control. He also did a great deal for the improvement of the city of Resht. Appointed commander of the troops at Tabriz in 1925. Fell again into disgrace a year later, probably through his inability to abstain from intrigue. Chief Inspector of the army in 1927 and in the police of Tehran during 1928. Went to Europe; then returned to be chief of inspection missions in 1930 and 1931. Appointed chief of police in April 1931.

At one time Ayrom was looked upon as having greater power than any member of the Government. He is a very clever man. His son even married a daughter of the late Reza Khan.

Ayrom left suddenly for Germany, ostensibly for medical treatment, in the summer of 1935. Serious charges of taking bribes and of all kinds of trickery have since been made against him, and Reza Shah furious with "the only one of my trusted servants who has hitherto deceived me" tried to secure his extradition. But he got large sums of money out of the country, and was heard of in 1942 living on the Riviera as a Count of Lichtenstein.

Has an Italian wife, whom no one saw while he was at Tehran.

Speaks Russian and a little German. A strong disbeliever in Bolshevism and organised a kind of OGPU in Tehran to counteract Soviet spying.

6. *Akbar, Hussein*.—Born about 1904, second son of the late Sardar Mu'tamad of Resht. Inherited large estates in Gilan from his father. Educated at Tehran. Married in 1937 Victoria, daughter of Sarem-ud-Douleh. Deputy for Resht in the 13th Majlis, and again for Fuman in the 14th.

A fat and cheerful little man who, like all the members of his family, has always been on good terms with us. Not of great intelligence, but clever and active when it comes to disposing of his rice crop and circumventing the Russians.

7. *Ala, Hussein, C.M.G. (Mu'in ul-Firah)*.—Born about 1884. Son of the late Prince Ala-es-Saltaneh, for many years Persian Minister in London. Educated at Westminster School, where he seems to have received rough treatment, which resulted in a strong anti-British bias, at any rate for the next few years. Created C.M.G. in 1908, when he accompanied his father on a special mission to London for the coronation of the late King Edward VII. Appointed "chef de cabinet" in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1906, his late father being then Minister for Foreign Affairs. He remained as "chef de cabinet" to various Ministers until 1916. Appointed Minister of Public Works in January 1918, and continued to direct that Ministry during the Cabinet presided over by Sarem-ud-Douleh, which was in power from May to August 1919. This Cabinet abrogated the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

Ala was hostile to Sir Charles Marling, His Majesty's Minister from 1915 to 1918, and caused repeated complaints to be made to the Foreign Office through his brother, who was then Persian Minister in London. He accompanied the abortive Persian mission to the Paris Peace Conference in 1918. Appointed Persian Minister at Madrid in 1919, and at Washington in 1920. Conducted negotiations in Washington in 1921-22 for the American Financial Mission to Persia, after he had failed to obtain the North Persian Oil Concession first for the Standard Oil Company and then for the Sinclair Corporation. Returned from Washington in 1922 and took his seat in the 11th Majlis as a Deputy for Tehran. Minister of Public Works for a short time in May 1927. Second delegate to the League of Nations for some time. Attended Locarno in that capacity in December 1925.

Appointed Minister at Paris in 1929. One of the Persian delegates selected to represent Persia before the League of Nations in the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Returned to Tehran early in 1933 to take over a

high post in the National Bank of Persia, though he had no particular knowledge of banking. Was a member of the National Bank of the "Red Lion and Sun" and in the Ferdousi Memorial Committee.

In 1931 his transfer to the post of Minister in London was mooted though it did not materialise. On that occasion His Majesty's Government were unwilling to receive him, on the ground that his attitude in reporting a rebel on His Majesty King George V rendered it difficult to suppose that he was then animated by friendly sentiments.

Appointed Minister in London July 1934. Recalled in the summer of 1936, returned to Tehran in October. Appointed Supervisor of Monopoly Companies, December 1936. Director-General of Commerce in 1937, and given the new appointment of Minister of Commerce in September 1937. Removed from this appointment, April 1938. Chief Persian attached to Major-General the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during their visit to Tehran for the Crown Prince's wedding, April 1939.

Married Fatmeh Khanum, the only daughter of the late Abu'l-Qasim Khan Qaragozlu (Nasir ul-Mulk), Regent of Persia, in July 1927. Miss Ala was one of the first of her generation to leave off the veil. President of the National Bank, October 1941. Minister of Court, October 1942, but appears to have done nothing to curb the young Shah's evident intention to rule the country in much the same way as his father did.

A hard worker and a staunch patriot, intelligent and well-read, interested in the literature of many countries and quite a good pianist. Has a perfect command of English and speaks good French. In the past he has had a reputation for anti-British sentiments. In 1943 and 1944, however, his relations with the British Legation were good, he seems a good deal more anti-Russian than anti-British, and is doubtless more pro-Persian than either.

8. *A'lam (Aalam), Dr. Amir (Amir-i-A'lam)*.—Born about 1880. Son of the late Mirza Ali Akbar Khan, who was Persian consul at Damascus for a number of years. Educated at Damascus, Beirut and Lyons, where he obtained a medical degree. In private practice in Tehran since 1911. An army doctor for some years.

Married the eldest daughter of Vassugh-ud-Douleh, and took part in politics through the influence of his father-in-law. Reorganised the shrine hospital at Meshed.

Minister of Public Works 1920, a member of the fourth Majlis. Minister of Education 1921. Court physician in 1925 and subsequent years.

Helped to found the "Red Lion and Sun" Society and has devoted a good deal of time and energy to its affairs. Vice-president of the Inter-Parliamentary Union 1934, and vice-president of the "Red Lion and Sun" organisation in Persia. Speaks French.

9. *A'lam (Aalam), Muzaffar*.—Born about 1885. Son of the late Mirza Ali Akbar Khan, Persian consul at Damascus for a number of years, and brother of Dr. Amir Aalam. Brought up at Damascus, and destined for a military career in his youth. Sent to St. Cyr and served for some time in the army. Served on several occasions on the Turco-Persian Frontier Commission. In 1928 appointed Governor of the Gulf Ports, and in February 1931 Governor-General of Fars, with jurisdiction over the Gulf Ports as well. Relinquished that appointment in July 1931 to serve as Deputy Governor-General of Fars. In April 1933 appointed Governor of Western Azerbaijan, residing at Rezaieh (Urumieh).

Director-General of Commerce 1935. Minister to Iraq April 1936. Minister for Foreign Affairs July 1938. Represented Iran at the League of Nations Assembly, September 1938.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again in 1941 but summarily dismissed by Reza Shah early in that year, at which he retired to Isfahan and has hardly been heard of again.

Speaks French, Arabic and Turkish fluently. A corpulent and agreeable person, showing little signs of intelligence on any subject. Is said to owe his advancement to the fact that he saved the life of Reza Shah on one occasion.

10. *Alom (Aalam), Muhammad Ibrahim (Shaukat ul-Mulk), C.I.E.*.—Born about 1882. Descended from a family the members of which have exercised more or less independent rule in the Qainat and the neighbourhood for several generations. Has been Governor of Sistān and the Qainat on many occasions. Has a long record of service to the Government. He has been a great help to us. Previous to the present extension of the authority of the Central Government Shaukat enjoyed a considerable measure of

the theory being that all the land in question was Crown land, which the Sardars had usurped or occupied by force. Appointed Governor-General of Fars, September 1937 until October 1938. Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones, February 1939

A very generous, open headed, agreeable man. Certain of his relatives were educated in England. His nephews, Humaid Dowleh and Samson ul Mulk and his brother in law Malik Muhammad Khan, are persons of local importance.

Married a Persian woman, but divorced her and married a German woman. Held various posts in the Ministry of Public Works from 1927 to 1930, then in the Ministry of National Economy, and from 1931 served in the Department of Industry. Sent to Europe in 1933 in connection with the purchase of machinery for coal mines. ~~Returned to Germany in 1934. Served in the Department of~~ the reorganized Department of Industry in 1935. Unemployed in 1937 and thought to be in Berlin.

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1997

Chang, P. H., and P. H. Chang. 1993. A study on the effects of the 1992 U.S. trade policy on the U.S. economy. *Journal of International Trade and Development* 4: 1-15.

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(2) 1997-1998

1316

OF THE UNITED STATES.

1. **Journal of a Female Slave in North America** by Harriet Martineau, 1832. This book is a collection of letters from a female slave in North America to her mother in England. The letters describe the harsh conditions of slavery and the author's efforts to educate herself and her fellow slaves.

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1995-1996

*Priority of the above items shall remain in the Department.

What is the country?

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appointed managing director of the National Bank. Promoted major-general, March 1930. Minister of Finance, October 1939.

Married a much-divorced Caucasian lady, usually known as Kitty Khanum. Speaks French and Russian. Sociable and friendly a bridge player; but will never be an eminent financier. Carried on a long rivalry with Mahmoud Bader, when he was head of the bank and the latter was Minister of Finance.

Dismissed from the post of Minister of Finance, May 1941. Since then in retirement and seldom seen, went to India on business 1942. Got rid of Kitty Khanum and married the wife of one of his staff. Left Tehran October 1943.

A man of little intelligence and no scruples—his main idea in banking was to spend as much money as possible.

18. *Amiri (Amery) Javad*. Born in Tehran 1895, from a Semnan family located in Persia and France. Speaks French, and has studied law in Paris. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1914, and was for many years assistant to the French judicial adviser attached to the Ministry of Justice. Was professor in the law school. In 1928 appointed president of the Tribunal of Commerce. President of the court of first instance in Tehran 1931-34. Director of the Department of Legislation in the Ministry of Justice in 1934. Went to Bagdad with Fathullah Noury Esfandary in December 1935 as legal and technical adviser in the abortive negotiations about the frontier, &c., with Iraq. Juridical Counsellor in charge of the Ministry of Justice in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1938. Administrative Director General, August 1938, and Under Secretary, January 1939, in that Ministry.

In charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time of the invasion 1941. Minister of the Interior in Soleymani's Cabinet 1942, and later Minister of Justice. In the former post he was a disappointment, in the latter he was more at home but was soon replaced. Elected to the 14th Majlis from Semnan December 1943.

A man of considerable influence and importance in his capacity as technical adviser. He has been one of the few Persian advisers here, his knowledge of law and administration is well known.

His knowledge of law and administration is well known. He has been one of the few Persian advisers here, his knowledge of law and administration is well known.

19. *Amiri (Amery), Sultan Muhammad*. Born at Nain about 1885. Educated at the American School at Tehran. A teacher at that school in 1913. Helped Seyyid Zia-ed Din by translating English articles for his paper *Ra'ed* and so became closely connected with the Seyyid. Appointed assistant in the Department of Indirect Taxation by the Seyyid's influence. After the latter's *coup d'Etat* in 1921, was appointed "chef de cabinet" and Acting Minister of Finance, and elected a Deputy to the fourth Majlis. After the Seyyid's fall he made a speech in the Majlis, revealing the fact that he had been reporting all the activities of the Seyyid to the Minister of Court. Re-entered the Ministry of Finance in 1923, and served under Dr. Millspaugh. Under Secretary of Finance in 1926. Visited Europe in 1926. In 1931 chief accountant of the northern railway construction. Under Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1933. Governor of Western Azerbaijan in March 1935.

Arrested and tried in Tehran for embezzlement in 1936, and sentenced to imprisonment, though after the departure of Reza Shah he managed to obtain a new trial and was exonerated.

Speaks English. A clever and intelligent official.

20. *Amir-Taimur Kaluli, Muhammad Ibrahim*.—Born about 1895. Member of a well known Khorassan tribe. Educated in Tehran. Elected to the Majlis in the time of Reza Shah and again for Kashed in the 14th Majlis elections, 1943 where he headed the poll.

A talkative demagogue, fond of working himself into passionate indignation about the treaty of 1921. He was one of the few who opposed the tripartite treaty and caused the Ferozghi cabinet a great deal of trouble. But he is amenable to argument, and, though pig-headed and vain, is not entirely without good ideas.

21. *Amiri (Amery) Abdul Husayn*.—The eldest son of the late Ali Quli Ansari Mushavir-ul-Mamluk. Born 1899. Educated at Tehran and in Europe. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. Served for a number of years in the Persian Embassy at Moscow as secretary, and his rapid promotion is largely due to his father's influence. Counsellor at Moscow in 1927 and held that post till he was transferred to Tehran in 1931. Head of the Economics Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in September 1933. Went

to Germany as a member of the Persian Economic Mission to Germany in July 1935. Head of the Third Political Section (dealing with British affairs) 1936. Head of the Protocol Department, November 1937. Consul-General Delhi, May 1938. Minister to Sweden 1941.

Married a Russian at Moscow, the lady was suspected of being a spy, she died in Berlin in 1936 leaving one child, a boy. Married an Iranian in 1937.

Civil and fairly energetic, but formal, and lacking in geniality and sense of humour. When he was in charge of the Economics Section it proved impossible to get much useful information out of him, and as the head of the Third Political Department he was not particularly helpful. Speaks Russian, French and German, his outlook is almost as much Russian as Persian, and many of his colleagues distrust him accordingly.

22. *Ansari, Ghulam Ali, Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Born about 1900, of a military family. Joined the army and earned a reputation for honesty and energy. Director of Artillery November 1941. Commandant of the Officers' School, June 1942. Assistant to General Greely, United States army, when adviser to the Ministry of War, August 1942. Under-Secretary for War, September 1943, but was not allowed to do much good owing to the opposition of rivals. Unpopular in the army because of a rough tongue, a strong temper and an uncompromising attitude.

Married to a daughter of Abdul Hussein Shaibani (Wahid ul-Mulk).

23. *Aqeebi (Aqhebi), Farayullah*.—Born in Isfahan 1858, the son of the late Mirza Aqeebi, a well-known Persian official. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911. His knowledge of French and some English. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911. His knowledge of French and some English. Entered the service of the gendarmerie in 1911. His knowledge of French and some English.

Persian Military Commission, which sat in 1919-20.

Appointed general in 1922, and Chief of Staff to the Western Army in Hamadan. Military Governor of Gilan for a time in 1923. Governor-General of Khuzistan 1928 to 1930, during which time he showed administrative ability in establishing the authority of the new regime.

Accused of partiality towards the tribes, he was placed on the retired list in 1930.

Appointed Director-General of the Registration and Civil Census Department in 1932. Relieved of this appointment in 1934.

Re-employed in the Army after the departure of Reza Shah, was suspected of pro-German bias at the time of the arrest of Zahedi in 1942. Head of the Gendarmerie in 1942 and did his best to re-organise that force, but was not in close agreement with the American Gendarmerie advisers. Arrested and removed with other suspects to Sultanabad in June 1943.

Has the reputation of being efficient, energetic and conscientious, and a devout Moslem.

24. *Arasteh, Nadir*.—A Qajar prince. Born about 1893. Governor of Pahlavi in 1925. Deputy-Governor of Azerbaijan in 1930-32. Governor of Kermanshah 1932-33. 1933-34. Persian Legation in London. Appointed Minister to Poland, December 1933. Appointed first Persian Minister to the Argentine Republic, August 1935. Presented his letters in October 1935. Recalled to Tehran, October 1936, the post being abolished. In charge of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a short while in 1937. Minister at Berlin, August 1937. Accredited also to The Hague in 1939. Recalled from Berlin May 1940. Governor General of Mazandaran, January 1942 and of Gilan January 1943.

A little man, speaking English and French. Agreeable, but no great character.

25. *Ardelan, Abbas Quli*.—Born about 1897 of the well-known Kurdish family. Educated at the American College, Tehran, then joined the Ministry of Finance. Spent three years in London, where he studied the work of the Bank of England and the British Treasury. Has written a book on accountancy and is considered an authority on that subject. A man of good reputation and capable. Has been for some years Treasurer-General resigned from that appointment summer 1943.

26. *Ardelan, Dr. Ali Gholi*.—Born about 1900, brother of Amanullah Ardalan. Served mostly under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various posts from 1922. Secretary at Washington, 1932, where he had a dispute with Ghaffar Jalal, the Minister. Counsellor at Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940. Returned to Tehran 1942 and was in charge of the English section of

Deputy for the 14th Majlis for Kermanshah, he seems to regard himself as elected by the personal order of the Shah

40. *Bader, Muḥamed*.—Younger brother of Abdul Wahhab Bader. Born in 1893. Educated in England. Has been in the service of the Ministry of Finance since 1910. Assistant to the Accountant-General at the Ministry of Finance for a number of years. Chief Accountant of the Ministry of Public Works October 1928. In the same capacity in the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1930. Director-General of the Ministry of Finance 1933. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance in July 1935. Succeeded Abolghassem Ferouhar as Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Finance in April 1936. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance on the death of Davar in February 1937. Minister of Finance, September 1937 until October 1938, when superseded by General Amir Khosrovi, head of the National Bank, with whom he had carried on negotiations for a loan of the Government's financial operations. M. Bader was said to favour dealings with Germany.

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24

is said to have enlarged them considerably at the expense of the owners of neighbouring estates, and by methods which will not bear too close scrutiny. Commanded a division of the Tehran Garrison in 1937. Visited the Legation once in 1942, but takes no part in politics, and spends most of his time in his village. He is a typical product of the Cossack Brigade and a man of similar character to Reza Shah. He can be very suave and agreeable when he likes, but he is a robber at heart.

52. *Dadgar, Hussein (Adil-ul-Mulk)*—Born about 1862. First came into prominence as a member of the Democratic party in the third Majlis (1914-15). In 1916 he turned against the party. Was appointed Under Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior in 1916 and remained there until 1918. Was anti-British. Later became Acting Minister of the Interior. Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister in 1920. Was involved in the *coup d'état* of 1921 and fled to the mosque at Kum when Seyyid Zia fled to Europe. Remained some months in refuge at Kum. Elected a Deputy to the fourth Majlis 1921, and to the fifth Majlis in 1923. Was Minister of the Interior 1925. Elected Vice President of the National Assembly, December 1925, which elected Reza Shah to the Throne of Persia. Elected as a Deputy to the sixth Majlis 1926 and to the seventh Majlis 1928. President of the seventh Majlis. Elected a member of the eighth Majlis 1930.

Left Persia suddenly in the summer of 1935 under circumstances which have never been explained. He is said to be living in Paris. He is a man of many bribes. Understood to be living in straitened circumstances in Paris 1943. A rumour that he was founding a "Free Persia" movement there appears to be unfounded.

Outwardly very friendly, but liable to be touchy about protocol questions of precedence; rather vain and stupid. Speaks a little French.

53. *Dadgar, Mehdi (Yusef es-Saltanah)*—Born about 1874. Entered the service of the Ministry of War in 1905. Joined the Nationalists and came to Tehran with the Nationalist forces. Chief of Accounts at the War Office 1909. Held this post for six years. Assistant Minister for War 1916 to 1918. Governor of Zanjan and Khamseh 1918. Minister for War during 1920. Governor of Gilan for a few months in 1922. Governor General of Fars in 1924, and of Kerman 1925. Governor General of Khorasan 1926-27. Elected a member of the eighth Majlis. Deputy Speaker of the ninth and tenth Majlis. In the eleventh he was (1939) only a member for Tehran.

Attended to only a few matters of importance. In 1943 he has failed in his ambition to become once more Minister of War; he is devoting some of his time to promoting trade with India.

A voluble politician, well disposed towards us, but carrying little weight in the Majlis.

54. *Dargahi, Muhammad*—Born about 1896 in Zanjan. His ancestors lived in the Caucasus, and he has been heard to say that he looks forward to the time when the Caucasus will return to its rightful owners, the Persians. Served in the Court in his young days in some menial capacity. Educated at the British school at Tehran. Joined the gendarmerie under Swedish officers in 1911. At Kerman and Shiraz in 1915, was with the rebel gendarmes at Shiraz in 1915, being for a while arrested and imprisoned for six months. Rejoined the gendarmerie at Qum in 1921. Chief of military police at Tehran in 1922. He made himself very useful to Reza Khan, and was made chief of police on the dismissal of the Swedes in 1923. Promoted to the rank of general (*Sartap*) in 1928. Chief of the Department of Conscription in 1931. Director of the Census Department in 1935 and dismissed in May 1936. Rendered valuable service to the Shah during the intrigues which led up to the deposition of the Qajars, skilful in handling the bazaars, and well acquainted with the baser psychology of his own countrymen. Active and energetic, and extremely vigilant in detecting conspirators against the Shah; vindictive and cruel, and quite unscrupulous in fabricating evidence. A dapper little man in appearance.

Living in retirement at Tehran 1943. He has not returned to the limelight since the fall of Reza.

55. *Dashti, Ali*—Born about 1887. Educated in the schools of the Holy Places of Iraq. Returned to Persia about 1922 and edited a paper called

the *Shafag Surkh*. As an editor he became notorious for slanderous abuse and the extortion of money by blackmail, and his abuse of Great Britain and British statesmen was frequently the subject of complaint from His Majesty's Legation to Persia. He was elected a member of the sixth Majlis in 1924, but he was refused a seat by the Parliamentary Commission, whose duty it was to scrutinise his election proceedings. He was prominent in the abortive Republican movement in 1924, and is said to have received and pocketed large sums from Reza Pahlavi, on whose behalf he worked. After acquiring a share of this world's goods he appeared to become more human and ceased the abuse and vituperation for which he had become famous. He espoused the cause of Reza Pahlavi against Ahmed Shah, and was elected a Deputy to the sixth Majlis in 1926. He was invited to Moscow in October 1927 to attend the tenth anniversary of the Soviet régime. From Moscow he went to Berlin and Paris and returned to Persia early in 1928. He was elected a Deputy to the seventh Majlis in 1928 and to the eighth Majlis in 1930.

Edited or controlled his paper till about July 1935, receiving subsidies now from the Shah and now from the Soviet Embassy. He is a hot-headed firebrand who is said to have no other aim but to bring about the latest change of power, help him to attain his ends. He speaks no European language, except a little French.

In July 1935 he fell into disgrace and was said to have uttered disparaging remarks about the present régime. His paper was suppressed and he himself was allowed to plead sickness and to retire to a Government hospital, where he was made to pay well for his maintenance.

At liberty again at the end of 1936. In charge of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of Interior in 1937.

Since the fall of Reza has returned to the forefront of Tehran politics. A severe critic of Faruqi and Soheily in 1942 he worked hard for the return of Qavam-es-Saltanah as Prime Minister. When the latter came back to power and did not make Dashti a Minister, he turned against him and criticised him. He is a man of many bribes. He is a member of the eighth Majlis as few other persons can do. A prime mover in the Adalat party, he now utters the most enthusiastic praise of democracy on the British model, and evidently hopes that his past will be forgotten by us. As he appears to have much more audacity and forensic ability than most of his rivals, he may be elected a Minister. He was elected a member of the eighth Majlis 1930. Backed by the Shah as candidate for the fourteenth Majlis, 1943.

56. *Daulatshahi, Abul-Fath*—Born about 1879. A son of the late Mahdi-ud-Daulah. His mother was a daughter of the late Zahir-ul-Mulk Zangeneh of Kermanshah. Is married to a daughter of Mirza Hashim Ashtiani. A Qajar prince. Appointed Governor of Fars in 1903. He is the brother of the late Ghalam Ali Mirza Daulatshahi, a relative of the second Pahlavi. Appointed Governor of Fars in 1925, but was dismissed in September 1937 and was arrested for numerous corrupt practices. An easy-going spendthrift, up to his ears in debt, but not without intelligence.

Since 1941 has come out of his shell and is evidently hoping for employment, but was disappointed at failing to get elected to the fourteenth Majlis from Kermanshah.

57. *Diba, Abul Hassan (Siqat-ed-Daulah)*—Born in Tehran 1888. Son of the late Vakil-ul-Mulk; a half-brother of Hushmat-ud-Daulah and of Dr Musaddiq. His mother is a sister of Farman Farman. Educated in Europe. Employed in the Ministry of Finance. Owns a large property in Tabriz and Tehran. Employed in the Railway Office in 1928. In the Department of Commerce in 1931. Assistant Director of that Department July 1932. Resigned May 1933, and has since then devoted himself to private trade. Formed a private company, which is interested in various projects. Married one of his daughters was educated in England. Owned the Park Hotel 1943.

Not devoid of brains.

58. *Dizambegi, Agha*—Born in Kurdistan about 1891. Educated in Persia. In the employ of the Ministry of the Interior for some years. Went to Turkey with the Nationalists during the war. "Chef de cabinet" to the Governor-General of Kerman when Teymour-tache was in charge there. A member of the sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises. Governor of Gilan in 1931. Resigned in 1933 and appointed Governor of Mazandaran in October 1934; relieved early in 1936.

Governor-General of Khuzistan, July 1942, and showed some energy but is reported to have lined his pockets pretty thoroughly in connexion with certain contracts. Recalled early 1943.

Speaks French. Agreeable to talk to, but unreliable. Related to the Qasbi family.

59 *Fahim, Akhalil (Fahim ul Mulk)*.—Born about 1885. Related to the Mukhbir-ud Douleh (Hedayat) family.

Employed in various posts in the Foreign Office early in his career. Minister of Finance in June 1922. Appointed Governor-General of Kerman in October 1925, but did not proceed. Member of the Majlis for Quehan on several occasions. *Rapporteur* of the Financial Commission of the Majlis. Supported, by a speech in the Majlis, the cancellation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company concession. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in February 1934. Ambassador to Turkey, May 1936. Recalled, November 1941.

Prominent member of the Society of Supporters of the League of Nations founded in December 1933. Governor-General at Tabriz, 1941 after the fall of Reza. Did not display much energy in dealing with a difficult and delicate situation. Recalled to Tehran at the end of 1942. Minister without portfolio in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Speaks French. Very agreeable and reasonable in conversation. Not a great personality.

60 *Farhudi Dr Hussein*.—Born about 1899. Son-in-law of Wahid-ul Mulk Shaibani. Educated in Tehran. Served in various capacities in the Ministry of Education, at Tehran and in the provinces. Has also done newspaper work. One of the directors-general of the Ministry, 1943. Successful candidate for Dasht-i-Mishan and Susangird in the fourteenth Majlis 1943, though he had little connexion previously with that district beyond having been representative of the Ministry of Education in Ahwaz about 1933.

A rather greeny individual, well disposed to us as he regards his success in the elections as our doing and in fact a warm recommendation from the Minister of the Interior Tadayvun, was passed on by this Legation to the Consul General at Ahwaz.

61 *Farrukhi, Mehdi (Mu'tasim us Saltaneh)*.—A Seyyid. Born about 1887. Was for some years in the employ of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and head of the 2nd Political Department, dealing with eastern countries. Minister at Kabul in 1927-29. Subsequently Director-General of Industry, Governor of Western Azerbaijan, February 1936. Again Director-General of Industry and Mines, September 1937, and shortly afterwards raised to the newly-created appointment of Minister of Industry and Mines. Removed from this post without explanation, March 1938.

Governor-General of Fars 1940, and of Kerman in 1941. Minister of the Interior of Soheily's Cabinet, July 1942, and in spite of Majlis opposition maintained his place in the Cabinet. Qawam-es-Saltaneh, in August, made him Minister of Food, in which post he displayed a sort of crazy activity which interested many and did not achieve much. Having fallen out with the American adviser Sheridan, he left the Ministry of Food on the fall of the Qawam Cabinet in February 1943. Elected a deputy for Zabul in the fourteenth Majlis, November 1943.

62 *Farrukhi, Muhammad*.—Born at Yazd about 1885. Self-educated coming from a poor family. A professed Communist since the Russian revolution of 1917. Started a paper in Tehran called *Tufan* (Storm) in 1923, which lasted in all eight years, being temporarily suspended eleven times during that period. Repeatedly exiled from Tehran, and once took refuge in the Soviet Embassy. He was a deputy for Shiraz in the fourteenth Majlis, when he repeatedly criticised the Government. Succeeded in leaving Persia for Russia in 1930 without a passport. After a short stay in Russia went on to Germany where he edited, for a short time, a Persian Communist paper called *Nehzat* (Progress). This paper was suppressed in 1932 by the German Government. Since then is believed to be living in Germany. Composes poetry.

63 *Farzaneh, Hassan*.—Born about 1893. Educated at Tehran and in France. Was in the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for about twelve years, during which he acted as *Chargé d'Affaires* for Moscow and Rome in 1924 and 1929. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior in 1937, and appointed Governor of Khorramshahr in February 1938. Assumed charge of the Governorates of Khorramshahr and Abadan in October 1938. Employed in

Ministry of Interior 1942. Head of Political Department 1943. Appointed Director-General of the Ministry of the Interior December 1943.

Speaks French, a fair amount of English and a little Russian. Well educated and polished, keenly interested in westernisation. Friendly to the British.

64 *Fateh, Mahmoud*.—Brother of Mustafa Fateh. Born about 1900 at Isfahan and educated at Tehran and at Montpellier. Trained in agriculture and husbandry. In charge of the Karaj agricultural school for some years. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Agriculture 1943. Has planned a model village at Veramine of which he is very keen.

Helpful and business-like though inclined to be too optimistic and to imagine that all Persia's agricultural difficulties can be solved by tractors.

65 *Fateh, Mustafa*.—Born in Isfahan about 1907. Son of Fateh-ul Mulk, a servant of the Prince-Governor of Isfahan Zill-us-Sultan. Educated at Tehran and at Columbia University, United States, where he graduated in economics. Entered the Anglo-Persian Oil Company about 1922 and is the senior Persian official in that company at Tehran, drawing a large salary. Author of a book on the economic condition of Persia, published in 1926. Has a perfect command of English and is keenly interested in Persian politics. He also has an international outlook and a considerable knowledge of world politics, particularly those of the left. In 1943 founded the *Hamrohan* party, with the express object of achieving a socialistic system in Persia.

His socialistic ideals far beyond anything which will be practicable in Persia for some time. Always very approachable and desirous of enlisting British help for his schemes, and a mine of information about the foibles of his countrymen, who are (1) very corrupt, and (2) his party members who are sublimely honest. Few other people believe in this dichotomy, and he has many enemies who accuse him of devoting the oil company's funds to the purposes of his party and its newspaper, *Imrooz va Farid*.

He is a close friend of the late Minister of the Interior, Sarem-ud Douleh, who surely would come in category (1). His wife was a daughter of the Zill-us-Sultan's head secretary Siraj-ul Mulk.

66 *Fatimi, Mehdi (Imad us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1888. Has had an official career in the Ministry of Finance, and in 1918 was financial representative in his native city of Isfahan, where he is influential both in the city and in the province. He was a member of the Majlis in 1922-23. Elected a Deputy for Isfahan in the fourth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Appointed Minister of Education in August 1925, Minister of Justice in December 1925, and Minister of Interior February to May 1927.

Formerly somewhat addicted to opium and fond of gambling, but when he attained ministerial rank he put aside these bad habits to a certain extent, with beneficial results to his health. As a Minister and a Deputy he was uniformly popular and successful. In 1923 he fell out with the Minister of Court and was not allowed to be elected to the seventh term of the Majlis. Elected a Deputy to the eighth Majlis 1930. Is socially agreeable and friendly to His Majesty's Legation. Governor of Gilan from December 1933 until October 1937.

Survived a good many attacks from the Court in connexion with his conduct as Governor of Gilan, one of the charges being that he allowed the level of the Caspian Sea to fall.

Head of the Ministry of Education in Soheily's Cabinet, February 1943. Resigned 1943 and elected Deputy for Nain 1943. He speaks no European language except a little French.

67 *Fatimi (Fatemy) Seifur*.—Born about 1905; one of three brothers, a Naini family which claims relationship with Mehdi Fatemy (Imad-us-Saltaneh), though the latter denies it. Educated at the Stuart Memorial College, Isfahan, where he became a baptised Christian, but he made away with some of the mission funds and the mission do not forgive him. He and another, named Hussein Saadat, wrote a book against Islam. In order to marry his present wife, who is well off, became a Bahai.

He had been in Shiraz in 1941-43, but returned apparently because he had amassed too much money there. His Majesty's Consul, Shiraz, considered him energetic, helpful and capable. Then returned to Isfahan as candidate for the Majlis for Najafabad, and though he had little real following in that area success was engineered for him by Morteza Quli Bakhtiar and Sarem-ud Douleh.

Intelligent, entirely unscrupulous, and very ambitious, speaks good English and has studied English and English literature, and can remember many extracts. At present (1944) it suits him to appear pro-British, he is certainly anti-Russian. Has many enemies, both Persian and British, but is a man who can, when he wishes, make himself very useful.

69. *Farouhi, Abul Hassan*. Born about 1878. A younger brother of Mirza Ali Akbar. For a number of years he has always shown leaning towards the Soviet Union. President of the Ecole normale for some time. Appointed Minister in Switzerland 1933, probably in order to keep an eye on the Crown Prince's education in that country. The professor did not shine as a diplomat and was recalled in 1934. He apparently failed to pay proper reverence to the Pahlavi Qajar. In 1935, he was appointed to the Ministry of Education, but was recalled in 1936. He is a highly respected, timid, and ineffective professor of philosophy.

69. *Farouhar, Abbas*. Born about 1895. Though his junior in age, is an uncle of Abul Qasim Farouhar. Member of the Protocol Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1934 and acted as head of that department in 1935 and part of 1936. Head of the Personnel Department, July 1936 to April 1937. Counsellor, Angora, until September 1938. Head of the Protocol Department, September 1938.

Speaks French. Married in 1939 a daughter of Muhammad Ali Muqaddam. Politic, friendly and well meaning but the head of the Protocol Department under Reza Shah had a thankless task. Nevertheless, M. Farouhar unlike his colleagues at the Court, survived the ordeal of the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations.

Sent to Beirut with the vague title of "Délégué" at the end of 1942. Recalled temporarily in 1943 to give explanations about the conduct of Muzaffar Firuz. He survived the ordeal and attributed the unfounded accusations against him to the enmity of Nasrullah Rizezam.

A talkative but somewhat too oily little man.

70. *Farouhar, Abul Qasim (Abolghassem)*. Born in Tehran about 1883. A grandson of Mirza Abbas Khan Qavam-ed Dowleh, who was Minister of Finance for some years. Educated in Tehran and Switzerland, studied law. A judge in the Ministry of Justice, then Chief of Construction.

Appointed to the Ministry of the Interior in 1927. In the Appeal Court in 1929. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Finance under his great friend Davar October 1933. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934. Minister to France June 1936, but recalled in January owing to an anti-Persian press campaign in some French news.

Minister of Industry and Mines, March 1938. Minister of Interior, August 1938 to February 1939, when superseded for no stated reason. A Deputy for Tehran in the twelfth Majlis, October 1932, and in the 13th Majlis, 1941. Appears to have been recalled to run the elections in 1943. Married to a Bulgarian lady, he has a child in Germany, but he has always been friendly to us, and is a man of considerable intelligence.

71. *Fidukar (Fadukar), Taqi (Taqi)*. Born about 1905, in Isfahan, of humble origin. Educated at the Saravieh school at Isfahan. As a boy he got into trouble for socialist beliefs. Trained as a lawyer. Worked for a time in the Soviet Consulate-General at Isfahan in connexion with the sale of Soviet textiles in Isfahan. From 1940 onwards has devoted most of his energies to bettering the lot of the Isfahan factory workers and has done much to help them, as he has become the chief workers' representative in disputes about conditions of work. Founded a primitive sort of trade union for the protection of workers' interests, including insurance. Elected to the fourteenth Majlis for Isfahan 1943, being supported by the Tudeh party of which he is a member, though he disclaims being a Communist and is not looked upon favourably by the Tudeh party in Tehran owing to his moderate views. He is thought not to have had any direct relations with the Soviet authorities concerning the elections. He is, of course, disliked by most of the capitalists of Isfahan, though some of them accept him as a fairly single-minded man. His main political following is among the factory workers and guilds and small bazaar men, who are naturally opposed to domination by the few rich families of Isfahan.

72. *Firuz, Muhammad Hussain*. Born about 1895. The fourth son of the late Farman Farma. Educated at the military college at Petrograd. Entered the Persian army during the 1914-18 war, and was regarded as one of the promising young officers of the army. Appointed Chief of Staff of the South Division in 1925, and did very good work in organising the troops in Fars and enforcing discipline and efficiency. Sent to Delhi as representative of the Persian army at the Indian army manoeuvres early in 1925. Fell under suspicion for some reason about 1929 and resigned his commission. His Qajar origin was no doubt the cause of his collapse. Very attached to his brother Firuz (Nasrat-ed Dowleh) but not on good terms with his father. Married a Miss Nemazi, who was educated in Hong Kong and speaks English perfectly.

Returned to Persia late in 1941, and was sent to Fars as G.O.C. and Governor-General in March 1942. Superseded in both appointments by Marshal Shahrakhti a year later. He had succeeded in keeping a rather precarious order in Fars, but never succeeded in repressing Nasir Qushqari's rebellious movement. Head of the Air Force, 1943.

Speaks very good French and some English. Intelligent and enlightened. A brilliant talker, he seems capable of proving with most convincing reasons that he is always right—but one feels sometimes that he is too convincing.

73. *Firuz, Muhammad Vali*. Third son of the late Farman Farma. Born about 1893. Educated at Beirut and Paris. Sent to Tabriz as head of the Finance Department, 1915. Said to have taken many bribes while in that appointment. Is very thrifty and has large properties both in Tehran and Tabriz. Elected a Deputy to the fourth, fifth and sixth Majlises for Tabriz. On the fall of his brother, Nasrat-ed Dowleh, in 1931 he retired from public life and was seldom seen. Has been in Europe a good deal.

Elected to the thirteenth Majlis for Sorab in September 1941, and again to the fourteenth in November 1943. His appearance being that of an underfed bird of prey, seems to keep him in the background, but he has a good deal of his father's intelligence.

74. *Farouhi (Faroughi), Muhsin*. Born about 1897, son of the late Muhammad Ali Farouhi. Educated at Tehran and in Paris, where he took a degree. On return to Tehran began practising as an architect. Does not take part in politics. A good type of young Persian. Married to a Frenchwoman of good middle-class family.

75. *Ghaffari, Amir Sekamaddine (Zaka-ed Dowleh)*. Born in Tehran about 1890. The second son of the late Muhammad Ali Mamaslik. Educated in Persia and Germany. On the staff of the Ministry of Education 1914-18. Appointed Persian Minister in Bern 1919-22. Did not venture to return to Persia till the Pahlavi régime was well established in 1931. A chamberlain to Muzaffar ed Din Shah and Ahmed Shah. Employed in the Ministry of Education 1934, as a professor of economics. Imprisoned 1939 by order of Reza Shah, on an accusation of having expressed doubts whether the trans-Iranian railway would pay. Finally obtained release on the fall of Reza Shah in 1941. Director of the Propaganda Section in 1942 and 1943 though he was not very effective in that post and was relieved of his duties early in 1943. Advocated propaganda in favour of religion in order to keep men's minds away from communism.

Speaks French, German, and some English. A very voluble, persistent little man, with a great idea of his own importance and infallibility. Has a large family of daughters.

76. *Ghaffari, Hassan Ali*. Son of the late Moavined Dowleh, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs. Educated in France. He went to the Persian Legation in Brussels. His main activity was in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he became Director of the Protocol Department. Appointed to the Ministry of Justice in 1926. G.O.C. of the Ministry of Commerce at the Court ward post. In 1929, when he was appointed to the Ministry of Justice at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was recalled in November 1929 for permitting publication in the press of the judicial safeguards accorded to foreign subjects in 1928, after the abolition of the extra-territorial privileges, but was reinstated in December 1929. He owed his appointment and reinstatement to Teymourache, the Minister of Court, with whom he was on terms of intimate friendship.

Ghaffari is an agreeable and well-educated man, and speaks French and German fluently. Appointed Minister at Brussels in the spring of 1933. Recalled to Tehran December 1936.

77. Ghaffari Jalal ud-Din (Mukaddis-ul Mamalik).—Born in Tehran about 1880. Educated in Persia and Germany. Entered the Ministry of Finance in 1913, has held various posts as revenue officer in that Ministry. Discharged suddenly owing to intrigues against him in 1929. Since then acted as agent for the Sheikh of Mohammedrah in negotiations with Government Departments. Unemployed since the sheikh's death in May 1936.

Voluble and energetic, very well disposed towards us.

78. Ghani, Qasim.—Born about 1894 at Sabzevar. Sent to Tehran for school for four years. Then went to Beirut where he qualified as a doctor after a course lasting about seven years. On return to Tehran stayed a short time and then went to Meshed where he married a wife and doing many good works. Then went to Meshed where he married a wife. A great student of Persian literature. Elected as a Deputy for Meshed in the 13th Majlis. Minister of Health in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1943. Member of the Persian Farhangistan or Academy.

A cultured and widely read man, reputed to be a Bahai but that is doubtful. Author of a history of Sufism.

79. Hajer, Abdul Husain.—Born about 1895. The son of one of the Government officers who served in the Ministry of Finance and Communications, and in the following year followed that Minister to the Ministry of Finance. Governed various provinces. A number of times he was given various lucrative posts by him, including the management of the Cloth Monopoly. He was sent to Europe as part of a Commission to purchase stocks for the Cloth Monopoly. Head of the Industrial and Agricultural Bank, August 1938. Minister of Commerce and Industry, March 1942, and Minister of Roads and Communications in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Showed commendable energy in inspecting communications in person.

Went to England to study transport conditions in June 1943 and was still away at the end of the year, meanwhile, in December 1943, on the Cabinet being reshuffled, he became Minister of the Interior.

An energetic and resourceful man, in his early days he was an interpreter and munshi at the Russian Consulate-General. Speaks French, Russian and English; very talkative but has many sound ideas and a shrewd knowledge of his countrymen. Is unmarried.

80. Hakim, Ali Akbar.—Born in Tehran about 1894, the son of the late Mirza Mahmoud Khan Hakim ul Mulk, a personal servant of Muzaffar-ed Din Shah. Married to a French lady. Owns property near Tehran, on which he managed to grow a variety of cotton which was considered of very good quality. In virtue of this, appointed Director of Agriculture in 1931, though he had had no previous experience in Government service. Resigned in 1932. Acted as a member of the Directing Board of the Agricultural Bank during 1933. Since then has retired to his estates.

Minister of Agriculture in Feraqhi's Cabinet, October 1941 but resigned through ill health, or more probably incompetence, February 1942. It was not much loss.

81. Hidayat, Abdullah, Brigadier (Dartip).—Born about 1902, the son of Mirza Asad Khan, a family that has usually been pro-British. Brigadier Hidayat is outwardly friendly, but is a secret agent of the British. Head of the Third Bureau of the General Staff, May 1942, Commandant of the Officers' School, November 1942.

A well-qualified serious officer, more staff officer than a commander. Has a good reputation. Was with the General Staff in the Yezan. Belongs to the military clique headed by his friend Razmara. Speaks good French and some English.

82. Hidayat, Javadullah.—Son of the late Sami-ed-Douleh, who was murdered in Tehran during the Constitutional troubles about 1908. Born about

1895. Educated as a civil engineer in Germany. Member of the staff of the Legation at Berlin 1920-23. On the staff of the Ministry of Public Works 1923. Appointed Chief of Railway Construction about that time. Interested in various engineering projects in Tehran, and in a spinning factory. Director of the post of Pahlavi 1930. Arrested and tried for complicity in the irregularities in the Ministry of Roads and Communications February 1936, sentenced in the autumn to six months' imprisonment and a fine.

Intelligent, and of charming manners. Speaks French and German. His mother was a daughter of Muzaffar-ed Din Shah. Exonerated after the fall of Reza Shah, but not re-employed in Government service. In 1943 engaged in contracting work.

83. Hidayat, Mehdi Quli (Mukhbir-us-Saltanah). Born about 1885. Spent several years in Germany as a young man. Was appointed Chamberlain at Court in 1894. Accompanied the Atabeg on his tour round the world in 1903, and afterwards performed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Returned to Tehran in 1904. Appointed Minister of Justice in April 1907. Governor-General of Azerbaijan in 1908, but left for Europe in June 1909. Returned in August 1909 and resumed the Governorship-General of Azerbaijan, where he remained until 1911, when he again visited Europe. At this time, Hidayat was on very bad terms with the Russian Legation in Tehran. Returned to Persia in December 1911. Governor-General of Fars from 1913 to 1915. During the war his sympathies were with the Germans, and in Fars he secretly helped German agents. Appointed Minister of Justice in November 1917, and again in January 1918. Became Minister of Interior in April 1918, when he abetted the Jangalis in their rebellion against the Central Government, and he

led the South Persia Rifles, which led to some disaffection. Appointed Minister of Finance from July to November 1920, and Minister of Public Works from March to June 1923. Elected a Deputy to the fifth term of the Majlis 1924-26. Minister of Public Works June 1926. Appointed chief judge of the Court of Appeal in April 1927, and Prime Minister in June 1927. During his tenure of office as Prime Minister he acted at times as Minister of Finance as well.

Speaks German, French and some English, and is intelligent and well read. His hatred of Russia caused him to favour the German cause during the European War, and as a result he was often very unfriendly towards Great Britain. Of later years he has become more friendly, and endeavours to eschew political intrigue. As Prime Minister he was but a figure-head, and carried out the policy which Teymouriasche dictated. He is addicted to opium smoking, and is rapidly becoming more enfeebled in both mind and body.

Hidayat's Cabinet lasted till September 1933, when the Shah instructed it to resign. Hidayat was then appointed Governor-General of Khorasan, but succeeded in begging himself off, on grounds of old age and private affairs he therefore did not proceed to Meshed, and another Governor-General was appointed in December 1933.

84. Hidayat, Reza Quli (Nayyer-ul Mulk).—Eldest son of the late Jafar Quli Khan Nayyer ul Mulk, and a brother of the late Mukhbir ul-Douleh. K C I E. Born in Tehran about 1870. Educated at the Darulfunun College at Tehran. Served in the Ministry of Education 1893-1920. Director-General of that Ministry from 1919 to 1921. Minister of Education in Seyyid Zia's Cabinet of 1921. Again in the same post in 1922. Member of the High Court of Appeal in 1927. Acting president of the High Court of Appeal 1928 to 1934, and president from 1934 to 1936, when he had to resign owing to the Shah's displeasure at his conduct. Served in the Ministry of Roads and Communications. A member of the supervisory Board of the National Bank of Iran 1929-32.

A highly respectable and respected old gentleman, who was no doubt glad to be required from him.

85. Hikmat, Ali Arghar.—Born about 1894. A member of a Shiraz family and cousin to Mushar-ud-Douleh (Mirza Nizam-ud-Din Khan Hikmat) and Sardar Fakhr (Mirza Reza Khan Hikmat). Educated in the Church Missionary Society School at Shiraz 1908-09. Well read in Arabic. Went to Tehran in 1914, where he entered the American College, graduating in 1917. Joined the Ministry of Public Instruction as an inspector. Appointed Director of Education for Fars about 1920, but kept out of the position owing to

intrigues. Candidate for Parliament (the fifth Majlis) in 1923, for Shiraz and also for Jahrum, but was not successful. Employed in the Ministry of Education until about 1930, when he went abroad to Paris to study law. Said to have done well in his examinations. Returned to Tehran in September 1933, to take charge of the Ministry of Education as acting Minister. Raised to the rank of Minister in February 1936. Dismissed, July 1938, owing to the Shah's displeasure about a telegram connected with the Paris Exhibition, but restored to favour as Minister of the Interior, February 1939. Resigned March 1940. Was proposed for Minister, Berlin, but the German Government hesitated about his agreement. When it did come the Shah decided to re-employ him as Minister of the Interior instead but dismissed him in June 1940.

Minister of Industry and Commerce in Foroughi's Cabinet in 1941, and had a good deal to do with the negotiations about the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. Minister of Health, March 1942. Minister of Justice in Sobehi's Cabinet of February 1943, but resigned in July owing to differences of opinion with his chief.

The author of some literary works, he spends some time instructing students in Persian literature at the university. Often accused of intriguing against Qasbi. Most promising candidates for the post of Prime Minister.

Speaks English and French well, always very helpful to us.

86. *Hikmat Reza (Sadar Fakhir)*. Born Shiraz about 1888. Cousin of Ali Asghar Hikmat. During the 1914-18 war was a determined enemy of Qavam-ul Mulk and friendly with the Qashqaia. Since that war settled in Tehran and was employed in various Government appointments. Governor-General of Kermān 1940-41. Head of the Statistics and Civil Status Office 1942. Candidate for the 14th Majlis 1944 for Shiraz, and seemed still to enjoy the support and friendship of the Qashqaia.

A corpulent and polite man, very hospitable but a man of curious friends.

87. *Homayunadjah, Muhammad Ali*.—Born about 1898. A graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Judge of the Tribunal of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-25. Has held various clerical posts in the Ministry, culminating in that of head of the personnel section of the Ministry 1932-34. Sent as counsellor to Paris in 1935; a post to which he was singularly ill fitted owing to his scanty knowledge of French.

For some obscure reason said to be connected with seniority, was made Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in April 1942, in which post he maintains his reputation of benevolent and useless stupidity.

A corpulent individual showing few indications of intelligence, his appointment to a foreign post was looked upon as a very good joke in Tehran.

88. *Ibtisaj (Ehtesaj), Abul-Hussein*.—Second son of Ehtesaj-ul Mulk, and brother of Ghulam Hussein Ehtesaj. Born at Resht about 1900. Interpreter to the British forces in Gilan towards the end of the war. Entered the service of the Imperial Bank of Persia at Resht about 1920. Did well there and was transferred to Tehran 1925. Assistant to the chief inspector from then till he resigned in 1936.

Head of the Mortgage Bank 1939. Realised one of his ambitions when he became president of the National Bank of Iran (Banque Mellé) in September 1942. In that post he was well liked. Has a good deal of energy and energy. On the other hand he is hasty, hot-tempered and easily upset, and his persistence in an unwise legal attack on the Imperial Bank of Iran (a suit which he eventually lost) seems to show that he bears that institution a grudge. Pro-British and anti-Russian to such an extent that he is almost regarded as a British agent by his numerous political rivals.

Married in 1926. Married to a daughter of T. H. N. T. (Mazur and Doulah). Both he and his wife speak English, French and Russian well. No children.

89. *Ibtisaj (Ehtesaj), Ghulam Hussein*.—Born at Resht 1898. Eldest son of the late Ehtesaj ul Mulk, who was for years in charge of the Gilan estates of Fathullah Akbar. Educated at Resht and completed his studies at Beirut, and for a short time in France. Interpreter to the British Expeditionary Force 1918-20.

His father was assassinated by the Jungahis, and he, together with his family fled to Tehran when the Bolsheviks occupied Gilan in 1920. Clerk in the Prime Minister's office 1920-21. Secretary to the Governor of Gilan 1921-22. Transferred to the Ministry of Public Works and assistant to the American

adviser, Colonel Morris 1923-28. Dismissed from that post, apparently for dishonesty. Joined the Ulen Company in 1929, when the latter had a contract to construct the railways in the south. Transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1931, first secretary in London April 1932. First secretary in Cairo March 1933. Suspended by the Ministry shortly after, apparently for conduct in London when the d'Arcy Concession was cancelled. In 1934 Chief of Personnel at the Ministry of the Interior, and then director of the Tourist Department and chief of the Touring Club of Iran. Went to Moscow in September 1936 to arrange the transfer of the Russian tourist organisation "Intourist" to his organisation, newly named "IranTour". Assistant to the Chief of the Tehran Municipality October 1937, but returned to the Ministry of Interior in 1938. Director of Administrative Services in the Ministry August 1939. Acting Chief of Tehran Municipality July 1939.

Incurred Reza Shah's displeasure and was relieved of his charge of the Municipality in September 1940. Since then has been controlling "IranTour", an hotel syndicate, and also serving on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Mixed Administration. In 1942 divorced his Persian wife and married a Polish refugee.

Author of a widely used guide book to Iran. Speaks English, French and Russian. A clever young man, with vast ideas, not to be trusted very far.

90. *Ikhan, Amir Husain*.—Son of the late Sardar Zafar Bakhtiari. Born about 1896. Educated partly in England. Married to a sister of the late Sardar Asad. Governor of Yazd 1918-19. A Deputy to the sixth, seventh and eighth Majlises. Deposed of postmaster general and under arrest in December 1933. Tried by a military court on charge of treason to the State, sentenced to three years' imprisonment with hard labour November 1934. Released 1936.

A popular and pleasant young man, who speaks English and French

was elected for the fourteenth Majlis 1944. One of the best of the young Bakhtiari.

91. *Intizam (Entezam), Abdullah*.—Born about 1897. Brother of Seyyed Naorullah. Served the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in various capacities since about 1921. While secretary at Washington married an American lady. At the Ministry in Tehran 1925-27. In the Press Department of the Ministry 1931-33. Transferred to Prague 1935 as consul. Charge d'Affaires, Berne, May 1938.

Head of the 3rd Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs April 1941 and was responsible for most of the routine work connected with as a member of the staff of the Legation at Berne at the end of that year. Had previously divorced his American wife and one explanation of his journey to Berne was that he was pursuing another lady.

A pleasant and go-ahead young man speaks English and French

92. *Intizam (Entezam), Naorullah*.—Born about 1898. Son of the late Intizam and nephew of Hassan Ali Ghaffari. Educated in Tehran. Secretary at Paris 1928. Secretary at Warsaw 1927-32. Secretary to the Persian delegates to the League of Nations during the Anglo-Persian Oil Company dispute in 1933. Member of the Persian delegation to the World Economic Conference 1933. Secretary at London May 1933. Transferred to Washington 1934. Has also served in the Treaty Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. First secretary at Berne 1936. "Délégué suppléant" at the League of Nations May 1938. Head of the 3rd Political Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing *inter alia* with Great Britain), July 1938. Attended the Duke of Spoleto's wedding in Italy June 1939.

Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1941. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in the reconstruction of Qavam-es-Saltaneh's Cabinet in February 1943, a post which he retained in the following Cabinet of Sobehi.

A quiet and attractive young man. Helpful and honest. Speaks French and English.

93. *Iqbal (Eghbal), Ali*.—Born in Meshed about 1895. Son of a well known landowner of Khorasan, with property at Kashmar and elsewhere in the province. Deputy in the twelfth, thirteenth and fourteenth Majlises. Never in Government service, but well acquainted with Khorasan politics. Aspired to becoming the mutawalli-hashi of the Meshed shrine 1943, but did not succeed owing to the opposition of the Governor-General. An enemy of Sobehi, and a professing supporter of Seyyed Zia-ud-Din. In the Majlis does not cultivate the limelight but exercises a good deal of influence on various committees and political groups.

94 *Iqbal (Iqbal), Manuchehr*.—Younger brother of Ali Iqbal. Born at Meshed about 1895. Educated at Tehran at the medical school, and then in France, where he qualified as a doctor and received a medal for research. Returned to Persia in 1939 and was employed for some time in the Ministry of Public Health. Under Secretary of the Ministry 1943. He ran the technical side of the Ministry's work with success, and is evidently hard working and efficient. Does not mix in politics. Married to a Frenchwoman.

95. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Colonel Abbas Quli*.—Born about 1897. Third son of Hassan Isfandiari. Graduated at Saint Cyr in France and joined the French army during the war, was wounded and captured by the Germans. Was a captain in the French army and received the Légion d'Honneur and the Croix de Guerre. Returned to Persia in 1919 and joined the gendarmerie with the rank of Major. He was in command of the 4th Battalion of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the 1st Army Corps during the Haardt Citroën Trans Asiatic expedition in 1931. Acting head of the 4th Bureau at army headquarters in 1932.

Chief of the 1st Bureau of the General Staff Tehran in 1940.

96. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Abdul Hussein Sadig (Sadig-ul-Mulk)*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Joined the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1917. First secretary at Brussels 1926. Recalled in 1931. Counsellor at Kabul 1933. Consul at Karachi 1934-36. Head of the Economics Section of the Consular Department, later made a separate department 1937.

Consul General at Jerusalem 1939. Married a daughter of Yamin Isfandiari.

A relation of Hajj Muhsin us-Saltaneh (Hassan Isfandiari). Rather a weak individual, the inefficiency of whose methods caused travellers from Karun to Iran a good deal of trouble in 1938.

97. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Asadullah Yamin (Yamin ul-Manalik)*.—Son of the late Yamin ul-Manalik and a nephew of Hassan Isfandiari. Born in Tehran 1885. Educated in Tehran and Tiflis. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1901, in 1908 had reached the rank of deputy chief of the Foreign Office Tribunal. Kaerguzar in Isfahan 1917. Governor of the Gulf Ports 1921-23. Consul general at Baku 1924-29. Governor of Mazandaran 1930-32. Recalled from that post and under a cloud for some time. Director of the Tehran Telephone Company.

Deputy in the thirteenth Majlis 1941 to 1943. Is a director of most of the important companies of the capital, and finds time to look after the affairs of the Aero-Club as well. Has a typical capitalist and conservative outlook, but nevertheless spoke in the Majlis in favour of the factory workers at Isfahan.

98. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Fathullah Nuri*. Second son of Hassan Isfandiari (Muhsin us-Saltaneh). Born about 1893. Educated in Switzerland and France. Second secretary of the Persian Legation in London 1914-24. Assistant chief of the English Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1925. First secretary at Washington 1926-29. Counsellor at Paris 1929-30. Counsellor at London 1930-31. Chief of the Persian Exhibition. Chief of the Economics Section at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1932. Chargé d'Affaires again in London March to December 1933. Head of the Treaty Department at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1934, served also in the Passport section. For three months from the end of 1935 he was in Baghdad on a mission charged with negotiations over the frontier dispute, but achieved little. "Chef du protocole" May 1936 to December 1937. In charge of the Government-controlled "Iran" Insurance Company 1938. Appointed Persian Government representative with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1942 in London. Married. A very capable, helpful, an excellent type of permanent official, though he has not inherited the eloquence of his father, much to the latter's disappointment.

99. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Hassan (Haji Muhsin us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1862. Entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and after a short time was appointed secretary to the Persian Legation in Berlin. In 1895 he was appointed Persian consul in Bombay; returned in 1897 to Tehran and became Under-Secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied Muzaffer-ed-Din Shah to Europe in 1905. Later he became Under-Secretary at the Ministry of the Interior. Appointed Persian Minister of the Interior but did not proceed. Minister of Justice in 1910 and Minister for Foreign Affairs from January to July 1911. Minister of Finance in 1912-13 and again

from August 1914 to March 1915. Minister for Foreign Affairs from April 1915 to December 1915. Minister of Finance from June to September 1917, when he was appointed Governor General in Azerbaijan. In 1919 he was exiled to Kashan by Mirza Hassan Khan Vossuq for intriguing against the Government of the day. He was allowed to return to Tehran in July 1920. Minister for Foreign Affairs, February to March 1921 and from June 1921 to January 1922. Minister of Education June 1922 to June 1923 and Minister of Finance from September 1923 to January 1924.

Hostile to the Allies in the war of 1914-18, he was bought by the Germans in 1915, but that did not prevent him from taking money from the Russians as well.

Reputed to be dishonest and an intriguer. When Minister of Finance in 1917 he caused the grain in the Government stores to be sold in order to pay up the Russian loan. He was also responsible for the mortality caused in Tehran by the famine which followed the crop failure of 1917. Elected as a Deputy to the eighth Majlis 1930. Was a prominent speaker in the Majlis when the latter body unanimously denounced the Anglo-Persian Oil Company's concession at the end of 1932.

A pleasant man to talk to. Has great ideas of his own importance and is interested in the silk industry of Gilan, holding a Government concession for the export of cocoons. The father of Fathullah Hour Isfandiari.

He was a member of the Persian Legation in London from 1914 to 1917 and of the Persian Legation in Paris from 1917 to 1920.

September 1937 and of the twelfth October 1939. Headed the Iranian Mission to the Coronation of King George VI and the mission to the coronation of the Crown Prince to Princess Fowzieh, February-April 1939. President of the Majlis in its thirteenth legislative period 1941, in spite of being well over the age limit. It seems difficult to imagine the Majlis without him, and, in spite of occasional newspaper attacks, he is widely respected as an Elder Statesman. One of the last acts of the thirteenth Majlis, in December 1943, was to vote him a life pension of 10,000 rials per month.

100. *Isfandiari (Esfandiari), Musa Nuri (Murafag-us-Saltaneh)*.—Brother of Asadullah Yamin Isfandiari. Born in Tehran 1894. Educated in Tehran and Europe. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1918. Chief of the League of Nations' section 1932. Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires at Paris 1933. Counsellor at Moscow in December 1933, and very soon afterwards transferred to Ankara, where he was Chargé d'Affaires for some time. Head of the Consular Department, March 1937. Director-General of Industry and Mines, July 1937. Summarily relieved of that appointment in September owing to a muddle over the Chalus silk factory that was in reality due to his predecessor Jehanbani. Administrative Director-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, December 1937. Minister, Bagdad, August 1938. Sent on a special mission to Berlin 1939. Left Berlin on rupture of relations in 1941. Returned to Bagdad as Minister; recalled to Tehran, on conclusion of five years' foreign service in 1943. Though at first suspected of pro-German feelings, owing to his visit to Berlin, he behaved correctly on his second period of office in Bagdad. Minister of Agriculture in Soheily's revised Cabinet of December 1941.

Speaks French and Italian. A pleasant young man. Married very early, and has a son who is a champion at lawn-tennis.

101. *Itimadi (Ittehad), Nasir Quli (Nasir-ul-Douleh)*.—Born about 1886. A Qajar prince, descended from the famous vazir Mirza Taghi Khan. Occupied various posts in Government service, including Governor of the Gulf Ports in 1923. Sent on an economic mission to Germany in connexion with the settlement of various accounts about 1939. Returned to Persia 1942 and soon after appointed assistant to the Prime Minister by Soheily, with the rank of Under-Secretary of State.

Ambitious and clever; a good bridge player; but without much stability. Speaks French and German.

Having previously served in the Ministry of War he hoped at one time to become Minister of War. Resigned January 1944, having hopes of governing Persia.

102. *Jahan (Djehan), Ja'far (Djafar)*.—Born at Kerbela 1905, of a Mazandaran family. Educated at Tehran in the Law School. In 1931 went to France and studied law at Toulouse but did not complete the course. 1933 judge

in the Tehran Court of First Instance. 1934 in the Ministry of the Interior 1938 to 1940 employed on inspection duties. Editor of a Tehran newspaper. Has done translations for this embassy.

A talkative man, very self-opinionated, speaks of a revival of religion in Persia, and advocates a return to religious control of the "Waqf" endowments.

103. *Jahanbani, Amir Lashkar Amanullah*.—Born about 1890, son of the late Amanullah Mirza, Zia-ed Dowleh (a descendant of Fath Ali Shah), who committed suicide in the British consulate in Tabriz, where he had taken refuge from the Russians in 1917.

Amanullah joined the Persian Cossack Artillery School in 1907. In 1910 he was sent to the military school in Moscow, where he graduated in 1913. For the following two years he was attached to the Imperial Guard. In 1916 he entered the Persian Cossack Division with the rank of captain, and was made aide-de-camp to the Russian General Statossolsky, then commanding officer of the Cossack Division. He sided with Reza Khan in the *coup d'Etat* in 1921, and later distinguished himself in the operations against Simitko, being greatly helped therein by former Tsarist officers attached to his staff. Was made a general, and became chief of the General Staff in 1922. He visited France and England in 1923. Removed from his post as Chief of Staff for taking matters too easily, but regained the Royal favour, and was appointed to command the Eastern Division in August 1926. He organised and commanded the expedition for the pacification of Persian Baluchistan in the autumn of 1928, and in November 1928 he was created General of Division (Amir Lashkar) as a reward for his services; in December 1930 went to France to follow a course of two years' training at the Staff College.

Employed in Baluchistan in 1934 and 1935. In October 1935 fell from favour. Employed in the Senior Officers' Staff College. His eclipse was, however, brief, and he was a *petite* *Doyen* of the Staff College in March 1936. Dismissed in July 1937.

His reasons are variously rumoured as friendliness with foreigners, espionage by his Russian wife, or an explosion which occurred in a powder magazine.

He is pleasant and agreeable, though inclined to suffer from swelled head. Intelligent and fairly well educated, he is enthusiastic about sport, which he has done much to encourage in the Persian army; plays polo and tennis moderately well. Fond of European society, easy-going, and somewhat lacking in determination. He does not share the populace as do many of his colleagues. He is inclined to imitate westerners, and is ready to accept new ideas and machines without considering their suitability.

Is friendly to Englishmen, but finds Frenchmen and Russians of the former régime more congenial. Reported in prison in Tehran in July 1939, and in poor health. Liberated 1941 and made Minister of the Interior in September. Minister of Roads and Communications, December 1941. Minister of War, March 1942, and employed in the autumn at Court as a kind of aide-de-camp general to the Shah. Useful in doing little jobs with the Soviet Embassy but gives the impression of being overmuch inclined to subject the present Shah to the same sort of fulsome flattery which turned his father's head.

General officer commanding Pers, September 1943.

Speaks Russian and French fluently. Has a Russian as well as at least one Persian wife.

104. *Jahanbani (Djahanbani), Muhammed Hussein*.—Born about 1892, brother of Amanullah Jahanbani. Educated at Tehran and in Russia, and joined the Persian Cossack Division about 1916. Chief of Staff to General Anur Ahmed in the Luristan operations about 1923. Military Governor of the Bouz Ahmedi country shortly afterwards, where he governed with some success. Fell from favour with Reza Shah at the same time as his brother in 1935. Then served in various capacities at the Ministry of Industry, especially in some purchasing commissions. Director-General at the Ministry of the Interior 1943, being in charge of the arrangements for the elections to the fourteenth Majlis, an occupation which nearly drove him crazy. Chief of Police, February 1944.

Speaks French, Russian, and some English. The author of an anthology of Persian poetry. Said to be very corrupt financially but is easy to get on with.

105. *Jam (Djam), Mahmud (Mudir ul Mulk)*. Born about 1880. Has had a long career in the Customs and other Government departments, and was, for more than ten years, Persian secretary to the French Legation in Tehran.

Director of the Alimentation Service, Tehran, from 1916 to 1920, where he did good work. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in the short-lived Cabinet of Sayyid Zia-ed-Din 1921. Acting Minister of Finance January 1922 as Minister of Finance October 1923 to August 1924. Appointed as assistant to Prime Minister, Serdar Sipeh, until the latter became provisional head of the State on the 31st October, 1925, and then assistant to the two following Prime Ministers. Appointed Persian Minister to Brussels in 1926, but did not proceed. Appointed Governor of Kerman Province in September 1927, and Governor-General of Khorassan in April 1928. Recalled from Khorassan in December 1928.

General in August 1929. Appointed Minister of the Interior in Ferozgh's Cabinet of 1933, and succeeded him as Prime Minister in December 1935. Heavily criticised the mission to Egypt on the Crown Prince's betrothal to Princess Fawziyah June July 1938, and received the Order of Muhammad Ali from King Faruk. Minister of Court October 1939. Ambassador to Egypt 1941.

An amiable and pleasant man who speaks French fluently. The Legation, in their dealings with him, have always found him trustworthy and sincere.

106. *Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr ul Mulk)*.—Born about 1880, son of the late Mirza Asadullah Khan. He was prominent in the political events associated with the constitution of 1906. In 1911 he was appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Public Works, and in that capacity was suspected (in common with his son) of pro-German leanings. He held various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1923.

Not brilliant but sound and conscientious, said to be a convinced democrat very well disposed to us.

107. *Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr ul Mulk)*.—Born about 1880, son of the late Mirza Asadullah Khan.

He was prominent in the political events associated with the constitution of 1906. In 1911 he was appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Public Works, and in that capacity was suspected (in common with his son) of pro-German leanings. He held various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1923.

In 1921 he accompanied the then Crown Prince of Persia on a voyage to India and to various European countries.

In 1925 he was appointed Governor-General of Isfahan.

In June 1927 he was appointed Governor-General of Fars, and in December 1927 went to Bagdad as acting consul general. His tenure of office at Bagdad was not a success, he fell foul of the Residency owing to certain discourteous omissions in his conduct towards the Residency officials. Whether or not these transgressions were performed on his own responsibility or under instructions from his Government, the latter saw as he did him a *some* *disappointment*.

Thereafter he was unemployed until December 1931, when he was appointed Persian Minister at Tehran. Recalled to Tehran in 1934. Appointed Minister of the Interior, November 1935, and in December 1938. President of the "Comptable des Comptes" or Audit Department 1940, and was Minister of Justice for one day in the short-lived Ferozgh's Cabinet of March 1942.

He is a pleasant and intelligent little man. His relations with British consular officers at Isfahan and Shiraz were always cordial and friendly, but he is not a great personality.

108. *Kamal Hidayat, Mustafa Quli (Fahim ud Douleh)*.—Son of the late Mirza Asadullah Khan. He was prominent in the political events associated with the constitution of 1906. In 1911 he was appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs, and Public Works, and in that capacity was suspected (in common with his son) of pro-German leanings. He held various ministerial posts between 1917 and 1923.

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A delightful and amusing conversationalist, speaking French well. On very bad terms with his uncle, Mendi Quli Hedayat

A man of the world but too old to exert himself greatly, in fact, he is now too inclined to depend on his subordinates.

109. *Kumbakhsh, Abdus-Samad*.—Born 1905, at Kuzvin, his father, still alive in 1943, was Ain-ul-Mamalik, a Qajar prince and wealthy landowner at Kuzvin. Entered Persian army about 1923, sent to Leningrad for training and became a pilot there, also imbibed the doctrines of communism with enthusiasm. On return was active Communist and was known as the Persian representative on the Comintern. Sentenced to death by Reza Shah, but was pardoned and then imprisoned with fifty-three other Communists. Exiled in 1940 to Bandar Abbas, released on the fall of Reza in 1941. Married to a Persian related to the Kia family who acts as an accoucheuse in Tehran.

Candidate for the 14th Majlis for Kazvin, and helped in that context by the Soviet representative

110. *Kazimi (Kazemi), Buzir (Bagher) (Muazzib-ud Dowleh).*— Born about 1887. Educated in the School of Political Science in Tehran. Began his career in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, being first attached to the Russian section, and later employed in the Cabinet of the Ministry. Appointed Chief of Cabinet in 1921. Appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Washington in 1925. Sent to Iraq to inspect Persian consulates in 1928. Later in the same year appointed counsellor to the Persian Legation in Kabul, but could only proceed as far as Herat, where he remained as Persian consul general. Appointed Under Secretary to the Ministry of Roads and Communications in 1930, and Acting Minister in 1931. Appointed substantive Minister of Roads and Communications in May 1931, but had to resign in February 1932, owing, it is said to being unable to build roads fast enough for His Majesty, the ex Shah. He was subsequently appointed Persian Minister in Bagdad, towards the end of 1932.

To almost everyone's surprise, Kazem was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ferouhi's Cabinet of September 1932.

Went on official visits to Afghanistan and India November-December 1935, and was the guest of the Viceroy (Lord Willingdon) at Delhi. Resigned March 1936, and unemployed until appointed Governor-General of Eastern Azerbaijan, April 1937. Ambassador, Kabul, July 1938. Ambassador, Angora, October 1938.

Kazumi is socially agreeable and friendly, and speaks English and some French. As Minister for Foreign Affairs he was not a success. He was untruthful and unreliable, and relations between him and His Majesty's Ministers in 1934-36 became very strained. His departure was greeted by all foreign missions with relief.

Minister of Public Health, December 1941 to March 1942. Then Minister of Finance in Qawam al-Saltanah a Cabinet of August 1942, but resigned before its fall in circumstances which did him little credit. Appointed to Ankara as ambassador in May 1943, but did not proceed, the Turks appear to like him as little as the Iraqis, who have not forgotten how he opposed them in the dispute concerning the Shatt-el-Arab waters. Nevertheless he is a man of intell. force and energy.

111 *Kazimi (Kazemi), Mustafa (Dabir-ul Mulk)*—Born in Tehran 1891. Educated at the School of Political Science, Tehran. Entered the Ministry of Education 1914, and appointed Director of Education at Kerman in 1915. A staunch member of the Democratic party and intensely anti-British. Caused a great deal of trouble to the British forces and the Imperial Bank of Persia during the war. Financial agent at Isfahan 1920-22. In the Ministry of Finance 1923-25. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice 1927-28. Chairman of the Caspian Fisheries Committee 1928-32. Governor-General of Kerman 1932-33.

Engaged in politics after the fall of Reza Shah, tried to found a new party without success. June 1942 Elected member of the Majlis for Kerman 1943, after vehement protestations of repentance for his anti-British past.

An unreliable person.

at Kerbela and lived there for many years. He was arrested by the British Government in 1922 for non-co-operation with our policy in Iraq and came back to Persia, where he has been ever since. Kept in the background

during Reza Shah's reign, but on the latter's abdication in 1941 came back into prominence. He was an opponent of Reza Shah. His anti-British bias, a legacy from 1922, led him into intrigues with German agents and in August 1943 he fled from Tehran to avoid arrest as a suspect. An intriguing and unscrupulous reactionary

112. *Keyhan, Jalal ul Din*.—Born in Tehran 1884. Educated in the Tehran School of Law. Entered the service of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1903. Deputy Consul at Tiflis in 1905. Vice Consul at Tiflis in 1910. In the Russian section of the Ministry 1914. Consul in Kerdela 1919. Consul at Damascus 1920. Consul at Bombay 1927-32. Deputy Governor of Azerbaijan, June 1932. Head of the First Political Section of the Ministry 1935-36. General Consul at Tiflis 1936-37. 1937-38. Consul at Tiflis 1938-39.

File 1 of the Russian Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 641

A rather dried up individual, who hardly seems to have recovered from the shock of the invasion. I saw him at the Hotel de Ville. Very anxious not to allow a serious flood to take place. Speaks French and English, and is reasonable and agreeable to deal with.

113. *Keyhan, Mas'ud (Massoud)*.—Born in Jibrān 1886. Brother of J. A. B. K. Studied at Saint Cyr. Joined the gendarmerie in 1913 and served as a staff officer in different parts of Persia. Appointed Minister of War in Seyyid Zia's short lived Cabinet in 1921. Left the army after this, and since 1924 has been a professor in the secondary schools and the Ecole Normale at Tehran.

Speaks French. The author of a *Geography of Persia* in three volumes.

114. *Khazeh-Noury, Ghulam Ali (Nizam-uz-Salatin)*—Son of Amir Nour-uz-Zaman, Tehran. Member of the Persian Government of the Ministry of Finance Affairs for several years, with an interval as secretary at the Legation, Rome, in 1925. Visited the Sultan in 1926, and was connected with the printing of bank-notes for the Iranian Government and commissions for the Royal palace.

educated partly in Russia, where he learnt ballet-dancing. Spenska French and Russian. Tall, thin, dark, with a cold, pale complexion. Added to his excellent French, with a dash of Italian, he is a member of the Académie Française. He is hospitable and popular with the Diplomatic Corps.

Has done various services for the court after the fall of Henry Stuart. He has been being French instructor to the Queen Mother, whom he admires with a mother's love.

He prefers to be known as Nizam Khajeh Noury

115. *Khajeh-Noury, Hussein*—Born about 1892. Of Qazvin. A cousin of Nasser-ud-din, brother and co-adjutor to the Noury Pasha.

Entered the service of the Ministry of Finance about 1909. Until Dr. Meidpaugh's mission as assistant director of supplies, and head of a committee to the National Bank in 1927. He studied abroad in "Secret Police" matters, training to a private bank in Berlin, and was assistant to Dr. Lundenblatt. Dr. Meidpaugh left in 1929. He had been in the Ministry of Finance since 1909 concerning a loan taken during his period of office. In the Accounts Department of the Ministry of Roads August 1932.

that of interpreter and assistant to Dr. Modjough's financial experts in 1961.
A key witness who is said to have seen the [redacted]

116. *Akserovani, Shahab*.—Born about 1900. Native of Mahallát. Educated in Tehran. Recently married. A. V. H. S. Navy. 1938—Head marshi to the legation. Made a considerable fortune out of contracting for various constructional works 1940-43. Candidate for the 14th Majlis 1943-44.

An astute business man, but little more.

117 Akademi, Akademi. Per 187. ...
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127. Marzban (Morzuban), Dr. Hussein (Saeed-ul Mulk).—Born about 1888. Nephew of Mr Ismail Marzban. Studied as a doctor and was employed in this capacity on the Turco-Persian frontier commission in 1913. Then entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary and counsellor at Constantinople about 1920, and thereafter for some years, acquiring a very good knowledge of Turkish and a Greek wife. Consul-General at Baku in 1929. Governor of Luristan 1938. Governor of Western Azerbaijan at Reza'ish in 1942 and again in 1943. On Scheily's proposing him for the post of Governor-General of Azerbaijan, however, that he is either pro-Turkish or pro-Soviet, he has seen both countries at very close quarters and knows their peculiarities intimately.

128 *Murazan (Marzudan), Dr Ismail (Amin-ul Mulk)*. Born about 1875. at Resht. Studied medicine in France, and has practised as an oculist at Tehran for about the last forty years. Visited London in connexion with the Constitutional movement in 1906. Has had several excursions into politics, having been for a time President of the Iran Club after Jami, a post which he still holds. Universally liked and respected as an honest old gentleman. Owns a little property in Resht, but is not rich, and still practised up to his appointment as Minister of Public Health under Qawam-es-Saltaneh in 1942. He resigned from that post in December 1942. One son, Nan'rihr Marzhan, is now in the Ministry of Health Affairs. He has been a member of the 'Tehran' party for some years, but has not shown any active political views. Always ready to do right or right or wrong. Benevolent and agreeable manner. Speaks French. Took a prominent part in supervising the Tehran elections, December 1943.

Killed his own mother at his father's instigation on a point of honour in 1904. He seems to have lived down the odium of this deed. Has been several times to Europe. Has visited Persia. Speaks Persian, Arabic, French, English and is pleasant mannered, clever and intelligent. The two-fold stigma of being pro-British and a Qajar prevented him coming back to power during the régime of Reza Shah. Since the fall of Reza Shah he has continued aloof from public affairs, though he has kept in touch with what is going on, and has now become the unofficial controller of almost everything in Isfahan. He takes a great pride in his model village at Asgharabad, near Isfahan, and may very easily have a part to play in shaping Persia's future in the next few years. Has one surviving son, and a daughter. A famous hunter.

130 *Mas'ud* (*Masoudi*), *Abbas*.—Born in 1895 in Tehran. Educated in Tehran, and for a year in France. A journalist by profession and by nature. Proprietor with his brother, Jamal Masoudi, of one of the two principal vernacular daily papers in Tehran (the *Ittil'at*) and of the French daily paper *Journal de Tehran*. He accompanied the present Shah, when Crown Prince, to Iraq, Syria and Egypt on his wedding tour as press representative, and kept the

In the thirteenth Majlis came out strongly in opposition to Qavam-e-Saltaneh, being severely beaten by some of his opponents in the riots of the 8th December, 1942. Visited Palestine and Egypt in May-June 1943.

The Shah made him resign in June 1940, and his conduct of the various negotiations which had taken place while he was Prime Minister gave rise to a strong suspicion that he was favouring the Germans. In fact, in the speech which he made to journalists and Majlis Deputies shortly after Moini Dastgiri's dismissal, Reza Shah accused him of not reporting fully to the Shah. However, it is not clear whether he was actually dismissed or whether he resigned. In any case, the Shah being an absolute autocrat, receiving detailed reports from numerous sources, it seems unlikely that any Prime Minister would risk the royal wrath by suppressing anything. He himself says it was the Shah who ordered him to favour the Germans. Retired into seclusion in June 1940 until two years later. In 1943 was evidently hoping to re-enter the political arena. Arrested as a suspect June 1943.

132. *Miftah, Abdul Hussain*.—Son of the late Sir Daoud Miftah, K C M G. Was attached to his father when Minister in London in 1925. Passport Officer, Quetta, 1931-35, during which time he officiated as Consul General, Delhi in the absence of the incumbent. Then employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. A member of the suite attending on the Earl of Athlone and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations April 1939.

Slightly loud and self-confident, and does not appear to have inherited his father's well bred manner. Speaks English and French.

Minister of Public Health, September 1941, and resigned two months later, having incurred displeasure by converting an old shrine into a football field and encouraging mixed bathing.

134 *Mirbah Fatemy, Ali Naqhi*.—Born about 1898. Related to Imad-es-Saltaneh (Mehdi Fatemy) of the well-known Isfahan family, though not related to the *Shah*. He was employed in the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties. Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925, where he fell out with the Governor, Nasir-ul Mulk, who accused

134 *Mirshah Fatemy, Ali Naghi*.—Born about 1898. Related to Imad-es-Saltaneh (Mehdi Fatemy) of the well-known Isfahan family, though not related by blood. He was employed in the Ministry of the Interior, in various posts and inspection duties, Vice-Governor of Isfahan 1925, where he fell out with the Governor, Nasir-ul Mulk, who accused

him of taking bribes. Governor-General of Khuzistan in 1940 and again in 1943 he did well in asserting Government authority over boarders and ~~the~~ He also intervened to great effect in the elections, being successful the Government candidate elected for Dasht-i-Mashun, but putting in a friend of his, Nigahat, for Abadan, in defiance of the Government's wishes. Speaks English and French, and seems to get on well with the authorities of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company but a man who should not be trusted too far. Very voluble and plausible.

135. *Mu'addil (Model), Luft Ali*.—Born at Shiraz, 1902. Educated at Tehran. A landowner in Fars and considered a specialist in agriculture. 1929-33 head of the municipality at Shiraz. 1934-43 Deputy of the Majlis for Jahrum, and candidate for Shiraz in the elections for the 14th Majlis, 1944.

An active and intriguing little man, who was of great use to Scheily in many ways, he did well as rapporteur of the Finance Commission in piloting the bill through the Chamber at the end of the 13th Majlis. Mulk, however, considers him a venal and untrustworthy politician.

136. *Muhammad Ali*.—Born about 1890. Educated in the School of Political Science at Tehran. Entered the Service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and served in certain Russian posts, also Trebizond. A personal friend of Baku-Kavkaz Railway Minister. In 1934, appointed Moazed head of the second political section of the Ministry which deals with Russia. Consul-General at Herat in 1937. Head of the Consular Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, November 1937. Counsellor, Ankara, November 1938.

Speaks Russian and French.

Returned to Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1940 and in 1941 became the head of the Consular and Passport Department.

Persian Government representative at Beirut, January 1944, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary.

A somewhat dried-up individual, not a striking personality.

137. *Mubasir (Mubasir), Amirullah*.—Born about 1904. Younger brother of Mohdi Mubasir who was for years an interpreter in the Imperial Bank of Persia. Studied law in England, was called to the Bar and at one time practised to practice from chambers in Chancery Lane. Returned to Persia about 1938 and served in the Ministry of Justice. 1942 was President of the Court of First Instance in Tehran. Lent by the Ministry to assist in the interrogation of the suspects sent to Sultanabad under suspicion of pro-German activities. He was thus placed in a difficult position and did not please us.

138. *Muhammad Ali*.—Born 1894 in Shiraz. In 1912 entered Government service and till 1927 was employed in Government offices in Fars, reaching the rank of Assistant Governor. In 1935 Governor of Yazd, in 1937 of Ardebil, in 1938 of Luristan; and in 1941 of Mazandaran, where he had to cope with the invading Russians in August and September of that year. In May 1943 appointed Governor of Isfahan, and was useful and co-operative in collecting grain, &c.

A talkative man full of bright ideas and a great sense of his own importance.

139. *Muhsini, Dr. Ahmad (Imad al Mulk)*.—Born about 1885. Native of Khorassan. Came to Tehran in his youth and studied medicine.

Went to England before the 1914 war, where he made the acquaintance of Professor Browne, who helped him in many ways. Studied medicine in England, but failed to qualify as a doctor. Lost interest in medicine and then studied pedagogy.

Returned to Persia about 1918.

Employed under the Ministry of Education and made head of the department of the Ministry of Education in Azerbaijan, where he was at the time of the ex-Shah's visit in 1932. On the resignation or dismissal of Mirza Yahya Khan Gharagzou from the post of Minister of Education in June 1933, Dr Muhsini became acting Minister of Education.

In this post he was not a success, being old-fashioned and conservative in his methods. The Cabinet resigned in September 1933 and Dr Muhsini was relegated to the comparatively unimportant post of Governor of Kermanshah in the following November. Relieved of his duties at Kermanshah July 1935, since when he has been in retirement at Tehran.

Dr Muhsini is rather a wind-bag with a great sense of his own importance.

Married to a daughter of Mirza Sulaiman Khan Meykadeh, and therefore has many connexions with the Germans; nevertheless always makes a parade of his pro-British feelings. He made a good deal of money when in England by teaching and translating, and he evidently looks back with pleasure on his stay there. Speaks English.

140. *Muzai (Moizy), Sarlashkar Ahmad*.—Born about 1890. A Seyyid, whose family originally came from Resht, his father being a Tehran merchant. First came to Ahwaz in charge of a detachment in 1925. Helped to arrest the Sheikh of Mohammerah, and after the latter's downfall went with troops to Shush and covered the sheikh's removal to Tehran. Then served under the Sipahbud in Luristan, and then in Kuhgilu. Returned to Ahwaz in December 1930 as General Officer Commanding the Khuzistan Brigade, promoted to Brigadier-General (Sartip) in 1933, and Major-General (Sarlashkar) in 1935. An energetic and forceful personality, who since 1930 has taken a very prominent part in the affairs of Khuzistan, and has been the leading and most influential personality of Ahwaz.

He is extremely hardworking in training his troops and in the administration of his charge. He has seen a good deal of actual fighting in Persia and is proud of a bullet-wound through his ear. Very popular with officers and men who serve under him. At Ahwaz has a finger in every pie, civilian or military. Said to be a favourite of Reza Shah. An inspecting commission endeavoured to bring forth some scandals concerning his command in 1938, but he managed to get most of its findings quashed. Transferred to Rezaieh as general officer commanding, January 1940.

Returned to Persia shortly before the 1930 war. Retired with his troops when the Russians attacked in August 1941, eventually captured by the Russians but escaped from them at Baneh. General Officer Commanding, Isfahan, October 1941, but relieved of his command in the following month, since then unemployed.

White-haired, he looks much more than his age.

141. *Mukhtar, Ruka ud Din*.—Born about 1893. Son of the late Mukhtar us-Saltaneh, a former Governor of Tehran. A police officer. Chief of Police at Kermanshah in 1927, and for a time acting Governor and in charge of the municipality of Tehran. Deputy Chief of the Tehran police after Amir Ahrum, and succeeded him as chief of police in 1935, with the police rank of "carpas" (general).

On the fall of Reza Shah in September 1941 he retired to Kerman, and then to Kermanshah, but was summoned to Tehran and tried on charges of complicity in the death of the Sheikh of Mohammerah, Mudarris, Nusrat-ed-Daulah and others. The trial attracted a great deal of attention and Mukhtar was forced to defend his own defence that whatever he had done had been under the direction of Reza Shah. He was, no doubt, an efficient and very obedient Chief of Police, and the popular indignation which was vented upon him was almost entirely an expression of the pent-up feelings of resentment against the oppression of Reza Shah.

142. *Mukri, Murtaza*.—Born about 1882. A military officer. During the 1914-18 war was engaged on intelligence duties on the Russian frontier. Subsequently Frontier Commissioner on the eastern frontier. Acting Governor, Zabul from the 1st July, 1934, and military commandant. Governor, Zabul, but no longer military commandant, 1935-37. Acting Governor-General of Mukran July 1937, and confirmed as Governor-General December 1937. Rank: Colonel (1938).

Governor of Ilam (Fuahi-i-Kuh) 1942-3, in which post he distinguished himself among a crowd of corrupt and inefficient Governors, by his sound and just administration of a turbulent tribal area.

Intelligent, and a keen patriot. Well disposed, and has a reputation for honesty.

143. *Muqaddam (Moghaddam), Muhammad Ali*.—Born about 1889. Educated in Tehran. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for the most part in Russia. Director of Archives in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs for a time, 1930-31 "chef de cabinet" to the Minister. Sent to the Hejaz and Saudi Arabia as Minister at the end of 1933. Left Jeddah for Beirut May 1935, and appointed Minister to the Balkan States just after, residing at Bucharest. Accredited also to Czechoslovakia, January 1938.

Director-General, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, January 1939. Accompanied the Crown Prince to Egypt, February to April 1939. "Chef du Protocole" of the Court, August 1939. Minister in Louvain, 1940.

Relieved of his functions by Taghi Zadeh, October 1941, but stayed in Scotland for some time before venturing home. Back in Tehran, unemployed and disappointed, early in 1943. Appointed to Cairo to deal with Saudi Arabian affairs, residing at Cairo, December 1943.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English. His wife is Russian. His life has developed into a long-winded and far from successful career.

144. *Mughaddam (Moghaddam), Hassan, General (Surlushkar)*.—Born about 1890. Commanded at Sauj Bulagh in 1920. General Officer Commanding North West Division, December 1920. General Officer Commanding Kurdistan Division at Senneh 1930. When in Kurdistan had a reputation for efficiency and energy. Was the undisputed ruler of the province of Kurdistan from 1938 to 1941. General Officer in command of the troops in the West when the Russo-British invasion took place in 1941, and after handing over to the invading forces retired to Tehran.

Being an old friend of Reza Shah he was retained in the army and in June 1942 was made Governor General of Azerbaijan, on account of his local knowledge.

He was a very influential person in the district he became involved in all sorts of chicanery concerning his wheat, and failed to produce the much-needed grain for Tehran. He was also accused of giving in to the Russians about the election candidates and other matters.

In 1943, he appears to have resisted for some time the order to report to Tehran instead of obeying he retired to his estates near Karaghbeh.

He was unable to resist the temptation to make money whenever possible. His daughter is married to Reza Qavam, son of Qavam-ul Mulk.

145. *Musaddiq, Dr. Muhammad (Musaddiq-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1895, a nephew of Fardus Fardus. Has studied law in Paris to a certain extent and poses as a jurist. Appointed Governor-General of Fars in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1921, and sought and obtained authority from Parliament to purge and reform that Ministry. However, during his 8 months' tenure of that portfolio he destroyed indiscriminately the good with the bad, and at the end the organisation was worse than before, as he proved himself entirely incapable of making reforms. Appointed Governor General of Azerbaijan in 1922, and in 1923 became Minister for Foreign Affairs for a period of four months. Elected as a Deputy to the fourth, fifth, and sixth terms of the Majlis from Tehran. Owing to his opposition to the Government in the sixth term, steps were taken to prevent him from being elected to later terms of the Majlis. He is a demagogue and a windbag.

Imprisoned and otherwise ill-treated by Reza Shah, he spent the last few years of his life in prison. Released in 1941. Heated the public in the elections in 1944. Tried unsuccessfully to unseat Sayid Zia. Speaks French fluently.

146. *Mirza Hassan Mushir ul Mulk*.—Born about 1874. Started his career in the Ministry of Finance and rose to be an accountant. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1916, and again in 1918 in the Cabinet of Mirza Hassan Khan Vossuq, subsequently exchanging that post for that of Minister of War in 1920. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1921. Elected a Deputy to the fourth term of the Majlis in 1921, but, being suspected of plotting against Reza Khan Pahlavi, then Minister of War, he was obliged to resign and go to Europe. He returned to Persia in 1924 his innocence having meanwhile been established. Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in August 1924 and resigned in December 1923. Appointed Minister of Finance in November 1929, but resigned in April 1930, having found that the interference of the Minister of Court in financial administration rendered his position untenable.

He is a man of common sense and intelligence. As Minister for Foreign Affairs, he showed himself very friendly to His Majesty's Legation, and used his best endeavours for the settlement of outstanding questions. He is not popular with many of his countrymen in high places owing to his straightforward character and outspokenness.

In 1941 he was appointed a ward of the Royal estates of Mazandaran, a post which appears to have occupied all his energies till 1935. Being unwilling

to hand over the whole of his properties to the Shah he then fell from power and at the end of the year he was said to be under close surveillance in his house.

Went to France 1940 and in 1943 was said to be in Switzerland. Speaks no foreign language.

147. *Mulamad (Motamedy), Ali*.—Born about 1897. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs about 1919. Served abroad as secretary in various posts, Chargé d'Affaires at Rome in 1933. Head of the Third Political Department of the Ministry (which dealt with British affairs) in 1934 and 1935. Transferred to direct the First Political Department, June 1936. Hard working and intelligent, a good type of the younger school who showed himself reasonable and conscientious in dealing with our affairs in the Ministry. Head of the Department of Registration of Land and Documents under the Ministry of Justice, March 1938. Was Minister of the Interior, March 1939.

Prime Minister in 1940. He was a member of the Majlis in 1921, 1922, 1923, 1924, 1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 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Head of the Caspian Fisheries Board again 1940. A difficult post which he seems to occupy with some success, as he knows Russian well and is often able to frustrate, by a little diplomacy, the Russian plans to gain complete control of that undertaking.

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Has a good reputation and is intelligent and hard-working.

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Minister of Finance in Feroughi's Cabinet 1941, and did good work in the difficult task of reconstructing the country's finances in a new basis. Resigned with that Cabinet early in 1942 and has not since been employed. He now contributes articles on financial subjects to newspapers and was the author of

a brochure on inflation and how to combat it. Not popular with the ordinary run of Persians because he despises flattery and circumlocutions.

Married the daughter of Amin-ed-Douleh in 1931. Speaks English and French. A very sensible man, with a sound knowledge of local and French law, has been very helpful on many occasions to this Legation on legal points.

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Regarded as a profound scholar, but of unpleasant appearance, not a lovable personality.

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Minister in Tokyo early 1940, recalled on rupture of relations 1942. Said to have expressed admiration for Japanese methods. Ambassador at Kabul July 1943.

A polite and hard working official, whose appointment to a foreign post was a surprise. No experience of life abroad. When he was serving in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs this Legation regarded him as a blockhead.

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Intelligent and well disposed towards us. Brother of Dr. Hussein Quds (Ahmed) (No. 184). Brother-in-law of Najm (No. 156).

Has rank of Director General. In autumn 1943 helped to organise elections for Tehran's twelve seats.

162. *Nafisy (Naficy), Abol-Ghannem*.—Born about 1907, son of Dr. Mouddeb Nafisy. Educated in Paris and London, spent some months at the Great Ormond Street Hospital and became a specialist in children's diseases. Has been practising in Tehran since about 1935 doing good work in organising maternity clinics and welfare work among the poor of Tehran. A good type of young Persian. Married to Iran, daughter of Qawam-ul Mulk.

An exceedingly stupid, fat man, who appears to owe his high appointment to his own, he never went far wrong, and finally fell simply from the fact that his stupidity got on his royal master's nerves. Head of the Persian Staff College 1942.

Speaks Russian, French and a little English.

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in name." His admiration for his father and the influence of his bitterly anti-British mother, must both tend to make him believe the theory which his mother instils into him, that the British expelled Reza Shah, whereas in actual fact the latter abdicated at the advance of Russian troops on Tehran.

187 *Pahlavi Royal Family*.—The following are recognised members of the Pahlavi Royal Family:

Sons—

- (i) Shahpur V. Reza, born 1891, died 1920.
- (ii) Shahpur VI. Reza, born 1903, died 1924.
- (iii) Shahpur VII. Reza, born 1924, died 1924.
- (iv) Shahpur VIII. Reza, born 1924, died 1924.
- (v) Shahpur IX. Reza, born 1924, died 1924.
- (vi) Shahpur X. Reza, born 1924, died 1924.

Daughters—

- (i) Shahdukht (Princess) Shams-ul-Muluk, born the 18th October 1917. Married Feridun, son of Mahmoud Jam 1937. Has a daughter.
- (ii) Shahdukht Ashraf-ul-Muluk, born the 28th October, 1919. Married Ali Qavam, son of Qavam-ul-Mulk 1937, but a divorce took place early in 1942, with the Shah's approval. Princess Ashraf has a son, Shah Ram, who is at present the only male grandchild of the ex-Shah, Reza. Married 1944 the son of an Egyptian Pasha.
- (iii) Fatima Khanum, born the 30th October, 1920. Does not appear to be recognised as a princess.

Of these (iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) of the sons, and (iii) of the daughters, are the offspring of the ex-Shah's second consort, Imam (Khanum) Pahlavi; the rest are offspring of the present Shah's mother except (ii), whose mother, long ago divorced, is Turan, daughter of the late Razi Majd ud-Dowleh, K C M G.

188 *Pak-Nazar, Jussuf (Jahangir-ul-Vizars)*.—Born about 1888. An employee of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In charge of the section dealing with cyphers for many years. Has also been in charge of the passport section. Consul General at Tiflis 1934. Returned to Tehran 1936. Head of the Minister's Office at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1937 until 1938. Counsellor in Kabul 1941.

Speaks a little French. Always very friendly, but many years of coping with the cyphers of the Ministry have blunted the edge of his intelligence.

189 *Pakravan, Fathullah (Amir-i-Arfa)*.—Born about 1885. First became known as a member of the second Majlis, where it appears that he was the laughing stock of his colleagues. In 1910 he obtained the appointment of Consul-General at Constantinople. From Constantinople he went to Egypt as Consul-General, and later became Persian Minister there until he returned to Tehran early in 1925. In 1925 he was appointed Director of the Russian and Turkish section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1926 he was appointed Director of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1927 he was appointed Director of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1928 he was appointed Director of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1929 he was appointed Director of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1930 he was appointed Director of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. 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When he assumed charge of the Foreign Ministry, the first impression he conveyed was that of an agreeable and conscientious young man, but closer contact proved him to be a glib and ready. Teymourtahe exercised a close supervision over matters relating to the Foreign Ministry, and it was evident that Pakravan carried no weight and was not a factor. Teymourtahe was at the time in charge of the Ministry, and it was evident that he was in charge of the Ministry affairs remained at a standstill. Appointed Persian Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. in February 1931. Was accredited also to Finland and Estonia as Minister in 1932. Has a Russian wife. Recalled from Moscow in February 1934. Appointed Governor-General of Khorassan November

1934. Order of the Humayun, 1st class, May 1937. On Khorassan he showed that, if backed by the Shah, he is prepared to ride roughshod over all opposition.

After the fall of Reza Shah, was relieved by Ali Mansour in February 1942 and was brought to Tehran under arrest on various charges of peculation and irregular conduct while Governor-General of Khorassan, but managed to get out of prison on bail after a few months. At present living at Tehran unemployed, it is unlikely that the popular indignation against the many arbitrary acts which he had to commit by order of the ex-Shah will soon permit his re-employment. Nevertheless he was one of the very few Persian officials who stood his ground when the Russians invaded the Meshed district in August 1941 and he deserves credit for preventing a good deal of destruction by his firmness on that occasion.

Speaks French fluently.

170 *Pirniazar, Hassan*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1920. First secretary in Cairo 1925. Chargé d'Affaires in Cairo 1930. Returned to Persia in 1931. Consul at Bombay 1932, Consul General at Baku April 1935. Head of the Economic Section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs from 1941.

Speaks French and some English. Seems a conscientious official.

171 *Pirnia, Hussein (Mutanin ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1875, the second son of the late Muahmed Dowleh. Educated in France. After finishing his studies he returned to Persia in 1902, and became secretary to his father who was then Minister for Foreign Affairs. Received a Cabinet appointment in 1918 as Minister of Education. Was appointed a Minister without Portfolio in 1920. He has generally preferred a parliamentary to a ministerial career, and was elected to every term of the Majlis since its inception until the seventh term. To that term also he was elected, but refused to take his seat, as he did not consider the elections to have been held freely. He was chosen as president for the whole term of the third and fourth Parliaments and for the greater part of the fifth term and for half of the sixth term, and he showed himself to be firm and impartial.

Has not come back to politics since the fall of Reza Shah, though he is often mentioned in terms of extravagant praise as the most honest man, if not the only honest man, in Persia. He refused to form a Government on the fall of the Qavam-es-Saltaneh Government in February 1943, in spite of the insistent request of the Deputies, and similarly refused to be head of the Committee of Supervision for the Tehran elections to the Majlis in 1942. Elected for Tehran 1944 but refused to take his seat.

172 *Pureali (Pouresuli), Abul-Qasim (Abolghasem)*.—Born in Tehran about 1896. Educated in Tehran at the School of Political Science. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1921. A judge in the Foreign Office Tribunal from 1922 to 1924. Second secretary at Brussels 1925-27. First secretary at Rome 1927-30. Transferred to the Department of Commerce in 1931, and employed there as chief of the Import Permits section. In 1933 chief of the Persian section in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. In 1934 appointed counsellor at Berlin. Consul general in London 1935. Head of Personnel Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, April 1940.

Head of the second section of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, which deals with Iraq and Turkey, 1942.

Married to a German lady.

Speaks French. A voluble little man who has a great idea of his own importance, and has never gone out of his way to give us any help.

173 *Qadimi (Ghadimi), Dr Hussein*.—Born in Tehran 1895. The second son of the late Asadullah Ghadimi, Mushar-es-Saltaneh. Educated in France, and holds a doctor's degree. Attended P. 1915-21. Married to a French lady. At the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 1922-23. Secretary at Bern and for the League of Nations 1924-28. Chief of the League of Nations and Treaty Section of the Ministry 1929-32. Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm 1932. Counsellor at Bern 1935. Director of the League of Nations Secretariat of the Ad Hoc Department of the Ministry, 1937, and of the League of Nations Department, when that section was raised to a department in September 1938. Minister at Bern November 1941.

Speaks perfect French. A very efficient man at his job.

174 *Qajar, Abul-Fath (Salar-ud-Dowleh)*.—Born the 1st November, 1884, the third son of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah. Governor of Kermanshah in 1907,

of Zinjan in 1899 and 1900, and of Arabistan from 1901 to 1904, where he married the daughter of a local chief. Fled from Iekran to Luristan in April 1904, but was brought back and appointed Governor of Kurdistan in 1905.

Connected tribesmen from Luristan and rebelled against Muhammad Ali Shah in June 1907. A fight occurred in that month between his followers and the Shah's troops outside Nihavend. He was defeated and took refuge at the British consulate at Kermanshah, but was handed over to the Persian authorities under a promise of personal safety. Thereafter he was placed under surveillance and was considered mentally deranged. Expelled to Europe after *coup d'Etat* of 1905.

Entered Persia again in May 1911 from the direction of Bagdad. In the following July he seized the capital of Kurdistan and advanced on Kermanshah. Having arrived there he collected a large force of Lurs, including the Kaihur tribe, and marched on Tehran via Sultanabad. Bakhtiari and Armenian irregulars were sent against him and inflicted a severe defeat on him near Nubaran in September 1911. He then retreated to Luristan and was again defeated in November 1911.

Having been at large in Kurdistan for some time he suddenly appeared near Tehran and threatened, but did not actually attack, the capital. He then betook himself to Asterabad whence, with the assistance of Russian influence, he carried on negotiations with the Persian Government to be appointed Governor of Gilan. After some further adventures he was persuaded to leave Persia with a pension from the Persian Government and resided in Switzerland till 1918.

In that year he formed a project to enter Persia through Transcaucasia and raise a revolt in the Asterabad district. He was caught by a British detachment in about December 1918 before crossing the Persian frontier, and was sent via Kazvin to Bagdad where he was detained till the following autumn when he was again allowed to return to Switzerland.

He appeared over the Iraqi-Persian frontier in June 1928 and was at first the Iraq police authorities. His presence caused considerable embarrassment to the new Pahlavi Government who realised that Salar, however mad, was a possible rallying point for the forces of reaction. However, after fruitless negotiations with various Kurdish chiefs, he was permitted to settle down with the daughters of some of them, he left Persia in the autumn of 1928. The Persian Government from that date paid him a subsidy of 1,500 rials per month from secret funds up to September 1933. Salar was persuaded to settle down at Haifa after having given an ambiguous promise to behave himself. On the cessation of his subsidy in 1933 he was informed by British authorities that he was free to do what he liked. In 1935 living at Alexandria, where he has employed lawyers to press his claims against His Majesty's Government.

Speaks French. Scatter-brained and under-sized.

Still reported to be at Alexandria 1943, has not attempted to return to Persia after Reza Shah's fall, but his two sons, who have been living in penury at Tehran for many years, are now trying to get back some of the family properties.

175. Qaraguzlu, Ali Reza (Baka-ul Mulk)—Born about 1890. Owns property in Persia and is a member of the National Consultative Assembly. Studied in Europe for a number of years and is a graduate of the School of Political Sciences of Paris. Elected to the fourth Majlis as member for Hamadan. Appointed Minister of Finance in 1923, though he had held no Government office before. Resigned in April 1923, as he found that he was controlled by Dr. Mullispaugh. President of the Governmental Senate and a member of the National Bank, Persia 1929-32.

Minister of Justice in Quawan-es-Saltanah's Cabinet of August 1942, resigned in the following January without having accomplished anything valuable. An honest politician, but much too old to learn anything new or useful. Lives in Tehran, used frequently to visit Paris. A queer and eccentric man, with a reputation for honesty.

176. Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam)—Born in 1883. Educated at Harrow and Balliol College, Oxford. Married the daughter of Teymourache in 1931, and divorced her in 1935. An attaché at the Legation in London 1931. In the same capacity at Paris 1932. Returned to Tehran at the end of that year, and since employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at first in the Treaty Department and from the end of 1936 in the Protocol Department. Transferred to the Ministry of Interior at the end of 1937.

Resigned from Government service in 1938 and took to chicken farming. After the fall of Reza Shah was not employed in Government service until he became secretary to Dr. Mullispaugh at the end of 1942, and in May 1943 was employed at Court, his brother-in-law, Ala, being Minister of Court.

Charming but ineffective, his failure to fulfil his early promise has been a disappointment.

Speaks perfect English and French.

177. Nizam-Qaraguzlu, Hussein Quli (Amir Nizam)—Born in 1883, the eldest son of the late Amir Nizam. A member of the Qaraguzlu family of Hamadan and a nephew of the late Regent, Nasir-ul Mulk. Educated in England and Austria. Passed through the Military Academy at Vienna, and served with a commission in an Austrian infantry regiment for three years. Inherited large estates from his father in the district of Hamadan, but owing to his absence in Europe from 1921 to 1929 these estates have been allowed to deteriorate. Was appointed Governor of Kermanshah by Vossug in 1919, where he was very popular on account of his honesty and integrity. Being a rich man he was released at the time of the *coup d'Etat* of 1905 and took to pay 20,000 toman as the price of his release. He was so disgusted at this unmerited treatment that he left Persia and vowed never to return. During his stay in Europe he lost heavily at Monte Carlo and Deauville. Teymourache met him in Europe in 1928, and persuaded him to return to Persia, which he did in 1929. Appointed Grand Master of Ceremonies at the Court in March 1929. Sent to Europe on private business for the Shah in March 1930 and returned at the end of December.

A reputation for honesty saved him from sharing his friend Teymourache's fate. He was not employed in Government service until he became secretary to the royal irritability during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations in April 1939 and retired to his estate at Kabud Rahang, near Hamadan.

An extremely agreeable man, with more than a veneer of European culture. Is the best type of educated Persian, and is noted for his honesty and integrity. Speaks fluently French, German and English.

178. Qaraguzlu, Mubashir—Eldest son of the late Nasir-ul Mulk, Regent of Persia. Born about 1895. Spent about fourteen years in Europe with his late father, and received most of his education there. Elected a member of the seventh and eighth Majlis for Hamadan. Appointed Court Chamberlain when his brother-in-law, Ala, was Minister of Court at the end of 1942, accompanied the Pahlavi Princesses on various visits to Cairo.

Well-disposed but lazy. Charming manners, but neither energetic nor useful. Speaks English and French. Unmarried.

179. Qaraguzlu, Taqi—Born in Hamadan about 1891. The youngest brother of Ali Reza Qaraguzlu. Educated in France. Owns large properties round Hamadan. Employed in the A.P.O.C. office at Paris 1924-29. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1929 and sent to Rome as secretary. Returned two years later. Deputy Master of Ceremonies at the Court in 1934.

Speaks French and English. A handsome man with charming manners, pleasant, but ineffective.

180. Qashqai, Ali (Salar Hishmat)—Born 1889. Son of a former Ilbegi of the Qashqai tribe. He is the half-brother of the late Amir Nizam, and full brother to the late Ahmad Khan Sardar Hishmat. Appointed Ilbegi by the Farman Farma in 1918, he thereafter sided with the British troops against their inveterate enemy Soulat-ud-Douleh. Gave up the Ilbegiship in September 1920. In 1922 resided in Eastern Persia, where his followers committed certain depredations. In the following year he and his Shiraz followers were expelled from certain villages seized by his half-brother, but got no redress. In 1929 he took an active part in the Qashqai rebellion, leading the Qashqai tribesmen in their revolt against their Military Governor. With a small band of followers he remained for the most part at Siyakh, south of Shiraz, while other khans were treating with the Government forces. Through the influence of Soulat-ud-Douleh the anti-Government movement fizzled out, but Ali Khan remained more or less actively in opposition to the Government, acting as a centre of the many recalcitrants. A force of 500 troops was sent from Shiraz to round him up in 1932, it does not appear, however, that he was defeated in battle. In 1933 he came to Tehran, having come to terms with the Government; he is believed to have been given a safe-conduct in return for a promise of good behaviour.

Allowed to come to Tehran from Kerman at end of 1942, and sent to Shiraz to help the Government troops in their campaign against the Qashqais in June 1943.

He has the reputation of being the most courageous of his family in the field. However, he has no talent for organisation and administration, in fact, according to most observers, he is scatter brained and foolish.

181 *Qashqai, Muhammad Nasir*.—Born about 1895. The eldest son of the late Ismail Qashqai (Soulat-ud-Douleh). Elected to the eighth Majlis as a member for the Qashqai tribes. Ilkhan of those tribes for a short time during 1930. Deprived of parliamentary immunity and arrested for conspiracy September 1932.

Fled from Tehran during the general disorder in September 1941, and since then has been at large in the south of Persia, carrying on a wordy warfare with his own Government about the return of his lands and restitution for his wrongs. At the same time he has seized all the lands he can lay hands on with the help of his tribesmen and endeavours, through the agency of friends in the Majlis and elsewhere (such as the notorious Nawbasht), to make himself out to be a very patriotic and well intentioned person. Having expressed fears lest we might be at him by way of revenge for the deeds of his father, our great enemy in 1916.

Assuring him that we had nothing against him provided he submitted to his own Government. It seems certain that he had two Germans with him in 1943 and that he made a landing ground intended for German aeroplanes near Farrashband. Attacked by troops under Marshal Shahbakhti in May 1943, but the operations were very half hearted and soon fizzled out.

His youngest brother, Khosru, is actively assisting him in his intransigent attitude. Two other brothers, Malik Mansour and Ahmed, were in Germany at the outbreak of war but were in Istanbul at the end of 1943.

Observers before his escape in 1911 considered him reasonable and intelligent, but he now seems as cunning and unreliable as his anti British father.

Speaks English.

182 *Qavam, Qavam al-Mulk*, who was killed accidentally in May 1916.

Traditional policy of opposition to the powerful Qashqai group of tribes headed by his father, as well as the titular headship of the "Arab" tribes of that province, he wielded immense authority in the south of Persia at the time of the coup d'état of 1921. Reza Khan (late Reza Shah) when Minister for War met the Qavam at Isfahan in August 1923 and expressed a wish that he should reside at Tehran, he therefore became elected to the Majlis as member for the Khumseh.

Close friendship with His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz, the Qavam engaged in 1926 a British agricultural expert to develop his vast estates: the experiment proved a failure through local opposition and the Qavam's stinginess; the British expert left in 1928. In 1929 fled to Europe, doubtless having foreseen the Qashqai revolts of that year. Visited London 1929. Returned to Tehran the following year, having put his two boys to school at Beirut. His vast properties were left in the hands of his servants, who remitted him a monthly subvention. In 1929 various questions of validity of title to property were raised by the Ministry of Finance, and in 1931 the whole question was settled by the exchange of lands. The Qavam was given crown lands in Nishapur, in the neighbourhood of Tehran, and elsewhere in the centre of Persia, in exchange for his Fars properties. It is believed that he did well out of these transactions, and that he is one of the wealthiest landowners of Persia at present.

In the ninth Majlis of 1933 he was a Deputy for Baluchistan. He had also accompanied Reza Shah on several of his journeys, and was generally supposed to enjoy His Majesty's full confidence. In November 1933, however, on the arrest of the Minister of War Sardar Asad, who was believed to be Shah at the Larican races, the Qavam seems to have become the object of suspicion, and he was placed under arrest with Asad.

He is an attractive personality to meet. Very pro-British in sentiment, he sent his two sons (Ali Muhammad Qavam and Muhammad Reza Qavam) to England to be educated. Until his arrest he appeared to have settled down permanently as a peaceful courtier at Tehran. He plays polo, but does not mix much in society. Quiet in voice and retiring in manner, he is

yet capable of driving a very hard bargain with his own countrymen. He does not mix much in society. At Shiraz, he cannot be considered a tribal leader in the sense that the Qashqai chiefs are, he is best considered as a Persian noble whose family had for some time held suzerainty over a group of tribes and who attained great wealth and influence in Fars, partly through backing the right side in the 1914 war.

His son, Ali Muhammad, married Princess Ashraf Pahlavi in March 1937.

Visited India 1941-42 and bought a house at Bangalore. Sent back to Shiraz to help Marshal Shahbakhti with his attack on the Qashqais in June 1943.

His elder son, Ali Muhammad, went to Washington as Assistant Military Attaché at the end of 1941. Appointed Governor-General of Fars September 1943, but could not agree with any of the military chiefs about tribal policy and returned to Tehran November 1943, still holding the office of Governor-General.

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183 *Qavam (Ghavam), Ahmed (Qavam-us-Saltaneh)*.—A brother of Hussa Vasaq than whom he is younger by a few years. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Became Minister of War July to October 1916, and Minister of Interior, July to November 1911 and again in December 1911. Minister of Finance, July to August 1914, and Minister of Interior, November 1917 to January 1918. Appointed Governor-General of Khuzestan April 1918 and remained there for three years, during which he administered the province with uniform success during troublous times. Became Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, June 1921 to January 1922, and again Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1922 to February 1923. Banished to Europe in October 1923, being accused of having plotted against the life of Reza Khan (Reza Shah). Was allowed to return to Tehran at the end of 1928 and arrived in March 1929, when he went to reside quietly on his property at Lahjan near Teheran.

Came back to live in Tehran after the fall of Reza Shah. Prime Minister August 1942, after the fall of Solehly. Worked hard, but gradually surrounded himself with his own relations and friends. Tried hard to gain control of the Ministry of War, but failed to counteract the young Shah's enthusiasm for the control of the army. The Shah's opposition to him was shown in the disturbances of the 8th December, 1942, in which Qavam did extremely well and undoubtedly performed his duty. Thereafter, however, he became more and more involved in petty intrigues and favouritism, and had to resign in February 1943, since when he has been more or less openly accused of being the real instigator of the riots of December 1942. Seems really to be too old fashioned and unbending to adapt himself to the changed political life of to-day.

Received a letter from the British Legation in Tehran on 11th 1942 and to have received, when Prime Minister in 1942, messages from persons whom he knew to be German agents, without informing us. This was brought to the notice of the Shah in January 1944.

A clever man, but sly, intriguing and unreliable. Has generally been friendly to His Majesty's Embassy.

Speaks a little French.

184 *Quds (Ghadir), Hussein*.—Born about 1892. Graduate of the Tehran School of Political Science. Has held various posts under the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and was secretary in London for five years. Edited for a short time, a small literary review. Private secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 1934. Secretary and later Minister of the Ministry of War 1935 until relations were broken off. Accused of having abused customs franchise while in charge at Washington. Secretary in London March 1937. Consul, Izmir, 1939. Counsellor in London early 1943.

Speaks English and French. A quiet and level-headed official.

185. *Raf'ati (Ruffety), Hussein*.—Born about 1906. Educated mostly in England, studied at London University and acquired an Oxford accent. An instructor at the Officers' College. Very thrived with his English education and anxious to return to England whenever possible. A solid and capable man. Interested principally in literature.

186. *Rahnema, Zern-ul Abedin*.—Born about 1888, one of the sons of the late Sheikh-ul Iraqain, a Persian subject and small mujtahid of Kerbela.

Rahnema was educated in Iraq and came to Persia about 1910. He was a member of the Democratic party and edited first the newspaper *Rahnema* and subsequently the semi-official paper *Iran*. He was elected a Deputy to the fifth and sixth terms of the Majlis. Was sent to Europe in 1923 on a mission to "boom" Persia, and stayed most of the time in Paris. Was appointed Under Secretary to the Ministry of Public Works at the end of 1926 and Secretary to the Minister of the Interior in April 1927. In June 1927 he fell from favour and confined himself to journalism, and accompanied the Shah on his journey to Khuzistan in October 1928 as press representative.

Rahnema is an ambitious man, with plenty of "push." His great ambition has always been to obtain a Government post, which he hoped would culminate in a ministerial appointment. With that object in view, he discarded his turban and gave up his title of "sheikh." This brought him three different under-secretaryships in succession. He is intelligent and clever in a certain sense.

Went to Europe in 1933 to purchase printing machinery. In the summer of 1935 was exiled to Iraq and took up his residence in Beirut, the Shah was said to have suspected him of plotting against the régime.

Returned to Persia after the fall of Reza Shah in 1941, and resumed his editorship of the newspaper *Iran*. On a mission to the ulama of Iraq in 1942 and brought back certain messages addressed to the young Shah. Plunged into political intrigue in 1942 and after being disappointed at not being accepted by the Iraq Government as Minister, became a sort of secretary and spy in Soheily's administration in 1943, but soon resigned. A cunning, soft spoken hypocrite. Speaks a little French and English.

187. *Rais, Muharrir*.—Born in Tehran about 1895. Educated in Persia and France. The eldest son of the late Zahir al Milk. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1919. Sent to Switzerland as secretary of the Persian delegation to the League of Nations. Returned to Persia in 1924, served in the Ministry till he was sent to Paris as counsellor in 1930. Head of the Treaty Section of the Ministry in 1933. Minister at Berlin and The Hague 1935. Political Director General in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, September 1937. Minister at Bucharest for Roumania, Greece, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, December 1938.

Transferred to Yehy in 1941 and returned in July 1942 to Tehran. Minister in Bagdad July 1943.

Married one of the many daughters of Farman Farma in 1935.

188. *Razavi, Seyyid Muhammad*.—Born about 1888. Educated at Tehran for many years. Transferred to the Ministry of Justice in 1931. Director of the Registration Department at Isfahan 1930-32. Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice in 1933. Under Secretary at the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs later in the same year. Got into trouble in 1935, and after being under arrest for some time on a charge of embezzlement while serving at Meshed many years before, retired for a time to Isfahan. Employed in the Finance Department at Meshed 1941; and again at Tehran 1942-43.

Speaks French. A rather dull, saturnine man, whose wife, a much more lively person, was among the first Persian women to unveil in the provinces.

189. *Razmara, Haji Ali, Brigadier (Sartip)*.—Trained in France at Saint-Cyr. Born about 1900. Related to the Kemal Hedavat family. Joined the army and commanded a regiment in 1931. Military Governor of the Khamseh tribes 1931. Commanded operations against the Kurdish insurrection of Jassaf Sultan 1932. General Officer Commanding 1st Tehran Division October 1941. Chief of the General Staff July 1943. Relieved by Riazi September 1943. Director of the Shah's Military Secretariat October 1943.

An able, energetic but corrupt officer with a reputation as a disciplinarian. In fact, he is said to have killed a man on parade for insubordination. Very ambitious and a great intriguer, and turns his sails to any wind. Speaks some English.

190. *Riazi, Ali: Brigadier (Sartip)*. Born about 1891. Entered the army and was trained in France, where he graduated as an engineer officer at the French Staff College, and became Military Attaché in Paris. Was a member of the Anglo-Persian Military Commission of 1920, where he earned the respect of the British members for his honesty and frankness. Was one of the supporters of Seyyid Zia in his *coup d'état* of 1920. Retired from the army in Reza Shah's reign and joined the Ministry of Education, became Director of Education in Fars, where he did good work in preserving and restoring old monuments. Rejoined the army on the departure of Reza Shah and was appointed (1941) Deputy Chief of the Technical College and then of the General Staff. Strongly urged the appointment of foreign advisers for the army and thus came into conflict with the Chief of the General Staff. Then (1942) appointed Under Secretary of State for War, in which capacity he did good work in piloting various Bills through the Majlis. Chief of the General Staff after Rarmars September 1943, but was hampered in his efforts to work by the intrigues of his colleagues and the suspicion of the Shah. A serious man, of culture, intelligence and charm, of the studious rather than the commanding type. Universally respected for his honesty and simplicity. One of his daughters works in the Tehran Museum under M. Godard.

191. *Rukni, Muhammad Ali*.—Son of Prince Rukn-ud Douleh, who was a nephew of Nasir-ud-Din Shah. Has served at various posts under the Ministry of the Interior. Governor of Qom, Qazvin, Hamadan, and the Gulf Ports in succession. Governor of Kermanshah July 1935 till May 1936. A dignified and quiet little man.

Governor of Meshed since autumn 1940.

192. *Sadegh, Dr. Isma'il*.—Born about 1892. Educated in England (where he was for a time munshi to Professor Browne) and partly in America, where he took a doctor's degree. Began his career in a very lowly station in the Ministry of Education. Rose to be Director of Education in Gilan. Attended an international congress on education in England about 1929, where he lectured on modern educational methods in Persia. Principal of the Teacher's College (Ecole normale) since about 1932.

Minister of Public Instruction in Feraghi's Cabinet September 1941. On the resignation of that Cabinet in 1942 became Dean of the University of Tehran. Again Minister of Education in Soheily's reshuffled Cabinet of December 1943.

An intelligent and go-ahead man, speaking English and French. Well disposed towards Anglo-Saxon methods of education. The author of several works on education.

193. *Sadegh, Mostafazadeh Douleh*.—Born about 1895. Educated at Constantinople. Was a secretary at the Persian Embassy in Turkey for many years. Elected a Deputy for Tabriz, his native town, to the first Majlis in 1906. Elected President of the second Majlis in 1909. An ardent Constitutionalist he was arrested by Muhammad Ali Shah in 1908 and imprisoned until January 1909. Elected a member of the committee which was convened to draw up the Electoral Law. Appointed Minister of Interior in 1911, Minister of Posts in 1914 and 1915, and again Minister of Interior in 1915 and in June 1917. In the following Cabinet he was a Minister without portfolio.

Before the war he was pro-Russian, but when war broke out he espoused the cause of Germany and Turkey, and was one of the most extreme of "enemy parties." After the war he was Ministry Legation in London. He was exiled to some outlying province of Persia. From that time, with the exception of a short period in 1921 when he was a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, he lived a retired life and had little or no influence.

Appointed Persian Ambassador to Turkey in January 1931. Returned to Tehran on retirement at the end of 1935.

Minister without portfolio in Qavam-es-Sultaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 and returned to the Ministry of Education in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. Highly respected and considered a wit. Almost useless and senile. Dropped from Soheily's Cabinet December 1943.

Speaks French and Turkish.

194. *Sadr, Sayyid Muhammad (Sadr-ul-Asraf)*.—Born about 1873. An almost unknown person in Tehran politics until appointed Minister of Justice in Ferughi's Cabinet of the 7th September, 1933. Spent the whole of his previous life in the Court of Cassation. One of the old school, who looks much better in the turban, which he wore for most of his life, than in a Pahlavi hat. Was responsible for some of the new sections of the Civil Code. Resigned September 1938.

Butterly attacked in connexion with a winter dispute at Qum 1942. Looked upon as an elder statesman and one of the senior members of the Majlis 1943.

Minister of Justice in Soheily's Cabinet of 1943. Said to have been one of the pro-German "Kabod" party in 1942.

195. *Sadr, Abdul Ali (Sadr-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born in Tabriz about 1848. Son of the late Sa'ir ed Douleh. Entered the court of Muzaffar-ed Din Shah when quite young and was appointed a chamberlain. Attached to the court for many years. Imperial Commissioner of the Persian Government to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company 1905-18. Persian Minister in Washington 1910-21. Minister in Berlin 1924-25. Minister in London 1926-27. Lived in Europe for five years after that returned to Persia in 1932.

French and English. An intriguer, whose reputation is not of the best. His recall from London was said to be due to the Shah's suspicions that he had friendly relations with the Sheikh of Muhammerrah. A relation of the late Qavam-ed Douleh. His brother Farid Sadr (Farid-us-Saltaneh) is a well known adventurer, who makes his living by his wits, making himself out to be a fabulously wealthy Persian prince, in this way he married an Englishwoman and deserted her after getting her money, he lives in Europe.

In Germany 1942 and 1943 but returned to Tehran December 1943.

196. *Sa'id (Sa'id, Sured) Muhammad (Sa'id ul-Fazl)*. Also known as *Muhammad Sa'id Maraghehi*.—Born about 1885. Educated in the Caucasus. Served in various capacities in the Persian consular posts in the Caucasus, viz., at Baku, Tiflis and Batum. Acting consul-general at Baku in 1927. Head of the Russian Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1933. Appointed *Chargé d'Affaires* at Moscow in February 1934. Minister at Rome June 1936. Appointed ambassador to Hungary, 1938. Ambassador at Moscow April 1939.

A very agreeable official, whose Russian is better than his Persian. He must have an intimate knowledge of the Caucasus and of Soviet methods of administration. He has a handsome Latvian wife. Always willing to help. Appears to have no delusions about Russia. On the other hand, some members of the Persian Government look askance at Sa'id, as he was brought up in Russia.

Recalled from Moscow to be Minister for Foreign Affairs in Qavam-ed-Saltaneh's Cabinet August 1942. Held the post in Soheily's Cabinet of February 1943. In the running for Prime Minister, being favoured for that post by the Shah 1943, but the Majlis would not agree and, indeed, Sa'id seems to have neither the personality, the energy nor the intelligence for the post. His running of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs resulted in a sort of benevolent anarchy in that department.

197. *Sajjadi, Muhammad*.—Born in 1899 in Tehran. Son of a Mulla. Employed in the Ministry of Justice by the late Davar and later transferred to the Customs as Acting Director-General 1934. Then employed in the Tobacco Monopoly until 1937, when he became Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Communications. Acting Minister of Communications on Ali's dismissal in November 1938.

Minister of Roads in Ferughi's Cabinet of September 1941, and then head of the Tehran Municipality in 1942. Since then has been interested in the "Adalat" party. A talkative and clever man, with a rather attractive air of bluffness, but superficial. Married his brother's wife.

Arrested and sent to Saltanabad by the Allied Security Committee September 1943.

Spent several years in France, and speaks French.

198. *Saleh, Alayar*.—Graduate of the American College at Tehran. Born about 1900. For some years employed as a secretary in the American Legation at Tehran. He then became a judge, public prosecutor, &c. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance through the influence of Davar, and appointed director of the opium monopoly, and afterwards director of the tobacco monopoly.

Head of the customs for a short time. Then accountant general.

An intelligent and able young man. Speaks French and English.

Sent to Washington on an economic mission 1941. Returned in the autumn of 1942 to be Minister of Finance in the hope that he would work well with Dr. Millsbaugh, but he proved a disappointment, quarrelled with Dr. Millsbaugh, and was allowed to resign by Soheily in March 1943.

Sent on a Commercial Mission to India September 1943.

199. *Sam'i (Samiyi), Husain (Adib-us-Saltaneh)*.—Born about 1878, a native of Resht. Spent his early career in the Ministry of Interior and was once Governor of Resht. Appointed Minister of Public Works 1921 to June 1922. In March 1923 he became Minister of Interior for three months. When the present Shah became Prime Minister in October 1923, Sam'i was chosen as his Minister of Interior. In 1924 he was appointed Governor of Tehran and held that post until he was appointed Minister of Interior in June 1927. Appointed Governor-General of Azerbaijan in May 1931. Grand Master of Ceremonies (Internal), 1934. Dismissed during the Crown Prince's wedding celebrations, April 1939. Utandar (Governor-General) of the IVth Vatan (Western Azerbaijan), July 1939.

Ambassador to Kabul 1939. Returned to Tehran July 1942 and became Minister of State, without portfolio, in Qavam-ed-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942. Appointed Minister of the Interior by Soheily in July 1943, ostensibly in order to supervise the elections to the 14th Majlis, but he soon resigned. President of the Farhangistan (Academy) at Tehran 1944.

Sam'i is a pleasant man, but of little influence. He is not very energetic nor highly intelligent. He speaks no foreign language.

200. *Sam'i (Samiyi), Kazim*.—Born about 1887. Educated in Tehran. Married to the daughter of the Imam Jamch of Tehran. On the staff of the Ministry of Justice for some years. Director-General of that Ministry 1921-27. Director of the Civil Registration Department 1928-34. Director of Exploitation of State Agricultural Establishments, January 1939.

Speaks French. A conscientious official of the old school. Living retired at Isfahan 1943.

201. *Sanjabi, Kerim*.—Born 1904 near Kermanshah, a member of one of the principal families of the well known Sanjabi tribe. In 1920 came to Tehran for study and completed the courses at the Political and Law Schools at Tehran. In 1928 went to France and spent three years in Paris and three in the provinces. Doctor of Law of Paris. In 1934 returned to Persia, and served in the Religious Endowment Department of the Ministry of Education and also taught law. In 1940 head of the statistical department of the Ministry of Finance. In 1943 professor of law at the Tehran University.

A well-spoken young man with progressive ideas, wished to stand for the Majlis 1943, but decided not to do so owing to our discouraging attitude.

202. *Sayyah, Hamid*.—Born in Isfahan 1898. Brother of Humayun Sayyah. Educated at Moscow. Entered the service of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in 1916. For some time a judge in the Tribunal of the Ministry. Commercial secretary at Moscow 1922-26. A director of the Caspian Fisheries Joint Board 1927-31. Chief of the Russian section at the Ministry in 1932. In charge of the Eastern Department 1933. Consul general at Beirut, March 1934. Minister at Warsaw, June 1936.

Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in Qavam-ed-Saltaneh's Cabinet of August 1942 until January 1943. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs again December 1943.

Married, but afterwards divorced her. A charming man knowing too much about Russian methods ever to incline towards bolshevism. A good bridge player.

203. *Sayyah, Humayun*. Born about 1883. Eldest son of a famous and character named Haji Sayyah. Educated in Persia. Served in the Ministry of Finance for some years. Was financial agent for various foreign banks. Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Commerce, May 1933. In the law section of the Ministry of the Interior, where he has been Under-Secretary and Acting Minister since then.

Holds the dignity of K.C.V.O., received when in attendance on Ahmed Shah during his visit to London in 1919.

Governor General of Fars early 1942, but was superseded in the following summer without having accomplished much.

A rather pompous man, said to be a great intriguer, but he is not averse to the society of foreigners, and probably regrets the good old days.

Speaks English and French fluently.

210. *Shanqai, Hadi (Husn-ed-Douleh)*.—Born at Tehran 1890. Educated in Persia, Russia, and France. Did his military training in France. A cavalry officer, with the rank of brigadier-general.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942. Considered a competent officer without any frills. Inspector of Artillery 1943, and later in the year head of the Military Tribunal.

Speaks French and Russian.

211. *Shanqai, Hassan*.—Born in Tehran about 1893. Educated in Persia and in Switzerland, where he studied civil engineering. Returned to Persia 1914. Employed on surveys by Prince Sarim-ud-Douleh 1916-19. Joined the Ministry of Roads 1920, and employed in road construction since then. Inspector-General of the Department of Roads 1932-33. Is considered an able engineer with a good deal of experience of roads in Persia. Director General of the Ministry of Roads and Communications 1933.

Arrested on charges of embezzlement with other members of the Ministry of Roads in 1935 and sentenced to imprisonment. Later released, but not heard of again.

212. *Shariat Zadeh Ahmad*.—Born in Mazandaran about 1880. Educated in Tehran. Entered the service of the Ministry of Justice in 1909, and rose to the post of Procurator-General in 1916. Resigned from the Ministry soon after and began practice as a lawyer. His practice rapidly grew and he soon gained the reputation of being one of the cleverest lawyers in Tehran. Retained with a large fee by the Imperial Bank of Persia 1921-24. Deputy for Mazandaran in the fifth Majlis. Owns considerable property in Mazandaran.

Speaks French. Is much feared, owing to his reputation as a dangerous opponent in the courts. Is a rogue.

213. *Shayesteh, Muhammad*. Born in Tehran about 1895. Son of a merchant. Educated at Tehran in the law and political schools, and entered the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Served for some time as a member of the Tribunal of the Ministry before the abolition of Capitulations. Then became head of a department and about 1940 was transferred as counsellor to Washington, where he was chargé d'affaires for a long time. Has also served as counsellor in London, where he astonished everyone by his powers of talking volubly on any subject without saying anything useful.

An unreliable and false little bureaucrat.

214. *Shireani, Abu Tâlib (Banu-as-Sultan)*.—Born in Isfahan about 1899. Educated in the madrasah, and a few years at the Church Missionary School. Studied English, but cannot speak it well. Led a disreputable life in Isfahan. Served under the Khan of Qazvin. Served also under another original Alastan Khan. Served the Shah in Isfahan in 1919. On writing an article criticising Major Fazlullah Khan, the head of the gendarmerie, he was arrested and whipped by order of the major. In 1921 started the paper *Mahan* at Tehran. His paper was Nationalist and venomous. Published articles against the Sinclair Company in 1922, doubtless for a consideration. Deputy for Isfahan in the fifth and sixth Majlis. Interested in the Khorasan Oil Company. Visited Moscow by invitation in 1927 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the revolution. Visited London December 1927. Became an advocate in the Tehran courts in 1927.

Came again into prominence on the fall of Reza Shah. Head of the Department of Propaganda 1942. In 1942 he was accused of hostile criticism in certain newspapers accusing him (with truth) of being a Christian. Has claims to land in Fars.

An unprincipled intriguer, quite without scruple and quite untrustworthy.

215. *Shukuh, Hussein (Shukuh-ul-Mulk)*.—Born about 1890. Educated in Tehran. A member of the Shah's household. Has been in Government service for about thirty-three years, having held various posts in the Ministry of the Interior. Chief of cabinet to the Prime Minister in 1919 and

again in 1921-23. Under-Secretary to the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs 1924-28. Special office since 1928. Accompanied the Shah on his State visit to Turkey in June 1934.

Kept his post at the Court on the fall of Reza Shah; still remaining the soul of discretion and eschewing the society of foreigners.

Speaks French. A capable and polite official.

216. *Siam (or Siassi), Ali Akbar*.—Born 1893. Educated in France 1911 and stayed in France till the outbreak of the 1914 war. Took a course in psychology from about 1917 to April 1941. At the same time he was instructor in psychology and law at the University of Tehran; later professor. Went to Europe 1927 and took a further course in France, obtaining a doctorate in philosophy. Married the daughter of the late Bayat, and so acquired wealth. One of the founders of the French-sponsored "Young Persian Club" in 1921.

An intelligent man with a perfect command of French; his outlook is more French than Persian in some respects. Always polite and agreeable to talk to. Is also able to make a very good speech in English.

Minister of Education, August 1942. Resigned from Soheily's Cabinet in August 1943. Dean of the University of Tehran.

217. *Soheily, Ali*.—Born about 1890. Educated partly in Russia and talks Russian well, also French and a little English. His career has been in Government administrations. In January 1931 was appointed Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Roads and Communications under Kazimi. In September 1933 he was transferred to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs as Under-Secretary, when Kazimi was appointed Minister. Soheily had also served as chief Persian representative on the board of the Caspian Fisheries Directorate. Minister in London March 1937. Minister for Foreign Affairs May 1938, but dismissed in July, owing to the late Shah's displeasure over a telegram concerning the Paris Exhibition. Ustandar (Governor-General) of the VIIIth Ustan (Kerman) February 1939. Ambassador, Kabul, October 1939.

Became Prime Minister rather unexpectedly, in March 1942, after having been Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ferughi's Cabinet from September 1941. His Cabinet fell in July 1942, partly owing to lack of support from the Court and the army. Again Prime Minister on the fall of Qavam-es-Saltaneh in February 1943, once more unexpectedly, this time it was largely because Mu'tamin-ul-Mulk could not stand and the Majlis did not want the Shah's candidate, Saad. Proved himself once more a hard worker, but carried little weight in the country and had to maintain himself by various "combinations" and political deals with Majlis Deputies.

A very reasonable, matter-of-fact person, with a businesslike manner. Hard working, and a good deal more approachable than some of his colleagues. In his private life he is a very different person, and is a very capable and willing man to help and to arrive at reasonable settlements.

Has a Caucasian wife with a "past," and is universally suspected of having taken a great many bribes.

218. *Sur, Mirza Hassan Khan Mustaufi*.—Born at Tehran about 1880. The son of Haji Mirza Hassan Khan Mustaufi. Editor of the paper *Sur-i-Irafi* during the period 1911-1913. This paper, which was a Liberal and Socialist, views, was suspended by Mohammad Ali Shah several times, and one of its editors was hanged. Sur was elected a Deputy to the second and third Majlis. Left the country with other Democrats during the war and went to Turkey. Joined the Socialist party when it was formed in Tehran in 1922. "Chef de cabinet" to Mustaufi-ul-Mamalik when the latter was Prime Minister 1922-23. Acting Minister of the Interior till 1924. Minister of Posts and Telegraphs 1928-32. Member of the board of the Agricultural Bank 1933, and later in the year appointed Governor of Isfahan. Governor of Gilan, October 1937. Acting chief of Tehran Municipality, December 1938 to July 1939.

An amusing little man, usually very helpful when he was Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, and not devoid of intelligence.

Living in retirement in Tehran 1943.

219. *Sururi, Muhammad*.—Born about 1900. Served in various Government Departments, being one of the favoured young men selected by Davar, then

Minister of Justice, when he revised the organisation of the Ministry in 1929. Has been judge in the Tehran courts, and Under-Secretary at the Ministry of Justice. Director of the Agricultural Bank 1942, but removed from that post June 1943. Posted to the Ministry of the Interior to look after it till Hajhir's return, January 1944.

Businesslike and said to be honest.

2.1. Taba. Dr Abdul Husain. Born in Tehran about 1911. Educated in medicine in England and qualified in medicine and surgery after eight years in Birmingham and at Guy's Hospital. Real name is Tabatabai of the Yezdi family of that name. Employed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company as a doctor 1940-42 and since practising in Tehran.

A bright young man who seems keen on his profession. Married the youngest daughter of Vossugh ed-Douleh.

221. Tabatabai, Muhammad Sadiq.—Second son of the late Seyyid Mohammad Tabatabai, who was a prominent figure in the Nationalist movement of 1906 to 1910. Born in Tehran about 1880. Elected to the third and fourth Majlis. In close touch with pro-Germans during the war of 1914-18. Emigrated to Turkey in 1910. Returned in 1918 and co-operated with Suleiman Mirza in forming the Socialist party. During this phase he was in close touch with the Soviet Embassy. Ambassador to Turkey 1924-27. Recalled in 1927 and offered a post as a judge in the High Court of Appeal, but did not accept it.

Speaks French. Said to be intelligent and hard-working. Was more or less under arrest for about ten years in Tehran until the fall of Reza Shah 1941. Gradually entered political life after that and initiated and fostered the only Liberal party of Persia, called the "Millet" party ("The Nation"). In his old age has become very garrulous, but is shrewd, and is one of the few Persian politicians who tries to bridge the gap between the die-hard Conservatives and the young socialist hot-heads.

Head of the Election Committee for Tehran 1943-44, and himself elected Deputy. Aspired to becoming Prime Minister, but, though intelligent, has ruined his health by excessive opium-smoking.

222. Tabatabai, Seyyid Zia-ed-Din.—Born about 1893. Son of the late Seyyid Ali Yazdi Tabatabai. Edited the newspaper *Kad* (Thunder) in Tehran in 1915-16. Played a considerable political rôle in 1917-18. Sent to Baku by Vossugh ed-Dowleh in 1919 as Persian representative to Caucasian Azerbaijan, returned to Tehran in May 1920. Carried out *coup d'Etat* with the help of the Cossacks in February 1921, and seized the reins of office. Appointed Prime Minister with full powers by Ahmed Shah on the 1st March, 1921, and effected numerous arrests. His reforms were too radical for the country and the time, and he fell from power in June, fleeing the country. He has been in the tobacco business while exiled.

Took a prominent part in the Pan Islamic Congress at Jerusalem in 1933.

Said to have assisted Kazvini in the negotiations with Iraq at Geneva during 1935.

In 1942, being by that time the owner of a very prosperous farm near Chazza in Palestine, which he had developed himself, he began to think of returning to Persia. He had been in contact with the British and had been asked to run a newspaper campaign in his favour in Tehran. He published a letter to the effect that he would return to Persia if the British would support him.

His return to Persia in 1943, however, was not successful. A number of Deputies in the 13th Majlis seem to have favoured his return. The Russians and the Shah, however, were steadfastly opposed to his return, the former because they mistrusted Firuz's unfortunate letter, and the latter through fear that the Seyyid might become a dictator. However, he returned to Tehran in September 1943 and was elected to the 14th Majlis from Yezd, his native place. Caused annoyance by insisting on wearing a woollen hat of Caucasian style, and alienated some of his friends by an appearance of stubbornness and obstinacy. But he may yet have a part to play in controlling Persia's destinies.

Speaks French and English.

Has something of the mystic in him.

223. Tadayun, Seyyid Muhammad.—Born about 1884, a native of Birjand in East Persia, educated in Tehran, where he graduated and became a schoolmaster. After the split up of the original Democrat party in 1912, Tadayun became the leader of one of the more important Democrat factions. He was elected a Deputy

from Tehran to the fourth term of the Majlis, and from Birjand to the fifth and sixth terms. Was elected President of the Majlis in the second half of the fifth term, and again at the beginning of the sixth term. In February 1927 he was appointed Minister of Education, but in December he resigned that appointment owing to disagreement with his colleagues in the Cabinet, but he resumed office nine days later at the personal request of the Shah. On the 7th January 1928, the Shah ordered him to resign, and his fall was said to be due to the personal animosity towards him of Teymour-tacha, who even vetoed his candidature as a Deputy to the seventh term of the Majlis. In June 1930 he was appointed Governor of Kerman, and appears to have recovered the Royal favour to a certain extent.

Tadayun was one of the principal supporters of the Republican movement

and was elected to the 13th Majlis in 1933.

He is undoubtedly an intelligent man, and has a very pleasant manner.

He knows a little French.

He was recalled from Kerman in March 1931, and he appears to believe

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which was set up to decide on the Government of the country. Went to Europe in 1910. He was elected in his absence to the third and fourth terms of the Majlis, but did not take his seat. He stayed in Europe and America during the whole period from 1914 to 1923, and was for years in Berlin, where he edited a paper called *K. o. e. h.* For publishing certain articles of an anti-Islamic nature, he was excommunicated by the Mujtahids. He negotiated the Perso-Soviet Commercial Treaty in Moscow in February 1921, and finally returned to Persia in 1924. He was elected to the fifth term of the Majlis 1924-26, and to the sixth term in 1926. He visited America again in 1926 as Persian delegate to the Philadelphia Exhibition. Appointed Governor General of Khorasan in January 1929, he was recalled in May and appointed Persian Minister in London. He became Minister of Roads and Communications. In August 1930 he was appointed Minister of Finance, in addition.

Taqizadeh is a well-bred man, and has travelled extensively. He is no longer so notably popular as he was in the early days of the Constitution, and the Majlis marked him as a man of common sense and moderation and were in sharp contrast to the utterances of the former fiery young Nationalist.

Taqizadeh fell from grace in September 1933, for reasons which are obscure. He was, however, soon re-employed, as he proceeded to Paris as Minister in December 1933.

Recalled from Paris in August 1934, but obtained prolonged leave of absence and did not return to Persia. Appointed Iranian representative at the Congress of Orientalists at Rome in September 1935. But an article which he wrote for the official *Journal* of the Ministry of Public Instruction, in which he said the revision of the Persian language must proceed gradually and without the use of force, annoyed the Shah and caused the suppression of the paper.

He is married to a German and talks German, French, English and French less well.

Appointed Minister in London by Ferrouhi 1941 and has been suggested as Prime Minister on more than one occasion since then, but he has always preferred to stay in London. Became ambassador in 1944.

227 *Vakili, Ali*—Born about 1897 at Tabriz. Started as a carpet merchant and general exporter of produce. Was sole agent for Dr. Ross's life pills, from which he derived considerable profit. Has also managed the Cinema Sepah at Tehran. He still has the agency for certain American products.

A Deputy for Tehran in the tenth Majlis. Member of the municipal council for Tehran. Director of the Central Company, which imports cars, &c.

An energetic person; a protégé of Davar, the late Minister of Finance.

228 *Valatnabar, Abol Fath K.B.E. (Hushmat ud Dowleh)*, previously named *Abol Fath K.B.E.* Born about 1855. A chamberlain of Muzaffar-ed Din Shah when the latter was Crown Prince residing in Tabriz. Private secretary to Mohammad Ali Shah before he came to the throne, and continued in that post till 1909. An open enemy of the Nationalists. Governor of Resht in 1915. Minister of War 1916-17. Governor of Kerman 1918-19. Minister of the Interior 1920. Imprisoned by Seyyid Zia. Governor General of Khorasan May 1924; resigned the next year owing to differences with the military authorities.

Has owned large properties near Tabriz, but has spent most of his substance. Speaks French.

Living quietly in Tehran 1943. Made a pilgrimage to Kerbela early in the year. Aspired to employment in a suitable post at Court, and attained an appointment as a kind of chamberlain at the Court in 1943.

A respectable old-timer who helped us during the 1914-18 war and received a K.B.E. He took no part in politics during Reza Shah's reign and is too old to do much now.

229 *Yasni (Yasnighi), Sadig (Sadegh)*. Born in 1898 at Tabriz, but of a Muzandaran family. Employed for many years in the Department of Commerce of the Ministry of Public Works, and in the Ministry of Commerce since the former ministry was divided up. Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce until April 1938, when he became Acting Minister on the dismissal of M. Ala.

He has paid several visits to Europe, notably to Germany when the Clearing Agreement with that country was negotiated in 1935, and to Moscow in 1939 when the question of renewing the Russo-Iranian Trade Agreement arose. Head

of Agricultural Bank in 1942, but was removed to make room for one of Qawam-as-Saltaneh's political nominees. Member of the board of the Iran Insurance Company February 1943. Head of Mortgage Bank, December 1943. Secretary of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.

Educated in Tehran at the Ecole Polytechnique (Dar ul Funun), and speaks French and English.

230 *Vossug, Hassan, G.C.B. (Vossug-ed Dowleh)*.—Born about 1868. Began his career in the Ministry of Finance. Elected a Deputy to the first and second terms of the Majlis, and in 1909 chosen to be a member of the Nationalist Committee, which directed the affairs of State after the abdication of the Shah. He was a Minister of Justice in October 1909. In the following month he became Minister of Finance, but resigned in July 1910. In July 1911 he became Minister for Foreign Affairs. Again Minister for Foreign Affairs in January 1913, he left for Europe in June of the same year. Minister for Foreign Affairs, July-August 1914, and Minister of Finance, August-December 1915. Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 1916 to May 1917. Prime Minister and Minister of Interior from August 1918 to June 1920. Negotiated the Anglo-Persian Convention of 1919. Visited Europe in June 1920, and only returned to Persia at the beginning of 1926. Appointed Minister of Finance in June 1926, but resigned in November to take his seat in Parliament. Elected as a Deputy from Tehran to the seventh term of the Majlis 1928-30. Appointed President of the new "Academy" for the revision of the Persian language, December 1935.

A man of great ability and character. He became unpopular over the Anglo-Persian Convention, but, after a most able and convincing defence of his acts as Prime Minister during the period 1916-20 before the Majlis, he regained a large measure of popularity. Still has some bitter enemies, who seem to have prevented him from acquiring the favour of Reza Shah.

Went to Europe for a serious operation 1940, survived it, and is now reported to be living in Switzerland (1943). Unable to return to Persia, he was appointed ambassador to Turkey by his brother Qawam-as-Saltaneh in 1942, but could not proceed.

Speaks French fluently, also a little English.

231 *Yazdan Penah, General Murteza*.—Born about 1891, son of Mirza Ali Akbar, a small shopkeeper in the village of Serdash. In 1907 Murteza showed strong pro-Russian sympathies, and consequently gained rapid promotion. In 1912 he was promoted to the rank of Major. In 1913 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel. In 1914 he was promoted to the rank of Colonel. In 1915 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In 1916 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1917 he was promoted to the rank of General. In 1918 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In 1919 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1920 he was promoted to the rank of General. In 1921 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In 1922 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. In 1923 he was promoted to the rank of General. In 1924 he was promoted to the rank of Major-General. In 1925 he was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-General. 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Whatever the suspicions against him were, they appear to have been unsubstantiated, for he was released very soon. In the autumn of 1928 he was appointed inspector of the gendarmerie, but was superseded in 1930 and left without any active command.

Murteza Khan was always regarded until 1927 as a very loyal supporter of Reza Shah, but after his arrest in 1927 he appeared to have lost confidence in Reza Shah. He is active, intelligent, ambitious, and a strict disciplinarian. His military ideas and his general education are very limited, but he has shown respect, holds aloof from foreigners, and is a strong opponent of foreign interference in Persia.

Inspector of the gendarmerie 1928. Replaced by General K. B. E. in 1930. On the fall of Reza Shah, Murteza Khan came again to the fore. He soon became Chief of the General Staff and gradually worked as a loyal supporter of the young Shah. On the appointment of Amir Ahmed as Minister of War in 1943 it became apparent that the two could not work together, and Murteza's department became quite separate from that of the Minister of War. In fact, the Shah took to giving orders to the Chief of the Staff without the knowledge of the responsible Minister. Murteza took two months' leave in June 1943, but was soon appointed commander of the Tehran garrison. On the whole, was a disappointment, and was suspected of having sold himself to the Germans.

Speaks Russian and has a Russian wife.

Appointed Adjutant-General to the Shah autumn 1943. Member of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Relations Committee February 1944.

232. Zuhdi, Fazlullah (Basir-i-Duran).—Born in Hamadan about 1883. His father was for many years in charge of the late Nasir-ul-Mulk's property at Hamadan. Joined the Constitutional movement and was wounded. Joined the Cosacks and thus came into contact with Reza Khan, under whom he served. Rose to the rank of general in 1921. Commanded the troops at Shiraz in 1922. In 1924 commanded the troops sent to Khuzistan, and helped to arrest the Sheiku of Mohammerah in 1925. Transferred to Resht in 1926, where he commanded the Northern Independent Brigade. Recalled to Tehran December 1928. Commanded the Road Guards 1929. Arrested and degraded for neglect of duty in 1929. Soon after he was promoted and reinstated. Chief of police 1931. Relieved of this post after a few months owing to the escape of some prisoners from prison. Dismissed from the army in 1931. Turned his attention to business and became a partner in the "Kazadema" Ford agency. Reinstated in the rank of general 1932 and made A.D.C. to the Shah. Member of the Iranian commercial delegation to Russia in April 1935, and subsequently visited Central Europe.

More of a politician than a soldier. Made a good deal of money in Khuzistan. Being capable of generosity he was not unpopular with the troops under his command.

Married the daughter of Hussein Pirnia (Mo'tamen ul Mulk) in 1927.

Commanded troops at Isfahan 1942, and gradually took charge of all departments of Government; proof was found that he was working with the Germans, and he was arrested by British troops and taken out of Persia in the autumn of 1942.

233. Zand Ibrahim (Ebrahim).—Born about 1890. Educated at the Cadet College at St. Petersburg. Then sent to study law in France, where he was a member of the short lived Azerbaijan Government. After its fall he went back to France, and a few years after returned to Persia, where Davar employed him in the Ministry of Justice as an adviser. He was subsequently transferred to the Ministry of Finance, and in 1938 became a member of the board of the National Bank. On the appointment of A. H. Eftehaj as director of that bank he left the bank and was employed at Court as Comptroller of the Royal accounts. Minister of War in Scheily's third Cabinet, December 1943.

Married to the sister of Farajullah Bahramy. Speaks Russian extremely well, probably better than Persian. A harmless but weak man, who has not succeeded in making his mark in either politics, law or banking, and has obtained the post of Minister of War in order that he should enable others to run that Ministry.

234. Zand Hassan.—Aunt of Zand Ibrahim. Was employed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Second Secretary at Constantinople 1924-28. In the Treaty Department. Then transferred to the Ministry of War in 1934, and in London, 1934-37. Retransferred to Warsaw, May 1937, and recalled to Tehran to be Acting Chief of the Third Political Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (dealing, *inter alia*, with Great Britain), November 1937. At Geneva, August 1938 to October 1939, studying League of Nations organisation. Employed in the Inspection Department, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, October 1939.

Consul at Basra at the end of 1942.

Speaks French and some English. Has an Armenian wife. Agreeable, though slightly clammy.

235. Zarghami, Azizullah.—Born in Tehran about 1882. Educated in Persia. Joined the gendarmes under Swedish officers in 1911 and has been serving at first on the army and since commanding officer of the Road Guards since April 1930. Officiating Chief of the General Staff in August 1934 with the rank of major general. Chief of General Staff 1938. Retired in November 1941.

A deeply religious, well educated and capable officer.

236. Zand Khatun.—Born about 1885 of a Tehran family of Kurdish descent. Employed at the Persian School in Tehran and employed in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Served in various posts for seven years. In 1923 and 1924 was head of a section of the Ministry and was always very courteous and pleasant whatever referred to by members of the Embassy. Served as *chef de cabinet* to Mirza Mostafad A. Khan Ferozgha while the latter was Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was

subsequently posted to Washington, where he spent more than a year as secretary to the Persian Legation. He returned to Persia in 1927 and served in the Ministry of Justice for a time under Davar, at the time when the Ministry was being fundamentally reformed. He was for a time a judge of the Cour de Cassation. He then was transferred to the Ministry of the Interior where he was serving as Under-Secretary when the Minister of the Interior, Mirza Ali Khan Mansur, was transferred to the Ministry of Roads on the 26th January, 1938. From thenceforward he served as Acting Minister of the Interior until Ferozgha's Cabinet was formed in September 1933.

A charming man to meet. Speaks English and French. At the Ministry of Justice earned a reputation for severity, which was no doubt needed.

Proceeded to England as commissioner of the Persian Government with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in December 1933, with his wife and two children. Honorary counsellor to the legation in London 1937.

Returned to Persia December 1940. Under-secretary at the Ministry of Justice from 1941. Has always been helpful in settling cases and giving advice on points of Persian law. On Hikmat's resignation from Scheily's Cabinet in June 1943, became Acting Minister of Justice, but on the appointment of Sadr as Minister returned to the post of Under-Secretary.

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No. 11

by R. Ballard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 6th April)

N 127

Tehran 20th March, 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 121 of the 26th March, 1943, the honour to transmit herewith a review of the principal events affecting our interests in Persia during 1943.

2. I am indebted to Mr. Holman for the political section, to Colonel Macann Mr. Hill, Major General Fraser, Air Commodore Runniman, Mr. Trott, Mr. Cumberbatch, Major Savidge, Mr. Simpson, Mr. Bingley and Colonel Ross for contributions regarding their respective spheres, and to Mr. Somers Cocks for co-ordinating the report.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to his Excellency the Viceroy of India and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East.

I have, &c.

(for the Ambassador)

J. S. SOMERS COCKS

Enclosure N 1

Report on Political Events of 1943.

Anglo-Persian Relations

1. During 1943 Persian cabinets came and went in gloomy procession with little to distinguish them from each other in composition and quality. Each bore the traces to a remarkable degree of those three well-known Persian characteristics—dishonesty, inefficiency and inertia. The more the political pack was shuffled and reshuffled, the more drab the lands became without even the appearance of a joker to break the monotony and enliven the scene. For practically the whole year the destinies of the country were in the hands of Mr. Somers Cocks and his colleagues. Our official business had to be transacted. For Anglo-Persian relations it was not an entirely happy year, though far easier than its predecessor. The Persian ship of State weathered many storms in an inexplicable manner and at the close of the voyage had reached comparatively calm water. This may bode well for the future, but in a country like Persia it is better to refrain from reckless

2. In times of peace Persia has been regarded as a minor power, but war has multiplied the importance of those interests out of all recognition in view of the widespread responsibilities, both direct and indirect, now placed on the shoulders of ourselves and our Allies. At present Persia constitutes first and foremost the vital supply line for carrying aid to Russia and, although the operation of the Trans-Iranian railway was transferred on the 1st April

to the American military authorities, responsibility for the security of the railway was a matter of great importance. Supplies from the south remained vested in the British military forces. In addition, the presence of British troops provided our troops with a further heavy responsibility. Persia, too, is perhaps a country which, if not carefully handled, is liable to clash. A spanner thrown into the Allied machinery by an artful Persian may do untold harm. It is in the light of these considerations and of the inherent weakness of the structure of the Persian State that our policy in this country during the last year should be judged. As is well known, the Persian economy has, under war conditions, failed to carry unaided the burden which it has been called to shoulder in the economic, financial, military and other spheres, and in order to carry out efficiently our vital war responsibilities here, we and our Allies were forced into a considerable measure of interference in many branches of the Persian Administration, which we should naturally have preferred to avoid. Further, as the success of our war effort depends to such an extent on calm and order in the Persian State, it was necessary that the measures taken shape in 1942 was necessarily developed and extended in the year under review. For instance, the complete inability of the Persian Government to maintain order in large areas of the south, which will be dealt with more fully in another section of this despatch, compelled us at one time to provide military protection for convoys on the Bushire-Shiraz-Isfahan road, whilst later the presence of Germans with the Qashgai tribes, which constituted a potential danger of sabotage to the Trans-Iranian railway and the oilfields, called for similar intervention, for lawlessness and insecurity could not fail to affect our vital interests. At the end of the year a measure of peace has been restored and that was our principal immediate consideration. Again, under war conditions the outcome of the general elections could not be without interest to us. Consular officers were accordingly instructed to encourage and support those elements that appeared to be honest and animated by public spirit.

3. Generally speaking, our policy in the economic field was based on increasing our contribution to the welfare of the Persian people to the greatest extent consistent with the carriage of the necessary supplies to Russia. The principal element in the promotion of their welfare could only be internal reform, which we encouraged to the best of our ability, and the reorganisation of the Persian economy. Dr. Millspaugh arrived in Persia in February as Administrator General of Finances, in order to cope with the chaotic financial situation, and pressed for wide powers to control prices, reorganise the system of taxation and balance the budget, &c., he had our fullest backing in all his measures. Similarly, every occasion was taken by us to support the American advisers in other lines of economic reform.

Throughout the year cereals, transport and civil supplies presented serious problems. There again, all our efforts were directed towards their solution.

The full quota of wheat was imported under our Food Agreement of 1942. British Consuls and Consular Liaison Officers continued to work at high pressure in the Persian State.

At the close of the year the British army averted a shortage of wheat in Hamadan to railroad. An Allied Road Transport Board was set up and Lease-Lend lorries were supplied, and in this way a semblance of organisation was introduced into the civil transport system. In addition, steps were taken to increase the supply of consumer goods, particularly from India, and to allocate additional tonnage for civil supplies on the Trans-Iranian railway. On the financial side the acute shortage of currency notes was eased by the arrival of considerable consignments from the United Kingdom. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, too, assisted Dr. Millspaugh by making advances to the Persian Government on the oil royalties payable in 1943-44.

4. All the measures which we and our American Allies took to alleviate the lot of the poorer classes and to establish some order in the corrupt and antiquated machine of Government aroused the most bitter opposition from Persians. A quality which is lacking in the Persian make-up. Economic intentions. This campaign undoubtedly had a deplorable effect on our

popularity and it unfortunately acquired some show of justification when, at the beginning of the year, owing to the unforeseen interruption of the rail traffic and other causes for which the British were not responsible, Tehran was threatened with a serious shortage of oil. The public had naturally been greatly influenced by the fulminations of the press at our expense, which for long periods were allowed to continue their campaigns unchecked by the Government. These attacks might have become even more violent if it had not been for our victories in the various theatres of war. Fortunately, towards the end of the year with Persia's declaration of war on Germany and her adherence to the United Nations, and the issue of the Tehran Declaration, the position returned to normal and there was little to complain of in the attitude of the press. It was at times rather galling that Soviet Russia, having done little or nothing to help the Persian economy and at times having even acted in a manner detrimental to vital Persian interests should remain immune from attack. The Persian attitude, however, towards Russia remains one of deep respect based on fear. We do not think that Russians because they are our allies, we should not attack them.

5. On the 9th September war was officially declared on Germany, and Persia finally adhered to the Declaration of the United Nations on the 14th September. Up to that time Persia had really been an unwilling and purely nominal ally. However, the actual declaration of war, while not altering the situation fundamentally, produced a psychological change in the Persian people, considerably ready-made justification for taking strong action against Axis sympathisers. In fact Persia felt that she had at last become a full blown ally. The news was well received by the Majlis and the press, and gave intense satisfaction to the Shah who had always been keen on closer participation in the war, though for reasons of his own connected with the morale and equipment of the army. It was only the relatives of those serving in the army who bewailed the event, fearing that their menfolk would be called upon forthwith to proceed on active service.

6. It was not long before Persia figured in the limelight again, although to a minor degree. The Secretary of State passed through Tehran in October on his way to the Moscow Conference. Considerable interest and even apprehension was aroused in official circles, as it was feared that independent decisions might be taken at the expense of Persia. As it turned out, the British and American Representatives were unable owing to Soviet opposition to secure agreement on the issue of a declaration which would have reassured Persia as to the intent of the Allies. On their return journey to Tehran the American delegation informed the Persian Government that during the Conference the Russians had repeatedly declared their intention to execute the provisions of the Tripartite Treaty of 1942. This gave general satisfaction and relief. According to the British records of the meetings, however, it would have been more accurate to say that the Soviet delegation considered reaffirmations of the Tripartite Treaty as the Persian Government had complete confidence in the Soviet Government.

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Tehran Conference

8. For Persia all other events of the year were overshadowed by the historic Tehran Conference, which was attended by President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Mr. Churchill and their staffs, and lasted from the 27th November to the 2nd December. The meeting, which passed off without a hitch, excited the interest and flattered the vanity of the Shah, the Government and the whole nation, in that Tehran had been chosen as the seat of such an important conference. For reasons of security the strictest measures in regard to secrecy

had to be observed, and the news of the impending arrival of President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill was only communicated to the Persian Government a very short time in advance. In the case of Marshal Stalin, longer notice was given by the Soviet Embassy without our knowledge. This veil of secrecy, which virtually prevented official visits and entertainment caused some slight resentment and disappointment to the Shah and the Persian Government. It was quickly dissipated, however, by the issue of the Anglo-Soviet American Declaration.

9. When the Secretary of State called on the Persian Prime Minister on the 29th November the latter stated that Tehran was expecting that some communiqué relating to Persia would appear as a result of the conference, and suggested the lines on which such a communiqué should be based. A similar appeal was made to Mr. Churchill by the Shah. The Persian Government clearly knew that the British and the Americans were both sympathetic and that all that was required was to secure the assent of the Russians. In the cordial atmosphere prevailing their assent was secured without difficulty, and a Declaration was eventually issued (a) recognising the assistance given by Persia in the war effort (b) agreeing to continue economic assistance to Persia, (c) expressing readiness to give full

aid (d) confirming the independence and territorial integrity of Persia. This Declaration gave Persia all that she had asked for and was hailed by the nation as the first occasion on which a country had been given such a guarantee by the three Great Powers.

10. It was in the course of the Conference that took place, both the handing over by Mr. Churchill of the Stalingrad sword to Marshal Stalin at the Soviet Embassy and the celebration on the 30th November of Mr. Churchill's 68th birthday by a dinner party in the dining room of the British Legation in the presence of President Roosevelt and Marshal Stalin. These historic events served to reflect the close spirit of friendship and cordiality pervading the whole atmosphere of the Tehran meeting.

11. In the spring of 1943 the Persian Government expressed a desire to send the two countries. The Government of India concurred and His Excellency, Mr. Abahyar Saleh, a former Persian Minister of Finance, left Persia in November for Bombay, where he has set up his headquarters as Persian Trade Commissioner.

12. A further consideration by the Government of India was the Indian Trade Commissioner to Persia, Mr. J. H. ...

13. The Indian community in this country with special reference to anti-British and pro-Axis activities. As a result of Major Naqvi's report on his return to India the Government of India requested that the Persian Government be asked to withdraw the *permis de séjour* of eight Indians. The Persian Government agreed to do so and the Indians were arrested under the Defence of India Act as they crossed the Indo-Persian frontier. As a sequel to this, the Government of India are sending Major Naqvi back to Tehran, where he will be attached to the consulate as a temporary measure in order to continue under the supervision of the Additional Counsellor, his study of the Indian community in Persia. His first duty will be to cultivate the better types of Indian, and consider in what ways they can best be helped—whether in trade or anti-British activities on the part of Indians.

14. Towards the end of the year the Government of India extended an invitation to the Persian Government, through His Majesty's Legation, to send a small Cultural Mission to visit a number of Indian Universities. It was contemplated that the tour should begin and end with a few days in Delhi and take approximately a month in all. The Government of India have offered to be responsible for all accommodation and travelling arrangements and expenses from the moment the Mission reached Delhi till it left Delhi at the end of the tour.

15. The Government of India, on being asked for a contribution of cloth to the Anglo-Iranian Relief Fund, made a generous gift of Rs. 50,000 worth of thick and thin cloth suitable for winter and summer clothing for men and women. At the end of the year the cloth was on its way to Zahidan from India.

Soviet Interests.

16. Soviet policy in Persia remained during 1943 somewhat of an enigma. Officially it was based on strict non-interference in Persian internal affairs that was invariably the attitude adopted by the Soviet Embassy whenever they were approached for their views or concerted action on any issues which happened to arise during the year. Their real intentions were difficult to fathom, and it may

From the short-term point of view it was clear, however, that they were busily preparing the ground by all forms of propaganda, pressure and quiet interference to serve their interests as circumstances might later require. In spite of these difficulties and the natural language barrier this legation made every effort to work in the closest harmony with the Soviet authorities and to give them no cause for complaint, but unfortunately the Soviet Embassy seemed quite incapable of acting without clear-cut instructions from Moscow, and in any case the views of the embassy often carried little weight, when the interests of the Soviet army or other authorities were directly concerned. At times there was a surprising lack of frankness and candour in questions which concerned the Allied war effort in Persia, and any move on our part was invariably viewed with deep suspicion. It was only in cases where "Aid to Russia" and "Soviet Interests" demanded some measure of Allied collaboration that the Soviet Embassy showed more willingness to co-operate. (For instance, the Soviet Embassy was in touch with us over the arrest of the Persian suspects in August 1943 in connection with matters which arise out of the fact that Tehran is the junction point of the British and Russian air spheres). The absence of a Soviet Ambassador for many months of the year did not render our task any more easy, but fortunately the victories in the Mediterranean, and later the more cordial atmosphere generated by the Moscow Declaration, resulted in a more friendly attitude on the part of the Soviet authorities in Persia.

17. The Soviet authorities have continued to show particular interest in Central and Southern Persia and increasing suspicion of British and American policy. For instance, a Soviet scientific expedition toured Southern Persia at the beginning of the year, whilst Soviet consular officers have increased their activities, particularly at Kermanshah, in connexion with political, economic and tribal conditions in various parts of Persia. The Soviet authorities have constantly asked for information about road and aerodrome construction by the British army and our troop movements in Eastern Persia and have gradually extended their military posts southwards. On the other hand they, for their part, have refused to issue passes to British military personnel to visit places where Russian troops are stationed, unless they are satisfied that their journey is directly concerned with the furtherance of aid to Russia, or to agree to a British liaison officer residing at Tabriz. This attitude of suspicion which is characteristic and hardly surprising in view of past history, has been much increased by the support which we have consistently given to the American advisers in this country. No doubt a deep-seated fear exists that the influence of the Americans in the administration of the Government will in some way or other eventually result in the complete domination of Persia by the United States. There is little doubt that the Soviet Embassy are working against the American advisers. Other grounds for suspicion are our alleged support of Seyyid Zia, who returned to Persia in October. The reason for this attitude is not entirely clear, as he has never been associated with anti-Soviet policy, in fact, it was during his premiership that the Anglo-Persian Agreement of 1919 was signed. This attitude is based on the fact that he had lived so long in Palestine and was therefore regarded as an instrument of British Imperialism.

18. As was to be expected, the Soviet Embassy took an exceptionally keen interest and part in the general elections. The ground was well prepared, as closer contact by the Persians with the Russians, their discipline and morale and their sympathy for the lower classes had greatly affected preconceived ideas of the Soviet system. They began to be looked upon as the champions of the oppressed and as possible supporters of revolution against the present ruling class. The Tudeh Party was undoubtedly a powerful force, supported financially and otherwise by the Soviet authorities, however much they may deny this. Although the election results must have been rather disappointing to the Russians, they managed to secure the return of a few Tudeh candidates in the north, who will be more or less subservient to their views. The Tabriz elections, when completed, will probably include more Soviet protégés. The hope of a large Soviet party in the Majlis has not materialised.

Government to vary the rate of exchange without prior consultation with His Majesty's Government

27. An American Persian Commercial Agreement was signed in Washington on the 8th April.

28. In spite of the rather shifty and weak attitude of the United States Minister our relations with the United States Legation have, on the whole been very satisfactory, in fact, far more so than those existing between the United States Legation and their own military. These have been marked by a distinct coldness and have frequently been the subject of complaint to me by my United States colleague and of hints by the American General Officer Commanding. In a country like Persia, where whole hearted collaboration is all important in Allied interests, it is unfortunate that we have been unable to secure more sincere co-operation from Mr Dreyfus. He left for America on leave after the Tehran Conference, and in his absence Mr Ford, the chargé d'affaires, has proved an ideal colleague.

Polish Interests

20. A dual authority administered the Polish refugees from the Soviet Union. On the Polish side was the Polish Civil Delegation directly dependent on the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare in London. On the British side was a small organisation set up by the Middle East Relief Refugee Association, Cairo, at the instance of the Minister of State

40. The opening of the year found an acute situation among the refugees. In Persia there remained a total of about 24,000 (not 22,000, as stated in last year's review) of whom 15,500, including 300 sick, were in camps near Tehran, 2,500 were in Isfahan (including 1,700 children), 3,300 were in Ahwaz, 800 were in hospital and 2,000 were living in Tehran itself. These figures did, however, represent a small reduction on the maximum number of 25,700 which had existed in October 1942. The number of sick also showed a reduction from a maximum of over 2,000 in September 1942.

31 There were three main problems connected with the Polish refugees. The first was economic, the acute shortage of wheat and certain other staple commodities in Persia was used by many unevolved and irresponsible persons to blame the promise of the Poles in Persia for this state of affairs. Arrangements had been made to import all the flour, tea and sugar which the Poles had been using and which they would in future require and there was little or no truth in these allegations, such other items as were required were available in the country without affecting the ordinary consumption of the Persian population. With the diminution of the number of Poles to 9,500 by the end of the year, this situation improved considerably. The next problem was political, here again all menacing agents used the presence of Poles as an excuse for attacking their British sponsors. These attacks have ceased, though there is no guarantee that

various considered programmes involving the apportionment of shipping for

The number of ships available was nearly always much less than had been expected, at the same time the necessity for keeping the Polish transit camp at Abnuz filled to capacity was due to the fact that ships were liable to arrive at any time without due warning and had, owing to general exigencies of shipping space, to carry away a full complement of passengers.

32. The total number of Polish men, women and children evacuated during the year was about 14,500. A large majority went overseas to East Africa and to India, a small proportion were sent to Palestine and some who had relations in the Polish armed forces in the United Kingdom joined them there, a few, whose number did not exceed 2,000, left via Karachi bound for Mexico. Recruiting among the refugees continued throughout the year, 800 young men joined the Polish army and 2,600 young women joined the Polish A.T.S., Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. 760 boys and 250 girls also joined the youth organisations. (These figures refer to 1942 and 1943.) All these were sent to Palestine to join the Polish armed forces there.

83. The morale of the Poles as a whole remained at a fairly low ebb, uncertainty as to their future fate, the relations of their Government with Moscow, failure to provide shipping and lack of employment were all responsible for this. Employment was, nevertheless, found for more than 3,000 Poles throughout most of the year, mainly in various Polish official institutions; about 850 found work with the British and American armed forces and a few with the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation and similar organisations.

British Military Interests

The following is a list of the names of the persons who have been appointed to the various positions of the Board of Directors of the City of New York, for the year 1900, as provided for by the Charter of the City of New York, Chapter 190 of the Laws of 1897, as amended.

was appointed military governor and chief of police. In April Lieutenant W. V. C. ... Persia and Iraq Command, in the hope that the military governor would be guided and invigorated by his advice, and in October he was succeeded by Colonel H. J. Underwood (a former military attaché at this legation) with the title of Political Adviser for the Province of Khuzistan. Underwood was able to report that security me- improved and that at present conditions gave no cause for alarm. First a number of measures had been taken, or were impending— improve the efficiency and terms of service of the Persian police in the area.

35. At the beginning of the year His Majesty's Government considered the question of civil defence duties for British nationals in Persia, in the light of the changed military situation in Russia. They concluded that wherever the risk of air attack was now remote it remained essential to protect Adulian against the risks of sabotage or accidents due to special war conditions. They decided, therefore, to apply to the Province of Khuzistan Regulation 29 B B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, and on the 7th May His Majesty's Minister signed an order under paragraph 7 of Regulation 29 B B requiring British nationals (including Indians) in Khuzistan to undertake civil defence duties.

36 Relations between the British and the Persian authorities and people
of the whole of Persia. The Persian Government made a number of complaints
Most of these, however were petty. Many
dated and out of date, so His Majesty's Legation
Government that no
property, notably telegraph wires
to reduce the pilfering
Persian Government that to

he had made a

37 Owing to the prevailing insecurity the inefficiency of the Persian forces and the demand of the American Persian Gulf Command for a high degree of security, British troops have had to undertake increasing responsibility for the protection of supply routes to Russia and of installations supporting the war effort. In the latter half of 1941 the British presence in Persia was increased from about 10,000 to over 60,000 men. This increase was necessary to meet the demands of the American command for a high degree of security. The British presence in Persia has been maintained at this level since the end of the war.

Persia and Iraq Command placed at the disposal of the Persian Government.

1,000-bed Indian hospital in tents, complete with doctors and orderlies. The hospital remained open from the 11th April to the 10th July and treated 2,038 patients. This gesture on the part of the Persia and Iraq Command created an excellent effect among the Persians and served as good propaganda.

39. During the autumn the Persian Government pointed out to His Majesty's Legation that no procedure had yet been established for dealing with civil and criminal matters affecting Persians on the one hand and the British forces on the other, although article 4 (1) of the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty of the 20th January, 1942 provided for the settlement "in co-operation with the Iranian authorities," of all questions concerning relations between the latter and the Allied forces. As the Persian Government's contention appeared reasonable, His Majesty's Legation communicated it to the Persian and Iraq Command, who expressed the view that the same arrangements for the judicial immunities for British troops should be made in Persia as in Iraq so as to secure uniformity throughout the command as far as possible. The command then submitted a draft agreement on this basis, the text of which His Majesty's Legation forwarded to the Foreign Office for instructions and to the United States Legation in Tebran for comment (since co-ordination with the United States authorities on this matter seemed desirable). That was the position at the end of the year.

40. In January the Soviet Ambassador in London complained that His Majesty's Government had made important changes in the disposition of British troops in Persia without notifying the Soviet authorities. This, the ambassador asserted, was a breach of an undertaking given by Mr. Eden in letters dated the 21st October and the 21st November 1941, that the Soviet authorities should be consulted on such occasions. His Majesty's Legation, commenting on M. Maisky's complaint, pointed out that they had always informed the Soviet Military Attaché in advance of all important moves of British forces in West Persia. They had not informed him of military movements in South or East Persia, but these had been confined to a few reconnaissances. The Soviet Embassy, however, had never reciprocated with information about movements of Soviet troops. Every facility had been given to Soviet authorities to visit the British zone, but here, too, the Soviet authorities did not grant reciprocal facilities. In April Mr. Eden wrote a letter to M. Maisky suggesting the following procedure —

The military attached to this legation should communicate to the Soviet Military Attaché in Tehran, on condition that the latter reciprocally advance information regarding minor changes in the disposition of ~~its~~ troops in Persia which did not involve a substantial change in ~~their~~ total number, on the other hand, major movements, involving a substantial change in the total number should be communicated in advance through the diplomatic channel.

The Soviet Government accepted these proposals. The Soviet Embassy in London has been informed by the Soviet Foreign Office that the Soviet Government has no objection to the proposed changes regarding changes in the numbers or dispositions of their troops although there is reason to believe that such changes have taken place.

41. In the autumn the Persian Minister of Communications, while in London, explained that His Majesty's Government were not submitting the Persian Government regarding the disposition of British troops in Persia, notwithstanding His Majesty's Government's undertaking to do so in the Anglo-Soviet Persian Treaty of the 29th January 1912. His Majesty's Government decided that, in view of the changed strategical situation within the Persian and Iraq Command and of the representations made by the Persian Minister of Communications, a further report on the location of British troops in Persia should be forwarded to the Persian Government provided that the actual designation of formations and units was not divulged.

Security Questions

42. As in 1942 the conduct of German espionage in Persia continued to exercise the closest attention of the Persian Government to Axis agents and activities. The Persian Government was particularly concerned with the activities of German agents in Persia, and the use of certain information obtained with Axis aid for the purpose of demanding the arrest by the Persian Government of new German agents. The Soviet and American Governments were kept fully informed of all intentions. It happened

that at that time the Deputy Naulakht had tabled an interpellation in the Majlis attacking the Persian Government and the Aliens. Therefore, as a first step, I provided the Prime Minister with full evidence about Naulakht's treasonable activities to enable the Government to reply. I also asked for his parliamentary immunity to be withdrawn to facilitate his arrest by the Persian authorities. After interminable delays the Government failed to take any action and Naulakht fled to the Qashghar country without proceeding with his interpellation. Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, the anti-British mullah, went into hiding simultaneously. It then soon became clear that, if the Axis-controlled organisations were to be effectively dislocated, a much larger number of arrests than originally foreseen would have to be effected. Accordingly, having obtained the collaboration of the American authorities in the arrest of some railway employees and relying on the acquiescence of my American colleague, I handed to the Prime Minister on the 28th August a joint Anglo-Soviet list of 162 suspects with a request for their immediate arrest and detention and interrogation at Sultanabad. As well as the railway employees the list included Naulakht, Kashani and a number of senior army officers. On this occasion I was able to secure the support of the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, and the Prime Minister agreed, and by the end of the year about 138 had been arrested and handed over to us at Sultanabad. In October 1941 a further list of 124 suspects was handed to the Persian Government for similar action, and the majority of these were arrested. This constitutes an example of the good effect of joint Anglo-Soviet representations to the Persian Government. As a result of this the Axis-Soviet frontier was cleared of a large number of suspects proposed by the Russians against whom we had no evidence. In view of the embarrassing position in which we were placed the matter was taken up by the legation with the Soviet Embassy with the request that they should either take over their suspects or take part themselves in the interrogations at Sultanabad. Finally, after considerable delay and notwithstanding the apprehensions of the Persian Government, it was agreed that the suspects in question should be transferred to Rehsit for examination, although the move had not taken place by the end of the year.

43. On the whole the position as regards Axis activities in Persia has been vastly improved during 1943 owing to the prompt manner in which the Persian Government reacted to the joint Anglo-Soviet representations referred to above. In addition, in dealing with suspects the Persian Government have had their hands strengthened by their declaration of war on Germany and adherence to the United Nations. In fact they have at last come down completely on the Allied side of the fence. The course of the war, too, has had a sobering effect on potential Axis agents. Even so we shall always be up against the veracity and cowardice of the Persian authorities, and evidence of this is that well known suspects such as Naubakht, Vaziri and Kashani are still at large, whilst a few German agents are known to be in hiding in the south. Active measures are, however, being taken by us to round up those concerned in spite of the very considerable difficulties involved.

Anglo-Peruvian Public Relations

44. The entry of Allied troops into Persia in 1941, while it resulted in the elimination of many nationals in the country, had done little to win over the Government and people from their deep-rooted admiration and friendship for everything German which had been so zealously and thoroughly fostered by the Nazi party during the latter years of Reza Shah's reign. It became apparent that the press attaché's office was essential to carry out British propaganda and to counteract the general feeling prevailing in the country that the Allies would be defeated. Accordingly in the early months of 1942 an office of the Ministry of Information was established at Tehran as the Public Relations Bureau of His Majesty's Legation. The new organisation was suitably located in the old centre of German propaganda in Persia. By the beginning of 1943 the first English newspaper in Persia, the *Tehran Daily News*, had made its appearance. A film unit had been set up to promote the showing of British news-reels and propaganda films, both through Persian commercial channels and by means of mobile cinema vans in the provinces. Steps had been taken to disseminate large quantities of reading material throughout the country, and a start had been made with the establishment of information centres in the provinces in conjunction with the various consulates. The field of broadcasting had also been entered and a daily half-hour broadcast in Persian organised from Radio Tehran. Visual publicity

had been entered for by a special production unit in the bureau, which prepared press releases for the press attaché's office in Tehran. The office of the press attaché had been incorporated in the new organisation and had set itself the uphill task of securing the co-operation of an unfriendly local press.

45. During the year under review these activities were further expanded and systematised. The *Tehran Daily News*, which had first appeared as a cyclostyled bulletin, was converted into a printed newspaper with a special supplement once a week. By the end of the year approximately 4,000 copies were being sold daily in Tehran and the provinces, and a substantial circle of permanent subscribers, totalling over 1,400, had been built up. This paper, in addition to providing reliable information about the course of the war, was also used considerably as a medium for publishing British activities such as those of the A.P.C. and the M.P.P. During the latter half of 1943 the attitude of the Persian press, which previously had on occasions been hostile in the extreme, underwent a welcome change for the better and many articles favourable to ourselves and our Allies were accepted by local editors for reproduction both in the Tehran and in the provincial papers.

46. In the course of the year considerable expansion took place in the publicity work centred on our consulate, and separate public relations units were brought into being at each consulate under the local supervision of His Britannic Majesty's Consuls. In addition to arranging for the distribution of reading material of all kinds, several of these provincial posts undertook the publication of local news bulletins and the establishment of numerous reading rooms for the public in outlying areas where, besides facilities for reading, daily broadcasts of the British Broadcasting Corporation and other British radio services were made.

47. In the field of local publications a weekly news commentary in Persian, *Tafseer*, published by the press attaché's office, attained much popularity and 100,000 copies were regularly sold. With a view to influencing the younger generation of Persians a special fortnightly newspaper for schoolchildren was introduced in October and its popularity proved so great that the original circulation of 5,000 copies had to be increased to 17,000.

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49. During the year the seven mobile cinema units of the bureau covered many thousands of miles and gave performances to audiences in outlying areas which had hitherto, in many cases, never seen a cinema. In Tehran a special newsreel cinema was built in a central part of the city and after a mediocre start succeeded in attracting considerable attention locally.

50. In order to meet the demands of the representatives of our many Allies in Tehran, a special section of the bureau was formed in October to carry out propaganda towards foreign nationals in the capital. As part of its duties it undertook the teaching of English to the various foreign communities, and by the end of the year over 500 Czechs and Poles were receiving regular instruction.

51. During the course of the year the favourable change in the fortunes of war altered fundamentally the basis of our propaganda in Persia and the need for special emphasis on the war largely diminished. Propaganda policy towards the end of the year was, therefore, directed more to supplying the people of the country with information of a general nature on the progress of British life. There is no doubt that a knowledge of how the average Briton lives and of how his civilisation has been established will go far towards laying the foundations of a better understanding between Britain and Persia, which is so essential to the two countries in the post-war period.

British Council Activities

52. The first member of the British Council teaching staff arrived in Tehran in January 1943 and an institute building was leased in February, but owing to the difficulty of obtaining the necessary staff and equipment the formal opening was delayed till June. The institute now has 650 members taking English lessons and 400 members who have joined for other activities. These include a lecture, a film, a concert, and a debate every week. The present building having proved too small negotiations are now in progress for a much larger building to which all cultural and social activities will be

transferred leaving the present building for teaching only. The permanent teaching staff of five is also teaching in the university, teachers' training college, schools, technical college, national bank, railway school and elsewhere, the number of students in this category being over 2,000. The Agricultural College and Department of Mines have also asked for lessons. In a separate building lent by the Ministry of Education 700 adults are taught in evenings by British personnel who are employed during the day in the embassy, army, R.A.F. and other British organisations. This is obviously not altogether satisfactory, but no other teachers are available. The number now being taught English could be increased at will.

53. The Persian Medical Society, a learned society of the art of medicine, was founded in 1905 and has since then been active in the field of medicine.

54. During the year under review a special institute was opened in the city of Isfahan. This institute was opened in the city of Isfahan. This institute was opened in the city of Isfahan.

55. Books and periodicals have been sent to the cities of the country and the Ministry of Education. The Ministry of Education has asked for British teachers and professors for the university and has formally requested directors of institutes to inspect and submit to him reports on schools. The Minister of Commerce has asked for technical instructors for the technical colleges.

56. An institute was formally opened in Isfahan in December 1943 with a permanent British staff of three. There are 500 members taking English lessons and 200 have joined for other activities. As in Tehran the staff is teaching at the technical college and schools. Teaching could be extended to the staff of twelve factories which employ 25,000 operatives, to the large Armenian community in Julfa (a suburb of Isfahan), and to the 2,500 Polish children and adults who will remain there for the duration of the war, if sufficient staff were provided.

57. There is an urgent demand for institutes in other large towns of Persia. If permanent staff and funds were available the considerable overhead expenses for institutes are not forthcoming, temporary staff for teaching should at least be provided.

58. At the end of the year the Russians were planning to open an institute in Tehran on the same basis as the Anglo-Persian institute.

59. The 13th Majlis came to an end on the 23rd November. For many reasons less was heard than in the previous year about proposals for the limitation of its powers or its complete abolition. There seems to have been a general feeling that the powers of the Shah were tending to increase and ought to be held in check by the Majlis. Further, the Prime Minister had shown signs of using the Majlis as a smoke-screen to cover up his failure to pass distasteful legislation, whilst the Shah no doubt felt that the Majlis had its uses in curbing the power of the Prime Minister. At any rate, the provisions of the Constitution as far as they affected the Majlis were not being seriously considered.

Internal Affairs

(a) Majlis

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60. Legislation passed by the Majlis during 1943 included Bills for compulsory education, the establishment of a police training college, transfer of military personnel to the jurisdiction of civil courts, except in case of purely military offences.

military offences, insurance for workers and various important measures sponsored by the Millsbaugh Mission, which are referred to in other parts of this report.

(b) Cabinets.

61. At the beginning of the year Qawam-es-Saltaneh was in power, but soon began to lose ground. His relations with the Shah had never been good. Both were determined to control the Ministry of War and the Shah was openly advocating social reform and the limitation of the power of the moneyed class, to which Qawam-es-Saltaneh belonged. Internal troubles in the Cabinet also embarrassed the Prime Minister. Seyyid Mehdi Farrukh, the Minister of Food, resigned and, after carrying on practically single handed for some days, the Prime Minister presented a new Cabinet to the Majlis in the third week in January. It was composed as follows:—

Minister without Portfolio: Ibrahim Hakani
War: Marshal Amir Ahmed
Education: Ali Akbar Siassi
Industry and Commerce: Abdul Hussein Hajhar
Agriculture: Ahmed Adle
Food: Mehdi Farrukh
Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Saed
Justice: Jawad Amery
Finance: Allahyar Saleh
Interior: Forajollah Babramy
Posts and Telegraphs: Mubain Razi
Roads: H. Motamedy
Health: Nasrullah Intizam

The last three were the Shah's nominees and were relatively young men, without previous Cabinet experience. Early in February the Cabinet showed signs of disintegrating owing to internal dissension and the Prime Minister's treatment of the press, but he managed to obtain a vote of confidence by a small majority. His position vis-à-vis the Majlis was becoming hopeless. In a desperate attempt to appease the Deputies he tabled Bills (a) to abrogate the fundamental law that no Deputy might become a Cabinet Minister, and (b) to give to the Majlis powers over the appointment of the head of the National Bank.

His sympathies were alienated by the Prime Minister's declaration that, in order to establish the authority of the people, the Constitution should be revised, and by his legitimate attempt to curb the Shah's control of the army and the General Staff, it became evident that the game was up and Qawam-es-Saltaneh resigned.

62. Soheily was the next Prime Minister, and on the 21st February the following Cabinet received a unanimous vote of confidence from the Majlis:

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior: Ali Soheily
Commerce and Industry: Mahmud Hoder
War: Marshal Amir Ahmed
Communications: Abdul Hussein Hajhar
Justice: Ali Asghar Hikmat
Foreign Affairs: Mohammed Saed
Finance: Allahyar Saleh
Education: Ali Akbar Siassi
Posts and Telegraphs: Nasrullah Intizam
Health: Amanullah Ardalan
Ministers without Portfolio: Mohammed Tadayyun and Hussein Sami

63. Such a team seemed the best available in the circumstances, with the possible exception of the Prime Minister. The programme of the Cabinet included the supply of food, the stabilisation of prices, the improvement of the welfare of the peasants, the workers and Government employees, and co-operation with the Allies. Tadayyun, an experienced Majlis debater, was appointed Minister of Food in March, and Ettibar, a Majlis Deputy, became Minister of Agriculture a fortnight later. The Prime Minister managed to curb the excesses of the press, largely as a result of representations from this legislation. The offences for which newspapers might be suppressed were also re-defined and eleven organs of the press were actually suppressed. The Bill defining Dr. Millsbaugh's powers was proceeded with in spite of agitation against it, as expressed by the closing of the bazaars. However, the whole effect of this show of firmness was

ruined by the Prime Minister declaring in secret session that such action had been forced on him by the British.

64. As a result of a dispute between the Minister of Finance and the American advisers, the former resigned and was replaced at the end of April by an elderly Majlis Deputy, Morteza Quli Bayat. The Government survived with a large majority an interpellation in the Majlis in May challenging the legality of the appointment of the Majlis Deputies, Ettibar and Bayat as Ministers, as well as the right of the Government to transfer their authority under the Military Governor Law to the Minister of War and to interpret in their own way a section of that law. The Government victory was alleged to be due to the fact that there was no obvious successor to Soheily. Strikes of engineers and professors, the rise of the Tudeh party and the refusal of Marshal Ahmed to continue acting as Minister of War, however, were not sufficient to bring about the Government's fall. The Government was unpopular and resulted in the resignation in June of the Minister of Justice and the Director of the Department of Press and Propaganda.

65. At the beginning of July the Ministry of the Interior, and Khalil Fahmy filled the vacated post of Minister without Portfolio. Disorder and insecurity consequent upon the disaster at Sumrin in July seemed likely to create an ugly situation throughout the country, particularly in the tribal areas. How the Government dealt with that problem is told in the section on the Tribal Situation. The vacant post of Minister of Justice was given to the elderly reactionary, Muhsin Sadr, early in August. At the end of August Siassi resigned owing to a difference of opinion with Soheily. Hussein Sami's found the Ministry of the Interior too exacting for him and resigned early in September, and was replaced by Tadayyun. The latter had the invidious and unpleasant duty of administering the elections throughout the country, and carried out his duties with firmness and courage, though the inevitable accusations of bribe-taking and corruption were made against him, usually from disappointed candidates.

66. The complicated disputes between the General Staff and the Ministry of War concerning their spheres and relative positions proved a great embarrassment to Soheily. Dr. Millsbaugh also became restive at the procrastination of the Majlis in connexion with the passing of the Income Tax Bill, and threatened to resign. To make matters worse for Soheily about thirty of the Deputies who had found that they had no chance of re-election to the 14th Majlis, began an intrigue against the Prime Minister in every possible way. An interpellation concerning the nation's bread supplies was taken on the 31st October, and resulted in a vote of confidence for Soheily. Eventually, in November, the Income Tax and other essential measures became law.

67. Throughout the last three months of the year Soheily had to deal with the threat of a coup d'état by the Shah. On the 1st of December, of Seyyid Zia and Din Tabatabai after 22 years' absence in exile, latterly in Palestine. The Prime Minister profited from, and probably abetted, the campaign against the Seyyid, which was instigated by the Russians and by the Shah, and it was not owing to Seyyid Zia but to the Shah that Soheily had to resign in the middle of December. It soon became apparent that the Shah's chief interest was to eliminate from the Cabinet the only two strong men therein, Tadayyun at the Ministry of the Interior and Marshal Amir Ahmed at the Ministry of War. Soheily was called upon to form a new Cabinet without them, and on the 16th December the following Cabinet was appointed:

Prime Minister: Ali Soheily
Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Saed
Justice: Muhsin Sadr
Finance: Amanullah Ardalan
Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhar
Roads: Nasrullah Intizam
Agriculture: Moosa Noury Esfandiary
Education: Issa Sadiq
Posts and Telegraphs: Hamid Sayyah
War: Ibrahim Zand
Public Health: Qasim Ghanji
Commerce and Industry: General Shafai
Without Portfolio: Mustafa Adle

designed to improve administration, and since that entails a check on long standing habits of embezzlement, they are meeting with much opposition and progress is very slow. The arrival of 600 lorries from America has enabled them to begin the organisation of much-needed transport services, and they are working hard to bring some order into the medical, supply and finance services of the army. The American advisers appear to be leaving the development of the Persian air force to the Royal Air Force.

77. Some attempt has been made by the present Chief of Staff to discourage corruption. A number of senior officers have been placed on the retired list, but while military tribunals continue to acquit with monotonous regularity, even in flagrant cases, and the Shah to intervene to protect his favourites and their favourites, no great change of heart can be expected. The application of conscription continues to be one of the most scandalous abuses in the country, the sale of exemptions being a steady source of profit to the police, the gendarmes and the medical and military officials connected with the calling up of recruits. The result is that the army gets only the poorest men.

78. The only serious operation ventured on during the year was that carried out by General Shabbakhti in May and June in an attempt to secure the submission of Naair Qashgai. After weeks of procrastination, an initial success was scored by the driving of Naair Qashgai from his stronghold at Firuzabad. This, however, was not followed up, and the tribes retaliated by inflicting on the Persian garrison of Semirum, in the Qashgai summer quarters, a serious defeat which resulted in the capture of all the arms and equipment of the force of some 800 men. Some minor operations were carried out in different parts of the country nominally for the collection of arms, but there is no reason to believe that any of them was more than partially effective.

79. At the end of the year the nominal strength of the Persian army was 80,000 but it is doubtful whether its real numbers exceeded 70,000. It remains widely dispersed over the country organised nominally into ten so-called divisions, two of which are at Tehran. The spirit of the officers remains very poor, the better ones are disillusioned and disaffected, the others make as much profit as they can.

(b) Gendarmerie

80. Although American advisers have been at work in the gendarmerie for over a year no considerable improvement is yet visible, nor is any real improvement possible to get at the moment. The present state of affairs is far below that standard. Colonel Schwarzkopf has recently been given fairly extensive executive powers, and, as he has energy, determination and much optimism, it is hoped that he will soon be able to show results. His schemes are perhaps too ambitious. He aims at creating a force which will be entirely independent of the army in all respects, with its own services and equipped to carry out minor operations. As the rôle of the army in present circumstances is nothing more than the restoration of internal security, it seems that a close co-operation between the two forces and a pooling of certain resources would lead to economy and efficiency.

81. The official strength of the gendarmerie at the end of the year was 937 officers and 22,303 men. Its actual strength was probably considerably less.

Persian Air Force

82. The strength of the Imperial Air Force on the 31st December, 1943 after deduction of 53 officers and 196 non-commissioned officers awaiting transfer or discharge, was 225 officers, 433 non-commissioned officers and 506 conscripted men. This is a reduction of more than one-third from the strength of a year before and reflects a wholesome attempt at reorganisation on realistic lines. The strength in aircraft was 149, of which 101 were Fiat Variants and 78 Tiger Moths. No new aircraft were brought into service during the year. The morale, discipline and training of the force remain poor, but there are signs of improvement in all of them. This is due partly to the efforts of the present head of the air force, General Mohammed Hussein Firouz, and largely to the encouragement given by His Majesty's Government in the promised supply of fifteen new Anson aircraft and the assistance and advice of technical officers of the Royal Air Force. The return to the Imperial Air Force of certain buildings at Dehshah Tappeh and the completion of the hangars at Isfahan should help to improve the standard of maintenance of aircraft. In this respect better organisation and a proper stores

procedure should also in time show good results. A drastic reform of the headquarters organisation is in progress. It will, nevertheless, be some time before the force can hope to have any serious operational value.

83. Relations between the Persian Air Force and the Royal Air Force are good.

Finance

(a) General

84. Our financial relations with Persia in 1943 were more amicable than they had been during the previous year, principally because the vexed question of the supply of currency for the Allied war effort in Persia seemed at last to have been settled. But, although relations had improved, the financial situation had not. Several crises arose during the year which threatened to wreck the whole financial and economic structure of the country and in turn the entire machinery of government. Only by a very narrow margin was this avoided, but the elements which were responsible for the crises still exist, and Persia's financial future remains at best unsatisfactory and at worst precarious.

85. When, in 1942, the Persian Government saw their country sliding into financial and economic chaos, chiefly because of their own reluctance or inability to adopt and enforce the measures which have been universally accepted as essential to combat war-time inflation, they decided to invite Dr. A. C. Mills, an American who had headed a financial mission to Persia in the years immediately following the last war—to undertake the guidance of their country's finances in the difficult time that lay ahead. He arrived in February 1943, with a small staff of assistants, to take up this thankless task in the face of a covertly hostile Majlis which, in the months which were to follow, obstructed by all the means in its power every item of legislation which he proposed in order to combat inflation and restore the country's economic equilibrium. The reason for this was, of course, the fact that the Majlis were themselves the very people who would profit by a continuation of the existing state of affairs, i.e., landowners, merchants, contractors, etc. They wanted days in futile debates and used every article of oriental politics to delay and obstruct any essential legislation, either for their own selfish ends or for those vested interests of which they were the willing tools. Eventually at the beginning of November Dr. Mills' patience ran out, and he delivered an ultimatum that he and the members of his mission would resign if the Majlis failed to pass within a week the Income Tax Bill and a Bill authorising the engagement of a total of sixty American advisers. The Majlis capitulated and passed the two Bills. At the same time, they threatened to proclaim that it was their intention to turn the country over to the Americans, and they threatened them to subject these Bills to such close scrutiny.

And that's the wavering Majlis, for their love
Lies in their purses, and whose empties them,
By so much fills their hearts with deadly hate.

(b) Price Control

86. Dr. Mills' first task was to get the Majlis to grant special powers to control prices of essential commodities and to give the Government the right to control the production and distribution of these commodities. This was done in the year 1943. The law was passed, but the Majlis, in its usual fashion, was slow to implement it. Dr. Mills, however, was not deterred. He went to the Ministry of Finance, called the Price Stabilisation Committee, and set up a special organisation in the provinces.

87. Armed with these wide powers, Dr. Mills proceeded to issue regulations aimed at checking hoarding, speculation, and the use of essential commodities. As often as not active campaigns of propaganda were launched, and in some cases he had to bow before the opposition elements. Not only had he to contend with these obstructions to contend with, but he found himself dealing with a bureaucracy lacking any serious experience of administrative matters of this kind and, as well, unbelievably corrupt and inefficient. It is remarkable that in spite of all these handicaps, Dr. Mills has been able at the present time to bring some extent the soaring prices which have given Persia the reputation of being the only country in the world, with the exception of China, where war-time inflation has been allowed, with the

(c) Financial Crisis

88. By April it seemed that the financial volcano was at last about to erupt. Dr. Millsaugh estimated that, in excess of ordinary taxation revenue at least another 1,500 million rials would be needed to balance the country's budget. He could rely upon internal borrowing only to the extent of 500 million rials, to be obtained from the National Bank, and he suggested that the Allies should grant an emergency loan to cover the remainder of his apprehended deficit. In the event he has been able to carry on up to December 1943 without recourse to foreign loans, though he had, in fact, applied to the State Department for a loan of \$30 million. The Government has also received payments of oil royalties, and this has been used to finance the ordinary expenses of Government.

89. As the year progressed, and anti-inflationary legislation was slowly forced through a reluctant Majlis, Dr. Millsaugh began to take a more optimistic view of the Government's financial position. Revenue returns exceeded his expectations, and it was this, combined with his reluctance to put before the Majlis another major controversial measure, that induced him to postpone his request for a foreign loan. It is interesting to note the Persian Prime Minister's reaction (and presumably that of the Majlis) to the loan project. It can be summarized as follows—

Purely American loan—acceptable

British participation—unwelcome, but acceptable if unavoidable

Russian participation—entirely unacceptable

And that, perhaps, sums up the degrees of confidence which the Allies enjoy among well-informed Persians.

(d) Inflation

90. The trend of inflation throughout the year can best be gauged by a study of the cost of living index and the wholesale price index. At the end of 1942 the cost of living index was 814 and wholesale price index 554, by December 1943 they had risen to 1070 and 940 respectively. (The heavy comparative rise in the cost of living index figure is an indication of the extent to which retailers are amassing profits.) The internal price level in this country at the end of the year was therefore probably higher than in any other territory in the Middle East. In the closing months of 1943, however, wholesale prices eased, although the relief had not begun to be felt in the retail market. To some extent this was due to the fact that the demand for goods during the war was not so high as it had been in 1942. At the same time an improvement in the transport situation facilitated the arrival in the interior of stocks of goods that had lain for months in the Gulf ports, this also added to the anxiety of hoarders and contributed to the weakening of black market prices.

91. The scarcely concealed activities of hoarders and speculators also greatly hampered Dr. Millsaugh's efforts to control inflation, and it was not until the early part of 1944 that some of these hoarders were sent to prison. The primary cause of inflation in Persia, of course, was still the uncontrolled pressure of a constantly increasing amount of internal purchasing power upon a static or diminishing supply of consumer goods.

(e) The Income Tax Bill

92. Of all Dr. Millsaugh's anti-inflationary measures placed before the Majlis, the Income Tax Bill was the most unpalatable, as it directly affected all the Deputies, and created the crisis which almost led to his departure. The Bill hung in the Financial Commission for many weeks, and went through a process of emasculation which destroyed much of its original purpose. Finally during the first week of November, it came before the Deputies in full session for enactment. Amendment after amendment was proposed—all directed towards relieving the pockets of the rich from the incidence of income tax. It was finally agreed that the Deputies should be exempted from the tax for at least the remainder of their term of office, which had almost expired. Dr. Millsaugh thereupon decided to let it be known that unless the Bill was passed in its entirety, except for reasonable amendments, he was not going to remain. On hearing of this the Shah promptly intervened, indicating that it was his wish that the Bill, and the Bill to engage more Americans, should be

enacted without delay. So, on the 11th November the Majlis capitulated, and the Bill was passed. In its final form, the Bill represented a substantial compromise on Dr. Millsaugh's original proposals, but no amendment was incorporated which seriously jeopardised its principles though the postponement of its application for a year deprived the country of much-needed revenue.

(f) The Budget Law

93. Another major item of legislation which the Majlis passed in November was the Budget Law. The Budget for 1944, presented, the Bill was divided into two parts—the Ordinary Budget, which showed a deficit of about 1,400 million rials, and the Extraordinary Budget (covering the industrial and trading operations of the Government), which was self-financing. Although Dr. Millsaugh had indicated that the only way he could see of balancing the Ordinary Budget was by borrowing from the Allies, the Deputies, in their patriotic zeal, preferred to produce a balanced budget by means of the various Government trading organisations at the beginning of the financial year, rather than consent to a foreign loan.

(g) Sale of Gold

94. By no means the least important weapon employed in the fight against inflation in Persia was the sale of gold. The Government of Persia, in order to withdraw the excess purchasing power from the open market, to some extent. In the latter stages of the scheme which was begun in June 1943, the proceeds of the sales of gold were allocated to the British military authorities in Persia. The sale of gold was a profitable plan for financing the cost of the war, an arrangement was concluded between London and Washington whereby the whole of the local currency proceeds derived from sales in Persia were placed at the disposal of the American authorities with effect from 25th September, 1943.

(h) Note Circulation

95. In January 1943, the value of notes in circulation was Rials 2,193 24 millions compared with 935 93 millions on the outbreak of war. By December 1943, notes in circulation had risen to 6 150 75 millions, an increase during the year of 2 957 51, or almost 100 per cent.

96. The supply of notes was not the only cause of anxiety, but there were no acute shortages such as were experienced in 1942. At one stage early in the year, however, the currency authorities threatened to issue no more notes against sterling until we delivered the gold due to Persia under the Financial Agreement. The position we had adopted was that we would hand over the gold when the Majlis ratified the agreement. As it happened the threat was never carried into effect, and the agreement was ratified in June.

(i) Sale of Silver to India

97. When the National Bank of Iran decided, as a matter of policy, to replace the silver in the Currency Reserve by gold which the Government was purchasing from the United States authorities, the Government of India were asked if they wished to buy a quantity of silver which was available for sale in the open market. Of this amount the bank offered to sell 120 tons at Rupees 80 per 100 tolas 916 fine—the approximate price at which the Government of India had sold a similar amount to the Persian Government in 1942—and the remainder at the current Tehran price. The offer was accepted, and at the end of the year arrangements were being made to pack and ship the silver to India. Altogether the quantity of silver in the Currency Reserve amounted to 1,600 tons and the National Bank hoped to be able to sell the whole amount to the Government of India. If this can be done, the Persian Government will not only stand to make a substantial profit (the silver stands in the Currency Reserve at the international market price but under the Financial Agreement the rupees paid by the Government of India will qualify for convertibility as to 80 per cent into gold. On the other hand, the Government of India are buying the silver at a price well below that ruling in Bombay.

Civil Supplies and Transport

98. The new import licensing system introduced in the latter part of 1942 at the request of the Middle East Supply Centre to restrict imports to essential

The U.S. market for these products is growing rapidly, and the U.S. government has been working to increase its presence in the market. The U.S. government has been working to increase its presence in the market by providing technical assistance and training to local producers. This assistance has helped local producers improve their production techniques and quality control systems. As a result, the U.S. market for these products has grown significantly in recent years.

99. The Middle East Supply Centre, Tehran, moved out of the British Legation in May and set up in separate offices as an Anglo-American body. The staff nevertheless continued to be entirely British, for repeated efforts on our part to find Americans to share the work (and the odium) and to facilitate co-operation with the American advisers and the Lease-Lend organisation met with no success, and American participation was limited to attendance at committees and to the provision of an American room, which is usually empty, in the Middle East Supply Centre building. In the middle of the year Dr Mollapour's Price Stabilisation Section, as part of its attack on high prices, ~~issued a number of orders for the control of imports and exports~~ ^{imposed a number of restrictions} to discourage merchants and caused a diminution of activity, but many of these restrictions were later withdrawn and merchants' imports of the goods that had not remained Government monopolies (e.g., cereals, sugar, tea and cotton piece-goods) filled the available quotas. Co-operation between the Middle East Supply Centre and the Mollapour Mission, though tenuous at first, grew steadily, thanks mainly to the initiative of the former, into a very close and constant collaboration.

100. In the autumn clear signs of potential crisis during the winter appeared, but energetic action all round has removed our worst fears. Owing to low rates and poor control Government transport had become seriously disorganised and the ability of the Road Transport Department to meet many vital demands arising concurrently was seriously reduced, although at that time the Government owned 900 recently arrived Lend Lease trucks and had under contract (on paper) about 1,000 other vehicles. Cereals collection and the distribution of other essential goods were very seriously threatened by this prevailing lack of transport. Furthermore, the Government monopolies of sugar, tea, cotton piece-goods and drugs were not operating, and in fact had resulted only in substantial stocks of these goods not reaching the public. On top of all this came the threat by Dr. Millspaugh and his entire mission to resign. Happily this was withdrawn in time for the mission to co-operate with the Anglo-American relief committee for the relief of the civil supply crisis. The Persia and Iraq Command and the Middle East Supply Centre came to the rescue. The British army undertook to carry cereals for Tehran from the west and oil from Kermanshah to Tabriz and from Shahrood to Meshed, and arrangements were made for the seconding of Middle East Supply Centre officers to Persia to supervise cereals collection and civil road transport.

101. The year closed with the economic situation much steadier and with prices showing a tendency to fall. The new Government formed in December indicated a desire to work closely in economic matters with the British and American Legations and the Middle East Supply Centre, the new Minister of Commerce, Industry and Mines, General Shafai, even paid public tribute to the help given in the past to Persian industry and trade by His Majesty's Legation and certain Middle East Supply Centre officers.

102 With the end of the war in sight many Tehran merchants began thinking of re-establishing connexions with United Kingdom firms; and the number of enquiries received by the Commercial Secretariat on this point increased.

Industry

103. Early in the year an Industrial Development Committee was set up under the aegis of the Middle East Supply Centre, with Persian, British and American participation. Its object was to promote local industry in order to economise imports. This body was able to give substantial help to Persian factories, and it was mainly thanks to its efforts that the sugar-beet crop was

harvested and local sugar production maintained. Lack of transport hampered industry throughout the year. Latterly, signs of labour unrest increased, but direct Russian encouragement, though widely suspected, could not be proved.

Agriculture

104. In the early spring the Persian Government asked the Allies for help to provide seed for spring sowing. As a result, arrangements were made to import 2 000 tons of sorghum (a variety of millet) from Iraq and an Anglo-American relief committee was set up to supervise distribution. Thanks to the work of this committee a large part of the imported seed was sown, but the results, unfortunately, were not good owing (it is alleged) to the quality of the seed having been poor. The Khuzestan Agricultural Society, under the management of Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. C. Noel, D.S.O., C.I.E., continued its activity, but will not be extended because the soil in that area has proved to be unsuitable. Irrigation schemes in the vicinity are, however, being proceeded with under Lieutenant-Colonel Noel's direction and with the support of the Persian Department of Irrigation.

Ginn Collection.

105. Our efforts to assist the country as a whole to feed itself, so as to be independent as far as possible of supplies from abroad, continued throughout the year. Thanks to this, to arrivals of wheat from North America and adulterants from Iraq, and of wheat from Russia, the country reached the 1944 harvest without widespread famine, though there were undoubtedly many deaths from starvation in various places, including Tehran, and the free market price rose in some places to £40 a ton. The small band of British Consular Liaison Officers worked unflinchingly; without their help the situation would have been much worse. The central control of grain collection was transferred from Mr Sheridan, who resigned in August, to Mr. Crawford, another American. Mr Crawford was without experience of such work, but he is less quiescent than Mr Sheridan and he welcomed from the start the assistance of British officials of whose value it took Mr Sheridan some time to be convinced. Towards the end of the year the control of the Consular Liaison Officers, which had hitherto been vested in the Ministry of Agriculture, was transferred to the East Supply Centre, who also interested themselves in the question of additional help of Dr Mallapaugh. As Americans to fill the Mallapaugh cadre of six, were coming in very slowly it was agreed between the Americans and the British concerned that the British authorities should lend for work in Persia a considerable number of officers and men who had had experience in grain collection and food transport in Syria and Iraq. In May 1944 the request should be reviewed to decide whether this help was still needed or not.

100. The difference between the British attitude and the Russian has been touched upon in the section on "Soviet Interests." The north, though the main granary of Persia, contributed little towards the feeding of the deficit areas during the 1942-43 harvest, and against the historic gift of 25,000 tons of wheat from Russia must be set the large quantities of grain, especially rice but it is also wheat, which the Soviet authorities accepted in the early days of the war. The harvest of 1943, which was secured all over the country in 1948 raised the hope that this time the north would contribute its quota for the common good. Every reference to this subject in conversation with the Russians was met with the enquiry what Hamadan and Kermanshah were doing. In fact, not only did these two districts, which were expected to export wheat, but also the provinces of Gilan and Mazandaran, deficit areas, the British Consular Liaison Officer made contracts for a quantity of grain exceeding local consumption. The large quantities of wheat which, thanks to the energy of British Consular Liaison Officers, were collected in Hamadan and Kermanshah might, however, have been useless to the capital at its time of greatest need if the British military authorities had not carried grain from these two places to railroad at Sistanabad with military transport. By the end of August this quantity arrived and exceeded 10,000 tons and the lift was continuing. The Prime Minister, stimulated by Dr. Millspaugh and the British Legation, approached the Soviet Embassy about grain supplies from the north, whence Dr. Millspaugh had hoped to obtain 50,000 tons towards feeding the deficit areas and building up a reserve. The Russians admitted 40,000 tons as a fair quota from the north, and offered to help with the carriage from the main centres—provided that adequate road transport was provided for local hauls. Considerable numbers of lorries were sent up to Meshed and Tabriz,

but by the end of the year the quantity of grain received by Tehran from Khorassan was small and from Azerbaijan, nil.

107. On the other hand, the position in the central and southern regions of Persia is vastly different. Out of a target of 170,000 tons up to the harvest of 1944 149,360 tons had actually been collected by the end of the year and grain was still coming in satisfactorily. Provided that 20,000 tons only out of the 40,000 tons hoped for from the northern areas are actually received in Tehran, it seems likely that grain supplies will be sufficient to last till next

it will be because, whereas the north has served the State very ill, the south has made an unprecedentedly high contribution—thanks to the assistance afforded by British consular officers and British Consular Liaison Officers whose local knowledge, energy and powers of persuasion have been invaluable.

Locust Control

108. Since 1943 was the third year of the current migratory cycle of the Desert Locust and a serious influx of swarms into Persia was expected, the British, Soviet and Indian Governments lent every possible assistance to the Persian Government, with a view to obtaining emergency shipments of food to this country and also to hindering the mass reproduction of the insect which threatened India and the U.S.S.R.

109. A mission of Soviet entomologists (who had been in Persia since 1941 under the provisions of the Persian Soviet Anti Locust Agreement) and a British Locust Control Officer (Mr. O. B. Lean) co-operated with the Persian Ministry of Agriculture in perfecting as far as possible the Persian control

operation, and successive releases of lorries for this organisation were made. Anglo-American-Persian Road Transport Board. In addition, the support of the Inter-departmental Committee on Locust Control and of the Minister of State Resident in the Middle East enabled Mr. Lean to secure very generous assistance from the British military authorities. An Indian cavalry regiment was placed at his disposal for scouting and eventual control operations in Khuzistan, and when it transpired that the unusual weather conditions of the winter of 1942-43 had confined the invading swarms to East Persia, Indian army despatched several companies into Kerman Province, where they did excellent work with Mr. Lean. Meanwhile, the Government of Persia despatched a representative to the Tehran International Locust Control Committee (Dr. K. D. Bawa), whose first hand information about the westward movement of swarms from India and whose assistance in the forward planning of the Persian campaign were of great value. The Soviet mission, for their

locusts from the air by poison dust and after having installed similar apparatus into five Persian aircraft they supervised effective operations by this method in Khorassan towards the end of the summer. In spite of the considerable effort employed against them the locusts penetrated as far north as Meshed and as far west as Hamadan district, but the damage to crops was insignificant.

110. In July the Persian Government called an international anti locust conference in Tehran (at the suggestion of the Anti Locust Research Centre in London) at which it was generally agreed that preparations must be made in 1944 for a possible fourth migratory cycle. Consequently, a Soviet aerial control unit was established at Jiwani, a Royal Air Force anti locust flight at Bandar Abbas, and British military units at both these centres. Large orders for a new lethal dust (with di-nitro-ortho-resol base) were placed in the United Kingdom and the United States. And by November every preparation had been made for a devastating campaign against the swarms which were expected to enter from India and Oman.

111. The non-arrival of Desert Locusts in Persia (owing mainly to a successful campaign in India during the summer of 1943) has been a source of justifiable disappointment to those who worked so hard to prepare for them, because the success of such a mechanized campaign (an attack on and not a defence against the pest) would have been epoch-making. However, the preservation of the crops from locusts now is the most important thing, and the experience gained from training the units concerned will undoubtedly be of value in future migratory cycles.

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No 12

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 7th April.)

(No. 137)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period of the 20th to the 26th March, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran 27th March 1944

Enclosure in No. 12

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 12 for the period 20th to 26th March, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political.

1. THE new Prime Minister is having difficulties with the Majlis over the question of a free hand. At the first the Deputies had assured him that they would give him a free hand, expressing, however, the hope that he would retain the Cabinet as it was, with the exception of Seyyid Mushin Sadr, the Minister of Justice, and making a new appointment to the vacant Ministry of Industry and Commerce. The Majlis, however, indicated that this did not fall within their interpretation of a free hand and the representatives of so-called Majlis parties demand that more of the young and progressive should be represented but they have refused to specify the individuals who would meet with their approval. The five days of the Noruz holidays postponed the issue.

Economic

2. The absence of spring rains in large areas of the country is arousing anxiety regarding the wheat crop. The immediate situation of wheat in the wholesale and free retail markets and an increase of hoarding and speculation. The immediate grain situation is satisfactory some 300,000 tons of the 410,000 required to feed the towns until the next harvest having been collected. But the latter figure includes no reserve, and the Government should have a reserve of at least 50,000 tons. The prospects of collecting this amount are not good although the Government are still asking for grain from the country. Only 15,000 tons expected from Azerbaijan only 700 tons have as yet reached the capital.

Persian Forces

Army

3. Eight more American officers have arrived to join General Ridley's mission to Persia. All American officers will be posted to the Headquarters of Provincial Divisions, so that there will be one American officer at each Divisional Headquarters.

Appointments—military—

4. Sarhang Hummat to command the 6th (Fars) Division vice Sarhang Bahrami.

5. The following promotions have been announced—

Army Sartips to be Sarlashikars—

Abdul Reza Afshami (F.O. 2, M.A. 2), Commanding 7th (Kerman and Maku) Division.

Isma'il Shafai, lately Minister of Commerce and Industry.

Rashid Ali Karbassi—Military Governor of Tehran.

Muhammad Hussein Firuz—Commanding Persian Air Force.

Ali Riaz—Chief of Staff.

Hassan Arfa—Commanding 1st Division.

Haji Ali Razmara—Commanding Officers' Cadet School and Chief of Shah's Military Secretariat.

Sarhangs to be Sartips—

Reza Javadi—Commanding 3rd (Azerbaijan) Division
 Assadullah Gulshayan—Commanding 5th (Luristan) Division
 Hushmand Afshar—Commanding 4th (Kurdistan) Division
 Mansour Muzayini—Commanding 2nd (Tehran) Division
 Fazlullah Humayuni—Commanding 10th (Khuzistan) Division
 Nasrullah Motazed—Commanding Independent Cavalry Brigade
 Abbas Wahdati—Commanding 19th Brigade Khwakh, 7th (Kerman and
 Mekran) Division
 Ali Akbar She'ri—Inspector of Infantry
 Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami—Head of the 2nd Bureau, General
 Staff
 Abdollah Qalbogi—Military Prosecutor-General
 Seyid Wabullah Ray—Medical Services
 Ali Firuzi—Veterinary Services

Gendarmerie

Sarhangs to be Sartips—

Farzaneh—Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie
 Farzadan—Commanding Gendarmerie of 2nd (Azerbaijan) District
 Muqaddam—Chief of Gendarmerie Medical Services

Internal Security

Fars

6. Four of the five Germans who were being harboured by the Qashgai have been released. The possibility of attacks deliberately aimed against British war interests. The usual disturbances are, however, to be expected during the migration, which is likely to begin earlier than usual this year for tribes in southern and south-east Fars, owing to lack of rain and grazing.

Ahorassan

7. Disensions between Kurdish chiefs of the Buznurd-Qashan area, notably Farzad, Zafar, and Ali, have been disturbed the peace of that district. The Persian Government have been able to do little to maintain order owing to the Russian prohibition on the entry of Persian troops to that area. The Russians have, however, recently agreed to the stationing there of a small detachment.

American Affairs

8. There are now American advisers in the following departments of Persian administration—

Army	19
Gendarmerie	8
Police	1
Irrigation	1

Finance, Audit, Internal Revenue; Customs, Price Stabilisation, Road Transport, Cereals and Bread, Monopoly Goods, Ceded Properties and Public Domains—all under the supreme control of Dr. Millsjaugh. 31

Russian Affairs

9. In Summary No. 244 paragraph 15, it was stated that M. Kozlov, Soviet Consul General in Teheran, was to be appointed to the Soviet Mission to the European Commission. This has now been cancelled and he has been appointed Soviet Minister in Moscow.

10. Over 3,000 tons of stores were delivered to the Soviet authorities by the U.K.C.C. in the 7th March. In addition, the U.K.C.C. carried 2,121 tons of stores for the Soviet authorities from Shanghai to the Russian frontier at Rajei during the same period.

British Affairs

11. The total amount of grain lifted by British military transport for the Persian Government is 15,240 tons. See Summary No. 944 paragraph 16.

French Affairs

12. M. Pierre Lafond, delegate to Persia of the French National Committee, has now arrived in Teheran.

Persian Affairs

Political

13. The Prime Minister presented the following Cabinet to the Shah on the evening of the 26th March—

Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs: Muhammad Sa'ed
 Ministers without Portfolio: Mustafa Adl, Morteza Quli Bayat (F.O. 50, M.A. 65)
 Industry and Mines: Amanullah Ardalan
 Roads and Communications: Hamid Sayyah
 Interior: Abdul Hussein Hajhir
 War: Ibrahim Zand
 Public Health: Dr. Ghami
 Minister of Posts and Telegraphs: Abdul Qasim Ferouhar (F.O. 74, M.A. 59)
 Education: General Ali Razi
 Justice: Assadullah Mamaghani
 Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh
 Finance: Mahmud Nariman.

The last five are new appointments. They can hardly be said to represent progressive youth. Ferouhar has been a Minister in Reza Shah's Cabinet and was Deputy for Tehran in the last Majlis. General Ali Razi was Chief of Staff. He is not ill suited to his present post, but his appointment to the Cabinet is probably due mainly to the Shah's desire to get rid of him politically from the Government.

Assadullah Mamaghani was a Judge of the High Court of Appeal, with a none too good reputation as regards his sentiments towards the Allies. Mahmud Fateh was Under Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture. Nariman is a former Director-General of the Department of Indirect Taxation. Bayat, who has been a member of the Majlis for many years, is a former Minister of the Interior of parliamentary work and to deal with Deputies, for which he is better qualified than the honest and not too eloquent Prime Minister, was Minister of Finance in Solahy's second Cabinet in the spring of 1943. The reactions of the Majlis are not yet known, but it will be surprising if this Cabinet has a long life.

Teheran 26th March, 1944

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No. 13

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th April)

(No. 147)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the period the 27th March to the 2nd April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this embassy.

Teheran, 2nd April, 1944

Enclosure in No. 13

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 13 for the Period 27th March-2nd April, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Majlis did not take long to signify their disapproval of the new Cabinet which was presented to them on 27th March. The Prime Minister then invited the Deputies to furnish him with a list of thirty persons acceptable to them from which he would select his Ministers. By

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allowing that the Deputies might dictate to him the composition of his Cabinet the Prime Minister has weakened his position, and even among the Deputies one of the five parties which have been formed and the independents, who have joined no party profess to be averse to any such intervention by the Majlis. It is understood that a good deal of the opposition of the Deputies to the present Cabinet is concentrated against Ibrahim Zand, the Minister for War, Dr. (Ghani), the Minister for Public Health, and General Riaz, the Minister for Education, because it is believed that they were nominated by the Shah. Two of his selections in the previous Cabinet, Nuri Isfahani and Nasrullah Intizam, have already been dropped. The opposition of the Deputies to these Ministers arises not so much from objection to them personally as from resentment at the Shah's interference. There is a very strong feeling in the Majlis that the Shah's activities must be confined within strictly constitutional bounds. Dr. Millspongh, too, is likely to come in for vigorous criticism.

2. Five parties, or rather groups, since, with the exception of the Tudeh they are not political parties in the ordinary sense, have been formed in the Majlis. They are the Democrats with 10 members, the *Itisaf-i Milli* with 18 members, the *Tudeh* with 8 members, the *Afshan* with 10 members, and the *Iran* with 11 members. The last named is composed entirely of Deputies from Khorasan. These groups include 69 of the 108 Deputies elected up to the 2nd April. Some Deputies who are likely to be influential in the Majlis, notably Seyyid Zia'ed Din Tahaishahi, Seyyid Muhammad, Dr. Musaddiq and Ali Dashti, have not joined groups. There are still twenty-eight Deputies to be elected, mostly from Azerbaijan and Fars. Of the 108 Deputies already elected, the certificates of election of eighty-three have been accepted by the Majlis.

3. The Prime Minister announced the programme of his Government as collaboration with Persia's allies on the basis of mutual respect for each other's rights and interests, strengthening of friendly relations with friendly and neighbouring countries; re-establishment of public security and faithful execution of the laws; measures to assure the provision of food and essential needs of the population; measures to assure to peasants and the working classes the essential minimum in food, housing, hygiene and education; administrative reorganisation to associate the people more closely with the administration of local affairs; long term plans for agriculture, industry, commerce, public health and education; improvement of the situation of Government employees; encouragement for the deserving and punishment for the delinquent.

4. A Tradesmen's and Guilds' Union has been formed in Tehran whose alleged objects are to improve the economic position of the country, to fight against speculation and profiteering, to protect the interests of workers, and to strengthen the system of parliamentary government.

5. The arrest and trial of Soheily, the previous Prime Minister, has been justified by the Government as necessary to prevent further international interference in the elections, illegal suspension of newspapers and smuggling of arms out of Persia in the baggage of agents whom he had provided with diplomatic passports.

Economic

6. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that, owing to the ban imposed by the Soviet authorities on the export of dried fruits from Azerbaijan great hardship is being imposed on growers and merchants. Estimated stocks are now 2,100 tons of almonds, 16,000 tons of raisins and 9,000 tons of peaches.

7. The municipal tax of 3 per cent. levied on all goods and food-stuffs brought to towns for sale has been abolished from the 21st March.

Governmental

8. Muhammad Nakhai to be Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

Persian Forces.

Appointments Military

(i) Sarhang Kamran Pursaif to command the Behbahan Brigade (10th Army Division).

(ii) Sarhang H. Habibullah Deifumi, Chief of Staff of the Southern Army, to be Sarhang.

(iii) Sartip Ali Akbar Sha'ri to be Military Governor of Tehran.

Internal Security.

Fars.

10. Nasir Qashgai has been sending threatening telegrams to the Majlis and elected for Shiraz) and are so likely to be driven to despair by famine that he dissociates himself from any responsibility for the good behaviour of the tribes. This mood, if it lasts, may result in some robbery. A village has already been looted on the night of the 27th-28th March—in the near vicinity of Shiraz, but Qashgai's complicity has not been proved. Nasir's demands grow more ambitious. Jahanbani has tentatively resigned, possibly because he fears that the situation may get out of hand.

Kerman

11. In October last operations were carried out by Persian troops against in his submission. His son, Akbar Khan Shujapur, however, remained an outlaw and has only recently surrendered himself bringing in with him the rifles taken last year from the gendarmerie at Baft. The remaining prominent outlaw of this tribe, Murad Ali Murad, is still at large.

British Affairs.

12. Since it has now been decided that an invasion of locusts into South East Persia is improbable the Transjordan Frontier Force Regiment and the Royal Air Force are being withdrawn from the region (see Summary No 5/44 paragraph 8).

Russian Affairs.

13. Further information shows that the movements of Russian troops along the Turkish frontier, referred to in Summary No. 11/44, paragraph 10, were almost certainly merely normal relief. The increase in numbers is inconsiderable. From Sabzawar, 100 miles west of Meshed, comes reliable information that the Russians have secured accommodation there for fresh troops, sufficient, according to local reports, for 6,000. This is certainly an exaggeration, but the arrival of Russian troops in Sabzawar is confirmed, and coincident with their arrival the Soviet commander in Meshed ordered the closing down of all public traffic over the Khorasan telephone lines.

14. The Tabriz elections are now finished, but the counting of votes will take about another month. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that Russian interference on behalf of their candidates has been open and aggressive and so effective that it is likely that they will be elected in spite of the fact that they command no respect locally.

American Affairs.

15. The appointment has been announced of Mr. Leland Morris as American Ambassador to Persia.

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No. 14

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 19th April)

(No. 148.)

Sir,

Tehran, 3rd April, 1944.

AS the elections are not yet over in some parts of the country I am not in a position to report a final result. The following notes on the present position may, however, be of interest.

2. By the 2nd April the election of 108 Deputies had been announced leaving 28 members to be elected in the 13th Majlis. Of the 108 Deputies 40 were members of the 13th Majlis, 32 having passed by the Majlis, the certificate of election of one Deputy, Habibullah Durri from Darajaz, has been rejected.

3. Of the 108 Deputies 40 were members of the 13th Majlis, 32 having been re-elected for their old constituencies and 8 elected for different ones.

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not, the members re-elected are Dr. Tamer, Amir Tamer, Nara, Behbehani, Ali Dabhi and Tehrani. The notorious trouble-maker, Majid Muwaqqar, has not so far secured re-election, nor has the reactionary businessman, Nikpur. Among the new Deputies are several well known personalities such as Sayyid Zia-ud-Din, Tabatabai, Sayyid Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai and Dr. Muhammad Musaddiq, and, apart from the Tudeh, a number of comparatively young men of the professional classes.

4 The usual groups have been formed among the Deputies who have reached Tehran and account for about two-thirds of them, the rest considering themselves "independents." With the exception of the Tudeh none of these groups has a detailed account of them. The Tudeh group at present numbers eight Iskandari (Sari), Fekkar (Isfahan), Ghasabadi (Sabzwar), Kamkash (Qazvin), Khalafzari (Babul), Kishawara (Pahlevi), Radmanish (Lahijan) and Shahr Fardowsi (Fardows).

5 The members of the Tudeh group discuss the certificates of election of its members and give helpful advice to M. Seid on the composition of the 14th Majlis. There are so many new Deputies expected that the 14th Majlis will be

6 The members of the Tudeh group discuss the composition of the Majlis when the

7 Copies of this despatch are being sent to the Government of India, and to the Minister Resident in the Middle East

I have, &c.
R. W. BULLARD

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No. 15

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 19th April)

(No. 180. Confidential)

Sir,

Tehran, 6th April, 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 1st January, I have the honour to convey to you herewith a report on events in Persia during the first three months of 1944.

Raising of His Majesty's Legation to Status of Embassy

2. At the end of 1943 the State Department informed His Majesty's Embassy at Washington that the President of the United States had decided to raise the American Legation at Tehran to an embassy, as a result of the Tehran Conference. The American Government had assumed the status of co-belligerent and it was the general policy of the United States Government to have embassies in co-belligerent countries.

3. In view of this decision His Majesty's Government decided to elevate the status of His Majesty's Legation. On the 10th February His Majesty's Mission issued an announcement to the effect that it had been decided to raise the status of the British and United States Legations to that of embassies. His Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion that in view of their special relations with the Persian Government, recently strengthened by the Persian declaration of war on Germany and the adherence of Persia to the United Nations, this change of status of their mission constituted a natural development and would serve to put the relations of the United Kingdom and the United States with Persia on a new basis between Great Britain and Persia. (The United States Legation issued a similar announcement the same day.)

4. I presented my new credentials to His Imperial Majesty The Shahinshah on the 9th March.

5. The Persian Legation in London has likewise been raised to an embassy.

Relations with India

6. As part of a move to improve Indo-Persian relations, the Government of India in December 1943 issued an invitation to the Persian Government to send a small cultural mission to tour India this cold weather as guests of the Government of India. The mission, chosen with the concurrence of His Majesty's Embassy, consisted of Ali Asghar Hikmat, an ex-Minister of Education and of

Justice, Foor Davoud, a professor of literature and a specialist in Avestic studies and ancient Persian law, and Rashid i-Yaseni, a professor of history.

7. The mission reached New Delhi on the 8th March, 1944, and are still in India. They stayed a few days at the Viceroy's house, visited Delhi University, the Delhi Polytechnic, where they saw war technicians under training, All India Radio and the ancient monuments of Delhi. From here the mission proceeded on a tour of Lahore, Agra, Benares, Allahabad, Bombay and Hyderabad (Deccan), visiting museums, universities, industries and colleges of all kinds. After visiting Bangalore and Madras the official tour will terminate, but it is understood that one or two members of the mission propose to spend further time in India by Governors of provinces and other distinguished persons, by city corporations, Islamic and other societies and the staffs of universities and colleges. From their tour the mission will depend on the extent to which the members disseminate the facts they have observed in India on their return to Persia. The majority even of educated Persians are ignorant of the culture and the progress in scientific and industrial matters to be found in India.

8. The mission will be accompanied by a small group of Persian students, to give them an opportunity to observe the progress of the mission.

Security

9. As a result of further strong pressure by this mission the Persian Government and the Soviet Embassy eventually agreed that the Persian suspects at the internment camp at Sultanabad on the Russian list should be transferred to the Russian zone. They were removed from Sultanabad on the 3rd February, and were transferred to Resht. The joint investigation by the Anglo-Persian Commission of the suspects on the British list was completed on the 23rd February, and it was decided to release twenty-three, only one of them, however, was found to be completely innocent. The remainder were made to sign an undertaking—

- To refrain from anti Allied activities,
- To notify any change of address,
- To report to the police when required, and
- To communicate to the Persian and British authorities any information regarding anti Allied activities which might come to their notice.

The Soviet Embassy was kept informed of the release of these suspects.

10. In the middle of March the Persian Government pressed His Majesty's Mission to allow the internees still remaining at Sultanabad to be transferred to Tehran. This has been agreed to in principle, and the internees will be transferred as soon as the new camp has been made secure.

11. After prolonged negotiations with the British Security authorities the German prisoners of war were released after a number of months. A fifth German, who was born in Russia but had lived many years in Persia, had escaped or had been allowed to escape two or three weeks before. So far as is known there are no other Germans loose in Persia.

12. Our Security authorities had intercepted in Syria a number of Nasir Qashghar's brothers, who were returning to Persia from Germany, and who was not without influence on the outcome of the negotiations. The two brothers were restored to the bosom of their tribe.

Anglo-Persian Public Relations

13. The Public Relations Bureau continued to disseminate propaganda material in considerable quantities throughout the country. This reading matter is eagerly sought after and the principal periodicals are now firmly established. A new venture in the form of a fortnightly children's newspaper, designed primarily to project Britain and the Commonwealth to the impressionable youth of Persia, has been particularly successful, and over 17,500 copies are regularly bought by school children all over the country.

14. The half hour daily broadcasts from Tehran Radio by the Public Relations Bureau were favourably received, and particular interest was shown in a new series of talks given by Persian "guest speakers." The mobile cinema

vans of the bureau continued to give performances throughout the country, and in several areas reached audiences which had hitherto never seen a cinema.

15. *W. C. C.*—The W. C. C. has been active in the work of the Bureau of the Middle East Supply Centre, and in several areas reached audiences which had hitherto never seen a cinema.

16. Publicity was given to the activities of the Middle East Supply Centre and other British institutions giving material help to the country through the medium of special articles written for the English daily newspaper published by the bureau and for the local Persian press.

17. Special attention continued to be paid to propaganda directed towards the many Allied nationals in Tehran and the classes in English instituted by the Bureau by agreement with the British Council attracted over 400 pupils from the Czech and Polish communities.

British Council Activities

18. *Tehran*.—The Anglo-Persian Institute in Tehran now has 800 adult students and 750 club members. The staff also teaches in the University Teachers' Training College, schools, Technical College and Survey Department of the Ministry of Mines, and the National Bank. By using the voluntary services of British persons employed in the embassy, Army and Royal Air Force evening classes for 500 more adult students have been opened in a school (previously the American College) belonging to the Ministry of Education. Classes in the Agricultural College, near Tehran, have been started, and selected students will be sent to agricultural universities in India. A large building belonging to the Tehran Municipality has been leased and all council activities, other than teaching, will be moved to it. The Anglo-Persian Medical Association, Dramatic Society, Art Club and Music Society have increased their activities. A Shakespeare play will be staged out-of-doors in June. It is intended to publish the British medical bulletin in Persian, and broadcast English lessons from the Tehran Broadcasting Station will commence in April.

19. *Isfahan*.—The Anglo-Persian Institute in Isfahan now has 350 adult students and 150 club members. To accommodate the increasing number of members the removal of all club activities to another building is under consideration. The demand for further teaching, particularly in the twelve Isfahan factories, is insistent but cannot be undertaken owing to shortage of staff.

20. *General*.—Special courses in the Tehran and Isfahan institutes for those wishing to take entrance examinations in Persia for British universities will be started in April. Many applications have been received for the six months' course in English already started by the council, for October 1944. The opening of institutes elsewhere in Persia (which has been strongly urged by all consulates) cannot be considered until more staff is available.

American Interests

21. As stated in paragraph 9 the American Legation has been raised to an embassy. Mr. Dreyfus, the Minister, has been on leave since the Tehran Conference and is not returning. It is announced that the first American Ambassador to Tehran will be Mr. Leland B. Morris, at present Minister in Iceland, where he will be succeeded by Mr. Dreyfus.

22. On the 3rd March the Foreign Office informed His Majesty's Mission that there might be some discussions regarding Middle East policy with Mr. Stettinius, who was to visit the United Kingdom in the second half of March. If there were any special discussions, the American Mission would be informed. In reply, His Majesty's Mission stated that it was not aware of any such discussions.

- (a) The lack of co-ordination between the American advisers in Persia was somewhat disturbing; the United States Government and His Majesty's Mission were equally desirous that the advisers should succeed, being convinced that if they failed Persia had a poor chance of keeping her feet on the ground. The advisers, however, had no common aim, her animosity towards the advisers in general and the British in particular. The advisers, however, had no common aim among themselves and His Majesty's Mission wished to suggest that there should

be some co-ordinating authority. This should be the American Embassy and His Majesty's Mission considered that instructions to that end should be given to the new American Ambassador. His Majesty's Mission added that the American Chargé d'Affaires, Mr. Ford, was in general agreement with their views.

- (b) The Standard Vacuum Company and the Shell Group, backed by American and British Governments respectively, were competing for oil concessions in Persia. The Persians, and probably the Russians, were likely to regard this as a conflict of national interests and to rejoice accordingly. Apart from the desirability of avoiding, if possible, Anglo-American rivalry, His Majesty's Mission suggested that the Persian Government were not likely to grant a new concession to British interests when the grant of a concession to American applicants would at once give the powerful United States Government an economic interest in the fate of Persia. (To this the Foreign Office replied that the desirability of reaching an understanding with the Americans over oil concessions was fully realised by His Majesty's Government, but that meanwhile His Majesty's Mission should continue to support the Shell group.)

Soviet Interests

23. *General*.—The Soviet military attaché in Tehran, after making enquiries, His Majesty's Mission reported to the Foreign Office that the rumours were not confirmed, although there had been some relief of Russian troops and an additional labour battalion had been brought into Persia. In March, however, confirmation was received from several sources of movements and increases of Soviet troops along the Turkish frontier, previous troops had been relieved by fresh troops and on a large scale. The Soviet military attaché denied that there had been any increases.

24. The Soviet section of the Tripartite Commission in Tehran has recently begun to examine, with the greatest care, all books sent out from the United Kingdom to bookellers in Persia, and they have now listed about twenty as prohibited. The list includes a number of books which are admittedly highly critical of the Soviet régime, but also *Modern Iran*, by Mr. Elwell Sutton, a member of the staff of the Public Relations Bureau, and Robert Byron's *First Russia, Then Tibet*. They have also refused to allow to be distributed many items of news in which the British section saw no harm. In some cases, the items have subsequently been published in *The Daily News* which, being regarded by the Soviet authorities as the official newspaper of the British section, they have been distributed. The Soviet section has also refused to allow to be distributed the *Daily News* after the Soviet section had prohibited its general distribution, merely pointed out the obvious fact that the splendid Russian victories had been facilitated to some extent by the Anglo-American air attacks on German industrial targets.

25. The cultural activities of the Russians in Persia are increasing. On the 6th February the inauguration ceremony was held of a newly formed committee for Soviet-Persian Cultural Relations. The committee is composed of representatives of the Soviet and Persian Governments and the Soviet Ambassador are honorary presidents. The committee has not yet taken any building for cultural activities in spite of many rumours to the contrary. The committee has, however, been active in the establishment of schools, and in technical and agricultural colleges is now being strongly urged upon the Persian authorities.

Polish Interests

26. The main event affecting the Polish refugees in Persia during the period under reference was the visit of M. Henryk Straszburger, the Polish Minister of State. This was the second time that a member of the Polish Government had visited Persia, the previous occasion being the visit of M. Stanczyk, the Minister of Social Welfare, in the spring of 1943.

M. Strasburger arrived on the 24th February, spent fourteen days in Tehran where he made a thorough tour of inspection and then spent four days visiting the Polish children's colony in Isfahan. He left Persia on the 12th March.

27. The total number of Polish civilians in Persia on the 1st January was 9,622. By the end of March this had been reduced to 6,366. In the interval one ship left with 849 Poles with Rhodesia as their ultimate destination. The remaining odd 400 left for various destinations such as Palestine or (in the case of a few) the United Kingdom either as military personnel recruited in Tehran or as civilians. Negotiations were started for the settlement of 500 Poles in Syria and for about 200 Young Men's Christian Association, Young Women's Christian Association and Red Cross personnel to be transferred to Palestine. Neither of these plans had matured by the end of the period under discussion.

28. As the bulk of Polish refugees come from the eastern provinces of Poland, the declaration by Mr. Churchill concerning the future eastern frontier of Poland had a disturbing and demoralising effect on the refugees in Persia and rendered more difficult the task of the British authorities who deal with them. A fresh difficulty was created towards the end of March when some Poles representing the Union of Polish Patriots in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics set up an office in Tehran and began to angle for support among the refugees, using as bait the offer to allow the refugees to communicate with their relations in Russia and to send them parcels.

Internal Politics and Majlis

29. The 13th legislative period having come to an end and the 14th not having commenced. About one half of the Deputies had been elected, but the results of the Tehran elections were not known, though voting had finished. Provincial elections were held in the various provinces on the 1st and 2nd March. The opening of the 14th legislative period was fixed for the 22nd January and all arrangements were made, when, as the result of a series of intrigues, the ceremony was postponed. The Shah was certainly against the opening, and went so far as to suggest to His Majesty's Minister that as the elections had been so badly conducted it would be a good plan to annul them and to have fresh elections under a Prime Minister to whom everyone would have confidence, viz., Dr. Musaddiq. His Majesty spoke of large sums spent on votes and interference by officials and by the Russians. The truth seems to have been that what the Shah really wanted was to have a more substantial Ministry. Zia Tabatabai took his seat, and hoped that in fresh elections the Seyyid might be defeated. His Majesty's Minister deprecated the Shah's plan and pointed out that it did not seem to be founded on good constitutional grounds as the electoral law promulgated by decree, would therefore be likely to arouse feeling against the Shah himself. The Shah finally abandoned his plan, alleging as his reason that Dr. Musaddiq wanted first to hold a referendum to amend the electoral law.

30. The date of formal opening was finally fixed for the 26th February, and the Majlis was in due course opened on that day by the Shah, who made a speech setting forth the tasks which lay before the Majlis during the 14th legislative period.

31. Then ensued the usual examination of the credentials of Deputies. A number of objections were tabled, the most interesting being those against the election of Seyyid Zia Tabatabai. The attack was led by Dr. Musaddiq, who based his objection not on the election proceedings at Yazd but on the Seyyid's unfitness to be a Deputy owing to his share in the *coup d'Etat* of February 1921. Dr. Musaddiq's attack was supported by a number of other Deputies. The Shah took the opportunity to make a speech in which he defended the Seyyid and pointed out that the only way was to refer the matter to the Chamber. The Chamber was responsible for the election, and the Shah would not interfere. A second vote was taken, and the Seyyid was elected. His Majesty's Minister then made a speech in which he defended the Seyyid and pointed out that the only way was to refer the matter to the Chamber. The Chamber was responsible for the election, and the Shah would not interfere. A second vote was taken, and the Seyyid was elected. His Majesty's Minister then made a speech in which he defended the Seyyid and pointed out that the only way was to refer the matter to the Chamber. The Chamber was responsible for the election, and the Shah would not interfere. A second vote was taken, and the Seyyid was elected.

32. Muhammad Sa'id Masaghe'i was elected temporary president of the Majlis for the examination of credentials, and afterwards Seyyid Muhammad Sadigh Tabatabai, who had been in charge of the Tehran electoral committee, was elected president.

33. The Tehran elections passed off without any great surprises, no Tudeh candidates got in for Tehran, nor did Qawam-es-Saltaneh nor Seyyid Zia, and some rich contractors who bought votes on a grand scale were also disappointed. The notorious mujtahid Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani, was among the first twelve, but after pressure from His Majesty's Ambassador his name was omitted from the list by the Government. The highly-respectable but aloof Mu'tamin-ul Mulk Pirnia was high in the list of successful candidates, but as usual refused to serve. Another successful candidate was the aged Firuzabadi, but objections to his candidature on the ground that he was older than the age-limit of 70 were made and appeared likely to unseat him. The elections of Tabriz were at last finished by about the 21st March, but the votes had not been counted by the end of the period under review.

34. Apart from the resignation of General Shafai in February, circumstances mentioned below, the Sherehi Cabinet, which had been formed on the 19th December, remained in power till the business of passing credentials had been completed. After a good deal of talk about Any, Ambassador in Moscow, and Minister Governor-General of Khorasan, the Shah asked Sa'ed to form a Cabinet, and after deliberation during the No Ruz holidays from the 21st March onwards Sa'ed announced his team as follows:-

Prime Minister: Muhammad Sa'id Masaghe'i
Agriculture: Mahmud Fateh
Commerce and Industry: Amanullah Ardalan
Communications: Hamid Sayyab
Education: Sarfashkar Ali Razi
Finance: Mahmud Nariman
Foreign: Muhammad Sa'id Masaghe'i
Interior: Abdul Husseini Hajer
Justice: Asadullah Hamagah
Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Abul Qasim Faruher
Without portfolio: Murteza Quli Bayat, Mustafa Adl

35. Two Ministers who were thought to be the nominees of the Shah, viz. Intizam and Mousa Mouri Esfandary were thus dropped, though a third, Zand Minister for War, remained. Two new names appear: Mahmud Fateh and Mahmud Nariman, the former's appointment was interpreted in some quarters as a mark of the Shah's appreciation of the opposition of Mustafa Fateh, Mahmud's brother, to Seyyid Zia. The latter was known as a young man of great advantage in dealing with Dr. Musaddiq. At the end of March Sa'ed had only announced his programme, he did not venture to present his Cabinet for the Majlis's approval, as the Chamber showed itself divided and capricious. In fact, at the end of the quarter it looked as if the Majlis would accept Sa'ed but not his colleagues.

36. The general remarks are worthy of attention in the political events of this quarter. The first is the fact that the Russians did not intervene in the internal affairs of the country. Evidence was given that the Russian Government was not in a position to do so. The second is the fact that the British Government was not in a position to do so. The third is the fact that the American Government was not in a position to do so. The fourth is the fact that the Japanese Government was not in a position to do so. The fifth is the fact that the Italian Government was not in a position to do so. The sixth is the fact that the French Government was not in a position to do so. The seventh is the fact that the German Government was not in a position to do so. The eighth is the fact that the Spanish Government was not in a position to do so. The ninth is the fact that the Portuguese Government was not in a position to do so. The tenth is the fact that the Greek Government was not in a position to do so. The eleventh is the fact that the Turkish Government was not in a position to do so. The twelfth is the fact that the Egyptian Government was not in a position to do so. The thirteenth is the fact that the Syrian Government was not in a position to do so. The fourteenth is the fact that the Lebanese Government was not in a position to do so. The fifteenth is the fact that the Armenian Government was not in a position to do so. The sixteenth is the fact that the Georgian Government was not in a position to do so. The seventeenth is the fact that the Azeri Government was not in a position to do so. The eighteenth is the fact that the Persian Government was not in a position to do so. The nineteenth is the fact that the Afghan Government was not in a position to do so. The twentieth is the fact that the Indian Government was not in a position to do so.

37. The second general remark concerns the Shah. There has been a definite increase in the anti-Shah feeling which was noticed in previous reports. The Shah's intervention in the army continued, he went on issuing orders on

51. (b) *Gendarmerie*.—In the gendarmerie Colonel Schwarzkopf has been given six districts, each having two regiments, and the Tehran and Fars districts have three each. The cost of this force, at the rates of pay he considers necessary to attract a suitable type of man, will probably amount to 50-60 million tomans for the year, an increase of 100 per cent. on the provision made last year. An additional three American officers are now on their way to join Colonel Schwarzkopf's staff which, on their arrival, will total six.

52. The reorganization of the Persian Air Force drags slowly on. They are mounting under Royal Air Force guidance various branches of training which have been neglected over recent years and a certain amount of their equipment is being shown to be more serviceable than they thought. It is hoped that the delivery of their eagerly awaited Ansons may be the beginning of a serious attempt to reach a degree of operational efficiency.

53. Colonel Stedakh, who was attending the Middle East Staff College, has had a nervous breakdown and has had to be recalled to Tehran. Headquarters, Royal Air Force, Middle East, have offered to accept another officer, if a suitable one can be found, for the summer course at the college.

54. The inflationary situation remains serious, though the prospects of keeping it under control are better since the staff of the Millspaugh Mission has been increased. It is hoped to achieve more success in the enforcement of the Persian Revenue Laws and the collection of the duties on imports and exports, while Dr Millspaugh also feels reasonably optimistic about the budgetary situation as revenue is coming in better than he had expected. There are also indications that the Persian Government, no doubt under pressure from the Millspaugh Mission, are taking steps to put their house in order. They have begun a series of investigations into large-scale embezzlements and frauds which have occurred in various Government administration departments, and as a result there have been some dismissals and arrests in the Road Transport Department and the Ministry of Finance. The cost of living index still shows a sharp rise, the index for the first quarter of 1952 being 1,052. In December the figure was 1,050, in January 1,076, and in February 1,082. The wholesale price index over the same period was 665, 668 and 662 respectively. The incidence of note circulation also increased during the past three months.

56. The conclusion of a financial agreement to cover the use of the Iranian State railways by the American Powers was one of the first of the negotiations at the beginning of the year negotiations were speeded up, and a draft agreement was prepared by us in consultation with the American authorities, and submitted to the Russians for their approval. The draft was finally agreed between the Russians, the Americans and ourselves will then form a basis for subsequent negotiation with the Persian Government.

58. The silver deal with the Government of India, under which the National Bank of Iran sold to them 500 tons of cut rupees, rial and kron coins, has now been completed, the final shipment being made on the 10th March. The bank sold 120 tons at 60 rupees per 100 tolas (916 fine) and 380 tons at 93 rupees 12 annas per 100 tolas (916 fine). The former price was approximately that at which the Persian Government had bought the silver from India, while the latter is the price ruling on the open market in Persia.

50. In spite of the good harvest last year and the provision of nearly a thousand lend-lease trucks, the country was faced at the beginning of 1944 with another bread and transport crisis. This was happily averted by the combined efforts of the Millspaugh Mission, Paiforce and the Middle East Supply Centre. Dr Millspaugh recognised the need to concentrate on cereals collection and re-organisation of transport; and the Persian Government were fortunately able to have the help of these Allied organisations. The Middle East Supply Centre provided fifteen British officers and N.C.O.s. to help in supervising the collection and movement of grain and another twenty-five to assist with the control of civil road transport. Paiforce provided transport companies, which moved 17,000 tons of cereals from the Kermanshah-Hamadani area to the railway. Thanks to this measure, bread supplies for the population of Tehran and other centres were assured. The transport of civil goods by rail from the south to Tehran also improved following the appointment of a British officer to the Millspaugh Mission to supervise loadings.

60. The distribution of tea, sugar, piece-goods, drugs and other essential goods was another story. This was a failure, in spite of the Government's large stocks of these commodities and of considerable efforts made by Dr. Millsbaugh and his mission. Most of the civil population did without these "necessities" and bazaar prices remained at very high levels. Unfortunately, some of the measures aimed at reducing prices which were passed by Dr. Millsbaugh have tended to aggravate the situation by holding up distribution by merchants. Some

of the harmful measures were later rescinded, but the monopolisation of the commodities mentioned above is still a hindrance rather than a help to distribution.

61. The Persian Government agreed in January to supply the Russians with 38,000 tons of low-grade rice at considerably below cost price in exchange for Russian goods to the value of about £320,000. Like the arms contract now in force between the Persians and the Russians, this agreement is financially disadvantageous to the Persians. A new Rice Monopoly Company was set up to collect and deliver rice to the Russians (and also to the civil population of Persia), but its success up to date has not been remarkable.

Transport

62. Mr Floyd F Shields arrived from the United States during the quarter and assumed the direction of the Road Transport Administration. He has three American assistants and the twenty-five British officers and N.C.O.s provided by the Middle East Supply Centre to work temporarily with the Persian Government to help organise civil road transport on a proper basis. The Government has a fleet of motor vehicles which is small but is being increased. It is generally held that the future will be brighter. Supplies of tyres and spare parts for motor vehicles are being received satisfactorily but lack of maintenance facilities is still one of the chief handicaps to the proper use of the Government's fleet of motor vehicles.

63. With the extra staff at its disposal the Road Transport Administration began to exert its authority in the provinces. In some places, particularly Khorassan, it encountered opposition from local officials. In Meshed the Governor-General and the local road transport officials have developed a very bad feeling. It is expected that the future will be brighter. Supplies of tyres and spare parts for motor vehicles are being received satisfactorily but lack of maintenance facilities is still one of the chief handicaps to the proper use of the Government's fleet of motor vehicles.

64. The movement of civil goods by railway from the south to Tehran improved considerably, and no anxiety is felt on this score either in connexion with supplies of oil or of other commodities.

Cereals

65. It may now be stated with reasonable certainty that there will be no need to import grain from abroad. Out of a target of 310,000 tons required to feed the towns approximately 305,000 tons have been collected. There are at present about six weeks' stocks in the Tehran silo and over 12,000 tons surplus (almost two months' stocks) available in the southern region of the country for transport to the capital.

66. The target of 310,000 tons, however, does not include the substantial reserve necessary to maintain confidence to tide over the period of harvesting and to provide against the possibility of an indifferent harvest this year. The failure so far to accumulate this reserve is entirely due to poor deliveries from the northern region. Deliveries to Tehran from the southern region have, by totalling 50,000 tons, exceeded expectations. Similar deliveries from the northern and most fertile region of the country have only just exceeded 17,000 tons instead of reaching the 40,000 tons which might most reasonably have been expected. The difference of 23,000 tons, when added to further possible deliveries from the south, would have constituted a reserve, albeit a small one, with which to start the next agricultural year. Unless deliveries from the north increase materially during the next few weeks the Persian Government grain reserve at harvest time is likely to be insignificant.

67. Lateness of rain, and lack of rain in some areas, have caused anxiety regarding the forthcoming crop. The profiteers have taken full advantage of this by raising the price of seed and by spreading exaggerated rumours of the failure of crops. With improved facilities for estimating crops it is possible to form an estimate at this stage, that the present crop is unlikely to exceed 70 per cent. of the last crop.

Locust control

68. From the beginning of the year until the 23rd March there were no locust swarms in Persia and reports received from British Police in Iran and from Oman had been consistently reassuring. Preparations had therefore been made for the withdrawal of the Royal Air Force Anti-Locust Flight to East Africa, the return of the mechanised regiment of the Transjordan Frontier

Force to Middle East Command, and the early withdrawal of the British Locust Officer from Persia.

69. Between the 23rd and 31st March, however, half a dozen reports have been received which indicate that three or more swarms of indefinite size are moving in the Kerman and Eastern Fars provinces. Unfortunately their appearance was so unexpected that the British anti-locust unit was not able to attack any of them with D.N.O.C. poison dust as they crossed the coastal area. The situation is still very obscure, as exact information has not been received about the size of the swarms or the maturity of the locusts.

70. Mr Lean at once asked for the retention of the Royal Air Force and military units, and A.H.Q., Persia and Iraq, have agreed. General Headquarters, Middle East, however, could only agree to the retention of the mechanised regiment of the Transjordan Frontier Force until the 10th April, as they are required for duty in the Middle East Command thereafter.

71. It is therefore to be hoped that in the next ten days the swarms will be proved to be small (and therefore controllable by the Persian authorities) or else that the anti-locust unit immediately after the arrival of swarms in this country will not only impress the Persian Government unfavourably but may also do harm to the Allied war effort if Persian crops are exposed to serious damage.

72. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to the Master Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have &c.
R. W. BULLARD

E 2589 422 24]

No 15

For the British Consul in Tehran (Received 24th April 1944)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the period of the 3rd April to the 9th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 10th April, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 15

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 14 for the Period
3rd-9th April, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

AFTER some days' discussion, the different Majlis groups and the independent members of the Majlis agreed on a list of persons whom they considered suitable to be Ministers. On the 6th April the Prime Minister presented to the Shah his reconstituted Cabinet. Three of the five new Ministers he had presented the previous week—Mahmud Fateh, General Riaz and Mahmud Nariman—were dropped and in their places he introduced Nasser Elamadi as Minister of Agriculture and Dr Sa'ed Malik as Minister of Hygiene. Dr Ghani moved from the Ministry of Hygiene to the Ministry of Education in place of General Riaz and Ferozfar from the Ministry of Post and Telegraphs to the Ministry of Finance in place of Nasser. The Ministry of War was vacant. Elamadi was Under Secretary of State in the Prime Minister's office of Sobhy's Cabinet in 1943. Dr Malik has not previously been in the Government. The Cabinet does not appear to be any stronger than its predecessor, and it cannot be said to be a more truly representative of the young and progressive, except possibly Hajhir, probably for the good reason that any such appointment would raise a storm of jealousy and hostility from all the

2 The Cabinet is now composed as follows —

Infahan among the way was the ... the Anglo-
 Iranian Oil Company ... the ...
 forcing better conditions out of the face ...
 the influence of the Tudeh party ...
 intrinsigentism that is frightening ...
 to such an extent that even the ...
 the situation can be dealt with only by the establishment of a military governor-
 ship. There is a reluctance on the part of Persian officials to take action against
 movements which are suspected of being inspired from Russian sources. It is
 probable that the Tudeh party will endeavour to establish influence over all
 labour unions in all parts of the country.

6. The press has been making critical attacks on Dr. Millspaugh and his mission on the general grounds that the achievements of the American advisers do not justify their cost to the country. The discontent with the American Mission is widespread. They were never popular with the rich and the poor are disappointed that conditions have shown so little improvement from their point of view since their arrival. There is no noticeable decrease in the cost of living and monopoly goods—tea, sugar and cloth—which should be distributed at controlled prices on rationed scales, rarely reach the peasant or the tribesman. A weighty attack on Dr. Millspaugh has already been made in the Majlis by Dr. Musaddiq.

Appointments—Civil

Internal Security

9. Malik Mansur and Muhammad Hussein brothers of Nasir Qashgai, have recently returned to Persia from Germany and have gone to the tribe. They were both educated in England and after their experiences in Germany there is reason to hope that their influence on their brother will be good. Nasir, while still rebellious towards his own Government, is showing signs of desiring to get into the plans of the British and Russian Governments. He is now in Fars and is in Seyyid Zia, who is playing for tribal support. This has increased the Shah's uneasiness about the situation in Fars and his suspicions of General Jahanshahi's policy towards Nasir, with which he has for some time been very displeased.

10. The peaceful operations for the collection of arms from the Bahmai and Janeki tribes are now ended. The Janeki surrendered some 170 rifles, but the Bahmai did not carry out their promises of co-operation and, as far as is known, they surrendered few, if any, rifles. Their change of mind was probably due to the false statement made by B. R. Akbari who mightily misrepresented that General Jahanbani would not risk a fight. The Bahmai consequently retain their arms and Government prestige has been still further lowered by the failure to carry through an operation which had been launched with no little advertisement.

11 It is reported, but has not yet been fully confirmed, that the Russians intend to operate a bi weekly commercial air passenger service between Tehran and Meshed, beginning on the 23rd April. A trial trip was made on the 5th April.

E 2580 422 841

No. 17

Sir R Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 28th April)

(No. 171)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for the period of the 10th to the 16th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Telcom, 17th April, 1944

Enclosure in No. 17

(Secret)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 15 for the period 10th April
to 16th April, 1944*

Political

At 11.15 more than 4 were a week or so long. At 11.15 the programme the Government was given a vote of confidence by 69 of the 90 members present. 9 voting against the Government and 12 abstaining. There is a large majority than was at first expected, since 27 members had announced their intention of speaking and voting against the Government. That was perhaps due more to the desire of budding parliamentarians to secure an opportunity of airing their theories and gaining some practical ~~experience~~ ^{experience} than to the fact that in present circumstances the defeat of the Government would lead to anything better.

[29046]

During the debate Dr. Millspaugh and his colleagues came in for much criticism and it is clear that the dissatisfaction with them is deep and widespread. Such defence of them as was attempted was half-hearted and did not go much further than to claim that Dr. Millspaugh himself meant well and that in principle an American advisory mission was desirable for the finance and economy of the country, if only for the purpose of keeping alive American interests in and sympathy with Persia.

2. Seyyid Zia's relatively vigorous personality is creating some uneasiness and causing some concern. The Court fears that he is imbued with hostility to the Shah and that he is determined to endeavour to bring about a limitation of the Shah's part in the affairs of Government to that of a strictly constitutional monarch.

It is believed by Seyyid Zia and many others that he encouraged Mr. Musaddiq to oppose the acceptance of Seyyid Zia's election to the Majlis and that he arranged for the hostile demonstration of factory workers outside the Majlis on that occasion. Suspicious as he always has been that Seyyid Zia could not entertain friendly sentiments for the son of Reza Shah he now finds added reason to fear some act of revenge. There are others, too, who fear the effects on the country of a struggle between Seyyid Zia and his supposedly increasing band of followers on the one hand and the Shah and his paid intriguers on the other, others, the rich, who fear the advent to power of Seyyid Zia, and others who expect that if Seyyid Zia looked like being successful the Russians would attempt a *coup d'Etat* to prevent this victory of British policy. Several requests have recently been made by influential Persians to His Majesty's Ambassador that he should mediate to effect a reconciliation between Seyyid Zia and the Shah. The Shah is perturbed. For some time he has had no indications of any particular concern on the part of the Russians for his welfare. He suspects, possibly with good cause, that the Russians have taken offence at the conditions that were attached to the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft.

paragraph 9 below and are annoyed by his failure to unseat Seyyid Zia. The Tudeh party were persuaded to leave the attack entirely to Dr. Millspaugh (the man for this purpose.) Now doubtful of Russian support, and convinced that Seyyid Zia was accepted by the Majlis as a result of British support and that his policy is laid down by the British Embassy, he hardly knows where to turn. For the time being he is making a show of giving his Government advice and of abstaining from attempting to influence the course of affairs, but he is anxious to have relations with dangerous and unprincipled intriguers.

The Hamrahian party, composed mainly of intellectuals with Socialist views under the leadership of Mustafa Fatah of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which has never made much impression on the public, has recently suffered the secession of some of its members who have formed a party called the Socialist Party of Iran. The reason for their secession is said to be their discontent with the lack of vigour shown by the Majlis representatives of the party. There are only two—in their opposition to the acceptance of Seyyid Zia's election to the Majlis. The new party retains the party newspaper *Imruz va Farda*, and the old party has started a new paper *Shams*.

4. The proposal to make a new Shahrستان (Governor's district) out of the Bakhshe of Saqqiz, Baneh and Sardasht in Kurdistan—see Summary No. 48, 1943, paragraph 6—has been abandoned. Saqqiz will remain in the Shahrستان of Sanandaj, and Baneh and Sardasht in that of Mahabad. The Shahrستان of Sanandaj, under the Governorship of Shihab-ed-Douleh—see Summary No. 11, 1944, paragraph 6—is now to be independent of the Governor-General of Kermanshah.

Economic

5. It is now estimated that the Government may have, when the new harvest begins to come in a surplus of 25,000 tons of grain as a reserve. This, however, is not considered sufficient to put any effective check on hoarders or on the black market. It is said that the Government is now circulating reports that are being circulated about the coming harvest. Although crops have failed almost completely in some parts of South Persia, it is estimated that, taken as a whole, the harvest will be below average. The Government's financial position will depend on the extent to which the surplus is required to meet the Government's needs.

6. An earthquake occurred at Gorgan on the 5th April which, according to the Persian press, has destroyed or rendered uninhabitable all the houses in the town. The Shah and the Queen are now visiting the town.

Persian Forces

Army

7. The Russians have refused to allow American officers of General Ridley's staff to be stationed at Tabriz and Meshed, the headquarters of the 3rd and 4th Persian Divisions. It is suggested that an American officer should be attached to the headquarters of each division to reorganise the administration. The Russians have suggested to the Persian Government that if the Persian army requires advice or assistance they, the Russians, will be glad to give it.

8. The press reports that a number of officials of the Conscription Department in the provinces have been recalled to Tehran on charges of corruption. The application of the Conscription Law is one of the greatest scandals in Persia. Exemptions are secured not by virtue of the law but by bribery and the result is that only the poorest classes reach the army. The present Minister for War has the desire to clean up these abuses, but it has yet to be seen whether he has the strength to do so.

9. The general terms of the Persian reply to the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft—see Summary No. 9, 1944, paragraph 9—are that the Persian Government accepted the offer with gratitude, but that, since they were to be a gift, they did not see the necessity for a formal signed agreement, as requested by the Russians, for the formation of new tank and aircraft units with a Russian

the necessary officers and men to take over, after they had been instructed in their use, the tanks and aircraft at places convenient to the Russians. This reply was given to the Russians some six weeks ago and fairly reliable information is that since then the Russians have not reverted to the subject.

10. One of the papers of the Tudeh party, presumably at Russian inspiration, has published an article advocating a strong army. But the army must belong to the nation, must find its support in the nation and be ready to fight against reaction and despotism. The article refers to the "mysterious influences" that are trying to reduce the strength of the army.

Internal Security

Para

11. The northward migration of the Qashgai tribes has begun. It is reported that the return of Nasir Qashgai's two brothers to the tribe—see Summary No. 14, 1944, paragraph 9—with British permission and assistance has had a good effect on the tribe.

12. His Majesty's Consul General at Bushire reports that following on the withdrawal of Persian troops—see Summary No. 9, 1944, paragraph 11—disorder has again broken out in Dashti and Tangistan. The Dashti outlaw, Ali Ismail who had taken refuge with Nasir Qashgai, has returned to Dashti, and the Tangistanis have recently been guilty of many robberies.

Russian Affairs

13. The impression is now gaining strength in certain circles that the Soviet Embassy is dissatisfied with affairs in Persia. The causes for this are alleged to be the ill-success of Tudeh candidates in the elections, the failure of the attempt to unseat Seyyid Zia and the refusal of the Persian Government to accept the conditions attached to the offer of tanks and aircraft. The omission of the Soviet Government to send to the Shah the usual telegram of felicitations at the Persian New Year and to acknowledge the Shah's telegram of congratulations on recent successes of the Red Army is regarded as convincing proof of Soviet displeasure.

14. It is reported that Russian troops whose arrival at Salmas was reported in Summary No. 13, 1944, paragraph 13, is reliably reported to be 600. No information of the impending arrival of these troops was given to the Persian Government or local authorities.

15. It is confirmed that the Russians propose to run an air service, probably fortnightly, between Tehran and Meshed and perhaps between Tabriz and Tehran. It will carry Russian and Persian passengers only. See Summary No. 14, 1944, paragraph 11.

Polish Affairs

16. An office of the Union of Polish Patriots has been established in Tehran under Russian auspices to the serious perturbation of the authorities in charge of the Polish refugees in Persia. In its endeavours to get into touch with these refugees the Polish Patriots have a strong card—they are offering to put refugees in touch with their relatives in Russia.

Tehran, 16th April, 1944

[E 2647 155 34]

No. 18

Report by Captain H. Garrod, R.A.M.C., on Tour by 12th Indian Division Mobile Dispensary in Fars.—(Communicated by British Embassy, Tehran. Received in Foreign Office, 1st May)

General.

SINCE its arrival at Shiraz the unit has been working under the guidance of His Majesty's Consul. It was decided to tackle first the area bounded by Khashi and Ardekani to the east and by the A.I.O.C. workings at Gach Saran to the west. No one was more appreciative of this than the A.I.O.C. manager at Gach Saran to whom the officer commanding owes a great debt of gratitude for the unstinting assistance which he gave over transport, introductions and local information, for the hospitality which he extended and for the interest which he took in our work.

The tribes in this area from south-west to north-east are (i) Kashkuli Qashgai (winter only), (ii) Darrashuri, Qashgai (winter only), and (iii) Bavi Mamassani and Doshman Ziari. The Mamassani are further subdivided into Rustami, Javidi, Ferdousi and Bakesh. At the extreme south-west are the settled villages of the Khashi plain and to the west the settled lands of Baur Ahmed Sarhadi Garmari. Camped over winter in the valleys of Rustami and Bavi are what remain to Mohd. Hussein Tabari of the Baur Ahmed Sarhadi (Upper). Scattered in Kashkuli, by whose Khans they are owned, are a few permanent villages, some of Qashgai, others of mixed origin. The first week was spent with Kashkuli working north-west through Mahur from roadhead at Khashi. Felhan was the next roadhead, treatment being given at Bakesh en route. From Felhan to Bushi sick were treated at a number of Rustami villages and a rare opportunity was seized to treat and study the Qashgai comparative safety of Rustami protection. Bavi and the nomadic Tir Taji Baur Ahmed were treated at Bushi.

Ahwaz was visited to replace certain drugs which had become exhausted owing to the high incidence of malaria and the accidental immersion of a loaded mule. After returning to Gach Saran short trips were made into Darrashuri and sections of Kashkuli hitherto unvisited by us.

Arrangements had been made to stay a night at Aru, the centre of Baur Ahmed Garmari, where a mysterious epidemic was decimating the population, in appreciation of the help which their Kalantar, Muzaffar Khan Arisani, had extended to the Persian Government and the A.I.O.C. But at the last moment other rumours based on the growing insecurity of the area prevailed and the visit was cancelled. To appease Muzaffar's disappointment a present of quinine was forwarded by runner.

On the difficult route to Mamassani through Darrashuri endless transport troubles were experienced, and frequent changes of animals were necessary. Rain added to the delays. It was the intention, had not the officer commanding been taken ill, to continue through Javidi and Doshman Ziari to Ardekani and thereby complete the picture. It is hoped to visit these tribes on some future occasion.

Conditions encountered

(a) These lands harbour but a part of the intricate tribal mosaic which overlies the rugged framework of Fars and Kuh Gulu. Of diverse origins, brave traditions and mixed tongues, the inhabitants live in an unstable equilibrium whose balance once more is determined one way or the other by force of arms. Old blood feuds and half-buried quarrels are apt to erupt with destructive fury; whilst the strength of the weaker tribes is ever provoked and

their patience sorely tried by the raids, incursions or exactions of their more powerful neighbours. Those who are settled in rich lands have little to gain and everything to lose from lawlessness, and from having been rich feeding ground for Government officials they are now the tempting prey of irresponsible bandits. Women and children are the first to be killed and the men to survive.

(b) With the fall of Reza Shah his much-prided infantry and armies lost their nerve and were overthrown by the tribes or quick to escape from the narrow valleys where they were quartered, fearful of the awakening wrath of those they had been obliged to oppress. The nomads rejoiced in a reversion to freedom, and buried arms saw light again and were carefully cleaned. New rifles were bought or acquired, some sold by the army (Colonel Gavami, Military Governor of Behbahan in 1940, is said to have sold many rifles to Baur Ahmed Sarhadi) or arms traffickers, others seized in daring raids on outposts of the army and Ammeh. Added to these were the many rifles of the deserters, some of whom had been conscripted from the tribes and were quick to return to their tents. The rearmament race had begun.

Those of the former Khans who had survived long exile or imprisonment slunk back to their tribes and set to to re-establish their lost hold and reconquer their confiscated lands. The latter awaits full accomplishment and has occasioned more than one bloody battle with the Government, whilst the former was not always easy because, although they were welcomed by the majority of their old subjects and their weaker relatives who had been allowed to remain with the tribes, as fellow sufferers from Reza Shah, there were not a few among the latter who, thanks to the difficult accessibility of their pastures, or to lending themselves as tools to the Government, had escaped the worst oppression and had profited from the sufferings of their neighbours and now found irksome a return to the absolute rule against which there is no appeal but mutiny or secession from the tribe. Others who had been settled in equator and misery had been cowed into taking a craven and half-hearted pride in being law-abiding citizens,

and to return to their former spartanism. Moreover, in the absence of the chief Khans, the tribes had been weakened internally by poisonous intrigues of which the Government are masters and had been infused with insidious propaganda against the Khans. Much ill blood had been neutralized or removed. However, they mostly succeeded and tribal pride and morale were slowly reborn, whilst the myth of the invincible Persian army, of which many had come to be convinced and which only the Baur Ahmed had disposed of at Tang-i-Tamuradi, receded from their minds. Of all these tribes only the Baur Ahmed Sarhadi had not been fully subdued by the Shah who, by placing a cordon round their forbidding mountains, had kept them in a state of semi-independence. The Baur Ahmed and Ali and Vali Izad Punch, continued to sail forth although on a lesser and more cautious scale. Although their principal two chiefs were lured into captivity and ultimate assassination, the pride of the rank and file was never shattered by defeat.

The Qashgai horde resumed its biannual migrations without having to pay immense bribes for this ancient privilege, which had landed them in penury or debt. And the settled communities in their path endured once more the depredations and trappings down that accompany these undisciplined moves. Meanwhile, the "Hiat" were building up their flocks of sheep and goats and camels and the Kakhudas and Khans their stables of horses and mules, which had become thinned out from having been stolen by Government employees or given in bribes, and in the case of those that could not move had perished for want of grass.

So the position to-day is that outposts of gendarmeries and garrisons of troops are to be found only along the main road from Shiraz to Bushire, where traffic must run in escorted convoys, whilst there are two ineffective Gendarmerie posts at Shahpur and Felhan on the Mamassani road. These are unable to prevent armed Mamassani and Kashkuli from levying a toll on all civilian passengers and caravans at four points along the road, which they do by order of their Khans. The present day is a period of peace for the Baur Ahmed. At Gach Saran there is a company from a crack Persian regiment of the north, supported by British troops, who give security to this area from Baur Ahmed and other

elsewhere local government rests with the tribal Kalantars who in Kashkuli, Darrashuri and other Qashgai "tribes" are chosen by Nasir Khan from their own ruling families. In other tribes they are accepted by their subjects on a

The Boir Ahmeds Garmauri settled east of Behbahan under Muzaffer Khan, are still holding out against the octopoid encroachments of Abdullah Zarghampur, victor of Semrum, Kalantar of Boir Ahmeds sarhad (Lower) and self-styled Ikhan of Kuthgaun, who already controls the fertile district and tribe of Cheram and much of Taibi Garmauri to the north and has virtually annexed Dil, one of Muzaffer's villages. These settled Boir Ahmeds aided by Government rifles, are tough people and may yet fight against odds before losing their lands. They have been joined by Khosrow and Kuth Ali, two of Abdullah's brothers, who have quarrelled with him, and live in the full blast of a "war of nerves" conducted

The Garmair was smitten this summer by a terrible plague termed "Rang," which, attacking the horses and mules, spared few of their lives. The donkeys, however, were but lightly afflicted. This has seriously weakened them as against the nomads who passed through at the end, their animals escaping infection. The stables of the nomadic Javidi, however, were also free from the disease.

Although Mohammad Hussein Taheri has given an assurance to his friend Hussein Quli Rustam that he will not rob the latter's villages—the conditions under which he winters in Rustam—yet it is quite unsafe to travel in northern Mamasani without an adequate escort, which should not be let out of one's sight, nor that of one's baggage, and quite out of the question to proceed after dark, nor would any armed guard consent to accompany one after nightfall. The reason is that Qaid Qazi Bor Ahmed are a bold, undisciplined crowd and, although their chiefs and Kadkhudas can prevent major raiding parties, for the planning of

penalties of their lusty youths for minor robbery and would become highly unpopular and impoverish the tribe if they succeeded in doing so. The state of insecurity is reflected in Rustani villages, each of which nestles round a mound of night armed guards patrol the perimeter and give vent to frequent Salap alarm shots ringing out at intervals until the dawn. In Bavi the Tir Taji Boir Ahmeds are more concerned with their vast flocks and camels and little inclined to rob. However, a guard is still advisable, on account of loose outlaw elements within the Bavi tribe itself, who are in opposition to the Kalantar and given to preying on other tribes. In Boir Ahmeds Garmari security is probably worse in winter than in the preceding areas, from the northern proximity of the Boir Ahmeds Sarhad (border).

triangular plain (altitude 2,000 feet) bounded by the Bushire road to the east, the Kuh Takan range to the south west and by low rugged hills to the north, it is richly watered by the considerable stream of the Shahpur River, which flows from east to west near the northern foothills. A network of untidy canals traverses the plain and waters date plantations and paddy fields. Wheat, barley, tobacco and cotton are also grown. The many villages would be richer were it not for the insecurity of the area, occasioned largely by its own inhabitants, partly by Abulvardi Kashkuli, and for the ghastly tolls of malaria, trachoma and other diseases. Nor is the hot climate of summer conducive to work. The Abulvardi Kashkuli camp under the northern hills up to the road, but do not extend south of the river. Jhaugur Khan Kashkuli, who, however, owns none of the land or villages, has taken upon himself the security of the area, which doubtless he covets, and has posted his tofaughis at the motorable village of Khush, for which he is said to be levying taxes. Much of the property is owned by Hikmat, Hukmat al-Mumalik of Shiraz.

The inhabitants of mixed Persian and Lur stock are brave, fierce and well armed and speak Farsi mingled with some Luri. They live in miserable palm huts and mud hovels where they are tormented by flies and mosquitoes. The Kaskhuli tribute them with being good shots at long range, but state that they have improved, robbery and the clashes of small armed bands still give rise to shots in the plantations at night. These and the incessant howling of jackals are sufficient to deter most travellers after dark, and the Kadkhudas will not sanction their movement or risk escorts in their favour.

Public Relations and Propaganda Values

From reports received by A.L.O., Ahwaz, and Gach Saran it would appear the food is valuable to the troops. The British troops, who are being gratified by the treatment, remarked that they were even more pleased

that an Englishman should be willing to live as they do and take an interest in their families, their history and their way of living. The officer commanding was forcibly struck by the genuine and friendly attitude of Kashkuli and Darrashuri Khans, by the extent of the gratitude shown by the tribes and by the welcome he received on his return to Mamassani. Living in close proximity to the A.I.O.C. workings at Guch Saran for which they supply part and full-time employees, Kashkuli and Darrashuri have had ample opportunities to get to know the British, and have found the association profitable. Even now the company are negotiating with them for the purchase of many head of sheep in exchange for the much needed tea, sugar and cloth. Moreover there are traditions of co-operation with the British against the Sanial ud Dunleh in the Great War, and the South Persian Rifles, in which a number of tribesmen (mostly Qashgai) enlisted is still spoken of with respect and held up as an example of British

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Tribal policy is largely determined by fear, hatred and suspicion of the Central Government, based on past persecutions, and by a desire to strengthen themselves against a future reassertion of its power. With the fall of Reza Shah they shared in the short lived hopes that a new dynasty and a more capable and sympathetic Government would arise, whilst punishment would overtake their late oppressors. At this time the majority would probably have flocked to serve us as being their liberators from a cruel and selfish tyrant. But when they found that we had not come to reorganise the country or interfere in its internal affairs, and that we were supporting the son of Pahlavi and the Central Government, and when they saw the same corrupt clique continue in office and the chaotic and food situation deteriorate, hope turned to disappointment, and anti-British propaganda, aided by British reverses at arms, found a fertile field in which to take root. The old stories that we had been behind the policy of Reza Shah (vide Report No. 4) were resurrected and found favour among them. It is only with the changing fortunes of war, the confounding of enemy prophecies and an ultimate realisation that we have done them no harm that their feelings have recently begun to swing back in our favour. Nevertheless, friendly though they may be, they are unlikely to repose their full confidence in us so long as we are associated with a Government they despise. They know now that the Allies are the masters of the war, and that the ultimate fate of their country and themselves rests with us. They are not prepared to give up their independence, or to give them the benefits of a semi-independence. They assure one that they are now satisfied that the accusations made against us were quite unjust. However one is still asked why we didn't exterminate the Pahlavi dynasty and supplant it by another as though in token of our goodwill towards a people of Persia. The same remark was addressed to a Boer Ahmed Kakhoda with the prefix: "The Boer Ahmed want to know why . . ." It was replied that it isn't the custom of the British to indulge in unnecessary bloodshed and that in England the sins of the father are not visited on the sons.

They express admiration for the way we have turned the war in our favour, and sum up their feelings in a remark heard several times that "the British know well how to manage these things." The Kashkult are keen to explain that the recent Qashgai activities were directed against the Government and not against ourselves, as also to point out that the Germans are now with Boir Ahmed and no longer with the Qashgai tribe. In excuse for the past they explain Nasir Khan's anxiety for his two brothers who were in Germany and his fear of inciting reprisals against them. However, no bitterness is expressed against Germany other than an occasional "Give us arms and we will fight with you against them."

On the other hand, a great deal of the loss of response and thought noted in this is likely to have been inspired by propaganda, a knowledge of the ruthless tactics should be obtained, the Teheran Times is generally a better source than W. The British and American soldiers who are in the country are 99 per cent. illiterate and in extreme ignorance of outside affairs. Their opinions are largely moulded by elders or "Rish-Safids" (literally "white-heads") who are the only persons who can read and write the Arabic of Mullah. They are rich in local experience and tribal lore, and often exercise

a moderating influence, although there are trouble-makers among them. They should be treated with the respect due to their age and which is given them by the Khans and Kadkhudas, and are a mine of information which is not, however always accurate unless it pertains to family trees.

The Mamassani and Bavi look to the British for protection against their enemies, and, like the Armenians, are apt to resent our helping anyone else.

The Boir Ahmedi were very appreciative of treatment, hospitable and behaved reasonably well. Soon after arriving in their camps one is invited to a rifle contest in the presence of a large and critical audience. If successful in hitting the mark their respect is soon won and one is taken without further question into their circle.

Cordial relations are being maintained with Dr. Hikmat, Director of Public Health for Fars, and information is exchanged about conditions in the areas visited about which he seems to know little.

Medical

(a) *Prevailing Diseases*.—The health of Fars last summer and autumn was undermined by an unusually severe epidemic of malaria, accompanied by an almost complete lack of quinine and atabrin to cope with the cases. As was to be expected, the epidemic was due to a combination of factors: (i) the unusually heavy rainfall during the winter 1942-43 (17½ inches in Shiraz), which kept ponded water courses normally dry in summer, extended the swamp areas and allowed of a more extensive cultivation of rice; (ii) the mild autumn weather and late rainfall (mosquitoes were active and attacking furiously in Mamassani and Bavi in the third week of December, and fresh cases were still occurring); and (iii) the tendency towards increased rice cultivation which has shown itself since the fall of Reza Shah, who, for selfish motives, tried unsuccessfully to limit it to his Crown lands in Gilan and Mazandaran in order that his subjects should not pay a heavy tax on the rice. *An. alutus* appears to be the principal vector; suffered most, a high incidence was also met with in villages such as Naugak, which are situated near a pebbly watercourse, and where an almost 100 per cent infection was encountered. The only vector identified, and that in large numbers, was *An. superpictus*, the commonest vector in the mountain and submontane areas of Iraq and Western Persia.

A large proportion of the cases is said to be directly from malaria and the aridity of Mahur in the south, apart from a few brackish swamps, precludes any large-scale anopheline breeding, yet the Kashguli became heavily infected (about 70 per cent.) in the course of their downward migration. They say this took place at Shahpur, a highly malarious riverine and rice-growing area where they camp before dispersing to their winter quarters whilst tarrying in commerce with the merchants of Kazerun. By coming down earlier than is their normal habit, they arrived in what was probably the height of the season instead of near the end as in normal years.

The Darrashuri were only lightly infected as they passed swiftly through the fever-ridden belt of Mamassani whilst the Boir Ahmedi, who arrived much later and remained in the area, caught the tail end of the epidemic and were about 30 per cent. infected. Mortality from malaria was high in Mamassani, Bavi and Boir Ahmedi, Garmsiri and at Khusht, and the after-effects and complications of malarial fever were common. The epidemic was due to a combination of factors: (i) the unusually heavy rainfall during the winter 1942-43 (17½ inches in Shiraz), which kept ponded water courses normally dry in summer, extended the swamp areas and allowed of a more extensive cultivation of rice; (ii) the mild autumn weather and late rainfall (mosquitoes were active and attacking furiously in Mamassani and Bavi in the third week of December, and fresh cases were still occurring); and (iii) the tendency towards increased rice cultivation which has shown itself since the fall of Reza Shah, who, for selfish motives, tried unsuccessfully to limit it to his Crown lands in Gilan and Mazandaran in order that his subjects should not pay a heavy tax on the rice.

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and (iii) whooping cough in Khusht. No typhus was seen, but a few odd cases were suspected. Tuberculosis is not uncommon among nomad and village alike, and routine examination with X-ray would probably reveal a percentage approaching 5 per cent. This is not surprising in the light of the high incidence of chronic bronchitis and the habit of spitting indiscriminately on the walls and floors of confined spaces which is indulged in by every villager. Scabies is exceptionally widespread throughout the area and results from the indiscriminate use of other people's bedding which is never cleaned and the rarity of washing. Lice are almost equally prevalent. Venereal disease is almost unknown in Qashgai, Darrashuri and Boir Ahmedi, but is just starting in Mamassani. Some cases were also seen in Khusht. Among injuries hideous ulcers reaching to the bone and initiated by thorns and dog bites are common among the nomadic tribes, and three cases of tetanus were seen. Many Qashgai are still nursing the battle wounds of last summer, while ancient gunshot scars and sinuses are common in Mamassani and at Khusht.

(b) *Local Medical Facilities*.—It might almost be said that there is no medical aid to nil. There are Government and private doctors at Kazerun and a Government doctor at Behbahan. Cases requiring hospital treatment must find their way to Shiraz. At Malki, in Mamassani, there has been for several years a very poorly qualified Government doctor. But the complete lack of quinine, atabrin and other essential drugs from which he has been suffering for many months makes him an unfortunate object of ridicule. The A.I.O.C. doctor at Gachi Saran is willing to treat neighbouring tribesmen, but is only allowed to give medicine to those who are employed by the company. In exceptional and deserving cases the company arranges accommodation in its hospitals at Abadan or Masjid-i-Saleman for tribal chiefs or members of their families.

(c) *Supply of Drugs*.—Additional quinine and atabrin over and above normal rates of consumption should have been supplied to Government medical services in Shiraz from Tehran to cope with this year's epidemic, but this does not appear to have been done. An attempt is about to be made to reduce the prices of the chemicals in Shiraz by the establishment of a Government pharmacy which will sell at Government rates.

A. GARROD, Captain, R.A.M.C.,
D.C., 12th Ind Inf. Mob. Dispensary

1 January 1944

Appendix

Notes on Boir Ahmedi

(i) Boir Ahmedi Sarhad. Strength about 7,000 families

1. Distribution.

Sarhad and Garmsir more or less adjacent, being partly separated in the south west by the narrow strip of Cheram and Doshman Ziari Kuchek and in the south by the Sarhad of Bavi and Rustam.

The Sarhad is a nomadic tribe, apt to vary with the fortunes of the tribe and incapable of accurate definition.

North East.—From north-west to south-east Kuh-i-Dinar range, Kuh-i-Kakun and Kumehur, forming boundary with Qashgai Sarhad.

North.—From north-west extremity of Kuh-i-Dinar range running convexly westwards well north of Patawob, Maregun and Burj-i-Chin to upper reaches of Marun River near Qaleh Gulab.

An obscure and exceedingly mountainous boundary merging into unexplored lands which used to be occupied by the Nomi tribe and beyond which lie the Bakhtiari Kiamerasi tribes to the north and the Taibi Sarhad to the north-west. Bakhtiari has spread southwards into Nomi territory and now adjoins Boir Ahmedi.

South West.—Kuh-i-Simb extending south-east into the Choskehgor range and the upper reaches of the Kazerun River. The boundary is with Darrashuri Kuchek in north-west, Cheram in centre and Bavi in south-east.

The above territory includes some of the most difficult, mountainous and least explored parts of Persia, especially towards its north-west confines. Its nature is briefly described by A. V. Harrison, who has traversed parts of it, in an article entitled "Some Routes in Southern Iran" (*Journal of R.G.S.*, April or May, 1942) and in Route 63 (Bell), *Routes in Persia*, Vol. III, 1910 (U.S., India). It is well wooded and contains a large number of cultivated and well watered villages around Taki Khosrova and Saakht in the east, in Tatarzadi country to the north and round Safarjah in the west. As a general rule it may be said that the "upper" section occupies the south and south-east, and the "lower" the north and north-west of the area.

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The Bear Ahmash suched in the last of the tribes to move down and the first to move up, remaining from late November until about mid March in the Garmser. The Qaid Qiri have the shortest route, the Tamura and Qaid Qiri and Tir Taji follow the Nauguk Valley and the Tamuruchi the route Qalch Gul or Qalch Kalut, Maron River, Qalch (), Singaweh and Pataweli. Other sections either follow these or other more difficult trails through the Khairabad basin, or via Safarish and Sa adat.

A list of sub-sections with their present habitats and allegiance (December 1943) is given in section (c) of this appendix. There has been a strong tendency during the past year for sections of the "upper" to transfer to Abdulha Zarghampur, who has also seized some of the "upper" sections. The Muhaimmed Hussein Taheri is now left with only Tirah, the "lower" section. Qaid Qivi, the small Sa'adat Murderazi (which follows the "lower" section) is the nearest section of Aghai and of the Aulad Mirzali section of Dasht-i-Mauri. These together with his villages in the Sarhad amount to little over 1,000 families as against the 8,000 which Zarghampur can command.

The Quid Qivi are universally acknowledged to be the bravest, most warlike, most intelligent and least disciplined, but are much split by quarrels and blood feuds between the rival Kabbas. They are the only tribe so much concerned more with the protection of their vast flocks against other sections of the tribe than with robbery. They are the only Bahr Ahmeds who keep camels.

The Tamaradi is the largest, most inaccessible and most powerful section and is in a position of semi independence. Jalil and Babakani are savage and lawless but not so brave as Quid Qivi. The Aghai and Farsi sections took part in recent raids on Kashkuli and on Bandar Dilem respectively. The Zangawari are closely associated with the Ducht i Mauri and are noted within the tribe for the beauty of their women. The Sa'adat sections claim Arab descent, are mostly settled and

are sayids. There are a few Ali-Ullahs and Bahars among the Sa'adat-i-Bahmahmid. The activities of the settled Sisakhis who under Mullah Qubad were once the scourge of the Qumshah, Abadeh and Aharguh-Yezd areas, are well-known and have been recorded in Christian's *Tribes of Fars*. Under the many sons of the late Mullah they have resumed their former habits and are reputed to have raided near Nain and Yezd this summer.

The Bahr Ahmeds Sarhadis are still living in the "heroic age" and are becoming an interesting though highly-dangerous anachronism. Unless their growing power can be ruthlessly curbed the security and peaceful development of a large part of South West Persia will be jeopardised as it has been intermittently throughout the present century.

Their resurgence is directly attributable to the weakness of Government rule and the longer they are allowed to expand their power and increase their arms the more difficult will be their ultimate defeat. Pressure can most easily be brought to bear on them from Tal-i-Khoorovi and in the more accessible Garmser country where their downward migration could be forestalled by a powerful force. They are universally acknowledged by their enemies and by Qashgai to be the bravest, toughest and most ruthless fighters in Southern Persia, and on their own summer ground can outmanoeuvre any attacking force. These qualities, added to their general untrustworthiness and inaccessibility, have made them the terror of their neighbours and the scourge of settled areas up to 150 miles from their strongholds. Their mobility, though on foot, rivals that of the mounted Turkomans, whose depredations during the last century extended from the shores of the Caspian and Atrak valleys to the confines of Ispahan. However, like all tribes in whom

in internal feuds, but these are soon submerged when the tribe as a whole is threatened from without and it is possible in normal times for a powerful leader to unite most sections so long as the prospect of sufficient loot can be held before them. Travelling fast over little-used tracks in well-armed bands of about 100 strong, of whom most are on foot, he covers immense distances and is often away with his booty before a general alarm can be raised. When near the scene of his quarry he may lie up in some unfrequented spot during the day protected by sentries whilst others survey the lie of the land. He is usually able to fight how well equipped his troops must be met at night or at dawn by parties of gendarmes. His raids are carefully planned and usually avoid Qashgai country when the latter are there. Thus the settled villages of Mahur, Laravi, Zaidan and Behbahan are raided after the harvest in summer, whilst the Abadeh, Qumishah and Abarqub-Yard areas are disturbed most often in spring and autumn before and after the interposition of Qashgai between them and their quarry. Whilst in frequent conflict with Mamassani he holds these ancient enemies, when armed, in respect and will only tackle them in great strength. In the absence of a rifle he will fight with club or axo (as at Semirum) and has little compunction in seizing the arms of his allies in the general confusion of battle. Such is his vanity that he will sometimes claim that his raiding casualties were killed by his own people rather than grant the honour to his opponents. He shows scant consideration to his own wounded, even if it be a brother, and would rather see him die than have him nursed by a despised foe. The womenfolk until the love of raiding and war into their sons at an early age and a good deal of whispering into the ear of the boy behind him to tell his father to do it as he did. I saw 2 sons of a friend who had been sold into slavery and returned to his father's camp as a freeman, one having been sold as a slave in our 2nd year and the other as a slave in our 3rd year. They were both very brave and had been fighting for many years. It was said that they had been captured by a Nawa and taken to Mahur. Both of them were very brave and were a striped of their outer coat. Nawa made a prisoner of them and took them to Mahur. They were then taken to a place where they were kept for a while. A man called me to see them. I went to see them. They were very brave and had been fighting for many years. I saw them again in our 3rd year. They were still very brave and had been fighting for many years. I saw them again in our 4th year. 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In appearance, judging from Qaid Qivi and Tir Tazi, the Boir Ahmedz is superior to the average Lur, and shows a great variety of types in all of which

Funeral ceremonies in which all take part are reserved for "hon-men" and those who die in battle, and their principal feature is the parading of a finely caparisoned horse on which the dead man's accoutrements are placed. Death from assassination or other causes is not usually deemed worthy of a fine funeral, human life being held of little worth and a fighting death the greatest glory. Economically their life is similar to that of other nomads except that

The settled villages are self-supporting and produce maize, corn, bread fruits and nuts which are bartered with the nomads or marketed at Ardekhan a share being taken by the Khans in taxes.

[illegible]

Previous to Ghassem Khan the garmisr of Kashkuli Buzurg and Gharrachi was well east of the present Shiraz-Bushire road near where that of Kashkuli Kirmani still is. He found their new winter quarters in Mahur-i-Mehlatun, in the course of which Mamassani and Khush were dispossessed of a barren part of their lands, the former inhabited by the now almost extinct Mohammed Saleh and the latter by Mohammed Saleh remnants, whilst the population of Mal-i-Shaikh (G. 0870) are Khushis. In 1922 the unscrupulous Haji Muin-ut-Tajjar (Bushiri) produced a document which claimed that the area was once inhabited by Mohammed Saleh tribesmen and therefore belonged to Mamassani, and claimed shares in the company undertaking.

The numbers of Kashkuli have shrunk considerably. Thus the Gharrachi are said to have been 5,000 families as against the 500 of to-day. The Kashkuli Buzurg have seldom quarrelled with Mamassani or their neighbours to the north, although Mohammed Ali Khan was sent by the Saulat ud Dauleh to inflict punishment on them. But there was a tendency before the Great War for territorial aggrandisement to the south-east, at the expense of the Kumari, Khush and Mazra'eh "buluka," and to gain control of Kazerun and the adjacent sections of the Shiraz-Bushire road.

The Kashkuli were not content with this. They were determined to extend their power to the south-west, and to gain control of the Shiraz-Bushire road. This was broken in 1923 by the Saulat ud Dauleh, the Saulat ud Dauleh's orders, invited an attack on A.P.O.C. officials by the guards. The Saulat ud Dauleh continued his oppression, detaining Ilyas, Jehangir and other Anglophil Khans, and the tribe became impoverished and its power broken.

Strength—A little over 3,500 families made up as follows—

1. Kashkuli Buzurg	2,000	} not visited by me
2. Kashkuli Kirmani (or Kuchek)	1,000	
3. Kashkuli Gharrachi	500	

Tribe-men.—Industrious, on the whole peaceful, and enjoy a higher standard of living than other tribes. The large Abulvardi section under Mullah Fathullah and the Bagdoli are wilder and more predatory, "guarding" and robbing the Khush Kamariy frontier and that section of the Bushire road. Monogamy is universal and venereal disease and opium smoking apparently unknown. Physically tallish, wiry, dark-skinned and hawk nosed. Dress same as other Qashqai. Complete return to tribal dress.

Arms, &c.—Appear to be fairly well armed, but including a large proportion of the tribe. The Kashkuli is essentially an infantryman, but they can muster about 400 sowars. His fighting qualities are reputed to be good but nothing outstanding. The tribe is well armed, but they are not a fighting tribe. Owing to their wide dispersion, difficult communications, limited pastures and scattered supplies, it would be extremely difficult for the tribe to concentrate a force in their garmisr, and one could only be maintained at the expense of more fertile neighbouring areas (e.g. Khush, Mamassani).

Agriculture.—Wheat and barley are grown in the few open areas of the garmisr, notably at Mal-i-Shaikh, Mehlatun, Buz-i-Safar Beg, Bikarz, Mashan, Neza, Baba Kulu and around Baba Muir. They are sown in December or early January, are rain fed and harvested from end of April until early June, by the settled sections of the tribe. Dates are grown at Mal-i-Shaikh, oranges and limes at Baba Kulu and sundry fruits at Baba Muir. Small-scale irrigation is resorted to in these villages. The Sarhad is said to be well-watered and more fertile, and supplies the greater part of their crops, as well as nuts and dried fruits.

There are about thirty sections, each under Ilyas or Jehangir for administrative purposes and under these or other Khans for taxation purposes. Many are divided between Ilyas and Jehangir, e.g., Abulvardi, Bagdoli. Their subservience to the respective

Kalantars is determined by geographical situation and traditional family allegiance. But they appear to be free to transfer from one to the other should they so desire. The Kalantars are divided into sections for tofangchis or sowars in time of battle or when migrating, and claim a variable share of any booty and a proportion of the annual taxes.

Besides these loyalties, which vary with changes of Kalantars, sections or their sub-sections are directly controlled by the different land-owning Khans. Any family which chooses to cultivate must render a fifth of the crop to the land-owner. In addition one sheep per flock (flock 100) per year is given to the respective Khan, and a share of this is passed on to the Kalantars. The settled villages give half their corn and varying amounts of other produce to the owner, in return for protection against robbers and provision of arms.

The only Government taxes paid are those on produce which enters controlled market centres (e.g., Kazerun, Ardekhan).

Appointment of Kalantars and their Extra-Tribal Power.—Nominally the Kalantars are still appointed by the Government, Nasir Khan having no direct power. But in fact they are now appointed by Nasir with due and careful deference to the wishes of the tribe, and more or less acknowledged by the Government. At present their outside powers are considerable, in keeping with Nasir Khan's unofficial assumption of responsibility for law and order in Fars. Thus Jehangir Khan controls a large part of the Shiraz-Mamassani road, for which they both take taxes and traffic tolls, and security, though far from good, is probably better and oppression less than if the areas were under Government control. Hikmat, Hishmat-ul-Mamalik, whose claims in the first place to Khush are very dubious, and who in the past has bled the area white, now finds difficulty in securing his share of the taxes and produce. Meanwhile Jehangir and his brother Abdullah are doing all in their power to gain the respect and goodwill of the Khushis and appear to be succeeding. The taxes collected by the Kalantars are split with Nasir Khan, the promoter of the scheme, whose share is referred to as presents and is grudgingly afforded.

Nasir and Feridun Khan guard the A.I.O.C. roads in their area without payment other than rations.

Effects of Reza Shah's Oppression.—This, coming as it did on top of Saulat ud Dauleh's revenge on the tribe, led to much suffering and impoverishment. They had a choice between (1) settling in the Sarhad where in the absence of fuel, proper houses and winter pastures they could not withstand the cold or maintain their herds, or (2) continuing to live in their present quarters, but at the expense of their privilege of migrating. Each of these factors led to impoverishment. The power of the Khans was broken and many fell into debt from having to pay exorbitant taxes or large fines for real or trumped-up offences (e.g., Jehangir is said to owe 30,000 toman, which he was forced to borrow long ago from Shiraz merchants). The miserable settled villagers of Mashan testify to the speed with which degeneration can set in.

After the war with its consequent and a resumption of migration and robbery in 1912 they started on the road to recovery and their rehabilitation has been remarkable. But it is doubtful if they will ever see their former wealth and prosperity.

In conclusion, the Kashkuli represent nomadic life at perhaps its highest and most dignified level, and it is a pleasure to work with these people or enter their tents. However, in the general excitement and new-won freedom of last summer the tribe undoubtedly contributed its share to the looting and misery of settled villages, and will as a whole have to share the reputation of its wilder and more predatory sections.

2. Darrashuri.

Tribe-men.—Like the Khans, they are remarkable for their fair hair and features and hazel or blue eyes. But they cannot be of the same stock as Kashkuli, although both speak the same Turki.

Arms, &c.—Except in the camps of the Khans, there is very little display of arms, which gives an impression that they are scarce. The fighting qualities and predatory instincts are said to be more highly developed than in Kashkuli. The Darrashuri is essentially a horseman.

Livestock.—Very little in the garmisr mostly in Sarhad.

Livestock.—Few camels, numerous horses (small and badly kept, but tough).

3. Relations of Darrashuri and Kashkuli Buzurg with Nasir Khan and Boir

The khans of Darrashuri and Kashkuli are keen to point out that they have been supporting Nasir Khan because "they love him and he is trying to help them regain their former greatness," but not because he has any hold over them. Nor do they feel any duty in this respect. My impressions were that so long as it is profitable (e.g., their increased prestige with their neighbours by being in a formidable bloc) they will continue to support him and will render him very limited aid (e.g., presents). But when it suits them they will swing over to independent action. Whilst in the garmsir their past relations with Bavi and the formidable (if armed) Mamassani, on whom Darrashuri are so dependent for their migration route and both their trade (rice), have tended to be good, as also with the A.T.O.C. at Guch Saran.

Kashkuli and Darrashuri have a respect for the fighting qualities of Boir Ahmed Sarhadi which amounts almost to reverence, and perhaps reflects the consciousness of their own limitations in this respect.

Notes on Mamassani

The Mamassani (excluding Doshman Ziari) number about 5,000 families, made up as follows:—

- Rustami: 1,500—about fifty villages.
- Javidi: 1,400—about thirty five part-occupied villages, mostly nomadic.
- Bakeh: 1,750—about sixty villages.
- Fehlani: 500—twelve villages.

Nature of Country

The Mamassani are probably unsurpassed in Fars. Lying at the junction of "garmsir" and "sarhad," where sandstone and conglomerate give way to limestone crags and wooded ranges, it enjoys the advantages of both. The bulk of the tribe is spread to Chah Mureh. Smaller side valleys and canyons cut north-east through the grain of the hills into the sarhad and south-west to Bardangan, whilst the axis of Javidi runs eastwards along an important cross fracture to Ardekan. In the more open valleys of Quahgai and provide summer pastures for Javidi and a few families of Rustami and Bakeh.

(b) *Water Supply.*—Massive rice cultivation is fed by ample springs and streams. Nurabad drains the Doshman Ziari hills to the east. Fehlani and East Rustami depend on the Fehlani River, which gives off a network of streams. West Rustami is well watered by the Ab-i-Shah, which, rising from springs at Deb-Nar and Marash, passes through a swamp to the Naragan stream at Kupan.

Boirah through Mamassani and Bavi follows the only natural alignment short of the coastal plain and would offer a great saving over the present road. An unmotorable branch track leads east along the Javidi cross-fracture to Ardekan. These are the routes followed by armies and caravans in the past, and the ruins of Sassanian and Safavieh bridges at Pul-i-Birin and Pul-i-Murd testify to their ancient importance, as also the remains of a defensive wall at the Tang-i-Sangar (B 2249). The Qal'eh Sar-i-Bakeh, which crowns the road to Ardekan, is a remarkable natural stronghold or "diz." Rising with precipitous limestone walls 2,000 feet above the valley, its summit is fed by a spring and is approachable only by a steep and guarded path. Its 3-mile circumference is circled with the remains of massive bunkers poised to descend on those who tried to scale its walls.

The armies of Alexander and the Mongol hordes were embarrassed by its impregnability.

(a) *Historical.*—The origin of the Mamassani and whence they came is obscure. Lurs with a Luri tongue, their appearance and peculiar characteristics are sufficient to place them in a separate branch of this racial group. Their prominent bearing, handsome features and large physique have been described as of the ancient Iranian type and have been preserved with scanty admixture of Arab and other invading elements. Their arrival in Shulistan with Doshman Ziari, who are usually classed as a separate tribe, dates from about two centuries ago. Previously Fehlani and the adjacent Shah Hassan villages, then the only settlements in the district, were the only ones to remain. The present Fehlani are rather different from the others and are probably a mixture of Mamassani grafted on to the original Fehlani stock. They have neither memories nor legends of a past nomadic life and their present ruling family, the Mansuri, are of distant Behbehani origin.

Nomadic at first, Rustami, Bakeh and a part of Javidi began to settle, living in the Garmsir. The Governor-General of Fars when they had to, but made no claim to ownership of their land, which was Crown property. The Rustami, through the marriage of the khans into the ruling family of the neighbouring Boir Ahmed, became settled. (In this connexion it is only during the exile of the leading khans of Rustami and Boir Ahmed that they have been in conflict.)

The Bakeh, under Vali Khan, great-grandfather of Vali Khan Kiani, were expelled by the forces of Mutamid-ud-Daulah Gorgi, the Governor-General of Fars, and Vali with all his sons except Sherif were captured and exiled to Ardebil, where they died. It was on this occasion that a party of their women-folk, who had taken refuge in the Qal'eh Gulab (A 2134), rather than fall captive from the high parapets on to the rocks below. Sherif Khan, the successor of Vali, was powerful and greatly respected and waged a successful war against Khoda Karam Boir Ahmed, wounding and defeating him at Karbal, near Guch Saran, and killing over a hundred of his followers.

The Javidi have shrunk in numbers, many families having migrated to Kelestan, Fasa and other parts.

(b) *Mamassani Land Question.*—As the rest of the history is more or less bound up with their land it is best told under this heading. In 1898 Sayid Muhammad, a descendant of the founder of the tribe, was captured and confiscated by the Persian Navy. In collaboration with his more influential friend, Haji Mohd Dashti, Muin ul-Tujjar (Bohrir) they bought the ear of Muzaffar-ud-Din Shah through the medium of the Atabeg whom they had bribed, and claimed compensation on the grounds that they were Sayids (descendants of the Prophet), which was stated to be a village, was ceded to Sayid Ismail by the royal farman with full rights of ownership. He gave a third to Haji Muin in recognition of his cunning assistance. The Mamassani were incensed at this intrusion into their time-honoured independence. Imam Quli Rustami especially, and put every difficulty in the way of the agents of the new landlord. However, their chances of a successful appeal against the Government decision were lost through their inability to unite, a circumstance of which Haji Muin was quick to take advantage. Sayid Ismail was imprisoned and sold into slavery.

From now on until 1930 the story is one of unscrupulous intrigue by Haji Muin, aided by the Daulah and Qavam-ul-Mulk by offering them shares in the land they heaped coals upon the fires of their already bitter rivalry, and by splitting the rival elements of Mamassani in attempts to drive a bargain. They were able to gain only a meagre and uncertain portion of their revenue and virtually none from Rustami. Thus Abdol-Karim Baki was bribed to murder his elder brother Hussein Quli, the Kalantar and an inveterate enemy of Haji Muin. Abdullah was similarly dealt with when he ceased to serve the Haji's interests a few years later. By bribing the Chief of Army, Shiraz, in 1922 he obtained the services of troops supported by a cannon and a detachment of S.P.R. under the direction of his son Jawad Agha, Amir Homayun, with the intention of forcibly occupying the Rustami area and securing his revenue. But Imam Quli Rustami withheld them for many months, although in the next year he proffered his obedience to the

Government and consented to destroy his fortifications. Amir Humayun visited Mamassani at subsequent intervals through the Bakshdar of Fehlan, but failed to get any benefit from the lands.

In 1930 Reza Shah, bent on destroying the independent Rustami, occupied Mamassani with his troops, induced Imam Quli to visit Tehran through a promise of the Sardar Asad of his safe-custody (and ultimately killed him), and confiscated Mamassani as "war compensation," the descendants of Haji Mumin losing their claim to the lands.

Until 1942 it was ruled by gendarmes and Government officials and was subjected to increasing extortions, whilst the now broken khans led a life of miser and oppression. However, Amir Humayun succeeded in retaining Fehlan, which he had bought from the Qavam ul Mulk.

Soon after the Anglo-Russian entry in 1941 the khans seized their chance and retained all the wheat and rice, the Government being too weak to enforce its rule. With the escape of Hussein Quli son of Imam Quli from exile in the spring of 1942 and his successful assumption of the Kalantarship of Rustami, he set to to bury the hatchet between him and the other sections by marrying his sister to Bakhshdar of Kazerun. He has since then been active in the Bavi office to the west. Whilst anxious to work with the Government, whom they could serve if necessary in the warrior tradition for which they have been famous in the past not for love but because they have mutual fears of the growing might of Boir Ahmedi and Qashgai, yet a complication has crept in. Amir Humayun and the relatives with whom his affairs now rest succeeded in regaining their entitlement to the lands. But in a recent Government decision less than a third of the property has been made over to the khans, who, however, are adamant in their insistence upon complete ownership. Meanwhile Nasir Khan Qashgai fearing Mamassani independence and anxious to include them in a southern tribal bloc subservient to him has threatened to buy the lands from Amir Humayun, an undertaking which, if successful, might place him in a position to oust the khans and extort the revenues by force and with a legal backing. There is, may yet, in the continuance of official indecision, join the ranks of the rebels and further tip the scales against the declining forces of law and order in Fars.

The People and their Khans.—(a) A typical Mamassani is a striking figure and has features which class him apart.

He is a tall, slender, well-proportioned man, with a high forehead, deep-set eyes, a straight nose, and a thin mustache. He is usually dressed in a simple, light-colored robe, with a sash around his waist. He has a dignified and somewhat stern expression, but his eyes are kind and his voice is soft. He is a man of few words, but when he speaks, he is listened to with respect. He is a man of great energy and endurance, and he is always ready to take the lead in any enterprise. He is a man of great honor and integrity, and he is always ready to stand up for his rights. He is a man of great courage and bravery, and he is always ready to risk his life for his people. He is a man of great wisdom and insight, and he is always ready to give advice to his people. He is a man of great faith and devotion, and he is always ready to pray for his people. He is a man of great love and compassion, and he is always ready to help his people in their time of need. He is a man of great strength and power, and he is always ready to defend his people from their enemies. He is a man of great honor and respect, and he is always ready to be the leader of his people. He is a man of great courage and bravery, and he is always ready to risk his life for his people. He is a man of great wisdom and insight, and he is always ready to give advice to his people. He is a man of great faith and devotion, and he is always ready to pray for his people. He is a man of great love and compassion, and he is always ready to help his people in their time of need. He is a man of great strength and power, and he is always ready to defend his people from their enemies. He is a man of great honor and respect, and he is always ready to be the leader of his people.

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Hussein Quli Rustam is now the acknowledged leader of the Mamassani. He is a man of great energy and endurance, and he is always ready to take the lead in any enterprise. He is a man of great honor and integrity, and he is always ready to stand up for his rights. He is a man of great courage and bravery, and he is always ready to risk his life for his people. He is a man of great wisdom and insight, and he is always ready to give advice to his people. He is a man of great faith and devotion, and he is always ready to pray for his people. He is a man of great love and compassion, and he is always ready to help his people in their time of need. He is a man of great strength and power, and he is always ready to defend his people from their enemies. He is a man of great honor and respect, and he is always ready to be the leader of his people.

drawn to seek support against his rival Abdullah Zarghampur with whom, however, neither he nor Mohammed Hussein are anxious to come into conflict.

Vali Khan Kiani and his cousin Mohammed Khan are the joint Kalantars of Bakesh. Vali, the more powerful and unscrupulous of the two, exercises considerable weight in tribal councils.

Villages. Numerous and small, and would support a larger population without the malaria. Those of Bakesh and Fehlan are fairly well built and planted with trees, but in Rustami they consist principally of reed huts walled to a varying height and clustered to the slopes of mounds on which rest the more solid and fortified qalehs and towers of the khans and kadkhudas. This is retrograde so far as the Deli Nau Valley of Rustami is concerned and is traceable to the depredations of the Boir Ahmedi from 1930-41.

Agriculture and Live Stock. Rice is the predominant crop wherever water abounds. It is sown in the month of "Mordad," transplanted two months later and cut at the beginning of "Ahar." Wheat, barley, lentils, vetch and opium are also grown and are mostly raised, the latter being confined to the villages of Fehlan and Bakesh. Maize is only found in the higher lands of Doshman Ziari to the east. Bitter oranges, lemons, a few date palms and other fruits mingle in the gardens of Nurabad and in the Naugak valley of Rustami, but are not enough to export.

The considerable flocks of Javidi support their nomadic way of life, and the village shepherds of Bakesh and Rustami dwell in tents on the outskirts of the plains and move with their flocks to the neighbouring hills in the summer. Almost all the horses and mules were killed this summer by a plague termed "Rang." Wild boar abound in the rice fields but withdraw to the acorned hills with the cutting of the crop.

Markets.—Much trade is carried on with the surrounding nomadic tribes, who are extensive buyers of rice in exchange for animal products which are locally consumed or eventually marketed elsewhere. Mahki and Fehlan are the principal centres for the collection of corn, rice and opium, some of which is collected by kharbar lorries and brought to Kazerun and Shiraz.

The A.I.O.C. bought 65,000 kalog. of rice from Hussein Quli Rustam last year in addition to their previous purchases.

Taxation.—The villagers give a quarter of their corn and a half of their rice to the khans, and a tenth of each to their kadkhudas. But in Rustami Hussein Quli has remitted them a sixth of the rice, so that they only have to contribute a fifth. This is in compensation for their recent hardships and to secure their loyalty. Nothing is now paid to the Government nor to the legal owners of the land.

Industry.—The villagers are engaged in the weaving of cloth, the making of pottery, and the raising of silkworms. They also engage in the raising of sheep and goats, and in the raising of bees. They also engage in the raising of chickens and ducks, and in the raising of fish. They also engage in the raising of silkworms, and in the raising of bees. They also engage in the raising of sheep and goats, and in the raising of chickens and ducks, and in the raising of fish.

Hygiene and Sanitation.

(a) "Hamman."—As there are none in Mamassani, Bavi or Khasht a good opportunity exists for the Government to start them on hygienic lines, with showers. The reason for their absence is probably because the water here is mild, a "hamman" serving in higher places as a refuge from the cold.

(b) **Clothing.** The wearing of loose-fitting, light-colored robes is one of the most serious evils in Persia to-day, and is the direct or indirect cause of much disease and mortality, more so in areas where the health is already undermined by malaria. It is surprising that the nomad has not learnt to weave or knit woollen cloth to protect him from the cold but has always relied on the towns for the production of his articles of clothing.

(c) **Venereal Disease.** An example of the evils which social reformers set up against in the towns and larger villages is a superstition which prevails among the nomads, and is probably derived from the Persians. The effects are not infrequently seen in the mission hospitals, and it would seem that the crime passes unpunished.

(d) **Marriage.**—Child marriage, which was forbidden by Reza Shah, is coming into practice again in the towns, and cases similar to that in paragraph (c), and arising from this cause, are sometimes seen in the hospitals.

(e) **Female Circumcision.** This is a practice which is still prevalent in the rule of the nomads, and is a source of much suffering and death. It is a practice which is still prevalent in the rule of the nomads, and is a source of much suffering and death. It is a practice which is still prevalent in the rule of the nomads, and is a source of much suffering and death.

Reactions of Tribesmen to Medical Treatment

The average tribesman is more sensible about the taking of medicine and more appreciative of treatment than the average villager. He is less wrapt up in ideas of "hot and cold," perhaps from the more restricted nature of his diet. However, it is possible for enemy agents to cast doubts upon the medicine and arouse suspicions which can only be neutralised by follow up visits. Thus, they told the Khasiaks six months ago that a British army doctor would be visiting them and distributing drugs which exerted a very slow poisoning effect (this from Khorow Khan), and a recent source of information has reported much talk on these lines in the tribe based on a few cases which failed to recover or got worse after treatment.

Another factor is that free distribution is not understood in this country, a snag being suspected. By having to pay, even a small sum, their faith in the treatment would at once be trebled.

E 2661 422 841

No. 10

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 2nd May)

(No. 182)

HIS Majesty a representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 16 for the period the 17th to 23rd April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tolson, 24th April, 1944

Partners on No 13

(1924-1925)

*Military Attache's Intelligence Summary No 16 for the Period
17th to 23rd April, 1944*

Pereira A. Boite.

Indiv. received

114. Mr. A. has proposed a new reform: he proposes that two-thirds of the budget be regularized immediate expenditure pending the passing of the entire budget.

2 Sa'ed's Cabinet has been the subject of much windy oratory and destructive criticism. Sa'ed himself is agreed by the majority of the Deputies to be an honest and gentlemanly fellow, competent in his own sphere of diplomacy, but quite incapable of holding his Cabinet team together or of putting into effect the items in his programme. Deep distrust of his possible rivals, and especially of Seyyid Zia-ud-din, is the sole reason for the limited support which the Deputies are prepared to afford him.

Both in the press and in the Muslim opposition to the American Mission has increased, and most papers have now passed the bounds of legitimate criticism and have descended to scurrilous abuse. The Persian passion for hyperbole, their inability to consider the basis for the truth of any statement before making it, and the absence of any law of libel has resulted in the wildest utterances. Two American advisers are openly accused by name of having accepted large bribes. The attacks against Dr. Millsbaugh and his associates are made from every angle, but the chief accusations are as follows.—

- (i) That they do not possess the necessary qualifications for their job.
- (ii) That they are too numerous.
- (iii) That they have accomplished nothing.
- (iv) That they are costing the country too much and are paid too highly.
- (v) That they create new jobs for still more Americans instead of training young Persians to do those jobs.
- (vi) That they employ unsuitable Persians and others (e.g., Armenians) in posts as confidential secretaries.
- (vii) That they behave in an autocratic manner and are subject to no control.

Dr. Malsbrough, in a communiqué to the press, has replied to these accusations. On the whole his is a dignified and reasoned protest, and he points out that his chief opponents and most bitter critics are the racketeering. He warns the nation that abuses are so widespread and the breakdown of governmental machinery so complete that it is useless to expect a speedy cure of those ills, and that some of his reforms may take years to come to fruition.

Economic

4. Conditions approaching famine in the Tangistan coastal area are caused by the total of the drought in the Kizil-Arka and Ak-Sai deserts and the search of work and food.

5. Casualties in the Gorgan earthquake (see Summary No. 1544 paragraph 5) were at first reported to be slight (two killed and four wounded), though the destruction to buildings has been heavy. Subsequently, exposure to wet weather has caused much sickness, chiefly pneumonia.

Abstract

9. Sheikh Abdullah Galleddarian has been elected as a Deputy for Bandar Abbas.

Regional Forces

7. Sarlashgar Razmora (M A 243) has been appointed Chief of the General Staff. The post had been vacant since the appointment of Sarlashgar Razm as Minister for Education on the 26th March in Sa'ed's short lived first Cabinet. The appointments of Commandant of the Officers' Training College and Chief of the Shah's Military School have also been made.

Internal Security

Իսկոհատ

8. There has been much unrest among mill workers in Isfahan for a long period. The cause is due to the political rivalries of the Tudeh and anti-Tudeh parties, who squabble for the support of the workers and the right to represent them. A fight between these two parties occurred on the 18th April. Troops were used to restore order. The mills have remained closed since that date. The absence of a Governor (Mowla) and the delay in the appointment of a new one on the part of Government are delaying the settlement of the dispute. General Qade, the General Officer Commanding Isfahan Division, who has for some time past been advocating the establishment of a military governorship, is in Tehran. The Under-Secretary for War stated on the 23rd April that Government did not intend to appoint a military governor.

15/11/2000

D. After a period of some weeks free from insecurity, a hold up is reported of a U.K.C.C. truck on the 13th April, 18 kilom. north of Zahidan and of three U.K.C.C. trucks on the 16th April, some 60 kilom. north of Zahidan. One child was killed and one child and a driver were wounded. Tyres and personal effects were stolen. The robbers are thought to be Baluchis, but there is strong evidence of connivance on the part of the gendarmerie.

Fare

10. The Government has not yet received any information regarding the activities of the tribesmen in the border areas. The Government has not received any information regarding the activities of the tribesmen in the border areas. The Government has not received any information regarding the activities of the tribesmen in the border areas.

Russian Affairs

11. The second aeroplane on the recently started Tehran-Meshed air service arrived in Meshed on the 12th. According to the Soviet Press of the 13th, 14th and 15th, it was the first of a series of such flights. As on the first run it carries a large number of passengers, the Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs states that permission to start this service has never been granted for by the Russians though it is proposed to start a service

12. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports that there are signs of a concerted plan to increase Russian influence in Tabriz. A Russian hospital is to be opened for the local population, and schools are to be provided in which the chief languages will be Russian and Turki. The Turki newspaper *Vatan Yalinda* has reappeared under the editorship of a Russian Armenian from Baku with a large staff of Caucasians. Some semi Communist propaganda is being carried on in factories and some talk of a greater Azerbaijan or a new Caucasus is heard.

11 2850 422 847

No. 20

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th May.)

(No. 105.)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the *Journal* No. 17 (see annexure to 24th April) of the 30th April, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation
Tehran, 1st May, 1944

Enclosure in No. 28

(Signed)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 17 for the Period the 24th April to the 30th April 1944

Persian Agents.

Pattern

[illegible]

2. The Prime Minister has announced the formation of a Tribal Commission to advise the Government on the problems of the tribes. The Commission will be headed by the Minister for Tribal Affairs and will include two tribal leaders, Amir Jang Bakhtiar and Abbas Qadiani Khatir. In a statement the Prime Minister said that it was not the intention of the Government to act towards the tribes as in the past, but to endeavour to right the wrongs from which the tribes had suffered.

3. A Bill was tabled by Seyyid Zia and thirty-one other Deputies whose purpose was to oblige Ministers to take an oath on appointment pledging themselves to perform their duties with honor and fidelity to the Constitution and to the laws passed by the Majlis, to be loyal to the Shah; to do homage to the principles of democracy and to the rights of the nation and to be guided solely by considerations of the interests of the Persian State and nation. There was little discussion on the matter, and after some days a motion to remove the Bill from the agenda of the Majlis was approved.

4. Dr. Millsbaugh has asked the Public Prosecutor to take action, under article 269 of the Penal Code (which deals with defamatory statements and publications), against the authors of the slanderous statements made about him and his assistants.

5. The Minister of Education, Dr Ghani, has resigned from the Cabinet.

Appointments—Civil

- 6.—(i) Roza Afshar (F.O. 4, M.A. 4) to be Governor-General (1 standar) of Isfahan Province
(ii) Hasan Sadr to be Farmandar of Malayer
(iii) Hussein A zam Rukni to be Farmandar of Qum
(iv) Ali Azghar Musavvar Kutmani to be Farmandar of Saveli

Pets and people

Answer:

7. The last stage has now been reached in a plot which has been patiently worked out for months for the elimination from positions of influence in the army of a number of officers who were characterized by their determination to support the American military advisors and their belief in the value of co-operation with the British. For these reasons they were regarded unfavourably by the Russians, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that their elimination is at least in part due to Russian influence. The first to be removed was General Ahmadi from the Ministry for War, and there is little doubt that his removal was a condition made by Stalin when he made his offer of tanks and aircraft to the Shah. The next to go was General Annari from his post as Under-Secretary for War, and he has recently been relegated to unemployment. Then came General Razmara, appointed Secretary No 12-44, who was a strong supporter of American aid, and a vocal critic of the Russian offer of tanks and aircraft, a fact of which the Russians were probably made aware by General Razmara. And now General Arfa has been relieved of the command of the 1st Division. General Razmara, who has recently been reappointed Chief of the General Staff, has been, since he resigned from that post in September 1943, in close and intimate contact with the Russians (see SECRETARY No 42-43 at para 14). It is not a surprising conclusion, in view of his infinite capacity for intrigue and mischief and his lack of principle, and it is unlikely that he would have taken the risk of appointing him to be Chief of the General Staff unless influenced by some extraneous consideration. It has been suggested that the appointment was dictated by the Shah's desire to regain Russian favour which it was reported in SECRETARY No 13-44 para 2, he feared he had lost.

6. The budget for the army including the air force, which has been made out for a total of 80 000 men, comes to between 140 and 150 million tomans. In their present temper the Deputies will only with great difficulty be persuaded to grant more than 100 million tomans for the army this year exceeding 80 000. It is more likely to be reduced to a lower figure.

Appointments—Military

- 9.—(i) Sarhang Abdullah Amidi from command of the 8th (Khurasan) Division to command the 1st (Tebran) Division vice Sarlashkar Hassan Arfa.
(ii) Sarhang Ghulam Hussein Naqdi to be Judge Advocate General vice Sartip Ghulam Ali Ansari.
(iii) Sarhang Qaspiri to be Head of the 2nd Bureau of the General Staff

Internal Security

10 All the tribes of South Persia are now on migration. Whether the villages are suffering from the usual tribal depredations is not known, but there has as yet been little or no disturbance on the roads.

1792.

11. Labour unrest has now shown itself in Shiraz. The employees of the power station went on strike and there was trouble in one of the spinning factories. The arrest of 288 workers and 100 others of the labour party has temporarily, at least, restored order. This trouble followed shortly on the greatly increased activity of the hitherto inactive Tudeh party of Shiraz. There was a small demonstration in the bazaar in Shiraz on the 10th of the month, and the headquarters of the party in Tehran

Isfahan

12. The mill workers of Isfahan returned to work on the 25th April. The terms of the settlement of the strike was more or less the same. But some of the workers are growing resentful of the control of the Tudeh party and of the latter's desire to exploit them for political purposes.

Russian Affairs

13. The Russians have now inaugurated a weekly air service between Tehran and Tabriz. The passenger fare is 1,200 rials for the single journey. The service is very popular. In an official communication the Soviet Embassy has stated that these services are mainly for the convenience of Soviet organisations in Persia, but that other passengers will be carried when accommodation is available.

14. The press has indulged in fulsome adulation of the Soviet Embassy for the inauguration of this service.

15. The Russians have offered to hand over to the administration of the Iranian State Railways the operational control of the sector from Tabriz to Julfa, and have offered to pay 6 million rials a year for their traffic, estimated at 450,000 tons a year. As the annual upkeep of the railway is variously estimated at 30 million and 60 million rials, the proposition is not viewed with favour by the Persian authorities.

Tehran, 30th April, 1944

2 2979 422 241

No 21

See R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th May)

(No 204.)

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to HIS Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 18 for the period the 1st May to the 7th May, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 8th May, 1944

Enclosure in No 21

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 18, for the Period 1st May to 7th May, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The Prime Minister is struggling with honesty and courage to carry out his task in the welter of intrigue by which he is surrounded and with which his simple and straightforward nature is ill-qualified to deal. He gave a sensible and salutary lecture to journalists which had some slight effect on their irresponsible virulence. He dropped a bombshell into the Majlis by introducing a Bill, actually sponsored by the Minister of the Interior, proposing that the officials of all Ministries should for the period of the war be considered to have the same liability as officers and soldiers called to the colours, whether the properties of Government or of private owners, and their workmen should similarly be considered to have been mobilised for national service, and that restrictions should be imposed on the place of residence of persons who have acted against the war-time interests of Persia or her Allies, or who have instigated others to act against public order or who are engaging in activities likely to disturb the peace. This Bill is likely to arouse considerable opposition.

2. The situation that has arisen among the factory workers in Isfahan has figured prominently in the Majlis and in the press, and it has given cause for much vituperation on the part of the Tudeh party and the supporters of Seyyid Zia, each accusing the other of attempting to stir up strife. There seems to be little doubt that the trouble originated in the aggressive action of the Tudeh members of the Workers' Union in attempting to prevent the employment of certain workers who had refused to accept the control of the Tudeh party. In the resulting riot 200-300 workers were injured, most of whom were not members of the party. Troops had to be called in and the local authorities seem to have acted with reasonable firmness. The Tudeh party which includes 4,000 of the 10,000 members of the Workers' Union in Isfahan then insisted on a strike. As

reported in Summary No. 17, paragraph 12, the workers returned to the factories on the 25th April, but were unable to work as the owners would issue no materials. The present position is obscure. It is reported that opposition on the part of the workers to the control of the Tudeh party is spreading, largely because the party demands a monthly subscription from the workers from which they receive no benefit. It is also reported that the Tudeh party is opposed to the proposal of Seyyid Zia of the fact that no accounts have been published of the disposal of the estimated income of the party from these sources of 10-20,000 toman a month. Much opposition is being shown to the proposal of Seyyid Zia for the regulation to regulate the relations between employers and workers. Representatives of the Tehran Workers' Unions congregated before the Majlis building and demanded the passing of a labour law, the prosecution of those who had instigated the Isfahan disturbances and the official recognition of the Labour Unions.

3. In Meshed on May day more than 2,000 persons took part in processions and a mass meeting organised by the Tudeh party. The processions shouted 'Long live Stalin, Lenin and the Red Flag'.

4. Seyyid Zia has given proof, disturbing to his enemies, of the esteem in which he is held in some quarters by collecting two million rials for the relief of sufferers from the Gorgan earthquake. He continues to impress people by the forcefulness of his personality if not by his wisdom.

5. In Summary No. 14, paragraph 1, it was reported that several deputies were demanding the trial of Soheily, the ex-Prime Minister, on charges of having attempted to influence the elections. These charges have been investigated by a Majlis committee and it has been found that they are without foundation. Charges have now been made by a Deputy, who is also President of the Majlis, against Tadayyun of corruption during his tenure of office of Minister of Supply during the period March 1943 to July 1943.

6. The Shah, accompanied by the Queen and important officials of the Court, left Tehran on the 6th May for Shiraz. He is to spend a night at Isfahan and another at Persepolis. In view of the unsettled conditions of the working classes in Isfahan and of the importance of his Government in Fars, it is difficult to appreciate the considerations that prompted the selection of this time for this visit or to foresee what effect it will have on the situation at either place. It is unlikely that Nasir Qashgai will come to Shiraz to offer allegiance, and, since the Shah's visit is not likely to be followed by any more vigorous assertion of the Government's authority, it may be interpreted as tacit recognition of the status existing—that is the supremacy in Fars of the authority of Nasir Qashgai.

7. The elections in Tabriz are now finished. Of the nine successful candidates only two are from those supported by the Russians.

Persian Forces

Appointments—Military

8—(i) Army—Sartip Abdullah Hidayet to be Commandant of the Officer Cadet School in addition to his duties as Under-Secretary of State for War.

(ii) Police—Colonel Saif to be Acting Director-General of Police *interim* General Jehanbani, resigned.

Internal Security

9. The Prime Minister has appointed a Commission consisting of the Ministers of the Interior and for War and representatives of the General Staff, to consider measures for the improvement of security first in the capital and then in provincial towns.

Fars

10. Nasir Qashgai has visited Shiraz for the first time for about two years, and has called on the Acting Governor-General and on HIS Majesty's Consul promising to use his influence to maintain law and order in the province. He returned to the tribe after a stay of a few days.

Ahorasan, Mckran

11. In Summary No. 16, paragraph 9, it was reported that a band of 100-150 rickshaws were reported to have been sent from Meshed to Shiraz on the 1st May. In the same area a band of 100-150 rickshaws was reported to have been sent from Shiraz to Meshed on the 2nd May. On the 2nd May a large party of armed Batachi raiders from Afghanistan carried off 150 rickshaws.

from a district South of Birjand. In this case the Persian gendarmerie and armed forces were with some difficulty prevented from attacking them. The Government of India has sent some mechanised troops for the protection of Aid to Russia convoys.

Russian Affairs.

12. The Soviet Ambassador, M. Mikailov, has returned to Moscow. His place has been taken by his Counsellor, M. Maximoff as chargé d'affaires. Since his arrival in January very little has been seen of M. Mikailov. For some weeks past he has pleaded illness and has seen no one. Rumour has it that his illness was diplomatic rather than real, and that both his indisposition and recall were due to the failure of the attempt to present Seyvid Zia, and to the rejection by the Persian Government of the conditions attached to Stalin's offer of tanks and aircraft.

Brazilian Affairs.

13. M. Eulatio, Brazilian Minister in Persia, has left on transfer to Portugal. His place has been taken by M. Lemos, now Brazilian Minister in Portugal.

Tehran, 7th May, 1944

E 3180 422 34]

No. 22

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th May)
(N 210)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State and has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the period of the 7th to 14th May, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 16th May, 1944

Enclosure in No. 22

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 19 for the Period
7th-14th May, 1944

Persian Affairs.

Political.

THE Bill to apply military law to Government employees and factory workers referred to in Summary No. 18-44 has been passed by the Persian Majlis. The Bill is intended to be introduced as law and will be applied to all Government employees and factory workers. The Bill is intended to be applied to all Government employees and factory workers. The Bill is intended to be applied to all Government employees and factory workers. It is expected that the Government will survive the interpellation.

2. The Shah is reported to have had a good reception in Shiraz and has decided to prolong his stay. He is now due to leave on the 15th May. He was entertained by Nasir Qashgai, the Persian Minister in Shiraz, but Nasir himself did not come in.

3. The mill workers' dispute in Isfahan has been settled for the time being. It has been agreed that membership of the Workers' Union shall be unrestricted, that strikers shall return to work and the workers recently expelled (at the instance of the Tudeh party) shall be re-employed, that there shall be no propaganda inside the factories and that the disputes between employers and workers shall be dealt with by a special committee comprising the Governor of Isfahan and representatives of the Ministries of Justice and of Commerce and Industry.

Economic.

4. In reply to questions in the Majlis, the Minister of Finance stated that the Government had under consideration certain applications for the grant of new concessions to foreigners for the development of new oil-fields in Persia. The discussions were still in the preliminary stage (see also Summary No. 11-44 paragraph 5).

5. The Ministry of Agriculture has issued new regulations for the coming harvest. The intention is to enable the Government to get hold of the whole of the surplus crop, whether belonging to landowners or peasants. The sale of wheat, barley and flour has been made a Government monopoly and any quantities offered for sale or purchased on the free market are liable to confiscation. The price to be paid for wheat by the Government will be fixed separately in each area. Rules have been made for the methods to be employed in estimating the crop and for the assessment of the amounts that may legitimately be retained by the landlord and peasant. The whole of the difference must be sold to the Government. Government undertakes to distribute tea, sugar and cloth to peasants at controlled prices or, if it should fail to do so, to make a suitable increase in the price to be paid to the peasant for his grain. The landowner is made responsible for delivery to Government of the whole of the surplus production of his property, whether it be his share or the peasants.

Army.

Persian Forces.

6. It has been decided to abolish the Directorates of Cavalry and Infantry in the Ministry for War. These directorates, which were entirely independent of the General Staff, in theory performed the duties of Inspectorates, but in practice served no useful purpose except to provide appointments without work or responsibility for a number of officers. These officers are now being transferred to the General Staff. The Directorates of Artillery and Engineers remain, but are deprived of their functions of inspection.

7. For purposes of conscription Persia is divided into eleven zones, eight of which correspond to the areas of the eight provincial Divisions and three are located in the area of the two Tehran Divisions. Hitherto the Conscription Offices in each zone have been under the direct control of the Director of Conscription in the Ministry of War, who is responsible for the conscription of the Divisions in whose area they are located. It has now been decided that they will be placed under their control with the exception of the offices in the three zones in the area of the Tehran Divisions. These will be under the control of the Central Recruit Training Depot in Tehran. The purpose of this change is to check the abuses and corruption that have long been prevalent in the Conscription Department. It is doubtful whether this object will be achieved.

Gendarmerie.

8. Three more American officers have joined the staff of Colonel Schwarzkopf, making a total of six. No more are expected.

Appointments—Military.

9. Sartip Karim Ghovali to be Military Governor of Tehran, *cien* Sartip Shari, resigned.

Internal Security.

10. Only from Khuzestan are there reports of insecurity. For some time past the Arabs have been becoming increasingly lawless and the area of the Shushtar Minnah, in particular, has been suffering from the depredations of brigands. The local Persian authorities have for long wished to carry out operations for the disarmament of the Arabs, but doubts of the ability of the Persian forces to carry out such operations have induced the British authorities to discourage such suggestions. Famine conditions result from the failure of the crops are likely to be an added incentive to lawlessness. It has become necessary to agree to a limited operation for the establishment of Persian Government authority.

Russian Affairs.

11. It is reliably reported that since the end of April numerous Soviet military survey parties have been operating in Khorassan. No parties have recently been seen in the vicinity of the Tehran-Meshed road and no parties have been seen in the vicinity of Jajarm, Buynurd, Kashmar, Turbat-i-Haidari, Turbat-i-Jam and Khaf.

12 The strength of the Soviet garrison at Sabzawar (see Summary No. 17-44 paragraph 14) has been increased. There is also been stationed at Nishapur, and a small garrison at Turbat-i-Baidari. Several new road maintenance camps have been established between Shahrud and Baygiran on the Russian frontier. Increases in the garrisons of Meshed and Quchan are also reported and an influx of Russian women and children to Meshed. The Soviet Consul-General in Khorassan, when questioned about these activities, attributed them to the development of the Shahrud-Baygiran supply route.

13. One of the papers of the Tudeh party has published an article refuting charges made against the party of being Communist in sentiment and an instrument of Russian policy. The party, it claims, is a supporter of constitutional democratic government; it has no desire to seize power; its mission is to organize and educate the masses so that they will form a force ready and able to defend the Constitution if necessity should arise. If the party press seemed partial to Russia, that was only an expression of the gratitude felt by all Persians for the genuine services Russia had rendered to Persia. The party believed in equal rights for all races and religions. The article also stated that the party was not interested in power for power's sake, but was interested in the welfare of the people. It also stated that the party was not interested in the power of the Shah, but was interested in the power of the people. The article was signed 'The Tudeh Party' and was published in the 'Tudeh' newspaper, No. 18/44, paragraph 31. It was dated 14th May, 1944.

Teheran, 14th May, 1944

E 3200 33 34]

No. 23

Shiraz Diary No. 9, 1st to 14th May, 1944 (received 26th May)

Teheran

NASIR KHAN'S projected visit to Shiraz duly took place on the 1st May. Still more over being refused permission to stand for Parliament, Nasir Khan had from the beginning refused to call on the Acting Governor-General, whom he held (wrongly) responsible for Government opposition. Accordingly, when he was asked to do so, he refused. He then called on the general officer commanding and "accidentally" found there the Governor. Taking this as a call on him Nasir agreed to "return" the call and did so by going to tea at the Governorate that day.

2. After his call on the general officer commanding, Nasir called on His Majesty's consul. During a call which lasted two hours he stressed his readiness to do anything which would be of service to the British and to the Government. Notably he stated that he was determined to prove his friendship for us by doing everything in his power to help the British. He also stated that he should frequent the tribe. Throughout the interview he expressed complete distrust of the Persian Government.

3. Nasir Khan was entertained to lunch by the general officer commanding, senior Persians and British officials being present. The same people were also present at the tea given by the Acting Governor-General. On the morning of the 2nd May Nasir Khan returned to his tribal quarters, having spent the night with the general officer commanding.

4. The local authorities having received on the 3rd May news that the Shah was leaving Fars on the 7th May, the general officer commanding wished to return Nasir's call at once. Accordingly the general officer commanding, Acting Governor-General and His Majesty's consul set out on the 4th May for Nasir's camp near Barza. The general officer commanding naturally greatly desired Nasir to call on the Shah at Persepolis, and Nasir, though not admitting it, betrayed his desire to go, but only provided that His Majesty's Government would guarantee his immunity from arrest. The general officer commanding tried to induce His Majesty's consul to give the necessary guarantee, offering to give a written guarantee to His Majesty's consul that no action would be taken against Nasir. But His Majesty's consul felt unable to accede to this request without prior reference to the embassy—a course which time rendered impossible.

5. Nasir and his fellow khans still entertain the utmost distrust of the Government. They have feared that the Shah's visit to Fars immediately after Nasir's own visit to Shiraz indicated some danger for him. At the request of

His Majesty's consul, however, Nasir's two brothers, Mohammed Hussein and Khosrow, went to Persepolis to greet the Shah there and subsequently entertained him to dinner in Shiraz.

6. It is possible that the Shah, the general officer commanding and others are indignant that Nasir Khan did not come to greet him, and resent the fact that he would have come on a British guarantee which was not forthcoming.

7. During the visit to the Qashqai the general officer commanding discussed with Nasir Khan the question of the elections at the remaining three Shiraz seats, namely, Abadeh, Jahrum and Firuzabad. Nasir took the line with him (and with His Majesty's consul, who was subsequently dragged in) that he should have three Qashqai candidates—himself, Malik Mansur and Purreza—(to whom he had given his word) as all the other Deputies of Fars (except Reza Hikmat) were Qawam's men. In conversation with His Majesty's consul Nasir said that he must have all three seats or none at all, adding that he did not mind being unrepresented. His Majesty's consul deprecated the proposal that there should be no Qashqai representatives in the Majlis, whereupon Nasir said tentatively that he would agree to two candidates, himself for Abadeh and Purreza for Firuzabad. If he were elected, Nasir said he would go to Tehran from time to time, but would spend most of his time with the tribe. It was obviously not His Majesty's consul's business to refuse or accept this offer.

Nasir's visit to Shiraz and by the voluntary surrender (on the 4th May) of the Deputy N. Bakhtiari to the British, has been a great success. Some progress has been made towards re-establishing confidence between the tribe and the Government. Further confidence has been established by the fact that Qashqai tribesmen, for the first time for several years, have lately visited the town in numbers to buy and sell, and also by the fact that the spring migration has been remarkably free from incident. Although Nasir's promise to comply with our wishes must be heavily discounted, it is certain that he has a certain respect for our wishes. It therefore seems probable that tribal interests are less in danger of damage at the hands of the Qashqai than at any time recently.

Shah's Visit

8. On the 3rd May the senior Persian officials have received telegrams announcing the intention of the Shah to leave Teheran for Fars on the 6th May, spending only one night en route. At this news officialdom in Shiraz panicked. Meetings were held to discuss what was to be done to entertain the Shah and to furnish up the city to provide a fitting spectacle for his august eyes. Then it was discovered that the municipality had no funds to repair the pot holes in the main streets and to sprinkle water on them. The water-men were on strike because they had had no wages for two months and there was no prospect of getting a loan from the bank as the municipality had already borrowed heavily. The situation was extremely serious. The British officials, after lengthy and heated discussions,

decided to send a delegation to the Shah, consisting of the Minister of Court, M. Ala, and the Minister of the Interior, M. Hashir, duly arrived at Persepolis on the 6th May. The Shah, who was accompanied by His Majesty's wife, spent two hours, doubtless drawing inspiration from the illustrious dead. The next morning His Majesty's consul, at the request of the British officials, was present at the Shah's camp. While waiting, His Majesty's consul was questioned by M. Hashir and Shoku ul Malk as to the remedies for the present tribal situation. His Majesty's consul replied that he understood that His Majesty's embassy had already made certain proposals to the Persian Government. He also stated that it was his opinion that the tribes entertained a deep-seated distrust of the Government, which was partly justified by the events of the past. The essential problem was to wean the tribes from their present nomadic life and settle them down as agriculturists, and to do this a new administrative machinery should be devised which would be honest and efficient and which would inspire confidence.

11. That evening the Shah came into Shiraz and appeared to receive an enthusiastic welcome from the population. From observations made during the course of the last week there appears to be no doubt that the enthusiasm was genuine, though it is hard to say whether it is due to the person of the present Shah or to the general idea of monarchy—but it is probably the latter.

12. In the interview given to His Majesty's consul the next morning the Shah made several platitudinous speeches in which he emphasised the need of

Persian Forces

Army

7 The Minister for War has tabled three Bills. The first deals with offences of officials engaged on recruiting. It proposes that any official who refrains from recruiting those liable to conscription or recruits those not liable shall be condemned to from two to five years' solitary confinement. If he accepts bribes in any form he shall be fined five times the value of the bribe and be classed as an armed bandit and suffer the punishment to which such criminals are liable. The second Bill forbids officers and other ranks of the army to form political parties or to take part in any political activities. The third Bill aims at speeding up the work of military courts. It proposes that in future ordinary military courts shall consist of a president, a judge, a clerk, a public prosecutor and military courts of appeal of a president and five members.

8 In reply to a question in the Majlis the Minister for War stated that a sum of 51 million tomans of last year's allotments to divisions had not yet been accounted for. In a subsequent letter to the press he modified this statement by saying that the greater part of the amount had already been accounted for.

Appointments—Military

- 9.—(i) Sarhang Najaf Quli Abbasi to be assistant to the Military Governor of Tehran
- (ii) Sartip Mohdavi to be Director of the Supply Department of the Army, *vice* Sartip Diba, resigned

Internal Security

Fars

10 His Majesty's Consul in Fars reports that the atmosphere in Fars has been greatly improved by Nasir Qashgai's visit to Shiraz to call on the Acting Governor General and the British authorities of the abdicating Deputy Naubakht. To the consul Nasir was lavish with assurances that his only desire was to act in accordance with British wishes. It may be assumed that he qualified that statement in his own mind with the proviso that British wishes should not conflict with his own interests. For the moment there are to show what a power for order he can be in Fars, and it must be said that the migration of the Qashgai is proceeding with less than the usual lawlessness. In spite of the fact that Nasir did not come in to Shiraz during the Shah's visit, his two brothers, Muhammad Hussein and Khoosrow, were treated with marked friendliness and sympathy by the Shah and accompanied him to Tehran.

11 The Khansehi tribes, bullied, neglected, hungry, ragged and leaderless, have been ordered to give up their lawless life and to settle down to agriculture and brigandage. These tribes have, in fact, suffered much more in recent years than the Qashgai and have, on the whole, behaved with restraint.

12 There has been some fighting on a small scale between the khans of Hamadan and those of Fars. Fars has been the loser and has been obliged by the Government to collect from Larazi grain which the khans had failed to deliver to Government, and this presumably led to the hostilities.

Russian Affairs

13 At a ceremony at the Soviet Embassy the chargé d'affaires presented fifty medals to Persian motor drivers working for the Russian transport services as tokens of Soviet gratitude for their services. In his address the chargé d'affaires spoke with appreciation of the services rendered by Persia to the Allies in the prosecution of the war and of the devotion to duty of most of the motor drivers employed by the Soviet authorities engaged in transporting supplies to Russia.

14 In addition to the air services between Tehran and Meshed and Tehran and Tabriz, the Russians have now inaugurated a weekly service between Tehran and Palavan.

15 A Soviet Consulate has been opened at Kazvin, where there is already the headquarters of the Commander-in-chief of the Russian Forces in Persia.

16 It is reported but requires confirmation, that the Russians intend to asphalt the road from Astara via Reht to Kazvin and that they have commenced

work on the section between Astara and Reht. Most people do not seem to be interested whether it is a Russian or other foreign persons who are the owners of the road, but it is reported that the Russians are enjoying the high rates of toll and the money counts to them.

17 A Russian Airplane has been reported to have been shot down near Meshed. The pilot was killed and the plane was destroyed. The wreckage was found near Meshed. The Russian Airplane was shot down by the Persian Air Force. The wreckage was found near Meshed. The Russian Airplane was shot down by the Persian Air Force. The wreckage was found near Meshed.

Tehran, 21st May, 1944

[E 3391/422 84]

No. 25

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden—(Received 8th June)

No. 251

His Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 21, for the period of the 22nd to 26th May, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 29th May, 1944

Enclosure to No. 25

Secret

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 21, for the period 22nd May to 26th May, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The future of Dr. Millsaugh and his mission has been the main topic of interest during the past week. There has been much lobbying, and the matter was discussed in one secret session of the Majlis. There is a strong feeling, especially among his sympathisers, that Dr. Millsaugh has a heavier burden than he can discharge and that he should be relieved of some of his responsibilities with a view to some of the extensive work given to him. Others think that he has proved himself to be unsuitable and that he should be replaced by another American. Others, again, wish to see the whole American mission depart. Whatever solution is found it is unlikely that the position and authority of Dr. Millsaugh will remain unaffected.

2. The case of Dr. Millsaugh has been summed up by a Deputy in a question to the Minister of Finance in the following terms:—

- (i) Far from Dr. Millsaugh having brought about a decrease in the cost of living, prices have continued to rise. When he assumed his duties with extensive powers fifteen months ago the cost of living index was 750 (as compared with 100 in 1935) whereas to-day it is 1,200.
- (ii) In spite of the extensive powers given to him over transport and distribution he had failed to ensure a satisfactory distribution of essential commodities, and the poor were worse off than they had been before his arrival.
- (iii) His only attempt to check inflation had been to encourage the purchase of foreign exchange, with the result that during the past year much capital had gone abroad.
- (iv) He had failed to take full advantage of the quota of imports allotted to Iran by the Allies.
- (v) In spite of the fact that the harvest of the last year had been almost unprecedented in quantity the responsible organisation under his control had failed to build up any appreciable reserves of grain.

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Polish Interests

18. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 22nd May, 1944, was —

	Men	Women	Children	Total
In Tehran . . .	461	1,458	511	2,427
In Isfahan . . .	191	932	1,310	2,373
In Ahwaz . . .	460	1,746	907	3,113
	1,052	4,133	2,728	7,913

The total number of Poles in Persia in January 1943 was 21,091

Tehran, 28th May, 1944

Appendix

Extracts from "Vatan Yolunda" (see paragraph No. 13).

"Vatan Yolunda," No. 6, dated 21st April, 1944

The 24th Anniversary of Soviet Government in Azerbaijan

The Azerbaijanis and of what they can boast

During the last twenty-four years of Soviet Government, under the brilliant policy of the Bolshevik party, there has been great progress in arts, education, distribution of land and food, and many people have been trained for Government posts and defence work.

Before the revolution there were few engineers, doctors and teachers in Azerbaijan but now there are thousands of them. To-day Azerbaijan may boast of its numerous doctors, engineers, generals, officers, artists, teachers, writers, painters, specialists and the brave young men who have been decorated for their valour. There are also many well known Azerbaijanis outside Azerbaijan. Besides this many Azerbaijanis are working in commissariats and other organisations outside the republic, and in order to help the war effort many engineers, workers, mechanics, &c., are toiling in the oilfields.

"Vatan Yolunda," No. 8, dated 26th April, 1944

Azerbaijan during the last 24 years under Soviet Government

Azerbaijan is a country of civilisation and education. It has made great progress in these during the last twenty four years under Soviet Government. The national policy of bolshevism has changed Azerbaijan from an illiterate country to an educated one.

The April revolution greatly benefitted the Azerbaijanis, who now possess schools and fine arts which they had not known in the past. With the first years of revolution schools were established in every part of the country and the children of workers and labourers who in the past had been deprived of education were now educated free of charge. In 1914 there were 73,000 students, by 1940 the number had risen to 717,000. During the Soviet régime the number of schools has increased year by year so that between 1920 and 1939, 937 schools have been established. Of these the greatest benefit has been that of the high schools, which now produce doctors, engineers, specialists, &c. Before the revolution there were only five-six papers being published, now there are sixty. Before the revolution very little was known of opera, now we have many like Khor Oghli, Shakh Ismail Markis and many others.

"Vatan Yolunda," No. 9, dated 28th April, 1944

The Result of the War for Freedom

Azerbaijan did not gain Soviet Government, national freedom and a progressive life without any trouble, for during the past thousand years, as history shows, they have fought against various oppressors and tyrants against the Czarist Government. They have gained it through the devotion of great men.

Stalin, who is the founder of bolshevism in the Caucasus, came to Baku in 1904 and started to lead the people against the Czarist Government in order to create freedom . . .

In 1918 the Baku Labour party organised Soviet Government at Baku and proclaimed communism, which did great things in Baku for some months. But it did not live very long because Soviet Government was abolished through the treachery of Musavat party, Dashnagsagan party and Mensheviks, and the leaders of communism such as Azizbegov Shaukman, Chaparidz and some twenty-six others were killed. Kazi Mahammad, Binyad Sardaroff, Bala Amu Dadashoff, Amir Aslanoff, Mugtadi Aydinbegov and Ali Beyramoff were shot for being Liberals. This kind of treatment however, created such anger among the people that instead of discouraging them they were stimulated to fight for the Soviet Government. At last in 1920 on the 24th April under the leadership of Lenin and Stalin, Azerbaijanis, with the help of the Red Army overthrew Musavatist capitalists and hoisted the flag of freedom.

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No. 26

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. — (Received 12th June)

(No. 240)

H. S. Majesty's representative presents his compliments to Mr. Eden, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the period the 28th May to the 4th June, 1944 compiled by the military attaché to this embassy.

Tehran, 5th June, 1944

Enclosure in No. 26

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 22 for the Period
28th May to 4th June 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

NO solution has yet been found to the dispute between Dr. Millepaugh and his deputies. A proposal that he should surrender some of his powers to a Ministry of Economy was rejected by Dr. Millepaugh on the grounds that economic work was too closely associated with finance to allow of their separation, and he flatly refused to accept any reduction of his powers. In a confidential letter to the Government he answers some of the criticisms of his work. He points out that the rate of increase in the cost of living has notably slowed down since his arrival. He claims that the government has been successful in the policy of price control and distribution. The price of goods has been controlled and the price of labour has been regulated. The fact that the price of goods was only one-third of what it was before his arrival and that the price of labour was only one-half of what it was before his arrival. He claims that the government has been successful in the policy of price control and distribution. The price of goods has been controlled and the price of labour has been regulated. The fact that the price of goods was only one-third of what it was before his arrival and that the price of labour was only one-half of what it was before his arrival.

2. The news that a letter had been addressed by the American Government to the Persian Government on the subject of Dr. Millepaugh's mission leaked out to the press and the public. It was represented as being a warning that the American Government would regard further criticism or opposition to the American advisers as unfriendliness to the American Government. The press worked up some indignation over this imagined interference in the internal affairs of Persia and protested against what was purely an internal matter being brought into the field of international relations. The text of the letter has not been published. It is known that its sense was not as originally represented by the Persian press, but was rather an expression of regret that the Persian Government had not defended more convincingly the American officials in their service. That the question of Dr. Millepaugh's powers is a matter for Persia alone to decide and is not a matter in which any foreign Power can properly intervene has been insisted on in the press and the Majlis.

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3. The Cabinet is not happy. The Shah is reported to be discontented with the Prime Minister. The latter is said to be looking about for a successor and to be considering Qavam-es-Sultaneh and Hajhir, the present Minister of the Interior. The latter has probably too pro-British a colour to be acceptable to the Russians. His relations with the Prime Minister are now rather strained and this is attributed to the latter's suspicions that Hajhir aspires to his place.

4. For some time past tension has been evident between Moslems and Bahais and this resulted in demonstrations hostile to the Bahais at Senandaj, Hamadan and Abadeh. The latter is reported to have been used, as it was at Abadeh, to provoke disturbances for political reasons. There has, in fact, been some increased missionary activity on the part of Bahais of late to celebrate the opening of the second century of the Bahai faith, and, although no evidence is as yet available that there has been any notable increase in converts, the greater freedom enjoyed by the Bahais to speak of their faith has probably frightened the Moslems. The place might well be taken by Bahaiism. Bahaiism, with its vague but kindly philosophy, is agreeable to Persian mentality, and the community has a tradition, resulting perhaps from years of oppression, of solidarity and co-operation among themselves, which contrasts with usual Persian characteristics.

Economic

5. Dr. Millspaugh has published a statement to the effect that the total amount of grain collected by the Government since September 1943 is 346,278 tons and that stocks in Tehran on the 19th May were 31,510 tons. This he considers to be adequate assurance of the needs of the country until next harvest.

6. The instruments of ratification of the commercial agreement between Persia and the United States, which was signed in April 1943, were exchanged at Washington on the 31st May. The agreement comes into force thirty days after ratification. The text of the agreement is as follows: "The United States and Persia have agreed to exchange ratifications of the Commercial Agreement between the United States and Persia signed at Washington on April 1, 1943. The agreement shall be in force thirty days after the date of the exchange of ratifications."

7. As has already been mentioned, when the Soviet authorities arrived in Persia they took a number of measures to ensure that the Persian Government should not be able to pay its debts to Russia. The Russian Government has now paid the Persian Government the amount of 1,000 million rials, which is the amount of the Persian Government's debt to Russia. The Persian Government has now paid the Russian Government the amount of 1,000 million rials, which is the amount of the Persian Government's debt to Russia.

Appointments—Civil

8. Sarlashkar Muhammad Hussein Firuz to be Governor-General of Fars.

Persian Forces

9. In an interview given to the editor of the *Ru'di Firuz*, a paper closely connected with Seyyid Zia, Dr. Millspaugh gave the following figures for the budgets of the Persian forces for the past year:—

	Rials
Army	1,000,000,000
Gendarmerie	298,240,100
Police force	187,000,000
	1,485,240,100

He would allot the same gross total for these forces this year, and no more. It was for the Government to decide how it should be distributed among them, which force should be decreased and which, if any, increased. He expressed the opinion that in their present form these forces were superfluous and not worth the money spent on them. Whatever truth there may be in this, it is not encouraging to the American advisers who have been working with these forces for more than a year. The cost of the army considered necessary by General Ridley is about 1,500 million rials, and of the gendarmerie recommended by Colonel Schwarzkopf 800 million rials.

Appointments—Military

10. Sarlashkar Muhammad Hussein Firuz to command the 6th (Fars) Division.

Russian Affairs

11. A party of Russians was in Persia on a mission to study the situation in the Caucasus. They said that the Russian Government was interested in the possibility of establishing a Russian colony in the Caucasus. They gave examples of the Russian Government's interest in the Caucasus by Shah Abbas. It has inevitably been said that the purpose of this visit, as it may well have been, was to make contact with Persian minorities of Caucasian origin. The Armenians of Julfa, near Isfahan, also come in for Russian attention. Three hundred of their children under 16 are now learning Russian in a school established by the Russians for the purpose.

12. The Irano-Soviet Cultural Society (see Summaries Nos. 9/44, para. 15, 16/44, paragraph 20) which was established in the Soviet Union for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union, has now published its statutes contained in twenty-five articles. The second article sets out the main objects of the society under eighteen headings, which are mainly concerned with methods of making known the literature, art, drama, music, science, educational methods of one country to the other. It is clear that in practice the society will be used to make Soviet culture known to Persia and to spread Soviet ideas rather than to make Persian culture known to Russia. Ordinary members, who pay 3,500 rials a year as subscription, must be Persians, but Soviet citizens may be admitted as honorary members. A member of VOKS (Society for Cultural Relationships between the Soviet Union and Foreign Countries) must be a member of the committee. Branches may be opened in the provinces.

13. Questions have been asked in the Majlis by one of the Azerbaijan Deputies whose election was opposed by the Russians why the "Allies" were preventing the export from Azerbaijan of the dried fruit crop and other products. The Deputy answered that the Government was not allowed to export without authority.

14. The Soviet authorities have given contracts for the asphaltting of the road from Astara via Resht to Kazvin and for some masonry bridges on the section between Astara and Resht. The rates they have accepted are higher than those normally paid by the British authorities. The specification they have laid down is for a more enduring type of surfacing than has been used by the British authorities, and it seems that they have some longer term object in view than their war time needs, for which, indeed, the construction of the road seems to come rather late in the day.

15. It has now been ascertained that among the conditions attaching to Stalin's offer of tanks and aircraft to the Shah (see Summary No. 48/43, para. 8), which included the formation of regiments of mixed Russian and Persian personnel, were the following:—

The commander of the regiment was to be a Russian officer.

The Persian personnel were to be selected with the approval of the Russian commander.

The Soviet Government would pay the Russian personnel.

The regiments were to be under the command of the Red Army.

The regiments were not to be moved from their present places of training—Mashad and Kazvin—nor could the material be diverted to any other purpose, without the approval of the Red Army.

Corrigendum

In Summary No. 21/44, paragraph 8, for "Abadan" read "Abadeh."

Tehran, 4th June, 1944

E 3596/260 34]

No 27

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th June)

(No 247)

HIS Majesty's Representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a Confidential Circular to all consuls, Persia, regarding His Majesty's Government's post-war policy towards Persia.

Tehran, 10th June, 1944

Enclosure in No. 27

Sir,

Tehran, 10th June, 1944.

Since, when the war is over and our forces are withdrawn, the responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of that security which is necessary to our interests in Persia will devolve entirely on Persian officials it is desirable that British officials should bear constantly in mind the necessity for establishing and increasing the authority and prestige of the Persian Government and its officials. Subject to the overriding consideration of the security of our war-time interests, the influence of consular officers should be directed towards inducing the senior responsible Persian official, who will in most cases be the Governor-General, Governor, or O.C. Troops, to fulfil his responsibilities. When action is taken by a Persian official as the result of persuasion or pressure by a consular officer, the British instigation should, as far as possible, be kept discreet. It is important that the Persian official concerned should be allowed and even encouraged to believe that the Persian official concerned acted on his own responsibility and initiative. While consular officers should insist that they should be consulted in all matters where British interests may be affected and should explain clearly the conditions that our interests demand, they should discourage any tendency on the part of Persian officials to hide behind British officials or to allow the British official to do the work they should do themselves. It is particularly desirable that the Persian official should be kept to the greatest possible degree. Consequently, when, for example, British officials are asked to give assistance in the distribution of goods, the distribution should be given to the Persian Government and its American Advisers. It should now be our endeavour to establish in the minds of the Persian people the impression that the Persian Government really is in authority.

It is probable that for some time to come consideration for the security of our war-time interests will demand prompt action which may necessitate the by-passing of the responsible Persian official and direct action by British Consular Officers. Such action should, however, be limited to occasions when our war-time interests are at stake and when there is reasonable ground for believing that the responsible Persian official will not take the measures which the occasion demands.

I am, &c
R. W. BULLARD

E 3597/188 34]

No 28

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th June)

(No. 248.)

Sir,

Tehran, 10th June, 1944

I HAVE the honour to enclose a copy of an interesting appreciation of the tribal situation in Fars, prepared by Mr. Gardener just before he left Shiraz to proceed on leave. I agree generally with Mr. Gardener's appreciation and feel that particular emphasis should be laid on the following two points, both of which were mentioned by him:—

- (1) That, although the Qashgai tribes may rally behind Nasir in the face of a common danger, the kalmukars of the tribe have no desire to be exploited again by the Soulat and Douleh family and, given a reasonable hope of fair treatment, they will very easily be persuaded to deal direct with the Government. Our experience in Bakhtiari

with Morteza Quli Khan, a much more reliable man than Nasir, shows us what happens nowadays when a tribal chief is put into a position of paramount authority in a big tribal confederation. Similar dissensions could be expected in Qashgai between Nasir and his brothers and other rivals.

- (2) That no long-term reliance can be placed on Nasir's assurances of a desire to act according to our wishes. We should take advantage of it now, but when British troops are withdrawn Nasir will probably pose as the national hero who saved Fars from a British occupation.

2. For some time I have been endeavouring to induce the Persian Government to evolve and implement a definite policy towards the tribes. Such a policy should include at least the following points:—

- (a) Settlement of tribal land cases and the restoration of, or the grant of compensation for, lands unjustly confiscated by Reza Shah. Under continual pressure from this embassy some action has been taken, but several cases are still outstanding, notably the important case of the Mamassani lands referred to by Mr. Gardener under the heading "Methods of Application of British Policy."
- (b) The distribution among the tribes (and among other rural communities) of the essential consumer goods—tea, sugar and piece-goods—which have for a considerable time been available to town-dwellers on coupon at controlled prices. There have been many scandals in this connexion and the distribution is, even now, far from efficient, but until recently rural areas, including the tribes, have had to depend entirely on purchases on the open market at exorbitant prices. Lately, with the appointment of American advisers at a number of provincial headquarters and instructions from Dr. Millspaugh to expedite the distribution of goods, some improvement has been effected. Consular officers on this point in order to ascertain whether, in fact, any improvement in distribution is now taking place.

This is a long-term task and the settlement to be voluntary and not, as in Reza Shah's time, forced, it must involve long-term plans and a budget of considerable proportions. Reza Shah's settlement was carried out by military force and resulted in unprecedented mortality among the flocks on which the tribes so much depended. It was a general lowering of the tribes' already low standard of living. To bring about the voluntary settlement of tribes in villages, the Government must plan and provide funds for assistance to the tribesmen in building villages, irrigation works, and the provision of seed, as well as medical aid and the erection and staffing of schools. It seems unlikely that the Persian Government will be able to implement all these proposals for some time to come. It will be well to bear in mind that in some areas the need of assistance was so great that it was possible by private means to obtain for the tribesmen the necessities of food and clothing and to provide for the tribesmen a series of services which the Government has not been able to provide. It is an optimism which is probably fated to be disappointed to see a commission before long to the number of forty-eight.

- (d) The creation of a body, whether a Ministry for Tribes, a section of the Ministry of Internal Affairs or some form of tribal commission, whose business it would be to study the needs of the tribes, to plan for them and to represent their grievances effectively to the Central Government. Several abortive attempts have been made to set up such a body, but I have better hopes of the latest suggestion—the formation of tribal councils—and propose to press M. Hajir to carry it out. The scheme is to form a central tribal council in Tehran, consisting of representatives of the Ministries who would be concerned with any long-term tribal policy—Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Health and Education, and about twelve genuine tribal representatives (not town-dwelling ex-chieftains). The recommendations of the council would be executed through provincial tribal councils, which would consist of similar representatives and representatives of the tribes in the provinces concerned, presided over by the Governor-General.

3. As for British policy in respect of Persian tribes (apart from the matters of security and the re-establishment of the power of the Central Government on a just and equitable basis. That the first is completely subordinate to the second, as Mr Gardener suggests, I am not entirely convinced. Mr Gardener rather implies that a strong Central Government would be friendly to us. Of the contrary state of affairs we have had bitter experience in the recent past, though it can be argued that keeping the R. S. S. in the hands of the R. S. S. is a better way of us which did much to counterbalance the injustices which he inflicted upon our interests.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch, with enclosure, to the Government of India, to His Majesty's High Commissioner, Persia, Hamadan, and to the Officer Commanding, Persia and Iraq Command and without enclosure to His Majesty's Consular Officers at Bushire and Shiraz.

I have, &c.

R W BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 29

APPRECIATION OF THE TRIBAL SITUATION IN FARZ

Introduction

IN recent weeks, the political atmosphere in Farz has been dominated by the visit of Nasir Khan to Shiraz on the 23rd March. Nasir Khan's visit to Shiraz on the 23rd March, when he arrived at Shiraz on the 23rd March, was a very important event. Nasir Khan now states that he is ready to accept British guidance in all his affairs. It is necessary to determine our policy towards him and all the tribes of Farz.

Present Situation

1. Attitude towards Persian Government

All the tribes (for brief description see Appendix), but particularly the Qashgai, who are the most important tribes in Farz and who are the most powerful, are in a state of distrust amounting practically to hatred—of the Government. This is partly due to the harsh, inefficient, and venal treatment meted out to them by the ex Shah, and partly to the tribal nature which prizes power and independence. Taking advantage of the weakness of the Government after the events of 1941 certain tribal leaders fled from Tehran and resumed control of the tribes. Gradually the tribes were reformed by seizing arms from Government sources, by smuggling from abroad, and by digging up weapons not surrendered in the past.

During the last few years, the Qashgai, who are the most powerful, have consolidated their own position as head of the tribe. Nasir Khan's next step was the conclusion of a defensive alliance between the Qashgai and the Boir Ahmed—the two leading fighting tribes of South Persia to resist disarmament by force.

There seems little doubt but that these two tribes would now act in concert if attacked by the Government and that other tribes such as the Mamasani and sections of the Khamseh (notably the Basiri), would refuse to aid the disarming Government.

On the Government side, the army has not yet given proof of its ability to tackle these tribes, and the policy of just punishment of the present tribal war would be a severe and perhaps critical test of its fighting powers.

Thus, as between tribes and Government there is a deadlock. The Government hesitate to embark on a disarmament campaign, while the tribes have no intention of giving up their arms.

2. Attitude towards British

On the whole, particularly to the attitude of the khans of the Darrashuri and Kuzay, the British have been successful in their policy. The British were not able to bring about damage to British interests. On the contrary, when

they were in tribal—though admittedly not Qashgai—areas, Nasir initiated his policy of preserving security in Farz. For the last six months, including his visit to Shiraz, the Qashgai areas and the roads leading to them have been in a state of good order. The Qashgai areas are the most important areas in Farz, when a severe blow was given to Nasir's pride by the Persian Government who refused to allow him to become a Deputy for Shiraz. Nor is there any reason, on present showing, to think that British interests are likely to suffer at the hands of the Farz tribes, i.e., not including the Boir Ahmed. Furthermore, Nasir's feelings towards us will undoubtedly have a useful repercussion on the Boir Ahmed, as the paramount chief of that tribe—Abdullah Khan Zarghampur—is a close friend of Nasir's.

This agreeable state of affairs is not due to Nasir's love and admiration for us, but more probably to the following considerations: (a) knowledge of Allied war successes and desire to be on the "right" side (b) general desire of the khans (especially Darrashuri and Kashguli) to be on friendly terms with us so that we may act as mediators between them and the Persian Government (c) gratitude for our aid to the Qashgai Khans who were recently in Germany. This argument especially appeals to Nasir's mother, who exercises a salutary influence over him and fully understands the Khans' desire to further their own interests.

Nasir Khan and the other Qashgai Khans now stress their desire to follow our counsel. Of course, this naive attitude must be heavily discounted, but it is probably true that, for the time being, our advice will carry considerable weight with them.

3. Internal Situation

There is, as yet, very little evidence of the attitude of the other Qashgai Khans towards Nasir save that, at the moment, they are united with him in opposing disarmament. In any case, the present state of affairs rather suits the personal interest of all the khans. They supervise security on the roads, exacting tribute money in return. They are independent, and pay no taxes. No Government official robs or worries them. In fact, they are leading the old tribal life. But some of them yearn to come and live in towns. Even Nasir and some of his family desire this. Some khans may resent Nasir's assumption of authority over them. Former inter-tribal feuds are not forgotten. Furthermore, some of the khans desire to return to their former pursuits of agriculture and stock-breeding, from which they derived wealth in the past. The situation may be roughly summarized by stating that the Qashgai in times of war or danger are united under Nasir, but that, being human, they desire peace, and peaceful conditions best serve to disintegrate the tribe.

4. Economic Situation

The standard of living in the tribes—always lower than that in the towns—has suffered markedly in the last two years. In the first place, the nomadic tribes, responding to their khans' call to arms, have largely abandoned their agricultural pursuits (corn growing and stock raising) from which some of them gained their livelihood. Secondly, the price of their produce (corn, sugar, and animal fat) has fetched lower prices because the tribesmen have had no direct access to open markets. They are obliged to sell their produce and buy their necessities through grasping intermediaries. Finally, unlike the townsmen, they have not benefited from the rationing of tea, sugar and piece-goods. It is true that the tribes have robbed farms and villages, and have exacted "protection money" from those unfortunate people who lie in their path, but this wealth has gone mainly to the khans.

As a result the tribesmen feel that they are different from and inferior to the inhabitants of towns, and, in the case of the Qashgai who are of Turkish origin, this feeling may eventually lead to reparation. Unfortunately, the tribesmen are the British for these shortages, save the British always were, and still are, the most prominent foreigners in Farz.

Suggested Principles of British Policy

It is obvious that British policy in Farz must be directed towards—

- (a) Security of British interests (notably oil fields, shipping and water the war)
- (b) Re-establishment of the power of the Central Government.

The first objective is clearly subordinate to the second, for, if a strong Central Government existed which was friendly towards us and able to administer

The territory of this tribe is not situated in modern Fars, but on account of alliance with the Qashghis, it is the most important part of Fars province. Although it is a nomadic tribe, it is the most settled tribe of South Persia. Raiders from this tribe range far into settled territory in pursuit of loot, and are good fighters, possessing a considerable stock of modern arms. They have never been fully subdued by the Persian Government, and British contacts with them have been very limited.

The Boir Ahmedi are mainly nomadic, though the range of migration is for many miles. They possess both the way to Isfahan and a part of the road to Shiraz. In its winter quarters the tribe is very close to the oil fields at Gachsaran.

Traditionally, the tribe is divided into warring factions, but Abdullah Khan, the chief of the tribe, has recently been seen to have agreed to unite to resist disarmament, makes these two tribes the most important political factor in South Persia.

N.B.—The population figures given are the best obtainable, but they are only a guess, as no statistics are available.

E 2598 422 34]

No. 29

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th June.)

(No. 250)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the period of the 5th to the 11th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 12th June, 1944

Enclosure in No. 29

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 23 for the Period the 5th June to the 11th June, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political.

THE Court of Cassation came to a decision with unusual promptness on the case of Reza Afshar, a former Minister of Education, whose appointment had been the cause of an interpellation of the Government—see Summary No. 20 1944 paragraph 1. The decision was that his previous conviction decanted him from being appointed to a Government post. He will now be recalled from Isfahan.

2. Certain of the Deputies from Azerbaijan, not including any of those favoured by the Russians, have resigned with the Democratic group of Deputies to form a new group called Liberty, which will now have a membership of about thirty.

Economic

3. The sugar ration, in theory available at current prices is to be increased from 400 to 500 grammes per head per month.

Persian Forces

4. The statements made by Dr. Millsparagh in his interview to the press—see Summary No. 22 1944 paragraph 9—brought forth a reply from the Minister of War, which was also published in the press. The Minister pertinently asks what justification had Dr. Millsparagh, an employee of the Persian Government, for discussing in the press the affairs of the army and gendarmerie, and for creating public anxiety by his criticisms. The Government was well aware of the need for army reform, but would it not have been better if Dr. Millsparagh had consulted General Ridley before making his strictures. He had said that the

army was unnecessary and that the money spent on it could more usefully be used for agriculture, education and hygiene. That was a matter for the Persian Government to decide, but did Dr. Millsparagh think that anything could be done unless the army established and maintained security? Would not the Persian Government have been able to do this? The Persian Government's section alone cost millions of rials and had done nothing to reduce prices. The high cost of the army was entirely due to the bad administration of the country's finances and economy.

5. A Cabinet meeting has been held to consider the budgets of the army, the gendarmerie and the police. In addition to the Ministers it was attended by the Chief of Staff, General Ridley, Colonel Schwarzkopf and Dr. Millsparagh. General Ridley and Colonel Schwarzkopf justified the budgets they had prepared. Dr. Millsparagh said he had calculated the maximum revenue of the country for the current year at approximately 4,000 million rials, and that he could not consider allotting to the three security forces more than 40 per cent. of the total revenue—between 1,500 and 1,600 million rials. He left it to the Government to decide how the amount should be distributed between the three forces. The budget for the army amounts to over 1,500 million rials for 90,000 men of the gendarmerie to 600 million rials for 28,000 men, and of the police for 10,000 men to 300 million rials. Dr. Millsparagh suggested that they should each have approximately the amount allotted last year, that is 1,000 million for the army, 500 million for the gendarmerie and 300 million for the police. The reduction of the army to 60,000 men and of the gendarmerie to 14,000 men.

6. The Persian Government has been informed that fifteen Anson aircraft will be taken over by the Royal Air Force in 1941, will shortly be available in M. de Gaulle for delivery to the Persian Air Force. Three Dominie aircraft will also shortly be delivered for the Persian Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

Appointments—Military

7. Army—

- (i) Sarhang Khodadad to command the 8th (Khorasan) Division
- (ii) Sarhang Mir Aslan to command the Mechanised Brigade
- (iii) Sartip Muhsan Diba to be Director of Artillery
- (iv) Sartip Alai to be an Inspector in the Ministry of War
- (v) Sarhang Dadvar to be Chief of the Army Finance Department
- (vi) Sarhang Tarvan to be Assistant Chief of the Army Finance Department

Gendarmes

- (vii) Sartip Mahmoud Khosrow Pahah to be Chief of the Gendarmes, vice Sartip Setvavi, resigned.

Internal Security

Kerman

8. When in October last (see Summary No. 13, 1944, paragraph 11) operations against the Buchakchi tribe of the Sirjan district resulted in the surrender of old Hussein Khan and later of his son, Akbar Khan Shiyapur, the other Buchakchi brigand, Murad Ali Murad, remained at large with a band of followers. Operations are now being carried out by two battalions of the 7th (Kerman) Division to round these up.

Fars

9. A small operation was successfully carried out against the Khans of Luristan north of Shiraz on the 1st of June for the purpose of collecting these Khans to surrender. They have not done so. See Summary No. 20 1944, paragraph 12. A column, 180 strong, from Shiraz occupied Hissar (half-way between Shiraz and Bardar Fokh) where the Khans of Luristan, Muhammad Ali, fled. The grain is being transported to Bushire and the column is being withdrawn.

Bakhtiari

10. A number of Bakhtiari gathered in the village of Buldaji for the purpose of making a concerted effort against Morteza Qoli Khan, the Governor of Bakhtiari. There is little doubt that they were instigated by the

other senior khans, who are working up opposition to Morteza Quli—see Summary No. 21, 1944. The dissident khans, who included some of the minor khans who had supported Abul Qasim in his brief career as a rebel, surrendered without opposition and were taken to Isfahan. Some thirty rifles were recovered, of which fifteen were Bruo rifles which had been captured from Government forces.

11. It is intended shortly to initiate operations for the disarmament of certain sections of the Chahar Lang Memvand Bakhtiari in the area north-west of Faridan, including the Fuladevand, the Zillaki, the Hividi, who are believed to have been responsible for the murder of Mr. Harris—see Summary No. 32, 1942, paragraph 11—and the retainers of Khajeh Mehdi Quli Moghul. A column of a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry will operate from Ali Gudar and two battalions of the Isfahan Division from Faridan.

Russian Affairs

12. His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's representative in Tehran and is pleased to inform him that the Consulate General is fervent propagators of the expansion of Russian influence.

13. The operations of the Russian survey parties, which were reported in Summary No. 11, 1944, are continuing. It is reported that geological survey, with a view to the location of oil, forms part of the work of these survey parties.

14. A certain Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani is standing for election for the constituency of Ardabil in Eastern Azerbaijan. He is a notorious intriguer, agitator and mob orator frequently used by the Shah to work up disturbances and demonstrations, and recently particularly to fan the agitation against Seyyid Zia. It is noteworthy that his candidature is supported not only by the Shah, but strongly by the Russians.

15. An extra assistant military attaché, Lieutenant Colonel Ivanov, has arrived to join the staff of the Soviet Military Attaché.

16. The Russians persist in their refusal to allow the Persian Government to have long wished to do, although they are willing to agree to a maximum of a battalion of 300.

Yugoslav Affairs

17. A certain Colonel Mistrovitch is now in Tehran recruiting for Marshal Tito among Yugoslavs resident in Persia. He works in the Soviet Consulate and has so far recruited some fifty-sixty men, whom he is to take to Russia. Colonel Loxitch, who was Yugoslav Military Attaché in Moscow until he declared for Tito, is also here, accompanied by a youth whom he introduced as Tito's son.

American Affairs

18. A Deputy, Dr. Shafaq, spoke at some length in the Majlis in eulogy of American Americans and American services to Persia. The object of allaying the irritation that might reasonably be expected to have been caused to the American Embassy and the American Government by the scandalous attacks on the American advisers. Among the reasons for which Persia would be eternally grateful to America, he said, were the services of American educationalists and of Morgan Shuster and Dr. Millsbaugh during his previous engagement with the Persian Government, and American support of Persia at the Peace Conference after the last war.

Tehran, 11th June, 1944

E 3766 422 84]

No. 30

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 27th June)

(No. 255.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's representative in Tehran and is pleased to inform him that he has herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the period of the 12th to 18th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 18th June, 1944

Enclosure in No. 30

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 24 for the Period 12th-18th June, 1944.

Political.

THE Prime Minister, asked in the Majlis whether he had yet come to a decision regarding the future of Dr. Millsbaugh, replied that he hoped to bring about amicably a change in the methods and in the financial and economic policy of Dr. Millsbaugh that would be more suitable to the needs of the country and the wishes of the people. The Government accepted full responsibility, and the Majlis could rest assured that they would maintain direct and full control over the finance and economy of the country without delegating any of their responsibility to foreign advisers. While appreciative of the services of the American advisers, the Government was also aware of their shortcomings. Employees of the Government, whether Persian or foreign, who failed to give satisfactory service would be dismissed.

2. Three months of the current financial year have passed without the budget having been presented to the Majlis. All administrations are short of funds, and the Government is beginning to show impatience at the delay in presenting the budget.

Economic

3. The reopening of the Western front in Europe has brought about a fall in wholesale prices, merchants fearing that the end of the war may find them with heavy stocks on hand.

Appointments—Civil

- 4.—(i) Hashim Mukarram Nurzad to be Persian Consul General at Istanbul
- (ii) Ismail Bahadur to be Governor of Maragheh.
- (iii) Abbas Ferouhar to be Persian Chargé d'Affaires with the Greek Government in Cairo.
- (iv) Vahid Tunakabuni to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education.
- (v) Dr. Nakhai to be Under-Secretary of State to the Prime Minister.

Persian Forces

Appointments—Military

5. Sartip Muhammad Baqir Amir Nizami to be an additional Deputy Chief of the Staff.

British Affairs

6. Thefts of British military telephone and telegraph wire, which, on account of its high value and the difficulty of its protection, has always been an attraction to Persian thieves, recently reached alarming proportions. The police and the gendarmerie, even if they had had the goodwill, lacked the numbers and the ability to regulate these practices. The responsibility for these lengths of the line has now been assumed by the Persian army.

American Affairs

7. A Bill has been passed by the Majlis with double urgency authorising the transfer to the American Embassy in Tehran of the ownership of 22,000 square metres of land in the vicinity of the American camp near Tehran, to be used as a cemetery.

Tehran, 16th June, 1944

CHAPTER V. SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

E 2211 28 89]

No. 31

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 103, Syria and the Lebanon,
22nd March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th April)

(Secret.)

1 General

HIS Majesty's Minister and the G.O.C., Ninth Army, have discussed with the Syrian President and Prime Minister the revised paper on military security and the transfer of the native levies. On the security issue the Syrians were reluctant to commit themselves and it is now for the French to produce a draft based on our amended paper, and to negotiate with the Syrians on that basis. Considerable progress, however, was made regarding the transfer of the levies. The result of the discussions made it clear that the President and Prime Minister, though on tour, have agreed to invite the French to Lattakia to discuss it. Syrian Government are anxious to avoid further delay, as there is an increasing tendency to blame the Government for their failure to secure results.

2. Syria Damascus

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Finance have not yet returned, the delay in their departure from Riyadh being caused, according to the Syrian Foreign Office, by the indisposition of Jamil Mardam. Luthi Haffar, the Minister of the Interior is still in Jerusalem.

The President of the Republic left Damascus on the 16th March for Beirut. He was accompanied by the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the Prime Minister, and by the Chief Secretary of Government (Dr Najib Bey Armanazi), Dr. Shakh Jahri (Director of the Press Bureau) and various other officials.

The Prime Minister left the President's party at Hama and returned to Damascus on account of a riot which had started at a Syro-Iraqi football match on the 16th. The encroachment of the crowd on to the football ground had led to an attack on a policeman by three soldiers of the Battalion de Levant, and a scuffle ensued, in which one British sergeant and one soldier lost their lives. There were upwards of twenty civilian casualties, one fatal.

On Friday, the 17th, the town remained calm, but a demonstration took place outside the Sérail and there was much shouting of "down with the French" and demands for the immediate transfer of the army. On the following day, demonstrations continued, and stones were thrown at a French soldiers' club. A French military ambulance was stoned, overturned by the crowd and burnt, and all French signs on shops have been removed or obliterated.

The Prime Minister has stated that General Beynet, when he paid his official call, assured him that he had come as General Catroux's choice and would do all he could to facilitate the handing over of the powers so ardently desired by the Syrians.

According to the Minister of Justice, as a result of an exchange of correspondence with the French, the courts hitherto known as Mixed Tribunals will in future be designated "Courts dealing with matters affecting foreigners." The judicial powers heretofore exercised by the Mixed Tribunals will be exercised only while the Minister reserves the right of judicial supervision, transfers and appointments of judges.

Dr Kazem Daghestani has been appointed Director of Defense Patrols, and Dr. Fakhri al-Fakhri, Secretary of Defense. Dr. Saïd al-Damir has been similarly appointed for the Northern area, with Aleppo as centre.

A successful three-day display has been given by the Royal Air Force under the patronage of the President of the Republic. On the second day there were some 70,000 spectators and in the evening a performance of the film "Spartan", the Mobatez of Damascus announced that donations equivalent to the cost of eight Spitfires had been received.

3. Hama and Hama

The President of the Republic, with his party, arrived in Hama and Selema, and there were appropriate receptions, dinners and speeches. The day after the President left, some students in Hama staged an anti-French demonstration outside the Sérail in sympathy, they said, with "their comrades in Damascus." There have been no further developments.

The enthusiasm shown during the visit was moderate. Nationalists from the Government and the opposition, however, were not present.

On the day after the President left, some students in Hama staged an anti-French demonstration outside the Sérail in sympathy, they said, with "their comrades in Damascus." There have been no further developments.

11 The Lebanon

The settlement of the fate of Emil Eddé has again been postponed to the next session of the Chamber, which is expected to take place early next week.

It was reported in the press on the 21st March that a Bill was to be tabled that day providing for substantial increases in the salaries of Government employees, but the question was not in the end debated. It is feared that such increases, especially if they should be extended to commercial and industrial employees, would materially contribute to inflation, and the Lebanese Government have been urged to reconsider their proposals.

Rashid Mokaddem (see Weekly Summary No. 72 of 1943), whose health has been growing steadily worse for some time, was brought back to the Lebanon from his place of confinement in Cyprus on the 21st March and died in hospital in Tripoli on the following day.

Signs of trouble have been reported in the Chekka cement works, where a lawyer, who has a grudge against the company, has been exhorting the workers to strike for a programme of improved conditions. The workers are not on strike, however, and have apparently not shown much enthusiasm for the programme.

E 2396 23 89]

No. 32

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 104, Syria and the Lebanon,
29th March, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 1st April)

1 General

Political interest in the Lebanon continues to centre on the question whether the Government will proceed with the motion for unseating Emil Eddé. On 22nd March it seemed that they would, having secured the support of a small number of Deputies. The French appear to have committed the error of interfering directly on Eddé's behalf with the Lebanese Government. General Beynet has also seen a number of Deputies in an attempt to persuade them to oppose the Government's motion. The first result of this was that Riad Sulh informed M. Chataigneau, who had been sent to him by General Beynet, that this French intervention in a purely internal matter was most unwelcome. He pointed out that as the French had shot Pucheu they had no grounds for objecting to the Lebanese dealing in a much milder way with a traitor. The French also intervened with the Maronite Patriarch, who wrote to the President urging that Eddé should not be expelled from the Chamber. Riad Sulh called on the Patriarch and persuaded him to withdraw his opposition. Count Ostrorog again intervened, in General Beynet's name, with members of the Government with the same result. The consequence of these interventions has been to crystallise opinion in favour of strong action against Eddé. Realising this, the French changed their tactics and on the morning of the day the motion was to be voted upon offered to obtain Eddé's resignation, failing which, by next Friday, they will withdraw the motion. This is a very serious situation. It seems quite possible that if the French fail to obtain Eddé's resignation and the Government do not move the motion on Friday, it will be moved by private members and may result in a vote of no confidence in the Government.

[29046]

F 8

a Deputy strongly condemned the inadequacy of the direct taxes and the Government's policy of increasing wages rather than reducing the cost of living.

Amongst other laws recently submitted to the Chamber are (i) the long-awaited law for judicial reform, which reinstitutes the Court of Cassation and increases the number of justices of the peace, and (ii) the law on the defence of the State, which gives the Government powers to repress treasonable activities. It

under this latter law, but under another law which prohibits Deputies from accepting public functions except in certain defined cases.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs are expected to leave at the end of this week for Baghdad, at the invitation of the Iraqi Government, and thence to proceed to Riyadh on an official visit to Ibn Saud.

Regulations were published on the 17th March governing the entry into the newly constituted Lebanese Foreign Service, and it has now been stated that candidates must present themselves before the 26th April. The first posts will be given to nominated persons, future candidates will, however, have to pass an examination, the syllabus of which has been laid down. So far despite considerable lobbying, the Government has only settled one foreign diplomatic appointment, that of the present Minister of the Interior, Camille Shamoun, as Lebanese representative in London. They appear to have resisted a strong hint from Nahas Pasha that Taufiq Pasha Mafarreh, who is domiciled in Egypt, would be acceptable as Lebanese representative in Cairo, and to have held fast to their principle that all their representatives must be sent from the Lebanon.

The establishment of a "National Association of Lebanese Culture" has been announced. It is understood to owe its inception to the Apostolic Delegate and Cardinal Tappouni and to number amongst its members several prominent Christian Opposition Deputies. Moslems are understood to regard it with some suspicion.

E 2300 28 89]

No. 33

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 105, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th April, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 15th April.)

1. General.

GENERAL BEYNET made a last intervention with the Lebanese Government on the 29th March in favour of Emil Eddé. He suggested that the motion for requesting the Government to pass a law for his expulsion. The Prime Minister replied that because the Government would endeavour to secure his resignation from the Chamber, failing which they would take no further action. The Lebanese Government agreed, but the intervention seems on the whole to have stiffened their attitude, the Prime Minister, in particular, declaring categorically that Eddé would be out of the Chamber before he left for Riyadh on the 31st March.

On the 31st March, the resignation not having been offered, the case was at last brought before the Chamber. The Government asked the Chamber to pass a law for his expulsion. The Prime Minister replied that because the Government would endeavour to secure his resignation from the Chamber, failing which they would take no further action. The Lebanese Government agreed, but the intervention seems on the whole to have stiffened their attitude, the Prime Minister, in particular, declaring categorically that Eddé would be out of the Chamber before he left for Riyadh on the 31st March.

Following a decision by the Lebanese Government to establish diplomatic relations with France, the French Government has requested the Government to the appointment of Camille Bey Shamoun as Minister in London.

On the 20th March General Beynet left Beirut for Damascus, where he exchanged visits with the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, during which he reiterated his wish to facilitate the transfer of powers. The Franco-Syrian meeting to discuss the Troupes Spéciales took place on the 3rd April, the French Delegation headed by General Beynet and the Syrian Delegation headed by General Beynet. The meeting was adjourned until the 8th April.

3. Syria—Damascus.

The President returned on the 30th March, having cut short his tour on account of bad weather. The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and of Finance have returned from Saudi Arabia, and the Minister of the Interior from Palestine.

There have been attempts during the week by opponents of the Government to foment disturbances, but without success. Certain merchants of Damascus, while declaring their readiness to contribute to the national exchequer, are expressing dissatisfaction at the Finance Department's assessments for income tax, and at the alleged injustices of the Ministry of Supply in the matter of import and export licences.

A few days ago the Prime Minister lost his temper with an Aleppine journalist who had enquired whether it was true that he intended to resign, and ordered the man's arrest. After a good deal of argument the order was cancelled but it is thought that the Prime Minister's political opponents will make the most of this ill judged and "unconstitutional" lapse.

4. Aleppo.

During an extensive tour of the Mohafezat the President was well received by the public, who were pleased to see in him an active leader of independent Syria. In appealing for national unity, the President was at pains to reassure minorities, and is considered to have increased both his popularity and his authority.

Textile prices continued to rise during the week and the absence of a satisfactory reply to complaints against the Government's failure to achieve a policy of price control caused disappointment.

7. Alqaquta Territory.

The soldier of the Troupes Spéciales killed in the recent riot in Damascus (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March. Damascus) was an Alqaquta of Mosul. Although it is not known whether he was killed in his home town or elsewhere, the body of this soldier arrived in Mardin an hour or so after the riot. The Syrian President's visit to Mardin was intended by those responsible to be an act of provocation, public feeling is hardening in favour of the early creation of a national army.

Since the President's visit the Mohafez has adopted a friendlier attitude towards the Alqaquta. The King has been elected Vice-President of the Alqaquta Administrative Council under the presidency of the Mohafez.

News of the arrival of British troops in the Slesle area has had a salutary effect on the Alqaquta. The President is now a strong supporter of national independence and apologising for his absence when the President arrived in his district.

9. Tribes.

A dispute between the Shammar Khawasa and the Agaidat threatens to become serious.

The Agaidat and other semi-sedentary tribes—the Baggara, Wulda and Afndla—fear an attack by the nomads and are resolved to stand together. The British Political Officer at Deir ez-Zor has suggested to the Political Adviser at Mosul that the Iraqi Shammar should be induced to withdraw. Colonel des Esars states that he has sufficient forces available to deal with any emergency. The British military representative in East Syria, however, believes that the French would not be sorry to see the situation deteriorate, and that they may be expected to favour the nomads—a policy already indicated by the behaviour of the Contrôle Bedouin Officer in the dispute between the Wulda and the Fedaan reported in previous Summaries. There are unconfirmed but persistent reports that the French are issuing arms to the Bedouin.

Fighting has ceased between the Jabbour and the Feddagha (see last week's Summary), a corridor having been established between the two tribes.

10. Frontier.

At the routine frontier meeting between Turkish officials and the Officier Français at Hadramout, the Syrian representative was present for the first time. The question of the status of the Syrian representative was not raised.

8. Syria-Damascus.

There has been some speculation during the week as to the possible fall of the Government, and there are signs of increasing popular opposition to the Government. The Minister of the Interior, who is the Minister of the Interior in Damascus, but not, apparently, to his office. This is due partly to ill-health, but also to unwillingness to co-operate with the Prime Minister.

There has been a difference of opinion between the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance. Before the departure of the Syrian delegation to Riyadh in February, the Minister of Finance had stipulated that he should be appointed chairman of the Syrian Commission of the Supreme Council of Common Interests, and a draft decree was prepared to that effect. When he found on his return that the appointment had been given to Sayed Ihsan al-Sherif he complained to the Prime Minister and spoke of resigning. The affair has been settled satisfactorily, but there remains a lack of harmony among members of the Government. The Prime Minister realises the importance to the Government of maintaining unity until the negotiations with the French for the transfer of powers are concluded.

The President of the Republic has been taken seriously ill with duodenal ulcer.

9. Tribal

Following a request made by the political officer at Deir ez-Zor to the political officer at Aleppo, the Syrian Government has agreed to negotiate a peace with the Agnadat, thus avoiding what might have been a serious clash (see last week's Summary). A tribal conference has been arranged.

The Fedan have hopes of arranging a tribal conference at Palmyra under the auspices of French Bedouin control officers to settle their disputes with the Wulda and Afadla. The intention of the Emir Mujib is doubtless to undermine the prestige of the Mohafez of Euphrates, whose committee he refused to accept (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March). The Syrian Prime Minister is taking steps to ensure that any such conference will be held under the authority of the Mohafez.

10. The Lebanon.

There has been no further repercussions of the expulsion of Emil Eddé from the Chamber, apart from muttered threats from his remaining followers in the Mount Liban. The Easter holidays, as usual, caused an almost complete suspension of both Government business and political activity, and the country is quiet.

Nominations for the three bye-elections to be held on the 23rd April must be in by 13th April. So far, three names have been mentioned as candidates for the one vacant seat in North Lebanon, one of whom is strongly backed by the President and is therefore a strong favourite. As regards the two seats in Mount Lebanon, the Government have two candidates (both of them politically sound but of doubtful moral character), and the main interest centres on whether Taufiq Awad will stand against them. In any case, the Government's powers are likely to prove adequate to ensure the return of their own men.

Criticism of the Government is at present directed chiefly against their decision to increase direct taxation. To meet this latter charge, Camille Shamoun, the Acting Minister of Finance, has granted an interview to the press and has explained the Government's ideas as regards the imposition of increased direct taxation, including income tax. This appears to have been well received, although one opposition newspaper comments that such measures, however desirable, will be difficult to get past a Chamber composed for the greater part of property holders and merchants.

[E 2495/706/66]

No. 36.

Sir E. Spears to Mr Eden.—(Received 24th April.)

(No. 29.)

Beirut, 5th April, 1944

WITH reference to your telegram No. 165 of the 30th March, I have the honour to submit the following report on the origin, constitution and powers of the Supreme Supply Council and its dependent Advisory Boards.

2. The following Advisory Boards have been set up and are already functioning:—

- Joint Medical Advisory Board
- Joint Agricultural Advisory Board
- Joint Transport Advisory Board
- Joint Paper Advisory Board
- Joint Textile Advisory Board
- Joint Iron and Steel Advisory Board

3. Appendix A contains lists of commodities upon which each board is competent to advise.

4. The formation of a Miscellaneous Commodities Advisory Board has been agreed upon, but the board has not yet held its first meeting. This board will deal with all the commodities not already covered by the other boards (Appendix A 5).

5. The work of all of the boards is co-ordinated by a Joint Supply Council. Although the setting-up of the Joint Medical Advisory Board was originally opposed by the French, it was finally agreed upon, and the first meeting was held on the 4th October 1943.

6. The delay in setting-up this board did not result in the holding back of essential supplies. At that time the local Government entrusted the Office Pharmaceutique, which had been set up by the French for the control of the import and distribution of medical supplies, and had little confidence in its integrity. Although we held the same view as the local Government, it was considered inadvisable to retard the progress of the work of the Office Pharmaceutique.

7. It should be noted that the freezing of items imported by the L.A.C. which was agreed upon in the middle of our negotiations. In the event, the L.A.C. was not set up, and the L.A.C. was not set up. The L.A.C. was not set up, and the L.A.C. was not set up. In this connection I would refer to the Ministry of State's telegram No. 371 of the 30th November to me, repeated saying it yet.

8. The machinery for screening and passing on import licences functioned in a completely normal manner at the time of the L.A.C. Later of 17th January, 1944, and the Commission Supérieure du Ravitaillement was still meeting at that time.

9. The Joint Supply Council originated in the necessity for a senior board for the co-ordination of the work of the various Advisory Boards. It was set up by the L.A.C. on the 22nd October 1943. The L.A.C. was not set up, and the L.A.C. was not set up. The L.A.C. was not set up, and the L.A.C. was not set up. In this connection I would refer to the Ministry of State's telegram No. 371 of the 30th November to me, repeated saying it yet.

10. The Joint Supply Council is composed of five members, one Syrian, one Lebanese, one French, one American and one British. The French and British members being advisers to the Syrian and Lebanese members. The decree which created the Joint Supply Council and defines its powers is attached as Appendix B.

11. The Office Economique de Guerre continues to function, though the monopolies which it enjoyed with regard to various imports have been removed by the Governments in joint agreement. We have not taken any part in the negotiations concerning the future administration of the Office Economique de Guerre, and have not been invited to do so.

I have, &c.

E. L. SPEARS

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 107, Syria and the Lebanon,
19th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 1st May.)

(Secret.)

1 General

IN view of the Syrian President's illness, no further discussions have taken place between the Syrians and the French concerning the transfer of powers. It is evident from the general expression of sympathy towards the President, particularly in those parts of Syria which he visited recently, that the present Government, with which he has become so closely identified, owes much to his personality.

The help given by the Ninth Army, who immediately provided medical specialists with blood transfusions, has been most gratefully acknowledged by the Syrian authorities, and has had an excellent propaganda effect. It is generally believed, and probably with reason, that without this help the President would have died.

The Lebanese President has received a telegram from Ibn Saud, despatched by a messenger from the Lebanon, expressing his appreciation of the decision to recognise the independence of the Lebanon.

2 Wheat.

Recent rains have improved the prospect of a good harvest.

3 Syria—Damascus

Speculation continues as to how the Government will face the reopening of Parliament on the 22nd April. The Government has been in communication with the Ministers of Interior, Public Health, and National Economy, and it is thought possible that the Government will propose a new constitution in view of the President's illness.

The Syrian Government has been in communication with the French Government regarding the transfer of powers. The Syrian Government has been in communication with the French Government regarding the transfer of powers. The Syrian Government has been in communication with the French Government regarding the transfer of powers.

4. Euphrates and Jezireh

Euphrates.—There is at present a lack of confidence both in the local administration and in the Central Government. The Mohafez feels that he may be removed in favour of a member of the Nationalist bloc. He has been criticised as being weak, but his task is made more difficult by the lack of public spirit.

The period of adjustment following the transfer of the Bedouin Control to Syrian authority presents many difficulties to a Mohafez, whose duty it must be to secure the tribal sheikhs to accept that authority at the outset, and it is natural that French officers, while executive power remains in their hands, should tend to ignore the local Government representative. For instance, the two Mohafezes were given full scope to preside at the Shammar Agaidat conference, but when Capitaine Briaux, the French Bedouin Control Inspector, though acting under the authority of the Minister of the Interior, arranged the Fedan-Wul a conference at Aleppo and appointed himself President, he was acting against the expressed wish of the Mohafez of the Euphrates. It was subsequently decided that the French should not interfere in the internal affairs of the Syrian Government, and the Bedouin Control and the French Military Commander are more clearly defined.

Prospects for the harvest are good, and it is unlikely that there will be any serious disturbance in East Syria while Allied troops remain in the area.

There has been an outbreak of typhus on both banks of the Euphrates between Deir ez Zor and Abu Kemal. The Syrian Health authorities, assisted by the British, are taking active measures.

Jezireh.—No detailed reports received.

10 Frontier

In recent weeks there have been cases of Turkish guards taking men and flocks from the Syrian side of the frontier in areas near Aleppo. Clashes have been avoided and on two occasions restitution has been made on the demand of British units or of the French Frontier Officer.

11 The Lebanon.

Nominations for the three by-elections which are to take place on 23rd April were received up till 18th April. There appear to be three serious candidates for the North Lebanon vacancy and four for the two Mount Lebanon vacancies. The Government are strongly backing one candidate for each seat, and, with the means at their disposal, are expected to ensure their election. Little interest has so far been displayed by the population. None of the candidates is of high standing, and two in Mount Lebanon are of particularly low moral character so that in any case the level of the Chamber will not be raised by the result. The usual complaints of French intervention, so far quite unsubstantiated, have been received from North Lebanon.

The Government's attempts to compound with the Beirut merchants regard to the payment of arrears of War Profits Tax have come to a standstill. The Government are still being studied, but there appears to be no intention of putting them into force before next year.

The Lebanese Government have formed a large committee, composed of representatives of all communities and of the principal commercial associations, to raise funds for the purchase of Spitfire aircraft for the R.A.F.

The Lebanese Minister of the Interior has protested unofficially to the French against their action in establishing, or proposing to establish, a number of new Sûreté posts in the Bekaa and South Lebanon on the grounds that these posts are not needed for purposes of military security and that their establishment is provocative. It is understandable that the Government should be worried at any possible extension of French political activities in the Bekaa, in view of their own weakness in that troublesome area.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 108, Syria and the Lebanon,
26th April, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 4th May.)

1 General

THE Lebanese Mission has returned from Saudi Arabia. The question of Arab unity was discussed, and it appears that Ibn Saud's discouragement of any political Pan Arab conference before the end of the war has fortified the Lebanese Christians, including the President, in their aversion to the idea of federation. It is considered unlikely therefore, that the Lebanese Prime Minister will press for a conference at present. The attitude of the Syrian Government towards an early conference, though Pan Arab feeling is stronger in Syria, will no doubt be influenced by the Syrian President, who is strongly attached to Ibn Saud.

Messages have been received by both Syrian and Lebanese Governments from the Imam Yahya of Yemen acknowledging the independence of their respective States.

3 Syria—Damascus.

At the reopening of Parliament on the 22nd April there was a number of Deputies, who are members of the Chamber of Deputies who is attending the Financial Conference in Cairo, were present. The President of the Chamber, M. Tammam, said that the draft laws which are soon to be submitted to the Chamber.

After the conclusion of the formal business, a proposal signed by Sir Spathis to the R A F. The proposal was adopted.

In reply to questions, the Prime Minister stated that he agreed that a quarter of a century, its modification would require both thought and action. He said that the Government had been successful, that many had been released, and that the Government were now endeavouring to arrange for the release of the remainder. The French, he said, had submitted two schemes regarding the cession of the Army. In each of them some points were not acceptable and some required study but the most recent conversations had been encouraging. The illness of the President had, however, caused a temporary hold up in negotiations. The Prime Minister stated the idea that the Government was taking over only the shadow and the substance of the attributions of sovereignty as some of the Deputies suggested, and added that Syrian sovereignty would be complete, more by saying that all the other attributions, with the exception of the Sûreté.

It is probable that the Syrians will press their claim for control also of the service on the grounds that the Syrians, who are not at war, can have no concern with the properties involved.

The Syrian Government have decided to send diplomatic Missions to Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Algiers, Great Britain and the United States and to establish Consulates-General in Antman, Jerusalem, Bombay and Rio de Janeiro.

11 The Lebanon

In the by-elections the two Government candidates for Mount Lebanon, Farid el Khazen and Khalil Abu Jaoudah, were returned with large majorities but Nadra Issa Khoury, the candidate for North Lebanon who had been supported previously by the Government, withdrew his candidature at the last minute on the advice of the Prime Minister, leaving Joseph Karam, who had strong local backing, to win a straight fight against Hassan Jahjah, who stood as a member of the Constitutional that is, the pro-Government party.

The Mount Lebanon result caused little comment. The President and four members of the Government, including the all important Minister of the Interior, came from that region and the return of their candidates was a foregone conclusion.

In North Lebanon the result has been regarded as a blow to the prestige of the Government, although one of the principal factors which led to the success of Karam, whose family have long been influential in the neighbourhood, was his action in addressing a letter to the Prime Minister two days before the polling in which he denied in the strongest terms any accusation of being a tool of the French and affirmed his intention of supporting the Government and the cause of Lebanese independence.

The French did not interfere in any way in these elections. There was, however, a certain amount of interference—destruction of ballot boxes, picketing of polling booths, etc.—by Karam's supporters.

E 2966 23/89]

No. 39

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 109 Syria and the Lebanon, 3rd May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 15th May)

1 General

ON the 27th April the arrival of Joseph Karam, the new Deputy for North Lebanon, to take up his seat was the occasion of a serious breach of the peace in Beirut. Karam himself, although previously known as a French protégé, had

renounced their support (see last week's summary), and had complied with the Government's request that he should enter Beirut with only a few cars. His party was, however, joined by a large crowd of Opposition elements at the entrance to the town. In accordance with the deplorable local custom, many carried fire-arms. The police cordons proved inadequate to restrain the crowd. The police barriers were broken and a large crowd formed outside the Parliament building. A strong police cordon holding Parliament Square was also broken through by the procession, which was accompanied, it is alleged, by some Sûreté men. There were certainly cars carrying French flags in the lead; on one of these was M. Chataigneau's personal bodyguard. There seems to be no doubt that this manifestation was deliberately organised by the supporters of Eddé and those elements who have been steadily worked up since last November against the Government's alleged anti-Christian policy.

After Karam had entered the building a section of the crowd attempted to follow him. At this point an N.C.O. in French uniform climbed up the ironwork over the main door and fixed a French flag over it. He was shot in the act of doing so. A general mêlée ensued, during which a hand grenade was thrown into the entrance hall, wounding the second in-command of the police. One gendarme and four civilians were killed and some twenty persons, including a number of police and gendarmes, wounded before order was restored by the police.

Meanwhile the sitting of the Chamber was opened. The Prime Minister deplored the fact that there should be in the country a group of traitors who would violate Parliament and what it stood for. The Government's leniency he said had been mistaken for weakness, and force must now be used to suppress these traitors for the safety of the country. A declaration by Karam was read in which he dissociated himself from the incidents and reaffirmed his loyalty to independent Lebanon. A vote of confidence in the Government was then passed unanimously.

There seems to be no doubt that French troops in the telephone exchange opposite Parliament opened fire, whether because some shots fired by the gendarmes hit the building or on their own initiative has not yet been established. Many eye-witnesses assert that there were French officers (or men wearing French officers' uniforms) amongst the crowd. There were undoubtedly a number of French flags carried by persons in the procession (it is asserted that French lorries distributed French flags in the morning). It is widely believed that French agents working with Eddé and his supporters organised what was meant to be a movement to overthrow the régime. His Majesty's Minister at once conferred with General Bevet, who asserted that he was in no way concerned with the manifestations. General Bevet's attitude subsequently stiffened, and on the 20th April he handed the President of the Republic a strong note of protest against the Government's attitude. The Lebanese have replied that, if correct, he does not appear to have been able to control French elements in the Lebanon who have not ceased carrying out subversive activities.

Meanwhile a joint Anglo-French enquiry has been set up and the Lebanese are carrying on a parallel enquiry presided over by competent magistrates. The curfew, imposed by the Lebanese Government on the night of the incident, was raised on the 1st May and the town is now quiet.

The news of the incident caused great indignation throughout the country. There were some demonstrations but no breaches of the peace. Both in the Lebanon and South Lebanon the political officers successfully used their influence to discourage undue excitement.

2 Wheat

Purchases during the period the 23rd to 27th April amounted to 450 tons of wheat, 867 tons of barley and 663 tons of other adulterants, a total of 1,980 tons and a daily average of 396 tons.

3 Syria—Damascus

The Syrian Government were informed of a number of letters from the Rasha Kekhria of Aleppo, whose criticism of the Government is unrelenting but generally constructive, and several young Damascenes, including Sabri el-Asali and Ahmed Sbarabati, both members of the Chamber, who call themselves "Progressives." There are others whose adherence to the group is due primarily to their desire for the early transfer of the army. On the whole this is a healthy opposition.

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There is a second group, however, composed of reactionary elements, certain Alawite leaders, for instance, and pro-French Deputies, in particular the Emir Mughni, who sees advantage in the fact that members of the more genuinely patriotic group have blamed the Prime Minister for the delay in the transfer of the army, and is rallying some of the more simple-minded provincial Deputies to what he regards as the Prime Minister's policy. One of the main aims of these reactionaries is to maintain their feudal control at the expense of the Government.

Following the disturbances in Beirut the Government took measures to prevent any attempt at anti-French demonstrations. The Prime Minister had already shown by his handling of recent Moslem-Christian disputes an appreciation of the fact that disturbances only weaken the authority of the Government and serve the purposes of elements who would welcome its discredit.

Colonel Oliva Rogot broadcast a message by wireless saying that he wished to assure the population that the French had no connexion with the Beirut disturbances, or with the incident at the Damascus football ground on the 16th March. He explained that the French position, as recently defined by General Beynet, was one of friendship and co-operation. This turned out not to be a very happy idea, on the principle of "qui s'excuse s'accuse."

9. Tribal

The holding of the abortive Bedouin-Wulda conference in Aleppo which was arranged by the French Bedouin Control Inspector has led to the postponement of the final Shammar-Agalat conference at which the Emir Mughni, now in Damascus, was to have been one of the arbiters. The consequent delays which are to the detriment of Syrian prestige, have been caused by the fact that the French Bedouin Control officers retain their executive powers.

It has now been decided to hold the Shammar-Agalat conference on the 6th May in the presence of the Mohafez of the Jezireh and the Mountarrif of Mosul.

10. Frontier

No progress has yet been made in the investigations concerning the reported abduction by the Turks of two Syrians of the Garde Legère. The Turkish authorities having refused either to produce the two men or to allow them to make a statement to the Frontier Commission, the matter remains under negotiation between the French délégué at Aleppo and the V. S. A. at Antioch.

11. The Lebanon

The prestige of the Lebanese Government, which had suffered on account of the result of the North Lebanon elections, has been somewhat restored by the fact that the Government have issued manifestoes calling on their members to support the Government. The Government have also been able to restore order in the North Lebanon. The Government have been temporarily forgotten. Popular demand for the transfer of the Sûreté and the armed forces has increased.

On 25th April French marines from Beirut and a detachment of the 1st Foreign Infantry from Tripoli, who were asked to assist the Lebanese Government in the North Lebanon, were withdrawn. At their departure a small number of Lebanese were seen to be in the area. There were some slight disturbances between French and Lebanese forces, but the French Police and the Lebanese Police, under the supervision of the Mohafez restored order. By 25th April the Lebanese Government had been restored to power. M. Prunaud, ex-Lieutenant of the 1st Foreign Infantry, visited Syria on the 25th April. His visit appears

to have been a purely personal affair, but he was recognised on entering the town, and a large crowd gathered to see him. He was telegraphed to the Government in Beirut.

The Lebanese President and Government and all Lebanese and Allied notables were invited. Many thousands of spectators attended, and the display was generally voted a success. The Lebanese Government's fund for the purchase of Spitfires, which is aiming at outdoing the combined results of Damascus and Aleppo, is mounting steadily.

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No. 40

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 110, Syria and the Lebanon, 10th May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 23rd May)

1. General

DURING the week following the incidents of the 27th April the Lebanese authorities showed signs of considerable nervousness regarding French intentions. As a result of strong rumours that the French would take some form of violent action against them, the members of the Cabinet, with the exception of the N.F.A., who had not been warned, spent the night on the 4th 5th May away from their homes. It is tolerably certain that these rumours were put about by disaffected Frenchmen, but as nothing came of them the atmosphere was much calmer. There is good reason to believe that General Beynet, on the same date, addressed the corps of French officers in Beirut and told them in no uncertain terms to refrain from meddling in politics.

The two committees of enquiry, Anglo-French and Lebanese, are still at work. The Lebanese committee have accepted an invitation from the Anglo-French committee to provide witnesses for interrogation by the latter. The Lebanese authorities are reported to have convoked in all some seventy persons for interrogation but the Prime Minister has stated that only twelve have been interrogated. The Government's firm attitude. Indications so far as the Lebanese authorities are concerned are that they are as far as possible any evidence of French complicity which may come to light.

The Syrian Prime Minister informed Colonel Oliva-Rogot on the 2nd May that the Syrian Government did not propose to make any *démarche* in connexion with the incidents of the 27th April, but that they were watching the situation carefully.

There have been two discussions during the week between the Syrian Ministers and General Beynet concerning the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales, but the results are not yet known.

2. Beirut

Purchases during the period 28th April to 3rd May amounted to 1,049 tons of wheat and 1,211 tons of barley. The daily average of 575 tons, 3,446 tons and a daily average of 575 tons.

The Cereals Commission have made a tour of Syria and the Lebanon in order to assess the prospects of the crop to consider the question of a reduction in prices. It is evident that the total quantity of barley and wheat available to be bought in the market at least in the next few months may even be as much as 340,000 tons. The commission has therefore decided that the existing security stocks, amounting to four months' supply, can be reduced to a quantity sufficient for two months, and has approved also an allocation of 75,000 tons for export.

The Syrian Government are considering the possibility of financing the buying of this year's harvest. It is thought probable that, were they to do so they would be in favour of a reduction in the buying price, as their first estimate of the funds required appears to be extremely low.

3. Syrian Parliament

The week has been uneventful in Parliament. A motion was passed congratulating the Lebanese Government on their firmness in dealing with the recent events. Several Deputies have introduced the Municipal Law Bill as

designed merely to perpetuate a state of affairs inappropriate to the new elections, as are the Deputies, and that the heads of municipalities, who are of present nomination by the Government, should be elected by the Municipal Councils. A Deputy from Hama, the notorious demagogue Raif Milki, went on and condemned the whole system of two-degree elections as undemocratic. The discussion is to be resumed.

A Government proposal to sell Lebanese National Lottery tickets in Syria was criticised as being an unsound method of obtaining revenue. It was agreed to postpone a decision until after the return from Cairo of the Minister of Finance.

8. Euphrates and Jezreh

Jezreh—There is continued evidence of the French propaganda campaign in the Khabour settlement.

11. The Lebanon

The Committee of Enquiry into the large extension of the area of the Lebanon, which was proposed by the French Government, has been set up. The Committee is to report to the Minister of the Interior, who will then report to the President. The Committee is to be composed of a French and a Syrian member.

The Committee is to be set up by a Special Council, which will be composed of the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of the Army. The Committee is to be set up by a Special Council, which will be composed of the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of the Interior, the Minister of Finance, and the Minister of the Army.

The Prime Minister has visited the Maronite Patriarch, who has expressed his confidence in Riad Sult's ability to safeguard the interests of the Lebanon and to achieve its complete independence.

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No. 41

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 111 Syria and the Lebanon, 17th May 1944. (Received in Foreign Office 20th May)

1. General

The Syrian case against Eddé is still not concluded. The Government's independent judicial enquiry has, however, now been completed. It is understood that the evidence against Eddé himself is not sufficient to justify a trial. The President has expressed his opinion that it would be unwise to take proceedings against Eddé unless there was a cast-iron case. A long-drawn-out trial based on insufficient evidence would be most disturbing to public opinion. The President appeared to share this point of view.

The scare of further French repressive action against the Lebanese Government has now died down, largely because, after the Prime Minister's cordial reception by the French, the Government showed signs of improvement. The French, on the other hand, have intimated to the Government through their Député that they desire the removal of the Minister of the Interior, the Chief of Police and the Director

of Press, on the grounds of alleged anti-French conduct during and after the disturbances. They appear to have met with a blunt refusal from the Lebanese, maintaining their objection to the Director of the Press. They are nevertheless at present, both publicly and through their organisations, that the Prime Minister is "irreplaceable". At the same time they have succeeded in annoying the President and Government considerably by holding a military review in Beirut on St. Joan of Arc's day without inviting or even notifying the Lebanese authorities. Fortunately, the advice the Legation was able to give on this subject has smoothed over this incident.

The recent discussions between the Syrian Government and General Beynet have resulted in the French Government's consent to the consent of the G.O.C. Ninth Army in the first place and subsequent reference to the French Government. The French Government should be handed over when the Allied High Command no longer considers the Levant to be a likely field of action. The Syrians have proposed that a senior Syrian officer should be attached to the French Territorial Command, and that Syrian officers should be placed in the various bureaux of the Etat-Major, so that they may learn the duties of the command and staff so as to be ultimately in a position to take over.

As regards the Sûreté, further discussions are now to take place on the basis of the Ninth Army revised memorandum (see Summary No. 100 of the 12th April), which has been accepted by the Syrians.

2. H. A. A. A.

Purchases during the period the 4th 13th May amounted to 763 tons of wheat, 1,302 tons of barley and 436 tons of other adulterants, a total of 2,521 tons and a daily average of 262 tons.

The Cereals Commission have not yet decided on the buying prices for this year's harvest, but purchases have been suspended so as to prepare producers for possible reductions.

The Syrian Government have proposed a scheme for the purchase of wheat by loans to be issued by the O.C.P. and guaranteed by the Syrian Government thus replacing the present system whereby purchases are financed by the French, and they are apparently confident of obtaining a sum of £850,000 at a rate of interest of 1 per cent. They ask in return that the Lebanese Government should undertake to buy 100,000 tons of the crop and that the M.H.S.C. should dispose of any surplus above the needs of the Levant States, which are estimated at 250,000 tons. They are prepared to agree to export of cereals as soon as it can be ascertained that the harvest will be more than sufficient to meet the needs of the two States.

3. Syria—Damascus

There has been a very quiet week in Parliament. Nuzem Qudsi and Rashid Karami, of Aleppo, and N. m. Antaki, of Damascus, now form the nucleus of the opposition. The Syrian Government have proposed a scheme for the purchase of wheat by loans to be issued by the O.C.P. and guaranteed by the Syrian Government thus replacing the present system whereby purchases are financed by the French, and they are apparently confident of obtaining a sum of £850,000 at a rate of interest of 1 per cent. They ask in return that the Lebanese Government should undertake to buy 100,000 tons of the crop and that the M.H.S.C. should dispose of any surplus above the needs of the Levant States, which are estimated at 250,000 tons. They are prepared to agree to export of cereals as soon as it can be ascertained that the harvest will be more than sufficient to meet the needs of the two States.

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The draft of the important new Tribal Law has not yet been introduced, a fact which is causing some concern to the Tribal Deputies.

5. Hama and Hama

There is nothing of political importance to report from Hama. The Hama community have shown a nervousness which pro-French elements are eager to exploit. The Prime Minister has recently expressed the view that the disputes

in Hama have not been essentially of a sectarian nature, and has instructed local authority to deal firmly with those who seek to accentuate confessional differences.

Local notables are alarmed at the increasing activities of the Hama Communists, who are mostly Moslems, and have distributed pamphlets reporting the speeches of Khalid Baghdash, the secretary of the Syrian Communist Party. A society known as the "Youth of Mohammed" has issued a reply pointing out that communism is contrary to the Moslem way of life.

It is said that the Mohafez, who is still away from Hama, may resign, and there is already speculation on the choice of a successor.

9. Euphrates and Jezireh.

Euphrates.—It is evident that the future reputation, both of the Mohafez and of the Central Government, will be determined to a large extent by the degree to which the activities of the Communists in the Euphrates region are kept under control. The French authorities, who were largely due to the activities of certain French elements, have been dealt with severely. Some forty Baggara tribesmen are now in prison at Hametche.

10. Tribal

Bedruddin Sabagh, the Assistant Director of the new Tribal Affairs Office in Damascus (see Summary No. 103 of the 22nd March) has informed the Political Officer at Dair ez Zor that it is proposed to create subsidiary offices in the various provincial centres in which a Syrian official would work together with the French Indigénat Control Officer. The success of this system, which is in theory excellent, will no doubt require a greater degree of co-operation from French officers than they have tended to show in the past (see under "Euphrates and Jezireh").

11. The Lebanon

An apparent improvement in Franco-Lebanese relations having turned public attention once more to questions of internal policy, the Government has met with increasing criticism in the Chamber on economic and financial grounds, and the opinion is now being expressed in many quarters that a Cabinet reshuffle is overdue. It is natural that a Government which has remained in office for eight months should be the subject of attack, and it is difficult to determine the extent to which such criticism may be attributed either to a genuine conviction that the present Ministry could be improved, or to the ambition of other Deputies and officials who would benefit by a change. The Prime Minister has stated definitely that he will not change his Ministry on account of the present pressure, but a reshuffle will probably be made when the Minister of the Interior resigns.

The O.C.P., the U.K.C.C., the Banque de Syrie and the Office Economique de Guerre have all been targets for criticism in the Chamber. The Government defended the first three, but stated that they had asked for the creation of the last named as part of the Common Interests. The Government's five-year plan, the cost of living or collect the War Profits Tax, were other points on which the Chamber has expressed its views. The Government obtained considerably less than its usual majority.

The Prime Minister has received a telegram from the Chinese Government announcing their decision to recognise the independence of the Lebanon.

The agreement has been received to the nomination of M. Camille Shamoun as Lebanese Minister in London (W.S. No. 105 Section 1).

12. Press and Propaganda

The statement made by the Lebanese Prime Minister that the Government's enquiry into the events of the 27th April was being pursued with complete

impartiality, and his conciliatory reference to General Beynet's assurances of his determination to implement General Catroux's policy, are regarded by the press as an important contribution towards an improvement in Franco-Lebanese relations. It is emphasised at the same time that relations of friendship must depend on respect for Lebanese independence.

The Maronite Patriarch's declarations of confidence in the Prime Minister are frequently quoted, particularly his assertion that he would not object to being governed by Moslems alone provided that they were all like Riad Suih.

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No. 42

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 112, Syria and the Lebanon, 24th May, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 7th June.)

1. General

THE Lebanese Prime Minister announced in the Chamber on the 20th May the appointment of Camille Shamoun and Ahmed Damk as Lebanese diplomatic representatives in London and Algiers respectively. It appears that the French Committee had decided, after the incidents of the 27th April, to withhold their agreement indefinitely, but that General Heynet forced their hand by acting on earlier instructions to synchronise his action with His Majesty's Government's announcement of the appointment of a Minister in London.

The Lebanese Government have not yet announced the results of their enquiry into the events of the 27th April, nor have they taken any action against Eddé Eddé. Eddé's son has been vainly attempting to provoke a lawyers' strike in protest against the continued detention of two lawyers—followers of his father—who were arrested for complicity in the disturbances. The Government intend eventually to have all the cases tried by a special court, which has not yet been constituted. The results of the independent Anglo-French enquiry are not yet known, though their work has been completed.

The Syrian Prime Minister has informed the Political Officer at Damascus that the Délégué Général's final report on the discussions regarding the transfer of the army, incorporating the suggestions advanced by the Syrians (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May), has been transmitted to Algiers by the hand of M. Chintaigneau, who left by air on the 18th May.

The French Délégué Général and Mme. Beynet gave a reception to celebrate the 1st of May. The President and members of the Government were all very upset over the incident of the military review (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May). The reception was not held until the reception unless they received an undertaking from the French never again to hold a review on Lebanese soil without first seeking the permission of the Lebanese Government. As the French could not afford not to have representatives of the Government at the reception the undertaking was given. The Government decided to suspend the review until the Lebanese Government had given its permission. The review was held on the 1st of May at the Syrian Club. The Syrian Government withheld permission but offered to hold a review on its own premises, provided it were not termed a military review. The review was held and members of the Government duly attended the service. In Aleppo the usual review of French troops took place. The Syrian Government withheld permission without effect. The Government in Damascus.

3. Syria—Damascus

In Parliament political activity has centred round opposition to the Government, particularly over the questions of the Ministry of Supply and the establishment of the civil service, and, though there is no sign of consolidation of opposition, there is criticism by individual Deputies of almost every proposal put forward by the Government. Rashid Kenia of Aleppo (see Summary No. 111,

attributes this criticism to the lack of confidence in the Government as a result of their failure to announce a definite programme.

In a debate on income tax the Government were criticised for leaving the distribution of the tax to the municipalities, who were merely called upon to provide sums to the Government. The Minister of Finance stated that this was the only way to apply the system fairly and to assess each person on his real income.

On the 20th May the peace was broken in Damascus by demonstrators who attacked a demonstration of Moslem ladies at a charity ball to be held that evening. A demonstration had been held against the formation of a women's club earlier in the week. In Damascus the police were some casualties. Calm was restored.

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4. Jebel Druze

Agitation continues for the abolition of the régime of financial and administrative centralisation.

The Druze in the Jebel Druze area are still agitated. The Political Officer at Hama is reported to have received reports of further disturbances. The Druze are still agitated. The Political Officer at Hama is reported to have received reports of further disturbances.

5. Euphrates and Jezireh

Euphrates—Nothing of political importance to report.

Jezireh—The Political Officer at Hama was present at the tribal conference between the Agaidat and Shammar on the 9th May when it was decided that as tribal war had not been declared, there could be no cancellation of all losses. It was therefore resolved that both sides should, before the end of May present to the Syrian and Iraqi authorities lists of casualties and losses suffered during the recent affray. This decision was unpopular with the Agaidat who have a considerable credit balance. A settlement of all claims is to be made, in the presence of arbitrators, on the 15th June in Dair ez Zor.

6. Deir ez Zor

In view of recent tribal differences, the Political Officer at Deir ez Zor is reported to have advised the Syrian Department of Tribal Affairs, in concert with the French Bedouin Control Officers, should take further steps to avert disturbances. The visit of Bedruddin Sabagh (see Summary No. 111 of the 17th May) has not improved matters to any appreciable extent.

11. The Lebanon

The news of M. Shamoun's appointment (see "General") has given point to the rumours that he will take his place in the Ministry. It is generally believed that Hamid Frangieh will take his place in the Cabinet and that the Government are considering the removal of Adel Ossayan from the Ministry of Supply (where he has not been a success) as well as the addition of a Minister of Education.

Following upon the by-elections in North Lebanon there have been clashes between the Maronite and the Druze. An attempt at mediation by the Minister of the Interior failed and fighting between the villagers became so intense that the Government, under the new agreement, called on the French to lend the civil authorities the necessary

troops. Two companies of Senegalese were despatched to the scene to restore order. The villagers have now been constrained to return to their homes and fighting has ceased. The Political Officer states, however, that only determined action by the Government against those responsible for the disturbances will prevent a recurrence. According to the French O.C. Troops in Tripoli, the Troupes Spéciales (which would normally have been used in such an eventuality) were so unreliable that the Senegalese had to be sent in their place. The Lebanese and French authorities are examining the question.

The Government are also considering the payment of arrears for War Profits Tax. A draft Income Tax Law has been submitted to the Chamber for examination.

12. Press and Propaganda

The Lebanese press is still agitated. The newspapers are still agitated. The Lebanese press is still agitated. The newspapers are still agitated.

E 2443 23 69)

No. 43

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 113, Syria and the Lebanon, 31st May, 1944 (Received in Foreign Office, 10th June)

1. General

The troubles in North Lebanon (see paragraph 11 of W.S. No. 112 of the 24th May) are not yet over and the Lebanese Government have been obliged to retain in that area one third of their total gendarmerie force, together with the Senegalese troops which had been supplied by the French. There is a danger of the ill-equipped Lebanese Gendarmerie being unable to deal with further outbreaks in other areas, and the Government have felt compelled to ask the French to place at their disposal a battalion of Troupes Spéciales and some arms and equipment, in order that they may have sufficient forces to maintain internal security pending the conclusion of a definite agreement for the handing over by the French of the Lebanese Troupes Spéciales. The French have apparently agreed in principle but have procrastinated. Reasons are always forthcoming for postponing a final decision.

The Syrian and French delegates met on the 27th May to continue discussions on the transfer of the Shereh. The French are understood to be insisting on special privileges for their nationals, but neither the Syrian nor the Lebanese Governments are prepared to accept this contention. The Syrian Government have agreed to the attachment of a British officer to the future Syrian Security Service.

3. Syria-Damascus

The Syrian Government have been very active in the handling of the demonstrations of the 20th May. The Prime Minister by his confident and vigorous action has deftly turned the original issue, the emancipation of women, into a question merely of civil disturbance which has been dealt with satisfactorily by the Court of First Instance, thus defeating an attempt by the religious Society Al Gharra, who have always been politically ambitious, to impose their will on the Government.

In Parliament there has been little activity. A draft Bill for the Budget and the Finance of the Republic was presented to the Chamber by the Minister of Finance and passed to the Committee of National Economy with the recommendation that the present budget should be continued until the next session of Supply. A further draft Bill which would enable the Minister of Education to revise the establishment of his department by decree met with adverse criticism, but was defended by the Minister concerned, who explained that the scholastic year begins in October, before the re-assembly of Parliament, and that if he were not to receive immediate authority to make appointments, his scheme for the reform of his Ministry must be postponed until next year. The Bill passed into committee.

The British Overseas Airways Corporation as a port of call on the Cairo-Bagdad-Tehran line, and the service will start shortly. The French authorities at the airport are co-operating satisfactorily. The M.I.S.E. will also operate a service between Damascus and Cairo. A proposal for a programme of British Council activities in Syria has met with an enthusiastic response from the Syrian Government.

7. Alauite Territory

The Court of Arbiters is now assembled to deal with the many complaints at Sulaiman Marshid. A member of his harem has meanwhile hoisted the French tricolor in the village of Shutha, and his supporters have been celebrating with rifle fire the rumoured departure of the British from Syria. Numerous protests have been sent to Damascus by Alauites accusing Marshid of working for the re-establishment of mandatory rule.

11. The Lebanon

The Lebanese Government are losing prestige through their failure to take decisive action to settle the trouble in North Lebanon (see "General"). Hamid Frangieh, head of one of the Zghoria factions, handed over five of his partisans, but Joseph Karnin, head of the other faction, failed to produce certain of his men. The Government have ordered by the Government, and this has further damaged their prestige. The present session of the Lebanese Chamber ends on the 31st May, and the next full session does not start until October. The Government have, therefore, decided not to proceed immediately with a ministerial reshuffle, since it is not possible at the present time for Camille Shamoun to take up his new appointment in London. Adel Bey Oueyran has declared that if he is removed from the Ministry of Supply he will leave the Government, and in that case one of the Prime Minister's principal difficulties would be finding a competent successor for him out of the Shia community.

The Phalanga newspaper *L'Action* has circulated an uncensored edition devoted to a bitter attack on the Government. While some of the allegations were more reasonable, it is probable that the Government will be held over until the next session. The Prime Minister and Vice-President, who both made speeches. The Party and its leader received Lebanese decorations.

The British Council, with the cordial support of the Lebanese Government, has decided to embark on a programme of educational and cultural activities in the Lebanon. It has been announced that M. Shamoun, Lebanese Minister Designate to His Majesty's Government, will also be Minister to the Belgian Government in London.

Local newspapers have expressed the view that the recent disturbances in Syria, though ostensibly of a religious nature, were similar in origin to the Beirut incidents of the 27th April, and that their motive was to undermine the foundations of national independence. It is generally considered that whatever may have been their origin, in both cases the results have served to strengthen, if only temporarily, the authority of the respective Governments.

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E 3604 23 80]

No. 44

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 114, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 7th June, 1944—(Received in Foreign Office, 20th June)

1. General

NEGOTIATIONS between the French and the Syrians for the handing over of the armed forces reached a stage during the week when the divergence of their respective claims as to when the eventual transfer should take place threatened to cause serious difficulties.

The French contended that the transfer could only be effected either at "the end of hostilities" (a term which has not been defined), or upon a decision by the National Committee at Algiers.

The Syrians replied that the French had never claimed that they were entitled to limit, except in matters directly connected with the war, Syrian sovereignty, and that there had been no question in all the negotiations but that the armed forces would be handed over as soon as the military situation should permit. They said they had made many concessions and accepted far-reaching

They contended, further, that from the moment when the war definitely and finally receded from the Middle East, no valid military reason could be advanced for their not obtaining control of the army, and that the decision as to when that moment had arrived could only be made by the Supreme Military Commander in the Middle East. They further pointed out that it was clear from Serial No. 11 of the Ninth Army Memorandum, which had been accepted by both French and British, that the General Officer Commanding, Ninth Army, accepted the principle that further powers could be handed over to the local Governments progressively as the danger receded from their territory.

Général Reynet attempted to delay negotiations, but the Syrian Government, being determined to press their case, insisted that they should continue and stated they would have no choice but to recall Parliament should the French refuse to continue the negotiations. The Prime Minister warned Général Reynet plainly that in the present state of public opinion a revolution would almost certainly follow if the Syrians and the French failed to reach an agreement.

The French later produced a proposal that the army should be handed over when the two parties jointly agreed that the time for handing it over to the native Governments had come. The Syrians answered there were two objections to this, the first that it would permit the French to block the handing over indefinitely, the second that it would leave the decision of this purely military question in the hands of a political body, the F.F.V.C., a contingency hitherto never envisaged. They suggested, as an alternative, that the decision as to whether the Levant States were definitely no longer threatened should be left in the hands of the highest military authority in Europe, i.e., General Eisenhower. This point is now being considered by the French.

The Lebanese Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs were present at the Franco-Syrian negotiations concerning both the Troupes Spéciales and the Sécurité.

Negotiations have been concluded for the transfer of the Services of Common Interest, all of which are now under the control of the Syrian and Lebanese Governments.

2. Wheat

Negotiations with the Syrians and the French for financing and fixing the price of the 1944 crop have now been successfully concluded, and only await acceptance by London and Cairo to be put into effect.

An agreement has been concluded between the French and the Syrians whereby the 1944 crop will be sold to the O.C.P. at the same price as in 1943. At one stage the French put forward conditions which were totally unacceptable both to the British and to the Syrians, but they abandoned these in the course of the negotiations.

The following is a brief summary of the points on which agreement has been reached.

M.E.S.C. will guarantee to purchase 100,000 tons of the 1944 crop at prices which are well within the limits assigned by London and Cairo.

It is expected Syrian Government levy (F.A.E.) will not be paid on these quantities.

Prices paid to consumers for all adulterants will be substantially lower than in 1943, and although in the case of wheat the price per ton with 0 per cent. of impurities is maintained, the amount actually receivable by the producer will be decreased by raising the standard of deductions for impurity content and charging transport costs to the producer.

The Syrians have agreed to refund the 15 per cent. F.A.E. on all cereals from the 1943 crop delivered to the British army, and to adjust the charges on deliveries to Palestine, Cyprus and the U.K.C.C. to the prices paid by the local Ravitaillements. The total saving resulting to the British taxpayer from these refunds will be in the neighbourhood of 2 million Syrian pounds.

3. Syria-Damascus

The Ministry of Supply has again been the centre of interest in Parliament. Demands for the appointment of a commission to enquire into alleged irregularities were resisted by the Government, who have decided to appoint their own committee of three civil servants of reputed integrity. The budget for the Ministry of Supply being still under consideration by the Committee of National Economy, it was decided to continue temporarily the system of *douzièmes*.

Parliament rose on the 31st May and will not meet again, until September.

The President's health is improving, but his British medical advisers suggest that he should have Damascus with him until he is fully recovered.

4. Euphrates and Jezireh

Jezireh.—Tension is again reported between the semi-sedentary tribes of Jezireh and the Syrian authorities (see Weekly Summary No. 111 of the 17th May). The Mhafez states that he has appealed several times in vain to the French for assistance in enforcing a settlement, and has now gone to Damascus with his Commandant of Gendarmerie to give his personal account of the recent tribal disturbances and of French activities in the Jezireh.

11. The Lebanon

The trouble in North Lebanon seems to be nearly over. The Government, in spite of their failure to obtain a battalion of *Troupes Spéciales* from the French (see paragraph 1 of Weekly Summary No. 113 of the 31st May), decided that strong measures must be employed, and gave full powers to the Minister of the Interior to effect the necessary arrests. Most of the supporters of Karam originally implicated (ten in all) are in custody, and a number of the gendarmerie have now been withdrawn.

Parliament has passed the budget, together with special allocations for the Ministries of Supply and Finance. The extraordinary session will be called towards the end of the month to consider the draft Income Tax Law and other outstanding matters.

The composition of a National Court of Justice to deal with offences against the law of the State, and of a Tribunal of Commerce to deal with disputes between merchants, has been submitted for trial. Transjordan has recognised the independence of the Lebanon.

E 3701 23 89]

No. 46

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 115, Syria and the Lebanon
14th June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 24th June.)

1. General

Discussions between the French, Syrians and Lebanese regarding the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* of Syria have continued all the week but, although progress was made, particularly as regards the *Sûreté*, no final result has as yet been achieved.

In reply to a request by the Syrian Government for 1,000 rifles for the gendarmerie, the French have offered 400 1907 model rifles at a cost of £Syr 400 each, which is equivalent to approximately five and a half times the cost, including transport, of the 1884 manufacture rifles at 147 piastres (3s 4d) a round. This offer being unacceptable, the Syrian Government may, it is understood, decide to send a mission to the British Ministry of War Affairs, that the British authorities should provide the arms and equipment of which the gendarmerie are so urgently in need. The Lebanese Government may be expected to take similar action.

The Syrian and Lebanese Prime Ministers, having been informed by the French that the Soviet Government were considering the possibility of recognising the independence of their respective States and of appointing to them diplomatic representatives, have now decided to send a Syrian official to Cairo in order to establish contact there with the Soviet Legation. They apparently propose to reply to the French that they welcome the idea but would prefer to discuss it direct with the Soviets.

The news of the Allied landing in France induced a wave of somewhat exaggerated optimism throughout Syria and the Lebanon, causing a marked fall in commodity prices during the first few days.

2. Wheat

The agreement fixing the prices and the financing of the 1944 harvest, and granting refunds to the army and other British authorities on purchases from the 1943 crop have been signed by all the interested parties (see para. 2 of W.S. No. 114 of the 7th June).

E 3677 217 89]

No. 46

Mr. Duff Cooper to Mr. Eden.—(Received 23rd June)

(No. 1101)

(Telegraphic)

Algiers, 22nd June, 1944

I FOUND Massigli this evening in a state of violent agitation and extreme expression. He said that on 17th June the attitude of the Syrian Government, with regard to the handing over of special troops had suddenly hardened, and that the Syrian Prime Minister had referred to some "secret" that was in his possession on 21st June. His Majesty's Minister at Beirut informed General Spears that the British authorities had decided to supply the Syrian gendarmerie with arms and equipment. This he took to be the "secret" which the Syrian Prime Minister had referred to.

2. Massigli reminded me that on 5th February this year, a definite assurance had been given that the British would not give Syrians assistance either in finance or equipment or in materials in order to enable them to maintain native troops and that this assurance had been given by General Spears to M. Oatrogog at Beirut, by Sir M. Peterson to M. Vienot in London and by me to himself. He added that on 4th April this assurance had been reaffirmed by the Foreign Office. He suggested that giving of arms to the Syrian gendarmerie was in spirit if not in words a clear breach of this undertaking.

3. He added that it was also a breach of article 4 of 1936 of the League of Nations agreement, which laid down that the French should be the dominant Power in the Levant and mentioned specifically control over gendarmerie.

4. There was nothing in the existing situation to justify such an act without consent or consultation. The French authorities were well able to look after the internal security, and it could hardly have been contended that Turkey was likely at the present time to make unprovoked attack upon territories under the control of the United Nations. In view of the fact that the British had agreed to our demand that there should be set up at Beirut a Franco-British Committee with the express duty of examining all questions of military security. If there were really any need for rearming the gendarmerie the question should have been referred in the first instance to this committee.

5. He said that in his opinion, the only way to avoid the dangers which he foresaw might arise at the present time when negotiations which we all hoped would prove successful were under way, was to proceed to the point of view of the situation in the language the dangers which he foresaw might arise.

E 3792 217 89]

No 47

Mr Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Algiers)

(No 972,
(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 29th June, 1944

YOL R telegram No. 1212 and my telegram No. 865, paragraph 2 (of 27th and 28th June) Syrian armed forces.

The case of the *Troupes Spéciales* is quite different from that of the gendarmerie. In the first place negotiations for transfer of the former to the States Governments are actively proceeding, and it would militate against securing the conditions which the French and we desire to attach to this transfer if arms were to be supplied by us before agreement is reached. In the second place, the creation of a Syrian national army would not in any way advance the war effort at present, and we have therefore adopted the line that we would not be willing to supply arms to it, though we shall have to see that *Troupes Spéciales* carrying out operational duties for us during the war are properly armed and equipped.

2. Gendarmerie, however, has important duties to fulfil in maintaining internal security, and it is a direct military concern of ours to see that it is capable of fulfilling those duties. We do not deny that (as between the French and ourselves) gendarmerie is primarily a French responsibility under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreement, but we cannot for reason given above disinterested ourselves from its efficiency. See in this connexion Lord Moyne's telegram No. 1537 with which I agree.

3. Moreover discussions of last February to which you refer related to the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* to the States Governments. The Syrian gendarmerie are already a Syrian force (though the French had some say in its control).

4. No one could have had the gendarmerie in mind when we informed you (by telegram No. 1191) that there had at no time been any intention on the part of the British Government accepting a financial commitment to the Levant Governments. Indeed, the French seem to be reading into this alleged "undertaking" far more than we for our part had ever intended, but as we still have no intention of accepting such a financial commitment this does not greatly matter.

E 3830 217 89]

No 48

Mr Eden to Mr. Duff Cooper (Algiers)

(No 230)

Foreign Office, 29th June, 1944

M VIENOT called upon me this afternoon and made representations, on instructions from M. Massigli, regarding the decision of the British authorities in the Levant States to furnish arms for the gendarmerie. The general lines on which he spoke were the same as the representations which M. Massigli has made to you (see your telegram No. 1191). M. Vienot complained that the question of the gendarmerie was a French responsibility under article 4 of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, and that Sir E. Spears should not have offered arms to the Syrian Government without previous agreement with the French authorities. He said that, while the question might have its technical aspects, our action must undoubtedly have political effects injurious to French interests, in particular, the effect would be to eliminate the French from all further influence in regard to the gendarmerie.

2. M. Vienot recalled the assurances given by you on the 5th February to the effect that we would not give financial assistance or arms to the Levant States to enable them to maintain an army, and urged that it was impossible to separate the gendarmerie from the army for this purpose.

3. A Mr. H. [redacted] who was present at the interview explained to M. Vienot the distinction between the gendarmerie and the *troupes spéciales* on the lines of my telegram No. 972. He recalled that the need for strengthening the gendarmerie in the Levant States had been apparent for some months, and that the French themselves had recognised this need. The Syrians had been unwilling to buy arms from the French and Sir E. Spears himself when he saw the Syrian President and Prime Minister in March with the Commander-in-Chief, 9th Army, had urged that this was an untenable attitude and had pressed

the Syrian Government to purchase the necessary arms without more ado. Subsequently, it had become apparent that the French could not supply the necessary arms at the present moment.

4. I told M. Vienot that we recognised that the French were entitled to be consulted regarding the provision of arms for the gendarmerie, but that, since our military authorities regarded the need as urgent, I must request that the matter should be dealt with as a matter of urgency. I also pointed out that the proposal contained in my telegram No. 972, paragraph 6, that an Anglo-French committee should agree on its composition, which should preferably be military, since the question was a military one.

5. M. Vienot appeared to be favourably impressed by this suggestion. He suggested that it might in any case be well if the arms were not in the end provided direct by the British military authorities, but were given to the French authorities for their disposal.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Beirut and to the Resident Minister in the Middle East.

I am &
ANTHONY EDEN

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

E 1580 16 63]

No 49

Mr Eden to Lord Moyne, Minister of State Resident in Cairo

(N)

My Lord,

Foreign Office 18th April, 1944.

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the memorandum dated 14th April 1944, which was sent to the State Department at the opening of his informal conversations with Mr. [redacted] on 14th April 1944.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, [redacted] and His Majesty's Ambassadors at [redacted].

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN

Enclosure in No. 49

British Policy in the Middle East

THIS paper is written without regard to the possibility of an United Nations Conference on the Middle East, or to the way to maintain peace and security, and to implement the terms of the Atlantic Charter.

2. There is nothing in British policy as defined below which need imply that we are in any way opposed to the principle of self-determination in general colonial territories. And its peace and security are already partially, and not ineffectively, guaranteed by the treaty relations existing between the countries of the Middle East.

3. The Middle East as a whole is of particular importance to the British Commonwealth. It lies on the main line of communication by sea, land and air between the United Kingdom and India and the Dominions in the Pacific Ocean. In time of peace the importance of this route is obvious, but in war the necessity to maintain the link unimpaired by the triangle Suez, Aleppo and Basra would mean not only dislocation of the British Empire's oil supplies but interference in the vital oil supplies from the Middle East oilfields to the Eastern Mediterranean and through the Persian Gulf. The Middle East is in fact a buffer between our principal enemies, Germany and Japan, and at the same time a vital link in the system of communications of the British Commonwealth. The importance of the Middle East to the British Commonwealth may perhaps be likened to that of the Caribbean Area and the Canal Zone to the United States.

4. In order to secure the safety of their interests in this area it has been for many years the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to assist in the development of prosperous, progressive and stable Governments of a high degree of internal security and with stable Governments and a sound economic background. His Majesty's Government attach particular importance to the development of these conditions and have done their best to promote them.

5. When the countries of the Arab Peninsula were separated from the Ottoman Empire at the end of the last war it was already clear that most of them had passed beyond the colonial era but were not sufficiently developed politically, socially and economically to be quite fit to govern themselves. This state of affairs was recognised in the series of treaties concluded for Syria, Palestine and Transjordan, and the special Treaty of 1922 concluded with Iraq. His Majesty's Government have taken steps to ensure that the development of self-government in these territories is in accordance with their general policy of sympathy towards the Arab Nationalist movement. The approach of stability and self-government has been hastened by the guidance and encouragement given

by His Majesty's Government to Arab countries, particularly in matters connected with their economic, social and educational well-being. His Majesty's Government gladly recognise and welcome similar Arab efforts in some of these countries. The development of self-government in these States is a tender plant and it seems likely that they will continue to require assistance, especially in facing modern economic problems. Many British subjects have acquired special aptitude for this, apart from any contributions that may be made by the Middle East Supply Centre.

At the instance of His Majesty's Government the mandatory regime for Syria and Lebanon was replaced by a new independent member of the League of Nations, the State of Syria, which was approved by the Council of the League of Nations.

When in the summer of 1941 Syria had been defence against external aggression. When in the summer of 1941 Syria and the Lebanon were removed from the control of Vichy France and cleared of German influence, His Majesty's Government were able to arrange with General

is complicated by the question of the Jewish Home. His Majesty's Government still hoped that some measure of agreement might be obtained among its inhabitants on a satisfactory form of government.

7. Transjordan is ruled autonomously by the Emir Abdullah, with a certain amount of assistance from His Majesty's Government under the mandate.

8. With Saudi Arabia His Majesty's Government are in the closest relations of friendship and they have given a substantial subsidy to Ibn Saud to enable him to overcome the critical situation resulting from the war and the falling off of the pilgrim traffic. His Majesty's Government have also the most intimate ties with the Arab sheikhdoms on the south coast of the Persian Gulf with whom they have special treaty relations, dating in most cases from the last century. Both Saudi Arabia and the Gulf sheikhdoms contain oilfields of great actual and potential value on which American foreign policy is largely concentrated. At the same time on the full co-operation of the sheikhdoms depends a vital trunk line of air communication.

9. Among the various peoples of the Middle East, the Arabs are the most numerous and the extension of Arabic speaking people becoming a dominant factor in the Islamic culture and tradition. The process, are hastening the possibilities of co-operation with neighbouring peoples. It has been shown recently in the possibility of at least active co-operation by the Prime Minister. Certain personalities in Syria. While few Arab politicians or statesmen agree in any detail on what can or should be realised in this direction His Majesty's Government have announced that they would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural and political unity. But clearly the initiative—in the political sphere at least—will have to come from the Arabs themselves and so far no such scheme which would command approval has been worked out.

10. Persia and Afghanistan fall outside the framework of the Arab countries mentioned above but they are of particular interest and importance to His Majesty's Government. The maintenance of a stable and friendly Government in Afghanistan is of vital concern for the defence of India, while Persia borders not only on India but also on Iraq for the defence of which His Majesty's Government have treaty obligations. Both Persia and Iraq contain oilfields of the highest strategic value.

11. With this prelude further details may be given of British policy towards each individual country.

Palestine.

12. The policy of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Jewish Home in Palestine is based on the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. Various interpretations of these instruments have been elaborated from time to time, the last occasion being the White Paper of 1939 which it hardly seems necessary to summarise here. Meanwhile tranquillity in Palestine is essential for the duration of the war. This consideration must necessarily dominate all questions connected

with the Jewish Home and the attitude towards its realisation adopted by the local population, both Jewish and Arab, as well as by the Jews in other parts of the world and by the Arabs in other Arab countries. As has already been stated His Majesty's Government have hoped that eventually it might be possible to obtain some measure of agreement between the inhabitants of Palestine on a satisfactory form of government. Owing to the need for tranquility no fundamental decisions are desirable until the end of the war with Germany.

13. Under British guidance and largely as the result of Jewish activity the initiative Palestine has made since the beginning of the present war. Whatever the political outcome of the present situation may be Haifa is bound to remain a port of very great importance as it is one terminus of the pipe-line from Kirkuk to the Mediterranean. Palestine is also bound to retain its importance owing to its proximity to the Suez Canal and to sea and air communications essential to the British Commonwealth of Nations.

14 Under the Mandate, His Majesty's Government undertake the sole responsibility for the administration of Palestine, and have borne at the cost of British resources and British lives the burden of repressing the disturbances consequent on the policy approved by the League of Nations and United States Government, of facilitating the immigration of European Jews. In the long run it has to be recognised that whatever settlement is made in Palestine must either meet with the acquiescence of the surrounding peoples or be maintained by force.

15. Transjordan is a more primitive and desert country but it is ruled autonomously by the Amir Abdullah with a certain amount of assistance from His Majesty's Government who are responsible, under the Mandate and by agreement with the Amir for the conduct of his foreign relations. He has been loyal throughout the stresses of the war and his hereditary feud with Ibn Saud has never seriously affected the peace and prosperity of the Arabs. The future of Transjordan cannot be altogether separated from the future of Palestine although it is under a separate Administration. The Amir Abdullah has several times suggested to His Majesty's Government the termination of the mandate but it seemed better that a decision should await the outcome of the present state of transition in Palestine and Syria.

Leontopodium

16. As previously stated, His Majesty's Government have been able to arrange for the recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the French authorities. In return they have assured the latter notably in an exchange of letters between General de Gaulle and Mr. Oliver Lyautey, 11 [redacted] of state at Cairo, dated the 7th August, 1941, that Great Britain [redacted] disputing the position of France in this area. As a result of the elections recently held in the Levant States, democratic governments have emerged which it is hoped will be sufficiently stable to enable the position to be regularised on a basis of real independence. It has not been possible during the war to regularise the position by the formal termination of the mandate, nor is the form of connexion between France and the Levant States yet settled or agreed. One method, according to our conception and aspiration, a stable and co-operative frame, might involve the conclusion of treaties between that country and the Levant States, the effect of which would be to put France in a similar position to that which Great Britain enjoys in Iraq. Such treaties have been suggested by the French [redacted] though the intention of the Levant States to conclude them is more problematical than it seemed at first. But meanwhile it is hoped that substantial self government will be granted by the French National Committee of Liberation as the result of General Catroux's negotiations and that an equitable *modus vivendi* will result by which the countries concerned can conduct their day-to-day relations on a mutually agreed basis, at any rate for the duration of the war.

17. The interest of His Majesty's Government in the Levant States was great during the war. The Levant States were in the hands of the Allied hands while the command of a British force was maintained in the Levant States. In general the present situation in the Levant States can never be a

matter of indifference to His Majesty's Government, as a Power with large responsibilities and interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and the outlying islands of Syria are bound to remain of strategic importance.

As a result, production of cereals is of special importance to the economy of the Middle East, and it is not a coincidence that the United States has been the leading supplier of cereals to the Middle East since the war. The United States has been the leading supplier of cereals to the Middle East since the war. The United States has been the leading supplier of cereals to the Middle East since the war.

bordering on the Eastern Mediterranean which were separated as the result of the last war. His Majesty's Government do not exclude the possibility of some future arrangement which might be made for the purpose of effecting a settlement of the outstanding questions of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Transjordan, should it be found that the interests of the peoples concerned are best served by such a settlement. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to support the efforts of the British Empire to secure a settlement of the outstanding questions of the Middle East. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to support the efforts of the British Empire to secure a settlement of the outstanding questions of the Middle East. It is the policy of His Majesty's Government to support the efforts of the British Empire to secure a settlement of the outstanding questions of the Middle East.

Index

20. The relations between His Majesty's Government and Iraq are governed by the Treaty of Alliance of 1930. Extensive economic, financial, technical and educational help has been given by His Majesty's Government to Iraq which has made much progress in the last twenty years. But like other Arab countries, its recent history, culminating in the Rashid Ali coup d'Etat of 1941, seems to show that its Government is incapable of fully Iraq's potentialities and to maintain an effective internal control, unless it receives military, economic and technical support and assistance. There are important reserves of oil in Iraq, the development of which has been undertaken by groups representing British and other interests. Iraq will remain of special importance to the British Commonwealth of Nations not only because of her oil resources, but also as an essential air and land link between Great Britain, India, Australia and the Far East. By Article 5 of the Treaty of Alliance of 1930 "His Majesty the King of Iraq recognises that the permanent maintenance and protection in all circumstances of the frontiers and interests of His British Majesty is in the common interest of the High Contracting Parties," and aires for air bases have, in accordance with this article been allocated to His Majesty's Government at Shabha and Habbaniyah.

21 During the war Iraq has acquired a special importance as a base for the forces necessary to operate and protect the Persian Gulf supply routes to the Soviet Union and also as an important source of cereals and food-stuffs for consumption in the Middle East. Special arrangements have been made by H.M. Majesty's Government to purchase the Iraqi surplus of barley and dates for distribution according to the needs of other Middle East countries by the Middle East Supply Centre.

22. But I wish to emphasise the related policy of Persia. The Persian Declaration confirms the hope of His Majesty's Government that the stability and independence of Persia can be maintained unimpaired by anything approaching spheres of influence. His Majesty's Government have already appreciated the efforts of the United States Government to this end. It is, however, that general security and the defence of oil supplies and communications in the oilfields area must be ensured by forces based on Iraqi or other Arab territory.

Saudi Arabia

23. Shortly after the conquest of the Hejaz and the expulsion of the Hashimite dynasty by Ibn Saud, a treaty was concluded between him and His Majesty's Government at Jeddah on the 20th May, 1927 by which His Majesty's Government recognised Ibn Saud as King of the Hejaz and Nejd and their dependencies. Ibn Saud, for his part, undertook to maintain friendly and peaceful relations with the Arab sheikhdoms in the Persian Gulf, who were in friendly relations with the British Government. The friendly relations between Ibn Saud and the various Arab principalities in the Arabian peninsula is considered by His Majesty's Government to be an essential requirement for the continuation of stable conditions along the eastern and western coasts of the peninsula.

24. Friendly relations with Ibn Saud are also a matter of great importance to His Majesty's Government because of the former's influence, as keeper of the shrine at Mecca, with the large Moslem population in India and in other parts of the British Empire, and also because of Saudi Arabia's proximity to the sea route to India. Throughout the war Ibn Saud has made no secret of his sympathy for the cause of the democracies, and on many occasions, notably during the Iraqi rebellion of May 1941 he has used his influence on behalf of His Majesty's Government and the United Nations generally.

25. Saudi Arabia depends for its revenue to a great extent on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and as this pilgrimage was seriously reduced by war conditions, His Majesty's Government undertook early in the war to provide Ibn Saud with a subsidy. This subsidy is being provided through the Middle East Supply Centre at the cost of His Majesty's Government. Help in the form of Lend-Lease assistance is also being provided to Saudi Arabia. The Saudi Arabian oil industry is controlled by the California Arabian Standard Oil Company, which holds a large concession in Eastern Saudi Arabia. In the course of time Ibn Saud should receive a substantial income from royalties, but at present it is upon financial help from His Majesty's Government that the Saudi Arabian administration mainly depends.

26. In view of the proximity of Saudi Arabia to Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and other territories in which Great Britain is interested, His Majesty's Government are closely concerned in proposals which have been made for allotting increased quantities of modern armaments to Ibn Saud. It is clearly not in the best interests of the Arab peoples that there should be a higher level of armaments in the Arab countries than is necessary to achieve internal security. In view of the mutual suspicion between some of them, any higher level than this is bound to lead to international tension, with harmful results both to the Arab peoples themselves, to the Jews in Palestine and in Arab territories and to the international companies and communications operating in the area. It is a policy of His Majesty's Government to discourage any such proposals and it will co-operate with the Foreign Office in discouraging any high level of armaments in the Arab countries.

The Yemen

27. The position in the Yemen is a matter of some importance to His Majesty's Government. The Yemen is a country in which the British Government has a long and friendly relationship. In April 1934 an agreement was concluded between the British Government and the Yemeni Government in which both parties agreed to do nothing which might in any way impair the independence or integrity of the Yemen. The only matter of dispute between His Majesty's Government and the King of the Yemen is the question of the frontier between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate. His Majesty's Government have accepted the frontier as it existed in 1934, but the King of the Yemen has refused to admit the validity of this Convention and claims large sections of the Aden Protectorate. By a treaty of the 11th February, 1934 the frontier existing at that date was stabilised pending a final decision. Apart from occasional differences of opinion as to the line of the frontier, relations between the two countries have remained consistently friendly.

Arab States in the Persian Gulf

28. British interest in the Persian Gulf dates from the 17th and 18th centuries, but it was at the beginning of the 19th century that Great Britain

entered upon her greatest task there, at considerable cost to herself, in clearing the Gulf of piracy, in putting down the slave trade and, later, gun-running, and in buoying and beaconing its waters for the peaceful development of the commerce of all nations. In a series of treaties with the local rulers His Majesty's Government have secured for the British Empire the responsibility for their military protection, with the result that the States in question have enjoyed a period of peace and prosperity for many years despite the restrictions which the natural poverty of the area has hitherto placed upon economic progress. In return for this, Great Britain has insured herself, so far as she has been able, against the establishment of any potentially aggressive Power in the Gulf to threaten her communications with India. The interests of Great Britain are to improve the prospects of these States, especially at Bahrain. It is of great importance that the existing peaceful conditions, and thus impede the development of the oil and other resources of the area, as well as the important cable and air communications which run via the Gulf to India.

Persia

29. British policy in Persia was explained in some detail in a memorandum issued by the British Government in 1941. The objectives of His Majesty's Government in regard to Persia seemed then, and still seem, to correspond very closely with those of the United States Government, and this fact has been confirmed by the declaration regarding Persia issued at the Tehran Conference in December 1943.

30. Taking a long view, the interests of Persia and of His Majesty's Government are identical. We desire to see a stable and independent Persia, and the common interest of Persia of His Majesty's Government and of the Soviet Government in this aim was expressed in the Anglo-Soviet Persian Alliance signed on the 20th January 1942. According to that Treaty, the forces of the Allied Powers shall be withdrawn from Iranian territory not later than six months after all hostilities between the Allied Powers and Germany and her associates have been suspended by the conclusion of an armistice or armistices, or on the conclusion of peace between them, whichever date is the earlier.

31. His Majesty's Government recognise the hardships which the war has brought to Persia, which they have done their utmost to mitigate within the limitations imposed by the world shortage of shipping and commodities, and by the paramount need in the interests of the common war effort to send the maximum possible amount of supplies to Russia. In so far as the difficulties of Persia are due to administrative defects, His Majesty's Government have believed that United States advisers would best be able to exercise a useful influence in Persia. If such advisers were not available it would probably be necessary to propose that the Persian Government should seek advisers from some other Power. His Majesty's Government have been most anxious to see Persia free from the influence of any Power other than the United States Government, and they have been most anxious to see Persia free from the influence of any Power other than the United States Government.

32. The British Government are most anxious to see Persia free from the influence of any Power other than the United States Government, and they have been most anxious to see Persia free from the influence of any Power other than the United States Government. The Trans-Iranian Railway, with its southern termini at Bandar Shahpur and Khorramshahr and its northern outlet on the Caspian, has proved its value as a supply line to Russia during the War, and its efficient maintenance and administration in the post-war years is likely to be a matter of commercial and political concern to more than one of the United Nations. India also has specially close relations with Persia in the commercial and cultural sphere. Persia is an important market, actual and potential, for India's products, particularly tea and piece-goods. Indian Shiadom worships at Persian and Iraqi shrines while India as a whole, not excluding even branches of Hindu culture, owes much of its literary and artistic inspiration to Persian sources.

33. Persia is also of special strategic concern to His Majesty's Government because it borders on India, for the defence of which they are responsible

3. Reverting to the document, I commented that while it spoke in eloquent terms of a union of Arab States, so far as I was aware we were still far from such a desirable state of affairs; and as for the active help that the Arab States had given us, we here had not yet forgotten Raschid Ali's rebellion.

4. The Ambassador did not defend his Prime Minister's document with any great vigour and asked me what he was to say to Nuhus Pasha. I suggested that it would be enough if he said that he had conveyed the document to me. His Excellency also mentioned that copies of this had been sent to the French National Committee, the United States Government and the Soviet Government.

I am, etc
ANTHONY EDEN

Enclosure in No. 50

Mon Excellence le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat
de Sa Majesté Britannique pour les
Affaires Etrangères, Londres.

Excellence,

Le Caire, le [1] avril 1944

Les leçons de la guerre et la révolution des esprits ont amené les Etats et les individus à considérer comme une nécessité absolue l'établissement d'un monde meilleur. En effet, les peuples pour l'avenir ont en totalité une démocratie épurée et sincère envisagent, à la fois avec espoir et anxiété, la réalité d'une paix qui, non seulement doit mettre fin aux violences de la guerre, mais organiser l'existence des nations et des individus dans l'entente, la confiance et la solidarité.

2. Dans les tragiques circonstances que nous traversons et à cette heure qui est la plus difficile de l'histoire de l'humanité, il est de notre devoir de prendre une part active à l'élaboration du monde futur, d'exprimer son opinion avec franchise et d'émettre avec netteté ses suggestions. Pour l'Egypte, que des considérations historiques et sociales placent en tête des pays arabes et qui, par sa position géographique, est en contact avec les deux mondes, une qui jamais désignée à servir d'agent de liaison, d'entente et de paix entre l'Occident et l'Orient, c'est un devoir, qu'elle ne saurait esquivier, d'élever la voix et de défendre la cause de l'Union arabe, qui est en même temps une cause de coopération entre Etats et peuples liés par d'étroites affinités culturelles, morales et politiques.

Les peuples arabes, qui ont été les premiers à souffrir de la guerre, ont, au milieu de la tourmente, dans le concert des nations, d'actifs éléments de paix et de civilisation. D'autres souffrent encore d'être incompris et de traîner le boulet humiliant imposé par des régimes périmés. Ce sont des Etats, ce sont des hommes qui ont le souci de leur dignité, qui nourrissent des aspirations légitimes et qui ne peuvent accepter d'être traités en Etats et en individus inférieurs à qui est refusé le droit d'être respectés, indépendants et libres, et de jouir des bienfaits d'une vraie civilisation.

4. Les peuples arabes, qui, chacun dans sa sphère, ont apporté à la cause des Nations Unies toute l'aide en leur pouvoir, à la fois pour faciliter la victoire et pour assurer la paix, ont vu leur rôle se concrétiser dans la formation de l'Union arabe en sérieuse voie de réalisation. Par cette Union ils ont la certitude qu'un équilibre qui manquait à l'organisation d'un monde meilleur sera trouvé et qu'entre l'Orient et l'Occident sera enfin close l'ère des malentendus.

5. Aussi bien, cette Union serait incomplète et ne produirait pas ses meilleurs effets si les peuples arabes de l'Afrique du Nord s'en trouvaient exclus et continuaient à vivre sous des régimes contraires à leurs droits et à leurs aspirations. L'Algérie, le Maroc, la Tunisie et la Libye entendent bénéficier, à leur tour, des principes pour lesquels se battent les Nations Unies. Il semble qu'on ne saurait, sans injustice, leur refuser un droit naturel et il serait profondément regrettable qu'ils soient les seuls à être tenus à l'écart des peuples libres et indépendants.

6. La Grande-Bretagne, l'Amérique et l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, autant par leurs actes que par leurs déclarations, ont encouragé et aidé la libération et l'indépendance des peuples. La France ne peut pas, de moins et nous apprécions les efforts du Comité d'Alger de modifier la politique

coloniale française. Les dirigeants de sa politique ont déjà prouvé qu'ils sont prêts à accepter non seulement la suppression de la Syrie et du Liban, mais aussi la création d'un Etat arabe en Algérie. Cependant, ces événements exigent également ailleurs des mesures définitives et des décisions complètes. La glorieuse France d'hier, qui redeviendra la glorieuse France de demain, ne doit de n'être pas la dernière à manifester en actes son libéralisme et son esprit de démocratie.

7. La France, en reconnaissant le droit des peuples arabes à l'indépendance, a le devoir de solidarité en soumettant à la France et aux Nations Unies les desiderata des peuples de l'Afrique du Nord. Loin de voir son prestige diminué, la France y trouvera, en outre, dans la reconnaissance de leur indépendance et de leur droit de la Charte de l'Atlantique, les modalités de l'indépendance de l'Algérie, du Maroc et de la Tunisie. Elle trouverait, dans la reconnaissance de leur indépendance, la justification de sa politique nouvelle et établirait, en même temps, avec ces pays, des rapports d'amitié et d'alliance beaucoup plus sincères et productifs que les rapports de dépendance qui sont cause aujourd'hui, et le seront davantage demain, de bien des frictions et de troubles.

8. C'est desormais, esprit de coopération et de justice et de solidarité, qui doit régner entre les peuples arabes et les peuples de l'Occident. Une paix durable, est à cette condition. Devant l'Occident et l'Orient au avenir particulièrement fécond s'ouvrira si les droits et les intérêts mutuels sont respectés et si la justice est égale pour tous. Une paix qui ne tiendrait pas compte des réalités nouvelles, qui, dans l'organisation du monde futur ne donnerait pas à l'Orient toute la place qui lui revient et qui ne reconnaîtrait pas ses droits, serait une paix dangereuse. Les peuples espèrent mieux et davantage, l'Orient comme l'Occident, l'ancien monde comme le nouveau.

9. Comme prélude à l'ère nouvelle, les peuples arabes attendent des Nations Unies et plus particulièrement de la France que, revenant sur le passé, il soit mis fin au régime de vexations et de persécutions, que les leaders emprisonnés soient libérés et qu'il soit permis aux représentants authentiques de l'Afrique du Nord d'exprimer, sans crainte de représailles, leurs légitimes aspirations. Ainsi la France nouvelle donnerait une courageuse mesure de son libéralisme et mériterait l'amitié et le respect de tout l'Orient arabe.

Veillez agréer, Excellence, l'assurance de ma haute considération

Le Président du Conseil,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères

CONFIDENTIAL

{16790

File Number

T

TREATY

Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 58

July to September 1944

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

Chapter I.—AFGHANISTAN

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
Mr. Square No. 56	July 1	Heads of foreign missions in Afghanistan Annual report	
No. 76		Leading personalities in Afghanistan Annual report	

Chapter II. IRAQ

Mr. Thompson No. 320			
Mr. Thompson No. 332	Aug. 14	Situation in Iraq Further account of recent events	

Chapter III. PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

Sir H. B. Hall No. 261	June 26	Persian finances Revenue and expenditure of the Persian Government for 1943-44. Dr. Miltipont's report. The budget for 1944-45	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 273	July 1	Heads of foreign missions at Tehran	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 281	July	Report on events in Persia during the months of April, May and June 1944	
No. 283, E		Report on events in Persia by the financial controller, dated the 3rd July	
No. 27		Six-monthly report on the political situation January-June 1944	
No. 27	Aug. 22	Situation in Azerbaijan course of events in Azerbaijan	
Mr. Jordan No. 346	Sept. 6	Further report on the composition of the 14th Majlis	

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

Sir H. B. Hall No. 263		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 19th June to 25th June, 1944	
No. 275		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the period 26th June to 2nd July 1944	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

111

No. and Name	Date	Subject	Page
Sir H. B. Hall No. 266		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 27 for the period 2nd July to 10th July 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 268		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the period 11th July to 18th July 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 293		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period 19th July to 26th July 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 312		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period 27th July to 3rd August 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 321		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the period 4th August to 11th August 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 333		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period 12th August to 19th August 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 341		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the period 20th August to 27th August 1944	
Sir H. B. Hall No. 361		Situation in Persia Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period 28th August to 4th September 1944	

Chapter IV. SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Jordan No. 61	July 1	Heads of foreign missions in Saudi Arabia Annual report	
		Leading personalities in Saudi Arabia Annual report	

Chapter V.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON

(A) Miscellaneous.

To Sir E. Spears No. 53, A	Aug. 27	British policy in the Levant Instructions to His Majesty's Minister	
Foreign Office	Aug. 28	British and French policy in relation to the Levant States Report of conversations with the French Delegation at the Foreign Office on the 28th August, 1944	
To Mr. Mackenzie No. 136	Aug. 30	British and French policy in relation to the Levant States Mr. Mackenzie's note dated 24th August and Foreign Office note dated 24th August in reply	
No. 139	Sept. 1	British policy in the Levant States Lines on which it is now proposed to conduct His Majesty's Legation and the Spears Mission in the Levant. Importance of a treaty being concluded between the States and the	

(B) Weekly Political Summaries

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
29	44	Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 118 21st June, 1944	144
30		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 119 28th June, 1944	145
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 120 5th July, 1944	146
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 121 12th July, 1944	147
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 122 19th July, 1944	148
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 123 26th July, 1944	149
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 124 2nd August, 1944	150
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 125 9th August, 1944	151
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 126 16th August, 1944	152
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 127 23rd August, 1944	153
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 128 30th August, 1944	154
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 129 6th September, 1944	155
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 130 13th September, 1944	156
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 131 20th September, 1944	157
		Situation in the Levant States Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 132 27th September, 1944	158

Chapter VI. GENERAL

31	Mr. E. Spears No. 39	1944 June 29	Armenians in the Lebanon Memorandum regarding the historical position of the Armenians in the Lebanon, their past future
----	-------------------------	-----------------	---

SUBJECT INDEX

figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

AFGHANISTAN—

Heads of missions—1
Leading personalities—2

T.

Heads of missions—3
Leading personalities—4
Heads of missions—5

SYRIA AND THE LEBANON—

Heads of missions—33
Leading personalities—34

SYRIA AND THE LEBANON—

British and French pour
Situation reports—20-41

C.

Heads of missions—6

CONFIDENTIAL.

**FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS**

PART 68.—JULY TO SEPTEMBER 1944.

CHAPTER I.—AFGHANISTAN

B 4133 904 971

No 1

Mr Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th July)

(No. 59.)

Kabul, 1st July 1944

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions in Kabul.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have, &c.

G. F. SQUIRE.

Enclosure in No. 1

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Kabul

Egypt (Minister). M. Mohamed Amin Fouad Bey

Presented his credentials on the 1st April, 1943. A career diplomatist. Very civilised after the French mode and seems to be well off financially. Has served among other places, in Angora and Bucharest, in which latter place he was first counsellor and later Minister. After Mr. Kagert he is far and away our most helpful colleague. Being the representative of a Mohammedan country with no axe to grind in Afghanistan, he and his busy little wife are able to entertain Afghans more freely than other legations, a concession of which they take full advantage and always to the benefit of the Allied, and especially the British cause, which they warmly support.

France (Vichy).

The legation has been closed, and since the 22nd May, 1943, Vichy French interests in Kabul have been transferred to the care of the Turkish Embassy.

Germany (Minister). Herr Hans Pilger.

Presented his credentials on the 28th August, 1937.

Iraq (Minister). General Khalid Al Zahawi

Presented his credentials on the 4th February, 1943. Served with the Iraqi army and has received training at the Staff College at Camberley, where he enjoyed himself thoroughly and where he seems to have been very well treated. Before being posted to Kabul he was Director-General of Irrigation in his own country.

A gentle but rather colourless person, seemingly well disposed to Great Britain but of little active assistance to the Allied cause in Kabul. A good linguist speaking English, French, Persian and Turkish. Has a Turkish wife, who joined him in the autumn of 1943 but who is shortly leaving again for Istanbul, where he has a son studying medicine.

Presented his credentials on the 9th December, 1936.

An extremely able and ambitious little man. An accomplished linguist, who seems to have been relegated to Kabul as the result of some past indiscretion. Profoundly versed in the history and archaeology of Afghanistan, on which he is now an authority. Has never been a keen Fascist but is prepared to subordinate any convictions he may have to his personal advancement. Was counsellor in the Italian Embassy in Moscow in 1926, when he met and married his Russian wife, a lady with a very malicious tongue. An interesting but untrustworthy and rather dangerous couple.

Japan (Minister) Motoharu Shichida.

Presented his credentials on the 3rd November, 1942

Persia (Ambassador) M. Abolghassem Nadim

Presented his credentials on the 5th August, 1943. A career diplomat, who has been successively Minister in Berlin, Paris and Tokyo. Friendly but ineffective and appears to have little influence in Kabul. The co-operation which he is on occasion asked to give to His Majesty's Legation on matters of mutual interest is adequate, but not more. As far as I am aware, he has never expressed any enthusiasm for the United Nations. Is learning English, which he understands tolerably well.

Soviet Union (Ambassador): M. Ivan Nikolayevich Bakoulin.

Presented his credentials on the 17th February, 1944 Aged 35

The infant terrible of the Diplomatic Corps in Kabul. Was apparently appointed to the Diplomatic Service from China in about 1938 and except for a few years in the early 1940s, he has been in Afghanistan since. Outspoken and entirely without polish, he boasts of his peasant origin. Like so many Russians he considers the only test of a friend is the capacity to put away an unlimited number of bottles of vodka. He is a very good and hard working doctor and works as embassy surgeon.

Turkey (Ambassador) M. Kemal Koprulu

Presented his credentials on the 1st June, 1942. Is something of a legal expert. Before the 1914-18 war was secretary to the legal adviser to the Ministry of the Interior in the Turkish Government. He served in the Turkish army as a reserve officer 1914-18, after which he resumed his career of lawyer and diplomatist. Was first secretary at the London Embassy in 1923. Acted as adviser to the Turkish Ministry for Foreign Affairs in connexion with the Arbitration Board appointed for the settlement of the frontier dispute between Afghanistan and Persia in 1934. It was then that he visited Afghanistan for the first time. In the next year he was appointed as second secretary for Foreign Affairs, a post which he continued to hold till 1938.

M. Keprulu has the prosperous appearance of a London hotel. He uses certain lavatory facilities which are not out of keeping with his work, smooth, not to say slippery, that it is hard to know whether there is anything in him or not. On the whole it is thought that there is not. He certainly is the expression of a certain type of conservative diplomat. He has, however, succeeded in avoiding even the least intimacy with the various representatives of the United Nations in Kabi, though there is no evidence so far available to show that he is on any more intimate terms with the Axis representatives. Till we can be more certain of his quality, therefore, he is probably worth watching. (Written in 1943.)

On leave in Turkey August 1943 to June 1944. Professes enthusiasm for the Allied cause, but unfortunately commands little respect either from the Afghan Government or from the large Turkish community in Kabul.

United States of America (Minister): Mr Cornelius Van H. Engert.

Presented his credentials on the 25th July 1942. During the war of 1914-17 he was secretary to the United States Legation in Constantinople, where he rendered the British Government conspicuous assistance in the matter of British prisoners of war in the hands of the Turks. In the interval he has frequently visited London, where he is well known at the Foreign Office. At Tehran and later at Beirut he gave many further proofs of his anxiety to co-operate with

his British Government as well as to further Anglo-Afghan friendship and in any way
to improve the relations between the two countries. He has himself most
frankly With him Anglo-Afghan friendship is at all times the closest co-operation between the two nations and British
relations, which is of great assistance to us in Kabul. Mr. Fagert's policy of
into difficulties and is not conducive to the securing of loyal support from his
ordinates. In spite of his friendliness it must be admitted that he lacks
and therefore fails to command the respect which he should otherwise enjoy.

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No. 2

Mr. Squire to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th September.)

(Soprano) No. 2. 144

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2 I am sending a copy of this despatch without delay to the Secretary of State for India and to the Government of India.

I have the
G F SQUIRE

Enclosure in No. 2

Records of Leading Personalities in Afghanistan

(The references in brackets are to "Who's Who in Afghanistan, 1936," issued by the General Staff in India.)

1. Abdullah W W 41—Born about 1880. Son of Qazi Ghulam
for W W 103. Sup. W W 103. Abdullah W W 41 was to his
residence in Warlik W W 103. W W 103. From 1909 to 1916 was Chief
Under Arabi, in Amrit. April 1916, had version of Kataghat. Was
arrested and sent to W W 103. W W 103. W W 103. W W 103.
He was arrested in 1916 to
King W W 103. W W 103. W W 103. W W 103. W W 103.
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Amir W W 103. W W 103. W W 103. W W 103. W W 103.
May 1920 and went to Jinnah. Returned to Amrit in December 1929.
He was President of the National Council in Amrit in 1930. In November
1931 President of the Punjab Legislative Council. Supreme Civil and Military
Attorney General Punjab and Chairman. Returned to Amrit in spring of 1932
and re-elected President National Council. He was elected to the
Punjab Legislative Council. Re-elected President of the National Council 1933.
Visited Warlik in May 1938 to look for Amrit. Propaganda.
Served on a committee in the House of Representatives to June 1939. In October
1938 visited Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit. Amrit.
President of National Council 1934 1935 1936 and 1937. In 1937 visited Europe
for medical treatment. Is suffering from diabetes. Still President of National
Council. He is now a very sick man but continues to carry out his duties. A
friend of the Prime Minister (W W 337). Owing to ill-health he is unlikely to

29

11 *Abdul Wahab* (W. W. 126).—Muhammadzai. Son of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Born about 1900. Accompanied his father to the Afghan Mussoorie Conference 1920. Left Kabul for London with despatches August 1921. Educated at Exeter College, Oxford. On return to Kabul was appointed to a branch of the Foreign Office. Went to Kandahar at the time of Amanullah's abdication and acted as Foreign Minister there. Accompanied Amanullah on his flight to India.

14 *Abdur Samad Khan* (W W 118) —Tajik
Secretary of Afghan Legation in London, returned to Kabul May 1925
visiting Mecca en route, and appointed a junior Under-Secretary in the Afghan
Foreign Office. His post was abolished, owing to economies of budget of
Apr. 1926 and he was placed at disposal of Government. Appointed to lead an
Afghan deputation to Ibn Saud's All-Muslim Conference, May 1926.
Appointed First Secretary to Afghan Legation, Paris, October 1926 and left
in that month for Paris. Appointed to the Foreign Office as Assistant Secretary.
November 1928. Transferred to the Privy Office, 1 Dec. 1928. On 11 Dec.
February 1931. Appointed Minister at Rome, and left to take up appointment

[illegible]

His four sisters were married to—

- (a) Late King Nadir Shah.
- (b) Late Muhammad Aziz Khan, brother of (a).
- (c) N. S. Abdul Ghan: Khan (W W 34).
- (d) Muhammad Akbar Khan (W W 161).

Went to Tehran for the wedding celebrations of the Crown Prince in 1939. Still Wazir-i-Darbar. Fond of shooting fishing and gardening, but suffers from a heart complaint and not therefore very active.

18. Ali Muhammad Khan Mirza (W W 179). Born about 1894. A brother-in-law of the Ameer Habibullah. Traveled in Europe, and on return (1923) was appointed as assistant in the Ministry of Education. In 1924 promoted Under-Secretary, Ministry of Education. Appointed Minister at Rome, February 1927. Was with Amanullah in London March 1928. Minister of Education November 1929. Appointed "Minister for the Maintenance of Order" February 1929. Appointed Minister of Education November 1929. In June 1933 was appointed Afghan representative at the Economic Conference, London, and in July was appointed Afghan Minister, London. Appointed Minister in Switzerland and representative of Afghanistan to the League of Nations February 1935, but was still in London in June 1935. Selected to represent Afghanistan at the Fourth International Hospital Conference in Rome in May 1935. Summoned to Kabul July 1935, and arrived there October. Speaks English and is intelligent and capable.

January 1936

Returned to Kabul (1938) and appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs. Visited U.S.A. in 1939 for the 1st time. One of the closest friends of the British Government. Member of the Council of the Sanjikh Pakt. Good knowledge of English literature and interested particularly in education. Enlightened, capable and genuinely friendly to Britain, but not a strong character and lacks energy. Not being related to the ruling family, he has no great influence with the Government.

19. Shah Akbar (W W 186) — Mohammadzai, Naib Salar and
 from 1932 to 1939. Appointed Governor and General Officer Command
 in 1939. In August 1941 he was transferred to the Southern
 Province as Governor (Rais-i-Tenzimia) and General Officer Command
 Southern Province army corps and promoted to the rank of Naib Salar.
 He is a pleasant, rather easy going individual, but has not been very successful
 as an administrator in the Southern Province, of which post he was relieved in
 April 1944. At present unemployed in Kabul.

90. 1926 Young (W W 192) — Indian of Muslim Son of Khan Bahadur
Rat Nayar of ... As a student at Lahore Uni-
versity to Afghanistan in February 1927 was at ... editor of the
Indian Mirror. A ... Was agent
of ... between them and the Hindu-Muslim fanatics. In 1927 was
... the Commission ... Hyderabad under
Shah Waliullah Khan ... Appointed Minister of Court October 1929
and a heavy November 1929. Was appointed to supervise the work on
Persian Affairs May 1930. In July 1930 he succeeded the Minister of Justice
(W W 25) ... with the Syrian King ... which he re-
peatedly failed to do well. Left Kabul for Europe via India in April 1931
ostensibly formed a treaty ... returning to Kabul in November 1931. In March

Again visited Kabul (1938) and returned to Germany. Played an important part in the German invasion of Russia, 1941. Still in Germany 1938. Visited Kabul in 1940 via Russia. Said to be anti British. Is still Minister in Berlin.

1930, returning to Italy. Revisited Turkey again for three months in June. Left Italy for Turkey in October 1930 but went back and spent the winter in Italy. Left Naples for Jeddah to perform pilgrimage on the 5th April, 1931, with the object of either rehabilitating himself in Moslem eyes, or concerting measures for the recovery of his throne. Published a letter decrying King Nadir and his régime. Left Jeddah for Suez, the 9th April. Visited Cairo, the 10th April. Left Cairo for Baghdad, the 12th April. Visited Baghdad, the 13th April. Left Baghdad for Basra, the 14th April. Visited Basra, the 15th April. Left Basra for Shiraz, the 16th April. Visited Shiraz, the 17th April. Left Shiraz for Tehran, the 18th April. Visited Tehran, the 19th April. Left Tehran for Moscow, the 20th April. Visited Moscow, the 21st April. Left Moscow for London, the 22nd April. Visited London, the 23rd April. Left London for Rome, the 24th April. Visited Rome, the 25th April. 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visited Constantinople and held a meeting of his principal supporters there. Reported to have tried, unsuccessfully to obtain Soviet support to his efforts. The execution of the late Ghulam Nabi, one of his chief adherents, intensified his hostility against the Yahya Khel. Members of his party were responsible for the assassinations of King Nadir Shah (Kabul 1933) and his brother Muhammad Ali. His chief supporter in Europe is Ghulam Siddiq (W.W. 309), a brother of the late Ghulam Nabi. In March 1935 again performed the pilgrimage to Mecca, where he met a number of other members of the party. He is reported to have been in contact with the Afghans amongst the North West Frontier tribes. He owns property in Switzerland, where he is reported to have been in 1935. Opinions are held as to the possibility of his return, but this seems unlikely unless further assassinations of members of the present ruling family, or feeling on the Indian side of the border definitely turns in favour of initiating an incursion into Afghanistan on his behalf. Since he has been living in Italy he invariably travels to Switzerland by way of Italy. He is reported to have been in contact with the Swiss Government in 1935. He is reported to have been in contact with the Swiss Government in 1935. He is reported to have been in contact with the Swiss Government in 1935.

22. *Asadullah Khan* (W W 190). -Sardar, Muhammadzai, Firqa Misbar (major-general). Born 1911. Is a son of the late Amser Habibullah by the Ulya daughter of the late King Nizam Shah. He is the son of late King Amanullah and a cousin of King Zahir Shah. Educated at the French school, Kabul, and speaks French fluently. Imprisoned in Kabul by Bacha-i-Saqo in 1920 and grossly ill-treated. In November 1929 visited Lahore for medical treatment. On return was appointed Sar-i-Os (Commander of the Royal Bodyguard) and A.D.C. to the Minister of War. Appointed to officiate as second secretary (equivalent to quartermaster-general) War Office, in addition to his other duties, in December 1930. In 1931 qualified at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Promoted Firqa Misbar and appointed General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, 1933. In 1934 acted as Officer Commanding Infantry Officers' School, in the absence of the German instructor, Major Christenn. Is still (1937) General Officer Commanding, Guards Division, and, as such, in command of the Arq and

Applauded by fellow Republicans (1967)
 Appear to like his - to - and as popular. Has acquired more
 gain in 1980 for medic
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 Inspector General of
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28. *Fazl Ahmad Khan* (W W 250).—Hazrat Sahib of Chaughatan, Herat. Son of Abdul Wahab and grandson of Hazrat Muhammad Umar Jan of the family of Sirhind Pirs. Born 1602 at Bakhriz in East Persia, where his father was in exile. The family returned to Afghanistan in 1602. Qadiri as a judge in religious matters. Visited Nadir Shah on his accession in 1929, and was appointed Assistant Minister of Justice 1930, and officiating Minister of Justice after Sher Agha (W W 256) in 1932. After Nadir Shah's assassination visited Kandahar to spread propaganda in favour of King Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Justice 1934. Member of the Joint Perso-Afghan Commission to enquire into the Zorabad (Iran) incident December 1934. His family is influential and receives an allowance from the Afghan Government, but he himself lacks influence and character. He has pleasant manners and is friendly. Married in 1930 a daughter of Sher Agha (W W 256). Still Minister of Justice.

27. **Fazal-Umar (Sher Agha)** (W W 200). A member of the family of Sirhind Pir established in Kabul. Noted Governor of Herat Sahib of Sirhind Province. Assumed the title of Hazrat Sahib of Sirhind Province after Sher Ahmad's death having succeeded to the throne of his father's death. In 1926 went on pilgrimage to Mecca and returned to Kabul but certainly went to Jeddah, Arabia where in 1928 he was crowned as Amir of Arabia. Was expected to go to North West Frontier Province in May 1928 under British security arrangements for dealing with the Afghan Government. In September 1928 Amir Khwaja Abdul Fatah deposed him from power and refused American aid at King Amanullah's request. Succeeded to Southern Province where he remained until November 1929. He has been seen since leaving Tashkoreh (Supreme Court and Ministry of Justice) to go back to Afghanistan and return to Kabul at the end of August. In June 1932 after meeting Fazl-Ahmad Khan, Hazrat Sahib of Chaharbagh, Herat (W W 200). In December 1931 offered his resignation and was appointed Minister. He was reported at this time to be pro-Soviet. Nazim-ul-Din Huseini, however, was not accepted until December 1932. Was granted a visa in December 1932 to proceed to India, from whence he was to have proceeded on pilgrimage to Mecca, but owing to the death of Caliphbert returned to Kabul. Visited Sirhind, India, in February 1933 and was requested by the Afghan Government to persuade the Hazrat of Chaharbagh to return to Afghanistan. Reactionary and opposed to progressive reforms. His wholehearted support of King Zahir Shah is therefore doubtful, and he is not trusted by the Afghan Government. On the other hand is probably not pro-Amanullah. He appears to have been in favour of "jihad" on behalf of the Mohmands September 1935, when he visited the Southern Province and induced tribal leaders to Khatolpur and Sulaymaniyah, who after holding meetings in his house, tried to induce the Prime Minister to declare "jihad". Wields great influence amongst the Sulaiman Khel Ghilzais. Said to favour friendship with the British as opposed to the Soviet. Is said to be on bad terms with Saïyid Hasan (W W 546). Prime Minister doubts his loyalty, and would have liked to

pilgrims. Visited Constantinople in early summer and was in touch with Soviet representative, Boveroi, through his brother, Abdul Aziz Khan (W W. 13). Engaged in active pro-Amanullah work in Europe. Visited Berlin in November 1933. Visited Rome in January 1934. In 1934 married Bibi Khurd (W W. 290), sister of ex Queen Souriya (W W. 823). Lives in Berlin (1938), and frequently visits Rome, where he is believed to be in close touch with Amanullah and working hard on his behalf. Receives an annual allowance from the Italian Government. A close personal friend of ex-King Amanullah and greatly trusted by him. Spoke English fluently. Believed to be pro-Amanullah and is therefore not trusted by the present regime.

34. *Ghulam Yahya Khan* (W W. 311).—Muhammadzai. Born 1894. Son of Habibullah Naib Tarzi, deceased, and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Brother of W W. 100, and cousin of W W. 325. Formerly secretary of Afghan Legation, Berlin. Appointed Under-Secretary, Visa and Passport Branch of Foreign Office, June 1926. Transferred to Political Section of Foreign Office, November 1926. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, February 1927. Accompanied Amanullah to Europe 1927-28. Roughly handled by British Government. Promoted First Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office, December 1929. Assistant Secretary, Political Department of Foreign Office, 1930. Promoted First Secretary, Afghan Foreign Office, 1930. Visited Chakhansur, November 1931, in connexion with Helmand water dispute with Persia. Officialised for the Foreign Minister in the autumn of 1933. Appointed Director (Rate) of Department of Public Health February 1936. Appointment raised to that of Minister in June. Member of Republican party. A pleasant, well-mannered man of no outstanding ability. He has been reported to be pro-Amanullah. Speaks German and Turkish. Was relieved of his post of Minister of Health in November 1939 and appointed Minister of Posts and Telegraphs. Reappointed Minister of Health 1940, a post he still holds.

35. *Gul Agha* (see *Siddiq Agha Muhammad*).

36. *Gul Ahmad Khan* (W W. 315). Tajik. Son of Mirza Abdul Ahmad Khan. Brother of F. M. Abdul Ahmad Khan (W W. 3) and Abdullah Khan, Governor of Herat. Born about 1897.

Was in charge of Government buildings at the beginning of Amanullah's reign. Later on became Superintendent of Roads and Ways. Afterwards transferred to the Intelligence Department. During Amanullah's march to Ghazni from Kandahar Gul Ahmad fled with his family from Kabul and joined the ex-King on the way. In 1920 said to be in Karachi. A member on the committee for reform led by Muhammad Yakub Khan (W W. 575) to Mazar-i Sharif, June 1930. Believed to be Governor of Mazar-i Sharif 1931. Arrived in Kabul June 1931. Appointed Resident of the Kabul Municipality in 1932. Appointed Governor of Mazar-i Sharif since Abdul Jamil Khan (W W. 49) in November 1934 which post he still holds. Appointed Minister of Health in 1939 but appointment later cancelled.

Believed to be capable and intelligent. Supporter of the present Afghan régime. Speaks some English.

37. *Habibullah Khan Tarzi* (W W. 325).—Muhammadzai. Born 1896. Son of the late Muhammad Zaman and nephew of the late Mahmud Tarzi. Cousins, W W. 100 and W W. 311. Was a junior Under-Secretary in Indo-European branch of the Foreign Office 1922-23. Proceeded to Paris as secretary to Minister. For a while he was Minister at Paris. On his return to Kabul was appointed Under-Secretary in charge of the branch of the Foreign Office dealing with India and Europe. Appointed Afghan Minister in Paris November 1928. Received Order of Astor, 1st class, December 1929 and returned to Kabul. Appointed secretary in Foreign Office, May 1931. Was a member of the Dokulim Boundary Commission, June 1932. Chief delegate on the Persian Boundary and Helmand Water Commission, October 1932. Visited Herat and

Islam Kala, thence to Zulfikar and Chakhansur in this connexion. Completed his work on the Persian boundary survey in June 1933 and returned to Kabul. Appointed Minister at Tokyo in July 1933 and presented his credentials there in October 1933. Speaks English fluently; a pleasant, well-mannered man. Returned to Kabul June 1939 and appointed first secretary at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Believed to be pro-Amanullah, and is therefore not trusted by the present régime.

38. *Hazrat of Shor Bazar* (see *Fazl-i Iwar*).

39. *Inayatullah Khan* (W W. 360). Sardar, Muhammadzai. Eldest son of Ameer Habibullah Khan. His mother is the Ulya Jan Badr-ul-Haram. Born the 2nd October 1885. Visited Europe in 1914. He is the son of Munn-as-Saltanah ("Helper of the State") under Ameer Habibullah Khan. Created Sardar-i-Ala in 1905. Appointed Minister for Education in 1916. Was the recognised heir to the throne up to the time of Ameer Habibullah Khan's death. Married a daughter of the late Mahmud Khan Tarzi, and was at one time said to be under the latter's influence. During Ameer Habibullah Khan's reign he received an allowance of 1,30,000 rupees per annum. After the murder of the late Ameer, he was offered the throne by the former's supporters, but he, however, refused it, probably well knowing that the decision had already been made in Nasrullah's favour, and that no other course was open to him. When Nasrullah, in turn, was compelled to yield to the claims of Amanullah, he had to accompany the former to Kabul. On arrival at Kabul, though not compelled to share Nasrullah's imprisonment, he was kept under strict surveillance. At the darbar at which those accused of the murder of Ameer Habibullah were tried, Amanullah decreed that Inayatullah had forfeited all his claims by his cowardly acquiescence in Nasrullah's usurpation of the throne and by his failure to take any steps to discover the authors of the crime. He was told that it would be advisable that he should retire into private life and take no further part in public affairs. Although occasionally seen in public, he undertook no Government work, and was presumably deprived of his appointment of Munn-as-Saltanah, &c. In October 1919 he was reported to have been arrested by the Ameer, and to be practically confined to his house until 1922. There was an abortive rising by the Saffi regiment in his favour in June 1920. This regiment was raised in Tagao by Inayatullah. Sanctioned a yearly allowance of 1½ lakhs of rupees and an escort of twenty men, March 1921. He consistently refused to take up any Government appointment. In July 1922 was allowed a certain measure of freedom which was increased until he moved about apparently without restriction. When Bacha-i-Saqao attacked Kabul on the 14th December, 1929, was summoned by the King and confined in the Arg. Forced to accept the throne on Amanullah's abdication, the 14th January, 1929, but on being besieged in the Arg by Bacha-i-Saqao, abdicated on the 17th January, 1929, on condition that he and his family were sent to Kandahar by air. Evacuated to Peshawar with his family in the Royal Air Force planes, the 16th January, 1929, and proceeded to join Amanullah in Kandahar. Fled with Amanullah to Bombay, the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed from Bombay for Persia, via Basra, the 6th July, 1929. Arrived in Tehran, the 27th July, 1929. Left Tehran for Europe, May 1930, and was in Berlin believed plotting against Nadir Khan. Asked for permission to reside in England for six months (June 1931). Visited England August 1931. Believed to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money from them. Then joined Amanullah in Rome. Visited Constantinople for his nephew's wedding, December 1931, and then went on to Tehran where his sister joined him from Kabul. In receipt of 800 tomans per month from Persian Government in February 1932. In August the Persian Government were said to be intending to discontinue this allowance, his sole means. Since then has remained in Tehran, where he now resides. Probable that the allowance made him by the Persian Government has been stopped, and that he is living in comparative penury. His sister, who had been with Amanullah in Rome, joined him in the autumn of 1933. Is periodically the subject of rumours in Afghanistan, to the effect that he has arrived or is expected to arrive in some part of the country. Lacks initiative, intellect and energy, but combines domesticity with pleasant manners and had a reputation for being hospitable and straightforward. An account of Inayatullah was received in June 1935. Stated to have been granted a monthly allowance of 1,000 rupees (1940) to be in touch with German agents in Iran, and probably receiving money

48. Muhammad Gul Khan (W W 3154) — Son of Muhammad Khurshid Khan (W W 408). Kuchi Mohmand of village Baru (on the Hissarak Rud, about 7 miles west of Balikot). Educated in Turkey. Was a Ghund Mushar (brigadier) in Amanullah's army in 1927. Promoted to Major in 1928 and to Colonel in 1929. Served in the Saqavi régime until the burning of Jalalabad, when he returned to his home at Baru. He joined H.R.H. Sardar Hashim Khan (W W 337) in Khugiani country about March 1929. Was Minister of the Interior in Nadir Shah's first Government October 1929. Promoted Nash Salar (general) and appointed to officiate as Rais-i-Tanzimieh (Supreme Civil and Military Administrator), Eastern Province. He held this post until the summer of 1930. During this time he did much to restore order in the province and dealt with the Shinwari attempt on Torkham in February 1930. After the Kohistan rising in 1930 he was appointed Rais-i-Tanzimieh of that district and apparently succeeded in

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Breakfast: Wafel of Katal 1939. Has good relations with His Royal Highness
attitude towards British Legation. Not on good terms with His Royal Highness
Shah Mahmud (No. 72)

54. **Muhammad Khan, Mirza** (WW 450).—Sent to Merv on a special mission October 1919. Still in Merv June 1920. Later said to be in Tashkent. Left for Moscow July 1920. Afghan Minister at Moscow 1921 until relieved by the late Gholam Nabi Khan. On return from Russia he was for a short time an Under-Secretary in the Ministry of Commerce. In 1924 was sent to Europe to negotiate the sale of certain Crown jewels. Appointed First Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office on return from Europe. Chief Afghan member of the Uria Tagai Boundary Commission, and proceeded to Badakhshan January 1926, returning in June 1926. Appointed Minister at Moscow October 1926, having first refused appointment of Minister at Rome. As Minister at Moscow he preserved a friendly relationship with the Soviet Government. Returned to Foreign Office 1928. Remained at Foreign Office under Bacha-i-Saqao January 1929. Appointed Under-Secretary Foreign Office by King Nadir Shah November 1929. Appointed Minister of Trade September 1930. In May 1932 was complimented by the King of Persia. Was reported to have been arrested by the British, but not discovered in September 1933. Left Kabul in October, with the Prime Minister, to visit the north. Returned to Kabul in November and swore allegiance to Zahir Shah. Appointed Minister of Trade in 1937. A man of no great standing or marked ability. Is said to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister, but to be on bad terms with the War Minister. Since he has been in office, the customs revenue of the country has increased considerably. Was one of the prime movers in the formation of the Ashiana Company. Is believed to be a heavy bribe-taker. His sister, who was a widow of the late Amir Habibullah, was given in marriage to Abdul Qadir, Bacha-i-Saqao's Governor of Kandahar. Is inclined to be anti British, but is lately believed to be less so than formerly. His son, Abdulrahman Khan, was one of six students who were sent to Japan January 1935. Appointed Minister of Revenue (1938). Still Minister of Revenue.

55. *Muhammad Naim Khan* (W W 4844).—Son of the late Muhammad Aziz Khan, Muhammadzai. Born 1911. Visited India in November 1920 with Asadullah Khan (W W 199). Appointed Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, October 1930. Appointed Minister, Rome, December 1932, recalled in 1934 and appointed extra secretary in the Foreign Office, Kabul. Appointed First Secretary 1935. Married in 1934 the eldest sister of King Zahir Shah. His wife gave birth to a son in August 1935.

Coordinating Foreign Minister December 1935 and again in 1936 during the absence of Fatah Muhammad in Europe

Also acting as managing director, Afghan National Bank, during absence of Abdul Majid (W W 73) in Europe 1936-37. Appointed Minister of Education in 1937.

Appointed president of Kabul Literary Society June 1937

Appointed Acting Foreign Minister during the Foreign Minister's absence in Tehran June 1937 and Jalatabad in January 1938. Still Minister of Education. Visited Khanshabad as head of an investigation committee (1938).

Appointed assistant to the Prime Minister (September 1939), in addition to his duties as Minister of Education. In 1941 appointed officiating Minister of National Economy during absence of W W 79 in Europe in addition to his own duties. Officiated as Prime Minister in the winter of 1943 during the illness of his uncle, Muhammad Hashim Khan (No. 30), with whom he is a great favourite. Easy-going and pleasant mannered and friendly to British Legation, but somewhat reserved, on account of a fear of a too close relationship. Speaks fluently and English tolerably. It is generally believed that he is destined to succeed his uncle as Prime Minister, but it is doubtful if he has either the brains, physical fitness or strength of character for the task.

56. Muhammad Nuroz Khan (W W 470) - Mirza of Logar. Appointed Chief Secretary to King Nadir, November 1920. Was on bad terms with Mirza, W W 470. Mirza ordered to stop with German ban with England and Russia. Accompanied late S. Muhammad Azim to Europe in January 1933 for medical treatment. Returned from Germany May 1933 and resumed appointment of Chief Secretary to King. Was appointed officiating Chief Minister 1933. Appointed Ambassador to Tehran, 1938. Relieved of appointment of Ambassador at Tehran in 1942. Appointed Minister of Interior 1943.

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61. Muhammad Hassan Jan (W W 342).—Muhammadzai. Born 1902
Said to have been in Afghanistan during WW I and to have returned to
Afghanistan after WW I and to have remained there until 1927. After that time he was
in India at a secret location. Was said to be in the British force at
Kabul. A report from King Amanullah dated August 1927 says he had returned. Also
went with Amanullah to Kandahar after his abdication January 1929 and to
Herat May 1929. Sailed for Italy June 1929. Was in Rome from October 1931
to July 1932. Not definitely located between summer 1932 and December 1933,
but said to be in Rome with Amanullah and to be verging on lunacy. Deprivation of
Afghan nationality November 1934. Alleged to have been known to the
Neflex in 1935. In Rome with Amanullah during summer of 1935.

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Visited India and Europe 1936-37 with view to purchasing air craft for Afghan Government. Purchased eight aircraft in Great Britain and twenty-four in Italy. Returned to Kabul in October 1937. Was awarded decoration of 'Grand Officer of the Crown of Italy'. Received by King of Afghanistan. Since 1937 the Afghan Air Force has achieved a modicum of efficiency mainly due to his drive, the assistance of British instructors, and the despatch of Air Force personnel to India for training, the latter being a policy he consistently supports. In 1942 he proceeded to India for medical treatment, returning in March 1943. After his return he gave out that he was in favour of retaining the present size of the Afghan Air Force and wanted an increase of nine more aircraft.

He recalls the fact that the Air Force is under War Ministry control and wishes to see it independent under the King. He is from a healthy and active and dominating personality in the Air Force.

53. *Mohammad Ismail Khan* (W W 377A).—Wardak, Totu Khel Ghilzai
S. of M. of K. of W W 3 and S. of W W 4. At one time Director
of the Eastern Branch Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Governor (Hakim) Kalan
of the Northern District, Kabul Province. Officiating Governor, Kataghan and

has influence in the Logar valley. Loyalty to present régime doubtful. Contains Republican tendencies. His ability and capacity and speaks a little English. Since his appointment as Minister of the Interior has become more influential and popular, the latter said to be due to his patience when investigating complaints.

57. **Muhammad Qasim Khan (W W 506)**—Muhammadzai. Son of Sardar Muhammad Sarwar Khan Kaka. Nephew of the late Sardar Abdul Aziz. First cousin of Ghulam Faruq (W W 273). Born at Lahore about 1900. Served in various minor appointments in Afghan Foreign Office 1921-25. Was a secretary in the Afghan Legation, Rome, in 1926, and also served in a similar capacity in the Afghan Embassy, Tehran, during 1927 and 1928. In 1930 was mudir (secretary) in the Prime Minister's office. Appointed assisting Hakim-i Ala (Governor), Eastern Province, November 1932, where he found it difficult to get on with the Governor. Recalled to Kabul in January 1933. Appointed Minister in Rome in February 1934, and left to take up his appointment in March. Recalled in spring 1935 and in June again appointed Governor of the Eastern Province. Is said to be a tactful and capable man, but lacks presence and personality. Speaks English, Urdu, Persian and very good Pushtu. His father died in 1933.

Appointed Governor of Herat (1935). Appointed Governor of Kandahar 1941, a post he still holds.

58. **Muhammad Qasim Khan (W W 507a)** (F M Muhammadzai). Born approximately 1904. Director of Intelligence in the War Ministry. Chief of Staff, Guards Division, 1936. Officiating in the 1st Division, Kataghan and Badakhshan Division, 1938. Chief of Staff, 1st Division, Officer Commanding Herat Division, 1937-40. Appointed Governor and General Officer Commanding of the Southern Province in May 1944 at the time of the Zadran disturbances. A tactful, popular and efficient officer who has pleasant manners, is intelligent and speaks little English. A staunch supporter of Shah Mahmud (No. 72).

58a. **Muhammad Sadiq Khan (Mir)**. Son of Mir Sikandar Khan. Born about 1893. His father was a Court official with the honorary rank of general in the reign of Amir Sher Ali Khan. Sadiq was born and later in India, where the boy was educated. Mir Muhammad Sadiq returned to Afghanistan during the reign of ex King Amanullah, and held minor appointments in the Educational and Agricultural Departments of the Southern Province and in Northern Afghanistan. During the reign of the late King Nadir Shah, he became First Secretary of the Afghan Embassy in Moscow. His appointment he held for three years. When he returned to Kabul, he was appointed Director-General of International Affairs in the Foreign Office. In March 1943 he was appointed Afghan Consul General at Meshed. He is described as patient and cautious, speaks English, Urdu and a little Russian, is reasonably well disposed towards the British.

59. **Muhammad Sarwar Khan (W W 560)**—Barakzai, Naib Salar (general). Son of Muhammad Sadiq Khan. Brothers: Ghulam Haidar (W W 276), Muhammad Shuash (W W 611) and Juma Khan. First secretary in the Afghan Embassy in Tehran. Formerly a Ghulam Bacha. Was highly esteemed by Amir Habibullah Khan. Promoted brigadier in 1906, owing to his success in the manufacture of guns and appointed superintendent of the Kabul Arsenal. In 1911 he was promoted to Major-General and in the same month left for Mazar-i-Sharif to take up the appointment of Naib-ul-Hukumah (Governor). He was given extensive powers in his province. Relieved of appointment and proceeded to Kabul in January 1922 where he officiated as Minister of the Interior. Governor of Kandahar 1923, but the real power in the province was wielded by the Minister of the Interior, who originally officiating as Governor of Kandahar, remained there on relief to deal with the disorders that were rife in the province during 1923. Muhammad Sarwar's jurisdiction seems to have been limited. Still Governor of Kandahar at the beginning of 1927. Described by the Amoor, during a visit of inspection to Kandahar, November 1925, as "honest and respectable, but slow and negligent". Summoned to Kabul June 1926, and well received by the King. Created Sardar-i-Ala November 1926. Appointed Governor of Herat 1929, Kataghan, 1929, but did not take up appointment. In Kabul 1929.

Appointed Governor of Kabul, February 1930, but relieved in 1931 and went on pilgrimage to Mecca. He served in the Afghan Legation in London. Was a member of the Majlis-i Aayan (Council of Nobles, December 1931). Reported to be pro-Amanullah. Visited his brother Ghulam Haidar (W W 276) at Maraf, Kandahar Province, in February 1932, but was recalled to Kabul in July. Has been unemployed since 1931. Still believed to be pro-Amanullah. Courteous and friendly but Amanullah's description (alove) his him. Still a member of the Council of Nobles.

60. **Muhammad Shafi Khan (W W 569)** (Sultan Muhammad Khel).—Born approximately 1900. Son of Muhammad Isa Khan. A relative of S. Faiz. Was a member of the Council of Nobles. Appointed Afghan Consul, Karachi, 1935. Believed to be loyal to present régime. Afghan Consul-General in India since Salah ud-Din (No. 71) 1939. Still Afghan Consul-General. A pleasant official who speaks English and is always friendly towards the British Legation.

61. **Muhammad Shuash Khan (W W 611)**.—Born approximately 1904. Younger brother of Muhammad Sarwar Khan (No. 59). Appointed Yawar to the Governor of Kandahar and Mudir of Agriculture 1934. Incapable and lazy. The Amir dismissed him during a visit of inspection to Kandahar October 1923. Employed as third assistant to the Minister of Court in 1931. Resigned in August 1932 and became Kandahar manager to Chandas Khan, agent for Burma. Was a member of the Council of Nobles. Was a member of the Council of Nobles importing Japanese goods. Brother also of Ghulam Haidar (W W 276). Appointed Afghan Consul at Karachi 1940. Still Afghan Consul at Karachi.

62. **Muhammad Umar Khan (W W 652)**—Fitqa Mirshar (major general). Visited Delhi manduyres December 1924 at the invitation of the Commander-in-Chief in India. Appointed head of Afghan Military Mission to Russia to select artillery for the Afghan army and study Soviet military methods October 1926. Left Kabul by air for Termez en route to Moscow the 3rd November, 1926. Visited Russia and returned to Kabul in January 1927. Appointed Chief of Staff of the Afghan General Staff early in 1930. In 1932 proceeded to Europe. Returned to Kabul via India in January 1934. Was a member of the Council of Nobles. Resumed his duties as Chief of Staff, but left on 1st March 1934. Has been much in Europe and speaks English, Russian and German fluently. Is also said to speak French and Italian. His loyalty to the present régime is doubtful. It is said that he will probably be appointed to a diplomatic post in Europe. Has pleasant manners and is friendly. Afghan representative to the League of Nations Disarmament Committee June 1935. Said to have been in London in 1936, where he was immoral conduct in Europe. Still Chief of Staff and a close friend of W W 414. He has the confidence of the Royal Family except in matters of a very secret nature. He is a great Nationalist, and neither anti- or pro-Russian, British or German.

63. **Muhammad Isma Khan (W W 661)**—Sardar. In 1915 appointed to command the Asmar Corps (about 1,000 men) to prevent raids into Chitral. In 1916 was appointed Brigadier and in 1919 was still Commandant at Asmar. Recalled to Kabul in August 1920. He was a member of the Council of Nobles. Appointed Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W W 837). Commanding the Ningrahar Corps in December 1921. Served as Afghan Consul in Bombay in 1927 and as Consul-General, India, in 1928. In Kabul 1929. Counsellor to Afghan Embassy Tehran in 1930. Appointed Muhi II in the Foreign Ministry in 1931. Was a member of the Council of Nobles. Appointed Naib Salar Hashim Khan (W W 837) 1935. Member of the Republican Party. Was suspected of complicity in Afridi Amanish plot in 1939. President of the Municipal Committee, Kabul since 1937. Relieved of this post, July 1942, for alleged malpractice in the distribution of food supplies to the public. A capable man with pleasant manners, who is somewhat disgruntled because he has not been given more important appointments.

64. *Muhammad Yusuf Akbar* (W W 686) - Comes from Jalalabad and is of Pathan stock. Secretary of Afghan Legation, London, from 1922-30. Always a close friend of the British Government. His views on the British Government and its policy in Afghanistan, which were probably sincere. Chargé d'Affaires from February 1929 to February 1930. He was a member of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America on Shah Wali's (W W 585) arrival as Minister in January 1930 owing to disappointment of non-recognition of his work and refusal of Shah Wali to appoint him counsellor. Reported to be in touch with Ghadr party in San Francisco. In June 1933 tried to obtain the assistance of British Foreign Office. He was a member of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America. Founded and became Director of the Afghan National Association in the United States of America.

185. Muhammad Zahir Shah (W W 66a).—Muhammadzaï, surviving son of the late King Nadir Shah. Born 1914. Accompanied his father to France. He was in England at the time of the King's death in October 1930. In 1931 attended a year's course at the Infantry Officers' School, Kabul. Married (1931) a daughter of Ahmad Shah (W W. 149). Appointed Viceroy of Western Mesopotamia in September 1932. Held the Education Minister in addition to his other duties. Was proclaimed King on the 8th November, 1933, immediately after his father's assassination. Quiet and unassuming with pleasant manners and a fair presence, he has so far had little

H B H Hashim Khan (W W 337), the Prime Minister. He is keen on shooting, tennis, riding and swimming. Up to 1938 he rarely left Kabul. Since 1938 he has made a few excursions into the country for a day or two, but is usually accompanied by a large number of officials. He spends two or three months each year at Paghman, the summer capital, to which the Government does not move. His birthday is celebrated on the 15th October each year. Has had three sons, Muhammad Akbar, born 1933, died 1942, Ahmad Shah born 1934, Muhammad Nadir, born 1941, and two daughters born in 1932 and 1936. He is taking an increased interest in affairs, including the development of the army and air force, and has been known to express a desire to take a more active part in the direction of State business.

General of the Political Section, Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Related to the late Amir Abdul Rahman through his mother. Educated at the French School, Kabul. Speaks French fluently and is now able also to converse intelligently in English. Has considerable ability and influence. He appears to enjoy the confidence of the Prime Minister and is probably closer to the centre of Afghan foreign and political affairs than the present Foreign Minister himself (No. 18). Ambitious and somewhat conceited but unfailingly courteous. Had the reputation of being strongly anti British, but, largely as a result of the kindness & courtesy shown to him on his visit to India in April 1944, is now extremely well disposed towards us. He could be more fairly described as a strong Nationalist. Dabbles in cultural matters and is a keen student of literature. If the present régime remains in power is likely to become a most important personage.

[illegible]

68 Rahimullah Khan (W W 515). - Tajik. Son of Atanullah. Native of Kabul. Was head clerk in the Russian section of the Foreign Ministry. Became Foreign Agent in Mazur. Afterwards transferred to Moscow as secretary to the Afghan Legation, and later on in the same capacity to Berlin. Appointed assistant in ~~the~~ Visa Section Afghan Legation Office December 1930.

Reported to be efficient and gets on well with Marconi's representative in Kabul. Stated to be keen on improvements and modern developments in his Department, but is slack and indifferent in carrying out his duties. His father died in 1936. Appointed Minister of Mines November 1939, Relieved of appointment of Minister of Posts and Telegraphs in 1940, and appointed Minister of Public Works in addition to Minister of Mines, but this is probably due to the help he obtained from German engineers up to 1941, in development of railways, &c. His attitude towards the British is friendly, but he is not Relieved of the appointment of Minister for Public Works in 1944 due to ill health, but retained portfolio of the Minister of Public Works on account of pro-German sympathies.

69 *Rahmatullah Jan* (W W 519) — Muhammadzar. Eldest son of ex King Amanullah. Born 1902. 1922. Accompanied Amanullah to Chaman and Bombay the 23rd May, 1929. Sailed for Italy with ex King the 22nd June, 1929. Was still with Amanullah in Italy 1931 and is believed to be there now (1943). Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933.

70. Sayid Qasim (W W 548). Son of Ahmad Shah Khan, Sayid of Kabul. Proceeded to Peshawar through the Khyber, December 1921, on his way to London as messenger from the Foreign Office. Married the third daughter of the late Mahmud Beg Tarzi. Member of the Afghan Legation in London 1924. Acted as Chargé d'Affaires in 1924 between departure of Abdul Hadi (W W 38) and arrival of Shuja-ud-Daulah (W W 812). Returned to Kabul May 1925 and appointed Under-Secretary in charge of Russia and Turkestan branch of Foreign Office to succeed Hafizullah (W W 327) February 1926. Appointed Afghan consul general, Delhi, October 1928, vice Haji Muhammad Akbar (W W. 153, and etc. Kabul, 1926. ~~Returned to Kabul, 1927.~~ January 1927. Appointed Afghan Minister in Rome, 1928. Returned to India and left for Constantinople, June 1929. Said to be working as a translator in the Foreign Office, Kabul, the 7th January, 1930. In December 1933 was believed to be with Amanullah in Rome. Speaks excellent English, well educated. Used to be friendly to members of British Legation, Kabul. His sister is the wife of W W 686.

71. *Salah ud Din Khan* (W W 553). Born about 1803. Son of Mufti Siraj ud Din of Herat, native of Herat.

Used to be the editor of *Ittihad-i-Islam*. Shuja-ud-Daulah (W W 612) from 1911 to Kabul and gave him the editorship of the paper *Tijarat-i-Commercy*. Afterwards became personal diarist to Amanullah. Appointed consul in Bombay 1930. In March 1933 acted as consul, Jeddah, in addition to his Bombay duties. Appointed consul general in India August 1933. Visited Dera Ismail Khan and Peshawar during the autumn of 1933, spreading pro-Naz propaganda. He visited Herat in February 1934. Pays periodical visits to Kabul. Maintained one Nur Ahmad Khan in Lahore as propaganda and publicity agent. Took care to maintain his contact and popularity with editors and proprietors of Indian vernacular papers. In 1939 returned to Afghanistan. Appointed Controller of Press at Peshawar in November 1940. A noted press censor. In Peshawar in 1940 was reported as having stated that, when consul and consul general in India, he was neglected socially by British officials at Simla, Delhi and Bombay. It is believed to have attempted to undermine the King's relations with the press with a view to the publication of the strict censorship maintained by the Afghan Government prevented publication on most occasions."

Is a philosopher and poet. Speaks English intelligibly but not very well. Was arrested in 1930. Released in 1931. Has the reputation of entertaining anti British sentiments.

72 *H R H Shah Mahmud (Mahmud Jan)* (W W 414).—Sardar Muhammadzai. Youngest son of Muhammad Yusuf and uncle of King Zahir Shah. First husband of W W 417 and mother of W W 420. Appointed Sardar of ranking as general, in 1917. Commanded the troops on the Peshwar front 1919

anti British. Deprived of Afghan nationality November 1933. Believed to be in pay of the Soviet. His wife is a sister of W W 269. In Russia February 1934

in the Arq, June 1929. Released, and joined Nadir Khan on his entry into Kabul, October 1929. Appointed Minister to Egypt, and passed through Peshawar, en route, February 1931. Proceeded to Mecca, April 1931, to watch Amanullah. In July 1932 visited Kabul on leave, and was received in a friendly manner by the King and the Prime Minister, Sher Agha (W W 266) was appointed to the post of Minister to Egypt, and arrived in Cairo on September 1932. Visited Mecca for the Haj 1933. Appointed Minister, Hejaz, (1933), but evinced no sympathy for Amanullah. Will in future reside permanently in Hejaz, relinquishing duties of Minister, Egypt. Still (1937) Minister in Hejaz. Reappointed (1939) in addition Minister to Egypt, and will reside at Cairo. Visited Kabul in July 1942. Returned to Cairo in 1942. Expressed anti-British views in connexion with the war situation and British attitude towards Egypt in 1942. Still Minister in Cairo (1943).

1930 Visited Afghanistan April 1937 and returned to Ankara June 1937
Appointed Ambassador at Moscow (1938). Still (1943) Ambassador at Moscow
During 1941-42 stated to have shown some concern for his personal safety, and
to have given depressing accounts of Russian ability to resist the Germans.

resulted in the murder of Habibullah. Was said to have been of Tarzi's party, and in favour of a treaty of friendship with the British. Has one other son, Obeidullah, known as Sher Agha (W W 492), born 1915. Left for Kandahar with Queen Soraiya, December 1928, and proceeded with energy to raise support for the Durrani Dynasty. Was not on good terms with Queen Soraiya. Accompanied Amanullah to Bombay May 1929. Sailed for Italy with Amanullah June 1929. In Berlin 1930 intriguing against Nadir Khan in favour of Obeidullah. Has remained in Europe 1929-35, mostly at Amanullah's residence at Rome, but occasionally visits Montreux in Switzerland, and Berlin. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Visited Mecca with ex-King Amanullah for 1935 pilgrimage.

In October 1935 was living with Oberdullah Khan (W W 492) in Ghulam Siddiq's (W W 309) villa in Berlin

Full (1943), so far as is known in the open

with his brother W W 555. December 1931. Has a son, Mass Jan, born in 1910, and a daughter, who joined him in Tehran in 1933. Probably still in Persia, May 1935. His property in Afghanistan was confiscated in 1933. Deprived of Afghan nationality in November 1933. Family deported from Kabul to Tehran, August 1935.

Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939 Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo.

Appointed Minister at Tokyo, 1939 Still (1943) Minister at Tokyo

No. 3

17.

I have &c

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports.)

He was consul-general designate for Delhi, but it was decided at the last moment to transfer him to Bagdad in view of the objections raised to the appointment of M. Mehdi Farrokh to the Iraqi capital.

1922-24, Foreign Service 1922. He served the following posts: Vice-Consul, Dublin, 1923-24, Vice-Consul, Queenstown, State Department Division of European Affairs, 1934-38, Third Secretary at Riga, Kovno, Tallinn, Moscow (acting as chargé d'affaires in the absence of Mr Davies).

1938-43, State Department, Assistant Chief of European Affairs Department. Accompanied Mr. Winston Churchill's party on its trip to Russia for the Stalin Conference in 1942. Appointed Bagdad 24th June, 1943. Presented his credentials 20th November 1943.

Has travelled extensively in Iraq since his appointment. Is very energetic. Pleasant and friendly to deal with but chafes a bit at what he considers his position. He is keen to be promoted Ambassador. Is married to an attractive but highly indiscreet Latvian lady who, while charming socially, is inclined to be anti-British and is rabidly hostile to the Soviet.

Representatives Accredited to Iraq but Resident elsewhere

Belgium. M. Egbert Graeffe, Minister (27th April, 1939).

*He is also Belgian Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

He pays periodical visits to Bagdad and always shows a keen desire to co-operate closely with this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

*M. Graeffe visited Bagdad this spring. I find him as hearty and keen as ever. (Written in 1942.)

M. Graeffe performed his annual pilgrimage to Iraq in April. His capacity for telling tall stories seems to be unimpaired. He has the custom of making a pre-emption of the many politico-military errors invariably committed by the Anglo-Saxons in moments of crisis. (Written in 1943.)

Illness prevented M. Graeffe from visiting Bagdad this spring.

China. Mr. Li Tich tseng, Minister.

Also Minister at Tehran, where he resides.

Presented credentials on the 8th April, 1944.

Outline of career as given by Tehran, is as follows. He was born in 1903 and started his official career as a district magistrate in Nankien. Since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service and has served in London for four years during which period he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference, and was also secretary to the Chinese delegation to the League Assembly in 1934 and 1935. He was a member of the Chinese delegation in the abortive negotiations for an immigration agreement in Burma in 1937.

Chargé d'Affaires ad interim Mr. Yu Hono-Joe, second secretary. Polish wife. Amiable, ineffective, speaks good French and some English. Rather a pathetic couple.

Czechoslovakia. Mr. Josef M. Kadlec, Minister (11th April, 1944).

Accredited also at Tehran where he resides.

The Czechoslovak Legation in Bagdad had been closed since 1941. Mr. Kadlec was formerly Czechoslovak Consul General at Jerusalem and was appointed consul general at Bagdad in 1941.

Denmark. Dr. M. A. E. C. Fensmark, Charge d'Affaires (17th June, 1939).

*Resides at Tehran. He struck me as a good and typically friendly Danish type. He is married. (Written in 1939.)

*In February the Iraqi Government received a communication from the Danish Government stating that Dr. Fensmark was no longer held to be their representative and that a new minister would be appointed. The Iraqi Government were at first inclined to withdraw their recognition of Dr. Fensmark, but, as the result of my representations, finally agreed to maintain their former attitude towards him. Dr. Fensmark visited Bagdad in April on his way to Syria and the Lebanon. He is undeniably pro-Allied in outlook, but he is rather tiresome to have to deal with. He talks good English, but he talks it too much. He is very glib. (Written in 1942.)

Dr. Fensmark has fortunately not been to Bagdad this year. (Written in 1943.)

Has only paid a fleeting visit to Bagdad this year.

Netherlands. Dr. P. L. C. Visser, Minister (7th August, 1941).

*He is Netherlands Minister at Ankara, where he resides. He stayed only a week in Bagdad for the purpose of presenting his credentials, and gave me to understand that he would not often visit this capital. He is a friendly man and created a most favourable impression both in British and Iraqi circles. (Written in 1941.)

*Dr. Visser visited Bagdad this spring. He further increased his popularity by a lecture he gave at the British Institute on his mountaineering exploits in the Karakorums. His wife, who accompanied him on this visit, did not create such a good impression, and many people were tempted to label her as pro-German. (Written in 1942.)

He has not visited Bagdad since. (Written in 1943.)

Dr. and Mrs. Visser visited Bagdad in the autumn of last year. I saw them as usual very friendly.

Poland. M. Jan Karasz Siedlewski, Minister (27th March, 1939).

*He has visited Bagdad occasionally during the past year. He seems to be a confused man but tries to be a good one. He is keen to look after his nationals, and the greater part of his work in this connexion, therefore, falls on this embassy. (Written in 1941.)

*M. Henryk Malhomme arrived early this year to be counsellor to the legation, with residence in Bagdad. He has served in the Polish Foreign Office and in Japan. A friendly individual who talks French and some English. He is active on behalf of his compatriots who are at present passing through this country on their way from Russia. He likes to "drop in for a chat" with members of my staff but rarely appears to have anything interesting to say. (Written in 1942.)

M. Malhomme has had a busy year. Largely due to his initiative, the Polish forces in this country enjoyed a number of successes. He has been very active during the winter months and M. Malhomme did all he could to popularise his country. The entertainment provided was welcome in the city. He also threw the spotlight on M. Malhomme's activities. He is energetic but so full of complaints as to be a nuisance. (Written in 1943.)

Bagdad has been an independent post since last year without a Minister. M. Malhomme is chargé d'affaires (not ad interim).

Sweden. M. Sven Harald Pousette, Chargé d'Affaires (3rd December, 1941).

*M. Pousette visited Bagdad in December last and in 1942. He was a friendly man and his presence was welcome. (Written in 1942.)

M. Pousette has still not visited Bagdad. (Written in 1943.)

We have still to welcome M. Pousette.

Holy See. Mgr. Georges de Jonghe d'Ardoye, Apostolic Delegate.

He is Belgian. Although not officially recognised by the Iraqi Government as a member of the Diplomatic Corps, he is invited to, and attends, all diplomatic functions. He has served for years in the Far East and travelled extensively in the Orient and in Europe.

A charming and friendly person with a dignified presence and a twinkle in his eye. He is somewhat sensitive to the fact that he does not enjoy diplomatic status. Moreover, the present restrictions placed on his use of cyphers and bags (as he is not a member of the Diplomatic Corps) are a source of reconsideration of his position. He is a very good person and a very good listener without a hint of self-interest. He has been in Bagdad for a long time. Admittedly, he was in 1941 and 1942 when we were not in a position to receive him. (Written in 1943.)

Mgr. de Jonghe d'Ardoye continues to twinkle pleasantly in the social firmament of Bagdad.

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden (Received 30th August 1944)

No. 332.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 14th August, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis's despatch No. 225 of the 8th June, a further account of recent events in Iraq.

2 The new Prime Minister Hamdi Pachachi made a short statement in the Chamber on the Government's policy on the 18th June. He said that he and his colleagues had set themselves three principal tasks, namely—

- (a) to improve the control and distribution of supplies
- (b) to take all necessary measures to establish normal security and order throughout the country, and
- (c) to improve the efficiency and probity of Government officials.

A few days later His Excellency reaffirmed this policy in the Senate and, in addition, he spoke about the Kurdish situation. He declared that the new Cabinet upheld the decision taken by their predecessors concerning Mulla Mustafa Barzani and intended to carry out an extensive programme of development and construction in the northern areas. There was, he maintained, no truth in the allegations that the Government would do nothing for the Kurds. On the contrary, the Administration wished to serve all Iraqis equally without discrimination, in particular to bring happiness and contentment to their Kurdish subjects.

3 So far, the Government has not accomplished any of the three tasks which they set themselves. This is not because they are not trying, but because of the nature of the difficulties which lie in their path and because they had very little in the way of plans when they took office. They knew, rather vaguely, what they wished to achieve, but had not thought out how to go about it.

5. The formation of Hamdi Pachachi's Cabinet was the signal for a stream of telegrams from many Kurdish notables, reminding the Prime Minister of the representations which had been put forward from the Kurdish districts in May and calling upon the new Government to complete the reforms and works contemplated by their predecessors. Mulla Mustafa joined in the chorus and disturbed ministers by the somewhat menacing tone of his message. The advice which the ambassador had given to the Government from the beginning was that they should go ahead quickly with much of public works in the Kurdish districts generally and thereby give tangible evidence of their desire to meet the Kurdish demands.

6. Sir Kinahan Cornwallis repeated this advice when the Minister of the Interior committed him about Mulla Mustafa's message and at the former's request (and that of the Minister for Foreign Affairs) he again sent word to the Mulla through the acting political adviser in the north warning him that he should keep quiet and not meddle in politics.

7. On the 12th July, by which date the ambassador had proceeded on leave, the Regent dismissed the Barzani. The Barzani and his followers would be undermined and it would be easier to deal with him and his followers in a more reasonable and less exalted frame of mind.

8. Major Kinch (the acting political adviser), when consulted on this plan, advised that the troops at Billa should be withdrawn without any previous notice being required from Mulla Mustafa, in the belief that if this were done the Mulla would of his own accord become more co-operative.

9. I did not wish, however, to adopt too negative an attitude towards the Regent's appeal for help by seeking to insist on such a condition and so, after further talks with ministers and others, I agreed, at the joint request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of the Interior, to instruct the acting political adviser to proceed with the plan, more especially to acquaint himself with the situation and, in particular, to report on the existing relations between the Barzanis and the local officials.

10. Major Kinch arrived in the area towards the end of July, the Iraqi Government having decided to withdraw their troops from Billa. He found Mulla Mustafa in a more than usually truculent mood and all the local Iraqi officials and police in a state of

11. The Barzani and his followers (and cemented by marriage) between the Barzanis and their subjects. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

12. Major Kinch arrived in the area towards the end of July, the Iraqi Government having decided to withdraw their troops from Billa. He found Mulla Mustafa in a more than usually truculent mood and all the local Iraqi officials and police in a state of

13. The Regent prorogued Parliament on the 28th June. In spite of having been in session for over six months the legislature accomplished relatively little.

14. Towards the end of June the Iraqi Government received an invitation from Nahas Pasha to send a representative to a Preparatory Committee, which the Egyptian Prime Minister proposed should meet in Alexandria at the end of

15. Early in July the Iraqi Government notified Nahas Pasha of their acceptance of his invitation and informed him that the Iraqi delegates would be Nuri Pasha and Ata Amin (the Director General of the Ministry for Foreign

16. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

17. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

18. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

19. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

20. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

21. The Barzani and his followers were in a state of

"controllers," at least one of whom has been abruptly recalled to his military duties. I confess to being delighted over the exit of Colonel Bayha, who throughout was a sore trial to this embassy. I have never known a clever man behave with such crass stupidity, nor create more trouble without cause.

26. The Mosul Liwa continues to be the seat of a number of tribal problems. The Mazur Brifkani trouble started by the abduction of Nuri Brifkani

Brifkani who murdered Haji Malo, remains at large. Ali Agba, son of H. Malo, was however persuaded to come into Mosul towards the end of June and the authorities continue their efforts to patch up the feud. On the 3rd June Shauk Sufay the leading Shaikh of the Shammar in Iraq was badly poisoned by

attention restored him to health after a week or so in bed. The police arrest several of the Shaikh's near relations, including Ahmed his younger brother, whom Sufay has had a grave quarrel about the sharing of their late father's property. These men were, however, soon released and the case now seems to have been dropped.

27. Sheep raiding has, as usual, broken out on the Turkish frontier in the Barwari Bala district and seems likely to increase unless better co-operation can be arranged between the Turkish and Iraqi frontier authorities.

28. In June and July the Mutasarrif of Mosul spent twenty days at Deir-az-Zor attending a tribal conference organised to settle outstanding disputes between several Syrian and Iraqi nomadic tribes of the northern Jezirah. The results achieved were generally considered to be satisfactory and the Mutasarrif's contribution to the discussions was, I am advised, competent and effective.

29. A clerk employed in the Ministry of Defence was arrested in June for supplying information about the Allied forces in Iraq to an Iraqi student in Istanbul, who is known to be in the employ of the German Intelligence Service. His house was searched and on being confronted with secret ink and other incriminating evidence found there, he made a full confession. Some weeks later an officer of the Turkish army was arrested together with a confederate, for supplying military information about Iraq to a receiving centre in Turkey. The evidence against them was overwhelming and they confessed their guilt. They remain under detention, presumably awaiting trial.

30. About the 14th June, fifty-one persons were arrested in Basra, Amara and Diwaniyah for being active members of secret societies formed by supporters of Rashid Ali to carry on pro-German and anti-British propaganda. One of the arrested men admitted that, in addition to propaganda, he had committed many thefts of British military stores and minor acts of sabotage. The arrested men are mainly junior ranks in the Iraqi army, subordinate officials, small shopkeepers, artisans and the like. No doubt they will be tried in due course.

31. The Minister of the Interior is thinking of releasing some more of the men interned at Amara, and I recently found it necessary to complain to the Regent now who have not thoroughly bad records and for that reason it is fortunate that the Regent has so far given a cool reception to Mustafa al-Umari's suggestions.

32. The trial of the internees returned from Rhodesia drags on without result and seems unlikely to reach conclusion for several months.

at Tehran and Beirut, His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Minister Resident in the Middle East at the Government of India, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East, His Majesty's consular officers in Iraq.

I have, &c.
G. H. THOMPSON

CHAPTER III.—PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

E 3958 54 34

No.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 6th July)

(No. 269)

Sir,

Tehran 28th June, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to address you as follows on (I) the revenue and expenditure for the year 1322 (the 21st February to the 20th March, 1944) to the 20th March 1944, which are covered in the enclosed copy of the report (I) of the Administrator General of the Finances of Persia, Dr. Millaupagh for the month of Farvardin 1323 (the 21st March to the 20th April, 1944) and for the year 1322, and (II) the budget for the year 1323 (beginning on the 21st March 1944), which has recently been presented to the Majlis.

1.—Revenue and Expenditure for 1322.

2. The report of Dr. Millaupagh, which may well be his last, follows on that for the month of Esfand (the 21st February to the 20th March, 1944), which was summarised in my despatch No. 249 of the 11th June. It is, he states, deliberately brief and, therefore, in general terms owing to the lack of full printing facilities. It gives, however, a cool and balanced account of the financial and economic position in Persia as it existed when Dr. Millaupagh arrived in Persia in 1932, and the task for which they were engaged, and at the fifteen months.

3. The following figures, taken from the report, show the out-turn of the financial year 1322. That for 1321 and the original budget estimate for 1322 are given for comparison—

| | (1)
Actual,
1321. | (2)
Actual,
1322. | (3)
Estimate,
1322. |
|------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| | | Million Rials. | |
| Ordinary expenditure | 2,603 | 3,900 | 3,207 |
| Ordinary revenue | 2,484 | 2,551 | 1,690 |
| Deficit | 119 | 1,349 | 1,407 |
| Commercial expenditure | 1,003 | 1,001 | 5,500 |
| Commercial revenue | 2,609 | 2,470 | 5,500 |
| Deficit | 634 | 933 | 1,100 |
| Total expenditure | 5,606 | 7,803 | 9,107 |
| Total revenue | 4,653 | 5,521 | 7,690 |
| Deficit | 753 | 1,372 | 1,507 |

Details of the figures given in columns (1) and (2) are not yet available.

4. It is to be noted that, over the ordinary and commercial budgets taken as a whole, the deficit for the year 1322 is very much as originally estimated, even though some 340 million rials were later added to the expenditure side of the ordinary budget to provide increased salaries for Government servants. Owing to an under-estimate of revenue and to the transfer of certain sums from the ordinary budget to the ordinary budget the deficit has been considerably less than estimated. On the other hand, the commercial budget has turned out badly owing to the increase in the cost of the industrial undertakings operated by the Government. It was, however, recognised at the time the commercial estimates were prepared that they were hardly more than conjectural. The Government's proposals for their reorganisation were given in his report for the month of Bahman 1322 (received by my despatch No. 247 of 1st May).

(*) Not printed

5. It has to be added that the figures given in the third paragraph above are those of the ordinary budget only. The commercial budget, and the appropriation accounts have been published within memory. There is said to be a Persian Accounts Tribunal constituted for the preparation of such accounts, but it is not known ever to have functioned.

11. Budget for 1323

6. The budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—

| | Million
Rials |
|-----------------------------------|------------------|
| Ordinary budget—
Expenditure | 4,000 |
| Revenue | 3,000 |
| Deficit | 1,000 |
| Commercial budget—
Expenditure | 500 |
| Revenue | 600 |
| Surplus | 100 |

The overall surplus is 470,800 rials.

7. As from the beginning of this year revenue and expenditure under the post and tobacco monopolies are transferred from the commercial to the ordinary budget. The figures for both taken together are

| | Estimate,
1322 | 1323 |
|-------------|-------------------|-------|
| | Million Rials | |
| Revenue | 1,031 | 1,425 |
| Expenditure | 258 | 359 |

8. The budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—
The ordinary budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—
The commercial budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—
The overall surplus is 470,800 rials.

9. As stated in paragraph 6, the commercial budget shows a slight surplus of 100 million rials with revenue estimated at 600 million and expenditure at 500 million. The ordinary budget shows a deficit of 1,000 million rials with revenue estimated at 3,000 million and expenditure at 4,000 million. The overall surplus is 470,800 rials.

10. As stated in paragraph 6, the commercial budget shows a slight surplus of 100 million rials with revenue estimated at 600 million and expenditure at 500 million.

This compares as follows with the figures for 1322, the first year in which the separation into the ordinary and commercial budgets was made:—

| | 1322 | 1323 |
|-------------|-------|-------|
| Revenue | 5,795 | 6,425 |
| Expenditure | 5,896 | 6,000 |
| Deficit | 101 | 95 |

11. The figures as between 1322 and 1323 require, as stated earlier, certain adjustments. The ordinary budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—
The commercial budget for 1323, as presented to the Majlis, is as follows:—
The overall surplus is 470,800 rials.

12. In the commercial budget for 1323 Dr. Millsaugh has had in mind (a) price stabilisation and the governmental purchase and improved distribution of food-stuffs and other goods on a large scale, with a view to reducing prices, and incidentally in due course relieving the budget itself, and (b) the transfer to private enterprise of those undertakings which are not proper to Government control and the competent management of the remainder. Dr. Millsaugh's resignation (given after long provocation, and assumed in the writing of this despatch to be final) will not only probably have the effect that his commercial budget for 1323 becomes so much waste paper (unless it should so happen that he is adequately replaced) but will result in a maladministration which makes it impossible at the present stage to forecast the course of the budget for 1323 as a whole.

13. In the meantime, the Majlis has transferred the budget to its Budgetary Commission for consideration. The commission have, it is understood, so far refused to approve it on the ground that the detailed estimates for Government Departments in the budget for the year 1322 have not been approved by them.

14. The following appendices are attached to this despatch:—

- (A) Ordinary budget. Estimated revenue for 1322 and 1323
- (B) Ordinary budget. Estimated expenditure for 1322 and 1323
- (C) Commercial budget. Estimated revenue for 1322 and 1323
- (D) Commercial budget. Estimated expenditure for 1322 and 1323

15. A copy of this despatch has been sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
R. W. HULLARD.

(P) Not printed.

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No. 6

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July)

(No. 273.)

Sir,

Tehran, 1st July 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 321 of the 4th August, 1943 I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a report on heads of missions at Tehran.

I have, &c.

R. W. HULLARD

Enclosure in No. 6

Report on Heads of Missions at Tehran

(Paragraphs marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports, Afghanistan (Ambassador). M. Mohamed Heydar Khan Hosseini (8th January, 1944).

A young man for the post—born probably about 1904. Has always served in diplomatic posts or in the Afghan Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Has served in Paris and Geneva.

Talks French well, and a little English. Wife in purdah. Amiable but colourless.

Belgium (Minister): M. Egbert Graeffe (17th January, 1937)

He was born in 1880 at Brussels. A big stout very professional looking man with a high forehead and a serious expression. He was at one time a commercial and financial affairs, especially in Berlin. Has much energy and determination and is outspoken in his discussions with the Persian Government. Unfortunately he is vain and boastful and lays claim to omniscience, and this leads many people to underrate his abilities.

When the King of the Belgians surrendered to the Germans, M. Graeffe, though a keen Royalist, supported the Belgian Government in exile, and continued to do so, in spite of the defeat of France.

Graeffe has been in closer touch with the Shah than most of his colleagues. He and the Shah have met frequently for shooting and tennis, pastimes for which as for dabbling in Persian intrigue, he has always had plenty of leisure.

It is not yet certain that he will ever recover full working capacity. Too long residence at this high altitude, and anxiety about his country and about a son in Belgium, may have contributed to the decline of his health.

M. Graeffe speaks excellent English, as does his wife, who is half American.

Brazil (Minister): M. Renato de la Serda Lago.

Has just arrived and has not yet presented his credentials.

China (Minister): Mr. Li Tich-Tsong (25th June, 1942)

Mr. Li is the first Chinese Minister to Persia. He was born at Chang-sha in 1906 and started his career as a magistrate in Nankien, but since 1931 he has been in the diplomatic service. He spent four years in London, where he acted as secretary to the Chinese delegation to the World Economic Conference and in his spare time attended courses at the London School of Economics.

He talks English well and is learning French.

Mr. Li has always been friendly to His Majesty's Legation (embassy), but since he gets from this very much more than he can give, too great credit should not be given to him for it. He is very touchy and protocolaire. He has just given proof of dishonesty, in that he sold in the open market at an immense profit a few days after he received it, a car which the Middle East Supply Centre had obtained for him from India out of the Persian quota.

Mr. Li has with him an attractive and sensible wife and three out of his eight children, the other five children are in China.

Czechoslovakia (Minister): M. Josef M. Kadlec (14th April, 1943)

M. Kadlec served as Czechoslovak Consul-General in Jerusalem for some years. He seems anxious to ingratiate himself with everyone he meets, and is a very agreeable man. He is accompanied by a married wife of Bulgarian origin and a cripple step-daughter (Italian father) who acts as his interpreter. He is very friendly to the British for the part they played when France collapsed. (Written in 1943)

Denmark (Chargé d'Affaires): M. A. E. C. Fensmark (13th April, 1939)

Formerly the Danish Minister in Stockholm was accredited to Tehran also, but M. Fensmark is chargé d'affaires *en pied*. Born about 1890. Formerly in Angora, and before that was attached to the Danish Court. Speaks excellent English. Very friendly to the British. It was due, at least in part, to him that about one in five of the men in the Danish community volunteered to serve in the Allied forces. For several months he ignored telegrams from his Government instructing him to work with the German Legation here, but finally obeyed instructions to inform the German Legation that he regarded his legation as neutral. (Written in 1941)

He maintained close relations with the Allied Legations, and after the signature of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty, when it was certain that Persia was finally in the Allied orbit, he adhered officially to the Free Danish movement and brought his whole community with him. (Written in 1942)

Those to whom M. Fensmark pours out his troubles often find him lacking in energy. A few days after his arrival he was in the British forces.

Egypt (Ambassador): M. Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha (17th February, 1943)

*Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha was educated at the Jesuit Fathers' College at Cairo and the Egyptian School of Law. He has served in the magistracy in Egypt, in the Royal Household of King Fouad and in the Egyptian Legation at London. He was Minister of the Interior when Zulfikar Pasha was appointed first ambassador in March 1939.

Although Abdel Latif Talaat Pasha should play an important rôle in this country owing to the fact that the Queen is a sister of the King of Egypt, he has apparently only seen her once. The Court seems anxious to keep him at arm's length. He is a sad and lonely figure, which may be due to the fact that his wife has not come with him. In any case, he seems frankly bored with Persia and hankers after his own country. He has great personal charm and culture once one gets beneath the surface of his rather shy exterior. He speaks some English. (Written in 1943.)

He has been abroad for the last nine months or so, and shows no inclination to return.

France (Delegate of the French Committee of National Liberation): M. Pierre Lafond (29th March, 1944)

M. Lafond was born probably about 1895. He fought in the 1914-18 war and then entered the diplomatic service. He returned to the army in 1930 but after the defeat of France he obtained an appointment in Tunisia. His open antagonism to Vichy caused him to be arrested by the Germans and sent back to France, whence he escaped back to Tunis after the occupation of North Africa by the Allies.

From all British sources we have good reports of M. Lafond. He is rather effusive in language but not the less sincere for that. He is an interesting and cultivated man, and a pleasant addition to the diplomatic corps. He speaks English quite well. His large family is still in Tunisia.

Greece (Chargé d'Affaires): M. Georges Constant (13th September, 1943)

M. Constant has been in the service of the Greek Government since 1920. He is a man that he ought to be a Minister. Agreeable but vain and with no character. His wife, a Greek from Istanbul is young and very silly.

Holy See (Apostolic Delegate): Mgr. A. Marina (29th October, 1939)

The position of the apostolic delegate is rather a delicate one. His official status is not fully recognised by the Persian Government and his name is not mentioned in the Persian press. He is a very agreeable man, but his official position is not fully recognised by the Persian Government. He has a friendly and sympathetic character. (Written in 1939.)

Mgr. Marina was bitterly disappointed when Italy entered the war. Very friendly to us and openly shows his disapproval of the Nazi attitude towards religion. (Written in 1940.)

After the withdrawal of bag and cypher facilities from the apostolic delegate in 1942 relations were for a time a little less friendly, but they are again very good, though according to a Roman Catholic colleague Mgr. Marina is convinced that His Majesty's Government are bent upon reducing the diplomatic status of the Papacy at the end of the war.

Iraq (Minister): M. Abbas Mahdi (7th April, 1943)

M. Abbas Mahdi was a member of the Iraqi Parliament. He is a very agreeable man, but somewhat dull. He speaks English and French well. He married late in life and has brought with him his wife and baby. His wife, who appears in public, is learning English, but says little in any language.

Netherlands (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim): Jonkheer de Brauw (11th March 1942)

Came here from Simla, where he held a consular post. He and his wife, who both talk English well, are very friendly. They have an only son in the Netherlands forces in England.

M. de Brauw is not a great character, but as he has nothing to do this does not matter.

Norway (Minister): M. Rolf Otto Andvord (20th April, 1942)

Born 1890. M. Andvord is also Minister. He was for seven years a member of the Norwegian delegation to the League of Nations. He is a friendly

social colleague, gets on well with Persians and has done excellent work among them in the Allied cause. His visits to Tehran are short as most of his time is spent in Moscow.

Poland (Minister) Dr. Karol Bader (18th July, 1942).

*M. Bader was born in 1897 and during the last war was head of the Press Bureau of the Polish National Committee at Berne. Later he was counsellor and chargé d'affaires at Prague, and he was Minister at Ankara from 1926 to 1931, when he retired owing to his opposition to the policy of Marshal Pilsudski. At the time of the German invasion he made his way from Poland to Ankara and since June 1940 has served alternatively at Beirut and Istanbul.

*M. Bader is a great relief after his silly and most voluble predecessor, M. Jan Karszo-Siedlewski. He is a co-operative and businesslike colleague and his judgment is sound and balanced. In view of wartime conditions he only entertains on a modest scale, owing to the number of Polish refugees here and the present state of Polish-Soviet relations, he has no easy task, but he works with great tact and discretion. He speaks excellent French and good English. His wife is still in Poland. (Written in 1943)

Soviet Union (Ambassador) M. Mikhaïl Alexeevitch Maximov (is just about to present his credentials).

M. Maximov's appointment as ambassador was very sudden. He was counsellor to the Soviet Embassy, but was promoted to succeed M. Constantin Alexandrovitch Mikhaïlov, who retired "ill" after three months.

M. Maximov was born about 1900. He served for several years in Afghanistan and was then for several years consul general in Meshed where His Majesty's consular officers got on well with him. He talks Persian well and is beginning to learn English.

M. Maximov has the reputation of being an exceedingly cunning man and of being mainly responsible for the election of a number of pro-Russian and pro-Communist Deputies to the Majlis in 1943. I believe that this reputation is deserved. Nevertheless, M. Maximov is business like and is sufficiently well informed about Persia to be able to give an opinion without fear, and, as he is also amusing and can grin at a fair bit, he is as good a Soviet colleague as one could expect to have in this country.

Sweden (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim) M. Sven Harald Pousette (14th October, 1941).

M. Pousette, who is in charge of German, Bulgarian and Hungarian interests, was previously counsellor at the Swedish Legation in London. He of course speaks excellent English. I have always found him a helpful and sympathetic colleague, and I am sure that he is a friend of Great Britain, though in his early days here the delicacy of his task sometimes compelled him to adopt an attitude of careful neutrality which some of his colleagues regarded with a very vertical eye.

His wife and children are in Sweden.

Switzerland (Chargé d'Affaires) Dr. Armin Dieniker (6th June, 1939).

Is in charge of Italian interests, which he protects with discretion. Is a sound and sensible man. Undoubtedly pro Ally, though so long as the Axis representatives were here he took great pains to be polite to them. His wife, who is a lawyer by profession, is believed to have been secretary to an anti-Nazi society in Switzerland before her marriage to M. Dieniker in 1938.

M. Dieniker is a Swiss of the old school, a man of great energy and is believed to covet the post of first Swiss representative to the Soviet Union.

Turkey (Ambassador) M. Cemal Husnu Taray (7th December, 1941).

Born about 1890. Formerly manager of a bank in Turkey and a Minister in one of Atatürk's Cabinets and later ambassador in Warsaw and afterwards in Athens. He wields considerable influence in Tehran as the representative of an important neutral Power and of the senior partner in the Saadabad Pact. He is a clever man, but has done himself harm by his foolish behaviour as a *courreur de femmes* and more recently by trying in his pan-Turanian enthusiasm to dictate to the Persian Government as to their policy towards the Qashgai tribe. He has always professed to be a friend of Great Britain, but his interference in the matter of the Qashgai, which, though it affected our military interests, was undertaken without notice being given to me, might have embarrassed the British war effort very seriously. M. Taray is much criticised by Persians for suspicious deals in carpets, and by the Allies for

having sold soon after receiving it, at a profit of hundreds per cent., a new car which the United States Government had allowed him to buy in America. Among the Persian suspects arrested in August 1943 were two or three who were frequenters of the Turkish Embassy, and M. Taray regarded their arrest as a British attempt to "get at" him. Altogether a man whose abilities are largely cancelled by regrettable faults of character. His health is bad but not worse than the bridge and poker which he plays assiduously.

United States (Ambassador) Mr. Leland Morris.

The arrival of Mr. Morris, the first United States Ambassador to Persia, is still awaited. His last post was that of Minister in Iceland.

Mr. Morris, who was born about 1886, began his career at Constantinople in about 1908 as a student interpreter. He was consul general at Alexandria for some time. He was in Vienna when the war began and was very helpful to our people there. When Germany declared war on the United States, Mr. Morris, as Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, was summoned by Ribbentrop to receive the

Mr. Morris should be a great improvement on his predecessor, Mr. Dreyfus, in that he knows something about the Near and Middle East and is an able and straightforward man.

Yugoslavia (Chargé d'Affaires ad interim) M. Milovan Tomasevic (24th July 1943).

M. Tomasevic is a pleasant, friendly man. He talks French well and English. He is pulled all ways in his mind. Like his wife, he is from Split, being knocked to pieces. He is a Croat, but is for the Government and against Pavelich and all his works; and he is anti-Bolshevik and for that reason if for no other he is bitterly opposed to Tito. Very pessimistic about the future of his country.

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No 7

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 18th July)

(No. 241)

Sir,

Tehran, 8th July 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 156 of the 6th April, I have the honour to convey to you herewith a report on events in Persia during the months of April, May and June 1944.

Allied Co-operation in Persia

2. During their visit to London in April Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Wallace Murray raised the question of Allied co-operation in Persia. It was agreed, on the proposal of Mr. Murray, to suggest to the Soviet Government that conversations should be held between the Allied representatives in Tehran to implement more fully the provisions of the Declaration of the Tehran Conference regarding economic assistance to Persia. The Foreign Office in turn suggested that the British and American representatives should be communicated to the Persian authorities by the United States and British Ambassadors in Tehran together with an undertaking to supply the necessary equipment, the Soviet Government should be informed before the offer was made.

I invited to furnish corresponding information regarding any Soviet proposals to supply arms to Persia. Both the British and American delegations agreed that their aim was to help Persia to be stable, prosperous and secure and that to this end the American advisers should be actively supported.

3. The Soviet Government agreed to take part in the economic discussions proposed by Mr. Murray and the first meeting between the British, Soviet and American representatives was held in Tehran on the 3rd June. The American Chargé d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador suggested to the Soviet Ambassador that the Soviet Government should be invited to join the Allied Higher Supplies Committee (described in the Economic Section of this despatch). The inclusion of representatives of the Soviet Embassy would ensure that co-operation between all four Allies which is essential if the best use is to be

The Soviet Ambassador asked for time for consideration of this proposal.

The Soviet Ambassador was called on the 21st June. The British and American Ambassadors and His Majesty's Ambassador impressed on the Soviet Ambassador that Persia needed economic assistance and that it was in the Soviet's own ultimate interests, if only as beneficiaries of the Trans-Persia route, to contribute

to Persia's well being. The American Charge d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador proceeded cautiously with the proposal which had been made by the State Department that the Soviet Ambassador should be pressed to support the American advisers, since the latter are still mistrusted by the Soviet authorities and it was not desirable to endanger the future of the joint economic discussions by bringing up this dangerous matter too brusquely. The meeting then discussed the grain situation and agreed that all possible help must be given

grain. The Soviet Ambassador, on instructions from Moscow, asked for further information about the proposed Higher Supplies Committee. It was clear that the Soviet Government were afraid that they might be voted down. The American Charge d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador made it quite clear that the Committee would not vote and would have no executive powers, but would only try to ascertain Persia's resources and needs and the possibility of meeting these needs from Allied sources. The American Charge d'Affaires and His Majesty's Ambassador also hinted that any questions which might involve divergence of opinion between the United Kingdom, American and Soviet Governments should be discussed outside the Higher Supplies Committee as far as possible. It is essential that these meetings should not be used by the Persians as an opportunity to arraign the Russians before the British and the Americans. In the course of June, the American Charge d'Affaires communicated to the Soviet Ambassador a scheme by the American Director of Road Transport for the management of road transport in the north. The Soviet Ambassador promised to study this, but he was guarded and tended to throw doubt on the need for Americans. Nevertheless, the local Russian authorities show signs of departing from their complete obstruction of the activities of the Millsapugh Mission in their zone. They have been more co-operative in the past, but the Soviet representatives, notwithstanding the unforthcoming reception given by the Soviet Ambassador to the American Charge d'Affaires' approach. Again, the American Ambassador has been told by the Russians that they remain aloof from the work of local collection but they have offered to help with the long distance haulage of grain. The Russians have given a delayed and grudging residence permit, reports good co-operation by the local Russian authorities.

5. On the other hand the examination by the Soviet section of the Tripartite Censorship of Persia of British and American books and periodicals has recently exceeded all bounds, and the British section have found torn wrappers addressed to His Majesty's Embassy. The British section of the Censorship in relations with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Dr. Millsapugh and various Persian Government departments. The British section of the Censorship in consultation with His Majesty's Embassy and Censorship, Middle East, have taken up the matter strongly and the Soviet section have promised to stop the practice. Periodicals addressed to bodies such as those described above or to British and American nationals. An opportunity has been taken of examining the publications recently condemned and while a few condemnations are clearly reasonable the majority can be described as frivolous. The Soviet censors are in future to be required to show cause why a book should not be delivered to the addressee, and when they cannot be persuaded to withdraw their objections, the book will be returned to the sender. The whole question is still under active consideration by the British authorities concerned.

6. Finally Soviet obstructionism reached its climax at the end of June when the Soviet authorities, in spite of strong pressure by His Majesty's Embassy, delayed to grant permission for Sir Olaf Caroe and Sir Denys Pilditch to fly to Meshed (where the Government of India have large interests) until the visitors had left on their return journey to India. (Their visit to Persia is described in the Indian Section of this despatch.)

7. However, the foregoing paragraphs, generally speaking, give an unduly gloomy view of Anglo-American-Soviet relations in Persia. Persia is the one country where British, American and Soviet military and civil authorities meet on a broad land front and the many day-to-day contacts proceed smoothly or at any rate smoothly enough for the despatch of business.

Relations with India

8. The Persian Cultural Mission which travelled to India in February returned to Persia in April. They professed to have been delighted at their

reception both in official and non-official circles and greatly impressed by what they saw. In particular, they were impressed by the enormous number of valuable Persian manuscripts in India—exceeding anything to be found in Persia itself by university, school and public buildings, by the vast progress made in industry, by the fact that the majority of ministers are Indians and that British and Indian officials work side by side, sometimes one being senior and sometimes the other, and by the high morale of the Indian people as a whole in the face of the Axis Powers. Most of these points may seem obvious, but they are not obvious to the Persians, who like to regard the Indians as a nation of helots trodden down by the British, and the mission has undoubtedly had a beneficial effect, particularly as its members have been emphasising these points in speeches and broadcasts since their return.

9. Four members of the Indian Defence Consultative Committee travelled to Persia in May to discuss the situation.

10. Sir Olaf Caroe, Secretary to the Government of India, and Sir Denys Pilditch, Director of the Home Department of the Government of India, arrived in Persia on 27th June to stay at His Majesty's Embassy. They were also entertained by the Persian Government on the 2nd July.

11. In view of the great demand for teachers of English in Persia and the impossibility of supplying enough teachers from the United Kingdom, arrangements are being made for five Indians to come to Persia for the purpose. Two will be stationed in Meshed and one each in Kerman, Yazd and Ahwaz.

American Interests

12. On various occasions during the period under review His Majesty's Embassy recommended that His Majesty's Government should urge the United States Government to send their new Ambassador, Mr. Leland Morris, to Tehran without delay. The reasons for this recommendation were, first, that Dr. Millsapugh was being increasingly criticised by both official and unofficial Persians for failure to solve the economic situation, and, secondly, that the Ambassador might be able to bring about a better working relationship between Dr. Millsapugh and the American advisers to the Persian army, gendarmerie and police regarding the funds which should be allotted to those forces. His Majesty's Government took action on His Majesty's Embassy's recommendation but, although the United States Government agreed in principle to accelerate Mr. Morris's arrival in Tehran, he will not in fact be here until the end of July. From April onwards a regular campaign against Dr. Millsapugh and his colleagues was launched both in the Majlis and the press. The more important criticisms were:

- (1) That the mission had not reorganised the finances nor prevented a rise in prices nor assured supplies. (This charge is in many ways entirely unfair. Dr. Millsapugh is doing his best during a period of inflation to increase revenue and reduce expenditure, but is faced, through no fault of his own, with a deficit on last year's working of some 77 per cent of the total revenue of the country. The rise in prices is largely due to the presence of the Allied forces in this country and it is unlikely that the price level will fall until they are withdrawn; meanwhile the rate of increase in prices has diminished considerably during the last few months. There is more substance in the third part of the charge—that supplies have not been ensured. Although large quantities of commodities such as piece-goods, tea, sugar and drugs are in the country and under Government control, they are not yet reaching the consumer at reasonable prices. Dr. Millsapugh is, however, confident that the steps taken by the Distribution Department will show definite results shortly.)
- (2) That the expenditure of Persian Government money on the running of the mission was excessive. (The expenditure on the mission, as reported by the Price Stabilisation Section, Revenue Department, Organisation, &c., was excessive. (The expenditure on American personnel in these departments is as high as £100,000 per annum. If the desired objects are obtained, the expenditure will have been well worth while.)
- (3) That some of the members of the mission were incompetent and unsuited to their work. (This is true to some extent, although at least a dozen of them are capable and suitable men.)

14. Dr. Millspaugh's qualities may be described as follows: he is scrupulously honest and tenacious, but is strong headed to the verge of obstinacy. He has administrative ability up to a point, except that (a) he tends to centralise all powers himself: this hampers and offends his American colleagues and causes delay (b) he is inclined not to discuss proposals sufficiently before issuing orders: this leads to the commission of avoidable mistakes (c) his obstinacy has led to the resignation of several of his best men.

15. The mission undoubtedly has many enemies. The Shah is opposed to an army as the Shah would like to have, and has been imprudent enough to say money expended on them. (This led the Ministry of War to issue a statement asking why Dr. Millspaugh made such strictures without consulting General D'Arcy, the American adviser to the army). The Russians, in turn, are still suspicious of the mission. Finally, there are the many powerful Persians who stand to lose by the mission's efforts to bring down prices and to control financial abuses.

16. At the end of May the American Chargé d'Affaires, under instructions from his Government, presented a note to the Persian Prime Minister expressing anxiety at the attacks on the American advisers and at the lack of support by the Persian Government. The note reminded the Persian Government that the United States Government only assented to the engagement of Dr. Millspaugh and his assistants because the Persian Government insisted and undertook to support them. The object was not to provide a political buffer but to afford Persian Government did not want assistance the United States Government did not intend to press it upon them. The Persian Government in their reply declared that they would support Dr. Millspaugh. On 21 June the Prime Minister brought before the Majlis a Bill providing for the repeal of the law which gave Dr. Millspaugh his powers and providing for the transfer of those powers to the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries. The next day Dr. Millspaugh tendered his resignation. At the same time the Road Transport Department, which owing to the failure of the Persian Government to appoint a Persian president now consists of British and Americans only, decided that until the situation cleared, a consignment of about one hundred Lend-Lease lorries which had arrived for the Persian Government should not be issued (there was justification in this in that the Persian Government have paid for very little of the Lend Lease material received, and that if Dr. Millspaugh went, the Americans who are running road transport for the Persian Government with some success would leave with him). The Persian Government were severely shaken by this and by the prospect of incurring the serious displeasure of the United States Government, and at the end of the month it was virtually certain that the difference between Dr. Millspaugh and the Persian Government would be composed.

17. It is clear that the British Government have given Dr. Millspaugh their full support and would regard his departure as a calamity in spite of his faults (which would prevent his receiving our full support if he was a British subject).

Soviet Interests

18. The new Soviet Ambassador, M. Constantin Mikhailov, who had presented his credentials in January, left Persia in May ostensibly for medical treatment and has not returned. There is ground for suspicion that his departure was not due to illness alone. The Persian Prime Minister saw the Ambassador the day after the Persian Government had refused to accept the conditions attached to the offer of war material made by Stalin to the Shah at the Tehran Conference, and he found the Ambassador "looking like a man condemned to death," yet maintaining that he was perfectly well. From that moment the Ambassador was never seen again except presumably by Russians, and it seems likely that he had fallen into disgrace for failing to complete a transaction initiated by Marshal Stalin himself. Neither the British nor the American Embassies regret his departure. He was cold and suspicious, and they failed to succeed by the former chargé d'affaires, M. Maximov, who is an old Persian hand and a clever intriguer, but is human, has a sense of humour, and can often be teased into taking action. The change therefore is for the better.

19. The Persian Society for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union has issued some impressive statutes, but so far little appears to have been done to implement the programme laid down in them, and the sole activity has been to organise classes for learning Russian, about ninety persons have been enrolled so far. It is too early to estimate what response the Persian public will give to the new society once it has begun to function properly. In Isfahan Russian is being taught to Armenian schoolchildren.

Polish Interests

20. At the opening of the period under review there were about 8,200 Polish refugees in Persia. Since then some 300 boys and girls have been incorporated into the Polish army in the Middle East as enlisted boys and P.S.K. There are thus about 6,900 at the present time, and this number should be reduced by about 1,000 in the course of the next few days by the departure of another group for India.

21. Of the 5,900 odd then remaining, about 2,000 will be in Isfahan, 2,800 in Tehran, and 1,000 in the transit camp at Ahwaz.

22. The period has been generally devoid of incident, and the health of the refugees has been satisfactory. The arrival from Soviet Russia of a mission of Poles masquerading as Polish Patriots does not appear to have had any influence on the Polish community.

23. It should be noticed also that the problem of Polish refugees in Persia has assumed a different aspect in the last few months. In the past it was a matter of putting pressure on the shipping authorities to provide transports to get the refugees away, and it was their inability to provide enough shipping owing to operations and other causes that has made the evacuation drag on the uncomprehensible time it has. Now however, practically all the refugees who are not in some way employed here, or are the relations of employees, have left, so under existing conditions only one more transport—referred to above—can be filled. Those military organisations, and their dependants (whom it has been decided not to move for the time being), the various Polish staffs, and the children's school at Isfahan. This last can only be moved when some place overseas can be found where it can be established as a permanent establishment. The new has been generally taken that this institution is doing such good work in forming a new generation of Poles that it would be a pity to break it up.

Anglo-Persian Public Relations

24. The reopening of the second front in Western Europe made a profound impression on the Persian public. The impression was followed by a wave of undue optimism regarding the early cessation of hostilities which swept over the country.

25. The Persian press continued in the week following the news of the success of the various fronts were reported. In general, however, the main preoccupation of the press centred round the internal troubles of the country and the need for Persia to prepare plans for arguing her case at the peace conference.

26. On the occasion of "United Nations Day" on the 14th June, a special celebration was arranged at "Victory House." The reception, which was attended by members of the Persian Cabinet and Government, and of the Diplomatic Corps, concluded with a showing of the film "The Gentle Sex," depicting the part played by girls of the A.T.S.

27. During the period under review the various activities of the Public Relations Bureau were examined in detail with a view to deciding the lines along which propaganda policy in Persia should be directed in the future in order to meet the changing war situation and the need for long term plan for the post-war period.

British Council Activities

28. General.—Professor Boase, the Middle East representative of the British Council, arrived in May and stayed for a while in Persia, reporting the Council's work. He lectured at the Tehran University and at the institutes in Tehran and Isfahan, and broadcasted from the Tehran State radio. It has been decided to open a new institute in Shiraz and a director has been sent there to

make the necessary preparations, but an assistant will not be available till September. 40,000 English textbooks have been ordered by the Ministry of Education for use in the schools throughout Persia: they are on their way from London. 30,000 text books for adults have been ordered from Cairo for sale to the public. The broadcasting of English lessons on five evenings a week was started in April, for which 5,000 textbooks were specially written by a member of the Council staff and printed locally: these were distributed to the shops in Tehran and the provinces and sold immediately. The first two numbers of "Atang," a bilingual quarterly published by the Ministry of Information in Delhi with the co-operation of the Council, were received here and all copies were sold without delay. The Tehran Medical Association continued their regular fortnightly clinical meetings and held a successful reception at the Tehran Institute. There are now about 200 members of different nationalities. As the showing of educational films to the University, schools and colleges of all kinds had grown too large for the Council to handle with their limited staff and equipment it was decided to leave all film work to the Public Relations Bureau in Tehran until the Council can take it over themselves. At the request of the Chancellor of the university 1,500 copies of a lecture by the British Ambassador on "Dr Johnson" were printed in English and Persian for distribution to the university and schools.

20. *Anglo-Persian Institutes.*—The institutes in Tehran and Isfahan and a branch in Tehran are now teaching over 1,500 adult students of both sexes and assist in the teaching of 500 in the university schools and other institutions. Further expansion of English classes is limited by the number of teachers, although they are helped by all the available part-time teachers from the British and American communities. In Shemiran, a summer resort near Tehran, the Summer Institute was opened in June with 200 students. At Isfahan factory owners have been approached to form workers' clubs in which English classes will be organised. The weekly concerts, film shows and lectures continued as usual although lecturers are becoming increasingly hard to find. An exhibit by the Isfahan Arts Group, of work both traditional and modern, was viewed by 2,500 visitors at the Isfahan Institute.

British Army Interests

30. The Indian Army Motor Transport Companies, who for some eighteen months have been supplying motor transport in Persia, often in very arduous conditions of road and winter weather, from Khashakin, on the Iraq frontier, to Tabriz, have now been withdrawn. The portion of that route was taken over by the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation but the Russians have now elected that with effect from the 1st August the United Kingdom Commercial Corporation shall carry to Pahlavi only and not to Tabriz. The maintenance of the Takistan Tabriz road, for long the responsibility of British engineers, has now been handed over to the Russian authorities, and the new Mianeh Bridge, the last work to be completed by the British Army with Azerbaijan appears now to have come to an end, and the Russians may perhaps be congratulating themselves that British officials have no further justification for penetrating that part of their zone in Persia except on business connected with the Consulate-General in Tabriz.

Security

32. After further prolonged negotiations, the surrender by the Qashgai to the British security authorities of the Persian Deputy, Naubakht, in the month of May. Naubakht had fled from Tehran and taken sanctuary with the Qashgai in August 1943. The Ministry of Information has announced that the Persian Government that they had documents showing that he was one of the chief instigators of the anti-Ally plot of 1942. Naubakht has been sent to the internment camp at Sultanabad for interrogation by the Anglo-Persian Commission.

33. In June the British security authorities located the Mullah Kashani in a villa in the hills north of Tehran, and effected his arrest in collaboration with the Persian police. Kashani was also implicated in the anti-Ally plot mentioned above. Kashani, too, has been sent to Sultanabad for interrogation. It is probable that there are now no more prominent Persians at large in Persia whose internment is required by the British security authorities, but some have escaped to Turkey and beyond with the connivance of Persian officials.

Internal Politics and Majlis

34. On the 6th April the Prime Minister, Saad, presented to the Shah and to the Majlis his reconstituted Cabinet. The two young men, Mahmud Fatah and Mahmud Naruman, were dropped, and also General Riaz; Abdul Qasim Ferouhar became Minister of Finance, Dr Ghani Minister of Education in place of Riaz; Nasir Etmadi became Minister of Agriculture, and the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs remained vacant, the Under-Secretary, Hukmi, being considered quite capable of carrying on as he had done on many occasions before.

Public Health was given to Dr Saad Malik, who had not previously held Cabinet rank. The Cabinet did not appear to be much stronger than its predecessor, and the young and progressive elements, except possibly Hajib, He, however, seems to agree that the Government has no authority or force. Before this and Vahid, the Under-Secretary, acting for him. Nevertheless the Majlis gave the new Cabinet a vote of confidence on the 16th April. Saad has let it be known that if his Cabinet was rejected this time he would resign, but perhaps the Majlis vote was due not so much to that fact as to the absence of any obvious alternative to Saad.

35. Seyyid Zia has caused some stir. He has kept aloof from the Shah and is evidently on the worst possible terms with His Majesty, whom he considers the principal critic, the Tudah party. His newspapers, the chief of which is *Fa'd*, are a ceaseless polemic against the Tudah party, who have replied in the same vein for his party, which is as yet nameless and, indeed, programmeless. He has also been a constant supporter of the Tudah party, and has brought into willing submission to the Tudah party the staff of the Ministry of Education, who are in favour of a limitation of the Shah's powers and a revision of the Constitution on that point, with a view to a more strict assertion of the limits of the powers of the Monarch. Seyyid Zia's greatest difficulty lies in the determined hostility of the Russians, who cannot get out of their heads the theory that Seyyid Zia is a creature of the British. Seyyid Zia seems obstinate, and to be reckoned with and it is unfortunate that the opposition of the Shah and the Russians has caused the Shah to take in this matter the same side as the Russians, a course which is bad for the Shah and might be dangerous for the stability of the country.

37. One of the features of the political life of Persia during the last three months has been the rise of several labour unions throughout the country. Such unions have existed for some time in the Russian-occupied zone, where they are affiliated with the Tudah party, and similar unions exist in Isfahan, in Tehran, amongst railway workers, and in Khuzistan. In Isfahan the power of the Tudah and the Workers' Union combined caused alarm to the Government, who sent down a new Governor-General, Reza Afshar, to deal with the situation. The Tudah party in the country. Other parties exist, but hardly more than in name: the various "fractions" in the Majlis continued to exist and to function, but they were more like associations of friends than political parties. The "Iran" fraction is composed of eleven members, all from Khuzistan.

48. The Shah had shown little sign of fulfilment of the promise he had made to the people of Persia to improve the lot of the people. He seemed to have secured the support of the people to improve the lot of the people at the Ministry of Education, but his visitors of matters of educational business; a step which was a great improvement at the time, but the Government was not taking any steps to improve the lot of the people in the later years of Reza Shah's reign.

48. With the surrender by the Qashgai of the Germans in March and of Nankahkt in May it became politic for British officials to show a less sceptical face to the protestations of friendship of Nasir Qashgai and his brothers. Nasir ~~had been~~ ^{was} calling on the acting Governor General and His Majesty's Consul, to whom he gave fervent assurances of his desire to act in accordance with British wishes. It suits him for the present to demonstrate his power for good in Fars by using his influence to restrain the lawless inclinations of the Qashgai tribes; and their behaviour during the spring migration and subsequently has been unusually good. But Nasir's change of heart did not extend so far as to induce him to pay ~~homage~~ ^{tribute} to his Sovereign during the latter's visit to Shiraz in May. On hearing that it was impending, Nasir retired to his mountains. He had offered to call on

40. A development that should lead to greater stability in Fars is an agreement between Qavam-ul-Mulk on the one hand and Nasir Qashgai and his brothers on the other to the effect that in future they will co-operate with rather than against the Government in Fars. The Qavam-ul-Mulk has suggested peace on two conditions: that no action should be taken injurious to the general interests of Fars and of Persia; that no action shall be taken against British interests or British wishes. The motives behind this reconciliation are, in the first place, the Qavam's conviction that he cannot rely on the Government to protect against the Qashgai such interests as he and his family still have left in Fars. In the second place, the fear common to all men of property in Persia of a Russian sponsored revolution in the north and the resulting desire to create some stability in the still feudal south that might be developed into some form of local autonomy, and, in the third place, the hope of being able to present a united front against a possible return of a tyrannical dictatorship of the Crown and the army.

50. In Bakhtiari assiduous attempts were made by all Morteza Quli Khan's sons and brothers to overthrow him, but without success. The situation remained satisfactorily quiet, and Morteza Quli Khan appears to be well in control of the tribe. The embassy reminded the disgruntled khans that they had themselves unanimously indicated Morteza Quli Khan as the most suitable among them to govern the tribe and advised them that their attempts to overthrow him now were not likely to encourage the Government to make further experiments in appointing a Bakhtiari khan to an important post nor the embassy to approve such an appointment. The khans seem to be taking this as the cause of their discontent is that Morteza Quli Khan has not allowed them opportunities of extracting money from Bakhtiari and as greed is an ineradicable quality in the khans of the older generation that has led for years to family quarrels, concord among them is not likely to be of long duration.

51. On the borders of the northern oil-field area in Khuzestan the Bahmai tribe, formerly a nomadic tribe, is not likely to be of long duration. The Bahmai tribe and the western Janeki tribe, but at the last moment fears that the Janeki lost some arms. It is through their territory that the Bahmai are now raiding, and the Janeki plead their disarmament as justification for being unable to prevent them.

[illegible]

53—(1) Army—At the beginning of this year the higher direction of the Army was in the hands of the War Office, and the War Office was in the hands of the Minister for War, who were firmly of the opinion that the best safeguards for

the interests of Persia and themselves lay in close co-operation with the British authorities and the American advisers. The dangers to those interests they saw in the internal disorder of the country and in the opportunity that that gave for the furtherance of what they were convinced were Russian designs against Persia. It was equally plain to them that they were not well regarded by the Russians. On the other hand, they were a disappointment to the Shah, who had certainly hoped that their obvious good will towards the British would induce the latter to provide some assistance in the re-equipment of his army. Consequently when Stalin made his offer of tanks and aircraft, to which it is believed he attached the condition that changes should be made in the higher direction of the army, the Shah, on one pretext or another, gradually removed the more important of these officers and in April appointed as Chief of the General Staff the Russian choice, General Razmara.

54. This officer, since his resignation from the same post in August 1943 himself with the Russians. It may, however, be assumed that Razmaria currently favours the Russians solely to serve his own ends. He is primarily ambitious for himself and then in less degree patriotic, strongly nationalist and anti-foreign. He is not hostile to his own country. In his heart he is hostile to us, but at present finds it good policy to conceal that hostility and to make a show of a genuine desire to co-operate with a view to giving us as little excuse as possible for interfering in internal affairs. He is not a military officer, but he is a military man, believing that he and his friends are better able to devise a military organization suitable to Persia than are American officers, but he tolerates them while they are the means of procuring equipment from America and is at present lavish in assurances to them of co-operation.

55. The American military advisers, who have now reached their full complement of twenty, have unfortunately not succeeded in gaining the confidence or support of any considerable number of Persian officers. By their presence they have undoubtedly restricted the grosser abuses and corruption and may even have helped towards the establishment of the beginnings of an ideal of honesty. In that they can certainly claim to have rendered service to Persia. But the prospect of fundamental and lasting reforms in the Persian forces being achieved through their endeavours grows less as the end of the war grows nearer and with it the expected strengthening of the Persian army.

56. The Shah, although less obviously interfering in the affairs of the army, still looks forward to the day when, Allied troops and American advisers having gone, he will, as Commander in chief in fact, rule this country as his father did. His intrigues with the army and the Ministry for War, and his intrigues with the British and American Chiefs of Staff and the usual discussions have begun to reappear between the (General) Staff and the Ministry for War.

57 All plans for the army for the current year, whether American or Persian, are at a standstill owing to lack of funds. Mr. Millsbaugh in the budget which he recently laid before Parliament has allotted only 100 million toman against the 168 millions estimated to be necessary for the organization approved by General Ridley. If the 100 millions is not increased the size of the army will have to be reduced, a measure which is likely to be strongly opposed by the Shah or the underpaid officer will have to be allowed to prey on the people as he has done before.

58. Stalin's tanks and aircraft have never materialized. The conditions subsequently attached to the offer stipulated that the units of mixed Russian and Persian personnel which were to be formed for the purpose of training in these arms were to be under the command of Soviet officers, who were themselves to be trained in the Soviet Union. The personnel were to be stationed at a base in the Soviet Union. The offer was made on the condition that the Persian Government would not permit the formation of such units without the approval of the Soviet Government. The Persian Government has refused to accept the offer, and the formation of such units is not being considered.

39—(2) *Gendarmerie*.—In the gendarmerie, as in the army, plans for improvement are held up by lack of funds. The credit demanded by Colonel Schwarzkopf for the modified organization he had in view for the current year that is, eighteen regiments of gendarmerie with a total strength of 24,000—the number he considers to be really necessary is 40,000—amounted to 80 million tomans. The amount allotted in the budget by Dr. Millsbaugh is 29 million

tomans, which is the bare cost of ten regiments at the increased rates of pay, which are in fact the minimum at which officers and men can be expected to refrain from partnership with brigands and thieves. Even among gendarmerie officers the opinion is forming that in the present financial and economic situation

the available resources to the army and the police. Colonel Schwarzkopf's insistence that the gendarmerie should be independent of the army has accentuated the lack of co-operation that became immediately evident when the force passed from the control of the Ministry for War to that of the Interior.

60. Colonel Schwarzkopf's mission has now been completed to the maximum strength of six officers sanctioned by the United States. Although Colonel Schwarzkopf has extensive powers, it is obvious that six officers can exercise no very effective influence over the actions of personnel scattered in small packets over an area of 628,000 square miles, and consequently in the provinces the gendarmerie shows no improvement as the result of Colonel Schwarzkopf's eighteen months' hard work.

61. (3) *Police*—There is as yet no indication that the Persian Government intend to ask for an American adviser to replace Mr. Timmerman, who died in May. Indeed, their experience of Mr. Timmerman is not likely to encourage them to do so. In spite of his record as an efficient police officer in the United States, the problem of the Persian police was far beyond his capacity. Indeed it is beyond the capacity of any one single foreign adviser.

62. The police, like the other security forces, is now faced with a cut in its budget demands which will necessitate either the cancellation of the inadequate increases of pay recently granted or a reduction in numbers that will remove all chance of the force being able to perform the duties required of it.

Persian Air Force

63. The fifteen Anson aircraft for the Persian Air Force are in course of delivery and arrival in the Middle East, whether a party of ten pilot-officers will be sent to receive them is not yet known.

The Persians have not been able to nominate a suitable officer for the command of the Persian Air Force, and the Middle East Staff College has been asked to recommend one.

64. The Persians have now taken over the repair and maintenance of their aircraft at Dozhan Tappeh. They are being assisted in this and in their general organisation by Royal Air Force personnel.

65. Efforts are being made by the Persians to establish a rudimentary meteorological service. The Persian meteorological officers have returned after a tour of duty in the Middle East.

66. Sarlashkar Hussein Pirouz is relinquishing the command of the air force on appointment as Governor-General and Officer Commanding Troops in Fars. His successor-designate is Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakhehavan, who is said to be accepting the post with reluctance under pressure from the Shah. Nakhehavan was a member of the Persian Air Force in 1927-35. Since he was Minister of War in 1941-42, he has held no active command and shown more interest in cars than aircraft. He is unlikely to infuse much discipline or energy into the air force, which sadly needs both.

Civil Air Lines

67. The Persian State Airline has asked and obtained leave to use Mehrabad airfield as its terminal. This airfield is used by British Overseas Airways, and the arrangement should serve, together with the shortly expected delivery of three de Havilland aircraft of the Rapide type, to maintain British influence in Persian air communications. Meanwhile, an experimental service to Isfahan, Shiraz and Bushire has been started with a light aircraft of the Flying Club.

68. The Russians, apparently without previous notice to the Persians, have begun to fly between Tehran and Meshed, Tabriz and Rasht. These are professedly official in character but are much used and appreciated by Persians on a commercial basis as the aircraft are comfortable and the fares moderate. The present frequency is about twice weekly to Meshed and once a week on the other services. This may be increased.

Finance

69. During the last few weeks the outturn for the financial year 1322 (ending on the 20th March, 1944) has been published. The deficit on the ordinary and supplementary budgets taken together is 1,372 million rials as

compared with 753 million for the year 1321) which is not far from the deficit of 1,058 million originally estimated. The commercial budget is responsible for 933 million of the total deficit.

70. The budget for the year 1323 is shortly coming under discussion by the Majlis. It shows ordinary revenue as 3,958 million rials against estimated expenditure of 4,569, while in the commercial budget revenue is placed at 6,367 million and expenditure at 5,735. The surplus is 470,391 rials. How far this estimate is accurate will depend largely on the extent to which the Administrator-General of the Finances, Dr. Millsbaugh, will be able to carry out his intention of turning over part of the Government industrial undertakings to private enterprise and reforming the management of the remainder. In general his task should be less difficult than it was a year or even six months ago. It is true that prices are still rising, the cost of living index in Tehran, which was 1,082 in February having been 1,083 in March, 1,167 in April and 1,201 in May. Over the last seven or eight months, however, the increase in the price index has been much less steep than formerly, and there are signs that a certain stabilisation of prices may be reached and maintained within a reasonable period and the figures may then turn downward, provided that the Millsbaugh Mission remains without serious curtailment of its powers. The improved distribution of food and other

goods, promised by Dr. Millsbaugh, will assist in improving the economic situation. Favourable war news has also already had some effect in decreasing prices.

71. The note circulation is still on the increase, it was 5,701 million rials in February, 6,036 in March, 6,119 in April, 6,222 in May and 6,261 million in June.

72. The Persian Government was represented by a small delegation headed by M. Ibtisaj, the Governor of the National Bank, at the Middle East Financial Conference held in Cairo during April, and it was a party to all the resolutions passed. It is certain that Dr. Millsbaugh, who already knows well the measures required to restore the Persian economy, will continue to press the Government to adopt those measures as and when possible. In this pressure he is assisted by His Majesty's Embassy. He is in particular considering additional direct taxation, but it is unlikely that this will not for the present produce the full revenue required.

73. The Persian Government is facing a number of serious economic problems—among them budgetary, fiscal and banking matters, trade and industrial policy, agriculture and industry, public works and unemployment, and general economic planning. This survey is being carried out by a number of committees, and the results are being reported to the Government. As is known, the rial proceeds of these sales are at present being transferred to the United States Government.

74. Sales of gold on His Majesty's Government's account have continued to increase. The total sales for the first four months of the year 1322 were £321,400 in March, £334,000 in April, £442,400 in May and £478,000 in June. It is to be hoped that they may be further increased partly as a result of the curtailment of sales in other Middle Eastern countries. As is known, the rial proceeds of these sales are at present being transferred to the United States Government.

75. The financial agreements with the Persian Government covering the use of the railway system since the 1st September, 1941, by the Allied nations has not yet been signed. The Government of the United States has not yet agreed to certain of the clauses in the agreement is at present being withheld by the United States Government who, it appears, may be unwilling to share financial responsibility for the Persian Government's debts so far as they are concerned with the Persian Government's debts. It is not yet known whether the Persian Government will be able to obtain the necessary funds to meet its obligations before the end of the year.

76. The Persian Government is facing a number of serious economic problems—among them budgetary, fiscal and banking matters, trade and industrial policy, agriculture and industry, public works and unemployment, and general economic planning. This survey is being carried out by a number of committees, and the results are being reported to the Government. As is known, the rial proceeds of these sales are at present being transferred to the United States Government.

77. The expenditure on Polish refugees in Persia is decreasing substantially, mainly owing to the reduction in the number of refugees. There has been a steady

been extravagance on this service in the past, but steps are now being taken by His Majesty's Government to ensure that the Polish delegation explanations on doubtful items of expenditure.

Economics

78. Notwithstanding the Persian criticisms of Dr. Millsbaugh, the period under review had shown a steady reinforcement of the personnel and organisation of his mission. Dr. H. G. Black, a prominent former member of the United States Administration, came from Washington to become Chief Administrator of the Cereals and Bread Section and a number of other Americans arrived to cover posts in Tehran and the provinces—notably in Meshed and Tabriz in the northern zones. There was thus a good chance that the work of introducing order into Persian economic affairs would now be extended progressively to the northern zones, which have hitherto been practically inaccessible to the mission, owing to Russian obstruction. Labour troubles increased, especially in Isfahan, where riots occurred among employees in the textile mills, in which workers were injured and output was considerably reduced. The Government continued to hold adequate stocks of the monopolised goods on which the civil population depends for its existence, but distribution was bad and large sections of the population received inadequate and in some districts no rations. Distribution, in fact, remained the weakest feature of the economic system.

79. An effort was made during the last few months to widen the scope of the various Anglo-American committees centring round the Middle East Supply Committee. Representatives of the Soviet and Persian Governments to sit on a new "Higher Supply Committee." (This would supersede the present Combined Supplies Committee which, apart from being only Anglo-American, confines its attention so far as imports are concerned to goods entering the country from the south or east.) Arrangements would also be made to have similar representation on the various sub-committees dealing with transport, industries, food supplies, import licensing &c., which would be reorganised to fit in better with present requirements.

79A. The instruments of ratification of the Commercial Agreement between Persia and the United States which was signed in April 1943, were exchanged in Washington on the 31st May. The agreement came into force thirty days later. Certain existing duties of interest to both parties are consolidated and a number of tariff concessions are made on both sides, but the agreement contains nothing discriminatory in favour of either party. Persian exports of gums, opium and handicraft products and United States exports of motor vehicles, tyres, machinery and lubricants are among the goods affected.

Cereals

80. Grain collection at the end of June was satisfactory. Total stocks in hand of one month's requirements, amounted to 69,154 tons, the surplus available to supplement this year's harvest therefore amounted to 41,463 tons. The immediate future is assured and it is unlikely that there will be any shortage considering the possibility of holding at a Gulf port a reserve of grain with which to meet any possible crisis that might arise. Factors liable to upset plans for the future are the possibility that the agitation against the Millsbaugh Mission, which is dying down, may spring up again presently, the need to supply areas such as Khuzistan and Bushire, where, owing to crop failure this year, there will be a considerable deficit, and the dependence of the success of grain collection on the efficient distribution of cotton-piece goods, sugar and tea. There is no doubt that this would be a wise precaution to take provided that the inter-

considerable quantity of grain awaiting transport southwards from Azerbaijan. Of a total of 25,800 tons in that province purchased by the Government, about 5,000 tons are being brought down, 10,000 tons could be carried under existing arrangements during the next two months; but for the remaining 10,000 tons there seems to be no possibility of moving it with the transport now available. In addition, it is believed that another 15,000 tons could still be purchased from the 1943-44 harvest surplus in that area. Arrangements are therefore being

the vehicles belonging to the Persian Road Transport Administration working

locally on collection, and by Transvitrans vehicles to carry the grain south to the Persian Gulf. The future prospects are good. Very little grain now remains to be transported from the south. Similarly the oil stock position throughout the country was satisfactory.

Transport

81. The transport by rail of civil goods and cereals from the Persian Gulf to the Millsbaugh Mission and with the help of Paiforce. The wagons allotted for civil goods were on the whole efficiently used and the future prospects are good. Very little grain now remains to be transported from the south. Similarly the oil stock position throughout the country was satisfactory.

82. Mr. Shields and his American and British associates in the Road Transport Administration effected considerable improvement in the organisation of road transport. Freight rates have been revised and a system of payment instituted which gives less opportunity for bribery and corruption. The British military personnel at present supervising the control of road transport in the country, but efforts are being made to retain their services also until November. This should enable a good start to be made with cereals collection for 1944-45. The Road Transport Administration now has European representatives in Meshed and Tabriz, where the local Government Road Transport offices had earned a reputation for inefficiency and corruption unequalled elsewhere in the country.

83. Persia has been allotted 540 medium-sized lorries from the Middle East quota for 1944. One hundred arrived recently in Tehran but delivery to the Persian Government was held up by the Office of the Foreign Economic Administration on the authority of the Road Transport Board, on account of the Millsbaugh crisis (as described above in the section on American interests). Another one hundred vehicles, also for the Persian Government, are due to arrive soon. The remainder of the quota for Persia is intended for acquisition by private importers, but the Government retains the right to take over some of these vehicles if replacements are required for the Government fleet.

84. There is a severe shortage of passenger-car tyres. Paiforce, however, have agreed to advance 400 until shipments for the Persian Government begin to arrive.

85. It is planned to organise a National Bus Service to carry passengers and mail regularly on the principal routes. Delays in the transport of mail have for some time been a serious cause of complaint and this and certain other plans now on foot to improve this service will be very welcome.

Desert Locust Control

86. At the beginning of the June quarter all the entomologists in Persia (Persian, British and Russian) were anxiously awaiting some indication of the scale of the current invasion of desert locust swarms from Arabia. The Soviet locust mission particularly entertained fears of an influx through eastern Persia into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

87. However, the reports which filtered in during April made it clear that these swarms were small and scattered but also that they did not migrate with great impetus. Personal investigation by a Soviet entomologist proved that they had not penetrated further north than Seistan and there and elsewhere they were shown by later reports to have scattered and probably lost their gregarious instinct, except in Laristan, the mountainous country north of Lang.

88. Owing to the difficulty of conveying news from that district the Persian Ministry of Agriculture are still unaware with what success their work parties controlled the locusts. It is therefore not possible to expect that an insignificant number of locusts will escape.

89. The present situation in Persia is, therefore, very satisfactory, and there was every justification for the withdrawal (in late April) of the British ground and air detachments from the Bandar Abbas area. Mr. Lean, the British locust control officer in Persia, has returned to the United Kingdom, and the other British entomologist, Mr. H. S. Darling is being transferred to Uganda.

90. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Government of India, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow and to all consular officers in Persia.

I have, &c.
R. W. BILLARD

E 4242 54 34

Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eden.—(Received 18th July)

(No. 283 E.)

Sir,

Tehran, 9th July, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of a report by the financial counsellor of this embassy, on the financial situation in Persia.

Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad, and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.

D. W. LASCELLES

Enclosure in No. 8

Financial Situation

THE are, to some slight extent, repetitions in this report of matter contained in previous despatches. It is, however, desirable to try and present, in one document, a general picture of the present situation.

Public Finance

2. The budget has been out of balance since the beginning of the war. The figures for the last four years are—

| | Revenue. | Expenditure. | Deficit |
|-------------------|---------------------|--------------|---------|
| | (100 million rials) | | |
| 1940-41 | 30.0 | 32.1 | 2.1 |
| 1941-42 | 31.1 | 32.2 | 1.1 |
| 1942-43 | 31.2 | 32.3 | 1.1 |
| 1943-44(*) | 31.3 | 32.4 | 1.1 |

3. Since the beginning of the year 1943-44 the Government of Persia, under the American Financial Mission under Dr. Millsbaugh, the budget has been divided into two parts, the ordinary budget and the commercial budget, the latter covering the trading activities and industrial undertakings of the Government. The following are the separate figures for 1943-44.

| | Estimate. | Actual |
|----------------------|-----------------|--------|
| | (Million rials) | |
| Ordinary budget— | | |
| Revenue | 1,890 | 3,551 |
| Expenditure | 3,207 | 3,990 |
| Deficit | 1,317 | 439 |
| Commercial budget— | | |
| Revenue | 1,795 | 2,870 |
| Expenditure | 1,806 | 1,903 |
| Deficit | 101 | 93 |
| Total deficit | 1,418 | 532 |

4. The considerable discrepancy between estimate and out-turn under the commercial budget will be noted. The budget for this year, however, was prepared when Dr. Millsbaugh had left Persia, and the Minister of Finance, General of the Finances; and he himself stated that, owing to inadequate data, the commercial estimates could hardly be more than conjecture. The deficit is the result of (a) the necessity for subsidising food-stuffs and (b) the incompetent and, in a number of cases, dishonest management of the Government's industrial undertakings. The budgetary deficit for this year, as for previous years, was met by borrowing from the National Bank.

(*) The financial year, like the calendar year runs from the 31st March to 30th March. These four years by Persian reckoning are 1319, 1320, 1321 and 1322.

5. The budget for the year 1944-45 was recently presented to the Parliament. The estimates are—

| | (Million rials) | | (Million rials) |
|--------------------|-----------------|--------------------|-----------------|
| Ordinary budget— | | Commercial budget— | |
| Revenue | 3,958 | Revenue | 4,347 |
| Expenditure | 4,569 | Expenditure | 5,755 |
| Deficit | 611(*) | Surplus | 612(*) |

6. The ordinary budget provides for receipts from income tax under considerably higher scales than formerly. They were adopted reluctantly by the Government last autumn in face of Dr. Millsbaugh's threatened resignation. Nevertheless, direct taxation bears a proportion of no more than 20 per cent. to total revenue. The opium, tobacco, sugar and tea monopolies provide 40 per cent., customs and other indirect taxation 14 per cent., and Anglo-Persian oil royalties 13 per cent. On the expenditure side, no less than 25 per cent. is taken up by the services of the Government. The monopolies account for 15 per cent. of expenditure, and agriculture and industry for 12 per cent. Education and public health bring up the rear with 6 per cent. and 4 per cent. respectively.

7. Under the commercial budget for 1944-45 the financial mission has provided for (a) the purchase and distribution by the Government of food-stuffs and other goods on a large scale with a view to bringing down prices, and (b) the transfer to private enterprise of part of the Government industrial undertakings, and either discontinuance or the competent financial and general management of the remainder. These undertakings are mainly an inheritance from the grandiose, but somewhat unbalanced, schemes of Shah Reza. They have been inefficiently managed and are in some cases honeycombed with graft. The whole system of Government industrial undertakings admittedly needs fundamental reorganisation.

8. At the end of the year 1943-44 the Government debt to the National Bank was 3,002 million rials and its total internal debt 4,440 million rials. Its external debt consisted of one item only, the Sterling Loan of May 1941. The balance outstanding at the end of 1943-44 was £870,816. In the budget for 1944-45 the Minister of Finance (M. Forouhar) stated that he had no intention of borrowing either from abroad or internally. The observation as regards internal borrowing shows how little he understands his business.

9. The balance outstanding at the end of 1943-44 was £870,816. In the budget for 1944-45 the Minister of Finance (M. Forouhar) stated that he had no intention of borrowing either from abroad or internally. The observation as regards internal borrowing shows how little he understands his business.

Banking, Currency, Prices Indices

10. The following table shows the increase of notes in circulation and bank deposits since the beginning of the war. —

| | Notes. | Deposits |
|----------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| | (Million rials) | |
| August 1939 | 938 | (not known) |
| June 1941 | 1,312 | 671 |
| June 1942 | 1,913 | 1,222 |
| June 1943 | 4,070 | 4,553 |
| December 1943 | 5,195 | 6,103 |
| March 1944 | 6,056 | 7,341 |
| May 1944 | 6,222 | 8,619 |

11. The indices of wholesale prices and the cost of living, prepared by the National Bank, follow much the same pattern: —

| | Wholesale Prices | Cost of Living |
|-----------------------|------------------|----------------|
| | (1939 = 100) | |
| June 1940 | 106 | 113 |
| June 1941 | 141 | 145 |
| June 1942 | 230 | 254 |
| June 1943 | 422 | 620 |
| September 1943 | 483 | 714 |
| December 1943 | 495 | 774 |
| March 1944 | 493 | 781 |
| May 1944 | 527 | 862 |

(*) The overall surplus is 470,801 rials.

sides; and on the assumption that Dr. Millspongh is able to carry on his work with only that modicum of opposition and interference which is to be expected in any case, it seems reasonable to take the view that within a year to eighteen months (although hardly earlier) the economy of Persia will be on a sufficiently stable basis for the country to face its future problems successfully. It is ~~therefore~~ ^{for these reasons} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~it is~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~country~~ ^{country} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~a~~ ^a ~~position~~ ^{position} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~face~~ ^{face} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~problems~~ ^{problems} ~~successfully~~ ^{successfully}. It is ~~therefore~~ ^{for these reasons} ~~that~~ ^{that} ~~it is~~ ^{that} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~country~~ ^{country} ~~is~~ ^{is} ~~in~~ ⁱⁿ ~~a~~ ^a ~~position~~ ^{position} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~face~~ ^{face} ~~its~~ ^{its} ~~future~~ ^{future} ~~problems~~ ^{problems} ~~successfully~~ ^{successfully}. 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Feb. 2nd July, 1944

(B 5112/187 34)

No. 0

Prospective Position

(Secret and Confidential.)

During the period under review Khorasan remained quiet under the firm if selfish rule of Ayaz Ali Massad and his colleagues who strove to enrich themselves and the profiteers in spite of the challenge to their monopoly described in paragraphs 9-13 below. Thanks to last year's bumper harvest, food was comparatively plentiful and the agriculturists prospered, but the fantastically high prices of other necessities caused more distress than ever to the fixed-income class and the multitudes living on the margin of subsistence.

2. Security The improvement noted in the last report was maintained on the whole. Baluch outlaws from across the Afghan border staged one large-scale raid on grazing camels and several hold-ups of U.K.C.C. and other trucks in the neighbourhood of Zاهدان, but at the beginning of May the arrival of a long range squadron from Quetta effectively curtailed their activities. In the hill country between Quetta and Bajgiran on the Turkmenistan border the robber gangs which had been holding up U.K.C.C. trucks were finally rounded up in February by the Persian gendarmerie who claimed to have killed eight of the bandits in clashes. In the Turbat-i-Haidari district, which is notorious for raiding, Captain Baluch continued to keep good order on the roads with the help of the 4 ton truck supplied by the Government of India and placed at his disposal by His Majesty's Consul-General. The two other trucks supplied at the same time have been very useful to the gendarmerie at Zاهدان and Birjand in security.

3. *Political Parties*.—The Tudah party continued to interest themselves in the affairs of workers, especially motor drivers, agricultural labourers and the employees of the Khusravi Mills. Recently, the arrival of emissaries from Syed Zia to start a branch of his party at Meshed has provoked reaction among the Tudah supporters, whose leader Buzurj Arzi has gone to Tehran to consult the higher command. Agha Tamaddun ul Mulk Sajjadi (as he now calls himself) because more and more it has been about the Tudah party. Little new blood came in and it became more and more evident that members cared for nothing but their own sect and party. The *Shah* published some excellent articles inviting the exactions of the public on profiteers and supporting administrative reform, the American advisers, the Luthi Commission, and any other agency that seems to be working in the country's interest, but this policy does not bring in new subscribers and he is losing heavily on his paper. Even the marks of approval he has received from the Soviet Consulate General (which he has been cultivating very tactfully) have not encouraged the public to join his party in large numbers, as he hoped. He is a candidate for employment in the Finance Department but Mr. Garder is not prepared to give up his party and paper to get it. Like almost every thinking Persian he deplores the complete absence of patriotism in the country. It is a fact that 99 per cent of his compatriots. His opinion carries more weight than most, because he does definitely belong to the 1 per cent.

4. *Elections*.—The postponed Mekran elections were completed at last in June. There was quite a struggle (though on lines very different from an English election campaign) between the sitting Deputy, Murad Rigi, and a rich Arab merchant called Abdol Akbar. Akbar was expected to be one of the ring, the Arab enlisted the enthusiastic support of the greedy and ambitious Governor of Mekran, Khozaima Alam, and is said to have spent over 100,000 Indian rupees. But Murad Rigi, a genuine tribesman and one of the most outstanding Persian Baluch of the last thirty years, Khan Sahib Idu Khan, was

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12

obviously preferable as a Deputy and His Majesty's consular officers gave him...
riteshmen near Iranshahr) been declared elected by a substantial majority...
dangerous tribal disturbances in a district bordering on British Baluchistan and the Kalat State

5. *Anglo-Persian Relations.*—Social relations between British residents...
nowadays in contact are excellent. Apart from the many and various activities of the P.R.B. the cumulative effect of which in Meshed is very noticeable

Relief Fund, the Shir-o-Khu...
occasional charity fetes and gala nights, and so on. But

ception of imaginary British designs on Persia remains. This is due partly no doubt to enemy propaganda, but mostly to mere xenophobia and a deep-seated superiority complex. It is useless for us to try and educate

Americans, that is to say, their failure will be our failure, though of course

have let us have a regency for the duration of the war, and then we could have shown a king for ourselves. This attitude will have to be reckoned with in the

period under review saw a notable increase in...
In March the Russians organised a

At the same time, extensive

the Soviet Consul General has assured me that there is no intention to extend the...
as in the days of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, as a no-man's land between the British and Russian spheres of influence

7. As was to be expected this expansion of...
the surveying combined with an influx of children into Meshed, Kirman and

but ignorance of present-day

Persia a future under the present

Anglophile, took

and was relieved by General

Anglophile, took

and was relieved by General

and was relieved by General

and was relieved by General

9. *Economic and General.*—Welcome signs of a tendency on the part of the Central Government and their Allied advisers to assert themselves in East Persia were—

(i) The appointment in January of Messrs. von Stemann and Kahr, Dames, to direct the Edarsh-i Barbati Ram fleet in Khorasan.

(ii) The deputation at about the same time of Lieutenant Joel, a member of the team of officers lent by Pailforce to the Persian Government, to supervise grain collection in Zabul, a responsibility which had for the previous two years been a thankless task of His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul and his Indian assistant.

(iii) The arrival at Meshed of Mr. P. W. Gordon, one of Dr. Milspeugh's most trusted assistants, towards the end of April to take over the finance and connected departments.

(iv) The appearance early in April of a Judicial Commission headed by Agha Lutfi of the Ministry of Justice to investigate the grain, sugar, and other scandals mentioned in paragraph 8 of my last report.

Unfortunately, thanks to the machinations of the "gang" (*ibid.*, paragraph 11) only the first of these measures has hitherto shown any positive results.

10. Mr. von Stemann displayed from the outset great energy and courage in tackling the "black transport" racket which has figured so frequently in this consulate-general's despatches. He met with marked official resistance and even obstruction at first, for control of the civil transport bottleneck is one of the chief means by which the gang complicate the distribution problem and force the prices of the commodities they control ever higher and higher. In spite of this, and of a most inaccountable lenience on the part of the E.B.R. Central Office (Adviser Mr. Shields) towards the owners of the illicitly operated trucks and smuggled trucks caught by Mr. von Stemann, the latter had within two months effected an 8 per cent improvement in the working of the P.R.B. fleet. This, combined with a certain amount of back-loading by T.K.C.C. trucks, went far to deprive the local administration of their chief excuse, lack of transport, for not sending grain to Tehran or rationed goods to outlying centres.

11. Mr. Gordon's appointment, like that of the Dames, was made in January, but the Soviet authorities in Tehran kept him waiting till the end of April for a permit of unlimited duration to work in Khorasan. It is highly probable that this was connected with the objection of the gang to any working in by the Soviet authorities on their profitable operations in Khorasan. However this may be they used the three months' delay in Mr. Gordon's arrival to ensure that when he did come he should have his hands full and his ambara empty. They went so far as to sabotage their own grain rationing programme, with the result that Mr. Gordon found on his arrival with a serious food shortage at Meshed, which a hastily convoked committee of officials and landowners graciously offered to meet by themselves arranging for the supply of the deficit. Not all of Mr. Gordon's difficulties, however, were of the local gang's making. Since his arrival he has more than

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There are many who wish Mr. Gordon well and would like to see him succeed in his task but their inevitable comment is "What can one man do, however experienced, energetic and honest he may be?"

12. The Lutfi Commission aroused hopes at first in the hearts of even the most disillusioned. They caused a sensation by insisting on the arrest of the outgoing Director of Finance, Farzad, a notorious ex-Director Dehmi, Major Arvin, head of the city police, and three well-known non-official profiteers

(29955)

1st August, 1944

$$f_{\text{eff}} = \frac{2\pi}{\lambda} \left(\frac{1}{\lambda} - \frac{1}{\lambda_0} \right) \quad (14)$$

The plot idea of M. Marchenko and his immediate collaborators has been

3 Other forms of propaganda also flourish under the direct control of the Soviet Government. The newspaper *Kotanda*, edited by persons from Baku, is the disseminator of these propaganda efforts. A new paper, *Avaz*, was published in 1925. It is a weekly paper, and is published in Baku. It is a weekly paper, and is published in Baku. It is a weekly paper, and is published in Baku.

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73

9. *Situation in Western Azerbaijan.*—On the 18th Dr. Marzban was succeeded as Governor General by Sarhang Ali, a former commander of the troops at Rezaieh and later of the 3rd Division at Tabriz. This change followed some weeks of disorder of a nature considerably more serious than is usual at such harvest season, among the Kurdish tribes to the north and south of Rezaieh culminating in a threat to sack Rezaieh by Kurds of the Herki tribe under Zern Beg. The population of Rezaieh reacted by demonstrating against the Persian and, indirectly, the Russian authorities for their failure to maintain order. In the course of these demonstrations Dr. Marzban was assaulted by the crowd, suffering minor injuries. He thereupon resigned. *Dr. Marzban* is now striving to increase the authority of the Administration as to reach a good understanding with the Russians, which is an indispensable condition. He proposes also to apply the law of the land equally to all Persian citizens without distinction, whether they are Musulmans or Christians and minorities. So far he has met with some success and the situation is at present quiet.

to Prior to the arrival of British Persian Administration among the tribes had been to all intents and purposes non-existent and Kurdish chiefs were able with impunity to behave with extreme violence towards the authorities. In practice it was only the Russians who could exert any real control over these fully armed tribes, but they for their part, while maintaining close relations with the Kurds through their consuls at Rezsieh and political officials declined to accept any sort of responsibility for Kurdish conduct, always alleging that it was the concern of the Persians and only intervening when the Persians had signally failed to deal with a potentially dangerous situation. At the same time the Russians denied the Persians the possibility of effective armed intervention by which alone, unless the Russians were prepared loyally to support the Administration, the authority of that Administration could be maintained. The only Persian garrison in Western Azerbaijan is stationed at Rezsieh, has a total strength of about 1,400 and is purely composed of Persians. It was intended for the garrison against Kurdish outbreaks, but some of the authorities themselves dismissing the tribesmen when they thought they had had enough rope. As no punishment has been meted out to the unruly Kurds there is a natural tendency for them to see how far they can go knowing that at the worst they will only be sent home like naughty boys by the Russians. The gendarmerie as at present constituted has, for its part, proved of little, if any, use in the preservation of order. Weak in effectives—the two extra battalions considered necessary for this province will remain a paper project—they are of poor quality and low in morale. Their small pay, of which a proportion is often retained by their officers, obliges them to live to a great extent on the country. Little loved by the Persian villagers, they are an object of intense hatred to the Kurds, to whom their presence is an outrage and constant provocation. They are

detested by the Kurds, in fact, far more intensely than the Persian army, whose visitations in the past have often been painful but were not continuous.

11. The quietest part of Western Azerbaijan in recent months has been the Mahabad district, where there are neither gendarmes nor troops, either Persian or Russian, and where Soviet representation has been limited to a single political officer. The Farmandar is inactive to the extent that his presence is hardly noticed and his few police do not appear after dark, when security is assured by guards organised by the local Kurdish chief, Ghasi Mohammed. The Kurdish chiefs in this district are therefore left fairly well to themselves and, in spite of their mutual jealousies, any serious incidents have been avoided. It is only fair to add, however, that the population is more purely Kurdish and the tribes noticeably less belligerent than further north.

12. *Majlis Elections*.—The Majlis elections in Azerbaijan have thrown an interesting light on the close connexion between the action of Soviet officials in Azerbaijan and the policy of the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. While, after considerable wrangling, the list of Russian protégés whose successful candidature was to be promoted was decided with the Persian Government in Tehran, it was left to the Soviet consuls in Azerbaijan to see that the local authorities carried out their instructions for rigging the elections. Thus, for example, electoral

even remote districts being visited by Soviet officials for this purpose. Pressure was put on voters who favoured independent candidates were kept from the polls by fear of violence. The better elements of the population, moreover, took exception to the Russian nominees on grounds of their general qualifications. As regards Tabriz, Pishvari was previously an unknown person and unaided could not have gathered more than a handful of votes. Ispahian is a merchant of no particular standing and semi illiterate. The climax of Soviet intervention was, however, reached in the elections at Ardebil and for the Armenian and Assyrian Deputy. In the former, the Soviet candidate, Sheikh Hussein Lenkuran, who has been described by the Governor-General at Tabriz as an unknown adventurer, received 18,408 votes out of a total poll of 20,122. In the latter, Ardashir Hovhannessian the Armenian Tudsh Iran candidate, was elected by 3,056 votes, no more than 12 being cast against him, thus providing an almost perfect example of a true

the Russians really desired to combine the protection of their interests with the welfare of Persia, it would have been possible to have found and backed more reputable candidates convinced of the necessity of closer relations between the two countries than the actual type. This is especially true as to persons with little or nothing to lose—opportunists and adventurers, willing to sacrifice their country at any moment. It is a fact, however, that in the political as in other spheres, the Russians have appeared anxious to attract to themselves those who, whatever their personal defects, can be relied on to serve as instruments of their policy.

13. Labour Situation—Just as in Western Azerbaijan it is the Kurdish problem which is the most serious, so in Eastern Azerbaijan it is the Kurdish the greatest threat to public order. The Soviet attitude to both these questions is practically identical. Officially, they are matters concerning the Persian Administration, in actual practice Soviet officials maintain close relations with both Kurds and labour organisations, which are equally amenable to their lead. For some months after the visit to Tabriz in August 1943 of Dr Sheikh of the Ministry of Labour a somewhat more favourable attitude to the workers was revealed, there was a period of comparative peace. But this soon came to an end when the demand for a reduction in prices of goods and services was put forward, and following some of the incidents of the winter of 1943-44 the workers have again formed a general strike movement which has been accompanied with considerable violence. It is estimated that between 100,000 and 150,000 workers are without and being unable to rely on any effective mediation by the local authorities. With every concession, however, the attitude of the workers has become more aggressive, while their output has sunk to a fraction of the normal. Conditions are now entirely anarchical; almost daily incidents are reported, such as stay in strikes, expulsion of the managements and threats to kill the owners. A last effort is to be made by the owners to reach a firm agreement with the workers and to obtain the overt support of the local and Soviet authorities for the agreement when reached, but success appears very doubtful.

14. The background to this unrest is largely political. For the purpose of the Majlis elections, Tudeh Iran, with Soviet encouragement, attempted, with a

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15. *Freedom of Movement*—The blockade has been a disaster for the country, particularly for the rural areas. The peasants were not permitted to sell their produce on the open market. The government had to fix the prices of agricultural products at a level which was far below the market value. This led to a sharp decline in the production of grain and other foodstuffs. The peasants were not allowed to export their surplus produce, which led to a sharp decline in the income of the rural areas. The government had to fix the prices of agricultural products at a level which was far below the market value. This led to a sharp decline in the production of grain and other foodstuffs. The peasants were not allowed to export their surplus produce, which led to a sharp decline in the income of the rural areas. The government had to fix the prices of agricultural products at a level which was far below the market value. This led to a sharp decline in the production of grain and other foodstuffs. The peasants were not allowed to export their surplus produce, which led to a sharp decline in the income of the rural areas.

16. The Soviet Trade Agency is acquiring an increasing share of all import and export business and the Soviet Union seems destined to replace Germany as principal supplier and customer. There is, however, a seemingly excellent opportunity for British firms to do export trade particularly in drugs, better quality textiles, toys, radios & and so on. I have expressed a desire to develop British connections. It is not merely, however, the proximity of Soviet Russia but also the methods at present adopted which if continued, may render successful competition difficult. At the moment, for example, the Soviet Trade Agency pays no regard to such matters as Persian import licences. Whatever the Russians want to import, they import whether authorised or not, and Persian customs officials are powerless to withstand them. The prices of their imports have, moreover, no relation to world prices, but are what the local market will bear. Thus, at the present time Russian sugar is being sold at Rls. 110 (17s. 2d.) per kilo, customs duty paid.

17 There is continued lack of confidence in the future of Azerbaijan. Soviet occupation for Tehran and other places in the south have unanimously decided not to return, and several have recently liquidated their remaining interests. Others are also transferring their capital southwards for security against possible Soviet designs. For the same reason, shares of Tabriz factories are selling at a low price. The price of property is low compared with the so and buyers are few.

18 Local Attitude to Great Britain.—Among foreign Powers, Germany reluctantly taken for granted, is causing profound disappointment, especially among the business classes. Self interest now demands a new orientation and there are many who, wishing to escape the clutches of the Russian bear, look to Great Britain for political and economic help. It is frequently asserted that they will either emigrate or else suffer final eclipse in Persian eyes.

19 Much good work has been done in making known the British viewpoint through the publicity shop in Tabriz, maintained by the Public Relations Bureau in Tehran. The increasing distribution of literature covers not only Tabriz but Rezaieh and various country towns. The window displays attract much interest and many hundreds daily listen to the news broadcasts from London and other stations. There is a widespread desire to learn English, but there is an acute shortage of textbooks and teachers. It is very necessary, in my opinion, to arrange for the study of English and for the dissemination of pro-British literature as permanent features of our economic and cultural propaganda in Azerbaijan. From a trade point of view alone this should prove a remunerative

20 Conclusion.—The future of Azerbaijan depends on two interrelated factors: (1) The post war policy of Soviet Russia, and (2) the ability or otherwise of the Persian Government to develop a strong and efficient local administration. The immediate post war period is likely to prove a time of economic crisis with which the present administration will almost certainly be unable to cope. The resulting anarchical conditions may well afford a pretext for the detachment of Azerbaijan from Persia or for the continuance of the present status. To avoid the possibility of such a contingency it should be the urgent duty of the Tehran authorities to overhaul the administrative machine, appointing the best officials at its disposal to key posts. It is in any event seemingly inevitable that the situation will be drawn much closer to the loyal understanding will be reached between the Persian and British Governments which will render unwarranted the somewhat gloomy forebodings of this despatch.

21 I have the honour to acknowledge the instructions contained in your circular despatch of the 14th April 1944, and to inform you that the necessary arrangements are being made to comply therewith.

I have, Sir,
T. C. RAPP

[E 5847/189 34]

No. 11

Mr. Lascelles to Mr. Eiden.—(Received 25th September)

(No. 340.)

Sir,

Tehran, 4th September, 1944.

WITH reference to Sir Reader Bullard's despatch No. 14 of the 3rd April, I have the honour to submit a further report⁽¹⁾ on the composition of the 14th Majlis elected in 1944. The first list shows the constituencies and their members, the second, the Deputies in alphabetical order classified according to their economic and political activities.

2 The number of Deputies elected up to the 31st August, 1944 whose credentials have not been rejected by the Majlis, is 128. Elections have not been

(1) Not printed.

completed at Abadeh, Firuzabad and Saqqiz. I'timad ul-Tauhyn has been elected for Rey, but his credentials have not yet been brought before the Majlis. New elections are also due for the constituencies of the three Deputies concerned having been rejected by the Chamber. One Tehran seat is unoccupied, pending a decision in the case of the German agent Abul-Qasim Kashani, who was among the twelve elected for Tehran.

3 Of the 128 Deputies so far elected, 44 sat in the 13th Majlis. Of these 30 have been re-elected for the same constituencies.

4 According to the classification shown on list 2, 65 of the present Deputies are landowners, 13 are connected with commerce and industry, 4 are mullahs deriving their power from local religious influence, and 46 depend on various forms of political activity. The last category includes a number who were elected to serve the interests of landlords, merchants and industrialists.

5 The Tudeh group has been reduced from 8 to 7 members, owing to the expulsion from the party of Rahman Quli Khali Athari. The Tudeh-sponsored Tabriz Deputy Pishavari was rejected by the Majlis.

6 The other Majlis groups fluctuate in membership, and are not worth reporting on in detail. About a quarter of the total number of Deputies, including some of the most influential, do not belong to any Majlis group.

7 During the first six months of its life the 14th Majlis has passed very little legislation. The bulk of the members are actuated by no political motive, and that efforts to form a stable majority in the Majlis have so far been unsuccessful.

I am sending copies of this despatch, together with its enclosure, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and to the Government of India, New Delhi.

I have, Sir,
D. W. LASCELLES

(B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries.

E 3934 422 341

No. 12

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eiden.—(Received 6th July)

(No. 203)

His Majesty's representative in the Legation in Tehran, to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 10th to 26th June, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 26th June, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 12

(No. 21)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 25 for the period 10th to 26th June, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political

DR. MILLSPAUGH and all the members of his mission have resigned. This followed on the presentation by the Government to members of the Majlis for discussion the draft of a Bill cancelling the law of the 3rd April 1943, from which Dr. Millspaugh derived his autocratic powers. In his letter of resignation he accuses the Government of having failed to carry out their obligations under that law, of having withheld assistance and support from the American mission, of having encouraged those elements who desired to destroy the mission or to prevent it from working effectively, and of being unwilling even to consider the evidence that could be produced of the good progress made by the mission. From their previous conversations with Dr. Millspaugh the Government must have realised that their proposed Bill would result in his resignation, but it seems that they are trying to persuade him and other American advisers to stay on.

2. Dr. Millsbaugh's resignation takes effect from the 29th June. It is unlikely that the Persian Government have any plans for the operation of the various organisations and administrations now in charge of the American advisers, of whom there are now thirty-nine. Since objections to Dr. Millsbaugh's plan of relief have been raised, it is probable that the Government will be obliged to modify his policy in some respects. This will almost certainly lead to great dislocation in the finance and economy of the country, to the detriment of the population.

[illegible][illegible]

6. A reception was held at the Municipality on the 22nd June to celebrate the naming of three streets in Tehran which are in the vicinity of the embassies concerned, as Churchill, Stalin and Roosevelt Avenues. This is to commemorate the Tehran Conference.

Acronyms

7. The budget for the current year—the 21st March 1944 to the 20th March 1945—was presented to the Mayor on the 11th June. It shows revenue of £3,000,000, with a general expenditure at £4,000,000, leaving a deficit of £1,000,000. The total expenditure is £4,000,000, giving a surplus of £1,000,000. The Mayor has recommended that the Mayor should be authorised to borrow £1,000,000 to meet the deficit.

| | |
|------------------|-----------------------|
| | <i>Million rials.</i> |
| Army | 1,326 |
| Police | 265 |

But in the budget as presented these have been cut down by Millsbaugh to:

| | | | | | | |
|-------------|----|------|------|------|------|-----------------------|
| | | | | | | <i>Million rials.</i> |
| Army | ++ | 42.5 | 4 | 1.00 | 0.00 | 1,000 |
| Gendarmerie | " | 7.0 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.00 | 225 |
| Police | == | 0.00 | 0 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 187 |

8 The National Aero Club, a civil flying club, is operating with Polaris and the service weekly post service between London and Rostock. The machines can carry three passengers in addition to mail.

A pyrometallurgical—Cycl

- 9.—(i) Muhsin Nasser, to be Governor-General of Mazamderan.
(ii) Jahanshah Samsam (son of Morteza Quli Khan), to be Deputy Governor of Bakhtiari.

Internal Security

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10. The Babmat tribe of Kuhgulu have been guilty of a few minor raids in the vicinity of Masjid-i Sulaiman. An abortive attempt to disarm this tribe was made in April 1944—see Summary No 14 44, paragraph 10—as it was expected that sooner or later they would be unable to refrain from lawlessness.

Russian Affairs

11 The Russians have succeeded in frightening away all candidates for the Ardebil elections except their own choice, Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani—see Summary No. 23, 44, paragraph 14—so that there appears to be no doubt of his election in spite of the fact that he has no connexion whatever with Ardebil. The Russians presumably intend to use him for their campaign against Seyyid Zia. The Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz recently asked for the expulsion from Tabriz of a minor Persian official who had dared to send a telegram of congratulation to Seyyid Zia and, the Governor-General having refused to comply with this request, the offending official is now being subjected to the abuse and threats of Soviet hirelings.

12. At the request of the Soviet Consul-General in Tabriz the Governor-General of Azerbaijan has published a notice to the effect that the Soviet authorities had complained that Persians were purchasing arms from Russian troops and warning the people that anyone found in possession of Russian arms would be severely punished.

Tehran, 25th June, 1944

E 4043 422 341

No. 13

Str R Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 16th July)

(No. 275)

18 Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 26 for the period of the 26th June to 2nd July, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Treham, 3rd July, 1944

Enregistré au No. 13

(Secret)

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period
28th June-2nd July, 1944*

Previous Author.

Political

THE Government refused to accept Mr Millspaugh's resignation and requested him to stay on for the purpose for which he was originally engaged, that is, as Financial Adviser. The Deputies, of whom a majority, inspired by proposals to the effect, proposed that we should all press Mr. Millspaugh even to the extent of being prepared to face his departure, have created a serious situation of the Government and have a serious American relations and on Lease-Lend supplies, and an increasing number are voting round in favour of his retention. Dr Millspaugh has reiterated his refusal to accept any limitation of his powers, but he has made some conciliatory proposals, and the Government is showing some signs of wavering and of hesitating to accept the departure of the American Minister. This question has absorbed the attention of press and Parliament during the past week. It is generally considered that, if Dr Millspaugh stays on his own terms, the Government will have to go. The uncertainty has, as usual, paralysed the administration. Ministers are unwilling to give decisions on any matter. It

divided on the question and that is likely to increase already existing dissensions. The Prime Minister, the Cabinet and the Deputies, especially Seyyid Zia, who played an important part in turning Majlis opinion against forcing Dr. Midspaugh's resignation, will all have earned the displeasure of the Shah.

4. The paper *Daria*, to which reference has been made in Summary No 28 44, paragraph 3, and which is strongly suspected of being subsidised by the Russians, accuses Dr. Midspaugh of being an agent of the American Government, a kind of American High Commissioner ruling and exploiting Persia in the interests of the United States. The intervention of the American Government, it says, had frightened the Deputies from their original intention. What would happen if Persia's two neighbours were to follow America's example and, taking advantage of the weakness of the Majlis, treat Persia as if she were their colony?

5. Under the auspices of the Tudeh party there has been formed a "Central Council of Iranian Workers' and Tailors' Unions," to which it is reported that the *Zafar*, printed at the Tudeh press. It urges the necessity for all workers to enter the field of politics and to unite, for only in unity will they find the strength to fight the reactionaries.

Appointments—Civil

- 6. (i) Ghulam Hussein Miftah, to be Farmandar of Esfahan
- (ii) Ismail Nawab, to be Farmandar of Khuzestan

Persian Forces

Appointments—Military

- 7. (i) Sarlashkar Ali Riazi (F.O.: 190), to be Chief of the Shah's Military Secretariat
- (ii) Sarlashkar Ahmad Nakehovan (F.O.: 150, M.A.: 103), to command the Persian Air Force
- (iii) Sartip Ahmad Khusrovan (F.O.: 118), to command the 2nd (Azerbaijan) Division
- (iv) Sarhang Seyyid Hussein Hashimi, to command the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade.

Bakhtiari

Internal Security

8. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, has now reached Tehran to answer to the Government for the many complaints that have been made against him and to endeavour to come to terms with all the other Khans who have been agitating against him because they have not been allowed to extract from Bakhtiari the share of the pickings which they had hoped for on the *khana* with complaints against Morteza Quli have also reached Tehran. That some of these complaints are justified there is little doubt, but it will be regrettable if Morteza Quli Khan is removed from the Governorship as, whatever just causes of complaint there may be against him, he probably maintains better order than anyone else is likely to do.

9. Troops have moved out from Isfahan for the disarmament of certain small outlying sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari—see Summary No 23 44, paragraph 11. From such reports as have been received of the operations hitherto, it seems that the commander of the troops—General Qadar—is now waiting to see what offers are made by the tribes concerned to buy him off.

Fars

10. Reports from Fars say that Nazir Qashgai is becoming doubtful of his position in Fars. Having failed to get elected for Shiraz, he hesitates to leave the province for fear of being regarded as a mere puppet. He is, however, spending much of his time in Tehran, where he has made many contacts with Qashgai and the Governor-General elect, General Firuz. However much contempt the tribesmen may express for Tehran and the Government, there is still a tendency to attach some importance to what Tehran is saying, and Nazir does not know while his brothers do. He recently attempted to intervene in the dispute between Morteza

Quli Khan and the other Bakhtiari Khans, to meet with a rebuff. He has also been trying to rent the lands of the Dushmanzari tribe with a view to increasing the sphere of his influence. This has aroused protests from the Dushmanzari chiefs who have no desire to have a Qashgai overlord.

Russian Affairs

11. The opening of a Soviet Consulate at Kazvin was reported in Summary No 20 44, paragraph 15. A consular agency has now been opened at Kabul.

12. A member of Dr. Midspaugh's mission has recently made an extended tour of Western Azerbaijan. He has returned convinced that in Western Azerbaijan the Tudeh party is definitely working for the separation of Azerbaijan from Persia. The Armenians, he considers, are the driving force. He could not find any clear evidence of Russian direction behind this movement, but having regard to the proved connexions of the Russians with the Tudeh party it is unlikely that the movement is being carried on without their approval. On more than one occasion the Russians have not hesitated to represent hostility to the Tudeh party as hostility to themselves. In Isfahan they have trumped up charges against the opposition party, the Vatan, as a pretext for asking the police to take action against it.

13. Summary No 24 44, paragraph 11, stated that a party of Russians had been seen at the border of the Soviet Union. It is reported that they were on their way to the Soviet Union. A Russian official connected with the mission had previously been seen at the border with Bakhtiari and other tribal chiefs. The report is that they are on their way to Seyyid Zia's supposed connexion with the Russians, and it is said that the Russians should want to know what is going on.

British Affairs

14. Aid to Russia supplies are no longer to be carried to Tahriz by British military transport. The transport should deliver to Pablori only. The British Consulate now remains the only British presence in Azerbaijan to assist the entry of British officials to this part of the Russian zone.

Tehran 9th July 1944

E 4405 422 34]

No. 15

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 24th July)

N 293

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No 28 for the period the 10th July to the 16th July 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran 17th July 1944

Enclosure in No. 15

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 28 for the Period the 10th July to the 16th July, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

It is reliably reported that the Tudeh party recently proposed to Seyyid Zia that he should be elected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Government constituted of Ministers selected half by the Tudeh party and half by Seyyid Zia. They are reported to be in a state of hostility towards the Russians.

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15. Reports are again current in Azerbaijan of an increase of Soviet armoured units on the Turkish frontier and of a general increase of Soviet troops in Tabriz and elsewhere in Azerbaijan.

16. The Russians are now reported to have extended their surveys (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 17) to the Shur River, which has hitherto formed the southern limit of Soviet penetration.

17. The Majlis has, to the great annoyance of the Tudeh party, invalidated the election of Pishavari, one of the Deputies forced on Tabriz by the Russians (see Summary No. 18, 44, paragraph 7).

18. Major General Rossor has succeeded Lieutenant General Yarmaskévitch as Chief of Staff to Lieutenant-General Soroktnikov, commanding all Russian forces in Persia.

French Affairs

19. The Persian Government has recognised the French Committee of National Liberation as the Provisional Government of France.

(2 4889 422 34)

No 16

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 31st July.)

(No. 298)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the period of 17th to 23rd July 1944.

Tehran, 24th July, 1944

Enclosure to No. 16

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 29 for the Period 17th July to 23rd July, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. There have been no developments of importance during the week. The Russians have shown more courage in braving Iranian anger by throwing out the Tabriz Deputy, Pishavari (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 17), and is now preparing itself to eject the other Deputy forced on Tabriz, Ipekbachian, and the even more scandalously elected member for Ardebil, Sheikh Hussein Lenkorani. The Majlis has seen telegrams sent by Sobehi, when Prime Minister, to the president of the Election Committee in Tabriz giving the names of four Deputies whom the Russian insisted on having elected for Tabriz, the president's reply that the "election of these four would provoke a revolution in Tabriz and a further telegram from the Prime Minister saying that he had persuaded the Russians to be content with Pishavari and Ipekbachian, whom the president must get elected.

Economic

2. The Government tabled a Labour Bill in the Majlis on the 16th July, of which the principal points are:—

No employment of children under 13; a 48-hour week; one day's holiday with pay per week; a fortnight's holiday with pay per year; no night work for children under 15 or for women; minimum wage in each Shahristan to be fixed by special tribunal; permission to workers to form unions; prohibition of the use of force or threats to coerce workers to strike or to join unions.

3. The Shah has donated 3 million rials for the construction of wells in the southern quarters of Tehran which have suffered greatly this year from lack of water.

4. Two American experts have been engaged by the Persian Government to advise them on questions connected with the exploitation of Persian oil. They have arrived in Tehran.

Appointments—Civil

5.—(i) Sarhang Ali Akbar Darakshawi, to be Governor General of Western Azerbaijan.

(ii) Isa Iteshami, to be Farzandar of Shahrud.

(iii) The appointment of Hassan Khosrow Panah to be Farzandar and Deputy Governor-General of Isfahan (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 6) has been cancelled.

(iv) Faqieh Zadeh, to be Farzandar of Qasvin.

(v) Sartip Muhammad Hussein Firuz has arrived in Shiraz and taken up his appointment as Governor General.

Persian Forces

Appointment—Military

6. Sarhang Hussein Haslami Hazi, to command the 9th (Ardebil) Brigade.

Internal Security

Western Azerbaijan

7. The situation in Western Azerbaijan (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 9) is now reported to have quietened down as the result of Russian insistence that the Kurds should return to their villages. But they did not take this action until disorder had become widespread, many villages suffering from Kurdish pillaging and several small gendarmerie posts being disarmed by Kurds. The Soviet authorities refused to allow the Persian military authorities to take action, reinforcements of two companies of Persian troops sent from Tabriz to Khoi, with the permission of the Soviet authorities in Tabriz, were sent back by the Soviet commander in Khoi, and the proposal of the Persian Government to send reinforcements from Tehran to Rezaieh was vetoed by the Soviet authorities. It was not until the Persian authorities had been thoroughly

Western Azerbaijan that the Russians said the word that would have checked the Kurds at any time. The Persian Government has now appointed a military governor general for Western Azerbaijan.

Bakhtiari

8. It has been decided to modify the plans for the disarmament of outlaws. The more truculent sections—the Abdolv and an Ipekbachian—were to be applied to Khajeh Mehdi Quli, of the Moghul, to induce him to hand over his arms or more money.

Ahuzistan

9. The operation against the Mian Ab Arabs (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 10) has been successfully conducted. Over 300 rifles have been collected and, with a few exceptions, the worst offenders have been arrested. The troops have now begun the disarmament of the Chavaneh and some of the Western Chah.

Russian Affairs

10. Soviet policy in Azerbaijan is, in the opinion of His Majesty's Consul General, fairly consistently designed to undermine and discredit the authority of the Persian Government. The policy (see Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 9) were not deliberately instigated by the Russians, they were tolerated for the reason that they furthered Russian designs. They do not attempt to conceal their opposition to the American advisers and they thereby acquire some merit with the landlords and capitalists whose favour they seek equally with that of the proletariat. The departure of British military forces from Azerbaijan has been interpreted as being due to the Russian desire to eliminate all other foreign influence from Azerbaijan. A further indication of the desire to interest Moslems of Persian Azerbaijan in Soviet Azerbaijan is the proposal to send 200 young Persian Moslems to Baku for a year's training in administration and economics.

(29855)

11. His Majesty's Consul-General at Tabriz reports recent arrivals in Tabriz of additional guns and tanks for the Soviet forces and an increase in the number of aircraft from about thirty to about sixty. See also Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 15.

12. The report in Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 16, that the Russians are now surveying south of the Kal i Shur River in Khorassan has been proved to be untrue. Their survey parties have not yet crossed that river.

13. The matter of further oil concessions in Persia continues to receive attention in newspapers under obligations to the Russians. These are now claiming that the Soviet Government have still certain rights as regards the exploitation of oil in the Northern Provinces and that these provinces are closed to any other foreign Power. Every attempt is being made to arouse fear in the Persians of the possible political consequences of granting concessions to Americans, who, for the time being, are evidently regarded as being more dangerous than the British. Dr. N. J. ... on the Persian Government to further the interests of American oil hunters.

14. A new Soviet Consul-General, Abramov, and Vice-Consul, Uzhurov, have arrived in Meshed. The former was at Naples with the Soviet Mission to the Badoglio Government. Uzhurov was previously at Kermanshah.

British Affairs

15. The Shah and the Queen attended a hockey match between two Indian military teams, and the Queen gave away the prizes.

E 4997/422/34]

No. 17

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. -(Received 23rd August)
(No. 313.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the period of the 24th July to 6th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 7th August, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 17

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 30 for the Period
24th July-6th August, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

ALTHOUGH Deputies express much discontent with the ineffectiveness of the Cabinet and there is much talk of the necessity for a reconstruction with some new Ministers, there appears still to be a majority in favour of the retention of Sa'ed as Prime Minister for the time being. Seyyid Zia is gaining increasing respect, but it seems to be generally considered that it is not yet time for him to make a bid for power. The ... of the credentials of Ispokehian and Shukh Hussein Lenkovan when they are considered by the Majlis. Meanwhile, very little legislative work gets done. Of twenty-eight Bills laid before the Majlis during the life of the present Government, only seven have been passed. One—the Bill to mobilise Government employees and factory workers, which was mentioned in Summary No. 18 44, paragraph 1—has been rejected. None of the others has passed the first reading.

2. The ex-Shah, Reza Pahlavi, died at Johannesburg on the 26th July. Conventional mourning customs have been ordered and observed in Tehran. The Tudeh Deputies refused to be associated with the Majlis' conventional message of sympathy to the Shah. The Tudeh press and some other papers have objected to any demonstration of mourning.

3. Hassan Taqizadeh, Majid Ahi and Anoshirvan Sipahbod, Persian Ambassadors in London, Moscow and Angora respectively, have been summoned to Tehran for consultation. Mahmud Jam, Persian Ambassador in Egypt has already arrived in Tehran.

Economic

4. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis that would have nullified that part of Dr. Mills' regulations governing the collection of the coming harvest that related to the right of the Government to take the surplus grain of the peasant as well as of the landlord. Dr. Mills' regulations have, however, anticipated the decision of the Majlis by agreeing to cancel the regulation as far as it relates to the peasant's surplus. It was estimated that 50,000 tons of grain would have been obtained from that source.

5. The weekly postal service between Tehran and Bushire, to which reference was made in Summary No. 25 44, paragraph 8, has been suspended.

Appointments—Civil

6. Hassan Suraj Hijazi to be Farmandar of Arak (Sultanshab)

South Persia

Internal Security

7. A meeting will be held in the near future between Qavam ul Mulk and the Qashgai brothers. The Qashgai brothers, who are representatives of the Qashgai tribe, wish to invite Abdullah Khan to attend, but this is not regarded with favour by the others, since Abdullah Khan has not yet made his peace officially with the Government. The purpose of the meeting is to confirm the pact of friendship and co-operation made between Qavam ul Mulk and the Qashgai brothers, which was reported in Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 4, and to extend it to include the Bakhtiari Khans. The meeting is no secret, the Governor-General of Fars has been invited to attend and the Shah is aware that it is to take place. It will almost certainly appear to the Russians as a step in a plan for the formation of a pro-British bloc of tribes in South Persia. Resistance to subversive Tudeh and Russian influence is admittedly one of the objects of the organization, and for that reason it is viewed with favour by property owners in the south.

Fars

8. Some activity is being shown by Government forces in the pursuit of minor bandits. The General Staff, in a communiqué to the press, report the capture of five leaders of robber bands.

Bakhtiari

9. Morteza Quli Khan, Governor of Bakhtiari, who was summoned to Tehran to answer complaints made against him (see Summary No. 27 44, paragraph 8) has now returned to Bakhtiari with the renewed confidence of the Government, though not of the Shah. He discomfited his enemies and made an armistice with his quarrelsome relatives which is unlikely to develop into a lasting peace. He has agreed to accept a representative of the rival branch of the family, the Hajj Ikhan, as a subordinate associate in the Government of the tribe. Dissension is, however, likely to break out again unless the Government comes to a decision on the matter of claims the Khans have for the restitution of, or compensation for, lands exchanged or sold under compulsion on the orders of Reza Shah. The fate of these lands is not of great interest to the Bakhtiari tribesmen, but as long as the Khans are dissatisfied with the Government or with each other the country is not at rest. The Shah, perhaps mindful of the part the Bakhtiari tribe has played in the past against would-be dictatorial Shahs, is reported to have been none too content when he heard that the Khans had come to an agreement. It is reported that Morteza Quli Khan had rather strengthened his position. In order to limit his sphere of influence it has been suggested that the Chahar Lang tribes should be separated from the Haft Lang and given a separate Governor. This proposal is the support of some of the Chahar Lang Khans and of the General Staff.

Khuzestan

10. The Persian General Staff reports that 850 rifles had been collected from the Mianab Arabs and about twenty of the sheikhs had been arrested. From the Chananeh some 300 rifles had been collected with little or no opposition. (See Summary No. 29 44, paragraph 9.)

Russian Affairs

11. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan reports that, in spite of the fact that the Russian Government has repeatedly stated that it regards Azerbaijan with mistrust and suspicion by the great majority of the Moslems of Azerbaijan. Soviet officials have not attempted to conceal their annoyance at the rejection by the Majlis of Puhavari's credentials (see Summary No. 28 44 paragraph 17) and have taken the Governor-General roundly to task. Soviet agents have been seen in various parts of the country, and the Governor-General has been informed that they are endeavouring to stir up the Moslems against the Government.

12. After much discussion between the Persian Government and the Soviet Government, it has been agreed that Persian troops in Azerbaijan may have liberty of action to suppress disorder but they have stipulated that one garrison may not be reinforced from another, nor may they be used to suppress disorder in any other province. As Persian troops are not allowed to enter Azerbaijan for the suppression of disorder, they are unable to be effective.

13. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan reports that Persian officials in Azerbaijan profess to have seen recently signs of growing Soviet hostility to Turkey and that Turkish officials were showing some nervousness. (See Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 3, it was reported that the Russian Government was anxious to secure a peace treaty with Germany.) In Summary No. 28 44, paragraph 3, it was reported that the Russian Government was anxious to secure a peace treaty with Germany. The consul-general in Azerbaijan comments that Turkish officials in that province show remarkably little political interest, and the slightest evidence of any desire to acquire influence among Persian officials or the Turkish people.

14. The newspaper *Darya*, to which reference has been made in previous summaries, has recently published an article in which it anticipates the suppression that could not have been long delayed having regard to the strong protests made by the British Embassy against its provocative and anti-British character. The article states that the British Embassy has been informed that the British Government is not prepared to support the suppression of the article.

15. In Summary No. 27 44, paragraph 13, some evidence was given that the British Government was not prepared to support the suppression of the article. It was stated that the British Government was not prepared to support the suppression of the article. It was stated that the British Government was not prepared to support the suppression of the article.

French Affairs

16. 1,500 Alsatians, who had been conscripted into the German Army and later taken prisoner in Russia, have passed through Tehran from Russia en route for North Africa.

Polish Affairs

17. The Polish Minister, Mr. M. Rostkowski, arrived in Tehran from London and left for Moscow on 10th August 1944.

| | Mrs. | Women. | Children. | Total |
|-----------------|------|--------|-----------|-------|
| Polish soldiers | 438 | 1,561 | 410 | 2,409 |
| Polish women | 115 | 741 | 1,140 | 2,002 |
| Polish children | 126 | 715 | 300 | 1,141 |
| Polish men | 2 | 2 | ... | 4 |
| | 679 | 3,019 | 1,850 | 5,548 |

Tehran, 6th August 1944.

E 8116 422 34]

No 15

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. — (Received 23rd August)

(No 320)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 31 for the period of the 7th to 13th August, 1944 compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 14th August, 1944

Enclosure in No. 18

(SECRET)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 31, for the period 7th August to 13th August, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The Government is to be interpellated on the 17th August on a matter connected with the administration of the State railways. It is expected that the Prime Minister will survive the interpellation, but that he will be obliged to make some changes in his Cabinet. He will be urged to change, among others, the Minister of War, who is regarded by the Majlis as being a mere cypher, subservient to the Shah.

2. A new party, calling itself "Mardum," has been formed under the leadership of Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, the President of the Majlis. It includes nine members of the National Union (the Ittifaq-i Milli) group in the Majlis—see Summary No. 12 44, paragraph 2—eight other Deputies and Amanullah Ardalan, Minister of Commerce, Ibrahim Zaid, Minister for War, and Murteza Quli Bayat, Minister without portfolio. Its manifesto, which bears some 180 names, says that the aim of the party is to achieve the unity of the nation for the preservation of the freedom and independence of Persia and the restoration of the true principles of democratic government. It calls for the abolition of the monarchy and the establishment of a republic. The party includes some known Shah's men, and it is likely that the Shah has favoured its formation. The list of names attached to the manifesto is not impressive, and it is not considered likely that the party will be constructive or will support the American mission.

3. Much attention has been given in the Persian press to an interview given by Dr. Millspaugh to the newspaper *Sitara*, where he is quoted as having said that his mission had been sent to safeguard the independence of Persia. America was the only country that had consistently championed the independence of Persia. If the American Mission had not come, disorders would have broken out all over the country and that would have resulted either in the complete occupation of North and South Persia by the British and Russian armies respectively or in the occupation of Persia by an international army, or in the re-establishment of dictatorship. Dr. Millspaugh has been very severely criticised by the Persian press for these statements. The position of the American mission has not visibly improved. There is even suspicion, voiced in no uncertain terms by the Shah himself, that Dr. Millspaugh is deliberately trying to ruin the economy of Persia in order to give America the excuse for taking control of it. This is Russian propaganda.

4. The Tudeh party is now holding its first General Conference in Tehran. It is attended by 170 delegates, of whom the great majority is from the Northern Provinces. Isfahan sends seven, and there are representatives from Qum, Savah, Sultanabad, Alwaz, Durud and Andimeshk. The conference has expelled from the party the Deputy for Babul because he took part in mourning ceremonies for Reza Shah, has dissolved the local committee at Shahravar for the same reason and expelled another member for "co-operation with reactionaries."

5. As it becomes more apparent to Persians that the war will end not merely in the defeat of Germany but in the complete destruction of German power, their vision of the future is all the more free of anxiety in the West and the East, and of unchallengeable supremacy in Central Asia. In Russia's regard for her pledged word they have no confidence whatever. Of Russia's

designs on the Northern Provinces they are convinced. Of the efficacy of British combined with Russian opposition to appointments or measures that might lead to the strength of stability of the Central Government they see the resolve to create a situation that will lead to the outbreak on the withdrawal of Russian troops of a greater disorder than the Persian Government can remedy and an appeal from tutored parties in Azerbaijan for Russian intervention. It is not difficult to find evidence on which to base such a theory. What Russia may do overshadows all other considerations in the minds of men of property and wealth. Some such as Qavam es Sultaneh and General Muqaddam, lately Governor-General of Azerbaijan, ready to the Russians, others are considering liquidating their property with a view to transferring their capital abroad.

Economic

6. In reply to a question in the Majlis asking for information about the Government's negotiations with oil-concession hunters known to be in Tehran the Prime Minister replied. In October and November 1943 two representatives of the Shell Company arrived in Tehran with proposals for the grant of a concession in South-East Persia. They were followed in February 1944 by a representative of the Standard Oil Company with proposals for the same area and about the same time the Sinclair Oil Company informed the Government that they were also making proposals for a concession. To assist the Government in studying these various proposals for a concession two American experts, Messrs. Hoover and Curtis, were engaged as advisers and they were now in Tehran.

The leader of the Tudeh party in the Majlis protested against the engagement of Americans to advise on a question in which American oil companies were interested.

Appointments—civil

7. Muzah Turbatli to be Farmandar of Dasht i Meshan in Khuzestan.

Persian Forces

Army

8. The Minister for War has tabled two Bills, one of which makes it now a crime for an officer to draw pay for imaginary employees or to employ as his servants more men paid from army sources than the regulations permit or to hire out men paid from the army budget for his own profit; the other specified punishments awardable to military personnel who use army transport for their own profit.

Administration

9. In an interview with the reporter of a Persian newspaper Col. Schwarzkopf gave an outline of his ambitious scheme for the reorganisation of the gendarmerie. He said that after a lengthy study of social, economic and administrative conditions in Persia he was ready to be put in execution. He said that the Ministry of the Interior was prepared to allot. He said he had already instituted schools for officers and n.c.o.s. Asked what he had done to improve the morale tone of the gendarmerie, Col. Schwarzkopf replied that only in rare cases was he able to get definite evidence of corruption. He admitted that he had not yet succeeded in eliminating all theft, bribery and oppression, but he claimed that he had reduced these crimes.

Appointments—military

- 10.—(i) Sarhang Muhammad Reza Shahandeh to command the 19th (Kwash) Brigade.
(ii) Staff Sarhang Abbas Hidayet to be Deputy Director of Army Transport.

Internal Security

11. Two of the Arabs arrested after the operations in the Minhab area—see Summary No. 30.44. paragraph 10—have been hanged for highway robbery and several others have been condemned to death. The effect, as far as it is known at present, has been good.

Russian Affairs

12. Reports from so many sources speak of considerable recent increases in the number of Russian troops in Sharpur. It is reported that it may be accepted that there has been some increase. From fairly reliable sources it is reported that there are Soviet tanks in notable numbers in Sharpur, Kbor and at Bazergan on the Turkish frontier. Under orders from the Soviet commander air raid precautions have been instituted in Sharpur. These dispositions are also reported to be directed with a view to their being used against the Turks.

13. A party of Russian officers and n.c.o.s. recently visited Bushire for a few days and stayed at the old Russian Consulate. This is probably the party reported in Summary No. 30.44. paragraph 15.

Polish Affairs

14. M. Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister and his party returned from Moscow on the 10th August and left for London on the following day.

American Affairs

15. Mr. Leland Morris, American Ambassador designate to Persia, has arrived in Tehran.

Tehran, 13th August, 1944

[E 5317 422 34]

No. 19

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 31st August)

(No. 331)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period of the 14th to the 20th August, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 21st August, 1944

Enclosure in No. 19

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 32 for the period 14th to 20th August, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The interpellation of the Government has been postponed until next week, the Deputies having been unable to make a decision as to what they want in the way of a Cabinet. They wished the Prime Minister to reconstitute the Cabinet before the interpellation, but he prefers to wait and see if he will be given a vote of confidence.

2. Yet another political party has been formed, the "Kur" under the leadership of Dr. Mucharrafi Nafisi (F.O. 154. M.A. 190). It published the usual admirable programme with perhaps less than the usual sincerity, for Dr. Nafisi, although unpopular on account of his blunt, ungracious manner, is genuine in his desire for better things. He believes, and includes it in his party programme, that Persia should be administered by a committee of Persians. He disagrees strongly with some of Dr. Mills' measures. The first issue of the party newspaper, *Pand*, enquires why the Allies should keep so many troops in Persia, especially in places like Khuzestan which are very remotely concerned with the war.

3. The matter of Dr. Millspaugh's remarks published in the *Sitara*, to which reference was made in Summary No. 31 44, paragraph 3, has been raised in the Majlis. Strong exception was taken to Dr. Millspaugh's claim to be the defender of Persian independence against Persia's allies. The Prime Minister was asked what action was being taken by the Government since the Government was responsible for public statements made by its employees, of whom Dr. Millspaugh was one.

4. The meeting between the three potentates of South Persia, referred to in paragraph 8 below, attracted some attention in the press, meeting with the approval of some newspapers and provoking others to suggestions that it was a dangerous plot against the independence of Persia organised by foreigners. There is some anxiety lest the Russians, believing the agreement between the Southern tribes to be a British move, may attempt to form a similar union under their influence, among the tribes of Azerbaijan. The Shah is suspicious that unity in the south may not be in his ultimate interest.

Economic

5. The Cabinet has approved the formation of a Supreme Economic Council to be composed of four members, of whom eighteen will be nominated for a period of three years by a decree of the Cabinet on the proposal of the Prime Minister and six will be elected by those eighteen. The duty of this council will be to advise the Government on all those matters which are within the province of Dr. Millspaugh's mission.

Appointments-Civil

- (i) Ghulam Hussein Bitchaj (F.O. 89 M.A. 117) to be Mayor of Tehran
- (ii) Zaim-ul-Abedin Rahnama (F.O. 186 M.A. 237) to be Persian Minister at the headquarters of the Fighting French at Algiers

Persian Forces

7. Ten of the fifteen Anson aircraft to be given to the Persian Government in exchange for the Mohawk aircraft taken from them in 1941 have been delivered in Tehran, having been flown from Cairo by Persian pilots—see also Summary No. 23 44, paragraph 5.

Internal Security

South Persia

8. The meeting between the Qavam ul-Mulk, Morteza Qali Bakhtiari and Nasir Qashgai, referred to in Summary No. 30 44, paragraph 7, resulted in satisfaction to at least the two former. Nasir's views are not known. It was conducted in a friendly spirit and all three signed a document pledging themselves not to act against the interests of the Allies, to consult together before taking any action affecting each other's or their mutual interests and to stand together to protect their common interests. At Nasir's request a paragraph was added to the effect that Abdullah Zarghampur Hozr Ahmadi would be allowed to adhere to the agreement. Nasir has been very popular at present, but he is not popular with much opposition in his own tribes and it is doubtful whether his adherence will be of much value. He has appealed to Nasir for assistance, but it is reported that Nasir would now willingly get rid of his long-standing commitment to stand by Abdullah Zarghampur.

Bakhtiari

9. The Persian General Staff report some 300 rifles have been collected without opposition from Moghnia and Zivaki sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari—each tribe has been allowed to keep twenty-five for its own protection. The troops are now being withdrawn to Isfahan. See Summary No. 29 44, paragraph 8.

Azerbaijan

10. Five more of the Arabs arrested after the disarmament operations in Miandab have been hanged, making seven in all—see Summary No. 31 44, paragraph 11. All reliable reports agree that the effect on the Arabs generally has been good.

Azerbaijan

11. Some sections of the Jaf tribes who had migrated from Iraq to Persia refused to obey the orders of the Persian Government regarding the payment of grazing fees. Troops of the Saqqiz and Seneh garrisons were sent to enforce obedience. In the ensuing clash the Jaf suffered twenty to thirty casualties and were driven into Iraq. The Persian troops report two casualties and the death of a khan of the Tilekub tribe who were supporting the troops.

Shahrud

12. An anti-Bahai riot occurred at Shahrud in which several persons were killed. Order was restored by the Persian and Russian authorities.

Tehran, 20th August, 1944.

E 5426 422 34]

No. 20

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 3th September)

(No. 335)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the period of the 21st to 27th August, 1944 compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 28th August 1944

Enclosure in No. 20

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 33 for the Period 21st August to 27th August, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The Government, elected on the 20th August, and headed by Sa'ed, has the support of eighty-five Deputies of the Azad, Mihan and Ittifaq-i-Melli groups. It has been entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet. Presumably the three groups above mentioned will dictate its composition. Some Deputies, perhaps a majority, are demanding a complete change. It is unlikely that the unity of these groups in support of Sa'ed or of any aim will last for long, and it is generally expected that the Government will be short-lived.

Administration. Seyyid Zia is being spoken of more and more as the eventual most suitable successor to Sa'ed; but Seyyid Zia himself does not think that he can yet count on sufficient solid support. Relations between him and the Shah have recently improved outwardly, and Seyyid Zia's supporters find cause for optimism in a recent long interview he had with the Shah which he reported as having been satisfactory and as having resulted in a large measure of agreement on important points of policy. The Russians, however, show no signs of reducing their opposition to Seyyid Zia, and it is too early yet to accept as the Shah's apparent inclination towards faith in his virtues.

2. An analysis of the 128 Deputies who have taken their seats in the Majlis shows that sixty-five are themselves landowners, thirteen come from the commercial and industrial classes, four are priests. Of the remaining forty-six a number have been elected through the influence of landlords and merchants whose interests they represent. The Deputies are not united in any political party, nor do they stand for any political principle, nor even for the interests of the constituency from which they have been elected. Indeed, some of them are not even known in their constituencies. It is consequently not surprising that attempts to form a stable party in the Majlis have hitherto failed with no success. Groups are formed which coalesce or disintegrate for some reason or other. The Majlis has been unable to discharge its duties of public responsibility and less unity than the 13th, and during the six months of its life it has passed practically no legislation. (See also Summary No. 30 44, paragraph 1.) The three years of parliamentary government that the country

has experienced since the abdication of Reza Shah have done nothing to dispel doubts of Persia's fitness for democratic government. Indeed, the conviction grows that no Government can function effectively while dependent for approval on so mercurial and irresponsible a body. The Shah wishes to form the Senate, which is provided for in the Constitution, possibly with the idea of closing the Majlis while preserving in the Senate some slight appearance of regard for the Constitution. He is the more inclined to this idea in that he has the right of appointing thirty of the sixty members of the Senate.

3. A report on the proceedings of the Tudeh party conference (see Summary No. 31 44, paragraph 4) has been published in the party press. Among the resolutions adopted were: to oppose all foreign advisers from whatever country they come; to oppose the grant of any economic concession that may weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation, to support friendly relations with all freedom-loving nations on a basis of mutual respect and complete recognition of the political and economic independence of Persia, to encourage the development and consolidation of labour unions and organise peasants and officials. Approval was given to the American advisers. Dissatisfaction with the present control and organisation of the party was shown by resolutions to ensure better accounting for the party's funds, to tighten up party discipline, to ensure better co-operation between the centre and branches, and to purge the party of doubtful elements. The Deputy for Armenians of the north, and Radmaniah, Deputy for Lahijan. The former was trained at the Sociological College in Moscow and has spent many years in prison for Communist activity.

4. The Government has decided to prohibit the pilgrimage to Mecca this year as far as Persian subjects are concerned.

Economic

5. The National Bank reports that notes in circulation now amount to 11,000,000,000 rials.

6. That prominent Deputy, Dr. Musaddiq, recently proposed in the Majlis that the Government should charge the Allies twice the cost price of any wheat delivered to them. He alleged that in the twelve months April 1943 to March 1944 the Allies had taken 100,000 tons of wheat. It is now a recognised Persian practice to use the word "Allies" when complaining of Russian actions but to refer categorically to British and Americans in similar circumstances. The proposal was unanimously approved.

Appointments—Civil

- 7—(i) Sherif Darnakchi to be Farmandar of Birjand
- (ii) Hadi Shahnoze to be Farmandar of Shafarud
- (iii) Shahpur Mihan to be Farmandar of the new Shahrstan of Pahlevi
- (iv) Ahmad Zelli to be Director General of Customs

Persian Forces

Appointments—Military

B. Army

- (i) Sartip Baharmast to be Quartermaster General of the Army
- (ii) Sarhang Mihan to be Director of Personnel
- (iii) Sarhang Mihan to be Director of Personnel

C. Cavalry

- (iv) Sarhang Humayun to be Chief of Staff
- (v) Sarhang Musbert to be Director of Operations
- (vi) Sarhang Gudarzi to be Director of Personnel
- (vii) Sarhang Jahanmazi to be Director of Plans
- (viii) Sarhang Mu'tazadi to command the 1st (Central) District
- (ix) Sarhang Shams Mulk Arzi to command the Khuzestan District
- (x) Sarhang Ma'zi to command the Isfahan Regiment
- (xi) Sarhang Maulavi to command the Kermanshah Regiment
- (xii) Sarhang Yarbakh to command the Kerman Regiment
- (xiii) Sarhang Fariburz to command the Shiraz Regiment
- (xiv) Sarhang Ishqi to command the Mazandaran Regiment
- (xv) Naib Sarhang Amir Parvizi to command the Tabriz Regiment

Internal Security

Kuh-i-Gulu

9. The opposition to Abdullah Khan Zarghampur, which was mentioned in Summary No. 31 44, is continuing. The opposition is being organised by authorities in Khuzestan, who appear to be endeavouring to form a coalition of those Bour Ahmadi chiefs who resent Abdullah Khan's attempts to impose himself as chief on all the Bour Ahmadi tribes. The chief of one section of the Mamassani also shows some inclination to join the opposition, who are alleged to be receiving ammunition from the Persian military authorities. Abdullah Khan is reported to be endeavouring to break up the combination of the southern tribes and to weaken them by provoking them to fight each other. The Governor-General of Fars is, however, of the opinion that this provocation is likely only to create disorder and he is recommending the abandonment of this policy.

Russian Affairs

10. At a meeting in the Armenian Club in Tehran it was decided that Persian Armenians should be asked to contribute funds for the equipment of a tank regiment for the Soviet Army, to be named after the Armenian general Bagramian.

11. During the current month 2,400 Russian ex-prisoners of war, liberated on European fronts, have been handed over to the Soviet authorities in Tehran by the British military authorities.

Czechoslovak Affairs

12. A mixed military and civil official mission, including a representative of the Czechoslovak Government and three general officers, passed through Tehran on their way to Moscow.

Tehran, 27th August, 1944

E 5645 432 34

No. 21

Sir H. Hallard to Mr. Eden—(Received 15th September)

(No. 345)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the period of the 29th August to the 3rd September 1944 compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 4th September, 1944

In closure in No. 21

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 34 for the Period 29th August to 3rd September, 1944

Political

Persian Affairs

1. The following Cabinet was presented to the Shah on the 31st August: Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs, Muhammad Sa'ed Maragheh; War, General Muhammad Hussein Firuz (F O 72 M A 94); Education, Baqir Kazemi (F O 110, M A 142); Justice, Allahyar Saleh (F O 108, M A 250); Finance, Ali Asghar Zarinkafsh (F O 236, M A 300); Commerce and Industry, Dr. Muhammad Nakhlai (F O 157); Interior, Muhammad Sururi (F O 219); Posts and Telegraphs, Yusuf Mushar; Communications, Muhammad Nariman; Health, Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal (Acting) (F O 94); Agriculture, Vacant; Without Portfolio, Khalil Fahimi (F O 59 M A 62).

[29955]

Only the Prime Minister and the Minister without Portfolio were in the previous Cabinet. Of the others Baqir Kazemi, Allahyar Saleh and Muhammad Nariman have previously held Cabinet rank, the two last-named for very brief periods. 7. The Ministry of the Interior has been reorganised and is satisfactory Under Secretaries.

2. The ministers were selected from the list of twenty-five presented to the Prime Minister by the three groups, referred to in Summary No. 33 44, paragraph 1, who had combined for the purpose of Cabinet making. The Tudeh party and the independent members were strongly opposed to the intervention of the Majlis in the selection of ministers, and the former were opposed to the return of Sa'ed as Prime Minister. When the Cabinet came to be presented to the Majlis the Tudeh and independent members absented themselves, with the result that the Government was able to form a Cabinet. General Firuz has not yet accepted his nomination.

Appointments:

3. Jamāl Mehdi to be Persian Consul General in Baku.

Internal Security

Kurdish Affairs

4. The Persian Government has enjoined caution on its military authorities in Khuzestan in their encouragement of the coalition opposed to Abdollah Zarghampur, which might involve the Mamasani and Qashgai tribes on opposite sides and might lead to a situation which the Persian authorities could not control. At the same time they want to keep the Opposition simmering and they will probably not discourage resistance by other Bost Ahmadi chiefs to Abdollah Zarghampur's attempts to impose his authority over them. See Summary No. 33 44, paragraph 9.

Western Azerbaijan

5. Following on action by the Persian authorities in ejecting Persian Herki Kurds under the troublesome chief Zoro Beg from several villages in the Daranduz district and the establishment there of gendarmerie posts, reports were current that Herki tribesmen from Iraq and armed followers of Muḥammad Mustafa had crossed the border and were being joined by Mameh and Begerdeli tribesmen. Their intention was said to be to drive the Persian authorities from Rezaieh and to set up a Kurdish administration. A later report said that negotiations between the tribes, who had concentrated in Margivar, and the commander of the Persian gendarmes in Rezaieh, supported by a Russian official, the tribes had dispersed peacefully.

Syrian Affairs

6. The Persian Government has recognised the Government of Syria.

Russian Affairs

7. The Kasso military party which was recently reported in Bakhtiari—see Summary No. 30, 44, paragraph 15—made enquiries as to the number of arms in possession of the southern tribes and whether arms are reaching these tribes from any source. From comments in the Tudeh press it seems that the Russians believe the pact recently made between the three tribal representatives of the south (the Qashgai, the Qashgai and the Qashgai) and the British (the tribes nowadays) to have been engineered by the British as a defensive or perhaps offensive measure against the Tudeh. On the other hand, the Shah has given as reason for the recent collection of arms from certain sections of the Chahar Lang Bakhtiari his belief that Russian agents had recently been intriguing among those tribes.

8. A group of party headed by the Red Army champion the cause of the tribes and is said to be active in the region. The methods used to attract subscriptions were the usual blackmail and threats.

Tehran, 3rd September, 1944

E 5055 422 34]

No. 22

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 29th September)

(No. 305.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the period of the 4th to 17th September, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 18th September, 1944

Enclosure in No. 22

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 35 for the Period 4th-17th September, 1944.

Persian Affairs

Political.

OPPOSITION in the Majlis has successfully managed to prolong the crisis by a spate of talk and criticism which has lasted throughout the week and postponed the vote on the Government. It was expected that the Government will have a majority when the vote is taken, but it is not yet known whether the Government will have a majority. General Firuz has not accepted his appointment as Minister for War. He has stated that he does not wish to be associated with a Government which has no hope of any effective action.

2. The Cabinet has adopted the programme of its predecessor (see Summary No. 13, paragraph 3) with the following additions:—

- (a) The safeguarding of public security by putting into execution the provisions of the law of the maintenance of the public order and the suppression of all elements of disorder.
- (b) The stabilisation of prices and the reduction of the cost of living, energetic suppression of hoarding.
- (c) The execution of the law of compulsory primary education and the revision of programmes of instruction.
- (d) Restrictions on the cultivation of opium.
- (e) Reform of the electoral law.

Economic

3. The Persian press states that the value of imports in the year March 1943-March 1944 was 1,527,233,672 rials and in the previous year 1,313,910,532 rials. The value of exports in 1943-44 was 703,100,178 rials and in the previous year 557,719,056 rials.

4. The Ministry of Health gives the following figures of the incidence of certain diseases in Persia:—

| | Number of Cases reported. | |
|---|---------------------------|---------|
| | | Deaths. |
| Typhus (December 1942 to December 1943) | 12,912 | 1,617 |
| Malaria (March 1943 to March 1944) | 1,237 | 125 |
| Malaria (March 1942 to March 1943) | 208,539 | 735 |

The number of unreported cases probably exceeds the above figures in the case of malaria.

Persian Forces

Army.

5. It has been decided not to proceed with General Ridley's scheme for the organisation of a permanent headquarters of independent national training centres under the direct control of a permanent staff. The scheme was never popular with the present Chief of Staff or with divisional commanders. Only in Tehran had such a centre been fully organised but during the months it was in operation it had never been provided with efficient instructors or with

necessary equipment. It has now been abolished. Recruits will in future be trained, as before, in regiments.

6. According to the Chief of the Staff Dr. Millspongh has agreed to find a further 15 million tomans for the army budget for the remaining six months of the current financial year. It is not yet known from what source this amount is to be obtained—whether by reducing the allotments to other Ministries, by increased taxation or by borrowing.

7. The remaining five Anson aircraft due to the Persian Government have now arrived in Tehran and have been delivered to the Persian air force (see Summary No. 32/44, paragraph 7).

Appointments—Military

8.—(i) Sartip 'Ali Akbar She'ri to command 7th (Kerman and Mekran) Division

(ii) Sarhang Mir Hussein Hashemi to command 5th (Luristan) Division

(iii) Sarhang Monammad Ahmad Sartipi to be Provost Marshal

(iv) Sartip Gholam 'Ali Ansari to be an Army Inspector

(v) Sarhang Nensar to be Military Governor of Mahabad

Internal Security

Western Azerbaijan

9. From several sources reports have been received to the effect that the movement for Kurdish independence is gaining strength in the Mahabad area. Five issues have now been made of the paper of the movement, the *Nishkman*, which is believed to be written mostly in Mahabad and is known to be printed in Tabriz with the help of the Russians. The Russians are generally suspected of being behind the movement; they are certainly watching it without disapproval. The Persian authorities are growing increasingly anxious. They are still trying to get Russian approval to the location of an adequate Persian garrison at Mahabad. Meanwhile they have posted military officers as Governors of Mahabad and Sardasht, although their authority is likely to be only nominal. They are also considering plans for the extension of Government's authority in those parts of Kurdistan where the Russians do not impose restrictions on military movements.

Kermanshah

10. A report has been received that Hamza Rashid of Baneh, who was in revolt against the Persian Government in 1942, has attacked another Kurdish chief, Mahmud Kanisani, and driven him out of his village of Merivan. Both these chiefs have for the past two years enjoyed a considerable degree of autonomy in their areas and have accepted responsibility and subsidies for the maintenance of order. Mahmud Kanisani is now appealing for the intervention of Persian troops. Kurdish chiefs cannot for long refrain from demonstrating to the Persian Government the necessity for the establishment of firm Government authority in Kurdish territory.

11. Two Kalkhuni chiefs, Rashid es Saltaneh and Rashid Agha, who had for some months been under detention by the Persian authorities, recently absconded and returned to their tribal country. Operations for their recapture were initiated by Persian troops. One of the chiefs was killed and the other absconders into the territory of a hostile tribe, where one was killed and the other wounded and captured. The prestige of the Persian Government is now considered to have been vindicated.

Bakhtiari

12. The Persian Chief of Staff reports that the operations for the collection of arms from the Mamivand tribes are proceeding well. The Mamivand tribes have now been completed and that the tribes have been disarmed. His information is that about 700 rifles have been collected in all and that there are still some 2,000 rifles with the Mamivand.

Fars

13. The Political Resident in the Persian Gulf travelling by car on the 10th September, was shot up about 5 miles north of Shiraz. A Persian Government lorry which was following him was held up and rifled. The brigands have not yet been identified.

Russian Affairs

14. The Russians are increasing the scope of their activities in Persia. They recently opened a hospital in Tabriz for the benefit of Persians, and there are rumours that they are considering opening hospitals in Isfahan and Shiraz. They have announced that Transovirana, the Soviet transport organisation operating in Persia for the carriage of supplies to Russia and for Russian military needs, is organising services in South Persia. An office has been opened in Isfahan, and owners of transport under contract to the Persian Road Transport Department are being bribed or otherwise induced to transfer their services to Transovirana. Merchants are being canvassed and are being offered rates lower than those of the Persian Transport Department, with no obligation to pay anything until the goods are safely delivered. In East Persia also, now that that route is no longer to be operated for supplies to Russia, lorry drivers employed by the U.K.C.C. are joining the Tudeh party and offering their services to Transovirana. The Persian Government has been persuaded to engage two Russian experts for the Ministry of Agriculture to combat the spread of epizootic diseases. These experts will have ample excuse for travelling and

will be accompanied by a Russian military camp near the old city of Isfahan, 8 miles south of Tehran, and by reports that the Russian military authorities are planning to occupy some important building or the residence of some important person. The Russians are also planning to open a camp for the repatriation of Russian prisoners of war and for the repatriation of Russian civilians. After investigation of the camp those for repatriation to Russia will be entrained at the adjacent station. The camp will be situated in a suburb of the city of Isfahan.

British Affairs

15. His Excellency Sir Reader Bullard returned to Tehran on the 10th September and was received by the Persian Government.

16.—The Cabinet was given a vote of confidence on the evening of the 17th September 1943 for the Government's policy in Persia.

CHAPTER IV. SAUDI ARABIA.

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N. 25

Mr Jordan to Mr Eden.—(Received 7th July)

(No 61)

HIS Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Jedda presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

Jedda 1st July 1944

Enclosure in No. 25

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jedda 1st July, 1944

(Passages marked with an asterisk are taken from previous reports)

Fighting France.

*M. Roger Maigret has returned to Jedda as "Désigné" of Fighting France. He was chargé d'affaires and later French Minister in Jedda from 1929 to 1937 (see report for 1937). He is being accorded by the Saudi Arabian Government, as a personal courtesy all or nearly all the privileges of the head of a foreign mission.

It is difficult to see what useful rôle can be played by a representative of Fighting France in this country at present. France, whether Fighting or not, has lost any prestige she ever had here, and Ibn Saud has described the Fighting French as "just another slave from the same old loaf".

M. Maigret professes to be a firm adherent of the Allied cause, and it is believed that he was one of the first in Syria to rally to de Gaulle. His mentality, however, is revealed by the fact that he considers that any representative of France in Jedda, even an admittedly incompetent and shifty M. Ballereau with his declared hostility to the Allies, is better than none.

As far as is known, M. Maigret holds no communication with his Vichy colleague. (Written in January 1943)

Since his return from leave in December 1943 he has remained very much to himself taking no part in social activities. His health is feeble and was further impaired by a long illness in the spring of 1944. The running of the delegation has been left in the slippery hands of Maître Bouer, a Syrian lawyer educated in France.

Iraq

*Jamal Pasha Ar Rawi was in Jedda from November 1939 to 1941 as Iraqi Chargé d'Affaires. After two years at Kabul he has now returned to Jedda as Minister. He presented his credentials on the 4th March, 1943.

He served during the war of 1914-18 first in the Turkish forces and then with his close friend Nuri Pasha as Saud in the Arab forces. Was principal military aide de camp to King Hussein.

Jamal Pasha is a very pleasant and friendly colleague but his health is not good. He is married, but his wife does not appear in masculine society. (Written in 1943) She has now (1944) started "coming out" however.

Netherlands

*Daniel van der Meulen has, owing to the internment in Holland of the titular chargé d'affaires, Dr. Dingemans, returned to Jedda, where from 1926 to 1931 he was consul and later chargé d'affaires. He had just been promoted resident in the Dutch Colonial Service, and is merely seconded for the duration of the war. He is an authority on the Arabic language and customs and speaks good English

and French. He is a most loyal supporter of the Allied cause. His wife, who is said to have some Japanese blood, has great charm of manner and is most helpful in counteracting her husband's occasional tendency to pessimism. Four of their children are in Holland. (Written in 1941)

*M. van der Meulen made a trip to the Yemen by land in the summer of 1942. In his opinion his trip did much to counteract Axis propaganda in the Yemen and served to show the Yemenis that the Netherlands was still a power in the world. (Written in 1943)

He was made Minister Plenipotentiary and presented his letters on the 5th November 1943. In January and February 1944 he made a tour of the Hadhramaut.

Turkey

M. Ayaabli (see report for 1943) left in 1943, and was replaced as Minister Plenipotentiary by M. Amin Ali Sipahi in January 1944. He presented his credentials on the 3rd February, 1944. His wife is a welcome addition to English speaking feminine society in Jedda although she left for Egypt with her 11 year old son after only a short time. M. Sipahi himself is a pleasant and friendly colleague if somewhat inquisitive.

United States

A permanent United States Legation was established at Jedda on the 1st May, 1942, the Minister being Mr. Alexander Kirk who was also Minister to Cairo, where he resided.

The resident chargé d'affaires in Jedda, Mr. James S. Moore (Junior), has now been appointed Minister Resident and presented his credentials on the 14th July, 1943. The United States Legation's connexion with Cairo has thus now ceased.

Mr. Moore is married but his wife and family are in America. He is a pleasant colleague socially but inclined to display a certain reserve in matters where close co-operation is desirable. He was frequently absent in the spring of 1944 owing to the Cairo discussions.

*Representatives accredited also to other Governments.**Afghanistan*

*Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq al Mujaddidi, is also Minister to Egypt and resides in Cairo. He came to Mecca on pilgrimage at the end of 1942, but was seen by his Christian colleagues. (Written in January 1943.) Did not come to the Hejaz for the 1943 pilgrimage.

Egypt

*Bahravi Bey has been transferred to a post in the Egyptian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and has been succeeded by Mohammed Hosni Omar, who is also Minister to Iraq. He has not yet presented his credentials and nothing is known of him in Jedda.

The Egyptian Legation is in the charge of Abdul Hamid Monir Bey, a most capable official who has been seen by his colleagues while on leave from the pilgrimage. (Written in January 1943)

Mohammed Hosni Omar visited Jedda for the 1943 pilgrimage. In the absence on leave of Monir Bey in 1944 the legation was in charge of Al Amrousi, a pleasant if colourless person.

Persia

*Ali Akbar Bahman, Minister to Saudi Arabia and Ambassador to Egypt, terminated his mission in both countries on an unspecified date in 1942 and, as far as Saudi Arabia is concerned, no successor appears to have been appointed yet. (Written in January 1943)

INDEX

Abdullah ibn Hasan. 12 (1)
Abdullah ibn Ibrahim al-Fadhl. 21 (4)
Abdullah ibn Hasan Qasbi. 45 (3)
Abdullah ibn Hussein Azar. 62 (16)
Abdullah Khasawir. 60
Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aql. 8
Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhl. 9
Abdullah az-Zafra. 10
Abdullah az-Zayt. 50 (1)
Abdullah Suleyman al-Harathi. 11
Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Muhi. 53
Abdul-Latif family. 12 (3)
Abul Majid ibn Ali Haydar Sharif. 53 (1)
Abdul-Nur ibn 'Abdul-Aziz. Azar. 1 (7)

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(1) *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn 'Abdur Rahman al Faysal al Sa'ud.*—King of Saudi

Born probably in 1892. Accompanied father on flight from Riyadh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1901. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh M. T. of Kuwait who gave access to family. Saw opportunity of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyadh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahman survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Najd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Hail in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Husayn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Husayn's son and successor 'Ali. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Saudi Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najran. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Mocha in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Amir of Nejd and Imam of the Wahhābīs; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'ūdī Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his

[illegible]

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he can feel he has no personal or just connexion with the Government of India. Only and in some sense vassalish. Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyadh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best English authority on the Sa'ud family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

Throughout the past year (1943-44) Ibn Sa'ud has shown himself to be an energetic and statesmanlike as ever in the conduct of the internal and external affairs of his kingdom. He, moreover, revealed a desire to reorganize the financial and economic administration of his kingdom by requesting His Majesty's Government to provide him with a Modern financial adviser as also a temporary business to train his sons in such modern lines. His loyalty and friendship towards His Majesty's Government remained as steadfast as before and his desire not to prejudice their war effort is shown by his advice to Arab leaders to postpone discussions on Arab unity until after the war.

(2) Da'ud bin Abdul Aziz. Born at Riyadh in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Saudi stock. Has for some years been Viceroy of Najd, and until 1934 was the ruler of the whole of Saudi Arabia. He visited Europe in 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1934, 1935, 1936, 1937, 1938, 1939, 1940, 1941, 1942, 1943, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, 2024, 2025, 2026, 2027, 2028, 2029, 2030, 2031, 2032, 2033, 2034, 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038, 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043, 2044, 2045, 2046, 2047, 2048, 2049, 2050, 2051, 2052, 2053, 2054, 2055, 2056, 2057, 2058, 2059, 2060, 2061, 2062, 2063, 2064, 2065, 2066, 2067, 2068, 2069, 2070, 2071, 2072, 2073, 2074, 2075, 2076, 2077, 2078, 2079, 2080, 2081, 2082, 2083, 2084, 2085, 2086, 2087, 2088, 2089, 2090, 2091, 2092, 2093, 2094, 2095, 2096, 2097, 2098, 2099, 2100, 2101, 2102, 2103, 2104, 2105, 2106, 2107, 2108, 2109, 2110, 2111, 2112, 2113, 2114, 2115, 2116, 2117, 2118, 2119, 2120, 2121, 2122, 2123, 2124, 2125, 2126, 2127, 2128, 2129, 2130, 2131, 2132, 2133, 2134, 2135, 2136, 2137, 2138, 2139, 2140, 2141, 2142, 2143, 2144, 2145, 2146, 2147, 2148, 2149, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2154, 2155, 2156, 2157, 2158, 2159, 2160, 2161, 2162, 2163, 2164, 2165, 2166, 2167, 2168, 2169, 2170, 2171, 2172, 2173, 2174, 2175, 2176, 2177, 2178, 2179, 2180, 2181, 2182, 2183, 2184, 2185, 2186, 2187, 2188, 2189, 2190, 2191, 2192, 2193, 2194, 2195, 2196, 2197, 2198, 2199, 2200, 2201, 2202, 2203, 2204, 2205, 2206, 2207, 2208, 2209, 2210, 2211, 2212, 2213, 2214, 2215, 2216, 2217, 2218, 2219, 2220, 2221, 2222, 2223, 2224, 2225, 2226, 2227, 2228, 2229, 2230, 2231, 2232, 2233, 2234, 2235, 2236, 2237, 2238, 2239, 2240, 2241, 2242, 2243, 2244, 2245, 2246, 2247, 2248, 2249, 2250, 2251, 2252, 2253, 2254, 2255, 2256, 2257, 2258, 2259, 2260, 2261, 2262, 2263, 2264, 2265, 2266, 2267, 2268, 2269, 2270, 2271, 2272, 2273, 2274, 2275, 2276, 2277, 2278, 2279, 2280, 2281, 2282, 2283, 2284, 2285, 2286, 2287, 2288, 2289, 2290, 2291, 2292, 2293, 2294, 2295, 2296, 2297, 2298, 2299, 2300, 2301, 2302, 2303, 2304, 2305, 2306, 2307, 2308, 2309, 2310, 2311, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2316, 2317, 2318, 2319, 2320, 2321, 2322, 2323, 2324, 2325, 2326, 2327, 2328, 2329, 2330, 2331, 2332, 2333, 2334, 2335, 2336, 2337, 2338, 2339, 2340, 2341, 2342, 2343, 2344, 2345, 2346, 2347, 2348, 2349, 2350, 2351, 2352, 2353, 2354, 2355, 2356, 2357, 2358, 2359, 2360, 2361, 2362, 2363, 2364, 2365, 2366, 2367, 2368, 2369, 2370, 2371, 2372, 2373, 2374, 2375, 2376, 2377, 2378, 2379, 2380, 2381, 2382, 2383, 2384, 2385, 2386, 2387, 2388, 2389, 2390, 2391, 2392, 2393, 2394, 2395, 2396, 2397, 2398, 2399, 2400, 2401, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2405, 2406, 2407, 2408, 2409, 2410, 2411, 2412, 2413, 2414, 2415, 2416, 2417, 2418, 2419, 2420, 2421, 2422, 2423, 2424, 2425, 2426, 2427, 2428, 2429, 2430, 2431, 2432, 2433, 2434, 2435, 2436, 2437, 2438, 2439, 2440, 2441, 2442, 2443, 2444, 2445, 2446, 2447, 2448, 2449, 2450, 2451, 2452, 2453, 2454, 2455, 2456, 2457, 2458, 2459, 2460, 2461, 2462, 2463, 2464, 2465, 2466, 2467, 2468, 2469, 2470, 2471, 2472, 2473, 2474, 2475, 2476, 2477, 2478, 2479, 2480, 2481, 2482, 2483, 2484, 2485, 2486, 2487, 2488, 2489, 2490, 2491, 2492, 2493, 2494, 2495, 2496, 2497, 2498, 2499, 2500, 2501, 2502, 2503, 2504, 2505, 2506, 2507, 2508, 2509, 2510, 2511, 2512, 2513, 2514, 2515, 2516, 2517, 2518, 2519, 2520, 2521, 2522, 2523, 2524, 2525, 2526, 2527, 2528, 2529, 2530, 2531, 2532, 2533, 2534, 2535, 2536, 2537, 2538, 2539, 2540, 2541, 2542, 2543, 2544, 2545, 2546, 2547, 2548, 2549, 2550, 2551, 2552, 2553, 2554, 2555, 2556, 2557, 2558, 2559, 2560, 2561, 2562, 2563, 2564, 2565, 2566, 2567, 2568, 2569, 2570, 2571, 2572, 2573, 2574, 2575, 2576, 2577, 2578, 2579, 2580, 2581, 2582, 2583, 2584, 2585, 2586, 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, 2593, 2594, 2595, 259

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(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz*.—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul Wahhab in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hāfiz Wahba. Reported intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of witnessing his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of his years in the comparatively civilized surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe, in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England.

Abdullah Suleymān, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleymān had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Fayal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including an honorary G.B.E. In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of a Saudi Arabian nobleman. Visited Abyssinia in 1936 on questions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last two years or so he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to be a more active ruler. Much credit is now going up to him for a good reason. He has not only rid the country of the tribes of bandits who he knows. He has also been able to put down the lawless and lawless tribes of the very north. Arabian tribes and their warlike character is not to be underestimated. The British Mission in Iraq, 1942. Visited Abyssinia in September to October 1943. Since his return he has been in the two Amirs, who were with him in 1939 and 1942. With (N. 2), travelled all the way by air. On their return journey, in December 1943, visited the battlefields in North Africa.

(5) *Khalid ibn 'Abdul-'Asa*.—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faysal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

Mansûr, No. 1 (B), deserves separate notice. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyâdh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyâdh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyâdh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jedda he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jedda and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India, for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother, Muḥammad and Abdullâh Suleman. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for

Talal, No. 1 (18).—One of the King's favorite sons. His mother, I mm Talal, one of the royal concubines, is the King's favourite. Talal went to Egypt in August 1944, on board H. M. S. *Sagitta*, for medical treatment. He was found to be suffering from syphilis, and after not very successful treatment returned by air in October.

No. 28 in 1943 report, *Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman*.—Died July 1943 (see obituary)

(30) 'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahman.—Born about 1894. Described as neat and spruce in appearance and as ambitious in character, so that King keeps him under close supervision. Served as interpreter on H.M.S. *Formosa* on a request in 1926 and H.M.S. *Clematis* with King's younger sons in 1928. He takes a keen interest in agriculture. Accompanied King on pilgrimage and visit to Jerida in 1942 and in 1943.

*Archie Branch. Also Amine

the surname of al-'Arāfa, would appear to be—
 sister Nāra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage. Probably
 the same Sa'ūd al-'Arāfa who was described in a recent report from Kuwait as
 being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Apmān tribe and
 secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ūd. Daughter reported to have married Amir
 Faysal (q.v.) in October 1935.

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor since the King's son Amir Khâlid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sdayri (No. 50 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1928 at the time of the clash between the Ikhwân and the Yemeni pilgrim caravan, the 'Usha, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

Governor of Jeddah until June 1932 when he was appointed Governor of Taif. Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'alla family who were prominent in the Wahhabi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyadh. Was Governor of Taif for about one year. A good reputation there. Was appointed to Jeddah in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qammagani since King Husayn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other sports and afflicted by paralytic in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941 but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.

4. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mus'ad ibn Sulaym ibn Sa'ud

Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hail since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Shuykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwan rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his position. In 1932 he was sent to the head of the Akhwan forces in the Asir area, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hail. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed Inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'udi Iraq frontier in 1935, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hail. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyadh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud.

5. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamud) ibn Zayd

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hail family said to be related to the Beni Rashid. Said to have been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Amman in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'udi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'udi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the terms of the 1926 Convention. Was again a Sa'udi delegate to 'Amman in August 1930 as Sa'udi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier region in January 1931, and has since the 3rd June, 1931, held meetings at long intervals with the British representatives. Personally amiable but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus in succession to Husayn Pasha.

6. 'Abdullah ibn Bishr

A leading figure among the Wahhabi Ulama. Comes from Hail. Qadhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ud, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925 26) as a "beet and wizened little man." Appointed Qadhi of Mecca in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1929 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhabi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejd delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 12 (1)), bent on urging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hail. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwan movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihad at the time of the Ibn Rifada rebellion in 1932.

7. 'Abdullah Kadam

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'udi Inspector of the Tiberia region in 1926. Went to Port Sudan in March 1928 as one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

8. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqil)

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejh by Hamid ibn Rifada. Probably identical with the Ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1932 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Jauf but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Akhwan mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifada.

9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al Fadhl

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.e.* Was formerly a merchant in Jeddah. Described in 1917 as "anti Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "English" in Jeddah. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ud at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ud and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Later, as a Sa'udi delegate at the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, he secured a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ud by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Sulayman by cornering benzine, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or wily course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation, still somewhat of a sheep, but wears his recent dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Acting Viceroy during Faysal's absence in 1930 and again during Faysal's absence in the winter of 1943.

10. 'Abdullah an Nafis

Important as being Ibn Sa'ud's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active seems to be.

11. 'Abdullah ibn Sulayman al Hamdan

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian 'Aneyza origin. Started his career as clerk in the Government office in Bombay. Returned to Nejd about 1910. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qasabis to replace his brother, who had died as a clerk in the King's Diwan. Rose to be head of the Diwan. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1926, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jeddah. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hama, but had his position restored in 1932. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wasir. hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage, and so on. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but full of ideas about development. In recent years has often spent long periods at Jeddah acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs taking turns in that duty with Yusuf Yasin. His relations with His Majesty's Minister improved greatly as contacts increased after the outbreak of war. On all matters he realises more clearly than any other of the King's advisers his country's complete dependence on British aid, has shown himself very reasonable and co-operative.

roughly collected the support of Sa'ud's brother, had been a member of the Egyptian Congress of June 1926. Went to Egypt and perhaps to Transjordan in 1929. Said to have attended Moslem Congress at Jerusalem in December 1931, when persons concerned in Hizb-al-Ahrar seem to have devised a pendant organisation called Jam'at ad Difa lil Hijaz. Was using Aden as base early in 1932, but left in summer. He has since worked mainly in Eritrea. Now excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan. Moved to Aden in 1936 and allowed to stay there. Opened a school, but soon began to send anti-British articles to Egyptian papers. Left for the Upper Yafa' country, where he engaged in anti-British propaganda. Probably financed by the Italians. Arrested in the Hadhramaut in June 1942. Deported and handed over to the Saudi authorities who detained him in Jizan. Attempted to escape early in 1944 but was unsuccessful and has been kept in chains ever since. Otherwise well treated by the local Au.

(4) *M. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in Asir. Reported drowned at Jizan, but report was contradicted later.

(5) *M. 'Ali ibn 'Abdullah*, another brother. Less conspicuous, but also very active. Took a hand in the actual revolt in Asir. Reported drowned at Jizan, but report was contradicted later. He was a member of the family who had a protected passport at Cairo in 1928 on strength of alleged subjection to Sultan of Mokalla. Author of letter from Lahu to Amir Shukir of the 20th February, 1932 which fell into hands of Sa'udi Government and revealed plans of conspirators. Seems to have gone further east, as he arrived at Aden from Singapore early in June 1932. Has since been very mobile, visiting Eritrea, Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan. Was understood in January 1933 to be heading back to Masawa, and perhaps thence to Aden and the Hadhramaut. Made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud after promulgation of amnesty early in 1935. Returned to Sa'udi Arabia that year and in 1936 was appointed Director of Education. Suspected of being involved in the Sherifian plot, 1940-41, but later pardoned by the King.

Other members of the family need not be enumerated. They all seem to be together and to have *attaches* with Hashimites. One, Mas'ud, a ha'ger at 'Ammân, was closely concerned in the Ibn Rifâda affair and was killed with Ibn Rifâda. The family also have *attaches* with the Idrisi, although there is nothing to explain one mention of (3) above as Husayn bin 'Abdullah ad-Dabbâgh al Idrisi.

20. Dawish Family

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Fayal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ud's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyadh in October 1931. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheikh—a kingly man and a king-maker. This gives importance to the family.

(1) *Bandar ibn Fayal ad-Dawish*.—Still a young man. Said to be looked up to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire. He is very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ud as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al Humaydi ibn Fayal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ud at Riyadh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ammân, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait who had befriended them when Fayal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ud in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1933. They included Fayal's mother, who had bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises, a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Shevkh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied, and a daughter, a woman of a respectable form and lineage who had been married to Shevkh Mubarak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Fayal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ud's brother 'Abdullah.

21. Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family

Najdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least by 1900 all the land. The one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original

'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business partners of the British. Family quarrels and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ud. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jeddah and does a tidy trade in grain. Disinherited by his father in 1948 as a result of a quarrel.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahman*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amir Fayal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill health, by Amir Fayal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way, but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Fayal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahman ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm with the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amir Fayal in 1926. Afterwards a partner in the firm who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a Legation there with the Sa'udi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Sulaymân. Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government representative to the California Arabia Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and now Saudi representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Speaks English.

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Sulaymân al-'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais ul-Diwân of the Amir Fayal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Fayal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1931. He is a very capable man, a very good speaker, and a very able time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners.

22. Fahad ibn Zu'ayr

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ud. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. It was reported in the summer of 1932 that he was going to resign himself. The King, protesting complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Fahad could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone first, but revolted and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizan. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunlida in or about June 1933.

23. Fawzan al-Sâhiq

Son of King 'Abdullah in Egypt and consul general in Cairo. Appointed in May 1914, 1919, for the conclusion of the Sa'udi-Egyptian Treaty of May 1938. Previously Sa'udi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqayl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammân. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. By profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ud's agent in Damascus before 1924. Moved in that year to Cairo, where he became Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in 1937. Is described by Sir Walter Smart as a devout Muslim, but a weak character and of a fashionable, polite, but rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Sa'ud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the races in Cairo and Alexandria.

24. *Fa'ud Bey Hamza*

Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Aheh, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'ud was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Aheh in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April May, 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria the Turkish Training College in Beirut and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Beirut. In 1923 he was sent to the Law School, got a Certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine. In 1926 he was sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the 2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Danlūji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928 when Dr. Danlūji was removed. He worked to undermine Danlūji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fa'ud as Under Secretary but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Prefers to call himself in English Deputy Minister. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'udi Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fa'ud and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1933 and 1934. In 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fa'ud Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English well and Turkish, but is hampered by lack of fluency in French. He is devoted to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ud as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Is used by the King as an agent for French, British and American interests. His power varies. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Sulaymān and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahhabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'udi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Likes drafting laws. Would go to great lengths for the cause he has at heart, but is seldom, if ever, dishonest in diplomacy. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. Has been spoken of as anti-British, and as pro-Soviet, probably wrongly. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ud. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built without the help of Ibn Sa'ud, who is said to have contributed £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'udi Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after collapse of France in 1940. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'udi Minister in Ankara where he proceeded in April 1943. It is clear that the King does not want him to return to Sa'udi Arabia, and the great power he once wielded has passed entirely into the hands of his rival, Yusuf Yasin.

He acted as King's representative in the negotiations at mediation between the French and the Syrians and the latter and the Lebanese when on a visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Saudi Arabia in April 1944 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Saud in April and May. He continues to remain with the King, who seems to attach greater importance to his counsels. It was rumoured in July 1944 that he was to be appointed first Saudi Minister in Washington.

25. *Hāfiẓ (Hāfidh) Wahba*

Sa'udi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Lived in Egypt until 1919. Was a member of the Egyptian political party in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul 'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrain at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed some time in the service of the Amir. Became Minister of the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in 1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ud's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ud's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. In 1928 he was sent to the Amir Faysal's court in Baghdad to counteract the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was removed in 1928 but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Religated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ud at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fa'ud Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the Legation in London represented his country at the Hague in 1931. Was long dead in 1931 to a Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for his return. Represented Saudi Arabia at the Congress of the League of Nations in 1938.

Hāfiẓ Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as having accompanied a mission to Egypt. He would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ud, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with the British. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has on occasion been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ud on the lecture platform and in society. Neither a scholar nor a talker, but a good speaker. He abstains from alcohol and tobacco (at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy). Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks moderate English, but is not fluent. A useful servant to the King, whose respect he commands, but not probably his entire confidence. He was on leave in Sa'udi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Kuwait, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'udi Kuwait Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faysal and Khalid on their visit to America and England in the winter of 1943. He returned with them to Saudi Arabia in December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely shocked at stories of general corruption of Saudi officials. The King appeared to consider him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944.

26. *Hamad Sulaymān*

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Sulaymān, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrain and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Haifa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary of the Amir Faysal in 1932. Was in full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khālid al-Qarqanī to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud. They were to be to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'udi mission to the Yemen in

27 *Hands Rev*29. *Seyyed Hamza al Chawth al Madani.*20. *Holmstrom Family.*

April of that year. The following other members of the family deserve mention:—

State prisoner at Riyadh, closely confined.
 of two leaders who in July 1929 visited Kuwait in the hope of enlisting support
 Was ...

30) *Населеніє і Аснуні (от Асунсіоні).*

31 *M. H. Huxford, Victoria*32 *Journal of Maritime Law*

[20955]

1933 was appointed *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Has improved Jedda considerably, is useful in pilgrimage matters, and is helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers. At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, but is not now trusted by the King or the Amir Fayzal in confidential matters.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920 formerly served under Yusuf Yasin in the Political Bureau at Riyadh and has now (May 1943) been appointed first secretary at the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad. Another son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, born about 1923, is a student at the American University of Beirut. A headstrong, he was dismissed in April 1944 as a result of a scandal connected with a slave-girl and his unblushing peculation of Government stores and smuggling.

33 Ibrahim Shakir

Born about 1903 in the Hejaz of Turkish-Syrian parents. Was employed as chief clerk in the Jedda Quarantine Department during the latter part of the 1920s. Next year he was transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture. Has since managed Awayni's piece-goods business in Jedda and acquired a considerable personal fortune in conjunction with Awayni and Najib Salha (q.v.). Visits to Europe for the Amir Fayzal. In 1943 he was charged with the management of Jedda, which he has now (July 1944) let to the United States Legation at an exorbitant rental. Has also built a luxurious villa in Casra. A close friend of Yusuf Yasin.

34 Ismet Din Shawa


Born about 1903 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after the rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ud provided he refrained from political activities. He has been in Sa'udi Arabia ever since and has kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Kharij early in 1944 and in April Director of the Ministry of Agriculture. A sincere nationalist, he is outspoken about his views on Palestine, but is not a trouble-maker. He is a very capable and energetic administrator and a cooperative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'udi officials. Has a son at Victoria College.

35 Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf

Formerly Sa'udi consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jaul to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus. He was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf was engaged during the Great War in buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busy in his post. Was considered by H. M. V. as present consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight. He is of an Arab type with the Sa'udi as a suitable rider for it. The brother Yasin Rawwaf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but has faded out of Sa'udi official life and now lives at Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwaf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Ruahayd Pasha (q.v.) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad. In 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammir. Ceased to be *Chargé d'Affaires* at Bagdad in 1938 when a Saudi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers.

36 Idrisi Family.

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi a native of Fex, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asir, where he acquired land and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisi supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abū 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali. The branch of the family most identified with 'Asir is descended from these two, as appears from the following table, which is not necessarily complete or accurate as regards order of birth.—



The numbered members of this branch deserve further notice.


(1) This Muhammad was a notable man in the 1840s. Born in 1876. Studied in Egypt and at Kufra. Organised opposition to the Turks in 'Asir in and after 1904. Made treaties with His Majesty's Government through the Resident at Aden in 1915 and 1917. Came to terms with Ibn Sa'ud in 1920, when he ceded to him any rights he might have in the country about 'Abha.

(2) Displaced (3) in 1920, after Muhammad's death. Accepted in October 1931 the practical annexation of 'Asir by Ibn Sa'ud, retaining a simulacrum only of quasi-sovereign rights. Joined in the rebellion against Ibn Sa'ud in November 1932, and was captured and executed at Mecca. His efforts to obtain his surrender, Ibn Sa'ud agreed recently that he should remain in the Yemen under the Imam's supervision, and accorded him a pension. Appears to be a man of weak character, very amenable to influence. Was described some years ago as "monkish."

(3) Successor of his father in 1920. Was upheld by the Masmari and other tribes in 1924 against the Sa'udi forces. He was captured in Mecca in 1925, where he was imprisoned temporarily at H. M. V. and was released in 1927. He was displaced by (2) in 1920. Returned to Mecca in August 1926, and seems to have lived mostly there until he was suddenly arrested and deported to Riyadh in the summer of 1932, under suspicion, apparently, of intending a coup in 'Asir. Recently attempted to escape. Was foiled, but did not die, as was rumoured.

(4) and (5) who lived on the 5th April 1932 were very active in organising and conducting the 'Asir revolt of November-December 1932.

The original Ahmed has a numerous posterity through another son, variously called 'Abdul Al or 'Abdul Mutal. His descendants have been principally associated with Dongola, where his tomb is a place of pilgrimage, and with Egypt. The following table shows only those of the branch who have come to notice in connexion with Arabia in recent years:—



(6) Was a trusted British agent during the Great War. Later played a rôle in opposition to his cousin Ali No. 3. Died in Egypt in 1930.

(7) One of the 'Asir delegation which came to Mecca in October 1930 to complete the arrangements for the absorption of 'Asir into Ibn Sa'ud's dominions. Concerned in the rebellion of November-December 1932, and left with No. (9) for Massawa after it collapsed.

(8) Has been politically active for many years. Works normally, it is alleged, in the Italian interest, but played an apparently pro-Sa'udi rôle in 1926-27, at the time of and after the establishment of Ibn Sa'ud's suzerainty over 'Asir. Visited Mecca at least three times from September 1926 to September 1927. Was thought perhaps to aspire himself to the post of ruler of 'Asir. Visited His Majesty's agent and consul in Jeddah on the 15th September, 1927. Mr. Stanohower Bird described him at that time as being the King's unofficial adviser in regard to 'Asir and Yemen. He found him a man of intelligence and broad views—pro-Sa'udi, but not pro-Wahhâbi. Accused by the Sa'udi Government in 1932 of again serving Italian interests, and of being concerned in the political plot behind the 'Asir revolt.

(9) Much concerned in the Asir revolt of November-December 1932. Was at Jizân at the crucial time, and attempted by a letter and a visit to Khamran to get His Majesty's Government to recognise what he represented as the restoration of Idrisi rule. Withdrew early in 1933 to Massawa, with his relative M. Al-'Arabi, No. (7).

All members of the family have the title of Sayyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senûsi, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisîs have also a connexion with the Mirghânî family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

37. Khâlid Al Qarqam (alias Al Hud, al as Abu'l Râhid)

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senûsi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to Abdur-Rahmân 'Azzâm Bey, formerly a desert fighter in the Senûsi cause. Former Egyptian Minister to Iraq and Sa'udi Arabia. Al Qarqam was brought to Ibn Sa'ud's notice, it is said, by Sheikh Hâfiz Wahba, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed to the post of Governor of 'Asir in November 1932, but soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German consul, de Hnass. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with Hamad Suleymân (q.v.) to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ud's Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following month, were sent to Sana'a to mediate between the Idrisi and the Senûsi. Was a Saudi delegate to the Bahrein Transit Dues and Kuwait Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'udi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited) (added in 1939). Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Saudi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of Amir Sa'ud, but later in the year officially appointed to that of Ibn Sa'ud. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war, and returned to Jeddah in 1940. Had an interview with Hitler, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French and perhaps Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by Ibn Sa'ud as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker but can be waspish. Said by some people to be a British but is probably only rather smart, pro-British. Is now in poor health (1943). It was rumoured in July 1944 that he was to be appointed Sa'udi Minister in Angola in place of Fuad Hamza. Speaks fair Turkish.

38. Muḥammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mûdhî

A Nejdî, formerly Governor of Jizân. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of Al Khobar, which post he now holds. A friend of the Qaimmaqam of Jeddah, but without the latter's knowledge of the world outside Arabia. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejdî accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company at Dhahran and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited

Dhahran in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their aircraft force-landed on Tarûf Island in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of Al Qatif, and another brother, 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Mûdhî, is Governor of Dhîba.

39. Mûdhî Bey

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An Iraqi, who has, however, lived a while in Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in King Hussein's army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A well-known figure in Mecca, and his influence was felt in the city. He was declared by a competent Indian witness to be the best-organised concern in Sa'udi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to Hnass, he was given by Ibn Sa'ud the title of *al Mûdhî* (The Reformer).

40. 'Abdur Rahmân ibn Mubârak

Governor of Wejḥ. Little known to the Legation, but worth mentioning because of his importance in the post and from the Egyptian and Turkish sides, and because he was one of the leaders of the forces, with advanced base at Dhûla, employed against Ibn Rifâda in 1932. Is possibly a tribal personage rather than an administrative Governor, and may be of the family of Huseyn ibn Mubârak of the Harb tribe, who was a power at Rabigh at the time of the Arab revolt.

41. Muḥammad al Tawîl

A native of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jeddah under King Huseyn. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel Huseyn's abdication and the accession of King 'Alī in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Alī, and was described as being "promoted later in November 1927" after a dispute in a dispute with Ahmed Saqqâf, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jeddah in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the Hizb-al-Ahrâr al Hijâzî but made his peace with Ibn Sa'ud after an absence at Riyâdh, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in Hnass. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appears to have kept up negotiations and dealings in Qusab, corns in the process, but not to have made the Hnass Customs as paying as he liked. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrein, but he fell foul of the California Arabian Standard Oil Company to such an extent that Sayyid Hashim was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. At Tawîl was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed against his will to be Director of the Nejd, Mada, and Transjordan Company. Since 1943 appears to have lived in retirement on his estate in Hnass. The company is now defunct.

42. Mustafa Badruddîn

Director of Customs in Jeddah. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jeddah custom house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at Yanbu'. Transferred to Jeddah in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, but was reported not long ago to be dishonestly honest. If so, he has not seriously infected the custom-house as a whole with this malady. Popularly supposed to be a spy, and certainly officials very wary of him. May have been a spy for the British. Is reputed to be well in with gangs of show-men smuggling goods across the Red Sea. Arrived in May 1944 with a large consignment of goods caught being smuggled out of Jeddah to Egypt. Released shortly after.

43. Ibrahim an-Nashm

Formerly Amir of Janf. Said to be a Nejdî, to have been originally a maker of native foot gear, to have been in Medina while the Hashimites still held it,

approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's treatment and of the policy of the British Government. He came to greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a coup at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he returned to the Hejaz in 1932, arriving at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the onset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Bilal tribe in the Hejaz, but the Governor of Wejh is now Ibn Mubarak (see No. 40). The family have attaches with a section of the Bilal established in Egypt.

48. *Rushdi Mulhan*

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Saudi Government, but no longer occupied post in 1938, though believed to be still connected with the newspaper. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief he is a bold and a bit of a well-read Arab. Literate in Arabic, English, French, good Turkish and some French.

49. *Sâlih ibn Abu Bakr Shâta*

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c. He was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ud. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Fayal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation. At the time the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Fayal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Sâlih Shâta was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 67. Referred to in 1943 as "Second Deputy" of the Advisory Council.

50. *Sdayri Family*

Take their name from the district of Sdayr in Nejd. Are related to Ibn Sa'ud through the fact that his mother was a Sdayri. He has, moreover, taken two wives from the family. Five members of the family have come to notice in recent years, viz. :—

(1) *Abdullah as-Sdayri*, Governor of Tabuk since about the beginning of 1931. Transferred early in 1938 to Medina (see No. 3).

(2) *Tahî as-Sdayri*, Governor of Asir with headquarters at Asha.

(3) *Abdul 'Aziz as-Sdayri*, Governor of Jauf with headquarters at Qariyat. Because of the proximity of his Governorate to Transjordan and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country he is the best known and most important member of the family.

(4) *Muhammad as-Sdayri*, younger brother of (3), Governor of Sakaka.

(5) *Ahmad ibn Turki as-Sdayri*, Governor of Al Qunfida.

51. *Shâ'ibi Family*

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that Ibn 'Uthaybi kept the key also later from the early period. According to tradition there was a break in the chain about the 19th century when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a Shâ'ibi. The late Keeper's phthal appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tanis but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Shâ'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) *Abdullah ash-Shâ'ibi*, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

52. *Sherifian Family*

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Ali, and whole clans known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abû Numei, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important viz.

The Dhâwî Zeyd,

The Dhâwî 'Aun, and
The Dhâwî Bakrakat

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhâwî Zeyd and Dhâwî 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhâwî 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'udi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who have come to notice in recent years. —

(A) *Dhâwî Zeyd*

(1) *'Alli Haydar*.—Formerly resided in Constantinople. Worked in with the Young Turks and was at one time Minister of Anqaf. Appointed Grand Sherif to supersede King Huseyn in or about 1917, but was naturally unable to assume the post. He died in 1926. He was later appointed Governor of Hejaz under Ibn Sa'ud. Moved later that year to Beirut, where he died in 1934. Had several sons, the eldest of whom, Abdul-Majid, is married to a Turkish princess (who is not, however, as stated in the last Persian alities Report, a daughter of the ex-Caliph Abdul Majid), and showed signs of political ambition after the Armistice. One of 'Alli Haydar's wives and the mother of two of his younger sons is of British birth. Yet another son studied at St. Andrew's and had the distinction of acting as best man at the marriage of a Scotch divine at St. Giles's Cathedral. Civilised people, important to keep in mind, though of no obvious political importance at present.

(2) *Ja'far Haydar*, brother of the above. Also lived in Constantinople. If alive, may be identical with the elderly Sherif 'Ali Ja'far who lived at Lahaj in 1932 and was described as a descendant of 'Abdul Mutallib.

(3) *Sharaf Adnân Pasha al Ghâlib as-Zeyd*.—Formerly frequented both Constantinople and the Hejaz. Spoken of in 1925 as a possible ruler of the Hejaz, if Ibn Sa'ud won the war. Elected president of the Moslem Congress at Mecca in June 1926, and was later the vehicle of Ibn Sa'ud's refusal to hold another owing to attitude of the 'Ali brothers. Represented Ibn Sa'ud in 1927 at conference at Jizân to deal with the Red Sea Petroleum Company's concession in the Farsan Islands. Described in 1928 as "grizzled and doddering." Still resides in Mecca, but apparently a back number.

(4) *Shâ'ib al-Dhâwî Zeyd*.—Formerly Sherif of Beirut. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears now (1943) to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(5) *Khâlid*.—A nephew of the 'Ali Ja'far mentioned at (2). Implicated in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud in 1932 and was active in and around Aden. Perhaps the same as Sherif Khâlid Sadiq Adnân.

(B) *Dhâwî 'Aun*

(6) *'Alli ibn 'Abdullah*.—Formerly Grand Sherif. Dismissed by the Turks in 1907. He was later appointed Governor of Hejaz in 1926. Described in June 1932 as an active supporter of the Hizb al-Ahrâr al-Hijazi.

(7) *'Ali ibn Huseyn*.—Ex King of the Hejaz. Succeeded King Huseyn on his abdication in October 1924, but was compelled to abandon untenable position in Jeddah in December 1925. Resided mostly in Bagdad, where he died on the 13th February, 1935.

(8) *Faysal ibn Huseyn*.—King of 'Iraq. Died in 1934 and was succeeded by his son Ghazi.

(9) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—Amir of Transjordan.

(10) *Zayd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900. Formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935.

All these, except perhaps (10), have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nasir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(10a) *'Abdul Hamid Al 'Aun*. Understood to be a grandson of (8). Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ud in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyadh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) *Dhawi Barakat*

(11) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ud and became Amir al-Arbab, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. Recently returned to Mecca from Egypt, but his present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) *Apparently of the Abadila stock though not of the Dhawi 'Aun*

(12) *Shakir ibn Zayd ibn Fawwad*.—Formerly Governor of Taif, a post which seems to have been hereditary in his family. President of the Beduin Control Board in Transjordan and intimately associated with the Amir 'Abdullah, with whom he has thrown in his lot. Died at Amman in December 1934. Was a tenacious enemy of Ibn Sa'ud and much less a play-boy than his master.

(13) *Hamud ibn Zayd*, brother of the preceding.—Probably the same as the *Sayid Hamud* who was in the plot with No. (10a) and was tried off to Riyadh dying, it is said, on the road.

(14) *Sharaf ibn Rajih*, a cousin of (12) and (13).—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tahir ad Dabbagh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'udi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ud.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila*

(15) *'Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansur*.—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harh tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifada affair in 1932.

(16) *'Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi*.—One of the Sherifs of Mada'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifada affair in 1932.

(17) *Muhammad Mohanna*.—One of the Jeddah family, one member of which was Chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jeddah and sent to Riyadh at the time of the Ibn Rifada affair.

(18) and (19) *M 'Ali* and *Muhammad al Bedawi* (a diminutive of Bedawi). Members of a family distantly related to King Huseyn and formerly important in the Juheyra tribe and in the coast towns of the Northern Hejaz. Despite the

similarity of name, they would appear to be two distinct, though closely related persons. Both were mixed up in the Ibn Rifada affair in 1932. M 'Ali became an object of attention in Transjordan and was more or less arrested in July to the displeasure of the Amir. Muhammad seems to have been in trade at Suva and Dhaba and was concerned in attempts to get supplies by sea to Ibn Rifada. It was probably he who was reported killed in the defeat of the rebels.

53. *Suwayt Family*

Leaders in the Dhafir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936.

(1) *Ja'dan*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to King Faysal or to Ibn Sa'ud and too proud to come to terms with either, and

(2) *'Ajami*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ud.

54. *Abu Tuqayq Family*

Formerly chiefs of the Tihama, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweyhat tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhaba. Rafi'a their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafi'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhabis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhaba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ud," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifada in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'udi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifada's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahman ibn Ahmed ibn Rafi'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifada. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left the Hejaz in 1932, and was in Egypt in 1933. May be the person whose exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmud ibn Ahmed ibn Rafi'a*, who rallied to Ibn Rifada early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ud.

View of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ud, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

55. *Turki ibn Madahi*

Was in 1932 Inspector General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ud realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person thus named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul Wahhab Abu Ma'alla and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imam Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imam in 1928. Was in Yemen in 1933, and was in the Sa'udi Government in 1934. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their frontier mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'udi-Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943.

56. *Yahya al Nasri*

Principal quarantine doctor at Jeddah. A Syrian, like most doctors, now employed by the Sa'udi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the Legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ud delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmud Hamdi Hamada.

57. *Yusuf Tamin, Shakh*

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the

Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence of the *Umm al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdī delegate at the Moslem Congress at Taif in 1926. He was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1926, 1927 and 1928. Reported in 1928 to have worked to the detriment of the King. Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fudh al-Haniza early in 1931, and for the Amir Fayṣal and Fuad as well in 1932, but has for some years been principally important as a personal secretary to the King, who made him head of the political section of his diwān in 1930, and whom he always accompanies. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the absences of Fuad al-Haniza, in 1934.

Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Was notorious for his obstructiveness during the Clayton negotiations, and is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers except 'Abdullah.

entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad al-Haniza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of

1941 has lived almost continuously in the Hejaz, spending most of his time in Jeddah. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the Legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Fayṣal being little more than a figure head. He was the negotiator for the 'Adi Arāna of the Sa'ūdī Kuwait Agreements which he signed at Jeddah on the 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the *Umm al-Qura* and drafts official communiques for publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ūd to England for the coronation of King George VI.

remains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Latakia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najīb al-Sāḥā (No. 59) in 1943 and

touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussion between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ūd early in 1944 on the reorganisation of Sa'ūdī finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported 'Abdullah Sulṭān in opposing any proposals for reform. A pompous busybody, his loyalty to the King appears to be genuine though it occasionally serves to hide personal motives. A difficult colleague with the small-mindedness of a Latakian grocer but not unpleasant if taken with a pinch of salt. His English continues to improve, thanks to the successive efforts of legation secretaries.

58. *Muhammad Surur as-Sabbān.*

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbān family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ūd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riwāḍh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed about two years ago to his present post. Is nowadays second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of recently formed Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936

to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and said to be most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surūr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najīb al-Sāḥā (q.v.) has rapidly regained his influence.

59. *'Abdul Kerīm ibn Layl.*

Appointed Governor of Qaṣf in 1934. Nephew of 'Abdul Azīz ibn Zayd (No. 5).

60. *'Abdullah Khawāster.*

Of Nejdī origin. Born about 1887. Intimate of 'Abdullah Sulṭān and Ḥamad Sulṭān with whom he spent many years in Bombay. Head of a section of the Ministry of Finance and may be a coming man. Is spoken of as a rival to Muhammad Surūr (No. 58).

61. *Araf ibn Huseyn.*

Appointed Governor of Najrān and the "territories of Yamā" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Had previously been Governor of Ruṣ.

62. *Ibrahim Shura.*

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Shaykh Ḥafīz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'ūdī Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

63. *Jamāl Ḥaddād al-Muallīm.*

or assistant, in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Born about 1890. Received his education in England. This was his first post in the Hejaz. He was formerly a member of the Arab League. He is a very capable and energetic man, but is somewhat obstructive and has shown himself to be a great obstacle to the negotiations with the Legation.

64. *Admīl al-Qaṣab.*

Born about 1873. Formerly Acting Director of Education in the Hejaz. Later threw in his lot with Ibn Sa'ūd and became at in 1936 during troubles in Palestine on account go between with the Supreme Arab Committee at Haifa. Then charged with communications from the summer of 1936 to the Hejaz, and in 1937 tried to persuade Ibn Sa'ūd to take part in a Moslem conference. In 1942 was bidding for the post of Syrian representative to Sa'ūdī Legation.

65. *Ḥusayn al-Zurākh.*

Syrian journalist. Born about 1886. Editor of *al-Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. He was in the Legation at Haifa in 1934. He was in the Legation there. Counsellor of the legation in 1944. One of Najīb al-Sāḥā's associates.

66. *Muhammad Sāḥib ibn 'Abdullah.*

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was Commandant of the Jeddah garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tāḥir ad-Dabbāgh in anti-Sa'ūdī activities abroad. At Mecca in 1931. He was in the Legation at Haifa in 1934. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tāḥir to Saudi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Aḡāf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity.

81 *Bashir al-Saidani*

A Tripolitan, believed to be related to Khālid al Qatqamī (y r.). Like Khālid, fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ūd as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyadh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyadh in March 1942, nor during his visits to the King in the spring of 1944.

82. Nāgar tōn 'A bhāṣānā tōn Aqil

Director of Finance at Jed'la. A cousin of Ibrahim al-Suwaynan ibn 'Aqil

93. *Suleyman Naisi*

Director of Constabulars. A Nejd, like nearly all the rest of the service friendly and helpful. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz.

Feb 24 before 4:12 the Frozen

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyadh. A Kuwaiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ud, of the Sa'udi army's mechanized transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time a valuable member of the King's private council. He is much in contact with the Amir Mubarrak who frequents the

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(Died since last report—June 1943)

Muhammad ibn 'Abdurrahman No 28 in 1943 report

CHAPTER V. SYRIA AND LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

[E 4229 9154 89]

No. 25

Mr Eden to Sir E Spears (Beirut)

2. 25.4

Foreign Office, 27th July, 1943

With the formation of the French Committee of National Liberation, our relations with the French will shortly enter a new phase, and I think it may be useful if I review the instructions sent to you in my despatch of the 6th February, 1942, on your first appointment as His Majesty's Minister, and redefine in broad outline the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to Syria and the Lebanon, and to the French position in those countries.

2. While the overriding consideration for the period of the war must be the necessities of the war effort, it was laid down in your original instructions that it was not our aim to remove the French from the Levant or to substitute our authority for that of France. The pledges given to General de Gaulle by Mr. Lytelton and reaffirmed by the Prime Minister, that once the essential step of giving independence to Syria and the Lebanon has been taken, France shall retain her pre-eminent position in the Levant, still stand. Our main interest in the political development of the Levant States is, therefore, to ensure that the promise of independence, in which we have associated ourselves with the fighting French, should gradually be fulfilled. While it would be contrary to the general policy of the United Nations to allow a definitive treaty between the parties concerned to be negotiated before the end of the war or to regard the French Committee of Liberation as entitled to conclude such a treaty in the name of France, we should welcome the eventual conclusion of a treaty between France and the two States which would bring the French position in the Levant after the war into line with that which we ourselves hold in Iraq.

3. Broadly speaking, therefore, we are thus entitled to intervene in the Levant on two main grounds. One is to ensure that all measures are taken, whether political, military, or economic, which, for reasons of military security, are considered essential by the Minister of State and the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. The second is to ensure that no action is taken which would imply that the pledges of independence (properly so-called and as distinct from friendly and confidential relations) should be confined to these two points, and the interpretation of these pledges should not be stretched to cover matters which cannot directly affect military security or engage British good faith. We can claim partnership with the French in all matters affecting the war effort, but we do not seek equal status, or claim partnership with them in the Levant. This last principle must determine the attitude we should adopt towards the forthcoming elections. No doubt many or most of the candidates sponsored, however improperly, by the French are sullyways like Mukaddam and it is perhaps inevitable that other and possibly better candidates should be alleged in some quarters, however incorrectly, to have the support of our own local authorities. But we should take steps to combat any suggestion that the election is in any way a trial of strength between the French and

[illegible]

5. It is not possible to have a degree of misgovernment and maladministration in the Levant States, and that in so far as popular discontent might involve local complications affecting military security we cannot divert ourselves of a close concern in all current events. The same

from Algiers, however, it is more than ever necessary that our policy in Syria should be considered in relation, not only to our policy in the Middle East as a whole, but also to the French as a whole. It is essential that our interventions in Levant affairs should be so framed as not to give legitimate grounds to the French, either in the Levant or outside, to consider them to be part of a plan to oust them from the Levant altogether contrary to the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements or to whittle away and encroach upon their position for reasons of our own. The French are all too prone to suspicions of this sort. I shall, therefore, count on you to see that everything is done to allay such suspicion locally so that Levant questions may not undesirably complicate our relations with the French and United States authorities in North Africa.

6. These instructions should be read in conjunction with those contained in my despatch of the 24th February, 1942. I wish in particular to reaffirm that, while the needs of the military situation must remain the dominant responsibility of the British authorities, it is still the policy of His Majesty's Government to foster the independence of the Levant States which we have guaranteed.

As far as possible, within the framework of our essential military requirements, for an increasing share of the internal administration of the Levant States and an increasing responsibility for their own administration to be handed over to them.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Minister of State.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

[E 5185 23 89]

No 26

Record of Conversations with the French Delegation at the Foreign Office, 1st August, 1944

The following were present:

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| The Secretary of State. | M. Massigli (Commissaire for Foreign Affairs). |
| Sir M. Peterson. | M. Outrigog (French Delegation-General, Beirut). |
| Mr. Baxter. | M. Bonard (Commissaire for Foreign Affairs, Beirut). |
| Mr. Channon. | M. Paria (French Delegate in London). |
| | M. Francfort (French Delegation, Beirut). |

General Policy in the Levant States

The Secretary of State, opening the discussion, said he thought that it would be useful at the outset to discuss the broad position in the Levant States. He wished to make it clear that His Majesty's Government had no desire to replace the French in the Levant States. If, as was alleged, our local activities were at variance with this statement, he would be glad to have the evidence for such allegations and to examine it. It seemed to him that French and British interests were parallel in the Levant States. He emphasised that both France and Great Britain were committed to the grant of independence to the Levant States and that it would not under any circumstances be possible to go back to the pre-war position. He asked M. Massigli if he confirmed this general view.

M. Massigli said that everything that had happened since Syria was occupied by the Allies in 1941 had been based on the assumption that independence would be granted. He emphasised that this was still the case.

He recalled, however, that it had always been assumed that the final grant of independence would be confirmed by treaties to be concluded between France and the Levant States. His Majesty's Government had agreed with this view, which found expression in the proclamation of independence in March 1941. In March 1941 General Catroux had suggested that the time had come for the conclusion of treaties, but His Majesty's Government had expressed the view that this should await the end of the war.

Then had come the crisis of November 1943. General Catroux, in transferring the *interêts communs* to the Levant States, had told both the Presidents that this was a *modus vivendi* of a provisional nature only and that a treaty should ultimately be concluded to regularise the position.

M. Massigli concluded that the French Committee of National Liberation were aiming at securing for France a position analogous to that held by Great Britain in Iraq. Never, he emphasised, had they aimed at anything else. But until the position was regularised and the mandate formally terminated (he recognised that the mandate was not at present practically operative) the position would remain provisional.

Sir M. Peterson recalled that in March 1943 the French National Committee was not in the position of a Government which would be able to conclude binding treaties and the Levant States were aware of the position. In reply to a question by the Secretary of State, he confirmed that if there were a Government of France able to conclude such treaties, there would be no further objection on part of His Majesty's Government, but there was understood to be reluctance on the part of the Levant States to conclude such treaties.

M. Massigli said that the situation in the Levant States varied according to the state of Anglo-French relations. If the English and French were agreed on any given subject, matters were very much more simple to deal with. In the last few months, he thought that French relations with the Levant States had got more difficult, but if Anglo-French agreement were to be achieved, the difficulties would disappear.

Spears Mission

M. Massigli explicitly said that what he would now say had nothing to do with any personalities, but he felt that he must refer to the organisation of the Spears Mission. It was natural in 1941, when General Catroux established the authority of the French National Committee, that there should be a British liaison mission to the French. It was also natural, after the proclamation of independence, that His Majesty's Government should establish diplomatic relations with the Levant States. It might have been thought at that moment that the Spears Mission had finished its rôle of liaison with the French authorities. But, on the contrary, it subsisted quite independently of His Majesty's Legation. Political officers were appointed in many parts of the country and little by little an organisation was created parallel to the French delegation with administrative functions. Instead of being a liaison mission to the French, the Spears Mission had become an administrative organism in direct relations with the local Governments. This was true in the economic and military spheres, as well as in the administrative sphere. In the military sphere, for instance, it might have been expected that, as the war progressed, British troops would be reduced. Nevertheless, there were area commanders and a security mission and in short a complete British organisation for what the French authorities had been short-circuited. This was a typical instance of what was going on. Although the subject was known to be under discussion between London and Algiers, some arms had been supplied already for purposes of instruction and in this, as in other matters, the French authorities had been short-circuited.

M. Massigli concluded that a state of affairs had been created in which the British authorities had in fact assumed the rôle of expert adviser which should normally have been held by the French. An impression had got around that the States were being treated if not in fact as a vassal state in a treaty with the French. A whole nexus of Anglo-French misunderstandings had thus been created. He accepted entirely what the Secretary of State said about British intentions, but thought he should know how the French regarded the actual development of events.

Sir M. Peterson said that it was true the Spears Mission was originally accredited to the French and no doubt the present position was rather

confused. But he felt obliged to point out that there were many war-time functions which in practice had to be performed by some organisation or other and that in no country did the diplomatic mission perform all these functions. He wished to emphasise that this was a special organisation for meeting war needs and it would clearly not continue in peace-time. He recalled that many of the economic activities (e.g. the Office des Céréales Panifiables) were exercised in close co-operation and association with the French authorities.

The Secretary of State said that, if he understood the French complaint aright, it might be summed up as saying that the British were carrying out functions which the French would do if the treaty had been concluded between them and the Levant States.

M. Massigli confirmed this. He said that it would have been natural enough if we had put personnel at the French disposal to enable them to perform these functions. But instead of this, the Spears Mission had become completely independent.

M. Massigli recalled the case of the censorship. The British had put in a British censor in Damascus, and the Syrian Government had then eliminated the French censor, saying that he was no longer necessary. He did not contest British good faith; he just wished to draw attention to the result.

The Secretary of State (Foreign Office telegram No. 1143 to Algiers) recalled that the French authorities themselves had made arrangements to hand over press censorship to the Syrian and Lebanese authorities under the transfer powers in December 1948. He recalled that the British censor had only dealt with military censorship, not political censorship.

M. Ostrorog denied that any arrangements had been made to hand over press censorship to the Syrian authorities. He said that the transfer of the 22nd December only applied to certain services and did not constitute a clean sweep of all the administrative powers of the French, nor, indeed, did it put a formal end to the mandate, as was suggested in some local circles. When the Secretary of State enquired whether, if the French censor had stayed, he would have been able to stop Syrian press attacks, M. Ostrorog replied that he would have been able to do so, but that he could not stay because the Syrians had pushed him out.

Sir M. Peterson, referring to the references to the mandate, said that His Majesty's Government took the view that it would be necessary to refer formally to the mandate once more, namely for the purpose of its termination. Formally, the mandate might still be in existence, but it must certainly be regarded as in suspense for all practical purposes.

The Secretary of State agreed with M. Massigli that there should be an examination of the functions of the Spears Mission and suggested that it might be made by Sir M. Peterson and M. Ostrorog, with, of course, the assistance of His Majesty's Minister, Beirut.

General Remarks

M. Massigli, reverting to the question of the gendarmerie, said that if it were possible to agree on certain principles, he thought it would be easier to find a solution for the present difficulties.

Sir M. Peterson said that one consideration which had to be taken into account in dealing with the question was the position of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East. Naturally, whatever was decided in London, we must be careful not to override his authority.

M. Massigli agreed, but said that it might possibly be useful to remind the Commander-in-Chief of certain considerations which should not be lost sight of. He recalled, for instance, that the gendarmerie question fell within the definition of territorial command and was a question which fell primarily to the French to deal with. The British authorities had, however, taken the opposite view. It seemed to him that there were perhaps too many authorities dealing with the question in the Levant States.

Sir M. Peterson said that he thought M. Massigli's view did less than justice to the line which the Secretary of State had taken in the question of the gendarmerie. He recalled that by arrangement between His Majesty's Government and the French Committee of National Liberation, a joint Anglo-French military *ad hoc* committee had been set up in Beirut. The proceedings of the committee had never been very clear to him but, so far as he had been able to understand, the officers who were members of the committee had taken the Commander-in-Chief's views as a military order.

M. Ostrorog said that the position of the French Commander had been very difficult. The course proposed had been contrary to the normal order of things under the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement, since the British were to give arms to the Levant States.

Sir M. Peterson said that the question of the gendarmerie was a very complex one. He recalled that in Serial 2, which had been agreed with the French authorities, it had been recognised that the responsibility of the Levant States. As regards the supply of rifles, Sir M. Peterson pointed out that the French authorities had had their chance and had missed it. That was how the French to participate in the supply of arms. He recalled that the French had agreed to supply 2,000 rifles and a proportion of automatics.

M. Ostrorog said that General Beynet thought there should be no arms. It was undesirable to put those weapons in the hands of the gendarmerie when no one could be quite sure against whom they would be used.

M. Massigli said that General Beynet was sure that at the bottom of all this there was the feeling which the Levant States had that they could play us out. If that feeling was not removed, the present difficulties would disappear. If he might say so, the position was that the Syrians were trying to use the British to turn out the French and then, no doubt, they would try to use someone else to turn out the British.

As for the automatics, M. Massigli pointed out that they might even possibly be used in forceful measures against the French. French forces were very much reduced and the British military authorities in Cairo had in recent months objected to any reinforcements being sent to the Levant States. Even a few sick people from among the French prisoners repatriated from Russia had not been allowed in. He thought there should be an issue of 2,000 rifles and some transport and nothing more.

Sir M. Peterson said that we were trying to help so far as the few sick repatriates were concerned. As regards the others, it had been felt by the British military authorities in the Middle East that a security check on French forces was certainly needed and that this had better be done in North Africa under the close supervision of Algiers.

The Secretary of State, after some further discussion, suggested the following procedure, which was agreed on:—

- M. Massigli was invited to state in writing the principles which he thought should be agreed.
- The question of quantities and types of arms to be supplied to the gendarmerie should, he thought, be discussed on a military level between General Huxley and General Bapst. Sir M. Peterson and M. Ostrorog should, he suggested, be there.
- There should be a discussion of the question of the Spears Mission, at which, of course, Sir E. Spears should be present.

Troupes Spéciales

Sir M. Peterson drew attention to the question of the Troupes Spéciales and said that His Majesty's Government would like to see the negotiations carried forward soon to a successful conclusion.

M. Massigli said that, if the gendarmerie question could be satisfactorily disposed of, the atmosphere for this would no doubt be improved.

The Secretary of State said he would revert to the question later.

Appointment of Syrian Minister in London.

Sir M. Peterson told M. Massigli that the Syrians had asked for the agreement of His Majesty's Government for the appointment of Dr. Kayali as Minister in London. He wished to inform the French of this, as had been done with M. Camille Chamoun had been appointed Lebanese Minister.

M. Massigli said that an application for an agreement for a Syrian Minister in Algiers had also just been presented.

[E 5144 23 89]

No. 27

Mr. Eden to Mr. Mackintosh (Brussels).

No. 138.)

Sir,

Foreign Office 30th August, 1944

ENCLOSE herewith a copy of M. Massigli's note of the 24th August which he communicated to me in response to my suggestion made at our meeting on the 23rd August that he should let me have a statement of the principles which he wished to see established regarding British and French policy in relation to the Levant States (see my despatch No. 131 of the 25th August).

2. I also enclose a copy of my reply to M. Massigli's note. I understand M. Massigli regarded this as satisfactory.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Algiers and to the Resident Minister in the Middle East.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN

Enclosure 1 in No. 27

Note communicated by M. Massigli 24th August, 1944

DES l'arrivée des Forces alliées en Syrie au mois de juin 1941 et l'établissement des autorités de la France Libre, la politique française concernant les Etats du Levant sous mandat français a été clairement définie. Elle est fondée sur deux principes :

1) Indépendance des Etats de Syrie et du Liban.

2) L'indépendance des Etats du Levant mettra fin au régime du mandat.

C'est sur ces deux principes exprimés dans toutes les déclarations du Général de Gaulle que sont basés les accords franco-britanniques qui définissent la position de la France dans les Etats du Levant. Cette position est "prédominante et privilégiée."

Les circonstances n'ont pas permis de négocier jusqu'ici ces traités. Consulté à ce sujet, le Gouvernement britannique a indiqué d'ailleurs qu'il lui paraissait préférable d'attendre la fin des hostilités.

La prolongation de cette situation équivoque où le mandat était suspendu sans être abrogé, a donné lieu à des difficultés diverses qui sont allées croissant. La présence d'autorités britanniques intervenant dans des questions administratives locales sans consultation avec et même à l'insu des autorités administratives françaises a provoqué un trouble dans les esprits. Syriens et Libanais ont vu dans cette situation la preuve d'une opposition franco-britannique et l'ont exploitée.

Le trouble a été aggravé lorsque, tant dans l'ordre politique que sur le plan militaire, se sont produits certains empiètements des autorités britanniques contre lesquels les autorités françaises ont eu à s'élever.

Sur le plan de la politique intérieure des relations directes se sont établies et tendent à se renforcer entre les autorités britanniques et les autorités locales dans des questions qui ne concernent à aucun degré les rapports normaux entre les Gouvernements, ni même les problèmes connexes à l'effort de guerre. Les incidents du 27 avril ont fâcheusement illustré cette situation.

Dans le domaine militaire ces empiètements se sont produits dans des questions qui relèvent expressément de la compétence du commandement territorial réservé au commandement militaire français par les accords Lyttelton-de Gaulle.

Tout se passe comme si, à la suite de l'accord intervenu le 22 décembre 1941 entre le Général Catroux et les Etats, en vue du transfert à ceux-ci de services gérés jusque-là par l'administration française, certaines autorités britanniques avaient estimé que leur Gouvernement considérait désormais l'indépendance des Etats comme pleinement réalisée. Il n'y aurait plus dès lors obligation de mettre fin au mandat et la conclusion d'un traité à cet effet entre la Puissance mandataire et les Etats serait désormais superflue. La France aurait en Syrie et au Levant une situation analogue à celle de toute autre Puissance et non plus une situation prééminente. Dès lors la Grande Bretagne serait libre de pousser ses avantages et de profiter de la situation d'infériorité où les circonstances ont momentanément placé la France.

C'est en partant de cette conception qu'un certain nombre d'initiatives ont été prises, depuis huit mois, qui sont incompatibles avec les accords franco-britanniques et qui portent gravement atteinte à la position prééminente reconnue à la France.

Puisque cette doctrine n'est point celle du Gouvernement britannique, suivant les assurances que le Premier Ministre et le Secrétaire d'Etat aux Affaires étrangères ont bien voulu donner aux mêmes à diverses reprises, et qu'en surplus elle est contraire aux engagements pris par la Grande Bretagne et toujours valables, il y aurait grand intérêt à ce que toutes mesures utiles soient prises pour dissiper toute équivoque, tant aux yeux des autorités locales françaises et britanniques que de l'opinion publique au Levant.

Dans ce sens, il importe :

(a) sur le plan civil que les organismes britanniques, dont les effectifs sont très supérieurs à ce qu'exige la situation, se contentent de l'instruction qui leur serait donnée de ne plus intervenir dans les questions de politique intérieure, quant aux affaires économiques ou autres pouvant intéresser l'effort de guerre, il importe que ces organismes n'y interviennent que dans des conditions qui respectent les droits reconnus aux autorités françaises et, par conséquent, que celles-ci ne soient pas constamment placées devant des faits accomplis.

(b) que, sur le plan militaire, on se revienne à l'application exacte des stipulations de l'accord Lyttelton-de Gaulle, le commandement des opérations demeurant aux autorités militaires britanniques, qui brideraient toute intervention dans les questions relevant du commandement territorial, lequel doit être sans conteste exercé par les autorités militaires françaises.

(c) La sauvegarde de la position reconnue à la France est d'autre part à longue incompatible avec la situation qui lui est faite au point de vue économique. Le Gouvernement français doit participer plus activement aux décisions d'ordre économique à intervenir dans le Levant, il doit donc insister pour être représenté au sein du Middle East Supply Centre.

(d) Enfin, du point de vue de la politique générale, l'affirmation de l'accord de vues maintenant entre le Gouvernement français et le Gouvernement britannique quant à la nécessité de mettre régulièrement fin au mandat est à consacrer l'indépendance déjà reconnue à la Syrie et au Liban par la conclusion entre ces Etats et la France de traités analogues au traité anglo-irakien aurait un effet décisif sur l'attitude des Gouvernements locaux.

24 août 1944

Enclosure 2 in No. 27

Note handed to M. Ostrog, 28th August, 1944.

THE memorandum communicated to Mr. Eden by M. Massigli on the 24th August, 1944, contains certain statements which seem to confirm the view expressed by Mr. Eden that fundamentally French and British interests

in the Levant run parallel and do not conflict. They also note from paragraph 4 of the French note that in the opinion of the French Committee of National Liberation consultation between the French and British authorities on the spot is inadequate in the past, and that a local impression has been created that French and British interests are in opposition there. While making all possible reserves in regard to the assertion that British authorities have wrongly interfered in local administrative questions (see in this connexion paragraphs 3 and 6 below), His Majesty's Government confirm that for their part they are anxious for the closest possible local consultation and co-operation, and that so long as both His Majesty's Government and the French Committee of National Liberation pursue the policy set forth in the first three paragraphs of M. Messig's note there seems to be no reason to fear any serious disagreement.

3. His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot accept the statements in paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 9 of the French note regarding alleged encroachments on the French position. It is normal and indeed inevitable that British representatives in the Levant States should be in close relations with the local Governments. This is especially the case as regards various economic matters (e.g., control of hoarding) in which the efficiency of local administrative controls is of vital importance to the planning of the economy of the whole Middle East in the interests of the common war effort, and also in questions of military co-operation. The Commander in Chief, Middle East, is in practice obliged to take a close concern. It is no part of the policy of His Majesty's Government to supplant French influence in the Levant States, and they do not intend that British influence in regard to the types of questions mentioned above should be in any way used against French interests. In practice, every effort has been made to ensure the closest co-ordination. In economic questions the French authorities are fully represented on the Higher Supply Council and on the various advisory economic boards, and nothing in the organisation set up prevents the French authorities from exercising their influence. As for the military questions mentioned, these conclusions have been fully agreed with the French authorities before any action has been taken with the Levant States. His Majesty's Government believe that the statement of the position in the French note does serious injustice to themselves.

4. With regard to paragraph 8 of the French memorandum, His Majesty's Government are aware that the French contention is that in certain respects British authorities in the Levant States have misinterpreted their policy. His Majesty's Government must, however, reject the quite unwarranted suggestion of that paragraph—that His Majesty's Government might appear to be misrepresenting the degree of independence achieved by the Levant States, in order themselves to profit by France's misfortunes in the present war. His Majesty's Government cannot accept the argument by which this conclusion is reached on the degree of independence which may or may not be held to have been conferred on the Levant States by the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943. Suffice it is to say that His Majesty's Government sincerely and earnestly welcome the progress which has been made towards the conclusion of a practical *modus vivendi*, which it is hoped will place relations between the French and the Levant authorities on a new basis of mutual confidence and ultimately enable the position to be regularised by the free conclusion of treaties. They trust that this will be continued and that outstanding questions such as the future of the Levant States will be the subject of early agreements.

5. Nevertheless His Majesty's Government are not prepared to make it a condition in recommending the French Committee of National Liberation to pursue a policy

of making such agreements with the two States, they do not lose sight of the fact that the appropriate moment in a definitive treaty settlement.

6. As regards the principles mentioned in paragraph 11 of the French note, it will be convenient to deal with them in turn—

(a) As already explained, His Majesty's Government must expressly reserve the right to take such steps as may be necessary in the interests of the war effort in economic questions which are of importance to the war effort. They will be glad to co-operate to the fullest extent possible in the closest association with the French authorities and within the framework of the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943, and in the future to be reached. The French authorities will be fully represented on the Higher Supply Council and on the various advisory economic boards, and nothing in the organisation set up prevents the French authorities from exercising their influence. As for the military questions mentioned, these conclusions have been fully agreed with the French authorities before any action has been taken with the Levant States. His Majesty's Government believe that the statement of the position in the French note does serious injustice to themselves.

(b) His Majesty's Government do not challenge the interest of the French authorities in matters covered by the definition of territorial command in the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement. They freely recognise and confirm the provisions of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements of the 25th July, 1941, and subsequent interpretations agreed between us which continue to govern the relations between the two Governments. His Majesty's Government must ask the French Committee to recognise that while the war lasts the Commander in Chief, Middle East, is entitled and, indeed, obliged to take a close interest in all matters of military importance, especially those of a territorial nature. French territorial command should always be ready to co-operate with the British in the Levant States and in Cairo.

(c) It has been explained why after a most careful and exhaustive enquiry His Majesty's Government regret that they cannot accept the French proposal for membership of the Middle East Supply Centre. Every possible attempt will be made to take account of French interests and special arrangements have been made to the French point of view but they cannot be expressed and carried out both in the Levant States and in Cairo.

(d) His Majesty's Government, so far as they are concerned, would welcome an agreement between France and the Levant States freely to conclude the treaties foreseen in the Declarations of Independence as a convenient method of determining their future relations.

7. His Majesty's Government willingly undertake to give consideration to the French proposal for a *modus vivendi* in the sense of (d) above, as defining their policy in the Levant. At the same time, they are also prepared to consider whether they can do anything, so long as the war lasts, to meet the views expressed on the French side that British organisations within the Levant States are both more numerous and more extensive in their scope than the situation requires.

Foreign Office, 28th August, 1944

B 5415 5178 89]

No 24

Mr Eden to Sir E. Spears (Beirut)

(No. 129.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 1st September, 1944.

ON your forthcoming return to your post after the conversations you have had with myself and my Department in London I think it well to lay down as shortly as possible the lines on which it is now the wish of His Majesty's Government that the Legation and Spears Mission in the Levant should be conducted.

2. In the first place and with the end of the war in view it is most important that our efforts should be used to the fullest possible extent to pave the way for an eventual agreement between the States and the French which will permit

the conduct of their future relations on an ordinary diplomatic basis. I have not been able to convince myself that any less formal agreement than a treaty is likely to attain this object.

You will be aware of the high importance of impressing on the local Governments that the conclusion of an agreement with the French is in our view not only the best but perhaps the sole method of securing full and unchallenged independence. You should also do everything possible to promote the establishment of a practical *modus vivendi* between the States and the French which will pave the way for such treaties.

4. It is not my intention, in addressing this despatch to you, to supersede the previous directives with which you have been furnished on your successive returns to your post. These directives bear on such matters as your day-to-day conduct of affairs with the French and on our general relations with the Levant States. I must, however, add that, as regards the somewhat complex relationship existing between the Spears Mission and His Majesty's Legation, it is my desire that the latter should from now on be brought more and more into the foreground in order that we may be able to pass in the post-war period into a purely diplomatic relationship with the Syrian Government. I shall therefore shortly enter into communication both with the Minister Resident, Cairo, and with yourself in order to ensure that the Spears Mission shall be gradually reduced, whether by absorption into the Legation or, as regards certain of its officers, into the military command or by simple suppression, so that the end of the war will find us in a position to conduct our relations with the Levant States on a basis which is scarcely, if at all, different from that of ordinary diplomacy.

I am, &c

ANTHONY EDEN

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

'E 3087 23 89)

No. 2)

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 116, Syria and the Lebanon, 21st June, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office 7th July)

1. General

The French and Syrians resumed negotiations on the 15th June for the transfer of the Sûreté and the Troupes Spéciales.

As regards the Sûreté, although the French had already accepted Ninth Army Serial 111 (see W.S. No. 106) they persisted in a demand that French nationals recommended by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs should be allowed to enter Syria without visas. The Syrians refused this clause, on the grounds that it would lead to demands for most-favoured-nation treatment on the part of other Powers, and on that note the negotiations broke down. The French asked for a further postponement on the flimsy pretext that they could not continue discussions in the absence of the head of the British Security Mission. After a heated discussion, the Prime Minister declared that if he did not receive a definite statement from the French by the 20th June he would put into operation his own plan for co-operation with the Arabs on matters of military security. He agreed, however, to await the arrival of His Majesty's Minister on that day, and the latter, on seeing the President and Prime Minister, advised them that they should avoid any precipitate action.

A much more serious situation was, however, developing over the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. The French and Syrians had failed to reach agreement over the question of the date on which the transfer should take effect. The French refused to accept any formula based on the final removal of all danger of war from the Levant (see W.S. No. 114), nor would they now agree to the principle of arbitration, which General Beynet had himself suggested at one moment.

A complete deadlock having been reached, the Syrians threatened to break off negotiations and on the 20th the Prime Minister informed His Majesty's Minister that the President intended taking advantage of the fact he was to make the first speech since his illness to representatives from all over Syria in Damascus on the 22nd, to inform them of the breakdown of the negotiations for the transfer of the army owing to French intransigence. He would announce a special meeting of the Syrian Parliament to deal with the situation. It was

clear that this was no idle threat. The temper in the Syrian Cabinet ran very high and it was certain that such a declaration, made by the President through loud-speakers to very large and excitable crowds, would have unpredictable though undoubtedly extremely grave results.

A review of Troupes Spéciales, gendarmerie and Lebanese Forces was held on the 19th June at the Troupes Spéciales and requested the French military authorities to confine them to barracks.

At this point His Majesty's Minister offered to use his influence to bring the two parties together to avert a serious crisis, and General Beynet asked him to negotiate with the Syrians on the basis of a formula for the transfer of the army three months after the armistice with Germany. The reaction of the Syrians to this proposal was unfavourable, but His Majesty's Minister succeeded in persuading the President to refer in amiable terms to the negotiations in his speech. Thanks to this intervention, serious trouble was momentarily averted, and discussions were resumed through His Majesty's Minister on the basis of a new formula for the transfer of the armed forces by stages. His Majesty's Minister was also able to arrange that General Beynet should attend both the ceremony of the President's speech and the review, on the promise he obtained that nothing wounding should be said about France and that everything possible should be done to avoid incidents or hostile demonstrations.

The arming of the Syrian gendarmerie (see W.S. No. 115) has been carried one stage further, the British military authorities having decided that in the interest of military security they shall be equipped forthwith with British material.

The independence of Syria has now been officially recognised by both the Chinese and the Polish Governments.

2. Beirut

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is also president of the Cereals Commission, recently told the press that the Syrian Government intended to make the O.C.P. a purely Syrian service under complete Syrian Government control.

Proposals for modifying the protocol of the 10th March, 1943, upon which the present constitution of the O.C.P. is based, have been drawn up for this purpose. These proposals provide for the nomination by the Syrian Government of all higher O.C.P. officials. The management of the O.C.P., under the supervision of a French co-director and two French and two British inspectors would be appointed. Other personnel would be Syrian or Lebanese.

The proposals have been put before the Lebanese Government, who are discussing the matter with the Syrians.

The proposal in its present form is unacceptable to us. The Syrians have not at present the personnel to run the O.C.P. efficiently, and there is little doubt that had they the power to do so they would hold the Lebanon to ransom.

7. Alaouite Territory

The Mohafetz of Latakia has recommended that Suleiman Marshud (who was a member of the Syrian delegation to the 1943 conference) should be a member of the arbitration agreement (see W.S. No. 115), and the Syrian Government have agreed to this recommendation.

Meanwhile, the situation in the Alaouites is again serious. Villagers are being harassed by the French and the British. The Mohafetz has complained to Damascus that the French, in spite of previous assurances (see W.S. No. 108), are stirring up trouble, and he has again recommended the removal of Capitaine Boussiquet and his secretary. There is undoubtedly much substance in the Mohafetz's contention that the French are stirring up trouble in the Alaouite area, and it is a fact that the latter are unable to make any headway against the French. The British, however, have been successful in their operations in the area, and it is a fact that the latter are unable to make any headway against the British. The British, however, have been successful in their operations in the area, and it is a fact that the latter are unable to make any headway against the British.

11 The Lebanon

The political lull continues and the country is generally quiet. The cases arising out of the incidents of the 27th April have now been transferred to the N. V. court.

On the 15th June in Beirut a protocol was signed between the French and a squadron of armoured cars at the Government's disposal, pending the signature of the definite transfer of the Troupes Spéciales to the State's Government. On the 17th June the President presented the battalion with the Lebanese flag.

E 4050 28 88]

No 30

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, Syria and the Lebanon, No. 117 of 28th June, 1944—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th July.)

THE DEADLOCK in the Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of the Syrian army to the Syrian Government was broken on the 23rd June when the Syrian Minister induced the Syrians on the 23rd June to accept, as a basis for negotiation with the French, the transfer of the Syrian army to the Syrian Government, to be completed before the signature of the armistice with Germany.

General Beynet informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 22nd June that the Syrian Government had accepted the French proposal for the immediate resumption of negotiations. These were resumed on the 25th. On the morning of the 27th the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs sent a message to the Political Officer that agreement had been reached for the transfer of the Syrian army to the Syrian Government. The Syrian Government have been reminded that, whatever protocol is signed, the British military authorities will not be bound by the terms of the Memorandum Serial III. Negotiations for the transfer of the army are still in progress.

The French National Committee have protested in violent terms at the French proposal to equip the gendarmerie (see Weekly Summary No. 116, section 1). Instructions have been sent to Mr. Duff Cooper to inform the Committee of His Majesty's Government's close interest in this problem which is considered to be of concern to the British as well as French authorities.

The Syrian Government have informed His Majesty's Minister that they sent one of their ex-Ministers to Cairo to establish contact with the Soviet Legation in order to discuss the proposal, as conveyed to them by the French, that Soviet diplomatic representatives should be appointed to the Levant States (see Weekly Summary No. 116, paragraph 1). It appears that the Soviet Minister was either unwilling to impart information or was ignorant of any such proposal, and that the Syrian Government have not yet decided whether to accept the French proposal.

Some months ago it became known that the Greek Orthodox Church in the Lebanon had been approached by the French Government in connection with the proposal for the transfer of the Syrian army to the Syrian Government. The proposal was not followed, but only recently General Beynet renewed the French offer of assistance in producing air transport, etc., for the visit if it were decided upon.

The activities of the local Communist parties appear to be strong and are being backed by the Russians. *L'Orient* of the 16th June published an eulogistic article on these parties and invariably gives considerable publicity to their meetings. The Lebanese President has twice recently received Communist leaders, who seem to have taken the opportunity to present their views on the Syrian situation and to suggest that the Syrian Government were approached at the instance of the French.

Syria—Damascus

The ceremony on the 22nd June to celebrate the President's recovery took place without incident. General Beynet was present. There were large crowds to welcome the President and the town was festal. A holiday spirit prevailed for several days.

The President made the following points in his speech:—

With regard to the Sûreté, he said that it was expected that this would be transferred very shortly, perhaps this week.

The transfer of the army had been delayed until now because the Syrians were anxious that it should be a Syrian national army in reality as well as in appearance. It was expected that the transfer would be completed without delay which would meet their desires so that Syrian independence would be complete.

The President alluded to the recent disturbances, characterising the instigators as short sighted and condemning the incident, particularly because it had occurred at a time when all the efforts of the nation must be united and consolidated. He paid a tribute to the way in which the Government had dealt with the situation and stated that he was prepared to crush the movement which had led to the incident with an iron hand. He said he himself was the supreme legal representative of the nation whose full confidence he enjoyed.

Alaouite Territory

When summoned to give evidence before the Court of Arbiters in Lattakia, Suleiman Murshid refused and took refuge in Beirut (see Weekly Summary No. 116). The Syrians having asked the Lebanese to hand him over, an imbroglio then arose between the two Governments. The Lebanese disliked the responsibility of making the arrest, and the Syrians were afraid of offending Lebanese susceptibilities by making it themselves. There was a good deal of hawking, but in the end Suleiman Murshid was brought to Damascus under arrest on Sunday morning, the 25th.

The President of the Chamber raised some objection to a Deputy being placed under arrest but it was pointed out that Parliamentary immunity only covers Deputies while the Chamber is in session.

Suleiman Murshid is now under detention in the gendarmerie barracks in Damascus. The present intention is that he should remain under arrest in Damascus until the Arbitration proceedings have been concluded.

The situation in the Alaouites meanwhile remains serious and the supporters of Murshid continue to offer armed resistance to the gendarmerie. Colonel Oliva Rogot requested an interview with the army commander to discuss the danger to security arising from this situation, but was unable to attend, having been recalled to Damascus on account of the deadlock in the Franco-Syrian negotiations. It was reported that Colonel Gausso, Adjunct for the Alaouites. The army commander explained to Colonel Gausso that the French alone were responsible for the dangerous state of affairs in the Alaouites and that they should therefore, do everything possible to assist the Syrian authorities in dealing with the situation. Colonel Gausso admitted that the French had supported Suleiman Murshid, but maintained that that was now past history. General Holmes pointed out that he had been obliged on frequent occasions to complain of the French policy in the Alaouites to General Catroux, General Mondar, Colonel des Essars and to Colonel Gausso himself. He considered that both Capitaine Boussiquet and his secretary (see Weekly Summary No. 116 of the 21st June) should be removed immediately that a definite assurance should be given to the Syrian Government by the French that Murshid no longer received their support and that there should be no further issue of arms permits in Alaouite territory. Colonel Gausso agreed with regard to the removal of the secretary, subject to the concurrence of the delegation, but said that the removal of Capitaine Boussiquet could not be considered.

Euphrates and Jezireh.

Euphrates—Nothing to report.

Jezireh—Tribal disturbances which are normal in springtime have this year proved to be more serious than in previous years. It is probable that this state of affairs will continue so long as the forces of the Contrôle Bédoon, nominally in Syrian hands, are commanded by French officers. The latter have,

during recent months, shown themselves to be inefficient and dilatory and are believed by the local Syrian authorities to have stirred up tribal warfare. These officers, many of whom were originally clerks in the Délégation Générale, have ample scope for meddling in local disputes concerning the ownership of land, which has increased many times in value. There are indications, though proof is almost impossible to obtain, that French authorities have distributed arms on a small scale to tribal and minority leaders in the Jezireh.

The Lebanon

A number of Members of the Chamber, representing about half the Chamber, visited the President to demand an extraordinary session. They informed him that they had decided to raise the question of confidence. The President agreed to call the session, the opening of which was fixed by decree as the 5th July, and indicated that he intended to resign and reform before that date.

So far the Government have not resigned, though they are expected to do so shortly. The President's intention is understood to be to ask Riad es-Sulh to form a new Government, as he considers that no other suitable Sunni is available. In that event it is thought that Riad es-Sulh would like to recall all the present Ministers except Camille Shamoun, who is due to leave for London in the near future and would be replaced by Hamid Frajich. He wishes, however, in addition to move Adel Ouseyran from the Ministry of Supply, but

from the Government, and there are objections to all other Shia replacements. It is also by no means certain the malcontent Deputies, who claim to be in the majority, would accept any such solution, as at present they are pressing for a complete change of Ministry. Discussions continue.

The appointment of a Mohafex for the Bekaa was at last announced on the 23rd June.

Press and Propaganda.

The Press Syndicate Committee which has been advising the Government on press matters resigned on the 23rd June as a protest against what they describe as the Government's unfair distribution of newspaper, arbitrary suspension of newspapers, over-strict censorship, and failure to suppress worthless newspapers.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda. - No significant change.

E 4178 28 801

No 31

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 118, Syria and the Lebanon, dated 5th July, 1944. - (Received in Foreign Office, 16th July)

General

THE Lebanese Cabinet resigned on the 1st July and, as expected, the President immediately asked Riad es-Sulh to form a new Government, the composition of which was announced late on the 3rd July. The Prime Minister was Riad es-Sulh, and the Ministers were: Riad es-Sulh, Prime Minister; Kamel el-Faraj, Minister of Finance; and Adel Ouseyran has been replaced by a young and unknown Shia from South Lebanon named Mohammed el Fadl. The problem of filling the Ministry of Supply, left vacant by the departure of Adel Ouseyran, was solved by the appointment of Kamel el-Faraj, the most experienced of the Lebanese permanent civil servants, as Director General. The Prime Minister also took the portfolio of the Interior previously held by Camille Shamoun.

It has now been announced that the Chamber will meet on the 8th July, when a vote of confidence in the new Ministry will presumably be moved. The general impression is that the new combination is not so strong as the old and is unlikely to survive beyond the summer, since its composition gives little satisfaction to Deputies' criticisms of former Ministers. The Prime Minister has given many assurances that he intends henceforth to overhaul the Administration and to direct internal affairs with a firm hand.

Little progress has been made in the Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of powers. An agreement having been reached, as reported last week, for the transfer of the Sûreté, the text of a protocol was communicated by the French to the Syrian Government. The Syrian Government, however, did not conform to the Ninth Army Memorandum Serial 111 the French withdrew their agreement and on the 30th June presented to the Syrians a new draft which included almost textually paragraph 7 of Serial 111, which gives both the French and British military authorities the right to arrest and intern. The Syrians refused to accept this, as they are not prepared to give the French the right to

was required, no internment could take place without British knowledge and consent, but they were adamant. Basing themselves on quite recent incidents, they averred that the French would take advantage of any powers given them to carry out arrests as in the past. A complete *impasse* was reached, and the Syrians stated that there was no alternative but for them to form their own Sûreté, which, however, they declared would co-operate in every way with the Allied military authorities.

Meanwhile General Beynet left for Algiers, but M. Chataigneau was given powers to sign any agreement come to on the question of the Sûreté, provided the British military authorities agreed. To break the *impasse*, it was suggested from the British side that the French protocol should not include the article referred to above, but that it should be clearly understood by all concerned that the requirements in the serial were maintained. This would mean, in effect, that the powers claimed by the Army Commander would be maintained, but that the Syrians (who have never been asked to sign receipt of the Serials) would not be required to appose their signature to a document containing a clause unacceptable to them.

British and French liaison officers to the Sûreté have been presented to the Syrian Director General of Police but the Prime Minister has refused to accept the French officer on the grounds that the British officer adequately represents the Army Commander.

Negotiations for the transfer of the *Troupes Spéciales* have been delayed pending the conclusion of an agreement on the Sûreté.

Alaouite Territory.

The recent Syrian Marshal, see Weekly Summary No. 117, was dealing with the arrival of British troops at Slendee, has, at least temporarily, changed the situation in the Alaouite, and Marshid's armed followers are no longer to be seen.

The Court of Arbiters has produced a report, together with certain recommendations, which the Mohafex intends to convey personally to the Prime Minister. It is reported that Marshid was seen to be present at physical torture had been used to extract from the victims blank deeds of transfer, which were then filled in and recorded in the Cadastral Register.

Other dark deeds have been brought to light which, in the opinion of the Mohafex, must lead to Marshid's arraignment before Parliament.

E 4384 28 871

No 32

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 119, Syria and the Lebanon, 12th July, 1944. - (Received in Foreign Office, 24th July)

1 General

The Franco-Syrian negotiations for the transfer of the Sûreté, as reported last week, had once more reached a deadlock when His Majesty's Minister intervened and suggested to both the Syrians and the French that negotiations might be resumed if the article in the draft Protocol concerning internment were omitted, but that it should be clearly understood by all concerned that the

requirements of the Ninth Army Serial were maintained. Negotiations were resumed on this basis, and protocols were signed on the 7th July by M. Chataigneau and the Prime Ministers of Syria and the Lebanon.

The question of the Sûreté would then have been settled satisfactorily had not M. Chataigneau addressed a letter to the Syrian and Lebanese Governments asserting that, in so far as the British authorities maintained reservations in making similar reservations. The Syrians have informed His Majesty's Minister that they cannot accept this statement by the French and will contest once more the right of the French to arrest Syrian citizens, which they claim they did not concede at any time during the negotiations. They explained that they had not attached undue significance to the details of the Serial, believing that it would at all times be possible to come to an understanding with the supreme military authority, since that authority is always fair, and they reaffirm their desire not only not to impede, but to help the war effort. The precise terms of their proposed reply are not known. Meanwhile the negotiations for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales remained at a standstill pending the return of General Beynet, who arrived from Algiers on the 12th July.

The issue of equipment to the gendarmerie has still not taken place. Following the decision that the question should be referred to an Anglo-French Committee, a meeting was held on the 11th July between General Officer Commanding Ninth Army and General Humblot. The army commander informed General Humblot of the Commander-in-Chief's decision and explained the reasons for it. He gave him a list of the items to be issued. After discussion General Humblot stated that he did not question the Commander-in-Chief's decision but requested that various objections should be placed on record. This has been reported to London.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 11th July, when a vote of confidence was passed. The Government obtained and three voted against the Government, one of whom was Joseph Karara, of Zghorta, who has demanded a debate on the disturbances of the 27th April. The trial of twenty persons accused of participation in those disturbances has now been concluded: six of the defendants having been acquitted, seven sentenced to imprisonment or fines and seven to imprisonment *ad hoc*, the heaviest sentence was one of two years. The relatively light nature of the sentences has been attributed in some quarters to a desire on the part of the Government to secure the support, or at least the neutrality, of the Eddé party, to which most of the accused belong, before the vote of confidence was moved in Parliament. A Syrian presidential decree issued during the same week has granted an amnesty to all persons arrested during the recent disturbances in Syria. It has been noticeable that the general reaction in Syria to the change in the Lebanese Government has been slight.

The recent decision of the Lebanese Government to allow the "Parti Populaire Syrien" to resume activities as a political party has given rise to a series of press polemics from the Communist party, which characterises its rivals, somewhat loosely, as "Fascist". The Government has stood to have received protests from all parts of the Levant States, and there is some evidence that the French authorities, who oppose the "Parti Populaire Syrien" on account of its ardent nationalism, are encouraging these protests. A mass meeting of the Communist and Anti Fascist parties was held in Beirut recently, when speeches expressing enthusiasm for the opening of the Second Front and other Allied victories were pronounced. Signs were displayed with the words "Down with Fascism".

The Soviet Minister in Cairo has arrived in Damascus to discuss with the Syrian Government the question of their relations with the Soviet Government (see W S No. 117).

7. Alaouite Territory.

The Alaouite Territory remains quiet. The Mohafez has returned from Damascus after discussion with the Syrian Government. It was decided that Murshid must not be allowed to return to the Alaouites either now or after the war, and that Capitaine Bousquet and his secretary must be removed from the Mohafezat. The Syrian Government, moreover, is to submit a law to Parliament, following a recommendation by the Court of Arbiters, to annul all transfers of land to Murshid or his dependants which have taken place during the past six years.

Colonel Oliva-Roget is reported to have opposed strongly the demand for the removal of Capitaine Bousquet, but the reasons on the Syrian side were incontestable and eventually he agreed to transfer both this officer and his Mess, a recent arrival from North Africa.

9. Tribal.

The terms of the Shammar-Agaidat agreement recently concluded are to be executed within two months. It became clear during the course of the proceedings at Deir ez Zor that it was the policy of certain French elements to use the distrust of Abbad el Hissel and his Agaidat tribesmen to unite them against the Shammar, in the hope of running a conference held under Syrian presidency. Provided, however, it can be shown that the Syrian Government possess enough power to implement their authority, the tribal sheikhs are expected quickly to adopt a more loyal attitude.

11. The Lebanon.

At the opening of the extraordinary session of Parliament on the 11th July a vote of confidence was passed in the new Ministry by a majority of forty-one votes to six (see under "General" above). Among the measures of reform already instituted by the Prime Minister are the closing of a number of gambling houses, the prohibition of the sale of opium, and the prohibition of the sale of alcohol. A debate on the 11th July criticised the financial agreement as being against an opinion that is gaining ground both in the Lebanon and in Syria.

The newly acquired Lebanese battalion of Troupes Spéciales was sent on the morning of the 10th July to reinforce the gendarmerie in a raid on Hecharre, with the object of arresting fifteen inhabitants suspected of complicity in the recent disturbances in that area. The raid was evidently well conducted and, although only six men have so far been arrested, a salutary impression has been made on the villagers.

The Sixth Arab Medical Congress was opened in Beirut on the 8th July, with an attendance of over 500 doctors, representing all the Arab States. A vote of thanks to Spears Clinics and a resolution that their work should be developed and assisted was passed.

The Lebanese Government have informed the French that they propose, as from this year, to break the tradition by which the Lebanese President called on the French Representative on the 14th July. Contrary to past mandatory practice the Lebanese Government offices will be open on that day.

12. Press and Propaganda.

The response to a radio address by the French President on the 10th July was an expression of some disappointment, but became more favourable when it was learnt that the Prime Minister would himself take over the portfolios of Supply and the Interior, upon which the bitterest criticism had been concentrated, and when drastic reforms in internal administration were announced.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda.—Enemy broadcasts have issued pronouncements in favour of the "Parti Populaire Syrien," which is still being attacked in the local press, chiefly by the Communist newspaper *Sa'at-sh Shaab* (see paragraph 1 above).

E 4490 23 891

No 33

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 120. Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, of 10th July, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 28th July)

General

ON the 14th July the French held military reviews in both Syria and the Lebanon in celebration of their National Festival. They did so in spite of requests by the Governments of both States that reviews should not take place, and in disregard of their promise to the Lebanese after the celebrations of St. Joan of Arc's Day that they would never again hold a review on Lebanese soil without first seeking permission of the Government (see Weekly Summary No. 112).

of the 24th May). The two Governments decided, when informed of the French intention, which they considered to be a violation of the independence of their respective States, that they could not be represented at the reviews. In deference to them, a similar decision was taken by the Diplomatic Body and the British military authorities. Both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments have protested to the French. The Syrian and Lebanese Governments as well as the Diplomatic Corps attended the French Délégué's receptions held in the afternoon, and His Majesty's Minister also attended a fête held that evening, at which he was received with military honours.

The Soviet Minister in Cairo, M. Novakov, who arrived in Syria last week (see Weekly Summary No. 119) has transmitted to Moscow on behalf of the Syrian Government a telegram proposing the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. It is expected that a favourable reply may shortly be received. The Lebanese Government have also signified that they would wish to exchange diplomatic missions with the Soviet Government, and M. Novakov is understood

Foreign Ministers had been approached previously by M. Chataigneau regarding the visit of the Soviet representative, but made it clear to him that they were

interest in this matter was due to the fact that the question had been raised with the French Committee of National Liberation by the Soviet representatives in Algiers. The two Ministers are believed to have accepted this statement with some

The discussions of the Anglo-French Military Committee concerning the issue of equipment to the gendarmerie continue. An instruction now received may be regarded as opportune, since, should the local Governments suspect that the French are obstructing the negotiations, serious consequences might arise.

Wheat

Total purchases from the 1944 crop up to the 15th July amounted to 64,000 tons.

The protests of the agriculturists regarding the price paid for wheat, particularly in the Jezireh, where, contrary to expectations, the crop is only mediocre, have increased in volume. A deputation of prominent agriculturists from the Jezireh has been in Damascus and has been granted interviews by the President of the Republic by Jamil Bey Mardem Bey, president of the Cereals Commission. A telegram has been addressed to all the Mohafezes in the country informing them that no changes will be made in the prices already fixed, and telling them that they must give every assistance to the O.C.P. in collecting the quantities due from each village.

Alaouite Territory

The area remains quiet. Suleiman Murshid's eldest son has failed in an attempt to secure the return of his father, who remains under guard in the Omayyad Hotel in Damascus. Murshid's lawyer, Yusef Taia of Hama, attempted to bring a hundred Alaouites to Damascus to demand his release, but the party was successfully headed off before it reached the capital.

Tribes

It is reported that the Bedouin Control which have not yet been overcome. Under the present system, requests for the use of force must be referred by the Mohafez to the Central Government, who must then approach the French Délégué in Damascus. The Military Commander in Deir ez-Zor takes action in anticipation of orders from the French Military Headquarters. This he is frequently obliged to do, and the impression is therefore created among the Bedouin that the French still retain their former responsibility and authority. It is understood that the Prime Minister intends to issue orders that the provincial Bedouin Control officers must now come directly under the orders of the Mohafezes.

The Lebanon

The new Ministry which Riad es-Sulh presented to the Chamber at the extraordinary session on the 11th July gives at least an impression of determination, and the Prime Minister's promises of administrative and fiscal reform have been well received, though it would be unwise to count on their fulfilment.

Lebanese gendarmes, together with British troops, have carried out a search for arms in the North Lebanon villages of Zghorta, Becharré and Elden. Though few weapons were found and many no doubt remain hidden, the moral effect of the search has been satisfactory.

On the 14th July a Lebanese agent employed by the Sûreté, whilst discharging his revolver from the balcony of the port Sûreté office in celebration of the French National Holiday, accidentally wounded a passer-by. The Lebanese authorities arrested him and intend to try him for illegal use of firearms and causing injury. The French have protested strongly on the grounds that the man was one of the employees whom they have the right to retain, for purposes of military security, under the protocol for the transfer of the Sûreté. In subsequent discussions it became clear that the French intended to retain a much larger number of Sûreté agents (about 300) than was considered by the Lebanese to be justifiable for this purpose, and, in any case, it is known that the man now under arrest was not a Sûreté agent. The French determination to pursue the matter, and, indeed, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that the French intend to retain the "Sûreté aux Armées" as a political instrument. The matter will probably be considered by the Franco-British Joint Security Council, and it is understood that, if the French confirm in writing their intention to retain the 300 agents mentioned above, the Lebanese Government will protest.

E 4747 23 89]

No. 34

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 121, Syria and the Lebanon, 20th July, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office 8th August)

1. General

THE Syrian and Lebanese notes of protest couched in similar terms against the French action in holding military parades on the 14th July without obtaining the consent of the two Governments were presented on the 10th July and included in both cases, a further complaint that the French Délégué Général, in continuing to issue arrêtés, even though they only purported to deal with French nationals and protégés, disregarded the sovereign rights of the States.

The Syrian press had in the meantime conducted a violent campaign of criticism against the French not only for their actions on the 14th July, but for the issue of arrêtés, and announced through the local newspapers that the arrêtés issued by the Délégué Général were illegal. A similar announcement was subsequently made in the Lebanon.

The French Advisers to the Syrians have been informed by the Prime Minister that they are servants of the Syrian Government, and must not communicate with the French Délégué on in the course of their work. Offered the choice of conforming or resigning, the advisers all accepted the Prime Minister's ruling.

The Syrian Government have received a telegram from Moscow agreeing to an exchange of diplomatic missions with the Soviet Union, and it is understood that a similar communication may soon be sent to the Lebanese who are soliciting it.

On the 24th July His Majesty's Minister left Beirut for London for consultation.

The destruction of the hashish crop is proceeding satisfactorily.

3. Syria-Damascus

A hardening of the Syrian Government's attitude towards the French, as indicated by the recent press campaign mentioned in paragraph 1, has led to the dismissal of certain officials believed to be too much under French influence, and there have been a number of changes in the judiciary.

9. *Tribal*

A minor dispute between the Feddagha (a subsection of the Shammar of Zor) and the Baggara has been settled satisfactorily by the Mohafez of Euphrates who, in the absence of the Bedouin Control Officer, employed gendarmes to restore order and to arrest Mohammed ibn Tait, chief of the Feddagha, who were the aggressors. The Mohafez has stated to the Political Officer that he considers that he has no need of a Bedouin Control Officer, and that he could keep the Euphrates tribes quiet were he to command a few more gendarmes with proper equipment and the necessary transport.

12. *Press and Propaganda*

The principal development of interest has been the Syrian press campaign (see under "General" above) following the incident of the French military reviews on the 14th July. The press pointed out that the troops employed in the Levant were not the same as those who fought in the West, and that they were in contrast to the spirit of liberty associated with the celebrations.

(E 4967/23 89)

No. 35

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary, No. 122, Syria and the Lebanon, 2nd August, 1944.*—(Received in Foreign Office, 17th August)

1. *General*

M. NOVIKOV, the Soviet Minister in Cairo, has informed both the Syrian and Lebanese Governments that the policy of the U.S.S.R. is favourable to the independence of Syria and Lebanon, and that it is opposed to the policy of French government in colonial territories or to other French imperialistic designs.

The publication in the local press of those parts of the American Republican and Democratic party programmes which advocate the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine has caused the expression of considerable anti-American sentiment. At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber a motion condemning any such policy was carried without a division, and the Syrian Prime Minister when addressing a meeting in Aleppo, stated that the Syrian Government would strive always to ensure that Palestine did not become Jewish.

The French Delegate General arrived in Damascus on the 22nd July to continue discussions for the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales to the Syrian Government. Since, however, the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the President were not in Damascus, and the Prime Minister was unwilling to undertake negotiations alone, General Beynet was obliged to return to Beirut the following day.

A potentially serious dislocation of traffic in North Syria has been brought about by a strike of employees of the D H P. Railway at Aleppo. The cause of the strike, which arises out of the different wages paid to Syrian and Lebanese employees of the company since the recent grant of wage increases by the Lebanese Government, is under investigation. Meanwhile the French Délégation Générale has informed the Mohafez of Aleppo that, unless order is kept by the Syrian Government, they will be forced to take measures for military traffic, and the British military authorities have a railway operating company standing by to take over the line for military purposes if need arises. The Syrian Government and the French Délégation have both declared their determination to do everything in their power to ensure that important military traffic is not interrupted. A novel element in the situation is that the British, French and Syrian authorities, military and civil, are working harmoniously together to the same end.

2. *Wheat*

Total purchases during the period the 16th-27th July amounted to 17,977 tons, a daily average of 1,498 tons.

In South Lebanon purchases are disappointing, and it appears that the estimate made earlier in the year of a 5 to 1 mean yield for the wheat crop in

that area was optimistic. In many cases the wheat harvested will be unacceptable to the O.C.P. on account of the prevalence of "rust," and many farmers may not even have sufficient seed wheat to meet their requirements for this year's sowing.

2. *Syria—Damascus*

With the President of the Republic convalescing in Zebdani and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Sofar recovering, it is said, from an attack of blood pressure brought on by his 20-year-old son's firm intention of marrying a lady ten years his senior, there has been little political activity.

On the 27th July the British military authorities began the delivery of equipment, in the form of boots, to the Syrian gendarmes.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. B. C. Weld Forester assumed charge of the Consulate and Political Office at Damascus on the 27th July.

6. *Jebel Druze*

Consternation was caused by the arrival in the Jebel Druze of a mixed patrol of British other ranks and Syrian gendarmes, under orders of the British military authorities, to locate and destroy hashish. The leading branch of the Atrash family have apparently cultivated hashish on a considerable scale and Soliman Atrash, a member of the Atrash family, and his brother, Hani Atrash, of Gendarmerie (Hani Bek el Atrash) are all implicated. The Mohafez, however, has agreed to co-operate with the British authorities, and it is expected that the destruction of the crop will proceed without opposition.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

Euphrates. Colonel des Essarts, Delegué Adjoint for East Syria gave a reception to French, British and Syrian officers at Deir ez Zor on the 14th July and spoke warmly of France's debt to the British. Had not the British fought alone in 1940, he said, France would not now be in the process of being liberated. He referred also to the part played by the British in the present fighting and said that the French would be able to save their lives. He enjoined everyone to work for good relations. The undoubted sincerity of the speech made a deep impression.

Jezireh. Wajih el Azhari, a Sunni from Lattakia, is designated as Mohafez to the Jezireh.

11. *The Lebanon*

Criticism of the Government has subsided, while public opinion is endeavouring to estimate the ability of the administration to carry out the promised reforms. The almost complete lack of contact between the Government and the French authorities continues, and the Political Officer reports that the Government undoubtedly have a majority both in the Chamber and the country in favour of the attitude they have adopted.

12. *Press and Propaganda*

The Arab press has reacted strongly to the recent announcement of the American Republican and Democratic parties in favour of the unrestricted immigration of Jews into Palestine (see paragraph 1), asserting that the Arabs will defend the cause of Arab Palestine to the last. *El Ayyam* describes the Atlantic Charter as a legend that has been drowned in the sea of Darkness (the Arab name for the Atlantic Ocean).

Enemy Wireless Propaganda.—Axis broadcasts have attacked the French for working against Arab unity and for the re-establishment of their own predominant position in the Levant.

1. General

The recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the Soviet Union implicit in the agreement to the exchange of diplomatic representatives is

The railway strike at Aleppo reported in Weekly Summary No. 122 of the 2nd August ended on the 3rd August when on the D H P, at instance of French Déléga-tion Générale confirming their promise that the workers' wages would be increased, the strikers returned to work, the Syrian Government having in the meantime arrested some 200 strikers who were preventing those willing to return to work to enter the workshops. The settlement provided a welcome if somewhat rare example of cordial co-operation between British, French and Syrian

2. Seed Domains

... Syrian Minister to the Court of St. James (th... known whether he will accept) and it is also rumoured that the... Naim Antaki (Minister for Foreign Affairs in Ata Aynoub's... number) to go to Moscow.

7. Alaska Territory

The Political Officer reports that in reply to the Mohafez's protest over the presence of Senegalese troops at the summer resort of Sienfé (where there is in any case this season an acute shortage of water), the French through their délégué have offered to make a bargain by which if the present peas campaign in Syria is stopped, the troops will be removed. The Political Officer adds that both the Minister of the Interior, who is at present in Lattakia in connexion with this presence of the Senegalese, and the Mohafez are very indignant at such a suggestion.

11 The Lebanon

General Bernet refused to attend the Government lunch given on the 5th August in honour of the Soviet Minister in Cairo. This caused offence to the Government (he was known to have lunched with Eddé on that day) and to M. Novikov who, when invited at a Red Cross Charity Ball next evening to sit at the official table refused to do so on learning that General and Mme Bernet were expected. This incident led to a remonstrance from the Lebanese and to a meeting between the President of the Republic and three of his ministers on the one hand and M. Bart, the French Délégué to the Lebanon on the other, at which each side gave vent to its

12. Press and Propaganda

The Soviet recognition of Lebanese and Syrian independence has filled the columns of local press during the week and has been hailed as the most important event in the history of the States. Some sections of the press emphasise that it shatters any hope the French might have had of re-establishing, with Soviet support, their ascendancy over these countries.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda.—Axis broadcasts state that the Soviet Minister from Cairo is at present engaged in drawing up plans for the establish-

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No. 57

Weekly Political Summary No. 124, Syria and the Lebanon, 16th August, 1944. - (Received in Foreign Office, 28th August)

1 General

THE Syrian Government are showing some anxiety at not having received the arms for the gendarmerie promised to them by the British authorities, and they are apprehensive also on account of the French delay in handing over the Troupes Spéciales.

The Syrian Government have published a *dementi* of the news broadcast by the Near East Broadcasting Station (Sharq al 'Adna) that Nuri Pasha Said and the Syrian Prime Minister had agreed to "a project for the unification of Syria and the Lebanon into a single State and the formation of a Federation consisting of Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine with one Council elected by the States represented in the Federation." A similar denial has been issued by the Lebanese authorities and belatedly by the Iraqis.

At the opening of the Arab Lawyers' Conference by the Syrian President at Damascus the leaders of the Egyptian, Transjordanian, Iraqi, Lebanese and Syrian delegations all spoke in favour of Arab unity and denounced Zionism. The Lebanese Prime Minister, in addressing the conference, emphasised that any project for Arab collaboration must be based on a guarantee of the independence of each individual State.

A keener interest is now being shown by the Syrian Government in local administration. As reported in recent Summaries, the Mohafizes of the Jazireh and of Hama have been dismissed. The Mohafiz of Aleppo has been placed on the retired list for reasons of health.

2 14 heat

Total cereals ~~for~~ ^{from} ~~the~~ ^{the} period the 28th July to the 14th August amounted to 34 074 tons, a daily average of 1,993 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 58,451 tons.

3 Syntak—Diction

See under "General" above

4. *Allyl*

A Government scheme, fostered by the Textile Advisory Board, for the control of the textile industry in partnership with the *Société Syrienne de Filature et Tissage*, supported by local interests.

A strike occurred on the 6th August among textile weavers on account of unemployment caused by a shortage of yarn, but ended on the following day when the Director of Ravitaillement promised to take steps to solve their difficulties.

5 Home and Home

Khaled Baghdadash, secretary of the Syrian Communist party, arrived in Homs during the week and held meetings at which several speeches were made mainly against the "Parti Populaire Syrien." On being informed by the

Mohafez that political meetings were banned in Homs. Baghdadash convoked a meeting of the *Ulema* in Hama. The *Mohafez* then obtained orders from the Central Government for the immediate return of Baghdadash to Damascus. The visit appears to have had no consequences other than a protest from the *Ulema*.

6. *Jebel Druze*.

The head of the gendarmerie at Soueida Hael Bey al-Atrash, is to be replaced by Zeid Bey al-Atrash. It is not known whether this change has been decided upon by the Syrian Government, who may have heard of Hael Bey's recent anti-governmental activities, or whether it is due to the Emir Hussein's known personal liking for Zeid Bey.

The head of the gendarmerie at Soueida by the Syrian Government to make a report on the situation in the *Jebel Druze*. It is stated that he was charged with the additional unofficial mission of endeavouring to bring about a reconciliation between the *Jebel Druze* and the Government.

7. *Alaouite Territory*

Nothing to report.

8. *Euphrates and Jezireh*

Nothing to report.

9. *Tribal*

Nothing to report.

10. *Frontier*

The French *Officier Frontulier* at Jour ash-Shughour near Aleppo has reported that in matters concerning the frontier, he would deal with no one except the *Officier Frontulier* and that, if a Syrian representative is to be present at frontier commission meetings, he must take no part in the proceedings, but act purely as an observer.

11. *The Lebanon*

On the 12th August the French arrested Naim Moghabghab, who wounded a French *Troupe Spéciale* during the riots on the 27th April (see Weekly Summary No. 109, section 1), on a charge of attempted murder. A warrant has been out against Moghabghab since the incident, but he escaped arrest by remaining in the *Jabal Druze*. The *Mohafez* for Foreign Affairs, on learning of the arrest, sent for the French Delegate to the Lebanon and expressed the hope that, as the Lebanese had dealt leniently with the persons they had arrested as a result of the 27th April, the French would follow their example. He suggested that it was in the interests of the French themselves that they should not make a martyr of this man, who was already something of a national figure. The Minister for Foreign Affairs then drew the attention of the delegate to the provocative action of the French authorities in, two days later, sending Senegalese troops to Moghabghab's village "for capture," and said that this was bound to excite the local population. If the French persisted in their intention to keep them there the Lebanese Government would feel compelled to send a force of gendarmerie to prevent violence. The delegate, who appeared to be totally ignorant of the presence of the Senegalese troops, merely replied that he hoped these questions would be settled for the *Jabal Druze* by the end of the week. General Beynet is paying the Lebanese Prime Minister at the end of the week.

12. *Press and Propaganda*

Recent rumours of a project for the unification of Syria and the Lebanon (see paragraph 1, section 1, of the Weekly Summary No. 124) which appears to reflect the local conviction that "Arab union" must be based on respect for the independence and national sovereignty of each Arab State. *Enemy Wireless Propaganda*.—No significant change.

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No 38.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 125, Syria and the Lebanon, 23rd August, 1944. —(Received in Foreign Office, 5th September)

1. *General*

The week has been quiet, the summer heat, the start of Ramadan, and, in Syria, a holiday on the anniversary of the election of the President of the Republic, have all combined to reduce political activity to a minimum.

The Arab Lawyers' Conference, held in Damascus from the 12th-18th August was attended by representatives from the *Jabal Druze* (Palestine) and Egypt. Many of the proceedings were purely political in character and several of the speakers hailed the conference as "the corner stone of Arab unity." The discussions were to be entirely of a professional nature, were opposed to any discussion of Arab unity and threatened to withdraw unless a statement was made by the Prime Minister defining the position of the Lebanon. Accordingly, Riad Sulh made a speech in Beirut in which he declared that the Lebanon was determined to remain independent and, while prepared to co-operate with other Arab States, would only do so as an independent entity and on an equal footing with them.

Two attitudes could be discerned during the discussions, members who were Government officials or those who one day hoped to hold posts stressed the need for each country to achieve separate independence as a preliminary to Arab union—a viewpoint strongly supported by the Egyptian and the Lebanese delegates—while members without responsibility were in favour of immediate union. The *Palestine* delegates pointed out that they could not support the policy of Great Britain, partly because they imagined that it is in the interest of His Majesty's Government's policy in the Middle East to support the Arabs, and partly because they feel that the Jews are now looking towards America. Altogether, less fanaticism against foreigners was expressed than might have been expected. Needless to say, the conference achieved nothing either from the political or juridical point of view.

Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, private secretary to Ibn Saud, paid private visits to Beirut and Damascus, ostensibly for the purpose of reconciling the views of the Syrians and Lebanese on the Arab question with those lately expressed by Ibn Saud.

3. *Syria Damascus*

The anniversary of the election of Shukri Quwatli as President of the Republic was celebrated as a holiday on the 17th August. The President himself returned to Damascus from his summer residence, and diplomatic and consular representatives paid congratulatory calls. The President later gave a reception in the garden of the Chamber of Deputies, to which some 300 Syrian guests were invited.

M Zawadowski presented his letters of credence as Polish Minister to Syria on the 14th August. It is understood that Dr. Kayala, for whom agreement as Syrian Minister to the Court of St. James the Syrian Government has asked will also be the representative to the Polish Government.

4. *Aleppo*

The cotton workers' strike (see Weekly Summary No. 124) ended when the Government proposed that the workers should postpone their attempt to collect income tax on the workers' wages.

5. *Hama and Hama*

After the visit of the head of the Communist party in Syria, Khaled Baghdadash (see Weekly Summary No. 124), opposition meetings were held under the aegis of Sheikh Safa el Sebei. The local Communists, remarking on the fact that the *Mohafez* did not attempt to suppress the meetings, expressed their disapproval of the Republic against the behaviour of the *Mohafez* and police during their leader's visit. Under censorship rules the local police refused to permit the transmission of the telegram.

Some 300 Polish and Rumanian Jewish refugees passed through Hama during the week but there was no evidence of popular agitation against them.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 126, Syria and the Lebanon,
30th August, 1944—(Received in Foreign Office, 11th September)

1 General

The French authorities celebrated with enthusiasm the liberation of Paris. French flags were displayed and distributed in abundance and French military transport used to bring Lebanese to the De Gaulle Général's reception, which was held with some discretion at Aley instead of in Beirut. The Lebanese Government, on British advice, behaved in a friendly manner, calling on the French Delegate General and despatching congratulatory telegrams from the President to Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and General de Gaulle. The Government later gave a garden party for the liberation of Paris, and members of the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, dignitaries, &c., were invited.

The Syrian Government adopted a similar attitude. There was at first some attempt both in Damascus and elsewhere to prevent pro-French sympathisers from displaying their flags, but the Government issued instructions, it is believed on the initiative of Shukri Quwatli, that there must be no interference. As in Beirut, the French, in questionable taste, dropped leaflets over Damascus on the occasion both of the first announcement of the liberation of Paris and the rebirth of French greatness.

Nearly all Syrians expect and desire an Allied victory, many of the Moslem nationalists view with some apprehension the possibility of a strengthening of the French position as a result of the successes in France. On the other hand, the minorities, particularly in Lebanon and Northern Syria, tend to regard the prospect of any lessening of European influence with mixed feelings.

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires went to Damascus on the 23rd and called on the Prime Minister to convey to him the negative reply from His Majesty's Government to the Syrian request that a special delegation should be sent to London, and to give Sandullah Bey assurances from His Majesty's Government that no change in British policy toward Syrian independence was contemplated.

A similar message was conveyed to the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs.

3. Syria-Damascus

A decree has been published granting Adel Bey Azmeh, who in April 1940 was condemned to twenty years' imprisonment for conspiring to overthrow the Council of Directors, and is believed to have taken part in the rising in Iraq whence he fled to Turkey, a pension of £Syr 121 (basic salary) as from the 1st April, 1939. He was also an active fomenter of trouble in Palestine in 1937-38.

There is speculation in high Syrian quarters as to whether the new British army "amenity" building programme in the Mezze and Qatana areas near Damascus indicates a prolonged stay by the British army in Syria, even after the war in Europe is over.

Abdul Monem Bey el Rifai, appointed Consul for Transjordan in Syria and the Lebanon, assumed his functions in Damascus on the 24th August.

6. Jebel Druze

Some friction is reported in the Shrafi at Dera'a, where the French assistant claims that the Syrians have failed to carry out the requirements laid down in the protocol for the checking of passports.

At Dera'a station the Syrian Arab Women's Association were assembled, probably by small boys who frequent the station yards. When approached on the matter, the Syrian Police Commissioner stated that he could not exercise adequate control owing to shortage of personnel.

11. The Lebanon

Camille Shamoun, Lebanese Minister to London, accompanied by his family and his staff left for Egypt en route for his new post on the 27th August.

The Beirut Merchants' Association have finally produced a guarantee for the payment of the sum agreed with the Government compounding arrears of War Profits Tax, and a Bill to promulgate the agreement is being submitted to the Chamber.

has been, and will always be at the root of all our sorrow. We are cured of it. The rivalry between two of our political parties has reached such a stage that a compromise seems no longer possible. What is still worse, each party claims the support of an 'ally' who, they believe, will not fail in time of need.

12. Press and Propaganda

The local Arabic press considers the recent rumours of the preliminary strength of the Arab Union Movement and strong disapproval is expressed of the alleged project to create a Greater Syria destined to become an area of exploitation for the Jews.

The tendency of local French newspapers to over-emphasise the part played by the French in the liberation of Paris has aroused resentment in nationalist circles.

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 127, Syria and the Lebanon,
6th September, 1944—(Received in Foreign Office, 10th September)

1 General

Little to report.

The Persian Delegate in Beirut (who is accredited to the French Delegate-General but not to the Syrian or Lebanese Governments) is reported to have called on the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs recently to deliver a letter from his Government recognising Syrian independence, and it is believed that an exchange of diplomatic representatives may be arranged shortly. The Lebanese Prime Minister has stated that the Persian Delegate has expressed the Persian Government's readiness to accord recognition as soon as a Lebanese delegation visits Tehran. The press in Damascus also reports that Ethiopia has recognised Syrian independence.

Mme. Sheerawi, the Egyptian feminist leader, who has been in these parts, informed a newspaper correspondent that the forthcoming Arab Women's Congress will be held in Cairo, and that the Egyptian women and endeavour by every means available to have these rights recognised in the Arab States. She also stated that the Congress will be arranged to arrange for the representation of Palestine Arab women in the Congress.

2 Economic

The price of gold sovereigns fell during the week to £Syr 41 85; at the close of the market on the 26th August, however, the price had risen to £Syr 43 15, still £Syr 1 50 lower than last week.

Bar gold also fell by approximately £Syr 2 during the week.

Textiles and commodity prices have shown a slight reduction, while food prices are stable.

The Regional Director of the O.C.P. has expressed the view that the wheat situation in the Hama-Hama area has reached a serious condition. They are about 5,000 tons behind schedule, reasons being (1) the war situation, which has led most landowners to risk hoarding to get better prices at the end of the season, and (2) the smuggling of considerable quantities of wheat to the Hama area.

Prices show a downward trend as a result of the war news.

3. Syria-Damascus

The President of the Republic has still not completely recovered. He has to leave Damascus three or four days each week for the transaction of current business.

7 Alawite Territory

It is reported that the celebration of Ramadan has occasioned considerable fanaticism amongst Moslems, and Christians and Alawites have commented upon the lack of consideration shown. They allege that in Hafe Moslems insisted on places at the head of the queues for rations.

The Senegalese Battalion left Sionfé on the 29th August (see Summary No. 123 of the 9th August, item 7). There have been no incidents.

11 The Lebanon

The anniversary of the creation of the Lebanon in 1920 was celebrated on the 1st September, and the President of the Republic gave a reception attended by the Diplomatic and Consular Corps, the British and French army commanders and local notables. Lebanese flags were lavishly displayed, partly as a counter-blast to the display of French flags at the time of the liberation of Paris.

Relations between the Lebanese Government and the French authorities are no better. Riad Bey Sulh, in an interview with the British Political Officer at Beirut, accused the French of systematically encouraging the opponents of the French themselves had made no advances. The Government's position in the

which produced the reshuffle of last July seem likely to come to a head early in the October session of the Chamber. These intrigues are largely due to the personal ambitions of Deputies, but the Government themselves are presenting a target for criticism by their continued failure to tackle the numerous outstanding problems or to show any tangible sign of improving the administration. The Minister of Finance alone amongst his colleagues, is said to be displaying energy in the preparation of new measures of taxation, which, however, have not yet come before the Chamber.

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No. 41

Extract from Weekly Political Summary, No. 123, Syria and the Lebanon, 13th September 1944. — (Received in Foreign Office 29th September)

1 General

His Majesty's Minister returned on the 6th September and since his return has paid calls on the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents and Ministers for Foreign Affairs and on the French Delegate.

On the occasion of the liberation of Brussels the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Syrian Government to the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires in Damascus. Government buildings were beflagged and flood-lit in celebration. In Beirut the Lebanese Government also sent their congratulations and the Minister for Foreign Affairs represented the Government at a Te Deum held under the auspices of the Belgian Chargé d'Affaires and attended by members of the diplomatic corps.

M. Chataignieu, formerly secretary-general at the French Delegation, but there. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs gave a farewell dinner party in his honour.

3. Syria—Damascus

Nassouhi Buxhari, Minister of Defence and Education, tendered his resignation on the 7th September. The consul in Damascus reports that it has not yet been definitely accepted but understands that Mr. Buxhari has refused to withdraw it.

The Council of Ministers is considering the 1945 draft budget in preparation to make provision for an expansion of some £Syr 6 million—an increase of approximately 20 per cent. on this year's budget, but includes provision for the interests of the

The Transjordan consul, who fell ill on his arrival in Damascus on the 29th August, opened the offices of his consulate on the 11th September.

The consul reports that a children's welfare society has been organized to look after vagrant children. The founders of this society include the wives of prominent citizens of Damascus, including Naim Antaki, the ex-Minister for Foreign Affairs and Adnan Atassi.

4 Aleppo

Trouble occurred on the evening of the 5th September when three troupes spéciales were arrested by the police for interfering with a theatre show. Next evening some hundred troupes spéciales beat up eight gendarmes in retaliation and casualties among civilians occurred when the crowd attacked and disarmed a French sentry. French flags (including the flag on the Intendance headquarters) were pulled down along the streets by the mob, and a knife was thrown.

Crowds continued in the streets till late in the night, and damage was done to shops believed to be French. Similar damage was done on the afternoon of the 7th the town was quiet.

The Syrian Minister

arrived in Aleppo on the 7th. The town was quiet, but the Minister of the Interior remained in Damascus. The new Minister, Hassan Charif, who arrived at very short notice in the midst of trouble. The appointment has been generally welcomed.

The French have demanded the presence of Syrian representatives of gendarmerie, at the rehoisting of the flag on the 10th. The Minister of the Interior promised to send a reply from Damascus, to which he returned on the 9th.

5 Jebel Druze

The Administrative Council of the Jebel Druze met on the 7th of September and passed a unanimous vote for the abrogation of the present financial and administrative Statute of Autonomy and the annexation of the Jebel Druze into the Syrian Republic.

This decision was greeted with great enthusiasm in Druze and the notables, including former opponents of the present Mobsaf, called on him to express their delight.

6 Euphrates and Jazirah

The political officer reports that the new Mobsaf is anxious to have Nuri, the son of the Emir Nujum, arrested and tried in the civil courts for the murder of the Emir Mubhim. Nuri, a recipient of the Legion d'Honneur, is a well-known French protégé, lack of support from the Central Government in Damascus, and the defeat of any gendarmerie force he might send against the Emir's notorious machine guns.

The Mobsaf is, however, not prepared to ask the French to carry out the arrest since he is disgusted with the disloyalty shown by the French Beduin Control Officer to his Syrian employers and has left for Damascus to take the matter up with the Syrian Government.

The fact that the crime was carried out with automatic weapons has caused considerable dismay among the semi-sedentaries and in particular among the Waida. The British military representative in East Syria states that the acting French delegate denied that Nuri had any automatics but the fact remains that some of the corpses are reliably reported to have as many as twenty-two bullet holes in them.

9 Tribal

A dispute arose during the past week between the Kikueh and the Baggara tribes. A n.c.o. was sent to restore order and arrange for the stolen animals to be returned to their owners. In the ensuing operations a n.c.o. was

killed while pursuing the goat thieves. Subsequently the gendarmerie intervened and nineteen arrests took place. The consul at Deir-er Zor reports that these arrests have had a salutary effect and is of the opinion that the best solution would be the calling of a Majlis to settle the tribal differences.

The quarrel is apparently due to a land dispute which dates back many years and had its origin when the French, after favouring the nomads, then allocated some villages in their possession to their opponent.

11 *The Lebanon*

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 31st September a number of Deputies criticised the severity of the Government censorship on internal news, and particularly the suppression of all criticism of the Government. The Prime Minister's defence of the Government was not well received, but the matter dropped without a formal debate.

At the same sitting a Bill was passed providing for compulsory increases of between 30 per cent and 12 per cent on the minimum wages of all workers in commerce and industry as calculated on the 1st January 1944. These increases which are substantially larger than those recommended by the Government Committee at present examining labour questions, were imposed by the Legislative Committee of the Chamber on the Government which in its present somewhat insecure position was not disposed to resist.

At a further sitting of the Chamber on the 11th September, a law was passed.

The principal clauses of this modification are those forbidding the formation of any company without the prior assent of the Government and obliging all companies to include at least 30 per cent of Lebanese in their boards of directors.

The arrangement recently arrived at between the Government and the Beirut Merchants' Association in regard to the arrears of War Profits Tax has still not been promulgated. The Financial Committee of the Chamber are not satisfied with the guarantees of payment put forward by the merchants, and the opinion is being once more expressed in many circles that the Government should have obtained a considerably larger sum from the merchants.

General Beynet made another of his flag showing tours this time through the Chouf on the 7th September. It is understood that he again ignored a request from the Lebanese Government that the tour should not be made in view of the danger of incidents. The visit was, however, everywhere ignored by the local population who showed no enthusiasm. The Lebanese Prime Minister made a similar tour of South Lebanon on the 10th September.

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

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No. 42

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th July)

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Beirut 29th June 1944

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of a memorandum on Armenians in the Lebanon.

This paper contains much information which is not otherwise accessible and provides a summary of one of the most intricate and difficult problems of the Levant. I am indebted for the compilation of this information to the staff of His Majesty's Consulate-General and to my press attaché.

I am sending copies of this despatch with enclosure, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East and His Majesty's Ambassador at Ankara.

I have &c

E. I. SPEARS

Enclosure in No. 42

ARMENIANS IN THE LEBANON

I—General Background

Before 1915 the Armenian population of the Lebanon numbered about 100,000, most of whom were artisans and merchants. They had no political rights and the Turks, generally speaking, treated them with tolerance, allowing them to establish schools and churches of their own. Between 1915 and 1921 the community was joined by a number of former exiles attracted by the French promise of sanctuary in Cilicia. Their expectations were disappointed when the French were driven out of Cilicia and an exodus of the Armenians already settled there took place. It is estimated that over 40,000 of these came to the Lebanon where the French acting nominally in the interests of the League of Nations, but motivated perhaps in part by an appreciation of the advantages to be gained by obtaining a Christian minority of this size, made arrangements for their settlement.

2. With the further influx of Armenians from Alexandretta to Turkey in 1937 when almost the entire Armenian population fled to Syria and the Lebanon. According to some sources, the panic which led to this exodus was inspired by the French; it is reasonable to assume, however, that the Armenians, with Turkish persecution still fresh in their minds, would have evacuated the Sandjak in any case.

3. The refugees who came to the Lebanon were settled in two main centres, at Anjar (in the Bekaa), and in the neighbourhood of Tyre. Anti-French Armenians maintain that these two districts, which are highly malarial, were purposely chosen because their inhabitants are predominantly Moslem, the Moslems being thus less likely to be relied upon to support them in any conflict with the often turbulent local population. Complaints are also often heard regarding the primitive nature of the accommodation provided; they have some justification, but it must be admitted that both the Anjar and the Tyre settlements compare very favourably indeed with the extremely unhygienic "tin town" near Beirut river which had been the home of Beirut Armenians since the end of the last war.

II—Armenian Institutions in the Lebanon

(A) The Churches

4. In the absence of any permanent temporal power, Armenians came, through the centuries, to regard their Church as their bastion against foreign invaders and as the custodian of their language and their national traditions. The main preoccupation of the 1921 refugees was, therefore, the establishment in the Lebanon of the Armenian Church and of the schools which it controlled.

5. The Orthodox Gregorian Church is the one to which the majority of Armenians belong. Its primate is the Catholicos of Cilicia, he resides at

of Beirut, where a cathedral has been built, with a school and attached. Next in importance to the Catholics comes the Armenian Archbishop of Beirut, who controls the twenty or so Gregorian churches in the Lebanon and in addition is responsible for liaison with the Lebanese Government. He is assisted by, and responsible to, a communal council which is divided into committees entrusted with the management of lay affairs. The council is elected by the laity, who thus have not only a measure of control over the higher ecclesiastics but also a share in the administration of charitable and educational institutions.

6. The present Catholicos is Karekin Hovsepian, who, owing to his absence in the United States, has not yet been enthroned. His *locum tenens* is an Armenian. The Archbishop of Beirut is Ardayast, a strong-willed prelate who exhibits markedly pro-British tendencies.

7. The Armenian Catholic Church has been established in the Lebanon and most of its members have become assimilated to the surrounding population, have taken Arabic names and only hear Armenian in the Church ritual. In 1921 they gave effective help to all such refugees as were prepared, in return to be converted. They have installed schools and monastic orders, have certain connections with Rome and the Jesuits. It serves as the channel of communication between the French and the Armenians. Their Patriarch is also styled "Catholicos of Cilicia". The present incumbent is Gregory Peter XV Agagianian.

8. The Armenian Protestant Church dates back to the early nineteenth century and owes its existence to the efforts of foreign missionaries. In Beirut, Armenian Protestants, until recently formed part of the Syrian Protestant Church. A considerable increase in their numbers decided them to secede and to possess numerous schools and churches of their own. They are looked down upon by the Gregorians, who regard them as their social inferiors.

B. Political Parties

9. There were no Armenian political parties until the latter half of the nineteenth century. At that time, under the influence of European Liberal movements, a number of secret societies were founded, with headquarters in the various capitals of Europe and underground branches all over Armenia. The principal common aim was the liberation of Armenia.

10. The Tashnags, a group of intellectuals, writers, and social reformers, were founded in 1890. They were the first to demand a day not entirely lost.

11. During the war 1914-18 they organised legions of anti-Turkish volunteers whose task was to hold back the Turks long enough for the Armenian population to take refuge in the Caucasus. In 1917, the strongest party in Armenia, they came forward with a programme of agrarian reform and nationalist self-determination and it was they who dominated politics in the short-lived Armenian Republic of 1918-20. When the British overran their country they were ruthlessly persecuted but those who could make their escape continued their militant and conspiratorial activities abroad.

12. Anti-Russian and anti-Turk as they were, they favoured any foreign power which might be expected to assist them in realising their national aspirations. They pinned their hopes at first on the Allies, but when Hitler came to power and revealed himself as the strongest force against bolshevism they turned pro-German and remained so until 1939. The Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact came as a rude awakening, and the Tashnags, bewildered at finding their would-be protector and one of their principal enemies apparently making common cause, transferred their sympathies to the Western Powers. When Russia was attacked, the Tashnag Central Committee in Cairo resolved to sink their previous differences with the Soviets and to align themselves with the Anglo-Russian Allies. They undertook at the same time to refrain from any act which might embarrass Turkey as long as she remained loyal to her undertakings to Great Britain.

13. By the end of 1941 the hold of the Central Committee over its various sub-committees was weakening, largely as a result of the difficulty of maintaining normal communications with them, but partly owing to their failure to come to terms with the Soviets or to obtain active support from the United Nations. A tendency is noticeable on the part of many of the younger members to look to Russia as their sole protector against Turkey in the future. Nevertheless, the

Tashnags probably constitute the strongest and best disciplined Armenian party in the Lebanon. They publish a newspaper (*Aztag*) and control a high school and a well-organised athletic club (Homenetmen), whose members are subject to rigid discipline.

When the latter was formed large numbers of the Hunchag members went over to the Tashnags and the party slowly disintegrated and ceased to wield any power. It has shown signs of revival during the past two years, but its activities, such as they are, are confined to the Lebanon. Elsewhere it has no importance. Its headquarters is in the United States, where it publishes a journal entitled *Yeridunart Hayastan* (Young Armenia). In this country it publishes a paper called *Ararat*. At one time the Hunchags in this country were closely associated with Armin Madovian, a Russian Communist, who has since quarrelled with them and is definitely pro-Soviet whilst they style themselves intellectual Marxists.

15. The Rahgavar party consists of the wealthier elements of the community. It favours close co-operation with the local Government and is opposed to the extremist parties, whose methods, it feels, might arouse hostility and thus endanger the safety of the whole Armenian community. It controls a newspaper, *Rahgavar*, which is financed by Armenians all over the world. The increase in the numbers of the wealthy and the support it enjoys from the Gregorian Church have given this so-called Conservative party an importance unprecedented in its history.

16. The Armenian Communist party was founded as soon as the refugees arrived in the Levant and remained a separate entity until 1935 when it was affiliated to the Lebanese Communists. An overwhelming majority of the militant Lebanese Communists are Armenians.

17. Although the power of the Communists is on the increase—recent Soviet successes having added considerably to their numbers and prestige—they are not yet strong enough to present their own candidates in elections. Their electoral policy is to give backing to any party except the Tashnags. They have their own newspaper, *Jagorouni Zorn*, and a clandestine press for use in case of emergency.

18. The Chetok party is composed of neutrals who belong to none of the main Armenian political parties. Its members wish Soviet Armenia well, but give their allegiance to the country of their adoption. Their relations with the Lebanese are friendly and enable them, in times of crisis, to act as peacemakers between the local population and the more extremist Armenians. Their candidate in the recent elections, Chaudian, was the only Armenian to be elected in the first ballot.

19. Whilst the ideological differences subsist between the various Armenian parties and are accentuated not a little by the mutual animosity of their leader and newspaper editors, it may be said that on issues of world import Armenian as a whole are of one mind. Thus the great majority—

- (a) hope for an Allied victory,
- (b) are loyal to the country of their adoption,
- (c) nourish fear and hatred of the Turks, this may be said to be the one compelling instinct which dominates, consciously or unconsciously, the mental outlook of every Armenian.

Non-Tashnags have a further bond in their opposition to the Tashnags.

III—Lebanon-Armenian Relations, 1919-45

20. During the Great War Armenians in exile had thrown in their lot with the Allies and the French had formed an Armenian Legion which saw service under General Allenby. After the armistice these levies, many of whom found themselves at the time in Beirut, took steps to secure the release of Armenian girls who had been sold to Moslem harems. The search for the girls was in some instances made an excuse for looting, passions rose on both sides, and in 1919 riots broke out in which a certain number of people lost their lives.

21. A more serious incident occurred in 1926. A Moslem Deputy, fearing the outbreak of an epidemic as a result of the unhygienic conditions in the Armenian settlement within the perimeter of Beirut, made a speech in the Chamber demanding the transfer of the Armenians outside the limits of the city. The press (deliberately or inadvertently) published incorrect versions of the speech stating that the Deputy was a Tashnag and a spokesman of the Armenians from the country. Although this account was subsequently discovered to be false,

the alarm aroused was considerable. Anti-French Armenians believe the French to have been responsible for the incident and to have made use of it as a warning to any Armenian showing an inclination to establish friendly relations with the Moslems.

22. In 1935 appeared a High Commission decree which, for the first time, allowed the Armenian Orthodox two seats in Parliament. The French made sure that both the successful candidates in the 1935 elections were their nominees. One was a Tashnag, the other allegedly a neutral although actually a French tool. Both the members elected were insignificant and their political influence was negligible.

23. Perhaps the most serious crisis in which the Armenians were involved occurred in November 1938, directly after the signature of the draft Franco-Syrian Treaty. Agents provocateurs seized the opportunity afforded by a recent polemic between a Moslem and Maronite newspaper simultaneously to incite the Moslems against the Christians and to encourage the Armenians to believe that they themselves were in danger of a Moslem attack. In the ensuing Christian-Moslem riots Armenians went to the help of the Christians. Their participation in the incident was greatly magnified and for a time very considerable hostile hostility was shown towards them in Moslem circles.

IV—Armenians in the 1943 Elections

24. With the return of the Lebanon to a constitutional life in 1943 it was decided at first to allow the Armenian Orthodox three seats in the Chamber. As a result, however, of the Moslem-Maronite conflict over the allocation of seats, the Armenians were sacrificed and found themselves, as in 1935, with two only. As under Lebanese Electoral Law voting is carried out by lists, each Armenian

has his own list. The following Armenians stood for election—

- (a) A Communist representative, who, however, withdrew before the first ballot in favour of all but the Tashnag candidate.
- (b) Der Kaloustian (Tashnag). He was an officer in the French army during the Vichy regime and has the reputation of being completely loyal to France. His many enemies accuse him of pro-Axis leanings.
- (c) Iskenderian (Munchag). His name figured on the same list as that of Der Kaloustian and he was also a French nominee, although possibly taken to make him more palatable to the Moslems by representing him as hostile to Armenian nationalism.
- (d) Chamlian (Lezok), and
- (e) Miskhan (Raigovar). Both these candidates had the backing of the Communists, of the Church and of all those Armenians who favoured the election of neutral representatives rather than of professional politicians.

25. Armenian Catholics and Protestants were not allowed to stand for election since they were classed under the Electoral Law as forming part of the minorities.

26. In the first ballot Chamlian was returned, whilst Miskhan missed election by five votes. In the second ballot Der Kaloustian, who would certainly not have been elected by the Armenians alone, was returned as a result of the strong support given to him by the French and, according to some sources, of an intervention by the Syrian President. Iskenderian, who was also a French nominee, was assiduously seeking all possible allies in an irredentist campaign against the Turks in the Sandjak.

V—Armenians and the Franco-Lebanese Crisis, November 1943.

27. Der Kaloustian, who was elected to the Chamber, became one of the most unpopular figures of the day. As he was regarded by many as a French tool, much of the indignation which was felt against the Government was visited also upon him. Agents provocateurs exploited this situation in an attempt to incite the Armenians and Lebanese by an intensive propaganda campaign calculated to inspire fear and hatred on both sides.

28. Fortunately for themselves the Armenians were genuinely shocked by the French "Putsch," and many of them took an early opportunity of showing it. The Communists issued an anti-French tract, Armenian women of all parties went in deputations to condole with Ministers' wives on their husbands' arrest and when the Government were released the Armenians took their full share in the rejoicings. Der Kaloustian, whose pro-French conduct was subsequently repudiated by the Tashnag Central Committee in Cairo, was obliged much against his will to join other Armenian notables in congratulating the Government on their release.

VI—The Future of Armenians in the Lebanon

29. At present between 60,000 and 70,000 Armenians are living in the Lebanon. On the whole, they have done well for themselves. They were, of course, assisted by the League of Nations and other organisations, but they are largely justified in their claim that they have risen from the status of refugees to that of citizens chiefly by their own efforts. They are a capable and hard working nation, extremely intelligent and individually ambitious to make good. The two settlements at Anjar and Tyre still exist, but in Beirut the insubstantial town has seen a steady exodus as people have been able to improve their conditions and remove to better quarters. Several of them have made their names in the professional class, in particular as doctors and lawyers, much of the town's trade is now in their hands.

30. The country has lost that aloofness which their outlay by the League of Nations created in them and that, through inter-marriage and common interests, they will eventually surrender their language and traditions and become completely assimilated into the local population. There is no indication, however, that such a movement is in progress or is likely to start in the near future. The concentration of the majority of Armenians in separate settlements, the existence of separate Armenian schools, churches, newspapers, athletic clubs and other institutions, are all calculated to foster their racial spirit. There are consequently few cases of inter-marriage with the local inhabitants, and Armenian and Turkish are the languages generally spoken by Armenians amongst themselves. Moreover, the Armenians, with their ready adoption of Western ideas, undoubtedly feel and evince a certain superiority over the more backward Lebanese.

31. The Armenians are not, however, potential enemies in the event of a major communal conflict. Meanwhile the Lebanese appear to be satisfied, despite Der Kaloustian's attitude, with the behaviour of the Armenians as a whole and there is no sign of any real desire to get rid of them.

32. Armenians are not for all their recent wanderings, a nomadic race and their principal aim is to find security and a permanent resting-place. They do not, however, appear to look forward with great enthusiasm to an indefinite stay in the Lebanon. They may be exposed, with other Christian elements, to persecution at the hands of the Moslems. A number would gladly emigrate to the United States or to the British Empire, and even more, in the heat of their present enthusiasm for Russia, would, if offered reasonable chances of work and security, remove to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic. In the meantime, they may be expected to stand aside from all major political issues and so avoid drawing unnecessary attention to themselves.

File Number.

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TREATY.

CONFIDENTIAL

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Further Correspondence

respecting

EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 59

October to December 1944

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| No and Name | Date | SUBJECT | Page |
|---|---------|---|------|
| Chapter I.--IRAQ | | | |
| 1 Mr Thompson
(Bagdad)
No. 543, Tel. | | | |
| 2 Mr Thompson
No. 557, Tel. | | Conversation with the Acting Prime Minister His powers | |
| 3 Mr Thompson
No. 769, Tel. | | Mullah Mustafa, and his proposed agreement for the district | |
| 4 Sir K. Carnwell
(Bagdad)
No. 576. | Sept 29 | Situation in Kurdistan
must decide to drop maps to deal with the situation
at that nothing must be done without Mullah Mustafa's approval | |
| 5 Sir K. Carnwell
No. 510. | | | |
| Chapter II. --PALESTINE | | | |
| 6 Sir K. Carnwell
(Washington)
No. 5509, Tel. | Oct 16 | Palestine and the Jews
Text of letter from President Roosevelt to Senator Wagner regarding the Democratic party resolution in favour of the opening of Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and | |
| 7 Mr. J. J. J. J.
No. 497, Tel. | 21 | Palestine and the Arabs
Translation of message from Ibn Saud to Mr Eden requesting the views of His Majesty's Government on the Arab reply to the proposals regarding Palestine, and the attitude to be adopted by the Saudi delegates | |
| 8 No. 397, Tel. | | Palestine and the Arabs
Instructions to His Majesty's Minister regarding the reply to be returned to Ibn Saud's message to Mr Eden | |
| Chapter III. PERSIA | | | |
| (A) Miscellaneous | | | |
| 9 | Sept 21 | Soviet policy in Persia
Soviet campaign for the acquisition of oil concessions in Persia. General Soviet policy in Persia, leading to a political crisis in that country | |
| 10 Telegraphic exchanges
intelligence with
presentations at
Tehran, Wash-
ington and Mos- | Nov 20 | Political crisis in Persia
Resignation of the Persian Prime Minister as the result of Soviet pressure and subsequent events. The oil question | |

TABLE OF CONTENTS

iii

| No and Name | Date | SUBJECT | Page |
|--|---------|--|------|
| 11 | Nov 21 | Soviet policy in Persia | 16 |
| 12 | Dec 20 | Policy of the new Persian Government
Passing of a law by the Persian Government
Soviet activities in Persia | 17 |
| 13 Mr. L. L. L.
(Tehran)
No. 723, Tel. | July 27 | Fifth edition of report on Persian Government's communication which describes the part of Kachuk and Naubakht of fifth edition | 18 |
| 14 Mr. L. L. L.
No. 34, Bagdad
Tel. | | | 19 |
| 15 Sir H. B. B.
No. 401 | | | 20 |
| 16 Sir H. B. B.
No. 410 | | | 21 |
| 17 Sir H. B. B.
No. 1199, Tel. | | | 22 |
| 18 To Sir H. B. B.
No. 554, Tel. | | Question of the closure of the | 23 |
| (B) Tehran Intelligence Summaries | | | |
| 19 No. 3 | Sept 25 | Situation in Persia | 24 |
| 20 No. 384 | | Summary of Intelligence
Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary for the week ending the 1st October 1944 | 25 |
| 21 No. 399 | | Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 39 for the week ending the 15th October 1944 | 26 |
| 22 No. 405 | | Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the week ending the 29th October 1944 | 27 |
| 23 No. 419 | | Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the week ending the 12th November 1944 | 28 |
| 24 No. 430 | | Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 42 for the week ending the 26th November 1944 | 29 |
| 25 Sir H. B. B.
No. 439 | | Situation in Persia
Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the week ending the 10th November 1944 | 30 |
| 26 Sir H. B. B.
No. 447 | | Situation in Persia
Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44 for the week ending the 24th November 1944 | 31 |

CONFIDENTIAL

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
EASTERN AFFAIRS

PART 59.—OCTOBER TO DECEMBER 1944.

CHAPTER I.—IRAQ.

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No 1

Mr. Thompson to Mr. Eden.—(Received 2nd August)

(No 449)

(Telegraphic)

Baghdad 2nd August, 1944

MY telegram No 424

Minister for Foreign Affairs sent for me this morning to discuss the situation

of Iraq. He said that he was very anxious to avoid any possibility of serious trouble not later than the autumn, and that what was being planned was a general move embracing not only Kurdish tribesmen in Iraq but also those in Persia and Turkey. Reports he had lately received from Tabriz show clearly that Russia had a hand in all this and while he did not suggest Soviet agents were active in Barzan area he had good reason to suspect the emissaries from Mullah Mustafa had been sent across the border to contact subversive elements in Persia. I think that there may well be some substance in this contention, two Kurdish "liaison officers" having lately vanished across the border.

2. Proceeding, Minister for Foreign Affairs said if any widespread uprising occurred, the Turks certainly would not remain idle (however powerless Persia—because of the Russians) and Iraqis (because of their military weakness) might be. This might lead to a Turkish incursion into Iraqi territory for the purpose of "restoring order". In all these circumstances and also because he felt it intolerable that Mullah Mustafa should deliberately flout the friendliness of the present Administration, he felt some action should be taken soon to restore the situation before it got worse.

3. I replied that facts must be faced. Although I had personally reached the conclusion that Mullah Mustafa was now in a mood very similar to that which had inspired Hitler after Munich, head of British Military Mission and all others who knew the truth were convinced that Iraqi army was in no condition to interfere except with the certainty of disaster. It was mainly for this reason that I had urged the Regent yesterday to take seriously Major Kinch's advice about the evacuation of the affected area, which could, if necessary, be sealed off and isolated economically. At the same time, the Iraqi Government should give immediate effect to General Renton's recommendations for reorganisation and training of the army, with particular reference to the formation of a mountain division capable of effective use, without further spreading if circumstances so dictated.

4. When the Minister for Foreign Affairs hinted that His Majesty's Government might possibly help if only with a few aircraft I made it absolutely plain that there could be no question of any such participation on our part. We had quite enough on our hands at the moment and had neither men nor equipment to spare for adventures in Kurdistan. I concluded by intimating that the Cabinet

certain public work that was being carried out at Shirwana Mazra, and would I instruct Colonel Lyon to use his influence to put an end to this nuisance! It also came to my knowledge that the Minister was toying with the idea of despatching troops to deal with the situation. On investigation, it transpired where an agent of Mulla Mustafa was obstructing the rebuilding of the police post. I thereupon sent a firmly worded message to Mulla Mustafa, a copy of which is enclosed, together with a translation of his earlier communication above mentioned.

3. The use of troops to cope with this minor affair could only have led to undesirable complications, more especially since there has naturally not yet been time to get them fit for even so minor an undertaking as the one envisaged by the Minister of the Interior. Indeed, both General Sir Arthur Smith and General Renton have impressed upon me the folly of any such move from the military point of view. I therefore told the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs (the Minister of Justice) that the situation did not seem to me to justify any precipitate action. His Excellency replied that there had been no Cabinet decision to use force, and while he was speaking I learnt by telephone from Mr. Edmonds that the Minister of the Interior had, on his own initiative, given orders for a brigade of the Southern Division to stand by. I reminded the Minister that the war was not yet over and that we were not prepared to contemplate the possibility of diverting men and equipment to rescue the Iraqi army from the difficulties in which they would inevitably become entangled if thrown into any adventure in their present untrained condition. I therefore expected the Iraqi Government, as Allies, to give me full warning of any intention to embark on operations and to consult me before coming to any decision. It was, I added, obviously to the advantage of the Iraqi Government to work in close harmony with ourselves in such matters, since it was our policy to uphold ordered government in this country. He no doubt realised how much the General Officer Commanding in Chief and the British Military Mission were helping forward the reorganisation of the Iraqi army. I concluded by emphasising that the Administration would have no right to look to me for

4. Although the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed his general to the Minister of the Interior, I found the latter in a difficult mood when he called upon me yesterday. While pleased with the tone and content of my reply to Mulla Mustafa, and although he admitted the necessity to investigate the facts of the recent incident at Mazra, his Excellency indicated his belief that then expatiated on the "intolerable" insults to which the Government were being subjected and on the necessity for maintaining their prestige, and so on. He had conferred with the Acting Prime Minister (Saleh Jaher) and the Iraqi present time, there was no reason why a "defensive force" should not be stationed at Mazra while building was in progress (although, in point of fact, such work is probably out of the question once winter sets in), and he spoke of sending a brigade from Diwaniyah. I answered that I thought it extremely unlikely either the General Officer Commanding in Chief or General Renton would see any merit in this idea. I then went over once more in great detail the ground I had already covered with his colleague of foreign affairs, warning him particularly of the consequences of going ahead in defiance of our agreement. The Minister did not take very kindly to what I said, but we agreed that there must be full Anglo-Iraqi consultation. The truth is that he is—not entirely without excuse—rabid about Mulla Mustafa and anxious and primitive individual. The Minister of the Interior is, indeed, a prey to rather dangerous wishful thinking, and in the absence of the Regent, the Iraqi Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Alexandria, seems inclined to take the bit between his teeth.

5. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding in Chief, Persia Iraq Force, and General Renton.

I have, &c.
KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

(Translation.)

Sir E. Cornwallis to Mulla Mustafa (Barzan)

Bagdad, 27th September 1944

After compliments,

I HAVE received your letter of the 16th September in which you say that you are in need of more help from the Government.

Already you have been given ninety tons of grain from Mergasur and to-day I have sent you another ninety tons. I am sure that you will be able to get the officials of the Government they will co-operate with you.

You should keep in touch with them and explain exactly what help you need, because you and your people must make a special effort to plough and sow as much as possible this autumn and winter so that you will all have food next year.

I have heard that some of your tribesmen have been interfering with Government building work at Mazra. You should not let this sort of thing happen. It causes serious misunderstandings and is most harmful to your own interests. Remember that you and your tribesmen are dependent on the help of the Government to obtain many of the things you need and that this help will only be given to you if you are obedient to the Government and maintain good relations with their officials.

I have, &c.
KINAHAN CORNWALLIS
His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

(Translation.)

Mulla Mustafa to Sir E. Cornwallis

Barzan, 16th September, 1944

After compliments,

YOU ordered me to keep quiet and I have done so and obeyed your orders. The time for working in the fields has nearly passed and we are in the direst need of the Government's help in every way.

We therefore beg your Excellency to respond to our appeal without delay so that the last opportunity to sow our fields may not escape us, otherwise we shall not be able to live in this area but be obliged to go elsewhere and some of our people will be driven to cross the frontier and commit robbery.

I lay our case before your Excellency and beg leave to invoke your kind help. May God grant victory to the British army.

I have, &c.
(Signed) MULLA MUSTAFA AL BARZANI

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No. 5.

Sir E. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th November.)

(No. 510)

Sir,

Bagdad, 31st October, 1944.

I HAVE the honour to submit, with reference to Mr. Thompson's despatch No. 332 of the 14th August, the following report on the main events that have occurred in this country since that date. Mr. Thompson was in charge of this mission until my return from leave on the 20th September.

2. During the last week in August the continued opposition of Tahir Ali finally resulted in the resignation of the Cabinet. The Regent at once asked Hashim al Pachachi to form a new administration. He did so without difficulty, bringing all his old colleagues except Tahir Ali. To fill the gap left by the latter's departure, Arshad al Umari took over Defence in addition to Foreign

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Affairs, Salih Jabr added the portfolio of Supply to that of Finance, and Abdul Amir al Uzri returned to Communications and Works. There was no change in the Cabinet's policy.

3. On the 18th August sentence was somewhat unexpectedly passed on six more of Rashid Ali's coadjutors in his *coup d'Etat* in 1941. Kamil Shabib, one of the four senior Iraqi army officers once known as the Golden Square, was treated in the same way as his two colleagues Fahmi Said and Mahmoud Salman, who were sent to the gallows in May 1942. Only one of the four, Salah ad Din Sabagh, now survives as a fugitive in Turkey. Muhammad Ali Mahmoud and Misa Shabbandar, both Ministers in Rashid Ali's Cabinet, were sentenced to five years' imprisonment, Sharif Sharaf, the usurper Regent, and Rauf Bahran, years respectively and the property of all up to a total of ID1,602,436 was confiscated to the State as a contribution to the damage which these people had caused to the State. Abdul Qadir Ghalani, a Court official accused of having insulted the Queen Mother, was sentenced to three months' imprisonment. The sentences evoked little or no public interest.

4. On the occasion of the 'Id al Fitr holiday, eight of the internees sent back from Southern Rhodesia were released. They were men of no consequence except for Abdul Qadir Ghalani. He has served his sentence in addition to his period of internment in Southern Rhodesia and is not the sort of individual to be one politically dangerous in present circumstances.

5. In late August the Minister of the Interior released nineteen further internees from Amara and four more were set free with the Rhodesian detainees mentioned above. His list was based on the recommendations of the "Edmonds" Committee and the few additions which he had made included no men likely to cause mischief under existing conditions. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that many of them have undergone a change of heart and the tougher men will probably have emerged from their internment more embittered and fanatical than they were before they suffered this unpleasant experience. It is to be expected, therefore, that so soon as war time restraints are relaxed many of them will again become actively antagonistic towards Great Britain and to the special relations of His Majesty's Government with the Iraqi Government. There are at the time of writing some 130 persons yet incarcerated in the Amara concentration camp of whom the release of yet another nineteen is at present under consideration. As is the case in the United Kingdom, the records of political prisoners are periodically reviewed and it must be anticipated that with the continued victorious progress of Allied arms more and more will gradually be released. My policy is to ensure if possible that the more dangerous characters remain as long as possible behind the wire and that when ultimately they emerge to see to it that they are subjected to police surveillance.

6. The Iraqi Government continue to be much exercised about the future of Palestine and to regard with apprehension the influence of the Zionists over public opinion in Great Britain and the United States. To combat this influence they are pressing forward plans for the creation in London and New York of representative propaganda committees to be financed and staffed by all the Arab States. The Government of Iraq, however, apparently in abeyance, if only for the time being. The Iraqi Government themselves are willing to contribute £300,000 to start the committees in question, and probably another £200,000 for the second year's work. They hope that the committees will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the presidential election in the United States.

7. The Iraqi Government are also much concerned about the influence of the Zionists over public opinion in Great Britain and the United States. To combat this influence they are pressing forward plans for the creation in London and New York of representative propaganda committees to be financed and staffed by all the Arab States. The Government of Iraq, however, apparently in abeyance, if only for the time being. The Iraqi Government themselves are willing to contribute £300,000 to start the committees in question, and probably another £200,000 for the second year's work. They hope that the committees will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the presidential election in the United States.

8. Our own relations with our American colleagues remain close and personal. On the occasion of the withdrawal of British troops from Arnhem

the American Minister, Mr. Henderson, took occasion to write a letter to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Persia-Iraq Force, expressing the admiration of the American people for the heroism of the British troops at Arnhem whose heroism at Arnhem will undoubtedly be regarded as one of the outstanding exploits of this war. Every intelligent person must have respect for an Empire and a culture which can produce men of such calibre. This letter was published both in the *Frank Call* (the service weekly) and in the *Iraq Times*, and was much appreciated.

9. American interest in politico-economic trends in this country and, I believe, throughout the Middle East, continues to grow. During October the trade mission headed by Mr. Culbertson, sometime United States Ambassador in Chile, was investigating the chances of increasing trade exchanges between Iraq and the United States and there is evident interest in American circles to think out ways of increasing trade between the two countries. The mission is expected to return to the United States in November. Mr. Culbertson is a very experienced and capable man and it is to be expected that he will be able to report on the possibilities of increasing trade between the two countries. He is also expected to report on the political and economic situation in Iraq.

10. The Government of Iraq are much concerned about the future of Palestine and to regard with apprehension the influence of the Zionists over public opinion in Great Britain and the United States. To combat this influence they are pressing forward plans for the creation in London and New York of representative propaganda committees to be financed and staffed by all the Arab States. The Government of Iraq, however, apparently in abeyance, if only for the time being. The Iraqi Government themselves are willing to contribute £300,000 to start the committees in question, and probably another £200,000 for the second year's work. They hope that the committees will be set up immediately after the conclusion of the presidential election in the United States.

11. The Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity, which met between the 25th September and the 7th October in Alexandria, served greatly to concentrate attention on Palestine and Syria. Iraqi concern with Arab unity is not entirely idealistic or academic. This country looks to the Mediterranean as a commercial outlet for its oil, and it is much disturbed lest ports such as Tripoli, Haifa, and Beirut should be in the hands of enemies under French or Italian control. Moreover, it is apparent that some of the Arab States are not so united as they appear. The conference gave great impetus to the movement for Arab unity. It achieved far more practical results than were expected. This has naturally increased the prestige of Iraq in the Arab world as a whole, when it acts in unison. As regards the mention of Palestine in the Alexandria discussions, the Iraqi Government have shown commendable restraint. In commenting on the conference, for instance, the newspapers were allowed to publish one leading article each on Palestine, and then only in general terms. In regard to Syria, greater latitude is allowed and an increasing number of articles strongly critical of French policy have appeared. Nor is North Africa being forgotten. One sequel of the conference was that the change of ministries in Cairo, Amman and Damascus produced a very strong rumour in Baghdad that the Pacha's Government also had fallen. These were encouraged by Berlin radio, but have proved quite unfounded.

12. The Kurdish situation has not fundamentally changed. Taufiq Wahbi, the (Kurdish) Minister of Economics, toured the Arbil and Sulaimani Liwas in August with the object of explaining to the people the good intentions of the Government. He also met Mulla Mustafa at Bile (near Barzan) and sought to bring him into a more reasonable frame of mind. Hardly had the minister returned to Baghdad, however, before news was received that Mulla Mustafa had arrived with an armed band at the nahiyah headquarters at Mergansar and demanded the surrender to him of the 100 tons of grain which was stored there.

He made it clear that if the grain were not given to him he would take it as he and his people had nothing to eat. The Government, having no other means of dealing with the situation, gave up the grain and Mulla Mustafa undertook to pay for it, an undertaking that he is never likely to fulfil. Towards the end of September news about the egression Mulla again threw the Cabinet into a flutter. He was reported to have used threats of violence to stop the rebuilding of the Government's *serai* at Shirwana Mazin, and for a day or two there was wild talk of sending Iraqi troops to deal with the situation. Fortunately a report from the political adviser revealed that nothing had in fact happened at Shirwana Mazin, but that Mulla Mustafa's agent had been interfering with a Government building contractor at Mazna (between Rowanduz and Mergasur).

13. Armed with these facts I was able to persuade the Iraqis to take a calmer view and to cancel the orders which the Minister of the Interior (and temporarily acting Minister of Defence) had given for a brigade to stand by. I also reminded the ministers that as Iraq's ally in war I expected to be fully consulted before the Iraqi Government undertook military operations. In my despatch No. 499 of the 23rd October, I transmitted to you a copy of a letter I had received from Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Smith, General Officer Commanding in Chief, Persia Iraq Force, supporting the view and deprecating the use of Imperial troops to help the Iraqi army out of any difficulties if through lack of training or some other reason their plans went awry. I expressed my agreement with General Sir Arthur Smith's views, with the proviso that it might, in certain circumstances, be necessary, as it was last year, to use Imperial troops defensively.

14. The report which Taufiq Wahbi made to the Cabinet on his return from a tour of inspection in the northern districts, and his views were supported by reports to the Embassy on the officers of the political staff, that the situation in the northern area was not so serious as it had been reported to be, was most welcome. At the time of writing it is possible to report some progress. Grain and cloth have been made available in most areas, and the immediate need of the people for food and clothing has been considerably alleviated. The General Officer Commanding in Chief, Persia Iraq Force, has at my suggestion asked the War Office to approve the sale to the Iraqi Government of 8,500 suits of unserviceable underclothing and 45 tons of old tents from which winter clothing can be made. The Government has made little progress in improving the public services in the Kurdish areas, nor have they begun any of the public works which I urged them to undertake four months ago. Work has, however, started on the approach road to the site of the Bekhme dam. The implementation of a constructive policy in Kurdistan would, I believe, be a great help to the Iraqi Government. I could be persuaded to let all and sundry know that this would be in accord with his wishes. Up to date His Royal Highness has proved stubborn on this point, but I shall continue to press him as and when possible.

15. During the month of October the Iraqi army under the guidance of Major General Renton, have been conducting a series of three exercises in northern Iraq. These exercises have revealed certain deficiencies in personnel and equipment. Major General Renton nevertheless is favourably impressed with the quality both of the majority of the younger officers and of the men, and considers that if his recommendations are adopted an effective force can be put in the field by next March. The Regent, who is supporting General Renton in his reorganisation, attended the last of these exercises.

16. Ever since assuming command of Persia Iraq Force General Sir Arthur Smith has done all in his power to foster good relations between the British forces and the Iraqi army. His efforts and those of his officers have done much to combat the atmosphere of suspicion and hostility which even a year ago endured in certain Iraqi military circles, particularly among the young officers.

17. During the annual migration, the Roghzaei section of the Jaf tribe came into conflict with the Persian authorities at Soqqia. The Jaf claim that the Persians invited a number of the tribal leaders to a conference and then seized and imprisoned them on the pretext that the tribe had ignored the Persian rules for their migration, and confiscated their sheep. Some fighting followed, in which the Roghzaei seem to have been roughly handled before they withdrew to the border into Iraq. The Iraqi Government have at last been induced to make a strong protest to the Persian Government and to demand the release of the imprisoned tribesmen and reparation for the stolen flocks. I have asked His Majesty's Ambassador at Tehran to support these representations.

18. Said, son of Nuri Briskani, who murdered Haji Malo, gave himself up to the British authorities and was sentenced to imprisonment under the Tribal Code to seven years' imprisonment. His surrender ends a state of affairs which was a threat to the peace and order of a large part of the Mosul Liwa.

19. On the 11th September the press published the texts of telegrams exchanged between the Iraqi and Soviet Ministers for Foreign Affairs, whereby diplomatic relations were established between Iraq and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. As reported to you by Mr Thompson, the Regent and the Iraqi Government have shown themselves nervous of closer contacts with Russia. In a country where the Government is almost entirely in the hands of the rich, the "Communist" bogey seems a very dangerous beast. They eventually grasped the nettle of establishing relations, mainly on the ground, I believe, that Russia cannot be ignored in the post-war world. But the suspicion is still there. It largely I understand, influenced the attitude of the recent Arab Unity Conference to foreign policy, nor has recent Russian action in regard to the Persian oil concessions done anything to allay it. The establishment of diplomatic relations, therefore, attracted much notice and became the topic of the hour in all places where politics are discussed. Press comment was not favourable, and the Iraqi Government seemed to have been seen in it the opening of a new field for entertaining, and perhaps profitable, political activity.

20. Representatives of Iraq and Saudi Arabia met at Jadaidat el Arar on the Nedj border early in October to settle tribal claims outstanding between the two countries. The proceedings opened on the 5th October. 177 Saudi claims and twenty-five Iraqi claims were dealt with and the atmosphere appears to have been cordial and businesslike. Only one case, which had been outstanding since May 1941, caused disagreement.

21. Almost immediately after the dismissal of Colonel Bayliss has persisted and the general outlook now causes me far less anxiety than was the case only three months back. The assistant British adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, Mr. Grace, soon succeeded Colonel Le Blanc (who had taken over on the fall of Colonel Bayliss) as Acting Director-General of Supply and for the last two months has been working hard to replace the all-embracing and restrictive policies of Colonel Bayliss. The result is that a wide variety of articles have been decontrolled to the general satisfaction of merchants and public prices having in the process fallen rather sharply. Piece-goods are arriving in fair quantities from India and are being distributed from the United States and Britain, and this has enabled the authorities to start effective distribution in the provinces. As a consequence, criticism of the Administration's handling of supply has been reduced and there is a tendency to lay all the country's economic tribulations at our door.

22. Nevertheless, there is still a widespread feeling based largely on the easier conditions in Syria and the Lebanon, which during each summer are visited by many Iraqis, that this country remains the Cinderella of the Middle East in supply matters. A recent reduction in the tea and sugar ration has accentuated this feeling and has led to public criticism. It is clear that the British have not shown sufficient appreciation of Iraq's whole-hearted contribution to the war effort, particularly in the furnishing of grain, dates and oil.

23. With this in mind I arranged when the barley negotiations were finally successfully concluded through the issue on the 28th October of an official notification fixing prices at 11/10 3/4 for 100 lbs. of barley. This was a considerable improvement on the 11/5 1/2 which had been the price for some time. The notification was published in the *Iraq Times* and the vernacular press of a statement showing how His Majesty's Government had come to Iraq's assistance in finding a market for the greater part of the crop surplus at a price markedly lower than that paid last year but yet considerably above the world level. The quantity to be purchased is 200,000 tons.

24. I consider that the barley agreement is fair and reasonable to both sides, and taken into account not only the interests of the British taxpayer but also those of the Iraqi producer who would have had cause for ill will had His Majesty's Government forced too drastic a cut on his price for a commodity at an exaggerated price. But the uncertainty as to the effect of the agreement on what would have been a purely Anglo-Iraqi issue for the first time since 1941 coupled with the loss of a substantial amount of the Minister of Finance's strategic reserves in the last few months, have probably contributed to the

goodwill we might have obtained had we been in a position to make our offer earlier in the summer. I trust that next year the policy of His Majesty's Government will be better co-ordinated and more rapidly decided and that, if for any reason we should not be in the market for any appreciable quantity of barley it may be possible to give the Iraqi Government ample warning, with an understanding to assist with transport and other facilities in the finding of other markets. With our present complete stranglehold over all forms of transport here, not a ton of barley can be exported without our authority, a fact which not unnaturally causes resentment.

25. King Faisal, together with his mother and other members of the Royal Family, returned from Egypt on the 10th October. The Regent had flown to Cairo on the 20th September and returned with the King as far as Palestine, whence His Royal Highness flew back to Bagdad on the 5th October. The Regent's intended visit to the United States of America planned for September was cancelled, largely because of the Presidential campaign. It will probably now take place next Spring.

26. On the 3rd October Captain Holt left Bagdad on transfer to the Foreign Office after twenty-five years in Iraq. Captain Holt succeeded the late Miss Gertrude Bell as Oriental Secretary in the year 1926. His intimate knowledge of Arabic and Kurdish and the experience of eighteen years in this Mission had made him an adviser of rare qualifications. He will be much missed throughout the country.

27. As I have already reported in a recent despatch, the Royal Air Force organised a display and tattoo on the 12th and 13th October. Both events were most successful, particularly the air display, which seemed to be attended by almost everyone in Bagdad. In general, the relations between the British Armed Forces and the Iraqi people remain very satisfactory, although during recent weeks there has been criticism in Ministerial circles because of the unilateral suspension by General Headquarters of provisional monthly on account payments to the Iraqi State Railways made under an agreement concluded in 1942. At the time of writing there is, however, a good prospect of this dispute being settled by a readjustment of rates going back to the 1st April 1943 and the resumption of monthly payments on the basis of 80 per cent. of traffic charges in lieu of on the scale of 65 per cent. which has existed hitherto. Since complex negotiations are about to be opened for the settlement of the rebate to be granted to the British Army over the whole period from 1941 onwards, it is very desirable to get this irritant out of the way before the main issue is joined on the diplomatic level.

28. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine and Transjordan, the Minister Resident in the Middle East at Cairo, the Government of India, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the Political Agent at Kuwait, the Political Intelligence Centre in the Middle East and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Iraq.

I have &c

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS

CHAPTER II. PALESTINE.

E 6310 67 311

No. 6

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden—(Received 17th October)

(No. 5608)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 16th October, 1944

SENATOR WAGNER (Democrat, New York) released on 15th October text of a letter from the President, which he read to the National Convention of the Zionist Organisation now being held at Atlantic City. Text of letter as read by Senator Wagner is as follows: "Dear Bob, knowing that you are to attend the forty-seventh Annual Convention of the Zionist Organisation of America, I ask you to convey to the delegates assembled my most cordial greetings. Please express my satisfaction, that in accord with traditional American policy and in keeping with the spirit of the four freedoms, the democratic party at its July Convention

has declared its support for the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine to unrestricted Jewish immigration and colonisation and such a policy as to result in the establishment there of a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth—efforts will be made to find appropriate ways and means of effectuating this policy as soon as practicable. I know how long and ardently the Jewish people have worked and prayed for the establishment of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish Commonwealth. I am convinced that the American people give their support to this aim and if re-elected, I shall help to bring about its realisation. With cordial regards and best wishes.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

E 7873 41 63.

No. 7

Mr Jordan to Mr Eden—(Received 11th December)

(No. 487)

(Telegraphic)

Jedda, 11th December, 1944

My telegram No. 456, paragraph 5.

Following is translation of message which Ibn Saud has sent for transmission to you and on which he requests your views:—

"I have received a number of communications from the Syrians and other Arabs concerning the visits of Nuri Pasha Said and Musa Alami to Arab countries to exhort the people to work for the Arabs in Palestine. His Majesty's Government are aware of my attitude towards the Jews and know I regard the Jewish question from the point of view of an Arab and a Moslem. I am, more than any one else, concerned to keep the Jews out of Palestine and to prevent them from gaining any authority in that country. The above-mentioned, however, are out to [group omitted] a hue and cry about Palestine. My policy differs from their policy of exhortation and I do not associate myself with this policy because His Majesty's Government and also the Americans are concerned. His Majesty's Government is aware of the letter which I addressed to President Roosevelt and of his reply. Palestine is a matter between the British and the Jews and is at His Majesty's Government's disposal. I have recently heard over the radio that His Majesty's Government are going to open the door to Jewish immigration into Palestine. I may send a protest to the Americans and they will probably reply as before. I am not inclined, however, to join in the clamouring for the Arab cause, for if I encouraged them and they rose against the Jews and I then abandoned them without further help it would be shameful, and if I support them difficulties will arise in view of His Majesty's Government's policy. I do not wish to take any action which would displease His Majesty's Government and would therefore like to know His Majesty's Government's views on my attitude towards the Jews and whether the question merely concerns the Arabs and the Jews. If it concerns the Jews and the Americans it is an American matter. If, however, the question is bound up with His Majesty's Government then I would like to know their views on the question."

2. Full translation follows by bag

3. It would appear from this communication that Ibn Saud feels that the Palestinian question is entering an acute phase and that unless he receives some assurance from His Majesty's Government regarding the future of that country, he will be obliged to go back and to try to do something for the benefit of the Arabs without losing face in the Arab and Moslem world.

4. Ibn Saud is undoubtedly sincere in his desire to collaborate with His Majesty's Government about Palestine but only in so far, I imagine, as to ensure a solution not unfavourable to the Arabs. It could hardly be otherwise if he is to retain the respect of his own people, the Arabs as a whole and of the world's Moslems.

5. I should be grateful for instructions.

E 7578 41 65]

No. 8

Mr Eden to Mr Jordan (Jeddah)

No. 207,

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 23rd December, 1944.

1012 telegram No. 467 (of 11th December). Ibn Saud's request for His Majesty's Government's views on Arab unity discussions regarding Palestine.

You should thank Ibn Saud for consulting His Majesty's Government and say that I quite understand his difficulties on this point. If certain Arab delegates to Palestine are as they say are, and if they are, Ibn Saud and his representatives are admittedly faced with a real dilemma. If they agree to the proposals put forward by the Persian Government, they will be opposing the interests of the Arabs and would be most unwelcome to His Majesty's Government. If, on the other hand, they oppose the proposals favoured by other Arab delegates, they will be opposing the interests of the Arabs and would be most unwelcome to His Majesty's Government.

2. His Majesty's Government are, of course, not aware what Arab delegates will propose, but they suggest that Ibn Saud might instruct his representative, if Palestine questions are raised, to advise moderation and possibly even postponement until the end of hostilities in Europe. He could point out that His Majesty's Government have not taken any new decision regarding Palestine and that there is no reason why the Arabs should do so either at this stage. The essential thing is to take no decision and to make no pronouncements which might give rise to disturbances in Palestine. It is the duty of the Government, including Jews, Arabs and Christians, His Majesty's Government are bound to oppose any agitation likely to lead to disturbances there, and we hope the Arab leaders will remember necessity for acting in a responsible manner, especially at the present time.

3. You may at your discretion add that His Majesty's Government have been profoundly shocked by the murder of Lord Moyne and that they are taking energetic steps to root out the terrorist bands responsible for this act and for the previous attempt on the life of Sir H. MacMichael.

CHAPTER III. PERSIA.

(A) Miscellaneous.

W 13635 34 78]

No. 9

(1)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden — (Received 21st September)

(No. 930)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 21st September 1944

ASSISTANT Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Kavtaradze arrived here from Moscow a few days ago. According to Persian Prime Minister Kavtaradze has with him experts who are going to examine oil wells which were dug in connexion with the oil concession in North Persia. The Prime Minister says that agreement with Russians was obtained by bribery and was never ratified. He spoke of references to concession in exchange of letters after occupation of 1941 and I informed him that in the opinion of His Majesty's Government these letters were superseded by treaty of 1942.

2. For Soviet point of view see my despatch No. 126 of 20th March (not repeated).

E 6959 04 34]

2.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden — (Received 20th September)

(No. 940)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 20th September 1944

PRIME Minister is disturbed about Russian attitude and activities. He gives these instances:

2. Soviet Assistant Commissioner (my telegram No. 930) has informed him that the Soviet Government would like an oil concession in the north.

3. Official Soviet transport organisation Transsoyuztrans is beginning to operate as though it were a commercial transport company but is disregarding Persian transport regulations.

4. Soviet authorities have still not given permission for additional Persian troops to go to Rezaen but have offered, if necessary to maintain order. Thus Kurds in the north talk independence behind a Soviet screen at the moment when some Kurds in the south are in conflict with Persian troops.

5. Soviet hospital and school in Tabriz have been opened without the permission of the Persian Government having been asked. Soviet Embassy say that the school is for Soviet children, but according to information received by the Prime Minister (and by His Majesty's Consul General, Tabriz) Persian subjects have been sent to the school. The school is a subsidiary of the Persian school.

6. This telegram will be supplemented by detailed telegram about oil, Kurds and Soviet transport organisation.

E 6016 013 'G]

(3)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden — (Received 1st October)

No. 977 Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 1st October, 1944

MY telegram No. 960

Oil concession in North Persia

2. Version given to me by M. Ala, who has just brought me message from the Shah, places the matter in another and more serious light. Message was to the following effect:—

3. The Shah received Kavtaradze and Soviet Ambassador 1st October. They said that Soviet Government was offering to exchange North Persia over an area of 210,000 (half 420,000) square kilometres during a period of five years, at the end of which they would indicate areas which they proposed

4. M Ala will inform American Ambassador 2nd October
5. See my immediately following telegram

141

(No. 978. Secret)
(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 2nd October, 1944

2. I said there might be very serious consequences if the Government could not be given notice. Persian then asked if I was talking about oil. I said I was talking about the whole country.

3. Mr. Abu asked whether it would not be reasonable for the Persian Government to tell the Soviet Government that they would like to await the conclusion of the international oil conversations which had been proceeding between United States and British representatives in London. He asked the American Government. I said I did not know that this was relevant. The natural desire to examine carefully any question relating to national oil resources was a legitimate and a better (group undecipherable) for delay.

3. M. Ali left in a very sombre mood. The day before, the Shah, according to a reliable informant who had had a long talk with him, had spoken airily of driving a bargain with the Soviet Government and implied that he might let them have an oil concession in return for a promise of better behaviour in Azerbaijan and in the north generally. If the Shah ever had such a plan his talk with the Soviet representatives on [group undecypherable] will have induced a more serious attitude.

7. I shall be glad to receive your instructions as soon as possible. I consider that we are entitled to say openly that —

- (1) Oil resources being a valuable but wasting asset applications for concessions need to be examined with greatest care
- (2) If competition in the south is encouraged by Persian Government why not in the north also?

9 All Persians in Tehran have been excited and anxious lately about the Soviet penetration, sometimes with sometimes without, justification. If the Russians succeed in their present demand Persians will conclude I think, that His Majesty's Government are a spent force so far as Persia is concerned and will rush to conclude the Russians by every possible means.

(5)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 6th October)

(No 997)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 8th October, 1944

MY telegram No 078

Russians are pulling possible wires to influence Persian opinion in favour of their oil proposal and several newspapers are supporting them. Kavtaradze has given an interview on the subject.

He implies that joint representation is based on Khourian agreement. The same misleading impression is conveyed in the newspapers. Reason for this is probably that Russians had only a half share in Khourian agreement.

2 The Shah has asked to see me on 8th October. Unless in the meantime I receive instructions in another sense, I shall use the language I used to M. Ali. Moreover I shall say that, in my personal opinion, Persian Government have a right to consider proposal that Soviet Government should operate a concession in Persian territory in the light of reply which Persian Government would get if it applied for permission for a Persian company or individual to operate a concession in Russia.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th October)

(No. 1015) Secret.)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 10th October, 1944

MY telegram No. 997.

I am informed by the Shah that the Persian Government will not grant the Russian request for oil rights. The Shah's attitude towards the Russians is more favourable than that of the British. I pointed out that the British application was for a concession in the north, while the Russian application was for a concession in the south. The Shah's attitude is not on all fours with the application from the Soviet Government. I pointed out that the Persian Government should be granted regardless of all other considerations because I am sure that Persia cannot have the Soviet Government exploiting their oil because the Persian Government would never at this juncture give a concession to a British or American Company in the south while rejecting a Russian demand for rights in the north.

2. We have yet to see whether in the last resort the Persian Government will try to (group undecyphered) small area. The Shah's attitude is more favourable than that of the British. I pointed out that the Persian Government should be granted regardless of all other considerations because I am sure that Persia cannot have the Soviet Government exploiting their oil because the Persian Government would never at this juncture give a concession to a British or American Company in the south while rejecting a Russian demand for rights in the north.

3. If the Government and the Majlis do in fact decide to postpone they sent an Assistant Commissioner to carry away a concession and he has advertised his purpose very widely. Russians may claim the Khouran agreement to be still valid and may insist on exploiting at least that area. If they accept defeat gracefully we may expect them to explain that they have saved Persia from capitalists who had designs on Persian oil in the south.

E 6262 615 G

(7)

(No. 1027a)

(Telegraphic)

MY telegram No. 1005.

According to the Prime Minister his final conversation with Kavlradze was to this effect.

2. I pointed out that the Russian request for oil rights in the south was a concession to a foreign company in the south while rejecting a Russian demand for rights in the north. The Shah's attitude is more favourable than that of the British. I pointed out that the Persian Government should be granted regardless of all other considerations because I am sure that Persia cannot have the Soviet Government exploiting their oil because the Persian Government would never at this juncture give a concession to a British or American Company in the south while rejecting a Russian demand for rights in the north.

E 6287 615 G

(8)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 13th October)

(No. 1028)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 13th October 1944

MY immediately preceding telegram

This is so far as it can be ascertained. At secret session of the Majlis the only speech strongly in favour of the acceptance of the Russian request was

by group undecyphered, Marash, who was Minister of the Court who made money buying for the Russians in Meshed and was elected with their help. Tudeh members are (group undecyphered) in concert with the Russians but are discredited by the Russians. British and American approaches had been made, one of the most prominent of Tudeh Deputies made violent speech demanding that no oil concession should be given until after the war. Perhaps it is for this reason that the Tudeh newspaper is giving indirect support by reproducing pro-Russian material from other papers. Small group of Tudeh newspaper editors are in Russian application violent with material which they are quite incapable of writing themselves.

2. More than one newspaper has stated that the Russians do not need oil and made their offer solely for the sake of the Persians. K seems to have uttered similar remark in the House of Commons. I pointed out that it was not for the sake of the Persians but to suggest that the Soviet Government should assist Persia by paying an economic price for munitions and rice.

E 6367 615 G

(9)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 16th October)

(No. 1043)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 16th October, 1944

MY telegram No. 1028

Russian inspired Persian papers are taking the line—

- (1) That Government decision to postpone examination of oil concessions is aimed at Russia, since until Russian offer was made the Government was seriously considering offers from other applicants for oil in the south and
- (2) That since Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have a concession in the south, the balance of power requires that a concession should be given to the Russians in the north.

Rest of press with one or two minor exceptions does not dare to support Government strongly on this issue.

2. Balance of power argument can be met with obvious rejoinder that Persia should think of herself as a member of the United Nations, not as football between two of her neighbours. Best defence against Russian demand is, however, in my opinion, to say frankly that no efficient State can be expected to allow Government of another State to work a concession in the former's territory, and that it is impracticable and contrary to principle of reciprocity that U.S.S.R., whose organisation excludes foreign firms and individuals from its industry, should wish to exploit essential resources in a foreign country through one of its State Departments. I await your instructions which I hope will not be long delayed. I am using these arguments quite as I find them in Persian press. The Prime Minister using such arguments I certainly do not contradict them. This is going to be a test case and I feel we are entitled to object on principle to Soviet demand, though we must be prepared to face retort that Anglo-Iranian Oil Company is really the British Government because of our official shares in its capital. It may be that oil from North Persia can never compete with oil from Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession or from Persian Gulf and that its natural market is Russia. Point however, is not where oil would find a market, but who is to exploit the oil area in Persia. That it should be exploited by Soviet Government seems to me entirely incompatible with Persian independence.

3. We cannot say what the unpleasant consequences may be that Kavlradze had in mind when he threatened the Prime Minister. A less courageous Prime Minister than Saad might succumb to pressure, while a less honest one, e.g., Qavam Al-Qasbi, might give way even without such pressure. Saad however will I think hold out. He believes (rightly, I consider) that it is better to have our country taken away than to concede to a foreign demand. I pointed out that to concede to Soviet demand would mean making Russia, presently ally of our ally, our enemy. I pointed out that the north goes for the Russian demand and that the south goes for the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. I pointed out that Persia is economically dependent on the world and that the world is dependent on Persia. I pointed out that the Majlis Government would not take such a step. If His Majesty's Government consider it necessary to let Russians have a free hand in Persia, let us at least do it with the

realisation that life of Persia as an independent State and a buffer for our protection is not likely to be long

4. It has been suggested that Persian Government should establish immediately a geological survey staffed by experts of unimpeachable reputation recruited from various countries. This would be justified since Persian Government knows little about its own resources and is therefore at a loss when asked to grant concessions. It would meet objection that Persian Government is neither developing its own resources nor willing that others should develop them, and it would afford a breathing space. Inspection, if taken up at all, would have to be taken up seriously, and at once. I should be glad to have your instructions whether to support it strongly. Until then I shall give it only the personal approval of a layman in science. You will probably wish to hear the views of Mr. Boyle on this point when he reaches home.

5. This oil controversy strengthens widespread belief here that until Soviet troops have left the country the Persian Government cannot hope to have a soul of its own. It is true that Saed has acted with courage and independence but he will get little overt help from his own people so long as Soviet troops are so in evidence. I hope the moment Persia ceases to be a road for aid to Russia troops will be withdrawn from Tehran and kept as far south as is compatible with protection of our oil interests during period until defeat of Japan and complete evacuation of Persia, and that every endeavour will be made to induce the Russians to reduce to a minimum the area in which they keep troops. However small that area, it will still be too large for peace of mind of the Persian Government and the people.

E 6262 615 G

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No 672. Secret.)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 16th October, 1944

YOUR telegram No 1027A and previous correspondence

If the Persian Government can maintain their refusal to grant any concessions during the war I agree that it would not be in our interest to press them to reverse their decision, although this would mean the abandonment of hope of a concession for Shell in South Persia, so long as the war continues.

2. But we must consider what should be our attitude in the not unlikely event of the Russians refusing to accept the Persian decision and applying stronger pressure. In this connexion, you should know that Russia's desire to obtain new oil rights may lead the Soviet Government to go to considerable lengths to force the Persian Government to give way.

3. Should this occur, we might well get the worst of all worlds if we were to urge the Persian Government to resist. Not only would it be morally certain that the Persians would give away to the Russians the fact that we were pressing them to resist, but we might well find ourselves in a position where the oil concession in the south had been withheld, while we had aroused Russian resentment by obstruction which could only be based on political grounds, and had failed to achieve our object of keeping the Russians out.

4. I share your apprehensions about Russian intentions in North Persia. But if it is, in fact, the Soviet intention to dominate the northern provinces of Persia, there are other methods, political, strategic and economic, by which the Soviet Government could achieve its object. In that event, it is doubtful whether refusal of oil concession would seriously affect the outlook.

5. Our case vis-à-vis of the Russians is undoubtedly weakened by the existence of the A.I.O.C. concession in South Persia. We could hardly sustain against the Russians the argument that the cases are quite different because the British concession is held by a British company, in which His Majesty's Government have a large interest, while under the Russian system the Russian concession in the north would be held by the Soviet Government or an official organ thereof.

6. Finally, if oil deposits in North Persia are to be exploited, the only suitable market in practice would be the Soviet Union. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the British Government is at present to compete for a concession in that area.

7. If therefore you learn that the Soviet Government are preparing to press matters further with the Persian Government, and if the latter ask your advice, you should say that because of their appreciation of Persian difficulties His

Majesty's Government for their part do not wish to dispute the Persian Government's decision to grant no further concessions during the war, always on the assumption that this decision is fairly and equally maintained. His Majesty's Government are not, however, prepared to advise the Persian Government as to the lengths to which they should go to maintain their decision, and should it for any reason be revised, His Majesty's Government would expect that an application by their nationals for a concession would again receive proper consideration.

8. For your own information, if Russian pressure were to take a form clearly incompatible with Persian independence, thus constituting a breach of the Anglo-Soviet-Persian treaty, I should certainly be prepared to consider taking the matter up with the Soviet Government direct. But the Persian Government would not be given any assurance in advance in this sense, since such an assurance would be almost certain to reach the Russians in garbled form, with results similar to those foreseen in paragraph 3 above.

9. I will telegraph again shortly with reference to your telegram No 1040.

E 6461 615 G

(1)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden—(Received 21st October)

(No 1072)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 21st October, 1944

MY telegram No 1040

Persian Government now declares by way of deprecating Russian wrath that decision to postpone consideration of applications for oil concessions was taken before Russians applied for oil rights over the whole of the north. Before he arrived and for some days after, object of K's journey was stated by the Russians to be the examination of Khouran business.

2. The Russian Government has now announced a series of ferocious attacks on the Prime Minister who is accused of being opposed adversely to Russian interests. According to the Prime Minister the Soviet Embassy yesterday asked radio Tehran to broadcast particularly scurrilous attack on the Prime Minister and had a person in the press and radio Ministry had to issue specific orders that the article should not be broadcast. Editors of these newspapers at the Soviet Embassy had been ordered to issue a press attack that they were summoned by the Soviet First Secretary and told that they had better stop printing Russian articles. Saad Zia's papers have been ordered to stop printing Russian articles. It is characteristic that this attack is issued by a Persian. In fact, the attack is issued by a Persian but being towards they are naturally greatly influenced by them. Prime Minister is unmoved, being sustained not only by moral courage but by experience of the Russians, which has taught him that the only thing to do is to resist the first unjust demand, otherwise you have to give in to a series of demands each more unreasonable and peremptory than the one before until everything has been given away.

3. Yesterday the Prime Minister made a statement in Majlis explaining and defending the Government's attitude. He tells me that he had the House with him with very few exceptions and that agrees with reports from other sources. No vote was, however, taken and I asked him how the public were to be convinced that he had supported the Government. His reply was that he had said he would take a vote and was sure of a large majority. I am not so sure though I agree that the Persians in general are entirely against the grant of a concession to the Russians.

4. I have received your telegram No 672 and have carefully noted contents. Before making any comments I await later telegram promised in paragraph 9.

[E 6387 615 G]

(12)

Mr Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 683)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 22nd October, 1944

YU (R telegram No. 1049 and my telegram No. 672)

For the reasons given in my telegram under reference I would prefer that you should not yourself use the arguments in your paragraph 2, though you need not object if they are used by Persian Government. Our own line should continue to be that it is fairly enforced all round.

Paragraph 3. The real choice does not appear to me to lie between giving the Government a free hand and ourselves inciting Persian Government to resist. Should it ultimately prove necessary for us to seek to restrain the Soviet Government themselves.

3. Proposal that Persian Government should establish geological survey to report on the oil resources of the country. But I think it is for the Persian Government themselves to make up their minds as to a course which Russians may regard as merely a pretext for progress. I think it is well advised to accept the proposal.

E 6315 615 G

(13)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 23rd October)

(No. 1079 Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 23rd October, 1944

MY telegram No. 1072

Soviet authorities are continuing war of nerves. Yesterday heavy loads of propaganda were sent to Persia. It was stated by Russians that they consider relations with Persian Government were "severed". Violent attacks on the Prime Minister continue and the story is spread that he has been assassinated. A Persian broadcast, which purported to be by Persian-Soviet Cultural Society, Soviet Embassy broadcast extracts from two Persian newspapers (one of them published by embassy) giving the Russian version of oil dispute.

2. Minister at Court has just been talking this over. He says the Shah feels that it would be fatal to give way. When informing Kaviaradze of decision to wait until after the war, Prime Minister had said to him that the Government had offers from American and British firms for oil in the south and that if Kaviaradze would let him know what terms Russians proposed for the north, Government would examine them. The Russians, however, refused present terms and wanted an acceptance in principle of their very wide demand, say 57% that they were no longer interested in Khouran. If, said M. Ala, Persian Government accepted detailed proposals however unfavourable to Persia, Prime Minister was quite ready to resign.

3. I would stay in office as long as possible, since in this matter he enjoyed the confidence of the Majlis. It was arranged as not to be connected with the oil dispute and any successor must take the same line and postpone oil concessions until after the war. Could anything be done to ease tension? Perhaps Kaviaradze was being stiffer than Soviet Government intended and Persian Government should send a special negotiator to Moscow to explain the situation. Could British and United States Governments—perhaps in connexion with oil talks which were to be resumed after presidential election—say a word to Soviet Government?

4. I have not yet decided whether to give you paragraph 7 of your telegram No. 672. I said I would inform His Majesty's Government but Ala must realise that they were interested in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and that one point made by the pro-Russians (though I myself did not admit an analogy) was that this justified grant of oil rights in the north to the Russians. I doubted whether it would be wise to offer to send special negotiator

to Moscow when Kaviaradze was still here, would it not answer better to instruct Persian Ambassador in Moscow to take the matter up with Soviet Government? If reports given by Ala of threatening attitude of the Russians were correct I could not say that wise course for the Persian Government would be to give way, though it was for the Persian Government to decide. As to Saad, I had found him honest and on the whole co-operative and should continue to support him so long as he was supported by Majlis. It was unfortunate that he had not taken a vote in the Majlis after his latest statement about oil since he had no proof of his contention that he had the Deputies with him, though I contested [sic] he had. I did not think if Saad resigned it would be easy to find successor who would agree to follow the same policy except possibly Taghzadeh who, I heard, had not refused to come back if urgently needed.

4. Am left to see United States Ambassador.

5. I venture to think condition laid down in paragraph 8 of your above-mentioned telegram has been fulfilled. Soviet Government have sent Assistant Under-Secretary to stay in Persia until Persian Government give him, without competition and without disclosure by Russians of any financial or other terms, exclusive rights over all the oil in an immense area which is probably the richest in oil in the country and happens to be occupied by Soviet troops, they use Persian Government's own radio to broadcast Soviet point of view in a most violent form, alleging falsely that broadcast comes from Persian Soviet Cultural Society, and they support their demand by military demonstrations. We cannot quote other forms of pressure which we know exist, viz., subsidising of gutter press, threats to journalists and Deputies and so on, but if what is being done openly is not incompatible with the independence of Persia, what is not?

6. Although I see a fundamental difference (as to the Persians) between our position and that of the Russians, I fully realise the delicacy of our position. So, of course, do the Russians, and they want what will eventually give them everything to be secured now, while they have troops in the country, a stranglehold on news going to other countries and the comfortable feeling of loyalty and policy will probably compel Great Britain and America to keep silence. Nevertheless, as I believe that what happens now will settle the fate of Persia, I am not prepared to let it pass. I am sure that Persia by a department of Soviet Government, I fully realise the delicacy of our position. So, of course, do the Russians, and they want what will eventually give them everything to be secured now, while they have troops in the country, a stranglehold on news going to other countries and the comfortable feeling of loyalty and policy will probably compel Great Britain and America to keep silence. Nevertheless, as I believe that what happens now will settle the fate of Persia, I am not prepared to let it pass.

7. What strategic difficulties you have in mind I do not know, but I believe that Persia has a chance of resisting political pressure in the post-war period after the war she has some chance of resisting political pressure in the post-war period if there is no League of Nations there will be the weapon of publicity. Russians so much dislike and fear. As to economic weapon, I believe Persia could be made much less dependent on Russia than she was in the time of the late Shah.

8. As to our economic interests, is it likely that Persian Government would give us another oil concession in the south if they had any hope of securing sympathy of United States Government by granting a concession to an American company? After all they would be tempted to say, America cannot do less than nothing for us.

E 6516 615 G

(14)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 23rd October)

(No. 1081)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 23rd October, 1944

MY telegram No. 1079

Reuter telegram from Moscow received to-day quotes from newspaper *Trud* grossly unfair attack on Persian Prime Minister accusing him of trying to break up democratic and workers' organisations and of general "Fascist" wickedness. Our censor has stopped this telegram here, but I suppose it will be published everywhere else whereas other side gets no hearing. This is most injurious to our interests. Is there any remedy?

E 6630 615 G)

(15)

Sir R Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 24th October.)

(No. 1098. Secret)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 24th October, 1944

MY immediately preceding telegram, not repeated.

The Shah yesterday had Kavyoradze and Soviet Ambassador to dine with Ala, Minister of Court and Yazdan Panah. The Shah did not invite Prime Minister. Account of what happened has been given to me by Ala.

2. The Shah tried to make the Russians believe that the decision of the Government was in no way directed against Russia and was in accordance with the wishes of the Majlis and the Persian people. The Russians repeatedly represented that they were not interested in the Persian oil question. They said that acceptance would help the Persians at the Peace Conference and—an amazing argument—would show the world that the northern part of the country really did belong to Persia. They talked much about disunity of general manager of the railways (my telegram No. 1082) and represented it as a proof that the Government was hostile to the "Allies".

3. Ala thinks that perhaps some good was done by the talk. The Persians did not give way at all, but conversations are to be resumed.

4. According to my information, Majlis is almost entirely behind Saed in this matter and even some of Tudeh members admit in private that he is right. The Russian newspaper campaign is a very important feature of the campaign that chief Tudeh newspaper is also attacking Taqizadeh as a sinister figure like Sayyidza. Russians are evidently anxious to forestall possibility of him becoming Prime Minister, probably because to judge by his reputation he, like Saed, would be above corruption by money and intimidation by threats.

5. No grain is moving to Tehran on northern railways. On 16th October orders were issued under instructions of Soviet Director of Movements that no waggons should be loaded except for Soviet military or commercial traffic and that any already loaded should not be moved. If Government made it public that Soviet authorities proposed to try to deprive Tehran of bread unless their demands for oil rights were granted, it would not necessarily advance Soviet cause. Effect of Soviet prohibition, if maintained, would be awkward but not ruinous. Thanks to the efforts of Americans and of British grain collecting officers, there is no large stock of grain in Tehran that Persia could just manage until next harvest even if no more grain reached Tehran from the north. Mills, though would, however, be obliged to impose several unpopular measures which he had abandoned as no longer necessary, e.g., collection of part of peasants' share and restriction on movements of private grain and also to increase proportion of barley in controlled bread. If time came when His Majesty's Government thought that an approach to Soviet Government was justified they could hardly find better excuse than above-mentioned Soviet order, which cannot be justified by any military necessity.

E 6575 6058 34)

(16)

Sir R Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th October.)

(No. 1095.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 25th October, 1944

MY telegram No. 1090.

Kavyoradze gave an interview to Tehran press on 24th October. After setting forth advantages to Persia in vague terms, he stated that "Saed in the course of conversations with me not only signified complete agreement and understanding but promised his help for satisfactory solution." He says that subsequent refusal was "received in a negative manner in Soviet circles" irrespective of darkened relations between the two countries. He expresses confidence that the question will be settled and calls for co-operation of Persian public opinion "as represented by liberal press of Persia."

2. Saed, whom I saw to-day, repeats that neither before Kavyoradze's arrival nor in talks when he arrived was anything mentioned but Khourian business. It was this that Saed was prepared to discuss, but when Kavyoradze made his wider proposals Kavyoradze said he was no longer interested in Khourian.

3. Prime Minister says that so long as he enjoys the confidence of the Majlis he does not propose to resign. He gave me the names of forty three leading members of Tudeh party who, he says, have told him in private that they agree with his policy. This agrees with news from other sources. Majlis seems to be standing surprisingly firm. I believe that if some Government granted a concession to the Russians, the Majlis would not confirm it.

E 6605 6058 34)

(17)

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden.—(Received 20th October.)

(No. 5809.)

(Telegraphic.)

Washington, 26th October, 1944

YOL R telegram No. 074 to Tehran.

In the absence of instructions from you I have so far refrained from discussing with State Department Soviet-Persian oil question, but Wallace Murray has now raised it and asked for views. He says that State Department have received disquieting reports (a) of attitude of Soviet representative at Tehran and (b) of tone of Soviet press, which as soon as Mr. Churchill and yourself left Moscow began to speak of fascism in Persia and of failure of Persian authorities to punish those guilty of sabotage and pilfering of supplies for Russia going on in Persia. There is also a report that the Russians are planning to bring up by the Russians of a case against Persia on classic German model. United States Government are for their part prepared to accept Persian attitude of refusing applications for oil concessions from any foreign power during the war. It would in view of State Department raise question of Anglo-American Russian agreement of December 1943. If this statement were to be brushed aside as a scrap of paper, it would be an extremely serious matter and a bad omen for future agreements with the Russians. The United States Government could hardly allow the matter to go by default and State Department wonder whether before matters go too far it might be desirable for Americans and ourselves to ask questions or to make some representations in Moscow. They would be most grateful for your very early views.

E 6603 6058 34,

(18)

Sir R Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th October.)

(No. 1103.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 26th October, 1944

MY telegram No. 1093.

K.'s interview is generally regarded by Persians as outrageous, as, indeed, it was. Newspapers defending the Russian point of view are still the loudest, and the most numerous, but the tide is turning. Six or seven newspapers support the Persian Government and Bakhtar of 26th October has a very strong article, which if it could be published all over the world, would place the Russians in an awkward position. The writer reminds K. that when Persia was herself starving two years ago she spared wheat and rice for Russia, then hard pressed by the Germans. He tells K. that contrary to rumours spread by Persian quackings who will take money from any one, Saed and his colleagues are just men and women who are fighting for freedom she uses it against Persia, will it not wound Persia's feelings?

2. Raazi Imruz describes the pressure which Russia is using as intolerable and says that any patriotic Persian would have behaved as Saed behaved.

3. Procession of lorries of armed men through the streets a few days ago did not have the effect of cowing the Persians but aroused indignation.

4. At the ceremony of congratulations to-day for the Shah's birthday instead of appearing with six or seven members of his staff in accordance with the practice of the larger missions, the Soviet Ambassador produced a swarm of secretaries. This was a very poor part of the ceremony.

E 6515 615, G)

(19)

Mr Eden to the Earl of Halifax (Washington)(No. 8394)
(Telegraphic)*Foreign Office, 28th October, 1944*

TEHRAN telegram No. 1079 and your telegram No. 6508

I share State Department's apprehensions about Soviet intentions in Persia and was about to enquire views of United States Government on this question

2. You may inform State Department that, in view of undertakings in Anglo-Soviet-Persian Treaty and in Tehran Declaration of 6th December, 1943 (to which latter United States Government are signatories), His Majesty's Government are minded to approach the Soviet Government on the basis of such approach would be that His Majesty's Government in no way contest the right of Soviet Government to seek an oil concession in North Persia. They consider, however, that this is a question on which Persian Government have a right to take their own decisions and they have for their part accepted without demur the Persian decision to grant no further oil concession during the war. They understand that United States Government have taken a similar attitude. They feel that it would not be in accordance with the above-mentioned undertakings if the Persian Government were forced against their will to concede during the war the very extensive rights which the Soviet Government are now demanding.

3. We would propose that any initial approach to Soviet Government should be based on the foregoing general lines, namely, that it is a necessary condition of Persian independence that Persian Government should not be expected to dispose of Persian property otherwise than by free negotiation. If Soviet Government can show that method is the only one open to them in these circumstances we should quote evidence in Sir Reader Bullard's telegrams and from Soviet sources, e.g., attacks on Persian Prime Minister in Soviet press.

4. Would the United States Government be prepared to take an approximately similar line with the Soviet Government?

E 6664/6058, 24)

(20)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 28th October)(No. 1110)
(Telegraphic)*Tehran, 28th October, 1944*

MY telegram No. 1145

Prime Minister, on whom I called at his request, informed me that demonstrators yesterday were accompanied by lorries of armed Russian soldiers. This is true and it arouses suspicion that if Persian police or troops had to use force to disperse a dangerous crowd or to protect public buildings they might be fired on by Russians. Prime Minister pointed out that in December 1942, when there were street disorders in Tehran, we brought in troops to help maintain order. Was it, he enquired, the business of the Russians only to maintain order and not rather of Russians, British and Americans? I said I did not think a solution of the problem was to be sought there, though I promised to inform you.

2. During the demonstration British military police were at hand to keep the British soldiers from getting mixed up in the crowd and a small number of British troops were also present. British soldiers were not allowed to fire. As a result of the demonstration they were very demoralised.

3. It is interesting if disgusting to see the whole technique of Hitler in Sudetenland unrolling itself before one's eyes. I have advised the Prime Minister to be extremely careful lest an incident be provoked. He has promised to take care, but says the Cabinet have decided that the next time groups of demonstrators are to be broken up while they are small.

4. Effect of K's interview and of street demonstration has been to concentrate support on the Prime Minister in Majlis. The press. Prime Minister's publicity has been poor and always late, but he intends I gather, to issue a statement in which he will deny that he promised Russians a concession and he may take a vote of Majlis to-morrow. Russian-controlled papers have [? group omitted] this by declaring elections were not properly conducted.

E 6305 187 24)

(21)

His Majesty's Consul, Meshed, to Mr Eden—(Received 29th October)(No. 45)
(Telegraphic)*Meshed, 28th October, 1944*

SITUATION Report No. 42

Soviet activities in Khorasan, including publicity, cultural work, support of

Persian apprehensions have correspondingly increased. An unfortunate incident of the 27th inst. has further increased the feeling of hostility and mistrust of our publicity and cultural work here on the part of Russian military authorities.

2. Yesterday speakers from balcony of Tudeh Headquarters addressed the crowd of several thousand, which completely blocked the main avenue. Speeches were repeated from lorries in other parts of the town. They violently attacked Saad Cabinet for trying to sell to Americans, "who are partners with other Powers," oil wanted by Persia's "northern neighbours."

3. Trouble is again brewing among Buzard tribes and Persian efforts to send troops to the area are still frustrated by Russian [group undecipherable] demand].

E 6661 6058 24)

(22)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 30th October)(No. 1115)
(Telegraphic)*Tehran, 30th October, 1944.*

YOL R telegram No. 702

Representative of Reuter and two American agencies has secured approval of the Prime Minister to telegrams which he has now to get past the Russian censors. I will watch and report the result. The Prime Minister has also given, in a talk with the American press, a statement in which he said that Persian news paper by Ka. He informs me it will be broadcast this evening in English and Russian.

2. The Prime Minister informs me over twenty newspaper editors have signed a declaration in support of his policy in regard to oil.

3. Military Governor has issued a warning that gatherings of more than three persons in the streets will be dispersed and that any persons resisting the order to disperse will be arrested. This is in accordance with Military Government regulations which have been in force since the occupation. Warning will, doubtless, be represented by Tass as terroristic attempt to prevent lovers of democracy from demonstrating in favour of the Russian but on the 28th inst. when 3,000 or 4,000 people paid for the purpose and encouraged by the presence of Red soldiers in the streets, a demonstration took place from Moscow reported 20,000 and represented Persian Government as trying to overawe them with tanks and troops.

4. The oil question was debated in Majlis meetings. Dr. Musavvigh demagogued but with a good reputation, supported Sa. . . . The other three speeches were all hostile. Reason for these three members of an opposition of perhaps twelve to speak was that when Sa. . . made first statement to the Majlis there was no debate and Molotov complained to Persian Ambassador in Moscow that the Persian Government had prevented supporters of Soviet proposal from speaking.

E 6670 615 G)

23,

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden—(Received 31st October)(No. 5874)
(Telegraphic)*Washington, 31st October, 1944.*

YOL R telegram No. 9394

State Department agree with lines of approach to Soviet Government over Persian oil which you propose, but they suggest that it would be wiser to omit any reference to United States as fourth signatory of paragraph 2 of your telegram in order to avoid giving Russians more strongly than can be avoided the feeling that we are ganging up on them.

2. State Department are telegraphing to-night instructions to United States representative at Moscow to make communication to Soviet Government on the following lines:

United States Government have noticed the public statements made by Kavtaradze in Tehran at a press conference and arguments used by the press in Moscow. They wish to let the Soviet Government know the action which United States Government has taken in the matter of applications for concessions. During the war, the United States Government have refused to grant them concessions during the war, the United States Government recognise that Persians have conducted negotiations in good faith and they have only asked that when negotiations are recommenced American interests should not receive less favourable treatment than the others. United States Government feel that sovereign and independent countries such as Persia have the right to withhold or grant concessions in their own territory. The United States Government are particularly concerned over concurrence in this principle in view of Tehran declaration and would not feel able to concur in any action which would constitute undue interference in Persian internal affairs.

3. The foregoing is a rough summary only.

4. State Department are not instructing their representative at Moscow to concert action with His Majesty's Ambassador for reasons given in paragraph 1 above but presume that he will in fact keep in touch with him.

E 6673 6056 34 (24)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden, (Received 31st October)

(No 1123, Confidential)
(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 31st October, 1944

ACCORDING to a reliable informant, Kavtaradze summoned a Persian who is both a Deputy and a newspaper proprietor and after vague threats directed against him and the Persians, more or less talked to the following effect:

2. Russia was the only country that would protect Persia. She wanted oil in North Persia in order to be able to protect Persia against Great Britain and the United States, who, after the war, would follow an imperialistic policy. Russia was extremely powerful. Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt were running off to Stalin whenever they wanted anything. The Persians were of course hoping to postpone granting concession until after the war because they thought that the Russians would then be less free to act. That was precisely why Russia wanted to secure concession now.

E 6717 94 34 (25)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden, (Received 1st November)

(No 1129)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 1st November 1944

MY telegram No 1121

Besides the troubles in Tabriz reported by acting British Consul General in his Situation Report No. 110, shops in Resht have been closed, in protest, it is alleged against attitude of Persian Prime Minister towards the Russians. There has also been some trouble in Isfahan, but I have no report from His Majesty's Consul.

2. Minister of Court informed United States Ambassador to-day that the Shah would have to sacrifice Saed unless he could be assured of American and British support. United States Ambassador said he could give no such assurance on behalf of his Government. To me M. Ala spoke less directly, though he asked whether I could give him any reply to representations reported in my telegram No. 1079, which of course I could not. Ala said that at a council held at the palace last night it was decided that if Saed was forced to go there was nothing to be done but to replace him by another Prime Minister who, in the matter of oil, would follow the same policy and so on indefinitely.

3. Saed, who is very tired, informed me to-day that he intended to submit his resignation in the hope that that might win his Government a few weeks' respite. This seems optimistic. He is, however, seeing representatives of Majlis parties to find out how far he can still count on support. Had he taken a vote at the beginning, he could have resigned as *non persona grata* to the Russians without prejudice to the attitude taken up by the Government and the Majlis, but events in Tabriz will have shaken the Deputies and he might not get so large a majority now though the real feeling of Majlis has not changed.

4. Radio Moscow, 31st October, broadcast a ferocious and baseless attack on Saed. He has drawn my attention to a passage which accuses him and other "reactionaries" unnamed of wishing to make Persia into a base for a line of attack on Russia. Saed associates this with a reference to North Persia by Kavtaradze as a "zone of security" in a recent talk between Kavtaradze and Persian Ambassador to Moscow, who is now here. Saed says that he has also been informed by a Persian in close contact with the Soviet Government that the Government are talking to this effect: "It is true that we asked for an oil concession, but the real point is that North Persia is a zone of security for us and we shall not let any foreigner show his nose there. It is a pity that Saed did not understand. We wanted to make the pill as palatable as possible."

E 6670 615 G)

(26)

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow)

(No 4080)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 1st November, 1944

WASHINGTON telegram No 3674 of 30th October

I shall be glad if you will now approach Soviet Government on the issue of paragraph 2 and if necessary paragraph 3 of my telegram No. 9394 to Washington of 26th October, but omitting reference to United States Government.

2. You will probably think it best to avoid being drawn into any irrelevant discussion either regarding the alleged benefits which the Soviet proposal would entail for Persia's economy or regarding the attitude of the Persian press or public opinion. Our information is that Saed has the support of responsible elements in Persia, and the fact that he has remained in office bears this out. But the important facts are that his Government is the legally constituted Government of Persia, that it has fulfilled its treaty obligations and that it consequently has the right to expect that the Soviet Government and ourselves will do the same. We have found it surprising to hear from the Soviet side that Saed's Government have obstructed passage of supplies to Russia.

E 6763 6056 34)

27

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden, (Received 4th November)

(No 1143)

(Telegraphic.)

Tehran, 4th November, 1944.

MY telegram No 1141

There are signs that the Soviet demand for oil is to be dropped. Indeed the Soviet Ambassador told me to-day that the oil question had never been raised between Kavtaradze and Saed, though the rage with which he uttered this stupendous falsehood was painful to witness. The Soviet demand for the head of Saed is however being pursued with greater violence. Saed is quite prepared to resign at once if he can secure postponement of oil issue.

E 6769 6056 34)

(28)

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No 732)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, 4th November 1944

PERSIAN Ambassador called on Sir A. Cadogan on the 3rd November to discuss Russian demand for oil concession in North Persia.

2. He did not add anything to what you have already reported, but he emphasised the gravity of the situation and the unexpectedness of the Russian

demands. He said that his Government were standing firmly on their decision not to grant any concession until after the war, and that even if the Government were to change, the new Government would maintain the same attitude.

3. Sir A. Cadogan said that he fully realized the difficult position in which the Persian Government found themselves. His Majesty's Government for their part had signed the Tripartite Treaty with Persia and had joined in the Tehran declaration of last year, and their position was therefore perfectly clear. They had also accepted the Persian Government's decision in regard to oil concessions and found no fault with it.

4. At the end of the speech, Sir A. Cadogan said that his Government were fully aware of the fact that the Persian Government were in a difficult position, and that what he desired was that we should intervene with the Soviet Government. He said that it might seem any appearance of our putting pressure on them, and that it was complete secrecy. The Ambassador said he fully understood this point.

If Persian Government again ask you what support His Majesty's Government will give them in the matter, it would be well not to divulge action. You may of course speak in the lines of the preceding paragraph.

(N 6957 60 38)

(20)

Sir A. Clark Kerr to Mr. Eden. (Received 8th November)

(No. 3300)

(Telegraphic)

Moscow 6th November, 1944

MY telegrams Nos. 3303 and 3304

You will have noticed in the latter part of Secretary's article of the 4th November that the demand for an oil concession that a recent reference in newspaper *Read* to a letter on this subject from United States Ambassador, Tehran, is made the occasion for an official enquiry as to how the presence of American troops in Persia without any treaty arrangement, such as exists in the case of Soviet Union and Britain.

2. The Soviet Government have been very active in their campaign for oil concession if they did not intend to carry it through at all costs. Its failure cannot but damage their credit abroad especially if all details came out and their use of Hitler technique becomes known. In this country Persians have seen what they thought impossible, viz., a Russian diplomatic defeat, and although they may feel the Russians will take revenge sooner or later, they have learnt that to stand up to the Russians is not necessarily to commit suicide. For the first time since the occupation of Persia the press, which was always ready to criticize us and later the Americans, has told the Russians some home truths, and it is hoped that this process will continue and not only tend to keep the Russians in order but also prevent the Russians supposing that the whole country is with them.

3. The death blow to the Russian scheme was of course dealt by British and American representations in Moscow, but some credit must go to the Persian Prime Minister who refused to resign even when many Deputies and high officials wavered and Radio Moscow accused him of wanting to use Persia as a base for Fascist aggression against Soviet Russia. His tranquility made Russian blustering seem slightly ridiculous and his reply to Kavyoradze received wider credence than Kavyoradze's accusations.

4. Soviet Embassy are still supporting the demand for Saad's resignation, but they and their Tudah followers are gravely discredited. It is not known whether Kavyoradze has left or will leave. But for him the Soviet Government could save their face by repudiating the Soviet Ambassador who may well have misled them as to the support Kavyoradze could count upon, but it is less easy to repudiate an assistant who was sent here on a special mission which he carried out under the glare of world publicity.

[E 6862/6058 34]

(30)

Lord of Halifax to Mr. Eden. (Received 7th November)

(No. 6005. Secret.)

Washington, 7th November, 1944

TEHRAN telegram No. 114

Wallace Murray said on 4th November that State Department had received a report of a remarkable and sudden change for the better in Soviet attitude. While it was only an assumption, he thought that it was fair to deduce that our common attitude and representations to [sic: I of] our two Governments in Moscow had had something to do with it. He felt much encouraged by this and thought that it would be an object lesson to those here who thought that it was useless to try and exercise influence so far [group undecipherable] and that there was nothing to be done but let position after position go by default. This may be premature or even wide of the mark, but it seemed undesirable to discourage his conclusion that to work closely with us is the only right policy for the United States.

2. Wallace Murray is, as you know, constantly preoccupied with the fear of Russian penetration in the Balkans and Middle East. It is clearly undesirable to encourage him to be anti Russian on general principles and on every issue, but his views about Russia are increasing the desire which I believe he has [group undecipherable] formed more and more definitely lately to co-operate with us on every issue. The opportunity was taken to impress upon him advantage of our consulting in advance on all matters and concerting our action. He expressed full agreement. It was also put to him that recent events showed even more conclusively the desirability of our helping the Persians to set their own house in order over the police and other matters. He said that he fully agreed and he would do his best to speed matters up. I have not yet heard anything further about the police since my telegram No. 3809.

E 6868 6058 34

(1)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 7th November)

(No. 1156)

Tehran, 7th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1151

How much credit should we give to the Persian Government for their campaign for oil concession if they did not intend to carry it through at all costs. Its failure cannot but damage their credit abroad especially if all details came out and their use of Hitler technique becomes known. In this country Persians have seen what they thought impossible, viz., a Russian diplomatic defeat, and although they may feel the Russians will take revenge sooner or later, they have learnt that to stand up to the Russians is not necessarily to commit suicide. For the first time since the occupation of Persia the press, which was always ready to criticize us and later the Americans, has told the Russians some home truths, and it is hoped that this process will continue and not only tend to keep the Russians in order but also prevent the Russians supposing that the whole country is with them.

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3. Soviet Embassy are still supporting the demand for Saad's resignation, but they and their Tudah followers are gravely discredited. It is not known whether Kavyoradze has left or will leave. But for him the Soviet Government could save their face by repudiating the Soviet Ambassador who may well have misled them as to the support Kavyoradze could count upon, but it is less easy to repudiate an assistant who was sent here on a special mission which he carried out under the glare of world publicity.

4. Russians can hardly sit down under this defeat, but, for the moment, the situation is better than it was before they made their extraordinary demand for an oil concession without offering any payment or anything in exchange except a vague promise of support at the Peace Conference.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th November.)

(No. 1167)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 5th November, 1944

ALTHOUGH Soviet Ambassador on 3rd November defended the retention by the Soviet censor of a telegram in plain language addressed by the Persian Government to the British Ambassador in Tehran, and that two others received 7th November were also being held up. I called on the Soviet Ambassador as soon as possible. He professed surprise and protest that I should not communicate with me and to-day he is alleged to be on holiday. The Soviet censor has, however, just informed his British colleague that the two earlier messages have been stopped, the latter ones passed. From [group undecypherable] message in plain language which was stopped by the Soviet Ambassador.

2. On the morning of 7th November British censor informed me that the Soviet censor had for twenty four hours been holding up two Persian Government telegrams, one to the Persian Ambassador, London, and one to the Persian Ambassador, Washington, and that two others received 7th November were also being held up. I called on the Soviet Ambassador as soon as possible. He professed surprise and protest that I should not communicate with me and to-day he is alleged to be on holiday. The Soviet censor has, however, just informed his British colleague that the two earlier messages have been stopped, the latter ones passed. From [group undecypherable] message in plain language which was stopped by the Soviet Ambassador.

3. As you are aware, our censorship agreement with Soviet authorities here provides for exemption of all Persian Government messages from censorship. Action of the Soviet censors which has of course been carried out under orders of the Soviet Ambassador is therefore serious breach of agreement with us as well as a particularly mean attempt to stifle the Persian case while giving world publicity to one-sided Soviet reports as in the article in *Lancet* of 4th November.

4. I have informed my United States colleague from whom I learned that the Persian representative in Washington has been enquiring about the missing telegrams from Tehran.

5. I shall protest to the Soviet Ambassador about the breach of the agreement.

E 6908 189 34]

No. 10

(1)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 9th November.)

(No. 1168)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 9th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1167

Persian Prime Minister says that he is receiving information from Russians by roundabout means, that if he resigns, oil question will be dropped and K. will leave a few days later. He is thinking of resigning after setting forth the history of the oil question for Majlis and for public. He says that the Russians have been employing, it will not be easy to find a successor. He is convinced that neither the Shah nor the Majlis will accept Qavam Al Saltana who is first choice of Soviet Embassy.

2. Referring to Moscow campaign against Prime Minister, I told the Soviet Ambassador yesterday that I had heard of no signs of success. The Prime Minister, M. Masimov, professed not to know such an expression had been used about Saltana, but said that his Cabinet had behaved badly. Pressed for details he could only quote matters of relatively minor importance. Finally he alleged that Saltana "would not even consider Soviet terms for oil concession." It is, of course, important part of Prime Minister's case that he was pressed to promise concession in principle without declaration of Soviet conditions. This is supported by K.'s statement to the press.

3. Prime Minister refused to allow Tudeh party to make a demonstration 7th November. [Group undecypherable] Several of their supporters who have been violent were arrested but released at night.

4. Newspapers which attacked the Prime Minister with particular acrimony, including the chief Tudeh organ, have been suppressed, but each has been immediately replaced by a paper bearing another name for which a licence had already been obtained. Prime Minister says there are 200 licensed newspaper titles still not utilized, and that he proposes to have a decree issued by Military Governor that all newspaper licences which have not yet been used are cancelled.

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 9th November)

(No. 1169)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 9th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1124

Various outgoing telegrams about crisis addressed to Reuter and American agencies (one in reply to cabled request for reports) were stopped by Soviet censor 8th November.

E 6965 189 34]

(3)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 10th November)

(No. 1175)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 10th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1168

The Majlis he felt he ought to submit his resignation as it might give the Russians an opportunity to drop the oil question at least [two groups undecypherable] it is known who will stop it. The Shah whom I saw yesterday, advised that the present various personalities are being mentioned.

2. The Shah whom I saw yesterday, advised that the present various personalities are being mentioned. He said that the Russians were not being accepted in London at its face value. He however suggested that the *Times* might have misunderstood the situation to say that there was no particular reason why negotiations should have to wait till the end of the war. He said freedom to discuss the oil [group undecypherable] question would come not with the end of the war but with the cessation of foreign troops, and that he was in favour of that being made clear. He was on this point, for as he said there could be no equality in [group undecypherable] if they had proved, willing to cut off food supplies of the capital and stop the Persian Government telegrams in violation of censorship agreement.

3. I showed the Shah extract published in *Iraq Times* from an article which appeared on 3rd November in the *Times* of London. The Shah was very happy to see that Russian propaganda was not being accepted in London at its face value. He however suggested that the *Times* might have misunderstood the situation to say that there was no particular reason why negotiations should have to wait till the end of the war. He said freedom to discuss the oil [group undecypherable] question would come not with the end of the war but with the cessation of foreign troops, and that he was in favour of that being made clear. He was on this point, for as he said there could be no equality in [group undecypherable] if they had proved, willing to cut off food supplies of the capital and stop the Persian Government telegrams in violation of censorship agreement.

4. The Shah said with reason that the crisis had not been all loss. Persians had shown that with all their faults and weaknesses they were [group undecypherable] patriotic when it came to the pinch, and the fact that for the first time some newspapers had begun to criticize the misdeeds of the Russians in Persia was a great gain.

5. I evaded discussion of the oil question, but I told the Shah that from press extracts I had seen I gathered that there was a general opinion in England that the methods used by the Russians were mistake. At the same time I deprecated talk of dishonesty in the press and urged that Persia should look rather to the United Nations scheme in which Russia would, we hoped, be a partner with Great Britain and the United States.

[E 6976 6058 34]

4.

Mr Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow)

No. 4241

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 11th November, 1944

TEHRAN telegram No. 1168 of 8th November

Though the fall of Persian Government may in the circumstances have been inevitable, and situation on the whole has improved, it cannot be assumed that crisis is completely over. If you have not yet had a reply to our representations to Soviet Government, I shall be glad if you will consider desirability of pressing for some statement of their attitude.

In any case please watch the situation and keep me informed

E 6938 6058 34]

(5)

Mr Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran.)

(No. 752)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 11th November, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 1167 of 8th November

Action of Soviet authorities in stopping these telegrams is inexcusable. You should press your representations to Soviet Ambassador strongly and inform me if he fails to authorise release of cypher messages.

E 6996 189 34]

(6)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 13th November)

(No. 1184)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 13th November 1944

MY telegram No. 1173

Most of the Deputies seem to favour Dr. Musaddiq as Persian Prime Minister. He has been asked to return to his seat in the Majlis on completion of his mission. This raises difficult constitutional question. Musaddiq would be hopeless at ordinary business and to show his independence might be a nuisance to us and to the Americans but it is believed that he would not sign a Russian oil concession.

2. Not only is Kavtaradze still here but he is emerging from Soviet Embassy where he had remained quietly for some time. Ministry of Agriculture were so ill advised as to organise totally unnecessary lunch to celebrate the Persian, British, Soviet anti-locust campaign and to invite the Soviet Ambassador and me. I have [group undecipherable] another engagement for that day and shall be represented by legal counsellor.

E 7021 6058 34]

(7)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 14th November)

(No. 1187)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 14th November, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 752

I made protest to the Soviet Ambassador in your name and asked whether the Soviet authorities intended to observe the censorship agreement which had been in force for three years or not. The ambassador alleged that the Soviet military authorities, finding that Saad was adopting a hostile attitude towards the U.S.S.R., ordered the Soviet censorship to stop certain telegrams. He would, however, consult K., who was in Tehran as the representative of Molotov. I said I was unaware of the status of K. here, but that the censorship agreement was clear and Persian Government telegrams were exempted from the censorship.

2. M. Maximov said that the Soviet Government had a right to expect co-operation from us when they were exposed to the hostility of the Persian Government. It was difficult to treat this seriously, but I did so, pointing out that our co-operation was always to be had in matters relating to aid to the Russians and all that that involved, but the Soviet Embassy could not expect us to support them in a dispute with the Persian Government about an oil concession. Maximov said that there were many other counts in the charge against Saad and he became almost lachrymose about the need for co-operation. I quoted a Russian proverb which I had invented for the occasion: "Cut the sheep's throat, but let it bleat." and the interview ended amicably, but I await M. Maximov's reply after his consultation with K.

E 7071 6058 34]

(8)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 16th November)

(No. 1205)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 16th November 1944

MY telegram No. 1187

The impression I gained from my last interview with the Soviet Ambassador is that in spite of the Soviet decoration which he received on the 7th November,

he is not at all easy in his mind about the oil business and this is supported by information from a person who meets many people on the fringe of the Soviet Embassy. According to informant, opinion of these Russians is that set-back in Soviet plan was due to the ambassador who, puffed up with his rapid advancement, persuaded himself that he could secure concession and recommended that K. should come for the purpose. Whether this is true or not, it would seem that any publicity which suggests that Soviet authority in Tehran went too far, that Moscow was not fully informed, and so on, is to be welcomed since it gives the Soviet Government a way out if they need one.

E 7101 6058 34]

(9)

Mr. Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow)

(No. 4306)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 16th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 4241 of 11th November and Tehran telegrams Nos. 1175, 1184, and 1167 of 10th and 13th November

The fact that Kavtaradze is still in Tehran and again showing signs of activity does not suggest that Soviet Government have in fact decided to drop the oil question. Indeed, it appears that having hinted to Persian Prime Minister that they would do so if he resigned, they are now preparing to renew pressure on Persian Government. Press attacks on Saad reported in your telegram No. 3301 seem to bear this out.

2. If you have still received no reaction from Soviet Government to your representations, please speak to Molotov personally and impress upon him that this is a question in which His Majesty's Government are bound to take a close interest, in view of the joint guarantees of Persian integrity to which they are a party. I accordingly wish to have an explanation of the continued pressure which is being put on the Persian Government.

To Washington only. "Please inform State Department."

E 7093 189 34]

(10)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden—(Received 17th November)

(No. 1212)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 17th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1184

Musaddiq's conditions have proved to be unacceptable to Deputies, who are now looking elsewhere for a Prime Minister. Meanwhile complete stagnation reigns in all departments of the Government.

E 7101 6058 34]

(11)

Mr Eden to the Earl of Halifax (Washington)

(No. 4307)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 17th November, 1944

MY telegram 4306 to Moscow of 16th November

Please suggest to State Department that they should send similar instructions to American Ambassador in Moscow. The situation seems unlikely to deteriorate if there is undue delay in making Soviet Government realise strength of our common views on this subject.

E 7115 6058 34]

(12)

Mr Eden to Sir A. Clark Kerr (Moscow.)

(No. 4350)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 19th November, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 3442 of 18th November

You will have seen my telegram No. 4345 of 18th November recording Sir A. Cadogan's interview with Soviet Counsellor. We thought it only right to

[30547]

D

E 7186 615 G]

(5)

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No. 797)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 23rd November, 1944

MY telegram No. 788 and your telegram No. 1241

Have you yet taken action authorised in paragraph 2 of my telegram under reference? If not, I think the time has now come to do so.

2. Unless there is any strong reason to the contrary, you should yourself see the new Persian Prime Minister as soon as possible, sound him as to the line he intends to take, and encourage him to maintain the policy of his predecessor.

[E 7271 616 G]

(6)

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran).

(No. 262)

S

Foreign Office, 23rd November, 1944

THE Persian Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, when his Excellency said that he was much troubled by the situation which had developed in his country. As I knew, he had been home on leave at the time when the incidents began. The Russians had brought in a few lorry loads of agitators from outside Tehran and had staged a wholly unreal demonstration. His Excellency said that he was much disturbed that this action should have been taken so soon after our departure from Moscow and he was apprehensive as to what the real Russian intentions were.

2. I told the Ambassador that we too had been taken by surprise by these events. It was true that Persia had not been discussed at Moscow and, indeed, there was no reason why it should have been since our relations, like those of the Soviet Union, towards Persia were governed by our joint agreement. The Ambassador said that he was much disturbed that this action should have been taken so soon after our departure from Moscow and he was apprehensive as to what the real Russian intentions were.

3. I then asked the Ambassador about the new Prime Minister. He said that he was much troubled by the situation which had developed in his country. As I knew, he had been home on leave at the time when the incidents began. The Russians had brought in a few lorry loads of agitators from outside Tehran and had staged a wholly unreal demonstration. His Excellency said that he was much disturbed that this action should have been taken so soon after our departure from Moscow and he was apprehensive as to what the real Russian intentions were.

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I am &c

ANTHONY EDEN

E 7241 6058 34)

(7)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 24th November)

(No. 1251)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 24th November 1944

YOC R telegram No. 797

I informed M. Ala to-day that His Majesty's Government, basing their representations on Tripartite Treaty declaration of Tehran about Persia, &c., had expressed their concern to the Soviet Government both in Moscow and in London at the deterioration of relations between Russia and Persia and had asked for information. M. Ala was greatly relieved and pleased.

2. Soviet Ambassador being ill. Soviet Counsellor called on new Persian Prime Minister the 23rd November. Fortified I trust by my visit of the previous day, Prime Minister (according to M. Ala) gave a firm though conciliatory reply to counsellor on oil question saying this had been decided by the Majlis and public opinion (see my immediately following telegram).

3. I had delayed to reply to paragraph 2 of your telegram No. 788 because I wished first to see American Ambassador. I have now seen him. He had no up-to-date instructions from his Government and even seemed doubtful what to say if he should be asked by the Prime Minister what line to take with Russia. It will weaken our case very much if Persians think we are acting alone. After our conversation I hope my American colleague will at least tell Persians that they cannot now change their minds about oil concessions without making American public sceptical about any cry of distress that may reach America from this country.

E 7225 6058 24

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 24th November)

(No. 1252. Secret)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 24th November, 1944

MY immediately preceding

According to M. Ala conversation with the Soviet Counsellor Avalov and the Persian Prime Minister.

2. Avalov, a Georgian with a quiet diffident manner, was very conciliatory. He said that brusque hostile treatment accorded by Saad to the Soviet offer had caused great surprise and resentment. British and American companies had been allowed to negotiate for a long time whereas the offer from Russia was rejected at once as though she were, e.g., Mexico (Foreign Office will hear the echo of Lavrinov in this) instead of a great and friendly neighbour. Kavyaradze had asked Moscow whether he might leave but had been instructed to remain until the formation of the new Government. Russia wanted good relations, &c. The object was mutual benefit.

3. The Prime Minister expressed equal desire for good relations. His Cabinet was not yet definitely formed, and he could not speak for the Government but as far as he himself was concerned the question of an oil concession was settled. Saad had merely expressed the desire of the great majority of the Majlis and of the public for the removal of foreign troops and (he added) the departure of foreign troops, and as the new Prime Minister, he could only give the same reply. On all other points he hoped that there would be friendly discussion.

4. According to M. Ala, Avalov did not contest this but he questioned the Prime Minister closely as to the composition of the new Cabinet. He wanted to know whether it would include any member of the outgoing Cabinet. The Prime Minister evaded this question. In fact he will probably continue to enjoy the support of Majlis as Minister of the Interior. Avalov was also anxious to know whether Ahmed (Personality No. 16) would be included, and was so adept as to say Ahmed was reputed to be pro-Russian. It is well known that Ahmed was ejected from the Ministry of War not so long ago because the Russians held him to be "pro-British" and they might well [group under-standable] he would not permit demonstrations and would suppress violent newspapers fearlessly. The Prime Minister however has no intention to prefer so decided a character and told Avalov that Ahmed would not be in the Cabinet.

[E 7266 6058 34]

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 26th November)

(No. 1261)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 26th November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1251

The Shah expresses deep gratification at the friendly and helpful attitude of His Majesty's Government at this difficult moment.

[30547]

2. Being now in good heart himself the Shah will I hope encourage his new Cabinet. My impression is that he helped to force Sa . . . to resign, hoping thereby to propitiate the Russians, but at that time he did not know whether to expect support from Great Britain and America or not. He is still unaware of the attitude of the American Government.

E 7335 6058 34

(10)

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden.—(Received 29th November)

(No 6372)

(Telegraphic)

Washington 29th November, 1944

TEHRAN telegrams to Foreign Office, Nos. 1251 and 1261

I am pressing the State Department to instruct the United States Ambassador, Tehran, to say something encouraging to the Persians. They expect Harriman to reach Tehran in a few days time and are at present inclined to await a report from him. I have suggested that they should either—

- (a) authorise the United States Ambassador to say something to the Persians before then, either of his own accord or if questioned, or
- (b) authorise Harriman to say something

E 7383 6058 34

(11)

Earl of Halifax to Mr Eden.—(Received 2nd December)

(No 6428)

(Telegraphic)

Washington, 1st December, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 10051

In response to our suggestion that United States Government should [group undecipherable, I say] something to Persian Government to encourage them, State Department have instructed United States Ambassador at Tehran to inform Persian Prime Minister of the fact of the American *démarche* in Moscow saying it was made in the spirit of declaration of 1st December, 1943

2. State Department have also asked Mr Harriman for an early report

E 7414 6058 34

(12)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 3rd December)

(No 1253)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 3rd December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1260

I have no doubt that as soon as Bayat has obtained vote of confidence in Majlis, Soviet Embassy will make another attempt to obtain oil rights in some form or other. Persian Prime Minister has included among his Ministers two members of Saed's Cabinet and it is believed that if he secures vote of confidence he will appoint as Minister of Agriculture Nakhai, who was Saed's Minister of Commerce and Industry. Soviet Embassy, though they refused to invite Surani to their party, have not made his presence in the Cabinet reason for refusing to have relations with new Prime Minister and Russians in general are outwardly more discreet. Thus they are unlikely to behave in regard to Tudeh demonstrations as they did in Tehran and Tabriz. Nevertheless there are not lacking signs of intimidation. Many persons, official and private, have recently been ejected from Northern Zone by Russians as hostile to them and Prime Minister is receiving from those parts a stream of obviously inspired group undecipherable telegrams asking for security for "liberal" parties, death for Saed, exile for [undecipherable]. Saad Ziaee and [undecipherable] took part in first day of debate on programme of new Government when diplomatic box in Majlis contained six (later increased to nine) Russians, and of the six several were unknown to this embassy [group undecipherable: I and had] that well known underground look. This demonstration did not prevent one Tudeh orator from receiving so hostile a reception that he had to moderate his tone considerably. Menahel pro Russian papers are doing well some success to date on the issue, viz., the right of Persian Government to postpone talks about oil concessions until foreign troops have left the country.

2. Question which is doubtless a feeler from Russians has been put to the Shah by Iraj Iskandari, leader of the Tudeh Deputies in Majlis. According to Minister of [group undecipherable], who spoke to me on instructions from Shah, Iraj Iskandari asked whether an interesting suggestion made by Dr Musaddiq in a speech in Majlis on 29th October might not form basis of settlement with Persian Government. Suggestion was that oil in North Persia should be exploited by a Persian company and surplus sold to Russia at average international price. (Alternative suggestion made in same speech viz., that oil should be exploited by an international company was not mentioned by Iraj Iskandari). In discussion with Ala I found him suspicious that this was merely a device by which Russians might secure control in practice under a Persian cloak, since so long as they had troops in the north they would not allow Persian Government or a Persian company to employ there any person to whom they objected. I said that exploitation by a native company was natural way to retain control of resources, but if Persians could not produce oil experts with required experience and in adequate numbers, Persian Government must consider whether they would have free hand to recruit them elsewhere. If Prime Minister speaks to me about Iraj Iskandari's scheme, I shall not conceal my opinion that sensible course is to stick to his declared policy not to discuss oil until foreign troops have gone.

E 7415 6058 34

(13)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 3rd December)

(No 1254)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 3rd November, 1944

MY telegram No. 1253

Oil question took unexpected turn on 2nd December when Dr Musaddiq presented a Bill which was rushed through under double urgency procedure. Article 1 provides that no Prime Minister, Minister, &c., shall enter into negotiations about oil having official or legal parity with any foreign Governments or with any oil companies or any person or sign any agreement connected with oil. Article 2 covers [undecipherable] of oil and manner in which Persian Government should exploit and manage its oil deposits but must inform the Majlis of such conversations. Article 3 lays penalty for infringement of this law as solitary confinement for from three to [undecipherable] years and permanent dismissal from Government service.

E 7424 6058 34

(14)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 4th December)

(No 1254)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 4th December, 1944

1. PUTY Rahuman tried 3rd December to find backers for a Bill providing for cancellation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company concession. He found none and no other arrangement so project was dropped.

2. R., who is a member for Kuchan at Eastern end area over which Russians demanded exploring rights, is not officially a member of Tudeh party but he owes his election entirely to Russians.

E 7439 6058 34

(15)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 5th December)

(No 1290)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 5th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1256

Mr. Harriman happened to call on the Soviet Ambassador just after receipt of news of [undecipherable] Oil Concession Bill. He told me that Maximov was very angry and Kavtaradze, though more contained in his language, was equally definite in his opinion that this rebuff could not be accepted. Maximov suggested to Harriman that the law was directed against America and Russia since Great Britain already had a concession, but Harriman said that his Government were not interested in that but in the application of the declaration about Persia and the independence of small nations. Maximov's line was that the land

{30547}

D 4

of the country was owned by 300 families, that Majlis represented only 5 per cent of the population and that the Government must become more democratic. Harriman gained the impression that Maximov intended to exercise influence over the next elections.

2. I understand that Tudeh Deputies opposed the Bill and mustered only 7 votes whereas about 80 voted for it.

[E 7425 6058 34]

(16)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 4th December)

(No. 1291)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 4th December, 1944

WASHINGTON telegram No. 6420

Harriman saw Shah to-day. By agreement with American Ambassador who was present he informed the Shah that United States Government had expressed to Soviet Government its concern at crisis in Persia. He added, however, that while United States Government and presumably British Government viewed the matter with concern and sympathy it was a Persian-Russian problem.

2. Harriman said that he had been giving the Shah a long time of anxiety. The Shah was particularly worried at reports that demonstrators had been collected in Russian lorries for meetings in northern towns which talked about autonomy though he claimed that spectators showed no interest. Harriman then told Shah that Persian Government could not expect sympathy unless they could offer the population prospects which could compete with those held out by Russian sympathisers. Shah agreed. I told Harriman that I had been giving Shah and Persian military authorities similar warnings for three years and that in particular I suggested to them long ago that in order to forestall demands for autonomy which they feared might be received from northern provinces they should spontaneously apply to all provinces provision in Constitution for creation of provincial councils.

3. Harriman said that he had been giving the Shah a long time of anxiety. The Shah was particularly worried at reports that demonstrators had been collected in Russian lorries for meetings in northern towns which talked about autonomy though he claimed that spectators showed no interest. Harriman then told Shah that Persian Government could not expect sympathy unless they could offer the population prospects which could compete with those held out by Russian sympathisers. Shah agreed. I told Harriman that I had been giving Shah and Persian military authorities similar warnings for three years and that in particular I suggested to them long ago that in order to forestall demands for autonomy which they feared might be received from northern provinces they should spontaneously apply to all provinces provision in Constitution for creation of provincial councils.

[E 7524 189 34]

(17)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th December)

(No. 1312)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 8th December 1944

MY telegram No. 1201

Tudeh broadsheet published Tehran gives forecast of what is deemed the Russian policy. It quotes statement of an unnamed Tudeh leader of 1000 people at a meeting on 2nd December and refers to a meeting of the Tudeh Central Committee in Moscow. It says that the Tudeh Government is determined to implement laws into operation which will lead to the arrest and exile of Soviet agents. It also mentions the Tudeh Government's intention to take steps to put the country on a new basis. The Government agree so much the better if they express their intention to the people to work for a new Government.

2. Broadsheet ends with congratulations to freedom lovers of Persia from Central United Council (group omitted) workmen, workers and toilers of Persia and a promise of active support.

[E 7546 6056 34]

(18)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 10th December)

(No. 1316)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 10th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1201

According to new Minister for Foreign Affairs Intizam with whom I have just had my first interview, Maximov and Kavtoradze called on the Prime Minister on 7th December, and Maximov read from a paper statement to the effect that the Soviet Government were dissatisfied with relations between the two countries and that the passing of the Oil Concession Bill had increased the difficulties. Kavtoradze informed the Prime Minister that he was leaving for Moscow by first aircraft. He is in fact leaving to-day. Minister for Foreign Affairs is seeing him off at the airfield.

2. As the United States Ambassador is informing the Prime Minister of the approach of United States Ambassador in Moscow to the Soviet Government about the crisis here (this is in addition to message given to the Shah by Harriman), I told the Minister for Foreign Affairs that His Majesty's Government had expressed to the Soviet Government, both in Moscow and through the Soviet Ambassador in London, their concern at the crisis and their desire for information.

[E 7546 6058 34]

(19)

Mr. Eden to Sir R. Bullard (Tehran)

(No. 1316)

(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office, 14th December, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 1316 of 9th December

With Kavtoradze's departure there may be a lull in the Soviet-Persian dispute, but in view of Soviet attitude as described by Soviet Ambassador in your telegram under reference, no long respite can be expected, and Russians may well return to the charge shortly.

2. Persians have been able to resist the first Russian attack largely because it was clumsily made. Russians cannot be expected to repeat their mistakes, and it seems likely that when they renew pressure on the Persian Government they will do so by more insidious means. They may, for instance, try to blackmail Persian Government by means of threat of social disturbances or separatist movements in northern provinces (compare your telegrams No. 1312 of 8th December and No. 1320 of 10th December).

3. It therefore seems important that Persian Government should consider carefully the measures which they can take to meet the pressure of Soviet Government before pressure is resumed. In particular, it seems desirable that they should (a) take immediate steps to implement measures of social reform on the lines advocated by Mr. Harriman and yourself (your telegram No. 1201 of 4th December) (b) take steps granted under the powers granted by article 2 of the Bill reported in your telegram No. 1244 of 3rd December which would show that the Persian Government are taking active steps to put the country on a new basis. Mr. Butler spoke in the above sense to Persian Ambassador, who called on 13th December to say that the new Government intended to continue their predecessor's policy, and to seek information as to the action which His Majesty's Government had taken in Moscow. If Persian Government do nothing in the directions indicated Russians could represent their attitude as being purely obstructive and dog-in-the-manger. It is therefore essential that Persian Government should lose no time in taking action.

4. If you see no objection please speak to the Shah and Persian Prime Minister in this sense. I should at the same time be grateful for your observations on the action which Persian Government can most usefully take under paragraph 3 (b).

5. For your own information it is unlikely that Persian Government will be able indefinitely to debar Russians from participation in some form or other in the exploitation of oil deposits in North Persia. But they can hope to postpone negotiations until such time as these can take place in conditions which would enable Persian Government to obtain reasonable terms, i.e., after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. If they are to hold the Russians off until then, it is important that they should lose no opportunity of strengthening their case and that their general line of action should be one which would justify support of His Majesty's Government should this again be required.

E 7550 180 34)

(20)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 11th December)

(No. 1320)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 10th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1316.
The Persian Government are very nervous and their anxiety was increased when Kavytoradze evaded all attempts of Ministry for Foreign Affairs to have a meeting for discussion with Kavytoradze before he left.
2. Russians have now given Court a hint by declaring on Moscow radio that Ala as well as Sued was behind the law about oil concessions.
In my telegram No. 1290 I mentioned what Harriman described as a clumsy attempt by Maximov to cause disunion between British and Americans. According to United States Ambassador [? group omitted] is continuing this policy though in a slightly more discreet way. Same note is struck in a venomous article in the Persian press that if American troops had not been present in Rome blood of Italian people would have been shed like Greeks.
4. Tudeh newspaper *Rokhdar* published 10th December leading article from Ala as well as Sued's article. Kavytoradze's Persian authority would even consider his proposals and because the ruling classes were not to his difficulties. Object of Russian Government was not to obtain imperialist concession, but to prevent imperialist influence in Persia. Who would still all democratic tendencies and friendly feelings towards Russia? Soviet Government had not made so many sacrifices only to find another reactionary barrier erected against her and a Government like the hired Government of Poland or the dictatorship Reza established. If after the war armies of the three Powers left Persia, only the influence of Russia would in fact be removed for as everyone knew Persian Government, Majlis and politicians did not belong to the Persian people but were merely agents with no will of their own. The Majlis and Mr. Musaddiq had not done away with the problem, but only removed it from competence of Persian Government and handed it over to foreign circles.
5. A few days ago a Caucasian Armenian was murdered before witnesses by five masked men. At least seven Caucasians murdered or disappeared about three years ago, and there was another batch of cases two years ago. Whether, as the public believe, Soviet authorities were connected with these incidents or not the latest murder is being taken by many Persians as a warning.

E 7634 6058 34)

(22)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December)

(No. 1330)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 14th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1325.

The Persian Prime Minister informs me that the newspaper which published offensive article on British policy in Greece &c, viz, *Azhir*, is to be suspended

2. While Maximov was ill, Avalov, the counsellor, asked whether anything

had been done to suppress the Tudeh papers, which he volunteered had enhanced reputation of Sued by the violence of their attacks. For my view I said I had always been in favour of moderation in the press and avoidance of personalities and that I would suggest to the Prime Minister that he should begin by recommending moderation to journalists of all parties. I did so, but Maximov chose rather to demand (with success) the suppression of three newspapers which supported Sued policy.

3. During the last few weeks newspapers on both sides have been suppressed, but the Military Governor, in spite of the fact that he is the best and most courageous we have had, has allowed all pro-Russian papers to reappear, whereas several on the other side have had to adopt subterfuge of appearing under another name. In the case of *Azhir*, I informed the new Minister for Foreign Affairs that the attitude of the new Government to this article would be a test case.

4. Prime Minister assures me that he intends to check the violence of the press of all parties, but I shall be surprised if he proves to be able to apply this policy impartially.

E 7634 6058 34

23

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December)

(No. 1332)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 14th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1330.

I have received the following additional information from the Persian Prime Minister. Maximov also said that the Soviet Government expected oil concession law to be amended but suggested as an alternative that the Shah should refuse to ratify the law. The Prime Minister pointed out the difficulties attending these suggestions, but said that the law permitted the Persian Government to discuss the sale of oil. He said that the Persian Government had no capital for exploitation of oil and that the only practical way was the one the Soviet Government had proposed. The Prime Minister reminded him that the late Shah built the railway out of (group undecipherable) Persian money.

2. Since the demonstration at Tabriz on the 1st December there have been no more demonstrations and no telegram of protest have been addressed to the Government. The Prime Minister believes with some reason that the Tudeh are waiting while the Soviet Government make up their mind after hearing K's report what to do next.

E 7634 6058 34

24

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 14th December)

(No. 1337)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 14th December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1332.

In its issue of 13th December Persian newspaper published by Soviet Embassy reports the following statement which K is alleged to have made to certain Deputies about his parting conversation with the Persian Prime Minister—

2. The passing of oil concession law must be considered a mistake caused by pressure exercised by enemies of Persian-Soviet friendship and as such and Sued's law was the best start with the experience of foreign concessions in Persia. Soviet Government are convinced that the Majlis will correct the mistake. The concession asked for by the U.S.S.R. was not an imperialist concession. It would help Persia to develop her economy and develop the economic life of the country. After the expiration of the concession the equipment would be left to Persia. Soviet development and created by certain Deputies of atmosphere hostile to the U.S.S.R. had aggravated the difficulties and K was therefore leaving for Moscow.

E 7897 6038 34]

(25)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 15th December)

(No. 1340) Secret

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 15th December 1944

MY telegram No. 1325

Minister of Court has brought message from the Shah saying how much His Majesty admired Mr. Churchill's speech about Greece in the House of Commons and the determination it expressed not to allow a minority to impose its will on the country by force. The Shah, according to Ala, feared that some such attempt might be made here with support from the outside.

2. Events in Greece are being utilised by the pro-Russian press, which, in articles of the greatest virulence, draws parallels between what international reactionary capitalists and imperialists are alleged to be doing in liberated countries and what Saad Sayyid Zia and their "masters" are represented as having tried to do here viz: to hold down mass of Persian people who demand closer relations with Russia, the defender of freedom. This propaganda is not without effect on the public, but it is perhaps of more use to the Soviet authorities as providing them with an excuse for any policy they may decide to adopt here in defence of "rights of oppressed majority."

3. Persian authorities are very nervous. They have tales that Russians have within the last few months rented large premises in various parts of Tehran and that in all of them are garrisoned troops ready, they suggest, to intervene if the Government tries to repress disorder created by Tudeh. Russians have undoubtedly rented a number of houses for undefined purposes, but if they wish to intervene in street disturbances, they do not need special premises for the purpose. It seems to me that the wisest course is for them to encourage autonomous move in Azerbaijan. Provision in the Constitution for provincial councils and the admitted neglect of the provinces and particularly of Azerbaijan by Persian Government provides quite good pretext, while the leadership taken by Tudeh and the Russian influence nearly forty years ago affords a valuable precedent which would enable the Russians to take an air of verisimilitude to an otherwise unconvincing narrative. Nothing that the Russians could carry off successfully is excluded, but something that would look well to "advanced" circles in Great Britain and America would probably be preferred. Persian Government may, however, out of fear of lack of skill in negotiation make such forms of pressure superfluous, by entrusting effective control of exploitation of the northern oil to the Russian experts working for a nominal Persian company.

E 7822 6058 34]

(26)

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 21st December)

(No. 1354)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 21st December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1337 and your telegram No. 848

Soviet Ambassador has informed the Persian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs that according to telegraphed instructions which he has received from Moscow Soviet Government share the opinion expressed by Koryotadze on eve of his departure from Tehran and that nothing has occurred since to cause them to change their mind. This means that relations with U.S.S.R. cannot be good until oil concession law has been amended.

2. I have spoken strongly to the Shah and Prime Minister on lines laid down in your paragraph 2. Shah has always pressed for reforms including the breaking up of big estates (he has no estates) and heartily welcomed your recommendation on this point. Prime Minister foresees excellent results not expected by many other people from transfer of Millsaugh's economic powers to himself or his nominees which he hopes to bring about and claims to have planned to distribute essential commodities to rural and tribal areas. He professes to be ready to break up State lands into small holdings especially for peasants. He has a plan to have a few oil fields worked by a Persian company.

3. Both the Shah and Prime Minister said they realised that northern oil could not be left undeveloped indefinitely. Prime Minister said that he had already planned a Bill for presentation to Majlis providing for the formation of a Persian company to bore for oil. He did not seem to think it mattered that in

wartime it might be difficult to find foreign experts, other than Russian, British and American. Persia, he said, possessed experts—by which he appeared to mean Persians trained by Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. I asked whether a survey would be made to determine establishment of sites for borings and Prime Minister said that borings would be made at two sites indicated in papers handed by Amiranian Company. This company abandoned its concession activities, I understand, not because they found no oil, but because it could not profitably be brought to Persian Gulf.

4. I did not feel that the Prime Minister appreciated the difficulty of exploiting oil deposits. Many Persians suspect, however, that he proposes to give Russians a concession in everything but name. It will doubtless be necessary, as you point out, to give Russians an interest in northern oil, but group under Russian participation. Whether Bayat's Government will survive long enough to accomplish anything is uncertain. He has a wire-puller's majority in Majlis at present, but no one forecasts long life for his Cabinet. If, however, he seems to be making genuine attempt to solve the two problems stated in your above-mentioned telegram, we should do nothing to accelerate his fall for every Cabinet crisis tends to weaken Government in general in Persia.

5. Last sentence of your paragraph 4. I hope to reply in two or three days.

E 7847 6058 34

27

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 22nd December)

(No. 1363)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 22nd December, 1944

MY telegram No. 1325 paragraph 2

In a speech in the Majlis on the 19th December Dr. Muaddiq denied that he had any communication with Saad or Ala, or Sayyid Zia, or indeed anyone before tabling his Oil Concession Bill. He admitted that one of the things that provoked the Government was the fact that the three Powers had acted in Persia as she did without consulting Great Britain and America has been interpreted by some newspapers as a hint that the three Powers should dispose of Persian oil between themselves.

2. Muaddiq defended his action in refusing to back the Bill for cancellation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession (my telegram No. 1280). Existing agreements could not be cancelled by unilateral action or there would next be a Bill for cancellation of Persian Soviet Treaty of 1921. Muaddiq concluded by dealing with demand for a policy of equilibrium by which supporters of Russia mean that because the British have a concession the Russians ought to have one. Persia must not try to settle old accounts with her neighbours by taking away what is considered too much or by giving to others on the ground that they have received too little. Policy of "passive balance" requires that in future nothing shall be given to any Government if it involves harm to Persian interests.

E 7943 6058 34]

28

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 20th December)

(No. 1384)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran 20th December, 1944

YOUR telegram No. 848

It is a question whether Russian participation in exploitation of Persian oil can ever be reasonable. For Russia to buy surplus of North Persian oil on reasonable terms would be easy since world prices afford a criterion. When it comes to exploitation of Persian oil by the Russians will ever regard this as reasonable, not merely because terms cannot be competitive (since Russian demand is for exclusive rights in the north), but for reasons which can be summarised as follows: any Soviet company or organisation is a branch of Soviet Government and exploitation of oil deposits in Persia by any such company or organisation would involve encroachment on Persian sovereignty. (Fact that His Majesty's Government have a controlling financial interest in Anglo-Iranian Oil Company does not really alter the position and is not

regarded by Persians as doing so, they are well aware that despite British Majesty's Government). No great Power, and no other Power which was out of Russia's reach, would permit such encroachment and if Persia has to submit it will be because she is weak and because assurance in Tripartite Treaty of 1942 and Three Power Declaration about Persia which was made at Tehran Conference are worthless. Even mere participation by the Russians in exploitation of Persian oil fields could not withstand Russian pressure. Control of exploitation of oil reserves control of oil area. It is a short step from this to control of North Persia by Russians and after that independence of Persia is gone.

2. In my opinion this Persian reasoning is correct. In peace time it could be used with object but now it is used now at the moment of greatest need. Russian pressure in the north is tremendous, and whereas at first Russians demanded oil knowing, doubtless, that political control would follow, they have now reversed the process and are using measures little short of political control in order to obtain oil.

3. I keep myself open to the possibility that it is not sufficient to form a Persian company, since it is agreed that it is exploitation that matters and one of the Russian arguments is her need for security, i.e., assurance against establishment of potential hostile influence in Northern Persia. Only suggestion I have heard that holds out any hope is that Persian Government should invite Soviet Government to choose, to assist Persian Government in exploitation of their northern oil resources, experts from any country or countries neutral in the matter, i.e., any but Great Britain, United States and U.S.S.R., Persian Government would probably have to retain right of veto lest Soviet Government should send persons of doubtful loyalty, or persons trained by them at Baku; but high standard of education and skill required would act as a filter to some extent.

4. I should be glad to know as soon as possible whether you approve of this suggestion.

5. It cannot be denied that unless she obtains concession in the north, Russia will attempt to secure cancellation of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's concession in the south and may well prove successful. Against this risk, however, must be set far graver risks inherent in her obtaining of northern concession. For reasons set forth above this would lead eventually to termination of Persia's independence and hence incidentally termination of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. But even before this happened Russia could, and in my opinion would, use her concessionary powers in the north to render position of Anglo-Iranian Oil Company impossible by using her oil fields as a basis for a new oil company which would disrupt Anglo-Iranian Oil Company labour market, and she would also be able to export Baku oil at cut-throat competitive rates by using Persian oil for her internal needs. Apart from their intrinsic advantages to Russia, such preliminary manoeuvres would facilitate achievement of her ultimate objective.

E 4471 155 34)

No. 12

Mr. Lancelotti to Mr. Eden. (Received 27th July)

(No 723)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 27th July, 1944

HIS Majesty's Ambassador's telegram Nos. 458 and 514

Persian Government to-day published as from themselves a long communiqué text follows but which is in essence the gist of the Kashani and Naubakht in fifth column activities.

2. Both these persons and others have been taken into custody upon production of a letter from him to Rashid Ali and Mufti in Berlin and Persian members of joint commission had perforce to neglect cogent evidence. I therefore proposed issuing a joint communiqué, for which there are precedents, and submitted draft. The Prime Minister however insisted on cutting out all mention of joint nature of the interrogation and of the fact that the Persian side were not satisfied regarding the findings. He also insisted on a unilateral Persian communiqué ostensibly in order to assume full responsibility before Majlis but in reality, we suspect, in order to make it appear as though the Government were merely acting at our dictation. Furthermore he watered down the text by omitting a passage implicating Qavam es Saltaneh and references to

"guilt" of the accused (on grounds that only a legally constituted court could establish the guilt). He and the Cabinet have shown moral cowardice throughout the discussions but even in its present form communiqué is sufficiently damning for our purposes.

3. The Government are under strong pressure to bring Kashani and Naubakht to Tehran for internment and to allow them various privileges. Internees at Tehran are inadequately guarded (one of them has even been able to secure publication in the press of articles attacking the Prime Minister himself) and in these circumstances I propose to resist all proposals for further transfers from Sultanabad at least until the security has been radically improved. I am also protesting strongly to the Prime Minister at the release on his personal written assurance for which we had asked that they would not be re-employed on the railway.

E 4480/156/34)

No. 13

Mr. Lancelotti to Mr. Eden. (Received 15th August)

(No 34. Saving)

(Telegraphic)

Tehran, 27th July 1944

The following is a summary of a report which the investigation authorities have submitted to the Cabinet about Seyyid Abul Qasim Kashani and Naubakht.

Habibullah Naubakht said that just before the Japanese Mission left Persia he was told by the Japanese Minister that a German had remained behind after the events of Shahrivar. He discovered later that this was Franz Mayr when he met him along with Mohammed Hassan Husam Vaziri and Hussein Nevandi at the latter's house in the Khasbanch Shahpour. The first political discussion Naubakht admitted to having with the Mayr group was a week or two later at the house of Sayid Naghibzadeh Mushayekh. He said that Franz Mayr, Mohammed Hassan Husam Vaziri, Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani and Ahmad Vaziri were the founders of a new society called the Hub-i-Melina. Naubakht had several more meetings with Vaziri and Mayr before they left Persia. Mayr was called Berthold Schulze, who was a major in the Luftwaffe, was to go to join the Qashgai tribe. Naubakht admitted to having accompanied this man on the journey and said that when they reached their destination Schulze produced a radio transmitting set, which he had brought with him. On his return, Naubakht was while he was returning from this journey that he heard, in Isfahan, how a German had had a quarrel with his Armenian collaborator, that a suitcase full of documents had come into the possession of the Allies, and that General Zahidi had been arrested. Since he knew that Mayr had had relations with Zahidi he inferred that the German was no other than Mayr. Worried about what happened, he accepted Vaziri's invitation to meet Mayr again, when Vaziri saw him again in Tehran and told him that Mayr had been able to escape to the capital. At this meeting with Mayr, which took place at the Dowshantappeh Gate in a closed car, Mayr and Naubakht discussed the arrival of German parachutists who had landed at Siakh Kuh and in the Qashgai country. Mayr informed Naubakht that he intended to send some of these parachutists to the Bakhtiari tribe. Naubakht was in contact with Mayr up to the time of the latter's arrest in August 1943 and his statement implicated many of Mayr's collaborators, including Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani as well as *deterus* now in the internment camp of the Imperial Iranian Government.

Sayyid Abul Qasim Kashani admitted to having written a letter which is now in the possession of the Allies and which was addressed to the Mufti of Berlin. He said that he was in Berlin in 1941 and that he was in contact with the German authorities in Turkey. Kashani also admitted that he wrote a note on the back of one of his visiting cards, which is in the possession of the Allies, and which he addressed to Javad Alahadi, Mayr's henchman now in

detention. This card was found in Isfahan in an envelope addressed to Mays. Finally Kashani said he had heard from General Aghevili of the arrival of the German parachutists at Siyah Kuh.

Besides conducting these enquiries, the investigating authorities examined the following documents:

The investigating authorities were satisfied that Habibullah Naubakht and Sayid Abul Qasim Kashani were collaborating with Germans who were working against the interests of the Allies at the time when—as had been publicly announced in the press and on the radio—every Persian was in duty bound to report to the Persian Police the unauthorised presence of any German.

E 6494. 94. 34]

No 14

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 23rd October.)

(No. 395)

Sir,

Tehran, 10th October, 1944

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of a letter which has been sent to the United States Ambassador in Tehran by Dr. Millsbaugh about the Soviet proposal to obtain rice from Persia in exchange for piece-goods and miscellaneous articles.

2. We are no nearer than we were when your telegram No. 421 of the 13th July was despatched to securing Russian co-operation in economic matters with Persia. The Soviet proposal, which was made in reply to Dr. Millsbaugh's American proposals that there should be set up in Tehran a Higher Supplies Committee on which Soviet representatives, as well as representatives of Persia, Great Britain and the United States, would sit. The information given in Dr. Millsbaugh's letter reveals—or rather confirms, for we knew it before—one reason for the delay: the Soviet Government cannot afford to have their shabby commercial methods discussed by an international body. Economic imperialism never showed itself in a meaner light than in the policy of the Soviet Government in this country since the occupation.

3. Soviet Russia was a considerable customer of Persia during the period between the two wars, taking rice, sheep and on occasion wool, cotton and other raw materials, and when, owing to a dispute as to terms, the Soviet Government refused to renew the commercial agreement in July 1935, the Persians considered it a disaster, and so did the Shah, who depended on Russia as a market for much of the rice grown on his estates. Moreover, having made ordinary commerce a transaction almost impossible, the Russians had to be paid in kind, and so had to depend to a great extent on barter—a procedure which placed him at the mercy of Germany and Russia. The Russians have taken full advantage of their position as a Power, if not in occupation, at least much in evidence in the north of Persia, to acquire goods and local currency on terms favourable to them. The Persian Government would have been glad if the Soviet Government could have refrained from buying sheep and cattle during the last year or two, but the purchase went on. This embassy has reported more than once, as have various consular posts in Persia, how the Soviet authorities sell to merchants piece-goods, sugar or other goods at the lowest possible prices, thereby driving up prices and to embarrass the Persian Government and the American advisers in their effort to bring about a fall in the cost of living; winning the support of the merchants who then favour with their goods—and raising large sums of money, some of which certainly go to subsidise that part of the press which is hostile to His Majesty's Government, to America and to the American advisers. Dr. Millsbaugh now reveals the dilemma in which he finds himself: either he must accept a barter arrangement as ruinous as the one which was forced on Persia last year, or else the goods which he refuses to accept at the prices fixed by the Soviet authorities will be sold direct to the merchants with the results which I have mentioned above. The Russians would probably retreat if faced with the prospect of a full statement in the Majlis followed by the airing of the matter in the Tehran press, but I do not write well that the terms which I attach to them will prevent any such exposure of their arbitrary and greedy attitude, and that while keeping silent about Russia there is no chance of even pressing Russia for real or imaginary virtues. Persians will eagerly rush into print to accuse Great Britain and America of interference in their affairs, of lack of generosity, and of any other crime that comes into their heads or the heads of those who pay them.

4. It is particularly galling to know that the sugar which the Soviet authorities have sold in this country in large quantities is almost certainly Lend Lease sugar. I do not think that there is any doubt that it is Lend Lease sugar but even if it were not, it could only be at best Russian sugar set free by the receipt of a corresponding quantity of sugar under Lend Lease arrangements. It is said that the United States Government have hitherto shown indifference to the fate of Lend Lease goods supplied to Russia so long as they reached Russian hands the obligation of the United States Government had been discharged, and it was for the Russians to decide how they should be used. As Dr. Millsbaugh points out, however, Russian policy aims completely at attempts to strike a fair balance between Persia's needs and world supplies. The American and British Governments are desperately short of tyres. On the supposition that Russia needs tyres, supplies are denied to Persia (as to other Allied countries) except in strictly controlled quantities, even for some urgent needs recognised as such by the American advisers to the Persian Government. The Russians sell to private individuals in Persia tyres received under Lend Lease at a profit of many hundreds per cent. These tyres are then used not for purposes judged to be essential, e.g. carrying grain, but by private individuals who can only recover the immense cost by running as pirates and carrying opium or any other private goods that can bear the high price.

Given the situation which I have described, it is amusing to learn, when asked for an official comment, that the Russians are reported to have said that on the reply might depend the economic relations between the two countries. It is doubtful whether Persia ever gained much by her exchanges with Russia, and with a slight increase in the level of prosperity of her own people she could probably consume all the food-stuffs and raw material that she has hitherto exported to Russia. However, so long as Russia wants to buy from Persia, the Persians are not likely to refuse to allow them to do so. Nor as I have said, will they use the best weapon of defence—publicity, though it is presumed that after the war American and British governments will be in a position to stage examinations to see about the terms offered to Russians in North Persia. The sale of sugar and Lend Lease tyres should interest the American public.

I have, &c.

R. M. BULLARD

I enclose in No 14

Dr. Millsbaugh to Mr. Morris.

Dear Mr. Morris

30th September, 1944

YOU may already know of our long talks with the Soviet Trade Delegation concerning the sale of rice to them. On the ground that they are a poor country, they demand that we pay for their valued piece goods at very low prices. In principle, these barter transactions are unsound, and we are not at all anxious to the disadvantage of the weaker country. Last year we sold rice to them and bought goods from them at a big loss to the Persian Government, and we do not intend to repeat such a transaction this year. The Government is in agreement with us on this policy. We are willing to sell the rice at a fair price and buy the piece-goods at a fair price, but we are not willing to buy miscellaneous goods. It is practically certain, however, that we cannot reach an agreement on goods or prices unless the Soviet Trade Delegation finds itself able to make a sensible concession.

You should, I feel, take into consideration the fact that the Soviets have sold sugar and tyres (Lend Lease) it may be assumed, on the Persian bazaar market. We have, as you know, little or no control over their imports in the north and if these goods are imported as military goods, we have no control over them in the south.

It would appear that any sugar or cotton piece-goods imported by the Soviets with our agreement and transferred to us would not be delivered on from Persia's quota; but, if such importations are not delivered to us, they are sold in the black market, but are never below the quota. The result would obviously be to destroy our distribution programme. We cannot, of course, take responsibility for any monopoly goods that are illegally imported and sold by the Soviets. Such importations and sales would be because of force majeure and in contravention of the guarantees of sovereignty given by the Allies. It would quite obviously be unfair for M.E.S.C. to deduct any such importations

I wish you to know the situation, since it appears that it concerns all three Allies, and particularly the United States.

Sincerely yours
A. C. MILLSPAUGH
Administrator General of the Finances

No 15

Mr R Bullard to Mr Eden. — (Received 11th November)

Tehran, 18th October 1944

WITH reference to my despatch No. 281 of the 6th July I have the honour
to say that the same has been forwarded to the relevant authorities.
August and September 1944

American Affairs and the American Advisory Missions

2. The long-heralded arrival of the new American Ambassador, Mr. Roland Morris, at ~~his~~ ^{the} place of the 12th August. His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires took an early opportunity to emphasize to him the urgent need for co-ordinating the views and policies of the American Advisers to the Persian Government. If the ambassador had come with any instructions in that sense, he did not receive them. But he appeared to be impressed by the arguments used, in particular, he admitted the need for revision of the policy wherever the ~~ambassadors~~ ^{ambassadors} were not by the United States authorities to lend for themselves without guidance, as ~~ambassadors~~ ^{ambassadors} to the Persian Government. This was going to be a ~~very~~ ^{very} ~~important~~ ^{important} ~~question~~ ^{question} ~~for~~ ^{for} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} ~~with~~ ^{with} ~~regard~~ ^{regard} ~~to~~ ^{to} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~previously~~ ^{previously} ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~previously~~ ^{previously} ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~previously~~ ^{previously} ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} ~~had~~ ^{had} ~~been~~ ^{been} ~~previously~~ ^{previously} ~~discussed~~ ^{discussed} ~~at~~ ^{at} ~~the~~ ^{the} ~~United States Government~~ ^{United States Government} 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as a matter of fact, something homogeneous to back. The Persian Government
did not wish to do this, and Dr. Mills was not to be allowed to stay in the country
any longer. The idea being to give him a last chance. Dr. Mills was not
early in August His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires reported that he appeared to
be accomplishing nothing which would justify his continued retention in Persian
service. Dr. Millspaugh injured his reputation in the eyes of the Persian Government
interview granted to a Tehran newspaper. It was reported that he had said
and that the United States was the only country which had not granted freedom
things would have happened:—

- ings would have happened:—
- (a) Disturbances leading to the occupation of North and South Persia by the Russians and the British respectively;
 - (b) the occupation of the country by an international force,
 - (c) a dictatorship even more rigorous than Reza Shah's.

The Secretary of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Mr. Lascelles, stated that they doubt whether a joint demonstration to the United Nations Charter is compatible with the Teheran Conference Declaration. Mr. Lascelles declined, feeling that such a

assault on the Americans was a poor way of demonstrating an Anglo-Russian solidarity. Mr. Lascelles said that he had no personal desire but he undertook to remonstrate privately with the chargé d'affaires. When he did so, he found the chargé d'affaires most embarrassed and inclined to the view that the State Department had been awaiting just such a pretext for recalling Dr. Mills. In fact, at the end of August, the State Department informed a member of His Majesty's Embassy at Washington that Dr. Mills had been recalled for consultation, they wished to defer a decision about his return to Persia until they had talked to him, but they thought that they thought it might well end in Dr. Black—the second in command—taking over. Mr. Lascelles' comment on this was that the only pretext for the recall was for Dr. Mills to be recalled. The pretext was that the American Ambassador had reached the conclusion that no foreign adviser ought to be given the powers and responsibilities which were entrusted to Dr. Mills, on the grounds that this violated the Persian Constitution and was basically incompatible with the spirit of the Atlantic Charter. Dr. Mills should share these responsibilities with the Majlis; all decrees should be signed jointly, and in the event of disagreement the Prime Minister should decide between them. At this point, however, Dr. Mills' obstinacy stood him in good stead, he refused to go to the United States, fearing some trap to keep him there and being sure that at least his powers would be maintained in his absence, he expressed the intention to retire next February after two years' service, and meanwhile a successor should be brought out soon to be trained by him. The fact is that lately, owing to the war news, economic developments in Persia appear to be on the point of taking a favourable turn for Dr. Mills, and he is shrewd enough to see that if he hangs on for a few more months he may leave with much less discredit than now.

4. The future of all the American Advisory Missions was under review during the present period. The United States Chargé d'Affaires told Mr. Enríquez at the beginning of August that the United States Government were extremely satisfied by the lack of Peruvian interference with the work of the American military advisers in Peru. His Majesty's Government had no experience in the United States Government but they were not anxious for the American Missions to remain in Peru, and they suggested a strategy for them. They were convinced that Peru was not for foreign soldiers with a view to be great, particularly in the immediate post-war period. They were very concerned about the future of the Peruvian army when Allied troops were withdrawn and they were not prepared to say for certain whether they would follow the peace which in its present state was not likely to last. They thought they particularly serious consequences in the future. His Majesty's Government were anxious therefore that relations should be put on a basis where the withdrawal of British troops. These could not be carried out without foreign assistance and they would refer that question to the United States Government if necessary. If however the United States Government felt unable to provide it, His Majesty's Government would have to consider advising the Peruvian Government to look elsewhere. His Majesty's Government added that if the American Military Mission was going to be withdrawn, the Anglo-American plan for the supply of equipment for the Peruvian army would need to be reconsidered. The State Department replied that the United States Government were not losing interest in Peru, but they had no fixed policy of retaining advisory missions there. They had, for instance, always made it clear to the Peruvian Government that American advisers must not be exposed to vilification. If attacked, the Peruvian Government must defend them, otherwise they would be withdrawn and would not be replaced. The following decisions had been recently taken by the United States Government:—

- (1) Colonel Schwarzkopf and his five assistants would be left for a further year with the gendarmerie.
- (2) Instructions would be sent to the United States Ambassador in Tehran to investigate whether Colonel Schwarzkopf might take over the police as well.
- (3) General Ridley would remain until the 1st March, 1945, by which date the War Department thought that he would have done all he could to accomplish his task, the War Department would probably decline to appoint a successor and were inclined to concentrate on the gendarmerie and police.

Add to Request

The total target for Union of Soviet Socialist Republics' cargo in October is considerably lower than for preceding months. This is no doubt due to the conveyance by the northern route having started again under cover of the longer nights.

Polish Affairs.

Mr Haluch, the delegate of the Ministry of Social Welfare, who was in charge of the mission, was relieved of his duties with effect from the 1st September. His successor is Mr P. J. ... and will be more efficient. The change has had a beneficial effect on the relations of the delegation with the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and with the Polish community.

Index

15. The Indian community in the capital, having been purged of its most undesirable elements, is beginning to show a greater interest in the part which its members must play as ambassadors of their country, and their change of heart has been shown in the very generous contributions which the community has made to India's war effort, in the form of donations and investments in Government of India war bonds.

Anglo-Persian Public Relations

18. Mr Savidge's period of secondment from the Government of India having come to an end, Mr Graham took over the post of Director of Public Relations at the beginning of the period under review. Under Mr Savidge the Bureau did better propaganda at a greatly diminished cost, and since even the Persian is now convinced that the Allies are going to win the war, it is considered that economies can continue to be made without harm to the interests of His Majesty's Government.

Post-War Propaganda Policy of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India.

19. The probable early conclusion of hostilities in Europe has led to a reconsideration of propaganda policy in Persia. Emphasis has been laid on the need for greater concentration on such long-term matters as publicity for British and Commonwealth trade in the post-war period, and active steps have already been taken by the Government of India to implement this policy so far as India is concerned.

British Council Activities

21 The total number of books handled during the quarter exceeded 21,000. Open-air film shows at Tehran and the provinces at institutes, schools and sports organisations were attended by over 20,000 persons. Despite the hottest recorded summer in fifty years, summer courses were held in the Tehran Institute in

addition to the Alborz College evening classes. Twenty classes for 244 students were held at the Shemran Summer School outside Tehran. A soirée given by the Council in commemoration of Anton Tchekov was attended by the Russian Ambassador and other notabilities and the drama section produced a scene from *Hamlet* and *The Seagull* in the open-air theatre for the occasion. A production of *A Midsummer Night's Dream* in the open air was an unqualified success, playing for two nights to over 400 people. Members of the Isfahan Institute had 424. Summer courses included classes in Persian, English, and hospital nurses. Teaching of Polish children was continued and English classes for the Armenian colony at Julfa have been started. Some 500 students have been enrolled and twenty classes started at the new Anglo-Persian Institute at Sl. raz.

Internal Politics and Majlis

22. The position of the Cabinet remained precarious throughout July and August, and it was only the absence of any general agreement as to who should succeed Sa'id that prevented a crisis. Several candidates were mentioned including Hajhir, Ardalan, Ahi, Soheily, Hussein Sami'i, and Qawam-es-Saltaneh. Our objections to the latter had previously been explained to the Shah, the then Prime Minister, and the Soviet Ambassador, and were made clear to an intermediary sent to this embassy in mid-August. It was generally considered that Seyyid Zia had too much opposition against him for his appointment to be possible. He himself was understood to favour the appointment of Hussein Sami'i with a team of young men.

23. The Cabinet started the period badly. Having first of all, at the behest of the Majlis, taken a strong line against Mirza Aspaq, he eventually found it explaining to the Majlis that it had agreed to keep him for another few months to see whether he could produce any results. The change of front by the Majlis majority appears to have been due as much to the reflection that since the Shah and the Russians both wanted Mirza Aspaq removed there might be some value in him after all, as to the fear that the American Government might cut off supplies.

24. By the middle of August Majlis opinion had come round to the view that the best temporary solution would be for Sa'id to reshuffle his Cabinet. An interpellation which was to have taken place on the 17th August was accordingly postponed to the 28th August to enable him to make any changes he thought fit. In the interval Sa'id, after prolonged discussions with the Majlis, secured support from a coalition of eighty-five Deputies of the Mihran, Ittehad-i-Milli and Azadi fractions, resigned on the 28th August and was entrusted with the formation of a new Cabinet.

25. The new Cabinet, chosen by Sa'id in consultation with his supporters in the Majlis, was presented to the Shah on the 31st August. Apart from the Prime Minister himself the only other member of the previous Cabinet to be included was Khalil Fakhr, Minister without Portfolio. Three other members of the new Cabinet, Hagir Kazimi, Aliabazar Saleh and Muhammad Nariman, who became Ministers of Education, Justice and Communications respectively had previously held Cabinet rank. An Asghar Zarinkafsh, Dr. Muhammad Nakhai and Muhammad Sururi, who had been satisfactory Under-Secretaries, were appointed Ministers of Finance, Commerce and Industry, and Interior, and Dr. Manuchehr Iqbal became Acting Minister of Health. The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs was given to a comparatively unknown official named Yusuf Mushar, and the Ministry of Agriculture was left vacant. The Prime Minister himself took over the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. General Muhammad Hussein Firuz, Governor-General of Fars, was offered the Ministry of War but after a visit to Tehran he refused.

26. Opposition to the new Cabinet was immediately encountered from the Tudeh party, who objected to the return of Sa'id, and from the Independents in the Majlis who resented the fact that they had been consulted. When Sa'id attempted on the 2nd September to introduce his Cabinet to the Majlis the Opposition elements absented themselves from the Chamber, with the result that the necessary quorum was lacking. The Government, as a result, was unable to secure a vote of confidence from the Majlis on the 17th September. 73 out of the 100 members present voting in its favour. Although Sa'id obtained the vote of the Opposition on the 17th September up to the end of September, the position of his Government remained unstable owing to the opposition of the Tudeh and the Russians. The Shah also was not favourably disposed to it because it contained none of his nominees.

27. During the period under review the Majlis itself spent little time on legislation, being more occupied with intrigue over the composition of Cabinets and the credentials of Deputies. Some excitement was caused in July by the rejection of a new Deputy, the credentials of a Tudeh-sponsored Deputy from Tabriz, the way having been prepared by the prior rejection of those of an independent Deputy who headed the poll. The rejection of Pishavari's credentials was greeted with a storm of criticism in the Tudeh press; there was considerable agitation in Tabriz and the acting Soviet Consul-General expressed his displeasure. The excitement was short lived, however, and by the end of August there was general indifference in Tabriz to the fate of the Soviet-supported Deputies. The credentials of the other Communist Deputies of Azerbaijan who were elected with the support of the Russians have not yet come up for examination, but it is possible that they too will be rejected by a Majlis emboldened by its success in rejecting Pishavari, though the Soviet Embassy are working hard to prevent this.

28. Elections have not yet been completed at Abadeh and Rey. New elections are due for two Tabriz seats, for Darajiz and for Lar, where the death of Azadi has left a vacancy. The credentials of Dr. Falsafi, Deputy for Gurgan, were accepted by the Majlis. The number of Deputies so far elected whose credentials have not been rejected by the Majlis is 128.

29. There was some party activity during the period under review. From the 1st-12th August the Tudeh party held its first general conference at Tehran. Decisions were taken to tighten up party discipline, purge the membership, and set up an Inspection Committee, to deal with disciplinary matters and watch the Central Committee of the party. The resolutions also called for the best interests of the party to Seyyid Zia, all foreign advisers, and the grant of economic concessions "which construct or weaken the economic independence of the Persian nation," such as presumably the grant of new oil concessions to American or British companies.

30. The President of the Majlis, Muhammad Sadiq Tabatabai, enlarged his Majlis group into a party entitled "Mardum" (people), which adopted as its programme union in the defence of true constitutional and democratic Government. A party called "Kar" (work) was formed by Dr. Muhsenraf Nafisi, it had a lengthy programme of good intentions but its real aim seemed to be to promote its founder's candidature for the post of Prime Minister, an ambition which has little chance of being realised in view of Dr. Nafisi's unpopularity in the Majlis.

31. Towards the end of August efforts of the Government to bring unity to the Majlis seemed to have failed. Some party activity continued, but the Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity.

32. The death of the ex-Shah, on the 26th July, caused no grief except in the Pahlavi family circle and the present Shah was much criticised for the news of the ex-Shah's death. The press was free to criticise the ex-Shah's work and régime severely, and no section of the press made any attempt to reach a balanced assessment of his life and work. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity. The Tudeh party, which was the largest group, seemed to have lost its unity.

33. Seyyid Zia, however, took the opportunity to attempt to establish better relations with the Shah and called specially to condole. The effect was somewhat spoiled by a letter from the ex-Shah to the Shah, which was regarded as the Seyyid's paper. Signs were, however, not lacking that the Shah's hostility to Seyyid Zia was decreasing, and by the end of August a definite reconciliation appeared to have been effected. After several interviews a considerable measure of agreement was believed to have been reached between them, and the Shah spoke of Seyyid Zia as a man with whom it should be possible to work. The Shah's attitude was undoubtedly influenced by his realisation that the Tudeh were not to be appeased, and by increasing fears of Soviet intentions in Azerbaijan with the consequent need for a strong man to arrest the deterioration in the political situation. After considering all other possible candidates, including Taqizadeh, who was thought to be unwilling to accept the task, and Ahi, who could not be spared from Moscow, the Shah appeared to be coming to the conclusion that he might perhaps be well advised to make use of the vigorous personality of Seyyid

Zia in an effort to stand up to the Russians. When the reconciliation became known Seyyid Zia's stock rose in Tehran, but there were many who doubted whether the Shah's professed desire to co-operate with him was genuine.

.14 The Persian Ambassadors in London, Angora, Moscow and Cairo were summoned to Tehran for consultation with their Government on post-war problems concerning Persia. The two former arrived in September. Majid Ali did not come from Moscow as he was said to be too ill to travel, and Jam has not yet arrived from Cairo. In many quarters hopes were expressed that Taqizadeh might prove to be the man to take charge of his country's fortunes in her present hour of need, but Taqizadeh is apparently anxious to return to London.

Treated Situation

35 The tribes of Fars except the Qashgai have remained remarkably quiet during the period under review. Brigandage is endemic in Fars, but incidents have been rarer than usual, and few can be attributed to the Qashgai. There has also been an absence of the usual summer raiding by Boir Afandi across the Abadeh-Isfahan road and into the district of Yazd. Some credit for the unusual order prevailing may fairly be given to the influence of British officials and to the belief that British influence in Tehran will be used in favour of those tribes who have not misbehaved. The pact of friendship to which reference was made in my despatch under reference between Qasim-i-Mulk and Nasr-i-Qashgai later joined by Mostafa-Quli Khan, the Bakhtiari Governor of Bakhtiari, has also contributed to peace by removing for the time being at least some of the causes of unrest that lay in long-standing mutual antagonisms. This pact has been represented as an alliance or the tribes of the south. It, headed by the great Qasim-i-Mulk, still retaining some influence among the Khamsch tribes, cannot be said to be a tribal leader, he is concerned mainly with the protection against the Qashgai of the remaining interests of his family in Fars. We are, of course, suspected of having fathered the pact as part of a plan to form a zone of British influence in the south in opposition to the supposedly increasing influence of the Russian-inspired Tudeh party.

36. The Bor Ahmad tribes of Kuh-i-Gilan are at loggerheads with each other. Since unity between these turbulent tribes usually means trouble for their neighbours, it is no bad thing in present circumstances that they should work on their paganism on each other instead of on their neighbours within the limits of their own territory. The present quarrels arise from the high handed actions of Abdullah Khan Zarghanpur, a chief of the tribe an abscorder from Persian detention in Tehran and a close associate of Nasir Qashgat, who has been attempting to impose himself as paramount chief and to seize land claimed by other chiefs. The opposition to him is being encouraged by Persian officials, but, in view of Abdullah Khan's association with Nasir Qashgat, the necessity for caution has been impressed on the Persian Government lest the Qashgat should be driven to intervene, involving other tribes in Fars hostile to them and so extending disorder beyond the limits of the Bor Ahmad country.

37 In Bakhtiari rumblings of discontent against Morteza Quli Khan have continued but peace has been maintained. Some rather futile operations were carried out by the Persian army for the disarmament of the Moghul and Mainvand sections of the Chabar Lang Bakhtiari, most of whom lie outside the limits of Morteza Quli Khan's jurisdiction. Some arms were collected but, it seems, mostly from the settled elements of the tribes, and the Mainvand nomads remain in possession of some 2,000-2,500 rifles.

38. In Khuzestan the operation for the disarmament of the disorderly Arabs of the Abu Dasht area, which was referred to in my last despatch, was completed by the Persian forces with unusual efficiency and creditable moderation. In all, some 1,000 rifles were collected. A number of Arabs were arrested, and seven of them were hanged, with good effect on the Arabs in general, who did not question the justice of the punishment. Both civil and military Persian officials in Khuzestan are insistent that advantage should be taken of the mood induced in the Arabs by this display of Persian authority to extend the collection of arms, of which there are estimated still to be some 6,000-7,000 in Khuzestan, to other Arab tribes; and they are confident that, given a suitable show of force, the collection can be made without opposition. Since it is important for the post-war security of Khuzestan, and particularly of the interests of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, that the number of unlicensed rifles

in the hands of the Arabs should be reduced, I have raised no objection to the Bani Turuf being summoned to surrender their arms. My information, ~~is~~ ^{is} merely somewhat conjectural, is that they are likely to make some show of complying.

39. Kurdistan, particularly that part of it that lies within the Russian zone of occupation in Persia, has been causing the Persian Government increasing anxiety. Reports, probably exaggerated, have been reaching Tehran of Russian encouragement of Kurdish aspirations to autonomy. Persians suspicious of Russian designs have been intensified by the refusal of the Russians to allow the Persian Government to maintain in Azerbaijan forces of sufficient strength to take effective action against Kurdish lawlessness. The popular theory in Persia at the moment is that if the withdrawal of Russian troops from the Kurds will be incited to launch out on a campaign of pillaging which the Persian authorities will be unable to suppress; the people of Azerbaijan will then appeal to the Soviet Government to come to their protection. So that they can play their part in this plan, the Kurds must be protected against Persian attempts to subdue or disarm them.

40 The alleged movement for Kurdish independence is reported to be directed as follows: Persian Kurdistan is expected to be a Kurdish state. Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad. He is supposed to be in alliance with Hama Rashid of Baneh, and both are reported to have received visits from Soviet officers. Hama Rashid was in rebellion against the Persian Government in 1942 and was successful in wresting from them a settlement which left him in effective control of the Baneh district, with no semblance of Persian authority, and with a subsidy nominally for the maintenance of order. For some time past some Persian authorities have held the view that the autonomous position secured by Hama Rashid was a dangerous encouragement to Kurdish aspirations, and they have been considering the advisability of establishing by force if necessary, an administration in Baneh with some outward evidence of Persian Government authority. My advice was that any such measure should be preceded or accompanied by an announcement of Government policy and some concrete evidence of an intention to provide some benefits to the Kurdish tribes. Hama Rashid however played into the hands of the Persian General Staff, who were the principal advocates of a Farwa Policy by taking the Hama Rashid to the headquarters of another Kurdish chief whom the Persian Government had sought to bring to a sense of duty to the Government. Hama Rashid of Baneh. The Persian Government accepted the view that this was a direct challenge to the Government and they ordered the deployment of a column to expel Hama Rashid's followers from Meravan. This has been accomplished with little or no opposition. At the end of the period under review operations were being instituted for the occupation of Baneh though there are Persians in and outside the Government who are averse from provoking the Kurds at present.

Reserve Land Forces

41. The army has made little progress. There is perhaps a slight improvement in discipline and order, but corruption and embezzlement are less in evidence. The Government has not as yet decided on a policy as regards its forces, and the size of both the army and gendarmerie is considerably above what can be efficiently maintained on the funds available. In both forces there is much discontent and among the better officers a feeling of despair and of disappointment at the failure of the American advisers to effect any lasting reforms. General Ridley now takes a very restricted view of the scope of his mission, much narrower than he is authorized to do by the terms of his engagement. His influence is less and less in evidence. The activities of his mission are now limited to matters of transport, of supply and to giving unheeded advice about the medical services. It is strange to the military men that a large number of recruits has been obtained after a long and arduous process. It says that his task will be now to express as little more than the organization of systems of supply, transport and accounting will be finished in a few months. It is however he can be persuaded that his task is not only to inaugurate a system but to remain long enough to see it firmly established the officers would feel sure he is a key element.

42. The forceful personality of (General) Razmara, the Chief of the Staff, in contrast with the inertia of the Government is pushing the army into greater prominence in the affairs of the provinces, particularly in tribal areas. He is

demoralized as lethargic and as lacking in any laudable ideal as the Persian gendarmes.

44. Sarladkar Nakhchenn has now been in charge of the air force for some two months producing no noticeable change in its efficiency. He talks good sense about present and future policy, but there is little reason to hope that his practice will be as good as his precept.

40. Moreover, it is known to you that our friend has
They have had one serious accident in which a British officer was among those
killed.

51 The budget for the year 1323 (beginning on the 21st March, 1944) has been under consideration by the Budgetary Commission of the Majlis for some months past, and has not yet been before the Majlis itself. According to the present figures revenue is expected to under the commercial budget at 3,958 and 4,580 million rials respectively, and revenue and expenditure under the commercial budget at 5,367 and 5,755 million. No figures of revenue or expenditure for the current year have yet been published, but the financial counsellor is informed that for the first five months of the year, i.e., up to the 22nd August, they have been as follows. The figures for the same months in the preceding year are given for comparison.

36. As was expected at the time the last report was written, the United States Government have declared that they do not wish to be a signatory to the agreement for the operation of the Persian railway system, which will therefore, when the time comes, be signed by the British, Russian and Persian Governments only. The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are, however, still delaying their decisions on two points of detail arising on the draft agreement, and it is impossible for the Russian and British Missions in Tehran to present it to the Persian authorities until these points have been settled. The continued delay is most unfavourable.

57 At the end of the quarter wholesale prices had fallen, in the case of some commodities quite considerably so that even a number of bankruptcies were reported from different parts of the country, but this was almost certainly more the result of the war news than of measures applied by Dr Millsapugh or any other authority. Retail prices showed little signs of following suit and the shops are plainly determined to extract the last penny from the long suffering

58. An American, Colonel Harold E. Hoskins, has taken over the post of Chief Representative in Persia of the Middle East Supply Centre and Foreign Economic Administration (i.e., Lend-Lease), and the latter organisation has at last joined forces completely with the Middle East Supply Centre. Stocks of the most essential imported commodities, as well indeed of most others, were adequate for the country's basic needs, and the shortages that occurred were the result of a combination of factors, but not of a lack of supplies. Dist. Officer Mr. Millspaugh's main task in recent months, improved slightly, especially as regards the supply of foodstuffs, was to ensure that the country was not short of these essential commodities.

The Russians are trying to impose a bargain on the northern provinces. Once again the Soviets are trying to impose an inequitable bargain on the provinces. The Soviet Government is trying to impose a bargain on the provinces. The Russians continue to sell cotton piece goods, sugar (believed to be lend lease) and other goods on the open market for what they will fetch, and still show no signs of wishing to open it with the other provinces on equal terms. Nothing more has been heard from them about the proposal to set up with the Germans a Higher Supply Committee to co-ordinate civil supplies for this country.

Events and Agricultural Development

100. The grain situation in the country as a whole was satisfactory at the end of September. The stocks held at the end of September amounted to 100,000 tons, and the grain available in the Tehran Silo constituted sixty four days supply for the capital. The current harvest is generally satisfactory and no shortage of grain is expected during the coming winter. The Government is making available a sufficient quantity of seed-wheat for deficit areas of the Persian Gulf littoral has been partly overcome by the provision of 1,000 tons of seed at reasonable rates by the Government of India.

61 Various projects for the development of agriculture in the country, chiefly by the construction of irrigation works, have been under consideration by the Government. Requests for support have been made for the establishment of a research station at the Agricultural Science Centre of two experts to compare the soil fertility of the schemes with the type of the plant demanded. Such investigation is very necessary in order to prevent the initiation of projects such as the Hamudiah Farm scheme in Khuzistan which are fundamentally unsound and which have little hope of proving successful.

Transport

62. Railway traffic on the Trans-Iranian Railway was adequate for civil needs in spite of the great volume of aid to Russia going on and towards. Oil stocks for civil consumption remained adequate throughout the country. Road transport was still precarious and was maintained at its comparatively low level of efficiency only by the unremitting efforts of the Persian Government's Road Transport Administration, which has a number of American and British staff. Vehicles belonging to the Road Transport Administration are wearing out quicker than they are being replaced, in spite of the arrival so far this year of over 200 new trucks. The arrival and distribution of a large consignment of spare parts has, however, eased the position temporarily. Lack of passenger cars is greatly hampering the work of the administration, but the Government still do not appear to be strong enough to mobilise private cars, which still tour the country in considerable numbers.

63 In this sphere also the Russians are pursuing their own designs regardless of anybody else. Transovtrans, the Soviet transport agency, are

THIS ON TRUCKS AND CYCLES SUPPLIED UNDER LEASE—TOTAL 1970 1 1

141 CONCESSIONS

64 In paragraph 22 (b) of my despatch No. 136 of the 8th April, I mentioned that the Standard Vacuum and Shell Groups by the American and British Governments respectively--were competing for oil concessions in Persia. (To them was later added the American Sinclair Commission.) His Majesty's Government agreed at an early stage with the United States Government that neither would put pressure on the Persian Government and His Majesty's Government instructed this embassy to support the Shell Group but not to go further than was usual on behalf of reputable British interests and not to go further than United States Embassy. Late in June the American Ambassador expressed his interest regarding the delay in reaching a decision and this commission began to discuss the fundamental points (a) whether the Persian Government intended to grant a concession before the end of the war, (b) whether on political grounds they would prefer to increase the British stake in this country, and (c) what basis for the grant of a concession would be most attractive to them. As to (a) the Persian Government's difficulty was apprehension as to the attitude of the Russians towards the grant of an oil concession. As to (b), there were conflicting views and it was difficult to judge which would prevail. As to (c), Persian officials were particularly anxious about the terms offered and Dr. Millspaugh had recommended the engagement of technical advisers. These technical advisers, Messrs. Hoover and Cartier who are directors of an American firm which specialises in giving commercial advice to governments, have been engaged and proposed conditions arrived in July. The Persian Government then sent a note to examine the various proposals. It was decided that the Commission whose members the Government has recently named by the Secretary of State, the Ministry of Commerce, and the Ministry of Finance, should meet and report to the Government. The Commission will be composed of three members, one from each of the three departments mentioned above. The Commission will be asked to advise the Government on the merits of the various proposals and to recommend the best course to follow. The Commission will also be asked to advise the Government on the terms of the concession and on the basis of the concession.

[illegible]

Locus Control

68 Throughout the quarter under review Persia was virtually free of locusts. The upper portion during May and June reported the development of desert locusts and locust swarms in Afghanistan and Iran. Locust bands which crossed into Persia from Iran did not cause any locust damage. Locusts entered the country. The latest report from the Ministry of Agriculture, Locust campaign, which was received in July, states that Persian and Soviet parties in Azerbaijan and Georgia prevented serious damage to crops but were unable to forestall widespread egg laying. The eggs will hatch in spring 1946 and preparations are being made for an extensive campaign with Soviet participation.

67 Judging from Indian reports there is every prospect that the Desert Locust swarms will cover a large portion of the country during the coming winter. However, the Chief Locust Officer of the Middle East Air Force (who has visited Tehran in September) expects a considerable influx of swarms from Africa into

Arabia during the autumn of 1944 and preparations will have to be made to protect Persia against invasion from that direction at the beginning of 1945. The extent of possible British assistance has yet to be fixed.

48. Copies of this despatch are going to the Minister-Resident in Cairo, His Majesty's Ambassador in Moscow, to the Government of India and to His Majesty's Consular Officers in Persia.

I have, &c.
R W BULLARD

E 6882 54 34]

No. 15

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received 8th November)

N 410
S

Tehran, 26th October, 1944

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 233 E of the 9th July 1944, and to enclose herewith copy of a further report by the financial counsellor to this mission on the Persian financial situation.

2. Copies of this despatch and the enclosure are being sent to the Government of India, to His Majesty's Minister Resident in the Middle East, to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Washington, Moscow and Bagdad and to the Department of Overseas Trade.

I have, &c.
R W BULLARD

Enclosure in No. 10

PERSIA

Financial Situation

1. The present report brings up to date my report of the 3rd July (enclosed with despatch No. 233 E. of the 9th July, 1944) on the financial situation in Persia.

Public Finance

2. Revised figures have been issued by the Government for the out-turn of the financial year 1943-44. The estimate was 1,622 million rials on the 21st March 1944, and the actual for the year is now given as 1,612 million rials instead of 1,372 million as stated in my last report. The detailed figures are as follows:—

| Ordinary budget— | | | | | Million rials |
|--------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|---------------|
| Revenue | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3,377 |
| Expenditure | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3,215 |
| Surplus | ... | ... | ... | ... | 162 |
| Commercial budget— | | | | | |
| Revenue | ... | ... | ... | ... | 3,141 |
| Expenditure | ... | ... | ... | ... | 4,355 |
| Deficit | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,214 |
| Total Revenue | ... | ... | ... | ... | 6,518 |
| Total Expenditure | ... | ... | ... | ... | 7,570 |
| Deficit | ... | ... | ... | ... | 1,052 |

The earlier figures had included the profits from the tobacco and opium monopolies under the heading of expenditure.

3. Even though several months of the current financial year have passed the budget is still in a state of confusion. The Budgetary Commission, the Parliament, and the Ministry of Finance have not yet been able to settle the budget. Although the Government has endeavoured to accelerate its expenditure by the threat of stopping the salaries of the Ministers and other officials of those departments which are dilatory in supplying the budgetary details which it requires. This threat has, however,

been partly discounted by the fact that the monthly votes on account, on which the Government have been subsisting, have on some occasions been passed too late for Government salaries to be paid punctually in any case. Moreover, the supplements to official salaries, which are payable at the end of every month, are only to be paid if the money can be made available from savings on the departmental budgets.

4. The civil service has, however, other methods of compensating itself. The Minister of Justice recently informed the Prime Minister that the amounts included in the budget for the salaries of the judges were only a small fraction of the actual salaries paid. This figure is equivalent to over one-sixth of the revenue under the ordinary budget for the past financial year.

5. Revenue and expenditure for the first six months of the year 1944-45 have been as follows. Figures for the corresponding months of 1943-44 are given for comparison:—

| | 1943-44 | 1944-45 |
|------------------------|-----------------|---------|
| | (million rials) | |
| Ordinary Revenue | 1,643 | 1,633 |
| Ordinary Expenditure | 1,445 | 1,479 |
| Surplus | 198 | 154 |
| Commercial Revenue | 1,140 | 1,140 |
| Commercial Expenditure | 1,357 | 1,357 |
| Deficit | 217 | 217 |
| Surplus | 154 | 154 |

The figures for the ordinary revenue reported with last year are not yet final, as they include the profits from the tobacco and opium monopolies, which are not yet final.

6. It is not possible to say whether the budget for the year 1944-45 (the budget as prepared on the 21st March 1944) showed a small deficit on the Ordinary budget, or a small surplus on the Commercial Accounts (611 and 612 million rials respectively). The deficit was in effect in balance. Dr. Millard, the financial expert, says that the deficit was small, but receipts from direct taxes would not be below the estimate. Although the Government are not expected to show a surplus, it is not possible to say whether they will or not. The Government are not expected to show a surplus, but they may be able to pay their way by borrowing from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which has a large loan from the Government. The Government are not expected to show a surplus, but they may be able to pay their way by borrowing from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which has a large loan from the Government. The Government are not expected to show a surplus, but they may be able to pay their way by borrowing from the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, which has a large loan from the Government.

7. The municipalities are similarly embarrassed, since the 3 per cent. tax on goods entering their areas was abolished at the end of last year and the 10 per cent. surtax on income tax payments which was to replace it has not yet come in. They are being assisted by short-term loans from the Central Government to an amount of 36 million rials, the loan in the case of Tehran being 9 million. Much effective work is being done by the American financial directors in the provincial districts. In some instances tax receipts have gone up by nearly two and a half times as a result of more efficiency and less corruption in collection. The municipal authorities need considerable guidance in financial affairs; they are liable to produce a draft budget in which often as much as 80 per cent. and sometimes the full 100 per cent., of revenue is taken up by the salaries of officials and other staff.

8. Some six weeks ago, among other Cabinet changes, M. Ferozchi was succeeded as Minister of Finance by M. Zarrinkash. Although M. Zarrinkash could not be called a strong man, he is a great administrator and his predecessor. He has served in London and Washington as well as in the Continent and has a wide knowledge of the world; and, more important, the relations between him and Dr. Millard are excellent. He deplores the high percentage of expenditure (25 per cent.) on the army, but has not yet been able to do much to reduce it. He is a great administrator and his predecessor. He has served in London and Washington as well as in the Continent and has a wide knowledge of the world; and, more important, the relations between him and Dr. Millard are excellent. He deplores the high percentage of expenditure (25 per cent.) on the army, but has not yet been able to do much to reduce it. He is a great administrator and his predecessor. He has served in London and Washington as well as in the Continent and has a wide knowledge of the world; and, more important, the relations between him and Dr. Millard are excellent. He deplores the high percentage of expenditure (25 per cent.) on the army, but has not yet been able to do much to reduce it.

(30547)

9. The following figures show the amount of notes in circulation and of bank deposits over the last three years and in recent months:—

9. The following figures show the amount of notes in circulation and of bank deposits over the last three years and in recent months:—

| | | | | | Notes | Deposits |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----------------|----------|
| | | | | | (million rials) | |
| June 1941 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1,312 | 671 |
| June 1942 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 1,312 | 1,312 |
| June 1943 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 4,070 | 4,070 |
| June 1944 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 6,262 | 8,711 |
| July 1944 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 8,234 | 8,933 |
| August 1944 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 6,125 | 8,511 |
| September 1944 | --- | --- | --- | --- | 6,215 | 8,588 |

10 The following are the index figures, prepared by the National Bank, for wholesale prices and the cost of living over the same period. —

| | Wholesale
Prices | Cost
of Living |
|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------|
| | 1913 = 100 | 1913 = 100 |
| June 1941 | 141 | 143 |
| June 1942 | 229 | 204 |
| June 1943 | 422 | 229 |
| June 1944 | 615 | 240 |
| July 1944 | 678 | 246 |
| August 1944 | 711 | 255 |
| September 1944... | 744 | 260 |

11. res for which the cost-of-living figures have outstripped those for

11. The recent fall in prices has been due in part to improvements in production, but mainly to the favourable course of the war and apart from the fall in wholesale prices was not reflected in the retail market, since the retailer, anxious to maintain his position, was willing to deplete the huge gains made in the past by foregoing previous rates of profit on stocks of goods. The recent fall in prices is due to the movement, with the exception of a few commodities, in the same direction as in 1917. A serious situation is under way in the world economy, and the recent reports of bankers through the country no immediate economic dislocation in any country, although a decline of the European war at the present juncture and an attendant steep decline in the price level might well result in a crisis of considerable severity.

[illegible]

13 When, by agreement with the Persian Government, Dr. Millspaugh withdrew his resignation last July he informed the Government that he expected within a few months to be able to show the palaces residence that he had been possible so far. A week or two ago he addressed a letter to the Prime Minister, which was also published in the press, to the effect that—

- 1 Every possible action had been taken to obtain adequate imports.
- 2 Prices are falling
- 3 Distribution and transport have steadily improved
- 4 Persia has the largest stocks of grain in its history
- 5 Revenue has greatly increased
- 6 Sound plans for the post-war period are in hand.

14. In the meantime, fair consideration of this letter has been obscured by one paragraph (17) I referred to the unveiled hostility between M. Ibtihaj, the governor of the National Bank, and himself. Some weeks ago Dr Millspaugh requested that his staff be permitted to examine certain of the bank's accounts. M. Ibtihaj refused, whereupon Dr Millspaugh wrote to him dismissing him from his position. The Council of Ministers decided by a majority vote M. Ibtihaj was within his powers and that his dismissal of M. Ibtihaj was invalid. Whether or not Dr Millspaugh was within his powers is doubtful, but there is no doubt that his action had a lasting effect on his credit in the country. It is such ill judged actions on his part that make it sometimes difficult for the American Embassy and this embassy to give him full support. On the other side of the scales, his position has to some extent been improved by a recent letter from President Roosevelt to the Shah in which, to all accounts, the President commended the work which the American Mission is doing.

15. The statement of the present economic position given in Dr Millspaugh's letter to the Prime Minister is accurate enough—except that revenue has not "greatly increased" (!). But the improvement in the situation is in fact due to the development of the war in Europe to a greater extent than to the efforts of the mission. There are still many difficulties ahead: revenue from income tax will fall greatly short of the estimates, all idea of raising an internal loan has had to be abandoned, largely owing to the high rates of interest current in the country generally. (?) plans to cushion an eventual sharp fall in prices and to relieve post war unemployment are not yet formulated.

16. Two other matters, mainly involving finance, are understood to be in hand. One is a detailed statement of claims on the part of the Persian Government for what the Shah in a recent speech called quite seriously the immense sacrifices endured by Persia during the war and her incalculable assistance to the Allied cause. The other is a document to be laid in due course before the Peace Conference setting out Persia's claims for compensation in general. Both no doubt will be drafted with a practised eye on the procedure of bazaar negotiation.

17. It may well be that Dr. Mullaugh will have left Persia before these documents see the light. He is at the moment anxious to leave in February 1948, when he will have completed two years as Administrator General of the Finances, and to train his successor during the interval. This successor may be one of the additional staff whom he hopes shortly to import from the United States, or it may be Dr. Black, who is at present his deputy in charge of distribution, but in the view of some people at least, has hardly proved himself adequate to fill the higher position. Plainly it will be necessary, when the time comes, to hurry to find the right man, but to ensure that his powers are sufficient. Persia at the present time is entirely unfitted to cope unaided with its post-war problems; and His Majesty's Government is not without its share of responsibility in having, although of necessity, made more difficult the task of a Government which, it was known, could not govern competently even in normal times.

E. N. R. TRENTHAM
Financial Counsellor

Tehran, 23rd October, 1944

(*) Unless the commercial budget, which is irrelevant for this purpose, is taken into account (see the figures in paragraph 5 of this report).

(*) Ordinary rate 11 per cent. per annum. Discount rates 15-20 per cent. per ann. m.

[E 7088 1175 G]

No. 17.

(No. 1190) Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 13th November)

$$f = \text{fpr} - 1.75H \quad \text{for } 0.5H \leq f \leq 1.44$$

GOVERNMENT of India's telegram No. 14721 to the India Office. I think it would be unwise either to increase the strength of our patrols in East Persia or to send them further north than at present. Russians would always be able to ready to outplay us at that game. On the other hand I favour the retention of patrols in spite of their aid to Russia on that side since otherwise the Russians might be tempted to fill the vacuum.

[30547]

endeavour to ensure that the Russians do the same. It will be interesting to see in what area or areas they consider it essential to retain troops. Perhaps it will be 216,000 square kilom. in which they wish to prospect or 150,000 square kilom. which I understand they would like to exploit for oil eventually. I hope for our part at least we are already beginning to plan for the speediest and most comprehensive reduction possible of area in which we are obliged (if we are obliged) to keep troops until the end of the war with Japan.

No 15

Yo B34 (See ref.)

3. I am very conscious of need for earliest possible decision on this question and will keep you informed of developments.

E 6062 422.341

No 19

(No. 374)

Tehran, 25th September, 1944.

Enclosure in No. 19

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 36, Secret, for the Period the 18th 24th September, 1944.

Person A again

Political

1. The Government obtained its vote of confidence, but it has neither confidence in itself nor has it the confidence of the public. Its existence depends on the continued unity of the three Majlis groups, who are its supporters, and on its compliance with the dictates of those combined groups. It has not gained

2. The Press has for some time past been urging the Government to prepare a plan for the reconstruction of Persia. It is usual now for Persians to refer to Persia as the Bridge of Victory and to claim that it was Persia's contribution that tipped the scale in favour of the Allies. The Ministry of Finance has issued instructions to all departments of the Government to prepare lists of losses and damage incurred since August 1941 as a result of the entry of Allied troops into Persia. In a recent speech to a gathering of Ministers, officials and journalists the Shah stressed the necessity for ensuring that Persia obtained at the Peace Conference the place to which she was entitled. He deplored the lack of unity evident in the country at such a critical period and he urged the Government to work in co-operation with the Allies and to combine to secure for Persia the place to which she was entitled.

3. In the same speech the Shah called attention to the hardships from which the majority of the population was suffering. The alleviation of this distress was a primary duty of the Government. It was the duty of the Government to take steps to improve the lot of the patriotic people. There must be a better exploitation and a more even distribution of the national resources. The improvement of education and of hygiene was important, but it was more important still to ensure that the people were fed

4. Taqizadeh and Sepahbadi, Persian Ambassadors in London and Angora respectively, have arrived in Tehran for consultation on with their Government. Jam, the Persian Ambassador in Egypt is expected shortly. Ahi, Ambassador in Moscow, has also been summoned, but is reported to be too ill to travel.

Appointments—Civil

5. a) Ashrafi, to be Par...
b) ...
c) ...
Translation:

Economic

6. Allied successes have brought about a considerable reduction in the wholesale prices of imported goods—as much as 50 per cent in some cases—but retail prices are not as yet affected.

Russian Affairs.

7 A Russian Mission, said to consist of "experts," has arrived in Tehran. It is headed by Kavtarzudeh, Assistant Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, and rumour says that its visit is connected with oil concessions. At a reception given in his honour by the Persian Government, Kavtarzudeh expressed his appreciation of the zeal shown by the Persian Government and nation in assisting the transport of supplies to Russia.

8. His Majesty's Consul-General at Meshed reports that a considerable number of Russian troops have left that town for Russia.

French Affairs

9. The French Legation has announced that the nine scholarships at the University of Beirut which were allotted to Persian students in 1942 by the Free French authorities will be available again in 1944-45.

Tehran, 24th September, 1944

E 0232 422 341

No. 20

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. — (Received 13th October.)

(No. 384)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 37 of the 1st October, 1944, for the period of the 25th September to the 1st October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 2nd October, 1944

Enclosure in No. 20

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 37 for the Period
25th September–1st October, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political

THE necessity for measures to counteract the effects of Tudeh party propaganda on the workers is being more widely recognised by the governing classes. Moreover, they fear that the departure of Allied troops may result in a large amount of unemployment, which will be a serious factor in the spread of propaganda. The problem of dealing with these is now engaging the attention of the Government. And with a view to inducing the working classes to believe that the Government is concerned with their interest, a commission, which includes representatives of the Ministries of Agriculture and of Communications, has been formed in the Ministry of Commerce and Industry with the tasks of collecting information regarding the numbers and conditions of employment of workers in Government factories and industrial establishments, drawing up regulations to avert unemployment among workers; organising centres of technical instruction for workers to increase their output, improving the hygienic condition of factories, preparing plans to attract capital to the development of industry and public works.

Appointments—Civil

- 2.—(i) Hussein Mahman to be Under-Secretary of State in the Ministry of Finance.
(ii) Abdul Rahim Arfa to the Persian Consul in Trebizond.

Persian Forces.

3. In July 1943 a Persian detachment of some 800 men suffered a disaster at the battle of Sadrat (see Summary No. 27 paragraph 7). Various allegations were subsequently made of treachery and cowardice on the part of officers of the garrison and of incompetence and neglect of duty on the part of the divisional commander and his staff. The trial of a number of officers and other ranks has recently been completed and sentences on seven officers have been announced, varying from three years' imprisonment to death. The death sentences were pronounced on Saraf, Mahmud, and Nakhshaband, who were found guilty of cowardice and treachery. The other four officers were sentenced to imprisonment for periods ranging from six months to three years. The divisional commander was retired, as to be put on trial on charges arising out of the evidence given at the trial.

4. 641 soldiers who have finished their course at the Military School and have qualified for commissions in the army, navy and air force were inspected by the Shah on the 24th September.

Appointments—Military

- 5.—(i) Sarlashkar Ismail Shafai (F.O. 190; M.A. 261) to be Persian Military Attaché in Moscow.
(ii) Sarhang Ahmed Vosuq to the second-in-command of the Officers' Cadet School.

Internal Security

Kurdistan

6. Hama Rashid followed up his occupation of Merivan (see Summary No. 35 44, paragraph 10) by an insolent telegram to the Persian Government which induced them rather reluctantly to agree to operations by Persian troops for the eviction from Merivan of Hama Rashid's followers and the Governor he had set up there. This operation was successfully carried out with little opposition.

Hama Rashid are to be continued by the advance of a column from Saqqiz to Baneh. More serious opposition is expected here. The object of the operation is to put an end to Hama Rashid's rule at Baneh and to substitute for it an administration under a Persian official, supported by a force of gendarmes of Kurds officered by officers of the regular gendarmerie. Since Hama Rashid if driven out of Baneh, can take refuge in Iraq, the Persian Government has

The Minister without Portfolio of the Persian Government is to visit the area to assure the Kurds of the good intentions of the Government but, since the Government has no definite benefits to promise, and since, even if they had, the Kurds have little faith in Persian promises, his visit is likely to be of limited value.

7. There is some credible evidence that Hama Rashid is acting in agreement with the Kurds of the independence movement in Persia. It is definitely known that there is in Mahabad much talk of Kurdish independence and an absence of any sign of recognition by the Kurds of Persian authority. As reported in Summary No. 35 44, paragraph 10, the Kurds are in a state of ferment. There are reports that Russian officers visited Hama Rashid in the latter half of August, and Soviet officials in Kermanshah and Tehran have immediately shown a lively interest in, and some disapproval of, the operations now in progress.

Khuzestan

8. The Banu Turuf are shortly to be invited to surrender their arms on the assurance that one third of the number they now possess will be returned to reliable chiefs on licence. The invitation is to be backed up by a show of force. The local civil and military Persian authorities are confident that there will be no general disturbance.

Russian Affairs

9. The Assistant Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, M. Kaytaradzeb (see Summary No. 35 44 paragraph 10) is reported to be in Persia, and it is said that he is here for the purpose of negotiating a concession for the exploitation of oil in the Semnan area. The prospect of having a Soviet Government concern established in Persia has filled the Persian Government with great alarm.

10. In addition to a hospital, the opening of which was reported in Summary No. 35 44, paragraph 14, the Russians have now opened a school in Tabriz. While it is said to be principally for children of Russian subjects, it has been announced that Persian children will also be accepted without fees. The curriculum has been designed for a course of study of ten years, the principal language will be Turki, with Russian, Persian and English as subsidiary languages, the teachers will be Soviet Azerbaijanis. For neither the hospital nor the school was the permission of the Persian Government asked, and insult has been added to injury by establishing Turki as the principal language. In Meshed the Russians have opened classes for the teaching of Russian to Persians. These classes are being attended by some 300 Persians.

11. A very active Russian intriguer, Marchenko, who was vice-consul at Tabriz, has recently arrived in Isfahan as vice-consul. While in Tabriz he was shameless in his interference in Persian affairs, unco-operative with his British colleague, and undistinguished for any pro-British sentiments.

American Affairs

12. Two American officers have arrived in Tabriz to arrange for the evacuation from Russia of American air force personnel via Julfa.

Tehran, 1st October, 1944

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden (Received 21st October)
No. 391)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period 2nd October to 8th October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 9th October, 1944

Enclosure in No. 21

(Secret)

Intelligence Summary No. 38 for the period 2nd October to 8th October, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. The Shah recently received the Prime Minister, representatives of the Majlis, journalists and some others. In addressing them he laid stress on the necessity for the development of irrigation, for the preservation of existing forests and the planting of new forests with a view to increasing the rainfall. The speech was reported in the press. Such interviews are meant to be taken as an indication of the Shah's intention to act in a more constitutional and open manner as regards his relations with Deputies and journalists than he has been accused of doing.

2. Speculation about oil concessions has filled much space in the press and in the public mind, and some consternation has been caused by a frank interview given to the press by Kaviaratzeh, the Soviet Assistant Commissioner for Foreign Affairs—see Summary No. 37, 44, paragraph 9—where he stated that he had come to Persia specially to investigate the possibility of oil exploitation in the north. The report of the experts he had brought with him had been favourable, he was now offering terms for a concession to be given to the Soviet Government and was awaiting an answer. He said that his Government attached great importance to this concession from the point of view of strengthening political, economic and cultural relations with Persia. He gave his assurance that the invaluable co-operation of Persia in bringing help to Russia would have the best results in tightening the bonds between the two nations.

3. The three to four months' grace allowed by the Government to Dr. Millsaugh has now expired. He has written a letter to the Prime Minister, published in the press, in which he claimed that developments during these months provided an effective answer to his critics. Every endeavour had been made to obtain prices had dropped, monopoly goods were being actively distributed, the road transport service had been progressively improved, revenues had increased and, if expenses did not increase, it might be hoped that next year the budget deficit, if not totally extinguished, would be materially reduced, the Government now held stocks of grain greater than had ever been known in Persia, useful plans had been drawn up for the post war period. Dr. Millsaugh claimed that there remained only one point which might create dissension between himself on the one hand and the Government and Parliament on the other and that was the question of the special powers given to him. Suggestions had been made that the law that gave him those powers should be abrogated. That he thought, would be allowed, his special powers. In the meantime, as he did not wish to give any pretext to his opponents for accusing him of dictatorial actions, he proposed to exercise those special powers within the framework of the original law sanctioning them, under the supervision of the Minister of Finance and so restore the constitutional responsibility of that Minister.

The Russian inspired press, however, asserts that the economic position has greatly deteriorated and urges that Dr. Millsaugh should be deprived of his special powers and that the necessity for the retention of the American mission should be seriously considered.

4. An Indo-Iranian Cultural Committee has been formed in Tehran which includes the Prime Minister, a number of Persians distinguished for their cultural

attainments and representatives of the British Council and of His Majesty's Embassy.

5. Muhammad Sadiq Tabataba'i has been re-elected President of the Majlis, and the Deputies Malik Madani and Dr. Muazzami have been elected Vice-Presidents.

Economic

6. Due in part to the fact that the Government now holds reserves of some 90,000 tons, prices of grain are falling all over the country and in some places to below the level fixed by the Government. As a result, the surpluses they are bound to surrender. In consequence restrictions on the free movement of grain and flour have been removed. Prices of other commodities are also falling, in some cases even in the retail market.

7. Since the death of Reza Shah there has been much speculation in Tehran regarding alleged large sums which are said to have been lodged by him in foreign banks. The Court has published a letter addressed to the Prime Minister which says that enquiries had been made by Prime Minister Ferouhi at the time of Reza Shah's abdication and that no sums in foreign banks had been traced. The Shah now authorised the Prime Minister to make all further enquiries that were necessary to clear up this matter definitely.

8. The Persian press reports that Persia has been invited to send representatives to the International Air Conference to be held in America in November. The representatives selected are Hussein Nawab and Dr. Naar, commercial representative of Persia in the United States.

9. A commercial mission composed of representatives selected by the Tehran Chamber of Commerce is to attend the American Trade Conference.

Appointments—Civil

10. Mahmud Afshar to be Under Secretary of State in the Ministry of Education.

Persian Forces

11. A Bill has been laid before the Majlis for the grant of an additional sum of 15 million tomans to the Ministry of War for the remaining months of the current financial year. The amount is to be obtained by borrowing from the National Bank. The Bill is likely to meet with some opposition.

Appointments—Military

12. (a) Sarrup Asadu-lah Gulshayan to be Deputy Chief of the General Staff.
- (b) Sarrup Asadu-lah Gulshayan to be Director, Armaments and Factories.
- (c) Colonel Jawadi to be head of the Officers' Personnel Branch of the General Staff.

Internal Security

Kurdistan

13. The Persian forces operating against Hama Rashid—see Summary No. 37, 44, paragraphs 6 and 7—occupied his stronghold at Banah with little opposition on the 1st October. It is not yet known where Hama Rashid has withdrawn. An emissary from Hama Rashid has visited His Majesty's Consul General in Tehran and stated that he had been asked to ask for British intervention to effect a settlement, if the British do not intervene he will continue to fight. Other Kurdish chiefs of the Mahabad area have been summoned to Tehran to discuss the general Kurdish situation with the Government. Much is being made in the Tehran press of reports of the miserable condition of the people of Banah. The Shah has contributed 100,000 rials. As the reports of conditions in Banah come from the Persian army, who are anxious to show that they have accomplished something meritorious, they may be treated with reserve.

Kashgari

14. There has been no further contact between the Barz Ajmadi tribes which has so far affected only themselves. Abdullah Zarghampur's appeal to Nasir Qashgai for help met with little response as the Qashgai tribes showed no willingness to be involved in this dispute, probably because they feared they might

find themselves in conflict with the Mamassannim who control the migration routes of the important Qashgari sub-tribes, the Kashgari and the Darashuri. Nasir's brother, Malik Mansur, did go some way to the help of Abdullah / (spat with 200) or so men, but when his suggestions for a settlement of one / in the main causes of the dispute, the rival claims to certain lands, was / down by Abdullah Zarghampur, he is reported to have withdrawn. The Persian authorities, believing perhaps rightly, that the Boir Ahmadi united are a greater / danger to the peace of others than the Boir Ahmadi quarrelling among themselves, are not discouraging the opposition to Abdullah Zarghampur's aspirations to make himself paramount chief in Kulugah and are prepared to assist if it should show signs of being overcome.

Russian Affairs

15 Previous to the advance on Baneh reported in paragraph 13 above a Russian officer visited the Persian general commanding the troops and showed some anxiety about the operation. He asked that the Russians should be informed if there was any prospect of the operations extending to Mahabad and Miandoh.

16 A party of about eight Russians, officers and soldiers, has been making an extended tour through South Persia. It was reported in Bakhtiari—see Summary No 30 44 paragraph 15—at the end of July, and in August it or a similar party was in the Kerman district north of Kerman. The explanation given of the purpose of their journey is invariably that they are seeking lorries stolen from the Soviet Government.

17 Persian newspapers under Russian influence have for some time past been combating the argument that Persian economy should be based on agriculture and have been urging the initiation of an extensive programme of industrialisation. Regulations issued by the Ministry of Education for the establishment of primary schools in rural districts have met with severe criticism on the grounds that the retention of children for education in rural districts is part of a nefarious design on the part of foreign capitalists to exploit Persia's backward agricultural country, producing raw materials for the benefit of foreign capitalists and providing a market for their manufactured goods. Country children, the argument goes, should be brought to the towns for education.

18 Bagiroff, an important Soviet Commissar from Baku, is reliably reported to have made recently a secret visit to Persian Azerbaijan, including the town of Khoi in the Kurdish area.

E 6593 422 34

No 22

Mr R. L. Allard to Mr Eden.—(Received 27th October)

(No. 300)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No 30 for the period the 9th 15th October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 16th October, 1944.

Enclosure in No 22

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No 30 for the period the 9th 15th October, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1 The Russian demand for a concession for the right to explore for oil in North Persia has caused a great deal of alarm of the capital. The effects on Persia of the invasion of the area in question which extends from Azerbaijan to Quehan, by an army of Soviet Government officers, and the presence of technical experts occupying the places left vacant by the British, are widely reported. A fairly general approval of the Government's reply to the Soviet representative

Kaviradze, to the effect that it had been decided to postpone decision on the several applications for concessions for the exploitation of oil until after the war. There are, however, not a few who regard this defiance as dangerous temerity, likely to provoke disagreeable retaliation, a fear which Soviet officials have not failed to exploit and in the press there is not only an absence of the hostile criticism that was directed against the British and American competitors for concessions but, in certain papers supported by the Russians or inspired for the occasion, much argument as to the necessity for restoring the balance in foreign trade. The granting to the Russians a concession in the north; other articles, clearly not written by Persians, would represent the Russian demand as having been dictated not at all in the interests of Russia, Russia having no need of more oil, but solely by the Soviet Government's desire to secure a supply of oil for its own use. The granting to the Russians a concession in the north; other articles, clearly not written by Persians, would represent the Russian demand as having been dictated not at all in the interests of Russia, Russia having no need of more oil, but solely by the Soviet Government's desire to secure a supply of oil for its own use.

2 The Persian Government has decided not to grant a concession for the exploitation of oil in the north. The decision was announced by the Minister of the Interior. He is believed to have said that the Russian demand was not in the interests of Persia. The Persian Government has decided not to grant a concession for the exploitation of oil in the north. The decision was announced by the Minister of the Interior. He is believed to have said that the Russian demand was not in the interests of Persia. The Persian Government has decided not to grant a concession for the exploitation of oil in the north. The decision was announced by the Minister of the Interior. He is believed to have said that the Russian demand was not in the interests of Persia.

3 Some embarrassment has been caused to the Government and some resentment in the Court by Dr Mills' summary dismissal, without previous consultation with the Government, of the Governor of the National Bank, an official of considerable standing. The Government has decided that the dismissal was not within Dr Mills' competence—a decision which has given much pleasure to Dr Mills' many enemies and has not enhanced his prestige or his reputation for political wisdom.

4 It is believed that the Persian Government is now taking place between British and Russian policies—in Poland, in the Balkans, in Persia. In Persia they think they are the British, and they are not so powerful ally, yielding, as little as may be perhaps, to Russian anti-British aggressiveness. Attacks on British policy in certain Persian papers are well known to have been inspired by the Russians, and the nature of the enquiries made by Soviet officials of Persian officials leaves no doubt of the discord between Russian and British policies in Persia.

5 Sartip Abdullah Hidayet, Under-Secretary of State for War, has been appointed Acting Minister for War.

Economic

6 Dr. Mills' has issued a circular instruction to all Ministries notifying them that the special powers given to him in economic and financial matters will be exercised under the general supervision of the Minister of Finance. All regulations and correspondence on matters of policy will be signed jointly by Dr Mills' as Administrator-General of the Finance and by the Minister of Finance.

7 The Government has approved the grant of a credit of 1 million rials to the Ministry of the Interior for the reform and improvement of prisons.

8 Some progress has been made with the distribution of monopoly goods—cloth, tea and sugar—in tribal areas. Over 100,000 rations were distributed to the Qashgari, 200,000 rations were distributed to the Bakhtiari but lack of cash prevented the tribesmen from taking more than 60,000. Distribution has also been made in Khuzestan on a wide scale and in Luristan, and it is hoped that a beginning will shortly be made with the Kurds.

Internal Security

Kurdistan

9 His Majesty's Consul General in Azerbaijan reports that during a recent tour west of Lake Rezaieh he found generally a much healthier atmosphere as

regards the Kurds. There was evidence of some slight recognition on their part of Persian authority. The Kurds are still in the process of re-establishment throughout Kurdish territory. Kurds were talking of the necessity of finding a *modus vivendi* with the Persian authorities, and some Kurds spontaneously expressed loyalty to the Persian Government. Qazi Muhammad of Mahabad, who has been credited with being the protagonist of the Kurdish independence movement in those parts, admitted that all Kurds did not want independence, many would be content with an administration that gave them more consideration, schools where Kurdish would be allowed, health services better commensurate with the needs of the population, and a degree of autonomy in purely local matters.

The Military Governor General, Colonel Darakshan, of the Military Governor General, Colonel Darakshan.

10. In the Mahabad area the Kurds were said to be fairly orderly, but further north the Jalali, Horki and Shakak were being a pest to their settled neighbours. The Russian authorities had at last agreed to the location of 300 troops at Maku and to their employment for the protection of villages against marauding Kurds.

11. There is no further news from Bauch, nor is it known where Hamid Rashid has taken refuge. The Minister without portfolio, Fahreni, is due in Bauch shortly with supplies of tea, sugar and cloth. He will make recommendations to the Government. Qazi Muhammad and other chiefs of the Mahabad district have been summoned to Tehran for a conference with the Government, whose intentions as regards the Kurds are benevolent, although they may not have the capacity to translate them into practice nor the power to control the rapacity of their local officials.

South Persia

12. The downward migration of the tribes has begun, accompanied in the case of the Qashgai, according to reports, by a good deal of levying of tribute from villages. Some 500 families of the Darakshani sub-tribe of the Qashgai are to remain for the winter in their summer quarters in the Seimurum area. Whether this will lead to their permanent settlement in that area and be the beginning of the sedentarisation of the tribe is not yet known, but their presence in that area should serve to check the Boir Ahmadi raiding that usually takes place when the Qashgai leave their summer quarters.

Russian Affairs

13. The Soviet authorities are again demanding large quantities of rice from the Persian Government, for which they offer to barter cotton piece-goods and miscellaneous articles. In a similar transaction last year the Persian Government lost heavily, but if they refuse to accommodate the Soviet authorities this year the latter will obtain the rice to pay for the rice by selling piece-goods and other goods on the black market. The Soviet has already obtained rice by barter at high prices on the black market sugar and tyres, commodities which they obtain from the Allies on Lend-Lease. Needless to say no customs duty is paid on any of the goods imported by the Soviet authorities for sale on the Persian market.

14. Transovtrans the Russian transport organisation corresponding to the T.K.C. (Trans-Kaspien Company) is operating in South Persia. It is reported in paragraph 14) owing to a drop in freights which has made operation unprofitable. A report from the Soviet authorities in South Persia, their main object was to obtain rice. The vehicles used were either Lend-Lease trucks or vehicles hired from Persian owners. They ignored all the rules of the Persian Road Transport Department.

15. His Majesty's Consul-General in Azerbaijan, after a recent tour west of Lake Rezaieh reports that there is now much less evidence of Russian political activity among the Kurds. The local Governor-General was positive that the Russians were not now encouraging Kurdish lawlessness. This improvement may be due to a change in the personnel of the Soviet Consulate at Rezaieh, the new Consul, a young man, is reported to have been helped to the Persian Administration. Three hundred Persian troops had been allowed to Maku to protect the villages against Kurdish brigandage.

16. A Turkish police demonstration took place at Rezaieh during the Consul-General's visit. It was a success and a good deal of the Russian influence was removed. The Consul-General reported that the Russian influence was removed.

17. Some 2,000 Russian troops arrived in Meshed on the 7th October. See also Summary No. 36 44, paragraph 8, which reported the departure of a considerable number of troops from Meshed for Russia.

Tehran, 15th October, 1944

E 8810 422 84]

No. 23

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden. (Received 6th November)

(No. 405.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 40 for period the 16th to 22nd October, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 23rd October, 1944

Enclosure in No. 23

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 40 for the Period 16th to 22nd October, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

THE Russians are trying in a variety of ways to frighten the Prime Minister, the representative of the people, by the display of the Government that no concessions for the exploitation of oil should be given until after the war. The greater part of the Tehran press has been mobilised, not only those papers previously dependent on Russian support. The Tudeh press had some difficulty in wriggling out of the position it had adopted before Kavtaradzh appeared on the scene, towards the granting of concessions. It explained, however, that its opposition was only to concessions that might allow foreigners to exercise influence injurious to the integrity and economy of Persia. The war of nerves has been prosecuted by parading through the streets of Tehran lorry-loads of menacingly armed Russian soldiers and by plain threats to prominent Persians and delivered by the Soviet Ambassador himself to the few editors who had ventured to support the Government. Rumours are being circulated to the effect that Russia is on the point of breaking off relations, Persians are urged to remember the fate of Finland; the Russian press has claimed that the whole Persian people are being deceived by the Government's offer (in fact, the Russians have as yet given no indication of the terms they are prepared to offer); and a broadcast from the Tehran Broadcasting Station, sponsored nominally by the Irano-Soviet Cultural Society, was used mainly to give extracts from the Russian-inspired Persian press hostile to the Government's decision.

2. Public opinion generally does, in fact, support the Government's decision, but few Persians have the courage to give their support openly. Great Britain, it is hoped, will intervene and save Persia from having to choose between the unpleasant alternatives of surrendering her northern provinces to Russia or incurring Russian hostility. The Shah is reported to be determined to stand firm, and the Prime Minister will probably do so, but a very violent and venomous campaign is being waged against him in the Persian press that is under Russian influence. He is accused of following a one-sided policy in foreign affairs, of being hostile to Russia and of trying to wreck Russo-Persian relations. In a speech in the Majlis he claimed that the decision to postpone consideration of the granting of concessions until after the war had been made by the Council of Ministers before the arrival of Kavtaradzh as was recorded in the minutes of a Cabinet meeting.

Economic

3. Certain changes have lately been made in the Cereals and Bread Regulations, of which the effect is to—

- a) Give higher exemptions to the smaller landlords
- b) Exempt the peasants completely
- c) Remove all restrictions on the transport of grain

These modifications have been made partly because of political pressure, but they can be justified by the improvement in the general situation as regards cereals, which may be summarised as—

- i) The possession by the Government of considerable reserves of grain
- ii) The decreasing tendency to hoard resulting from favourable war news
- iii) The recent falls in the price of grain on the free market

It is expected that the result of permitting the free transport of grain combined with the fall in prices due to the unloading of hoarded stocks, will be to increase the supply of grain on the free markets in towns, thus lightening the Government's financial burden. The Government hopes to be able to control the price on the free market by issues from the stocks obtained from the collection of landlords' surpluses. If present trends continue the Government hopes to hold at the end of the current harvest year stocks of 150,000 tons of grain.

4. Colonel Mahmud Khosrovani of the Persian air force has been selected as an additional representative of the Persian Government at the International Air Conference to be held in America in November (see Summary No. 38 44 paragraph 8). Colonel Khosrovani has already been in America purchasing aircraft and made profits from that transaction which were considered to be scandalous even in Persia.

5. The Red Lion and Sun (the Persian Red Cross) Society announces that it has received subscriptions of 600,000 rials for the relief of the inhabitants of Baneh who have suffered from the maladministration of Hama Rashid. Of this amount, the sum of 400,000 rials is said to have been subscribed by officers of the army.

Persian Forces

Army

1. The effect of the British blockade on the Persian army has been to reduce its strength to a very small number. The Persian Government has been unable to replace the losses suffered by the army in the last few years. The Persian army has been reduced to a very small number. The Persian Government has been unable to replace the losses suffered by the army in the last few years. The Persian army has been reduced to a very small number. The Persian Government has been unable to replace the losses suffered by the army in the last few years.

7. During a debate in the Majlis certain remarks made by the Acting Minister for War concerning the army's special relation to the Shah evoked an emotional protest from the Deputy Dr Musaddiq, who, while asserting that he was more devoted to the Shah than anyone else in the Majlis, felt bound to point out that the Shah's army was not entitled to special treatment and that it should be treated like any other army.

Internal Security

8. It has been decided in principle to apply the Military Government Law to offences committed on the railway and on certain roads with a view to speeding up the trial of offences against the law and to legalising the imposition of more severe sentences.

Kurdistan

9. The following information has been given by the Persian General Staff—

Hama Rashid has taken refuge in Iraq and from there he has made several incursions into Persian territory which have resulted in clashes with Persian

columns and casualties to both sides, including one of Hama Rashid's brothers. The Persian forces are, however, in effective occupation of the Baneh and Merivan areas. Important chiefs, such as Sulaiman Jaf and his two sons and the chiefs of the Mangur, have visited the Persian commander at Baneh and promised their co-operation against Hama Rashid, who had made himself unpopular by his exactions. He had destroyed almost everything in Baneh except the mosques before he fled. The people are gradually returning to their homes. The Minister without Portfolio and one of the Kurdish Deputies in the Majlis are due at Baneh on the 22nd October and they will distribute tea, sugar and cloth which has been provided by the Government. The Persian General Staff will be glad if a British official would visit the area to see conditions. Since it seemed unlikely that the Iraqi Government would co-operate to the extent of rounding up Hama Rashid and his followers if they remained in Iraq territory, the Persian Government had had to decide to maintain garrisons of all arms in Baneh, Merivan and during the winter.

Khanzestan

10. Three columns of Persian troops are now moving to positions of tactical importance on the outskirts of the Beni Turuf country preparatory to a summons being given to the tribe to surrender its arms. If the summons is obeyed the troops will take no action. The Beni Turuf Arabs are believed to possess about 2,500 rifles, of which about 800 will be returned to them for their own protection.

Abdullah

11. It is reported that all the Boir Ahmadi winter quarters are now occupied by the opponents of Abdullah Zarghanpur with the exception of Piti, a rather important tactical point, which is occupied by Abdullah himself. Khosrow, his brother and enemy, appealed for the assistance of Persian aircraft to drive out Abdullah, but this request was refused. Relations between Abdullah and Nasir Qashgai are reported to be deteriorating. Nasir is playing for his own hand and Government approval.

Fars

12. Nasir Qashgai has found that his position in Fars and his authority in the Qashgai tribe are weakening. If he wishes to maintain order in the tribe, he must be given material and moral support against Kahanlars of sub-tribes who are now questioning his authority. He suggests that one of his brothers should live in Tehran and that, of himself and the others, one should be with the tribe and one in Shiraz. The Government is in something of a quandary. Qashgai lawlessness is increasing, whether instigated by Nasir or not, but the Government forces are not yet ready to assume direct responsibility for maintaining order in the tribe. To give Nasir official recognition and support as being responsible for the behaviour of the whole tribe is tantamount to recognising him as Ilkhan—a retrograde measure which the Persian Government has been trying to avoid.

Russian Affairs

13. A team of Soviet footballers is now in Tehran to play a series of matches. Few personages, however important, have been so greatly feted or been given so much publicity.

14. The Soviet exploration of South Persia, to which reference has been made in previous summaries, continues. A party of Red Army officers has recently been making investigations, of a nature not yet ascertained, in the Zahidan area and along the Zahidan-Birjand road.

Tehran, 22nd October, 1944.

(No. 418.)

Takron, 30th October, 1944

Enclosure in No. 24

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 41 for the Period 23rd October to the 28th October, 1944

Perron 1990.

Political.

1. The Russians have continued their campaign of would-be intimidation of the Persian Government and Majlis. The journalists of Tehran, with a few exceptions, were loyal to the Soviet Embassy and were convinced by M. Kavtaradze with an exposition of the altruistic motives that had induced the Soviet Government to offer to exploit Persia's oil and of the advantages—in no case precisely defined—that would accrue to Persia, with veiled threats and with an attack on the head of their Government with whom, M. Kavtaradze said the Soviet authorities could have no further relations, although they still cherished the same warm feelings towards the Persian people whom M. Sa'ed was attempting to mislead. The newspapers, supported by the Russians, have increased the violence of their attacks on the Prime Minister accusing him of deliberately trying to embroil Persia with Russia. They remind their readers that those who opposed the Soviet are to-day being destroyed by the guns of the Red Army. The Russian press has also been busy with the sessions of the League Conference of the conditions of the peace war work. Quite recently with their expressions of regard for the welfare of the Persian people, Soviet authorities have stopped the transport of all goods to the army from the over-stocked granaries of the north. When was perhaps prompted by a counterstroke of the offensive was the proposal to increase the price of the Mekeles from 150 to 200 roubles and 1000 to 1500 roubles. It is said that the death of Dr. P. P. Mavrodiev, the Soviet Minister, has been a blow to the Soviet Embassy in Tehran. The Russian press is now in touch with the new growth of the war up to the present time. The propaganda by Russia is being carried out.

2 The exact nature of the ground which the Russians occupy in this respect is not clear. The Russians are not either at all or almost at all in a position to make any important contribution to the Peace Movement. The chief of the methods on the floor to all have been for the Russians to make a known basis of a treaty to be signed in peace, its taking the Peace Movement has been used for the purpose of Russia and against the other of these in quarters of peace resistance and the National Society to enter the Russian government. Foreign Press Newspapers that are in Russian notes have come out with some mixed defeat and as to the Russian has not taken Persians who consider that the greatest danger from the Russians is as a threat to the property of the lower classes now find cause for it to be called in the future since they find the view that even the common people are being antagonized by Russia's own attempts to bully.

2. In his interview with the journalists—referred to in paragraph 1—Kavtaradze stated —

(ii) That the Soviet Government wished to obtain a company for the exploration of a large province of Azerbaijan (i.e. an) Masanderat part of the region of Sumgait and some parts of Karabakh.

(b) After the massive period of heavy mining in this area at a place where it existed for years, it will be restricted to a relatively limited region. It is known from other sources that this area may extend to 150,000 square miles.

(d) At the end of the period of the concession all constructions and installations would be surrendered to the Persian Government.

(e) Employment would be found for thousands of Persian workmen, particularly for those who had been employed in the oil industry.

7) During the preliminary geological survey it might be expected that other

(A) The Soviet Government would accept responsibility for the medical care of all employees and their families.

(i) The Prime Minister in preliminary discussions had expressed his approval in principle of the Soviet proposals. His subsequent refusal to grant any concessions for oil until after the war had been badly received by the Soviet authorities and his attitude would lead to a deterioration in Russo-Persian relations.

4. It was to be kept in mind that the Prime Minister of having been aware of [redacted] had previously expressed his disapproval of it before his arrival in Persia. It is believed that the explanation given by the Soviet Embassy of the object of Kaviaradze's mission when it was first proposed to the Persian Government was that it was to discuss the old Khurasan oil concession in which the Soviet Government held no share and to obtain information about the situation there. The Prime Minister's view given to the press several months ago was as authentic as the fact stated as the matter of a few days ago was not confirmed by Kaviaradze himself. He stated that he had never seen [redacted] since after the war.

5 The press states that the American Ambassador has written to the Persian Government with regard to the possibility of a concession having been given to the representative of any American oil company and that he considered that the Persian Government was fully justified in postponing a decision until after the war.

d. Dr. Millspaugh has apparently refused to accept the decision of the Government that his dismissal of the Governor of the National Bank was *ultra vires* as, subsequent to that decision he notified all other banks and departments of the Government that Hitchay's signature on official documents was not valid.

7 Hassan Taqizadeh, Persian Ambassador in London has left Tehran on his return to England. Attacks on him continued in the Soviet inspired press up to the time of his departure.

8. Majid Ahi, Persian Ambassador in Moscow has arrived in Tehran on

9. The Minister of Roads and Communications, Mahmoud Nariman, has resigned as a protest against the Prime Minister's decision that M. El-Husseini, Nasser's old ally, be removed from the post of Director General of Railways, and should be reinstated.

Регина Корса

А гоним

10 The Bill for the grant of an additional credit of 15 million tomans to the army was passed by a substantial majority. An addition made to the Bill was that the period of service for graduates and lieutenants should be reduced to one year (see also Summary No. 40 44, paragraph 6).

Appointments—Military

11. (i) Sarkashkar Hassan Arfa (F.O. 30, M.A. 37) to be a Military Governor for the purpose of applying military law to offences committed on the railway and on other roads not yet opened, (see Summary No. 40, 44, paragraph 8).

2nd (Tehran) Division.

(iii) Sarlashkar Amanullah Jahanbani (F.O. 103; M.A. 132) to command the officers' cadet school

42

that it was not in the interests of Persia that oil concessions should be given to any foreigners since they upset the political balance and did not profit Persia economically to an extent proportionate to their value. He went over a lot of old history: claimed that the reason why the Russians had occupied North Persia in 1941 had nothing to do with the defence of Persia against the Germans, but was solely to prevent the British establishing themselves there on some pretext in the vicinity of the Baku oilfields. He reviewed the 1921 Russo-Persian Treaty with favour, and, at great length, the terms of the AIOC concession which he criticised as being unjust to Persia. He blamed the Prime Minister for having earlier the decision of the Government to postpone consideration of the grant of concessions until after the war. It was natural that the Russians, who were their neighbours, believing that the Government was considering the grant of a concession to the Americans should themselves apply for a concession. The Soviet Government could say one of two things: either that the concession for the northern provinces should be given to them to balance the concession given to the AIOC; or that Russia needed the concession because she needed oil. In the first case the Majlis would certainly not approve. In the second case, he

uttered the words: "The Tudeh party has published a lengthy manifesto giving the aims of the party to give Persia a limited number of foreign shareholders should be formed to exploit the northern oilfields and that the Government should undertake to sell for a period to be settled by agreement, the surplus oil of the northern fields." The Tudeh party has published a lengthy manifesto giving the aims of the party to give Persia a limited number of foreign shareholders should be formed to exploit the northern oilfields and that the Government should undertake to sell for a period to be settled by agreement, the surplus oil of the northern fields. Among the political aims are: the independence and integrity of Persia, democracy; co-operation with all freedom loving countries; freedom of thought, speech and pen; educational and religious freedom for minorities, electoral reform, the suppression of corruption in the police and gendarmes. For the workers it envisages a Utopia to be achieved through legislation. For the peasant it demands an extension of the property of large landowners, loans of money and machinery, the establishment of schools and hospitals, the improvement of irrigation, the revision of laws governing the proportion of the crop to be given by the peasant to the landowner. For women it aims at the right to vote in elections in local administration, the reform of the divorce laws and the equality of wife and husband. In education it demands, besides a fundamental reform of the system, the introduction of political teaching and freedom from censorship of all kinds. It lays stress on the necessity for increased industrialisation and for Government control of economic affairs. Membership of the party is open to all Persian nationals over the age of 20 who accept the principles of the party, with the exception of criminals, persons who co-operated with the old régime and members of any other party. Subscriptions vary from 5 rials per month for persons whose income is 1,000 rials per month to 100 rials for persons whose income is 5,000 rials per month. Local committees must meet once a fortnight, and a central congress of members elected from provincial organisations will be held yearly. This congress will be formed, who will be instructed in Tudeh aims and policy.

6. A step forward has been taken towards the execution of the Law of Compulsory Primary Education, passed by the Majlis in June 1943. A law has now been passed authorising the expenditure of a credit of 50 million rials on the increase of teachers' emoluments, on assistance to existing schools and on the construction of new schools. Further, the Government is to draft a ten-year plan for the construction or purchase of buildings for new primary schools in the capital and the provinces. The Ministry of Education undertakes to co-operate with the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in providing facilities for the education of workers in factories.

Economic

7. A representative of the British engineering firm of Sir Alexander Gibbs and Company has been for some time in Tehran investigating projects for improving the water supply of Tehran. One of these projects is to bring the water of the Lar River, which flows into the Caspian, to Tehran by tunnelling a canal through the watershed. Another, and much less ambitious, project, which is however, only a partial solution, is to improve the canal that now brings water from the Korej River so as to reduce wastage.

8. The Persian representatives to attend the Trade Conference in America have left Tehran. They are Dr. Ali Akbar Abhari, Akbar Abhari and Qazizadeh.

Persian Forces

9. Two commissions have been formed to enquire into the accounts of the Ministry of War. One will investigate the accounts for twenty years previous to August 1941; the other the accounts subsequent to that time. The present Minister of War is a former senior officer and other rivals who might return to the Shah's favour and oust them from their positions.

Appointments—Military

10.—(i) Sarhang Darabkhan, lately Governor-General of Western Azerbaijan, has been appointed to be deputy Military Governor of Tehran.

(ii) Sarhang Najaf Quli Abbasi to be deputy Military Governor of Tehran.

Internal Security

Bakhtiari

11. It has been decided to enlist 100 Bakhtiari tribesmen into the Persian army. They will be sent to the control of Bahmai and Tashir raiding, some will be at the service of the Government.

Kermanshah

12. Decorations and rewards have been distributed by the Persian Ministry of War to the Persian army who were active in the operations against the Russian forces in the North Caucasus.

Khuzestan

13. It is reported that the Sheikhs of the Beni Turuf, when summoned to surrender the arms, agreed to do so, and that 200 rifles have already been handed in without it having been necessary for the Persian army to take any forcible measures.

Russian Affairs

14. His Majesty's Consul General at Meshed reports that Soviet activities in Khuzestan, Kermanshah and other provinces, and movements and military measures, allegedly for security, have greatly increased lately.

15. The Russians are trying to buy secretly for export to Russia the surplus stocks of woollen material said to be 1 million yards in the Tehran mills. As this material is required for Persia's own consumption.

French Affairs

16. The French Legation in Tehran, together with its archbishop, have been in the Ministry of Education to discuss the new law of education. The Minister of the Provincial Government is also present.

Turkish Affairs

17. The Turkish Ambassador to Persia, M. Husnu Teray, who has been absent for some time, has returned to Tehran.

Tehran, 5th November, 1944

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the period of the 8th November to 12th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Enclosure in No. 26.

*Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 43 for the Period
5th 12th November, 1944*

Political

2. Unless the Russians are very ill informed, they must know that by his refusal of their demand Sa'ed has greatly increased his prestige and is, in fact, a minor national hero; not only that, but that Persian opinion was for the most part against the Soviet Government. It is not possible for the Soviet Government that world opinion has not been misled by the artificial demonstration of hirelings, nor by the inspired clamour of a certain section of the press; and that not only have they had a considerable rebuff but also that the Tudeh party is greatly discredited, having plainly shown itself to all to be nothing more than an organisation for the furtherance of Soviet policy in Persia. Moreover, the leaders of the party have realised that their Russian connexion is no guarantee of security, the leading papers of the party have been suppressed, its headquarters occupied by Persian troops and some of the leaders arrested. Persians may well wonder what services the Soviet Ambassador and the Deputy Commissioner for Foreign Affairs have rendered to Russia to merit the decorations whose award to them has recently been announced.

3. In broadcasts from Moscow, in the Russian press and in the Russian inspired Persian press malignant attacks on Sa'ed continued. The similarity of the attacks in the Russian and Persian press left no doubt as to their common origin. They intended a very important and preparatory to the effect, that it was only to Russia that the Persian people could look with confidence for protection against colonising Powers and against exploitation. The *Ishtisna* gave as proof of Sa'ed's truthfulness the fact that he allowed American troops to remain in Persia without any treaty right whatsoever. Reuter's and the B.B.C. were attacked for attempting to mislead world opinion by suggesting that Sa'ed had the support of the Persian people. Persian *Ishtisna* papers continued to publish criticisms of Russian policy, usually offering, however, to make allowances for the apparent fact that the Soviet Embassy had been misled as to Persian opinion by its Persian friends. One paper published what it claimed was the gist of a letter written by President Roosevelt affirming America's concern for the integrity of Persia and promising that America's treatment of Persia would be a model for all big Powers in their dealings with small nations. The editor of the paper claims that such a letter was written, but some time ago, to General H. H. H. and that it was shown to the Persian Embassy in Washington with the President's permission.

5. It seems likely that there will be some delay before a new Government is formed. There are at least fifteen willing candidates for the premiership. Dr Musaddiq appears to have the largest support in the Majlis, but no way has yet been found to satisfy his condition that he should be allowed to retain a lion's seat in the Majlis. Failing him, the choice of the Deputies at present seems to be between Mirza Asadullah Khan (Adib-ul-Mulk) (F. O. 99; M. A. 125) and Hussein Sam'i (Adib-e-Sultaneh) (F. O. 199, M. A. 254).

7 After a long drought rain has fallen over the greater part of Persia

8. The Cabinet has approved the promotion of the Baksh of Jahrum in south-east Fars to a Shahrستان. It will include the villages of Samigan, Hazer Gardan and Kuhak.

9.-(i) Sa'ed Sami'i to be Under-Secretary of State for the Interior
(ii) Alunad Ibrahim Zanganeh to be Under-Secretary of State for Commerce and Industry

(ii) Sarhang Ahmad Khorosvati (FO 118; M A 158) to command the Persian air force. (He was recently bundled unceremoniously out of Tabriz by the Russians, as he wished to take action against Tudeh demonstrators.)

First

11 It had, it seems, been decided by the Government that they could not go so far as to give to Nasir Qashgai an official decree appointing him Raimi of the Qashgai tribes—but they have agreed that he may be asked to accept that responsibility by the Governor General of Persia. Whether Nasir will accept this ambiguous position is doubtful. See also Summary No. 41 '44, paragraph 13.

12. A British officer who recently visited Banah confirms that the village has been cut off from the world since the British evacuated it on their return, and that the Persian military authorities are doing their best with the small resources at their disposal, to relieve distress. From Persian sources it is reported that all the Banah Beggards except Hama Rashid and his near relations have returned and made submission, also, that the Iraqi authorities are showing a benevolent disposition towards him and his family in the case of Hama Rashid. The Persian authorities are anxious to get him out of the way before the winter sets in. Banah becomes isolated for five to six months from the military assistance of Saqqz and Sarik which would otherwise be available. The size of any garrison left in Banah depends on the amount of supplies that can be sent to it.

13. Qazi Muhammad, the Kurdish notable of Mahabad, who has for some time been a member of the League of the Moderates, is a member of the league with the B. S. S. and is a member of the League of the Moderates of the Mangur, one of the Mamesh and one of the Govrik. He is endeavouring to convince the Persian authorities, as yet with incomplete success, that he is a loyal Persian subject. He has in the past been credited with loyal service to the Government.

Russian Affairs.

14 The Soviet Embassy did not hold the anniversary celebration of the October Revolution on 7th November. The Russian Ambassador stated that it would be impossible to hold such a celebration in Persia. The Russian Ambassador stated that the situation in Persia was such that they were unable to hold such a celebration. The Russian Ambassador stated that they were unable to hold such a celebration. The Russian Ambassador stated that they were unable to hold such a celebration. A letter from the Soviet Embassy to the Persian Government on 2nd November 1944 stated that the Russian Ambassador who dispersed the small crowd that was gathering at the party headquarters in defiance of the proclamation forbidding public assembly, occupied the headquarters offices and arrested some of the leaders.

Tehran, 12th November, 1944

E 7406 422 34]

No. 27

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden — (Received 4th December)

(No. 447)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and begs to say that he has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 13th November 1944 concerning the military attacks on this legation.

Tehran, 20th November, 1944

Enclosure in No. 27

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 44, Secret, for the period 13th November to 19th November, 1944.

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1 Persia is still without a Government. The Persians take a fatalistic view of the present situation and are waiting for a change of circumstances without actively disputing the situation. The Majlis has met in secret or open session almost daily. A Bill to elect Dr. M. A. J. (Majlis) as Prime Minister for a period of one year has been introduced and to preserve his parliamentary seat against the time when he might resign from the premiership was taken. The Bill was passed at 191-181. At subsequent meetings of the Majlis groups on the 15th November, Hussein Sami Adib-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 109, M.A. 234) was nominated by the Mihan group, M. A. Q. B. Bayat (Saham-us-Sultan) F.O. 47, M.A. 65, by the Ittehad group, Sadiq Sadiqi (Mashhadi and Dowlati) F.O. 103, M.A. 248, by the Azad group. The latter three groups, after some discussion with the other groups, have advanced three names as candidates for the premiership: Hussein Sami Adib-us-Saltaneh (F.O. 99, M.A. 125), Sadiq Sadiqi and Sami (Adib-us-Saltaneh). They were subsequently asked to reduce the number of their candidates to two. Nothing original in the way of a policy or vigour in carrying out can be expected from any of the above and the ideas in the minds of the majority of Deputies are probably that after the recent deterioration of Perso-Soviet relations it is essential to choose a Prime Minister who, though he will not give the Russians their concession, will at least not irritate them further and be a target for their personal animosity as Sa'ed was and that as long as the war lasts and foreign troops on Persian soil prevent the Persians from being complete masters of their own house no strongly nationalistic policy or vigorous Prime Minister is indicated or indeed advisable.

2 The Russian sponsored newspapers and the Front to Front press have kept up their attacks on Sa'ed, blaming his policy for embittering Perso-Soviet relations, his "Fascist" Government for suppressing certain of the Tudeh group

of newspapers and for oppressive action against Tudeh demonstrators. This Persian habit of kicking a man when he is down or continuing to revile him after he has resigned office suits the Russian look as they hope to obscure their recent defeat over the oil concession by a more concentrated attack on Sa'ed for his mistaken policy and past misdeeds which, they claim, are leading the country to ruin.

3 A further Tudeh demonstration on the 17th November on a small scale and unescorted by Russian troops, was stopped and dispersed by Persian police and military before the demonstration had proceeded far. Two lorry loads of bemused and unenthusiastic demonstrators from Sultanabad arsenal was stopped and turned back some 4 miles north of the town.

4 A society of Ulama has been founded in Tehran. The names of several eminent divines are among its members. Among its objects are the translation of the Koran and famous works on Mohammedan theology and the construction of a hostel for prominent clerics visiting the capital.

5 Sardar Akrami, the Governor of Hamadan, has been acquitted by the correctional court of the charges made against him of illegally imprisoning certain people in Hamadan.

Appointments—Civil.

6 Mahmud Faroughi, fourth son of the late Persian Prime Minister, Muhammad Ali Faroughi (Zuka-ul-Mulk), to be first secretary at the Persian Embassy in London.

Economic.

7 Reference Summary No. 42 44, paragraph 7, a contract has now been signed between the Persian Government and the British firm of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners for the survey of the Lar valley project. The survey is to be topographical and geological and is to cover the feasibility of the construction of the dam, boring of the necessary tunnels and the possibility of combining with the dam an hydro-electric scheme.

8 An anti locust conference has been in session in Tehran since the 11th November. Representatives of Great Britain, United States, Russia, Afghanistan and Persia attended.

9 Further good rain has fallen over the northern part of Persia.

Persian Forces.

10 The Russians seem to have at last agreed to the despatch of Persian troops to disarm the tribes in the Shirwan and Buzjard areas. Some 120 infantry and some 200 cavalry are to be sent on the 20th October for Buzjard. A commission composed of a military officer, the farmandar, the public prosecutor and two well known citizens of each place will be formed to collect arms from the tribes. It is reported that Anwar Bichatman is already under guard in Meshed and Farajullah Zafarani is to be arrested shortly.

Internal Security.

Kurdistan.

11 There is little news of the operations against Hama Rashid and negotiations with the Iraq Government for his arrest and extradition are still in progress. Hama Rashid's followers are still active in the Kurdish area and in harassing the Persian lines of communication to Basra where the garrison numbers about 2,000-3,000 men.

12 Distribution of piece-goods (71,005 metres), sugar (100,073 kilos) and (100,073 kilos) has been made in some of the districts of the Kermanshah province by the Customs and Excise Department. An offer by the Kurdish tribes to take delivery themselves in Kermanshah and to superintend the distribution was declined.

Security—East Persia.

13 Two U.K.C.C. trucks employed on wheat collection were held up by an armed gang about 15 miles north of 2nd November. One of the four Persian drivers and one of the two British drivers were injured. The robbers carried away the wheat and personal belongings of the drivers. A Persian army detachment sent in pursuit has so far failed to contact the robbers.

Russian Affairs

14. A consular report from Meshed states that some eighty Turkoman soldiers of the Red army are said to have deserted and joined the Persian Turkoman tribes in the Buynurd district. The Soviet military authorities approached the Persian General Officer Commanding in Khorassan for assistance in rounding up the deserters. A party of Persian troops, accompanied by a Soviet officer surrounded the deserters and after a short fight some thirty-three of them were captured. Twelve Persian Turkomans have been arrested for assisting the deserters.

15. The same source reports that a platoon of Russian infantry has been despatched to Birjand.

16. M. Kavtaradze, whose name has become so unpopular in Persia recently that it is now rendered as Kaftarzadeh (hyena spawn), is reported to be still in Tehran and indisposed.

17. The Russian Military Attaché, who recently visited Khwash and Iranshahr, is now reported to have arrived in Shiraz and to have made contacts with Nasir Khan Qashgai. Further details of this encounter are awaited.

18. The Persian Ministry for Foreign Affairs has protested against the opening, without prior permission of the Persian Government, by the Russians of a Russian Technical College in Azerbaijan. Other colleges, medical and agricultural, were to follow.

Polish Affairs

19. The number of civilian Poles in Persia on the 31st October, 1944 was

| | Men | Women | Children | Total |
|---------------|-----|-------|----------|-------|
| In Tehran .. | 431 | 1,413 | 399 | 2,243 |
| In Isfahan .. | 78 | 488 | 546 | 1,112 |
| In Ahwaz .. | 157 | 704 | 315 | 1,176 |
| | 666 | 2,605 | 1,260 | 4,531 |

Turkish Affairs

20. His Excellency M. Jemal Husnu Taray, the Turkish Ambassador, is reported to have been appointed as ambassador to Rome.

Tehran 20th November 1944

E 7537 422 34

N 2

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden.—(Received December 9.)

(No 466.)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the period 20th to 26th November, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran 27th November, 1944

Enclosure in No 2

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 45 for the Period 20th to 26th November, 1944

Persian Affairs.

Political.

1. At a secret session of the Majlis on the 20th November Mustafa Quli Baya (Sahab al-Saltaneh) was elected Prime Minister. Fifty votes against forty-five cast for Sadiq Sadiqi (Mushkashar-ud-Dowleh). The latter had previously announced his refusal to stand as a candidate for the premiership, but had

been prevailed upon to withdraw his objections. Samin (Adib-us-Saltaneh) had also refused to stand for the premiership out of disgust, as some say, at the manner in which the Government had been conducted. The Government had nominated candidates for Cabinet posts, their jackals among the Deputies and their hirelings among the press. It is more likely that, as a reasonably honest patriot (although without much force of character) he felt himself incapable, if elected, of choosing a Cabinet acceptable to himself, the Majlis and the Russians, to say nothing of the other Allies and the Shah. Baya was subsequently received in audience by the Shah and instructed to form his Cabinet. This he has at last done, and they were due to be presented to the Shah on the 25th November and to the Majlis on the 26th November.

2. The Cabinet is composed as follows:

Commerce, Industry and Mines: Kamal Hidayat, Hassan Ali (Nasr-ul-Mulk) (FO 107, M A 140) (C)

Minister of State (without portfolio): Fahimi, Khali (Fahim-ul-Mulk) (FO 59, M A 62) (B)

Finance: Ardalan, Amanullah (Haji Izz-ul-Mamalik) (FO 27, M A 33) (D)

Education: Sadiq, Dr. Isha (Sadiq-i-A'lam) (FO 102, M A 247) (D)

Justice: Adl Mustafa (Mansur-us-Saltaneh) (FO 1, M A 1) (D)

Minister of State (without portfolio): Simi, Ali Akbar (FO 218) (D)

Road and Communications: Isha, Nuri (FO 92, M A 12) (D)

Foreign Affairs: Rais, Muhsin (FO 187, M A 239)

War: Zand Ibrahim (FO 233) (D)

Health: Malik, Dr. Said (Luqman-ul-Mulk) (D)

Interior: Sururi, Muhammad (FO 219) (B)

Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones: Arasteh, Nadir (FO 24, M A 32)

The Minister of Agriculture has not yet been appointed, Nuri Isfandiari (Muvaffaq al-Saltaneh) has been offered and has accepted the post.

Note: (A) signifies member of previous Cabinet.

(B) signifies member of previous Cabinet in same post.

(C) signifies member of former Cabinet.

(D) signifies member of former Cabinet in same post.

Thus, the only two newcomers to Cabinet rank are Mohsin Rais and Nadir Arasteh. The former is now Persian Ambassador at Bagdad, and the latter has had a long diplomatic career with, in addition, two posts as provincial governor. In general they may be said to be "a decent set" and more competent than many if given a lead. It was rumoured that the Russians had said they would not accept as a Cabinet Minister any member of Sa'ed's Cabinet. It is difficult to see on what grounds they could object to any one of that category viz. Fahimi and Sururi. The former was a Minister without portfolio and had, moreover, been absent on a special mission in Kurdistan during most of the period of the crisis over the oil concession. Sururi is a promoted Under-Secretary, who has had a purely departmental career and has never dabbled in politics.

3. The Freedom Front (Russian-sponsored) press continue their attacks on Sa'ed. They say he has been a failure in all his policies. They say that Sa'ed's policy was one-sided and that, by wilfully estranging the Russians, he has upset the political balance. To the working classes they say that the refusal by Sa'ed to grant a concession has deprived thousands of workers and thousands of their chance of becoming unemployed on cessation of their work for the Allies' war effort. To the young intelligentsia they say (though not openly) that the British want this concession for the purpose of establishing a few Persian Persians whereas under Russian development, the majority of the educated and more highly paid employees would have been Persians.

4. In the provinces the Russians are as active in their efforts as in the capital. From Azarbaijan it is reported that they convene meetings of various guilds, assemble doctors and approach Kurds and endeavour to get them to send telegrams of protest to Tehran against the non-granting of the concession. They even took the occasion of a meeting of the Perso-Soviet Cultural Society in Tehran to make speeches on this subject. The elected ex-president of the Majlis, Haji Muhtasham-us-Saltaneh, got up and said that such utterances were out of place in a cultural meeting.

A press statement gives the numbers of the Majlis parties as follows.—

| | |
|------------------------|----|
| Independents (Mufrid) | 58 |
| National Union (Mills) | 30 |
| Fatherland (Watan) | 25 |
| Popular (Tudeh) | 8 |

The Court

6. The Queen Mother has left for Egypt to see her fourth child Prince Ali Reza who has recently arrived in Cairo from Johannesburg after the death of her first son, Prince Mirza Asadullah Khan. She was divorced, consort, left for Cairo some weeks previously to see her only child, Prince Ghulam Reza. It is believed that Ismet ul Muluk, Reza Shah's third consort, will also leave for Cairo in the near future to see her eldest son, Prince Akbar Reza.

7. Workers' Insurance Regulations have been passed by the Cabinet on the 8th November, 1944. In brief, the regulations apply to the towns of Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan and Meshed, and provide for—

- (i) Classification of workers by trades
- (ii) Medical examination of workers to decide their physical fitness for their present employment
- (iii) Protection from dangerous machinery, washing facilities, extra milk, suitable clothes, meals, lavatories
- (iv) Penalties for infringement by factory owners
- (v) Insurance premia vary according to the nature of the trade from 1½ per cent. of the daily wage to 3 per cent., one-third of the premium to be paid by the employer
- (vi) Insurance benefits graded according to the degree of disability from death down to minor injuries necessitating temporary stoppage of work.

Economic

8. A new regulation for the monopoly of agriculture has been issued by Mr. Mulkjagh. It supersedes the Stabilisation of Prices Regulation N. 14 and is framed to bring under one control the collection, transport, storage and issue of grain, the control of bakeries, and the functions previously performed by the Price Stabilisation Department.

Tribal Affairs

Ahusistan

9. The Acting Minister for War informed the British Military Attaché that up to the 20th November 1,000 rifles had been collected by the columns of the 1st and 2nd Divisions. One of the 1st Division's columns had met slight opposition. He said that he hoped the operations would be concluded within a month, as the Ministry for War had no desire to lock up so many troops in that area. (A recent report gives the strength of the Khuzistan Division and its attached troops as 7,556 all ranks.)

Kurdistan

10. Hama Rashid, formerly a member of the British Military Attaché's staff, has been appointed Acting Minister for War. He is a member of the 1st Division and is the Kaimakam of Hallabjeh and the Chief of Police of Penjwin. Hama Rashid is said to have proposed the following terms—

- (i) The Persian Government should not hold against him any acts of his subsequent to "the events of Shahrivar" (the entry of British and Russian troops into Persia)
- (ii) No acts of his tribe subsequent to his separation from them to be laid at his door.

No mention is made of extradition and the above terms could not be said to be suitable from the Persian Government's point of view. Meanwhile, negotiations between the two Governments are in progress in Bagdad. Another agreement signed, prior to Hama Rashid's surrender, by Colonel Saqafi, the Persian Liaison Officer, and Sayyid Sidqi, the Iraqi Liaison Officer, provides, *inter alia*, for the liberation of the fifteen Jaf tribesmen now in prison, a full enquiry into

frontier incidents where the inhabitants have suffered losses from raiders, negotiations between the two Governments for the handing over of Hama Rashid and the provision of safe-conduct for such of his followers who submit to the Persian authorities and desire to return to Persian territory.

Russian Interests

11. A small party of Russian military has arrived at Gunabad. It is believed that they intend to make a reconnaissance of the road Gunabad Firdaus Cebas-Yezd.

French Interests

12. General de Gaulle arrived in Tehran on the 26th November en route to Moscow.

Tehran, 26th November 1944

E 7740 422 34)

No. 20

Sir R. Bullard to Mr. Eden—(Received 10th December)

(No. 464)

HIS Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary, No. 46 of the 27th November to the 3rd December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 4th December, 1944

Enclosure in No. 20

(Secret)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary, No. 46, for the period the 27th November to the 3rd December, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. Mohsin Razi has refused the portfolio of Foreign Affairs alleging the ill health of his wife as the reason. He doubtless prefers his ambassadorial post in Bagdad to the uncertainty of tenure of a ministerial post in this Cabinet. So far no one else has been appointed.

2. The Tudeh continue to try and carry out the orders they receive from the Soviet Embassy and the Military Governor continues to resist them. They announced a large meeting at their headquarters for Friday the 1st December, but the Military Governor forbade entrance to their premises on the score of the recent emergency proclamation banning as unlawful assemblies any meeting of more than three persons.

3. On Friday, the 1st December, a reception was given at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to celebrate the 1st anniversary of the Tehran Conference, and the issue of the statement confirming Persia's political independence and integrity.

4. On the 2nd December Dr. Musaddiq entered the Majlis at 9 a.m., and sprung a surprise on the Deputies. He tabled a Bill making it a penal offence for any Prime Minister, Cabinet Minister or government representative to grant any oil concession in Persia at any time to any foreign government or foreign oil company. He was successful in obtaining "double urgency" procedure for his Bill which was passed at 4 p.m. on the same day. (The full text will be given in next Intelligence Summary.) Dr. Musaddiq was probably induced to take this prompt and extreme action by consideration of what many intelligent Persians have been saying and thinking ever since Sa'at's refusal to grant the oil concession produced the rupture in his relations with the Russians. Most Persians have thought that the Russian would not have been so long over and Kavtaradze's continued presence in Tehran supported this view. They agreed that the Shah might be won over or intimidated into promising the

concession, that the Cabinet might be bought or intimidated into granting it, that the Russians might object to and overthrow every successive Cabinet which resisted them until government was reduced to impotency. The one body, not from incorruptibility but from its size, its heterogeneous nature and its internal jealousies which could not be bought in its entirety was the Majlis. It was therefore garrulous, venal and lazy as it was, representing the only obstacle in the Russian path. What was more likely than that the Russians would urge the Shah to close the Majlis as a brake on the government of the country and, as a saviour of every measure of reform? Dr Musaddiq may have argued thus and seized this moment to record in statute form the opinion of the Majlis.

5. A new governorate of Jahrum in Fars has been formed. It will include the districts of Semkan, Khafar, Kurdiyan and Kuhak.

Appointments—Civil

6. Ahmad Divsalar to be acting Governor of Ustan No. 1 (Gilan) vice Nadir Arasteh appointed Minister of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones.

Economic

7. A clause will be inserted in all contracts for labour for the British military authorities whereby the contractor is bound, on the termination of his contract, to transport to their homes any workmen imported from their homes to the place of his contract.

Internal Security

Fars

8. The Governor General, for some time past, had been toying with the idea of pressing Nasir Khan Qashgai's election to the vacant Ministry of War. His objects, he said, were to induce a more stable frame of mind in Nasir and, during his necessarily long absences in Tehran, to allow the influence of the more sensible and tractable Muhammad Hussein Qashgai gradually to oust that of Nasir. As regards the first of Firuz's objects, it is doubtful whether a sense of his parliamentary responsibilities would effect any lasting change in Nasir's unstable mentality. The second object seems equally difficult to achieve since Nasir would not be compelled to spend the greater part of his time in Tehran. A Shiraz Deputy, Muaddil, for instance, has not, to date, registered a single attendance in the Majlis since his election. Nasir Khan's own objects are not difficult to guess. He wants additional representation for his tribe in the Majlis and, should a future government decide to bring him to book for his past misdeeds, he wants parliamentary immunity. However, Nasir's schemes have, for the moment, gone agley as Firuz has had instructions from Tehran not to proceed with the election for the vacant seat, the Persian Government not being, by such action in the South, to provoke similar demands from the North to fill those seats rendered vacant by the rejection of the credentials of the Russian sponsored Tudeh Deputies.

9. Reference Summary No. 4411 para. 17. The Russian who contacted Nasir Khan was not the Soviet Assistant Military Attaché but another Russian who had visited Shiraz some ten days previously, though the Soviet Military Attaché did evince considerable interest in tribal affairs and attempted to procure from the Governor, his host, a list of the tribes. As to the truth of the Russian offer of arms, ammunition and money there is only Nasir Khan's statement made to the Governor and to His Majesty's Consul. He might well have been trying to increase his own importance or even have been fool enough to think that British fear of such extension of Russian influence in the South might evoke a similar offer from the British.

10. Better security on the roads round Shiraz is reported as the result of a tax twisting administered by the Governor to Colonel Khoerowdad, the Chief of Gendarmerie of Fars.

Muassani

11. Hussein Quli Rustam of the Muassani has made overtures to His Majesty's Consul at Shiraz and has expressed his desire for guidance. If this chieftain, as was reported, is to act as mediator in the dispute between the two Zarghampur cousins, Abdullah and Khoero, this should make for a peaceful outcome.

Ahuzistan

12. The military operations to disarm the Arab tribes have been hampered by rain and the flight of a large number of the Beni Taruf across the border into Iraq. General Homayuni asked His Majesty's Consul at Ahwaz to intervene with the Iraqi Government and to inform it that this was not a matter in which His Majesty's Consul could properly interfere and that it should be dealt with through diplomatic channels between the Governments of Persia and Iraq.

Kurdistan

13. No result has yet been published of the discussions between the Persian and Iraqi Governments for the handing over to the former of Hama Rashid. It is reported that Iraq has refused to accept the extradition of Hama Rashid as they have no extradition treaty with Persia, and that his enforced residence in Iraq at a safe distance from the frontier is, in fact, a better solution both in the interests of the Persian Government and Hama Rashid.

Russian Interests

14. The Tudeh have now opened a branch in the sugar factory at Mervdasht near Persepolis.

15. There is some evidence to show that Russian propaganda in the Persian army is not without its effect. The chief targets are the warrant officers and the junior officers. With the former the line taken is that as the backbone of the Persian army and as long-service men, they are shamefully underpaid and badly treated. To the young officers the approach is by an appeal to their professional ambition and by urging them to better their own chances of preferment and promotion by making a clean sweep of their old corrupt and useless seniors.

16. On the 28th November a gold and marble plaque was unveiled in the Soviet Embassy to commemorate the Tehran Conference. A long speech was made by the Soviet Ambassador and a short speech in Persian by the Persian Prime Minister. It was worth noting that Soruri, the only Cabinet Minister who was also a member of Sa'ed's last Cabinet (apart from Fahimi, who is still absent in Kurdistan), was not invited.

Tehran, 4th December, 1944

E 7697 422 34]

No. 30

Sir R. Bullard to Mr Eden.—(Received 27th December)

(No. 472)

His Majesty's representative presents his compliments to His Majesty, Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a copy of Intelligence Summary for period 4th December to 10th December, 1944, compiled by the military attaché to this legation.

Tehran, 11th December, 1944

Enclosure in No. 30

(Secret.)

Military Attaché's Intelligence Summary No. 47 for the period 4th December to 10th December, 1944

Persian Affairs

Political

1. Dr. Musaddiq's Bill prohibiting the discussion of oil concessions by any member of the Government with the representative of any foreign Government or company (for the text see the appendix to this summary) and its immediate acceptance by the Majlis took the Soviet Embassy and its few supporters in the Majlis completely by surprise. Russian wrath at this further rebuff was evident in the comments of the Tudeh press and was made clear by the Soviet Ambassador in an interview with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Appendix.

Appendix to Intelligence Summary No 47 44

Law passed by the Majlis on 2nd December, 1944

(Summary No. 46/44, paragraph 4, and No. 47 44, paragraph 1.)

Article 1.

In the matter of oil concessions no Prime Minister, Minister, Acting Minister, Under-Secretary, or any other official of the Government or with any representative of an oil company or with any other person shall be permitted to enter into any agreement or arrangement with oil.

Article 2

The Prime Minister and the Cabinet may discuss the sale of oil or the manner in which the Persian Government should exploit and control Persia's oil deposits but must inform the Majlis of such conversations.

Article 3.

Offenders against articles 1 and 2 will be sentenced to solitary confinement for a period of from three to eight years and will be permanently dismissed from Government service.

CHAPTER IV.—SYRIA AND THE LEBANON.

(A) Miscellaneous.

'E 6637 28 89]

No 31

Sir E. Spears to Mr. Eden.

(No 103.)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Foreign Office telegram No. 358 of 1st October, 1944, a copy of a letter from the Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs dated 1st October 1944, regarding Franco-Syrian Treaty negotiations.

Beirut, 17th October, 1944

Enclosure in No 31

Sir E. Spears to the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs

Your Excellency,

16th October, 1944

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been instructed by His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to reply as follows to the message which I transmitted to him from your Excellency on the 22nd September regarding the conclusion of a treaty between the Syrian and French Governments.

2. The intention of His Majesty's Government in suggesting that the time had come to consider negotiating a definitive arrangement with France seems to be based on the fact that since the end of the war the situation in the Levant has changed because the mandated territory is become in every respect a fully independent State, the conclusion of a treaty between the mandatory and the former mandated State to define, for the future, relations between the two parties seems necessary and inevitable. Therefore, when, in 1941, the independence of Syria was promised, the formal termination of the mandate by a treaty was provided for both in General Catroux's proclamation of the 8th June, 1941, and in the simultaneous declaration by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on behalf of His Majesty's Government, as well as in the subsequent proclamations of independence issued by General Catroux later the same year.

3. Owing to the war situation there has not, since 1941, been in existence a French Government which was able to make a treaty of this kind on behalf of France. The question of a treaty has therefore remained an academic one during the war. Now that France has been liberated and a new Government has been formed, and His Majesty's Government would gladly see the final formal realisation of the independence of the Levant States, in which they have taken such a close, direct and sympathetic interest.

4. The question is, however, more than a matter of pure form. The French authorities in the Levant still possess (by virtue of the mandate, and legally speaking) various rights and functions in some of which British authorities co-operate or are associated with for war reasons. In many cases Syrian authorities participate in these functions. His Majesty's Government have always been in favour of such arrangements by which the Syrian Government would regulate their own day-to-day affairs by arrangement with the French authorities. They have frequently assisted the conclusion of such arrangements and they were the first foreign Power with the French National Committee to recognise Syria and accredit a diplomatic representative. But there are various questions which still seem to need clearing up and which can only be settled in a treaty or other formal agreement with France. It is not in Syria's true interest to leave them unsettled and as disinterested friends, His Majesty's Government feel that the Syrian Government that has won

their view. Mr Eden would ask that your Excellency and the President should judge the matter freely according to what you think is your country's real interest.

5. His Majesty's Government do not wish to prejudge what the treaties or agreements should or should not contain. That is for the Syrian and French negotiators to settle. As your Excellency will be aware from public statements made regarding the attitude of His Majesty's Government, they do not seek to replace or supplant France or to substitute British for French influence in Syria or the Lebanon. Both France and Great Britain are pledged to the independence of Syria and the Lebanon. The Lyttelton-de Gaulle agreements of 1941 state that while the essential steps for negotiation and without prejudice to it, His Majesty's Government for their part freely admit a predominant position for France in Syria and the Lebanon over any other European Power. As will be seen, this arrangement provides fully for Syrian independence and is in no sense contrary to the principle of the President's letter to Mr Churchill. Mr Eden notes from your Excellency's message that the Syrian Government for their part are unwilling to recognise a privileged position for France or any other State.

6. I would add that there are no secret agreements about the Levant States, as hinted in the letter to Mr Churchill. The policy of His Majesty's Government has been publicly stated on numerous occasions and is as described above.

I avail me
E. L. SPEARS

E 7238 23 691

No. 32

Sir E. Spears to Mr Eden.—(Received 25th November)

(No. 119)

HIS Majesty's Minister at Beirut presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him, with reference to Beirut telegram No. 66 of the 7th November, 1944, copy of a letter from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs dated the 7th November, 1944, regarding Franco-Syrian Treaty negotiations.

Beirut, 10th November, 1944

Enclosure in No. 32

Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Sir E. Spears

Damascus, 7th November, 1944

Sir,

IN reply to the representations, both written and verbal, which you made to me on the 16th October, 1944, acting upon instructions from His Majesty's Government, I have the honour to express to you the following paragraphs the point of view of the Syrian Government.

2. The Syrian Government wish to thank His Majesty's Government for the interest they have manifested on divers occasions, and to express their high appreciation of their generous attitude towards Syria and her people.

They have also taken note with great satisfaction of the intention of His Majesty's Government not to seek to replace or supplant France or to substitute British for French influence in Syria and the Lebanon, and of their assurance that they will support the Syrian Government in any way on their full support for Syrian independence. I am sure that the British Government will continue to be fully in the present favour of Syrian independence, and always and in all circumstances.

3. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government cannot share the view that the reasons put forward by His Majesty's Government would justify them in entering upon negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty with France. The motives which lie behind this attitude have been made known by the President of the Republic in his letter to Mr Churchill.

I may add that a treaty between Syria and France seems hardly necessary after the signature of the agreement with General Catroux on the 22nd December, 1943, by which France handed back to Syria the powers and functions which she

exercised until then in Syria's name. Moreover, the unpleasant memory which the Syrian Government have of the events that accompanied and followed them does not seem to encourage the entry into new negotiations.

4. In point of fact, Syria now enjoys complete independence, both internally and externally, for it is in possession of, and effectively exercises, all the attributes of sovereignty, and has gained recognition of its international existence as a sovereign State by France, Great Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, the Arab States and other States, and France's recognition was moreover solemnly confirmed by the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of 1941. The Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of which has placed Syria in a position to fulfil her international obligations. The Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement presents the realities of the situation both from the national and international points of view, and is in complete accordance with the principles concerning the Mandate and the League of Nations, which belong rather to the realm of theoretical discussion.

5. As to the effective exercise by the French authorities of certain powers in Syria, the Syrian Government do not see how these can be held to be inconsistent with the independence of the country, since they have ceded them of their own free will, temporarily and for the necessities of the war, moved by their declared intentions of placing all the resources of the country at the disposal of the Allied forces until the final victory of the United Nations is assured.

6. His Majesty's Government refer to the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreement of 1941 which deals with two distinct points—

- (a) The recognition by the British Government of Syrian independence; and
- (b) The recognition by the British Government of a predominant position for France in Syria over any other European Power, "without prejudice to Syrian independence."

It is not the intention of the Syrian Government to dispute the fact that France, as a result of the war, has acquired a predominant position in Syria, and that this position should be over other European Power, for what then will the position be as regards non-European Powers, and especially the United States and the Arab States? Moreover, even certain Allied European Powers do not seem to agree to the granting of such a privileged position. It must also be borne in mind that a great change has taken place in the external as well as the internal position of Syria since that agreement was signed in 1941. Nevertheless, the Syrian Government are very glad to note that the British Government understands that the Syrian Government are unwilling to recognise a privileged position for France.

I would like to say that the Syrian Government do not seek to replace or supplant France or substitute British for French influence in Syria and the Lebanon.

7. Despite the unfortunate policy exercised by France in Syria for twenty-five years, the Syrian Government are animated by the friendliest sentiments in their relations with the French, yet we cannot consent to tie our fate to that of France or any other nation in cultural, military, economic or political matters. These are questions of supreme importance to us.

The real interests of our country, its future as an independent sovereign State, as well as its geographical position, require that our policy should take into account the interests of the Syrian people, its cultural, political, economic and historical, which bind us to the other Arab States, indeed, as is laid down in the Protocol of Alexandria, we cannot consent to any arrangement that may not be in their interests. We have learned many lessons from the past and especially for the lessons of the present war in this matter have been severe and unforgettable. In short, both our national and our international existence cannot in any respect be separated from that of the other Arab States in war as in peace.

8. After receiving the British reply on the 16th October, and in order to arrive at a solution of all the questions pending with the French, and especially the question of the army, the Syrian Government resumed negotiations with the representatives of France on Tuesday, the 24th October, 1944; and you will

remember that in course of these negotiations, which lasted a week, we kept you informed of all the developments.

The French Government, however, should be considered as a whole. They gave their desiderata to be as follows—

- I.—A treaty of alliance.
- II.—A military convention providing for the presence of a French military mission.
- III.—A "convention d'établissement."
- IV.—A "convention universitaire."
- V.—A "convention consulaire."

The negotiations revealed that France's purpose was to ensure for herself a permanent presence in Syria. She wanted to keep it as a French province, and pointed out that the mandate itself did not confer upon the mandatory Power any such privileges. Moreover, Syria wishes to remain free from any engagement that may affect her independence, and believes that all matters regulating international relationship must be left over until the peace conference, where the fate of all the nations of the world will be decided. It is significant that the Syrian Chamber and public opinion are at one with the Government in this attitude.

The negotiations also showed that it was not the intention of the French to arrive at a solution of the problems, it was evident that they aimed at imposing certain limitations upon our liberty of action as an independent State by seeking to reserve for themselves certain powers and privileges, and attempting to force upon us a state of isolation which is incompatible with the Government's established Arab policy, a policy enshrined in the Alexandria resolutions. We, therefore, insisted that the army be handed over to us under the terms of the military project of June 1944, which the French had held up pending consultation with their Government. We could not tolerate that the army should remain in foreign hands and be used as a means of pressure to obtain a position which we could not accept.

The troubles which may arise as a result of the present French policy are a direct consequence of their refusal to accept the principle of independence, but we are sure that the Allied war effort in Syria, and will inevitably reflect unfavourably upon the position of the united nations in the Middle East.

Desiring as much as possible to avoid this eventuality, and seeing that no agreement could be reached, we decided to refer the matter to the British Government at the last meeting held on Monday, the 30th October, that it was their intention to have recourse to the good offices of the British Government to arbitrate on the question of the army, since it is they who assume military responsibility in Syria for war purposes.

I have the honour, therefore, to request that our proposal be communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Government and will be grateful to receive their reply at an early date.

I avail, &c.
JAMIL MARDAM BAY

[E 7288 23 89]

No. 33

Mr Eden to Mr Shone (Beirut).

(No. 206.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, 15th December, 1944.

I HAVE carefully considered Sir Edward Spears's despatch No. 119 of the 10th November, in which I was enclosed a copy of a note from the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarding the need for a treaty or agreement between Syria and France to regulate the questions outstanding under the former mandatory regime.

2. As you will be aware, I disagree in part with the statement of the position in the Syrian note. The Syrian argument seems in outline to be that General Catroux handed over all powers exercised by the French by the

agreement of the 2nd December, 1943. The Syrians admit that the French have during the war the right to have certain troops in Syria and to exercise certain powers, but state that this is only because the Syrian Government have agreed that they should and they consider that this will all end automatically with the war. Therefore, there is no need for a treaty. The French, they maintain, have no longer any special rights in Syria except those that have been voluntarily accorded for the duration of the war only, and the conclusion of any treaty, which will be a permanent arrangement, is prejudicial to the participation of Syria in the Arab Council.

3. In general, the answers to these points seem to be as follows. Whatever the agreement of the 22nd December 1943, may have been meant to cover, its exact scope is not clear from the text and there is a reasonable doubt on the subject. The French admittedly handed over a number of functions to the Syrian Government, so that the Syrian Government can be said now to be enjoying substantial independence, but there is a residue of rights which the French still claim.

4. I do not think that it would be useful or desirable for you to take a y initiative in rebutting the juridical arguments used in this note at the beginning of the war various other powers which they continue to exercise during the war. The reason that they exercise these powers during the war is in fact not that they are not independent, but that they are not yet independent.

5. I would therefore suggest that you should draw attention to the statements made in paragraph 6 of the Syrian note, which contains the comments of the Syrian Government on their communications to the French and an account of how the matter has been left. It would be interesting to know what the French have proposed to the Syrians that the five conventions mentioned in that paragraph should contain. What limitations do the French wish to impose on the Syrians? What powers and privileges do they wish to reserve to themselves which, in the Syrian view, should properly belong to Syria as an independent State? How do the French propose to force a state of isolation on Syria as is here suggested?

6. As regards the Troupes Spéciales, you should reply that, while we do not think it is practicable to arbitrate formally in any way on this question, we have been discussing it with the French Provisional Government, but that the French have so far not agreed to make any progress with it, except as part of the negotiations for liquidating questions outstanding under the mandate.

7. I hope to discuss with you at the very outset of your new appointment and that it will be desirable to prepare the ground carefully before taking the treaty question further. It seems to me likely, however, that the Syrians and Lebanese will perhaps raise these questions with you before you have been long in Beirut, and, while I do not wish to hamper your discretion in any way as to the best method of handling these questions, I would suggest that the foregoing line is the most likely to yield results.

I am, &c.
ANTHONY EDEN

25

ON your appointment as H. M. Minister at Beirut, it will, I think, be well if I set forth for your guidance the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards the Levant States.

2. First of all, I wish to confirm that it is the declared policy of His Majesty's Government to support the independence of the Levant States and to encourage its growth. This independence in the view of His Majesty's Government can best be regularised internationally by means of a formal agreement between the Levant States and France, and it is the policy of His Majesty's Government to facilitate the conclusion of such an agreement.

3 The policy of supporting the independence of the Levant States was outlined by the Prime Minister in his speech in the House of Commons on the 10th September, 1941. His Majesty's Government will expect the French to carry out fully the declarations of independence made by General Catroux in 1941 on behalf of General de Gaulle. You will recollect that General Catroux's declaration of the 8th June, 1941, was formally endorsed by His Majesty's Ambassador in Cairo on behalf of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. In addition you should bear in mind that the friendship of the Arab peoples in the Middle East is a matter of deep concern to His Majesty's Government and that the situation in Palestine renders it very necessary that her neighbours should be peaceful as well as conscious of the value of our support.

4. You should co-operate closely with the Minister Resident in the Middle East and keep him informed of all political and economic developments in the Levant States. You should maintain the closest possible liaison with the British Service authorities and consult them in all matters where their rights and interests are affected. Further it should be your concern at all times to extend your assistance and protection to all legitimate British interests.

5. So far as the French are concerned the rights and obligations of His Majesty's Government are contained in the Lyttelton de Gaulle Agreements. You should adhere carefully to these Agreements and should refer to me if any departure from them seems to be required. In all matters affecting the territorial command you should be guided by the special directive on the subject contained in my telegram No. 129, Saving, of the 12th October 1944, to the Minister Resident in Cairo, a copy of which is annexed for convenience of reference.

[illegible]

7. It is not my wish or intention to lay down what specific provisions the agreements between the Levant States and the French should contain; still less do I wish to impose any particular conditions upon Syria or Lebanon. Assurances on this point have already been given to them. I cannot admit that the conclusion of agreements to liquidate questions outstanding under the Mandate and to define the relations of the Levant States with France in the future would be

the French would have predominance over the Syrians or Lebanese themselves. You may find a tendency on the part of the French authorities to interpret our undertakings in a sense more favourable to themselves. They certainly have in the past, and we have not scorned to let the world know, been very ready to do so. Nevertheless it looks as if they would now find much difficulty in achieving any agreement so favourable to themselves, and provided no misunderstanding is caused it would be well to see that the French authorities realise this.

8. The provision of the Lyttelton-de Gaulle Agreements regarding the privileged position for France does not mean that we favour a state of affairs in which the French would enjoy discriminatory commercial privileges over other Powers. We would not accept this position which would be contrary to commercial privileges. The Levant States ought to enjoy independence to direct their commercial policy and no doubt to conclude commercial treaties and agreements with other Powers. It is not our intention to create a closed area and it is our intention that the Levant States should be free to trade with any other Power. It is our intention to create a free area and it is our intention to do this.

9. To summarise my views on Anglo-French relations in the Levant. French and British interests in the Levant States are not fundamentally opposed, so long as the French Government follow a policy in accordance with their obligations and promises, and progressively enable the Levant States to exercise the independence which has been affirmed and reaffirmed in the name of France. I am anxious to bring this state of affairs to an end and I know that the French Provisional Government share this desire. It will be your duty to endeavour to find means of improving the present far from satisfactory position, and to use all your influence with British officials, civil and military, in the Levant States to this end.

It is a fact that the consequence of the bad local relations between the French and Algerians has been that complaints and disputes have tended to be referred to the authorities for settlement rather than being settled locally and have had a prejudicial effect on Franco-Algerian relations. It is most desirable that all such complaints and disputes should be settled locally so far as possible and at the lowest possible level.

11. You should, at your discretion, keep your American colleague informed as to the policy of the Ministry's Government and the reasons for its policy. If you are unable to do so, you should inform your American colleague of the reasons for this. If you are unable to do so, your task will be much more difficult.

12. You should preserve correct and friendly relations with your Russian colleague, but I am not anxious to encourage Soviet interference in Arab affairs. I shall wish you to report fully on any symptoms of such interference, and in general I shall be glad to be kept informed regarding the Soviet attitude towards events in the area.

13. Both Russia and the United States of America have recognised the independence of the Levant States without any qualification and have shown no disposition to accept France's privileged position. It is dangerous to create a situation in which we should find ourselves left alone with the French in opposition to the two nascent Arab States and to our two major partners in the war.

14. As you will see from my despatches Nos. 139 and 152 of the 1st September and the 19th September to Sir E. Spears, I am anxious that His Majesty's Legation should be brought gradually more and more into the foreground in relation to the Spanish Mission, so that we may be able to pass in the post-war period into a purely diplomatic relationship without too abrupt a change. I should be glad if you would give this matter

... practices giving France a de facto control far greater than that accorded
by the League of Nations. The French Government has forwarded
the Syrian dossier to the N. E. C. on 20 November 1946. This is a shocking
extension of the French position since the usual French claim is that
it is not a member of the Council and therefore cannot reside in either capacity
who has evinced the slightest sympathy for the evolution of Syria into the
Lebanon.

7 The internal situation is undoubtedly unsatisfactory. The following are the main reasons:—

- (a) National consciousness, after centuries of alien domination, is only now making its way. The French people, who are called upon to make sacrifices for the good of the State, are consequently lacking. The Parliaments are ill-organised, without parties or policies, and internal politics are too much conditioned by the play of personal rivalries and jealousies.
- (b) War conditions, lack of control in the early stages and the presence of Allied forces, have produced a state of serious inflation which is causing much hardship and which would test the powers of the most efficient administration.
- (c) One of the gravest charges which can fairly be brought against the manner in which the French carried out the mandate is that they made no attempt to train up a team of native administrators against the day when the administration should become the responsibility of the States. On the contrary, they seem systematically to have set aside potentially valuable personnel who showed signs of independence of character. Consequently, now that the States are shouldering the full responsibility for administration in these difficult conditions, the Governments are heavily handicapped by the corruption and incompetence of the executive.
- (d) Finally, the French have created a number of insuperable obstacles to the work of the States. The French have been very conscious of their responsibilities. In view of the prevailing political conditions in the States, they have tried to lighten their burdens, but there is no reasonable doubt that the attitude of the great majority of local French officials varies between openly expressed scepticism as to the ability of the States to govern themselves, and active attempts to weaken the authority of the Governments in power by constant intrigue and propaganda amongst opposition and disaffected elements and minorities.

[illegible]

Parliament is showing a healthy spirit of criticism and the Government a realisation of its responsibilities. The general state of the people appears, indeed, to compare favourably with that in any neighbouring country.

at increasing realization of the necessity of forming a common front vis-à-vis the French. Since the French Government has refused to discuss the transfer of powers from the French to the States has caused inevitable dislocation. In particular, for the angle French economic control there has been substituted two separate controls, representing separate and often mutually conflicting interests, but operating in countries the frontier between which is virtually as porous as the frontier between the States. The question of tariff policy is causing difficulties. But in these matters the two Governments have shown a marked determination to reach agreement, and the Syrian President has recently

declared to the Lebanese that there must and shall be no cause for conflict between them due to this cause.

10. I come next to our own position in these countries, which is after all the matter of moment to us. At the time of the Allied occupation in 1941, the population as a whole knew little in favour of the British except that we seemed to have brought stability and wealth to every one of the neighbouring countries under our influence. We were remembered as having abandoned the country to the French in 1920, and our policy in Palestine had aroused strong and actively-expressed resentment. Hitler's victories had bred a conviction of our decadence and a corresponding admiration for the Germans. Having expelled the detested Vichy régime we now imposed another set of French indistinguishable, in the eyes of the people from their previous ones. The result was a disastrous shortage of wheat and rise in commodity prices. Disappointment at our failure to take over direct control was followed by disappointment at our failure to force the French to implement the promises of independence which they had made and which we had underwritten.

11. It required every effort on the part of myself and my staff to improve this unfavorable situation. But in the interim, in the interim, we were unable at first to control the errors and incompetence of the makeshift Free French organization in the political or economic fields, while the French, though obviously and painfully short of competent personnel, resented all our efforts to co-operate with them or to lend them expertise. We had in consequence, to endure the reproaches of the population, which persisted for long months despite the intense propaganda put out by the Free French, and we were in effective charge behind the scenes.

12. Our position began to improve late in 1941 when I was able to arrange with the Middle East Supply Center for the purchase of 1,000 tons of wheat to avert the seriously threatened possibility of famine, and in the spring of 1942 to promote the O C P scheme which, after a shaky start, proved to be the solution of the wheat problem. In the meantime the War Department, by its employment of thousands of local workers in the constructions of defenses and of the H. B. I. Railway, had relieved all fears of unemployment. The gradual improvement in the general war situation began, too, to cause a swing over in our favour in popular opinion. Later, when the war rounded from the Middle East after Alamein and local politics began to rank first in importance, it was generally realised that it was the unremitting pressure of His Majesty's Government on the Free French which had secured the restoration of the constitutions and the holding of elections. Our local efforts to prevent the French from rigging those elections when held in August 1943 were likewise highly appreciated, and the Governments which emerged therefrom have paid handsome tribute to them. When, as a result of the determination of the new Lebanese Government to pursue its independence, the inevitable clash with the French came in November 1943, both States freely admitted that British action, both in London and locally, had alone saved the Lebanon, and by implication Syria, from losing all they had gained.

[illegible]

14. The question of their relations with other Middle Eastern countries is looming ever larger in the minds of the populations of both Syria and the Lebanon. All are desirous of closer economic ties, including the suppression of customs barriers and visa restrictions. The Moslems desire in addition some measure at least of cultural and judicial uniformity. Politically, the conception

of Arab unity has been steadily gaining ground, here as elsewhere. It might be argued that the mutual rivalries of Damascus, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Cairo, and the mutual conflicting interests of the several Arab States, will always prevent it from having any practical significance. But the fact is that this conception is to-day the predominant one in the minds of the Arab people (see paragraph 3 above). It was given practical expression by the support furnished by the other Arab States to the resolution during the week of November 1943 and by the instant repudiation, by Christians and Moslems alike, of the pro-Zionist resolutions of American political parties. More recently, the preliminary Arab Conference in Alexandria has been hailed as the most important development yet to occur in the establishment of Arab solidarity. Uneasiness was shown in the more extreme Lebanese Christian circles (see paragraph 4) lest the result of this conference should be to place the Christian communities under Arab domination, but the fact that the Christians have accepted the draft of the Protocol regarding the territorial integrity of the Lebanon as a subsidiary guarantee of their rights and agree with the Moslems that the cooperation of the Arab States represents a powerful force in support of their national aspirations.

15. An important effect of this increased sense of the spirit of Arab unity is to strengthen the resolution of those who are working for the emancipation of these countries from any measure of French control, for it is generally realised that the rest of the Arab world, resenting a suggestion that the Levant States constitute a French sphere of influence and regards the continued presence of the French as a major obstacle in the path of the development of an Arab bloc.

16. On the future of these two States prophecy is obviously risky in view of the uncertainty of many of the governing factors. The conditions are also far from identical in the two.

17. Syria can, in my opinion, govern herself if left alone politically. She has many obstacles yet to overcome: first and foremost, French political interference amongst her minorities, secondly the absence of cohesion in her outlying provinces, and thirdly, the lack of capable administrators, and she will for many years require economic and technical assistance: such assistance should, however, be provided by neutral advisers freely chosen by her Government and paid for from her own resources. Given these advisers, the necessary equipment for her forces of public order, and freedom from foreign political intrigues, she is sufficiently mature politically to be able to ensure internal security and, indeed, by Middle-Eastern standards, a reasonable level of administration. In Shukri Kuwattly, whose term of office has now entered its fourth half-century, she has a statesman who stands head and shoulders above his countrymen, and who must rank high amongst Arab leaders. Above all her governing I ascribe that real desire for independence, within the framework of the so-called Arab world, which can at need induce in her population the resolution necessary to secure their aspirations.

18. Of the Lebanon I am less certain. In this mosaic of creeds, which has so far produced no outstanding personality and where the governing classes, though of high intelligence, lack character, the majority desire is rather for complete internal autonomy under the benevolent protection of one Power or group of Powers, than for complete independence. The Christian (chiefly Maronite) element which desires French protection against the Moslems (in default of protection by any other foreign Power) is in constant conflict with the much larger element (Moslem and Christian), which seeks first and foremost the elimination of the French. Serious divisions are already less pronounced among the younger generation, and in due time will die away but at present constitute the main obstacle to Lebanese unity. My impression is that the Lebanon will require some outside stiffening for some considerable time to come, but that that stiffening cannot be exclusively, or even pre-eminently, French, if only because Syria, with whom her relations must inevitably be close, would never accept such a solution.

19. The attitude of the French is the crux. The time when the French could have freely obtained preferential treaties went by in 1937, when they first declined to ratify the treaties they had signed in 1936 and then by allowing the annexation of the Lebanon by Turkey showed themselves incapable of assuring the protection of the States. Since then, and particularly since November 1943, the French have followed a policy which has brought about a reversal of the trend of French policy in the Levant States since 1920, and particularly its most recent emphasis on the principle of non-interference. The Delegé Général, amplifying through their press and public speakers the constant voice of the Christian minority under their influence, will sooner or later raise the cry

of "Protection for the Christians of the Levant" as a pretext for demanding terms which will run wholly counter to legitimate Syrian aspirations.

20. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Resident Minister in Cairo and to His Majesty's Representatives in Bagdad, Jerusalem, Jeddah and Paris. I have, &c.

21. If on the other hand, we are prepared to stand firm now and hereafter in support of the Status until their aspirations are satisfied, I am convinced that we shall be able to build, on the base of the goodwill already achieved, a solid position for ourselves which will buttress the whole structure of our influence in the Middle East.

22. Throughout my term of office here I have been guided by two main objectives, which must I submit, be ever present in the mind of His Majesty's Representatives in the Middle East: the successful prosecution of the war, and the preservation of our strategic position. How far I have been successful, and how far I have failed, I leave to the judgement of my superiors. I think, unimpeachable, and the policy which I have outlined in the preceding paragraphs is, I submit, the one best calculated to achieve them.

23. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Resident Minister in Cairo and to His Majesty's Representatives in Bagdad, Jerusalem, Jeddah and Paris. I have, &c.

L. SPIARS

(B) Weekly Political Summaries.

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No. 30

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 129 Syria and the Lebanon
20th September, 1944. — (Received 4th October)

1. General

United States recognition of the Syrian and Lebanese Republics, and the consequent elevation of Mr. G. Wadsworth to the position of United States Minister to these States, was announced on the 20th September.

The Syrian Government, since being informed by His Majesty's Minister that His Majesty's Government favoured the conclusion of treaties between the Levant States and France, have stated categorically that they would not in any circumstances make a treaty with France, nor even begin negotiations. The Lebanese Government, who have been in close touch with the Syrian Government, have adopted a similar attitude, they are, however, more perturbed than the Syrians appear to be regarding the effect of the news of these *demarches*, which has a real and known effect on the French influence, and consider that their own already difficult position in the country has been weakened.

The Syrian delegation to the Arab Unity Conference in Cairo, consisting of the Prime Minister and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, accompanied by two

His Majesty's Consul reports that the Minister of Defence and Education, who, as reported in Summary No. 128, had tendered his resignation and who was understood to say that he would not withdraw it under any circumstances, did, in fact, withdraw it this week.

The Syrian Government is proposing to introduce a uniform programme of teaching in both primary and secondary schools.

The Syrian Department of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones has, it is reported, inaugurated direct telephonic communication between Syria and Palestine. The press state that the department is taking up the question of communication with other neighbouring countries.

There have been no further disturbances. The French claim that the Troupes Spéciales who seized the [redacted] in the [redacted] have been severely punished; the civilians arrested by the local authorities have been released.

The French demand for Syrian representation at the re-hosting of the ~~Exposition Universelle~~ ^{Exposition Coloniale} is being met by the Syrian Government's claim that the *Troupes Spéciales* had desecrated a mosque on the 8th September by chasing and assaulting the worshippers. His Majesty's Consul reports that the weight of evidence seems to show that a few Moslem soldiers did enter a mosque during a *milice*. The claims are being discussed in Damascus but no decision is yet known.

M. Gault, who was Vichy Consul in Alexandretta until 1942 when he went to Aleppo and was put in charge of French propaganda, is to return as French Consul to Antioch.

There have been a series of fights in Homs during the week between members of the Shalab Mohamed party and the Communists. On Saturday evening, the 9th September, five people were wounded, and on Sunday night six persons were arrested and a Communist seriously wounded. On Monday night a member of the Alaszi family and a speaker in the mosque was attacked by three men as he left his house and severely beaten. One of the assailants was afterwards ascertained to be a member of the Communist party and this led to a general rising of the younger members of the Alaszi family on Tuesday, when they searched the coffee houses in bands, routing out and beating any Communists they could find. They were later joined by members of other important families and though several arrests were made, the intervention of the leading members of the families involved secured their release.

On Wednesday, Helmi Atasi arrived in the city and after calling a meeting of all parties induced them to make peace. Since the middle of the week there have been no further disturbances.

The decision of the Administrative Council of the Jebel Druze to ask the Syrian Government for incorporation in the Syrian Republic has not provoked any reaction from opposing elements, but the Atrash are reported to have been rather disappointed that the Government do not seem to have shown any particular enthusiasm in welcoming their gesture of solidarity.

Anxiety has been caused by announcements by a son of Suluman Murshid that his father is returning shortly. A fairly influential deputation has gone to the capital to express their support of the Government's policy with regard to Suluman Murshid and of the Mohafez of Lattakia.

*Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 109, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon,
15th March, 1944*

THE crisis which the appointment of General Beynet threatened to precipitate has been averted. At the last moment, as the Syrian and Lebanese Governments still maintained their firm attitude, and as no reply to their ultimatum had been received, His Majesty's Minister addressed them a letter couched in conciliatory terms, emphasizing that the new delegate had definite orders to carry on Catroux's policy. The receipt of this letter brought about a considerable détente, and the Japanese were prevailed upon to send the President's Chef de Cabinet to meet General Beynet on his arrival at the airport.

General Beyrout arrived on the 9th March. It transpired that he had finally been given the title of *Député Général* only (not commander-in-chief), but that M. Chataigneau had not been informed of the change. He brought with him letters from General de Gaulle to the Syrian and Lebanese Presidents, couched in studiously moderate language, and in order that diplomatic protocol should be

The general has now paid his official calls in Beirut and Damascus and has created a favourable impression. His manner has been straightforward and friendly and he is reported to have remarked that the attempted "Putsch" of last November was a "shocking mistake which must never be repeated."

Total purchases during the period from the 4th March to the 9th March were 1,476 tons, a daily average of 246 tons.

The Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Finance are still away on their visit to Saudi Arabia, and Lutfi Haffar, the Minister of the Interior, is still in Palestine. The breach between this Minister and the Prime Minister will no doubt be widened by the fact that the Prime Minister has removed Dr Aractinji (a personal friend of Lutfi Haffar's and a Christian) from his post as Director of Hygiene, and replaced him by Dr Ahmed Qudri (brother of the Iraqi Minister, Tahir Qadri). Dr Aractinji has been given the post of Syrian Delegate on the Pharmaceutical Committee of the Sunday Council.

The President of the Republic is leaving Damascus on the 16th March on a tour of northern and eastern Syria. He will visit Hama, Hama, Aleppo, Latakia, the Jezireh (including the Duck's Bill), Deir ez Zor and Palmyra.

to Darnassus. He is to be accompanied by the President of the Chamber, the Prime Minister, the Secretary-General of the Republic, the Director General of Hygiene, Police, Gendarmerie and Public Works, and by other officials.

The administrative machinery is undoubtedly working badly, and much dissatisfaction is being openly expressed, even within the various departments. The intervention and positive interference not only of the Prime Minister, but also of the President himself, in the affairs of certain Ministries, is causing increasing resentment, and the eventual return of the Minister of the Interior will probably bring matters to a head.

The reopening of Parliament has been postponed until the 21st April, by which date the Government desires to have introduced its Bill for the transfer of powers to the Deputies with something tangible in the way of a further transfer of powers.

There were holidays on the 7th March in honour of the Prophet's Birthday, and on the 8th in remembrance of the country's first day of independence and of the proclamation of the late Faysal Feisal as King of Syria. No invitations were issued this year to the Diplomatic and Consular Corps to attend the ceremonies on the 7th March.

Aref Nakad recently released from internment has been appointed to former post of Director General of the Ministry of Justice. The Prime Minister in explaining this appointment to the political officer, hinted that Aref Nakad was of Druze origin and that it was hoped to be able to use him as a "go-between" with the Druze in various matters.

The two holidays, the Prophet's Birthday and Syrian Independence Day, passed peacefully in Aleppo, with large crowds and processions in the streets. The Mohafiz, who held no reception on either holiday left on the second day for Damascus. It is understood that he wanted to discuss questions connected with future cotton yarn supplies and with the President's forthcoming visit to the city. The city is now being visited by a Christian mission.

Government officials and railway workers, who had threatened to strike have been granted an advance which is in effect, a present of a month's pay. There are still no signs of any price control.

Summary No. 100, dated the 1st March, referred to the Mohafex as having officially presided at the recent second-degree Frontier Commission meetings in Aleppo. This was based on a statement made to The Majesty's Minister by the Syrian Prime Minister, but is incorrect. It seems that the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, while staying at Aleppo on his way to Riyadh, did, in fact attempt to insist on the presidency of the Mohafex, but failed, the Vah of Urfa being unwilling to negotiate on this basis. The Mohafex merely attended the meetings and took no real part.

No detailed report received

Members of the Asnah and Halabi families have visited the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister to ask for the removal of the Mohafez. The Prime Minister is reported to have told them that this matter did not concern the Government, but was for Sultan Pasha el-Atrash to decide. The latter has, however, refused to remove the present Mohafez but cannot make up his mind as to the person to whom he will appoint him as the latter's sympathies are of pro-French tenor. He is, in fact, alleged to have come to an understanding with General Catroux, when the latter visited the Levant during the recent crisis, that, in exchange for French support for his ambitions, he would guarantee the retention of French control in the Jebel. It must be said that there was no sign of his having fulfilled his side of the bargain if indeed any such agreement was ever made. On the other hand, his attitude during the crisis itself was markedly ambiguous. Sultan Pasha intends to call a family council in the near future and thereafter to visit the President of the Republic.

in the near future and thereafter to visit the President of the Republic.

Several native officers of the squadron of the *Groupeement Druze* stationed in Syria have been taken to the Government House in view of the harshness with which they have treated the French troops. It is also reported that officers of the *Groupeement Druze* are being sent to the General Commandant in Damascus to inform him that under any arrangements which may eventually be made for the transfer of the Syrian forces to Syrian control the *Groupeement* must, exceptionally, remain under French command.

The Mohafez reports that the Prime Minister has referred automatically to the responsible authority for execution according to ordinary court procedure.

The Monarch of the Euphrates has been given the task of settling the Fustan-Waldia disputes with the help of a committee of his own choice (see page 'Tribal' below), and is thus faced with his first real problem as an administrator.

The mission of the French authorities in Kani was to despatch the karmakam, Philippe Farah in a French vehicle to visit the Mojafer at Hasehe. The result of this intervention is awaited by the local Catholic community, who are resentful at what they consider to be a high handed action.

A dispute has broken out between the Soviet and British planes in the Jordanian desert, a few days ago. The French authorities are reported to have been notified.

[illegible]

Nothing of importance

The Lebanese Prime Minister stated on the 9th March that he had finally made up his mind to bring the Bill for amending Part I-46 before the Chamber at U.S.S.R.'s request. "We will do it as soon as we can," he said. This being so, he added, the Government would have no objection to the bill's being introduced by Mr. [redacted] or Mr. [redacted].

On the 5th May, the Prime Minister told the Vice-President of the Council that he intended to introduce the Bill during his stay at Kabo House in the Bekaa, a town in the north which the former made a pointed reference to "certain anti-governmental circles" who were endeavoring to sow seeds of discord among the Lebanese and

stressed the Government's intention to preserve their independence. This allusion to the activities of certain French officers and agents in the region was lost on no one present, least of all the French political officer and did much to restore the Government's waning prestige in the area. Nevertheless a Mohafez has yet to be appointed at Zahlé.

The Prophet's Birthday was celebrated in Beirut on the 7th March, when the President of the Republic and Allied representatives were present at the principal mosque. Speeches were made by the Mofti and at the appointed passage of the Holy Quran in co-operation.

Press and Propaganda.

There has been a marked increase in references to the Palestine question in the press. The Moslem press is particularly active in this regard, mainly on agriculture, and is capable, through industrial development, of supporting millions, the Arabs should combat the Jewish invasion by developing their own industrial resources. The local newspapers express surprise at the attitude shown in the American press at a time when the United States are trying to win the consent of the Arab countries for the exploitation of their oilfields.

The Damascus French paper, *Echos de Syrie*, has again been suspended. The French Minister of the Interior, Georges Pons, is said to have been annoyed by the paper's attitude towards the bishop, and to have ordered it to be closed with an Arabic version of his diatribe against the bishop.

The universal complaint against the high cost of living continues.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda—Axis propaganda has continued to make much capital out of the Wagner resolution and other signs of pro-Zionist activity in the United States.

10. Frontier

Difficulties experienced by Syrian cultivators in collecting crops from land they own in Turkey are at least as great this summer as in previous years. There is no sign of a more accommodating attitude by the Turkish officials either towards the Syrians or the French frontier officers.

11. The Lebanon

The Soviet Chargé d'Affaires, who has come to open a legation preparatory to the arrival of the minister, called officially on the Lebanese Government on the 14th September.

Beirut has now been without Arabic newspapers for some days, as a result of a long drawn-out squabble over wage rates between newspaper proprietors and typesetters. Both sides are appealing for support and no solution appears to be in sight.

The visits of senior French officers to the Tripoli area and various military parades held there recently have caused a certain uneasiness which is also partly due to the effect of increased French propaganda and rumours that they intend to extend their hold over the country after the war. The Maronite clergy are blamed for attempting to cause dissension between Christians and Moslems by continually referring to the danger of Moslem domination if French protection were to cease. In general this and other activities have not helped to improve Franco-Lebanese relations in the region.

There has been more trouble in the always lawless region of Hermel, in the North Bekaa, as a result of a decision on the part of the Government to effect the arrest of certain persons wanted in connexion with previous troubles. A large force of gendarmes was successfully defied by the population which sent telegrams of protest to Lebanon and Allied authorities demanding their immediate withdrawal. It is doubtful whether the Government will be able to impose their authority in this remote area, which even under Turkish rule was constantly in a state of disaffection.

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No. 87

Extract from *Weekly Political Summary No. 130, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 5th September, 1944.*—(Revised 9th October)

1. General

THE Syrian Government have returned a categorical refusal to the proposal of General Bevet for the conclusion of a treaty between Syria and France. His Majesty's Consul in Damascus reports that there is reason to believe that Iraqi political personalities at present in Syria have approved the Syrian refusal and exercised their influence to reinforce the Syrian attitude. His Majesty's Consul also reports that relations between His Majesty's Government and Syria have been overshadowed by the fact that the Syrians consider that our advocacy of a treaty is an attempt by us to impose a treaty with France on the Syrian Government.

The Lebanese Government also, after a special Cabinet meeting and discussions with the Syrians, held fast to their determination not to conclude a treaty with the French. At a meeting with General Bevet on the 22nd September the President informed him in this sense, adding that the Lebanese did not propose to enter into any international obligations until the Peace Conference. The French representatives appear to have tried, without success, to convince them that neither the United States nor the U.S.S.R. would eventually give them any support. The Lebanese have now stated their intention of explaining their views on the treaty question to the United States and Soviet representatives.

The depression induced on the Lebanese by the notification of His Majesty's Government's views on the treaty question is considerably aggravated by the unconditional recognition of the Levant States by the United States Government, which was announced on the 19th September and particularly by the fact that this announcement made no reference to any recognition by the United States Government of a privileged position of France in the Levant States. The appointment of Mr. Wadsworth as first United States Minister is warmly

Enemy Wireless Propaganda

Radio-Berlin on the 19th September broadcast a speech by Haj Amin el Hussein addressed to the Arabs of Palestine and to the Arab delegates attending the Alexandria Conference urging them to defend Palestine against the British and the Jews.

On the 21st September the Free Arab Station, referring to the formation of the Jewish Brigade under British authority, said that it proves that Britain has given way to Jewish claims. The British army has no need whatever of a Jewish Brigade. The speaker urged the Arabs to form ten divisions to show the world that they are capable of defending themselves.

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No. 35

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary, No. 131, Secret—Syria and the Lebanon, 4th October, 1944 (Received 20th October)

1. General.

The discussions which have been taking place between the Lebanese and Syrian Governments on the one hand and the British and French representatives on the other, regarding the possibility of treaties, have not become known even in circles normally in close touch with the Governments. The two Governments have not wished to rouse popular feeling by referring to them and the French appear not to have wanted to advertise the refusal they have received. The Lebanese Government has stated that it is of the opinion that a treaty with France would be unwelcome to them and those, combined with the American recognition, have served to encourage them in their attitude.

The President of the Syrian Republic informed Colonel Olive Roget that unless the question of the transfer of the Troupes Speciales had been satisfactorily settled before the opening of the Parliament the Government would be powerless to prevent questions, with the inevitable public repercussions which the Government's reply would cause.

Major General Giles, Commander in Chief of the American Army Forces in the Middle East, arrived at Beirut airport on the 20th September to award General Heynet the United States "Legion of Merit" for his work when head of the French Military Mission to the United States. General Giles, who did not refer to the United States' full recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence and the hope that these countries would accept invitations to the Civil Aviation Conference to be held in Washington.

It has now been confirmed that both Governments intend to send representatives to the conference; the invitations, which are the first extended to the Governments to attend an international conference, have given them great pleasure.

3. Syria—Damascus.

The Syrian Chamber has been convened to meet in extraordinary session from the 5th to the 14th of October, when the following are among the matters on the order paper:—

Reform of Income Tax,
Educational reform, and the
Taxation of agricultural produce.

The press added that "other subjects of general interest would be raised and the P.O. in Hama reports that the Deputies there were saying that a public refutation of the idea of a treaty and a declaration about the war would be on the agenda.

There have been celebrations in Damascus on the occasion of the anniversary of the blind Arab poet, Aboul Ala al Ma'arri. The proceedings were opened on the 25th of September by the President of the Syrian Republic. Delegations from Egypt, Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon and Iraq attended the celebrations. A vegetarian meal was served in honour of the vegetarian habits of the poet himself. Special postage stamps were issued in connexion with these celebrations.

Dr. Aprahamian (see Weekly Summary No. 130, paragraph 4, and my telegram No. 111 of 7th September) on the 22nd September made a speech at the Armenian Church he emphasised the necessity of Armenian collaboration with the Arabs. In an interview to the press he said, when asked for his views on the Armenian Soviet Republic, that he was not prepared to comment. He also denied reports to the effect that the Armenian Republic had instructed him to study the situation of the Armenians with a view to the establishment of an Armenian Legation. He repeated that his visit was of a purely religious nature and was not intended to lead to any political action. In reply to the Armenian community regarding the attitude of the Syrians towards them, he replied that on the contrary he had only heard praises of the Arab people.

4. Aleppo.

The trial of three sheikhs on charges of inciting the congregations in the mosques to disorder on the 8th September was adjourned after the first sitting of the court on the 26th September. His Majesty's Consul reports that the cause of this postponement.

claim over the rehousing of their flag and the desecration of the mosques (see Weekly Summary No. 129).

Local political talk has been mainly concerned with the conference in Alexandria and the reopening of the Syrian Parliament next week. His Majesty's Consul reports that confederation or collaboration between the Arab States seems now to have a wider appeal than the idea of Arab unity.

5. Hama and Hama.

No further incidents have occurred in Hama between the Communists and members of the Shebah Mohamed party since the murder reported in Weekly Summary No. 130.

There were no repercussions in Hama of the recent disturbances in Hama.

6. Jebel Druze.

The Minister of the Interior also sent congratulatory messages on the occasion of Ramadan, and the Emir Atrash is delighted with these marks of recognition on the part of the Government.

On the 20th September the President of the Republic received a delegation from the Jebel Druze and, in the course of their visit, informed them that he was pleased to see them working together without distinction of party "for the good of the common cause and their high ideals."

7. Alaouite Territory.

The Mohafez, on his return from Damascus, was annoyed to find that, during his absence, the French had been making visits to the Alaouite leaders. Such visits are unusual at Ba'ram in view of the fact that this feast is not celebrated by the Alaouites. Syrian officials had reported that some of them had been ignored during the visits and that French Surete officials had spoken too much about the future power of France in Syria. The Mohafez has informed His Majesty's Consul in Aleppo that he intends to protest against these actions.

A Hama Deputy, who owns a village in the Alaouite territory, has informed the French Consul in Hama that a list of names of those who were working against France. The delegate left no doubt in the minds of his hearers that action would be taken against these offenders later.

Another complaint voiced by the Mohafez to the consul in Aleppo is that the French still refuse to hand over for trial by the Syrian authorities offenders arrested for failing to produce identity cards and other similar misdemeanours. The consul understands that the Mohafez is proposing to take this matter up.

11 The Lebanon (see also under "General")

The P.O. reports that there has been little or no public comment on the treaty question, and any whispers that the British were supporting French attempts to obtain a treaty have been dismissed as incredible.

The incidents in South Lebanon have ceased for the moment, most of the ringleaders having been arrested. The Acting Prime Minister, at a press conference on the 20th September, stressed that these several incidents were not due

true that the incidents are merely symptoms of a wave of disorder resulting from the weakness of the security services and the unwillingness of the Government to crush disorder in sufficient promptitude and firmness. Other local incidents are therefore likely to occur from time to time.

The Chamber of Deputies, on the 28th September, at last approved the Government's agreement with the Beirut merchants in respect of arrears of the War Profits Tax.

On the 26th September the Chamber sanctioned an additional credit of £1.8 2 million for financing the Kasimieh Irrigation Scheme.

The chauffeurs' syndicate of Beirut a strong and frequently intransigent body, has threatened to strike as a protest against what they regard as the inadequate and unsatisfactory distribution of tyres for commercial transport.

E 6501 23 691

No. 39

Extract from Weekly Political Report, No. 132, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon
11th October, 1944 — (Received in Foreign Office, 23rd October)

1 General

With the close of the Alexandria Conference, the Syrian delegation, except for the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is still in Cairo, returned by air to Damascus on the 8th and the Lebanese arrived in Beirut by train on the 9th. The Political Officer, Beirut, reports that the Lebanese appear to be very satisfied with the results obtained, particularly with the guarantee of the territorial integrity of the Lebanon, which should serve to silence Christian critics of the Government's alleged pan Arab policy.

The question of the transfer of the army was raised in the Syrian Parliament at its first meeting on the 5th October (see under "Damascus"), and in spite of a British military "stop," both Governments have already received the report by radio that the French National Committee have formally declined to consider

Damascus newspapers have published articles opposing the conclusion of a treaty with France. One of them contrasts the idea of a Franco-Syrian Treaty with the Anglo-Iraq Treaty. The article says that Iraq started off with a treaty with Great Britain a comparatively few years after the imposition of the mandate and adds that the treaty was modified several times subsequently in Iraq's interest. In Syria, on the other hand, the situation has been totally different, as the mandate lasted for some twenty years and was all that time a heavy load on Syria. The article ends by enquiring whether, indeed, the mandate circumstances which led to Syrian independence. The consul in Damascus reports that these articles may well have been Government inspired as a counter blast to reports from London, quoted by a Damascus paper and the Egyptian *El Akram* alleging that official circles in London favoured the conclusion of a treaty. The consul in Aleppo reports that the reporting of the *El Akram* article in the Aleppo press was followed by protests in numerous papers.

M. S. Iod, the new Soviet Minister to Syria and the Lebanon, arrived by air in Beirut on the 2nd October.

Arrangements for this year's pilgrimage to Mecca from the Levant States have now been settled. There will be seven sailings which should accommodate nearly 10,000 Syrian and Lebanese pilgrims. This is double last year's figure, but still considerably less than the reported number of applicants.

2 Syria—Damascus

The Syrian Government met in extraordinary session on the 5th October. Various speakers criticised the policy of the Government, maintaining that Syria did not really enjoy the full attributions of independence, and in particular referred to the delay in acquiring control of the army. It was argued that unless the army were taken over independence would have no real meaning. The acting Prime Minister (who replied in the absence of the Prime Minister) said that, although the Government had not been able to realise all its aims, independence had in a great part been achieved, as many of the sovereign powers had already been obtained. There remained, however, the question of the army and a special session would have to be devoted to it.

The Damascus press announces that the Syrian Government intends to hold a census in January 1945. The census will for the first time include nomad and semi-nomad tribes and will doubtless be used for the revision of the electoral lists, which in accordance with the Electoral Law, should take place in January each year.

A misprint occurred in section 3, paragraph 2, of Weekly Summary No. 131. The Homs Deputies expected a declaration not about the war but about the army.

4 Aleppo

The cancellation of army contracts and the departure of British units from Aleppo area has increased talk (and, His Majesty's Consul reports, apprehension in most cases) of an increase of French influence. The consul has suggested that with a view to keeping the balance between the Syrians and the French and also the Turks along the frontier, the retention of a British unit would be helpful.

The Syrians have protested to the French that since the British military authorities handed over train guard duties to the French, the latter have been endeavouring to elbow out the officials of the Syrian Sûreté, contrary to the procedure laid down in the protocol on this question.

The French claim over the rehoisting of the flag (see Weekly Summary No. 131) was settled when the Mohafez and the délégué arranged that early on the 5th October, before many people were about, representatives of the Syrian gendarmerie should salute the rehoisting of the flag on the Intendance and a detachment of Troupes Spéciales should march past the Mosque and salute the Cadi and the Mufti.

The British and responsible Syrian authorities have viewed with very grave concern the release by the French, without consultation, of a notorious local gang leader and *bandit* *Abd al-Hadi* *al-Badawi*, who was sentenced in Aleppo last year to seven years' imprisonment by the French Military Tribunal for offences including armed resistance to the S.I.B. The consul reports that a protest has been addressed to the French Délegué for the unwarranted French action in this matter, and the British military authorities are understood to be taking the matter up with the French.

On the 9th October a strike began among the workers in two cotton spinning mills as a protest against the imposition of Government control of spinning mills. So far the workers in one mill have returned to work.

5 Homs and Hama

No further moves have been made by either the communists or the Shiekh Mohamed after their recent quarrel.

The Political Officer reports that the Homs members of the P.P.S. (Parti Populaire Syrien) have started a new club under the name of the Homs Club. The Mohafez, on hearing of the proposed meetings, sent orders for the first one to be broken up and directed that the party should close the club. The premises of the club have, however, simply been moved and the meetings are reported to be continuing. Among the more moderate elements of the town there is some discussion about the formation of a new party to consist of both Moslems and Christians, with the object of exercising control over the excesses of the extremists of both parties. So far however, the discussion has not passed beyond the stage of casual discussion.

6 Jebel Druze

When a French mobile cinema visited Soueida recently the show had to be abandoned owing to a disturbance created by one of the spectators who, in the presence of the Mohafez and the French Délegué, shouted, "Down with the French!"

11 *The Lebanon*

The chief problem now before the Government is the election of a Speaker to the Lebanese Chamber, which is due to take place on the 15th October. There are two candidates, Sabri Hamadi (the outgoing Speaker) and Joseph Salem, the former is believed to enjoy the support of the Government on account of his close political relations with the President, but the latter, who has recently refused a pressing offer of the post of Lebanese Minister in Cairo, claims to have the support of a large group of deputies normally in opposition to the Government. Much depends on the Government's eventual attitude, which has not yet been clearly defined.

At a meeting of the Chamber on 2nd October a minor storm arose out of a declaration reported to have been made by the new Lebanese Minister in London advocating the holding of a conference in London to consider the questions of Palestine and the Levant States. The Government were questioned as to whether this statement was made with their authority, and if not whether their representative had the right to make personal political declarations, they could only profess ignorance of the facts.

On the 4th October the Chamber, with unusually complete unanimity, passed two measures of judicial reform, the first improving the status of magistrates and the second increasing the competence of the different courts. The measures, though criticised in some quarters for not going far enough, were on the whole welcomed, particularly those clauses which have for effect to abolish any measures of French control over the native courts and to confine the competence of the Mixed Courts to cases actually involving foreign interests.

The threatened chauffeur's strike did not eventuate, as on the 6th October the Acting Prime Minister was able to state the terms of an agreement under which tyres would be distributed this week to taxi drivers approved by their syndicate.

The Mutasarrif of South Lebanon imposed a curfew on the 5th October in certain areas where disturbances had taken place. The area is reported quiet.

[E 6793 23 69]

No. 40

Extracts from Weekly Political Report No. 133, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 18th October, 1944 -- (Received 3rd November)

1. *General*

The conference between the Syrian Government (see under "Damascus") and the Syrian and Lebanese reaction to the protocol of the Alexandria Conference.

In Syria, the Prime Minister, in his speech to the Chamber of Deputies commending the results of the conference to the members, said, that "what many may have considered to be an intangible dream has now become a reality. From the whispers about Arab unity in the past the idea has grown into the speeches made at the conference which proclaimed the Arab unity of today."

The delegation had made it clear that they desired the unity of Syria, that they desired the Syrian Republic of Damascus as its capital.

Popular interest in the results of the conference was, however, rather overshadowed by the announcement of the Prime Minister's resignation and the fall of the Government (see under "Damascus").

In the Lebanon (as reported in Summary No. 132), Government circles were pleased with the results of the conference. Since the return of the delegates, elements to stir up opposition to acceptance of the protocol both in the Chamber and outside. In particular, they tried to mobilise the Maronite Patriarch as the centre of this opposition and urged him to issue a manifesto condemning the decisions of the conference. The Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, called on him shortly after his return and believed he had induced him to abandon his intention. Nevertheless, the Patriarch shortly afterwards wrote a letter to the President of the Republic claiming that as the protocol smacked of Arab confederation he could not agree to it, and urged the President not to take any step which might impair the interests of the Lebanese. The

President has now accordingly sent a personal representative to call on the Patriarch in order to dissipate his misapprehensions.

The Maronite Archbishop of Beirut commenting on the Patriarch's letter in conversation with His Majesty's Minister said that these incursions into politics on the part of M. Arida were greatly resented by the Maronite community, the majority of whom did not by any means share the views expressed by the Patriarch and tended to diminish the considerable authority which the Patriarch wields in the mountain villages. The French have, of late, been making considerable efforts to gain his support as has been proved by a statement made lately by his chief vicar to the effect that Count Ostrorog, when he visited the Patriarch at the end of last month, showed him the text of the Lyttleton-de Gaulle Agreement and succeeded in obtaining from the Patriarch a letter to Beynet expressing approval of France's claim for a special position in the Lebanon. Apparently this letter was not judged sufficient by General Beynet, who sent Ostrorog back for a further letter definitely asking for French protection of the Lebanon. This the Patriarch refused to do.

The Lebanese Chamber met on the 14th October, to consider the results of the Alexandria Conference and after a tumultuous sitting passed a vote of thanks to the Government for what they had achieved. Several pro-French deputies, (including Naccache, Ayoub Tabet and Abboud) presented a motion to the President of the Chamber urging that discussion of the protocol should be postponed pending examination by a committee which would report to the Chamber. There was a certain amount of back biting and recrimination between these Deputies and the Prime Minister which, however, ended in the silencing of the Opposition.

The Prime Minister, expounding the spirit in which the Lebanese representative had accepted the Alexandria Conference, said that "the people of the Lebanon had, by spreading Arab learning and culture, worked not only for the independence of their own country but for that of the surrounding States." The Prime Minister said that "Lebanese independence now has a deeper meaning based on the unity of the Arab world." He went on to say that the conference had opened the way for the creation of a new State which would be a powerful factor in the Arab world. He said that the Lebanese had made it clear that they desired the unity of Syria, that they desired the Syrian Republic of Damascus as its capital. He said that the Lebanese had made it clear that they desired the unity of Syria, that they desired the Syrian Republic of Damascus as its capital.

His Majesty's Minister called on the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs which Jamil Mardam Bey had sent him on the 22nd September regarding a proposed treaty with France.

In presenting Mr. Eden's note, Sir Edward Spears emphasised that while the Syrians, they nevertheless suggested that the Syrians would be well advised to consider whether it was not in their own interest to conclude a treaty with France.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that if the French handed over the Syrian Republic of Damascus to the Syrians, they would agree that the Syrians should give any other nation the same conditions as they might grant the French, they would be prepared to start negotiating for a treaty.

Mr. Wadsworth also received instructions to present Mr. Cordell Hull's reply to a similar note addressed to him by Jamil Mardam Bey. The reply stated that while the United States Government did not wish to influence the decision of the Syrian Government, they would have no reason to object to the conclusion of a treaty between Syria and France provided it safeguarded their own interests.

Mr. Wadsworth was also instructed to add that the State Department believed there was considerable validity in His Majesty's Government's advice that it would be in the interests of the Levant States to negotiate a treaty now.

Last September, before the United States Government accorded full recognition to the Levant States, the French National Committee presented a note through their representative in Washington to the State Department, urging that recognition should only be accorded within the limits of General Catroux's declaration, i.e., recognising the predominant position of France in the Levant.

In their reply, the State Department, explaining the reasons for which they had decided to accord full recognition, added that they could no possibly agree to allow France and French nationals to enjoy discriminatory privileges in independent Syria and the Lebanon.

On the 13th October General Beynet called on the Lebanese President and informed him substantially that the resolutions of the Alexandria Conference made the conclusion of a treaty with France impossible, and that his Government might, therefore, consider that the declarations of independence made by General Catroux were invalidated. This statement was, according to the French, not made under instructions. The immediate Lebanese reaction to this was sharp, as might be expected, but they subsequently took a steadier and calmer view.

3 Syria--Damascus

The Syrian Prime Minister, Saadallah Bey Jabri, resigned suddenly on the 12th October at the end of his first speech in the Chamber after his return from the Alexandria Conference. It is not known what prompted him to take this action, but His Majesty's Consul reports that it is thought probable that he resigned in a moment of pique on finding that his speech, which was intended to be a triumphal vindication of his policy, was coolly received by the Chamber. During his absence the internal and the external policy of the Government had come in for sharp criticism inside and outside the Chamber, and it is said it was the intention of a number of Deputies to raise the question of confidence in the Government at that sitting. This theory is in accordance with the last sentence of his speech in which he said that his resignation would surprise not only his colleagues in the Chamber and his Cabinet, but the President himself. On the other hand, a source intimate with the Prime Minister said that according to Saadallah Jabri's own account, he had made up his mind to resign while walking in the Garden of the Palace in Alexandria, and though it is true that his impending resignation was unknown to his colleagues, it is believed that he had in fact informed the President.

On the morning of the 14th of October the re-appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs informed His Majesty's Consul that a Government under the premiership of Faris el Khoury had been formed. The portfolios in this Government are distributed as follows:

Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior and Public Works—
Faris el Khoury
Minister of Finance and Ravitaillement—Khaled el Azm
Minister of Foreign Affairs, National Defence and National Economy—
Jamil Mardam Bey
Minister of Justice, Education and Wakfs—Dr. Abdul Rahman Kayali

Naturally the management of the Wakfs, which by the Prime Minister, but as Faris el Khoury is a Christian it was thought better to transfer the management to a Moslem.

Two Deputies raised in the Chamber the question of the Government's version of the Deputies' speeches. It is believed that the Government's version of liberty of speech and of the press, accounts of speeches should not be subject to censorship. The Speaker replied that it was intended henceforth to issue an official version of Deputies' speeches so that false versions issued by journalists should not be given publicity.

Requests for two credits for £S 40,000 sterling in respect of expenditure by the Government on the Lawyers' Conference aroused criticism in the Chamber of the Government's habit of spending money and then asking for credits afterwards.

The Damascus press has this week also reported that lands are being sold to the Jews. One paper referred to a case at present before the courts in which the Wakfs stands as prosecutor and a Jewish society as defendant. The case concerns land in the Deraa district alleged to have been illegally transferred to the Jews. Another paper reports attempts on the part of Jews to buy land in Quneitra, and yet a third mentions other attempts of a similar nature in Northern Syria and Wadi el Avam.

The press is also urging the immediate formation of a Syrian army, and suggest that Syria should be able to produce without difficulty a national army equivalent to that of Iraq. It is suggested that there is no reason to prevent the formation of an army at once, particularly since the Great Powers "that have recognised Syrian independence and helped to abolish the mandate will be

willing to assist." These Powers, according to the press, would be agreeable to applying lease-lend principles to a country whose importance in safeguarding international communications is so great.

4 Aleppo

His Majesty's Consul reports that at the time of the compilation of his report the news of the formation of the new Government had not become widely known, but that he believed that it would be generally welcomed. The resignation of the Prime Minister did not apparently cause much surprise in Aleppo as there had been considerable criticism of the Government.

The cotton strike continues. The mills have been requisitioned and are under the guard of gendarmes whilst control officials are making every effort to organise staff to operate the machinery. His Majesty's Consul states that there are no appreciable stocks of yarn in the mills and that unless an agreement is reached soon unemployment in the weaving industry will result.

The three sheikhs on trial for having made inflammatory speeches in a mosque on the 8th September (see Weekly Summary No. 131), have got off with light sentences.

5 Hama and Hama

The Political Officer reports that the new Government formed by Faris Khoury has been warmly welcomed in Hama.

In Hama there has been an uneasy calm between the Shalab Mohamed and the Communists. Sheikh Safa Sebat has in speeches avoided all reference to political matters. He has, however, been reported to have engaged seven lawyers to defend the murderer of the member of the Shalab last month.

In Hama the opening of a chemists shop under the auspices of the A U B has led to protests to the Mohafaz by the leading pharmacists against the cut prices, drugs are sold at less than half the Hama price, and there has naturally been a rush of customers.

6 Tribal

There has been trouble again in the Syrian desert where at the beginning of the month a large raiding party of the Shammar Khroussa attacked members of the Ageidat some 50 miles east of Deir ez Zor and, after killing six of the tribesmen, drove off about 1,500 of their sheep towards the Iraq border. They were intercepted by the Shammar Feddagh a tribe friendly to the Ageidat, who recovered some 600 sheep. On the 10th of October the Ageidat were reported to have assembled a large body of horsemen (amounting to as many as 300-500) with the intention of carrying out a counter-attack, but so far no further clash has been reported. The Shammar Khroussa also raided the Afadla on the 6th October near Raqqa.

The dispute between the Kikseh and the Baggara has been reported in Weekly Summary No. 130) is probably settled. The Majlis decided that the Kikseh must pay for the extra nine deaths among the Baggara for which they were responsible.

11 The Lebanon

Apart from the debate in the Chamber on the Alexandria Conference (see Weekly Summary No. 132), the election of the new Speaker (see Weekly Summary No. 132). Both candidates did a good deal of canvassing, and meetings of supporters were held in private houses with a view to organising support. It soon became clear that the Government did not intend to withdraw their support from the present Speaker, Sabri Hamadi, the Shia Deputy from the Bekaa, and on the 17th October he was re-elected by thirty-six votes against fifteen for Joseph Salem. There was one blank vote. Demonstrations of Shia supporters took place in the streets of Beirut before and after the election with the usual accompaniment of banners, flags and shots in the air. Though, of course, the demonstrations in no way influenced the results of the election, the reaction has been bad among the Christians who, it is reported, fear that the Moslems will develop the habit of attempting to impose their will through demonstrations of this kind.

A new parliamentary party has been established composed of the so-called Nationalist Deputies, i.e., those who were elected on Edde's list, together with Alfred Naccache, the former President, and Mohamed el Abboud. It has taken

Abdul Hamid Karami, the Tripoli Moslem leader and Deputy, accompanied by two other Deputies from Tripoli, paid an official call on the Maronite Patriarch on the 11th October. The party was warmly received by the Patriarch, and it is believed that the visit has done much to improve relations between Patriarch and Deputy, who assured one another of their genuine desire to maintain Lebanese independence without any alteration in their frontiers.

No 41

1. *Isoperla*.

The Lebanese Government informed the Syrians of the action they proposed taking in the first instance. The Syrians, much excited, discussed the matter with the Iraqi Foreign Minister, who was passing through Damascus at the time. As a result the Iraqi Foreign Minister proposed, on his return to Bagdad, to address notes of protest in the name of the Iraqi Government to the Allied representatives there, and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs was to arrange that the other Arab Powers represented at the Alexandria Conference, including Egypt, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia, should be invited to take such action as they deemed appropriate in protest against General Beynet's declaration. His Majesty's Minister, when he heard that the Lebanese had decided to await the French Government's reply before taking any further action, suggested to the Syrians they might be well advised to avoid doing anything hasty or premature. The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs accordingly agreed to postpone the arrangements he had made to approach the other Arab Powers. His Majesty's Ambassador in Bagdad, at Sir Edward Spear's request, took similar action with the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Since then there have been discussions in Damascus between the Syrians and the French regarding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and the treaty. By agreement with the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, whom he saw beforehand, Jamil Mardam was able to make it clear that the Lebanese Government fully supported the Syrian Government in demanding the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales. General Beynet definitely bound the transfer of the army up with the conclusion of a treaty. This has resulted in a deadlock which the negotiations have so far not succeeded in resolving. The Syrians repeated that they had no intention of signing any treaty with any country during the war, and pointed out that before the war the Troupes Spéciales with their arms and equipment had been transferred by the British to these Governments. The Syrians also took issue with General Beynet's statement to the Lebanese President and enquired whether he had questioned the validity of General Catroux's agreement of the 22nd December. General Beynet replied that he had not done so and that he had

Majesty's Minister his Government had the intention of raising with the French authorities during their negotiations was the attempt being made by the French to create disaffection by distributing arms and pamphlets attacking the Government, disorders which would enable the French to claim that the Syrians were unable to govern their own country.

The attitude of the Lebanese and Syrian press and public to the United States has been profoundly affected by President Roosevelt's declaration in favour of Jewish immigration. It was known, of course, that every leading American politician had made such declarations, but it was always felt that this was done in an irresponsible effort to catch votes. President Roosevelt's declaration was different. Publicity for his declaration is said locally to have been encouraged by the French, and the Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who is known to have been embarrassed at the trend events were taking, has requested the censor to persuade newspaper editors not to discuss this subject further.

The Syrian Government met for the first sitting in Ordinary Session on the 17th October and elected parliamentary officers. For some days previously Deputies had been discussing the merits of the candidates for the post of President of the Chamber, which was vacated by Fawzi el Khoury on his taking office as Prime Minister. The two candidates were Saadullah Jabri, the former Prime Minister, and Rushdi Keklia of Aleppo, and Saadullah Jabri was elected with 67 votes to 44.

The new Supply Minister has been criticising the "severe methods" of Zein ed Dinn the Director-General of Silk in the handling of the Al-Spo spinning factories, and informed him that he proposed in future to have two Directors-General, one for policy and one for administration. On learning of the appointment of a second Director-General, Zein ed Dinn has tendered his resignation and the newly appointed Assistant Director remains in control.

His Majesty's Consul reports that, although the new Government is generally welcomed, some lack of confidence exists, as, in spite of widespread respect for Fares el Khoury, it is felt that he will be unlikely to be able to control for long the present Ministry. It is thought that the present Ministry needs new blood to strengthen it.

On the 19th October the Mohafex was instructed that agreement had been reached in Damascus regarding the cotton yarn control, and that the two requisitioned mills should be freed to permit them to restart and deliver a certain amount of yarn each month to the Government. Since the 8th October, when the Government's latest attempt to enforce control was started, no disturbances have occurred in connexion with the closing of the mills. Yarn prices have, however, risen higher than ever before, for the new scheme is not yet understood and weavers are uncertain about future yarn supplies.

5. Homs and Hama

After three weeks' comparative quiet, the Shahab Mohammed met last Sunday and listened to a speech in his best fanatical style, urging the Government to follow the tenets of Islam. He also, during the week, sent out invitations to his colleagues in Damascus and Aleppo to attend the Forty Days' Memorial Ceremony to be held in Homs on the 3rd November, to celebrate their new martyr—the victim of the brawl with the Communists last month. The Political Officer reports that, unless the Mohafez intervenes, this promises to be "a lively gathering".

The Political Officer records a report from Hama that an American representative visited that town on Wednesday to enquire into public reaction to the American declaration regarding Jewish immigration into Palestine, and states that, from all accounts, he is believed to have been given a very clear idea of Moslem opinion.

7. Alaouite Territory

A report has been received that a meeting was held in the house of Ibrahim King, attended by well known Alaouite personalities, including members of the Abbas and Yazaji families, presided over by a French officer, stated by one source to be Captain Besniquet, the French Political Officer in Latakia.

The object of the meeting apparently was to form a union between the Alaouites and Christians against the Moslems in general and the Syrian Government in particular, with a view to pressing for the continued administrative autonomy of the Alaouite State.

11. The Lebanon.

During the week under review there has been no parliamentary activity save for meetings of the parliamentary commissions, though there has been much unfounded talk of Cabinet reshuffle and speculation about the distribution of Ministries.

The Government has published decrees on judicial reorganisation (the higher administrative grades in Government offices and creating directors-general).

From Tripoli comes a report of a further demand from the local authorities, following a minor shooting incident, for police reinforcements to fill the vacancies in the local establishment. They have also asked that the Police Commissioner and the Mohafez should remove certain police officials who are considered undesirable. They are accused of disloyalty and are suspected of accepting bribes from members of the Mokaddem gang. They had already once been transferred from Tripoli, but had been posted there again in spite of complaints made by the Police Commissioner.

The shooting incident occurred as a result of a remark made by a night watchman to one of the Mokaddem family, who took exception to it. He next day sent one of his followers, a notorious criminal, to shoot up the watchman who received a severe bullet wound in the head. The assailant has since escaped. There is a strong suspicion that these incidents, which are deliberate attempts to embarrass the Government, have the support of the French, who are also reported to be paying members of the Omari family to cause trouble in Tripoli.

12. Press and Propaganda.

Internal. The declarations made by leading American statesmen in support of Jewish claims to Palestine have aroused extreme indignation in the Lebanese and Syrian press, which voices determination to defend the Arab cause to the end.

The press welcome the appointment of Fares Khouri, a Protestant Christian, as Minister of Education, as a sign of a new era of tolerance and therefore evidence of Syria's political development. In the Lebanon the press express the view that the shooting of Syrian as Speaker would have been a way towards the elimination of the same principle here.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda.—Talks were mainly devoted to praise of Rommel and his alleged friendship for the Arabs. Nothing else of importance.

E 7055 23 88]

No. 42

Weekly Political Summary, No. 135. Secret, Syria and the Lebanon
1st November, 1944 — (Received in Foreign Office, 16th November, 1944.)

1. General

During the week there have been three meetings between the French and the Syrians to discuss the questions of the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and an eventual treaty.

At the first, on the 25th October, the Lebanese Minister for Foreign Affairs also attended. General Beynet protested against his presence, on the grounds that insufficient notice has been given of his intention to attend, and stated that the French Government's instructions were that the Troupes Spéciales question should be discussed with each State separately. The Syrians claimed, and General Beynet denied, that the Troupes Spéciales formed part of the question of Common Interests which the two Governments had discussed jointly with General Catroux in December 1943. He stated that the French Government's proposals for the transfer had been rejected by Algiers because the Syrian Government's attitude towards France had been considered hostile, and that the French Government required assurances regarding the future position of France in Syria before considering the transfer. The Syrians protested friendliness towards France, but declined to bind themselves to give that country a privileged position in a future the conditions of which they could not foresee, they claimed that the Troupes Spéciales question was distinct and should be settled now, since the Chamber was pressing for results.

At the next meeting, on the 26th October, the French representatives, in reply to a Syrian enquiry, stated that the kind of treaty they had in mind would follow the general lines of the Anglo-Iraqi and Anglo-Egyptian Treaties and would include military, educational, consular and establishment conventions. The Syrians continued to press that the Troupes Spéciales question should be settled forthwith, and the French that it should form part of a general settlement.

On the 28th October, both sides, with courtesy but with a good deal of plain speaking, went over much the same ground without making the slightest progress. Finally, the Syrians, who had previously met and reached agreement with the Lebanese, proposed to the French that His Majesty's Government should be asked to arbitrate the Troupes Spéciales question in view of their guarantee of Syrian independence and their interest in security matters in the Levant States. General Beynet agreed to submit the proposal to Paris.

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber on the same day nearly all the speakers demanded the transfer of the Troupes Spéciales and repudiated the idea of a treaty.

Despite this deadlock, the Syrian Government have still succeeded in preventing demonstrations in Damascus, though they have expressed fears that they will not be able to do so if a solution is indefinitely postponed. They are apprehensive lest the French may be attempting to drive a wedge between them and the Lebanese preparatory to taking direct action against the latter.

M. Solod, the Soviet Minister, presented his letters of credence to the Syrian President on the 26th October and to the Lebanese President on the 28th October. In conversation with the Lebanese Foreign Minister he said that his Government's attitude towards the States had been clearly stated by M. Novikov, namely that the Soviet Government wished to see these States completely independent with no foreign power occupying a privileged position.

The news of the recognition of the French Provisional Government appears to have evoked little enthusiasm amongst the French, who regard it as overdue. Amongst the Lebanese and Syrians it has naturally caused fears that the French position in the Levant States will be proportionately strengthened.

The first special train of Mecca pilgrims left Damascus on the 29th October for Suva.

2. Economic

Total cereal purchases during the period the 16th to 22nd October, 1944, amounted to 4,243 tons, a daily average of 606 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 155,856 tons.

3 Syria-Damascus

The new Syrian Government appeared before the Chamber on the 26th October, when the Prime Minister made his declaration of policy. In the internal field, this promised encouragement and protection for national industries, development of irrigation, the promulgation of labour legislation, the promotion of primary education and increased freedom for the press where military and political security was not concerned. As for external policy, Fares el Khoury stated that his Government would follow the same lines as its predecessor. This policy fell under three heads, firstly complete independence, unfettered except by the principles of international law, the maintenance of peace and security, and good relations especially with those powers which had recognised Syrian independence; secondly, participation in the Allied war effort to the fullest extent of Syria's powers with a view to a voice at the peace settlement, and lastly, close collaboration with the countries represented at the Alexandria Conference, the outcome of which was the formation of a League of Arab Nations. The Prime Minister added that Syria must obtain control of the army, "in accordance with the agreement of the 22nd December, 1943," in order to ensure peace at home, conversations on this point were proceeding and would be resumed at once.

Two subsequent sessions were devoted to discussions of this declaration. A deputy criticised the Government's foreign policy and most speakers specifically mentioned the Declaration of the 22nd December. A vote of confidence was taken on the 30th October, the Government obtained a vote of confidence without dissentients, but with four abstentions. About 25 per cent of the deputies were, however, absent from each sitting.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs has told the American Charge d'Affaires at Damascus that his Government continues to protest against American support of Zionism. An anti-Zionist Committee containing Syrians and Lebanese of many shades of opinion has been formed in Damascus. The Syrian members include the Communist leader Khaled Bagdash.

Taufiq Chawneh, the former Minister of National Economy, who was to have represented Syria at the Conference on Civil Aviation in Chicago (see Weekly Summary No. 134), declined the invitation, and his place has been taken by Nourieddin Kalhaleh, Chief of Hydraulic Services of the Syrian Government.

4 Aleppo

The latest reports received indicate that the area has been quiet and that comment on the new Syrian Government was reserved pending the announcement of its policy.

The two cotton mills (see Weekly Summary No. 134), are now working again under the management of their owners. The result of the month's trial under the new scheme is the subject of speculation, but yarn prices have dropped sharply from their previous record high level.

5 Hama and Hama

Nothing of political interest to report.

6 Jebel Druze

Nothing of political interest to report.

7 Alaouite Territory

Many of the Alaouite Deputies remained in Lattakia while Parliament was sitting in Damascus. It is probable that their presence is connected with the campaign for the abolition of Alaouite autonomy, which Bedawi el Jebel, the Alaouite Deputy, is sponsoring. The issue may come up before the Administrative Council shortly, in which event the result will depend on the attitude of those members who are of the Alaouite sect. These do not so far seem to favour integration of the territory in Syria.

Moukema in this territory are reported to be extremely bitter against the French, and the French, in the declarations of President Roosevelt, Mr. Dewey in favour of Zionism.

8 Euphrates and Jezireh

Political Officer Deir-az-Zor, reports that the Mohatez of the Euphrates is taking strong action to control prices of local food-stuffs and has issued an official price list which he is applying strictly in Deir-az-Zor.

9 Tribal

The Political Officer reports that as a result of the recent trouble between the Shammar-Khrossa and the Agaiyat, the Agaiyat (who assisted the Agaiyat in their recent troubles with the Shammar) and the Jubur, are prepared to form a common front against the Shammar-Khrossa.

10 Frontier

His Majesty's Consul, Aleppo, reports that on a visit to the frontier he found the situation quiet.

On the Turkish side of the frontier, the guards were, he found, pleased with the new British rifles and Bren guns. Apparently, however, their control has been troublesome to the officials on the Syrian side of the frontier owing to their reduction in the number of places at which passport holders can cross into Syria.

11 The Lebanon

As the main political centre of gravity is at present in Damascus, no important developments have occurred in the Lebanon. The Alexandria Conference has by no means died down and both the press and public continue to discuss how far the protocol signed there is to the advantage of the Lebanon.

On the 28th October Riad Solh convoked the local press and replied to General de Gaulle's reported press statement regarding "artificial difficulties" in the Levant States. He said that the first part of General de Gaulle's statement, regarding the immediate independence of the States, was eminently satisfactory and no more than was to be expected of a recently liberated France, but that he was at a loss to understand the purport of the second part, for no one had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of the independent Lebanon, and it was therefore impossible that "artificial difficulties" could be created there.

Joseph Salem, the defeated candidate for the speakership of the Lebanese Chamber (see Weekly Summary No. 134), has now decided to accept the post of Lebanese Minister at Cairo, which he had previously declined.

12 Press and Propaganda

The chief interest in the press has been the statement made by General de Gaulle about "artificial difficulties" for France in Syria and the Lebanon, which, with the reply from the Lebanese Prime Minister, has been published in all the newspapers. With the exception of a short article in the Arabic newspaper *Beirut*, no comment on either statement has, however, yet appeared. *Beirut*, alluding to General de Gaulle's reference to the League of Nations, enquired what had become of it.

In the absence of any official communiqué regarding the various meetings held in Damascus between the French and the Syrian authorities, the press has correctly surmised that the *Troupes Spéciales* and treaty questions have been under discussion.

Enemy Wireless Propaganda

Nothing of importance during the week under review.

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No. 43

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 136. Secret Source and the Lebanon, 8th November 1944. — (Received in Foreign Office, 22nd November)

1. General.

NO important political developments have occurred during the week, as the views of Paris and London on the proposed French re-occupation in the *Troupes spéciales* question have not yet been received.

The 21st November 1944. The Declaration was marked in Damascus by orderly demonstrations and a brief partial closure of the town, while a number of protests against the declaration and against recent statements

[30547]

that Palestine would become a Jewish National Home were sent to the British Consulate. There were similar demonstrations at Latakia, Hama and Tripoli, but not at Aleppo. In Beirut a mass protest meeting was held in a cinema, the speakers at which included several prominent Communists, it was noticeable that Christians were as vehement as Moslems in their denunciations of Zionism and all its works.

The establishment of a Soviet Legation in Beirut has been followed by a series of press announcements of pro-Soviet activities, mostly by the body known as "Friends of the U.S.S.R.," and the 27th anniversary of the Soviet revolution was widely publicised. Russia is, in fact, all the rage at the moment. The Soviet Minister has already had a clash with General Beynet, who induced him to attend a French Consular Mass, though well aware that neither the Lebanese Government nor the Diplomatic Corps would be represented.

Afghanistan has recognised Syrian and Lebanese independence.

At a recent meeting of the Damascus Chamber a Deputy who called for the return of the Hatay to Syria was loudly applauded. The incident has aroused considerable interest in Aleppo, in which region the loss of the Hatay, and particularly the port of Alexandretta, has been keenly felt, but it is realised that to raise the question now may embarrass the Syrian Government just when they are angling for Turkish recognition.

The Syrian Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Lebanese Vice-President have both called on His Majesty's Minister to express condolences, on behalf of their Governments, on the death of Lord Moyne. The local reaction has been one of sincere regret at the death of one who was generally held to be a good friend of the Levant States, mingled with the hope that this crime will result in the modification of His Majesty's Government's attitude towards Zionism.

3 Syria - Damascus

The Chamber debate on the Government's statement of policy ended on the 10th November. The debate covered a wide field: official corruption, especially in the Ministry of Supply, came in for criticism, and there were demands for improved labour conditions and for increased pay in the Administration. Speakers raised the question of the foreign participation in the O.C.P., the Prime Minister, in reply, praised this organisation for its benefit to the country: he hoped, however, to see introduced in its Constitution certain modifications more in consonance with the Government's policy, particularly on the treaty issue, and demands for a more real Syrian control of the services handed over by the French. The Aleppo Deputy usually considered to be the leader of the Opposition elements announced that his group would vote for the Government so long as it faithfully carried out its announced policy.

4 Aleppo

The vote of confidence passed in the new Government by the Damascus Chamber has been generally welcomed, though the Prime Minister's speech is thought to have shown tact rather than strength. The chief local preoccupation is the recent price rise, which reflects lack of confidence in the supply services. The new Director of Supply, who is shortly to visit Aleppo, is reputed to be a Jew, and it is hoped that the Government will endeavour to tackle this urgent problem, which has been aggravated by recent purchases on a vast scale by the French authorities.

5 Hama and Hama.

A memorial meeting held by the Sheikah Mohammed to commemorate the Mustafa martyr, on the 11th November, was attended by a large number of people, including representatives from Damascus, Aleppo and Beirut. All speeches denounced communism and lamented the young man who "had sacrificed himself for Islam," but there was no disorder.

6 Jebel Druze

His Majesty's Minister, paying an official visit to Smeida on the 23rd November, was met by a large number of local notables welcomed by the Muhafiz, and was vehemently harangued on the subject of Palestine and the

Syrian army. According to the Muhafiz the French endeavoured to stage anti-Balfour Declaration demonstrations to coincide with the visit, but the notables declined thus to spoil the occasion.

7 Alaouite Territory.

The new Muhafiz, a Sunni Nationalist, is disturbed at what he describes as French encroachments on Syrian sovereignty in his area. He is also uncertain of what support he will get from the new Government, which he has reason to believe at first intended to allow Sulaiman Murshid to return to Latakia, an action which, if not prevented, might have had serious security repercussions in the area. The French Political Officer, Captain Boursiquet, and even more his interpreter, appear to be continuing intrigues among the separatists, they seem to have spread reports that Murshid would return and to have begun organising a welcome for him. The area is still calm, and the reopening of the British Political Office has caused a genuine feeling of relief in view of widespread reports that the British were leaving the country to the French.

The Muhafiz states that the question of the abolition of Alaouite autonomy is still under consideration, but that the French have not yet handed over

11 The Lebanon

The Lebanese press is generally favourable to the new Government, but there is a feeling of uneasiness about the future of the country. The press is still largely controlled by the French, and is not yet free to express its views through co-operative stores.

The Mufti of the Lebanese Republic has addressed a letter to the President expressing the support of his community for the Alexandria Protocol and for the Government's policy of refusing to conclude a treaty with France and contrasting their reasonableness with the fanaticism of certain Christian elements.

The Dardache, a notoriously unruly tribe in the Northern Bekaa, have been active in recent months. Their activity seems to date from a recent visit paid to them by the French Political Officer at Baalbek. Otherwise the country is quiet.

On the 3rd November the French Sûreté raided a printing press in Beirut in which was being printed a "Narrative of the Lebanese Crisis of November 1943" which the Government had originally commissioned two of its officials to write, and which the French believed contained insulting reference to their troops. The Government, immediately informed, sent police to occupy and seal the press and arrest the Sûreté. A tense situation ensued when the French protested strongly at this reaction to their illegal action, and the Lebanese Prime Minister, rather than risk a clash at this juncture, gave way to the extent of having the pamphlet burned against withdrawal of the French note of protest and release of the arrested manager of the press.

12 Press and Propaganda

Internal At a meeting of Lebanese and Syrian journalists at Chitaura on the 5th November it was resolved to approach their respective Governments with a view to pressure on the British authorities for increased supplies of newsprint. The internal censorship came in for severe criticism.

In general the press is unanimous in its opposition to American support of the Syrian Government. The Lebanese press is antagonistic to the Greater Syria movement, whilst both the Syrian and Lebanese papers are awaiting the exact terms of General de Gaulle's declaration before making any comment. On the question of internal reforms the entire press is discontented and has voiced bitter criticism of the two Governments.

Extracts from Weekly Political Summary No. 137, Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 15th November, 1944.—(Received in Foreign Office, 29th November.)

1. General

NO developments having occurred in the major political questions, public attention has been directed to the recent and continuing rise in the cost of living. The press in both States has contained numerous articles calling on the Governments to take effective measures to control prices, and in the Lebanon pamphlets have been circulated by the Falangistes and others attacking the Lebanese Government for its failure to do so. There is no doubt that the increase in the already excessive price level has, in fact, hit wage-earners hard everywhere, and labour troubles have already started as a result.

Information received from many different sources indicates that one of the main causes of this recent rise is the institution by the French civil and military authorities of bulk purchases of food-stuffs and other essential commodities for local storage and eventual shipment to France. The Lebanese Government have already protested on this score to the French authorities, who have admitted that releases have been made and who claim that they have now been suspended at General Beynet's behest, but they have declined to consider a further suggestion that the goods bought should be returned to the vendors. The question of these purchases was discussed at the 14th November meeting of the Government declared that their export from the country would be forbidden.

Apart from this Lebanese *démarche*, neither Government has produced any proposals for controlling prices. The Syrian Government have suggested that they will pay their civil servants a month's pay as a gratuity and the Lebanese by increasing the stocks of commodities to be sold through the co-operatives.

Certain reports alleged to have appeared in the *Manchester Guardian* and *The Times* regarding the position of Great Britain and France in the Levant States, including statements attributed to official French sources, that the 1943 Lebanese elections had been vitiated by British interference and that British officials had not observed the Lyttleton de Gaulle Agreement. He asked whether the Government were aware of the tenor of the Paris discussions which touched at the root of Lebanese independence, and repudiated the suggestion that the Chamber resulted from falsified elections. The Prime Minister in reply, said that he had no official cognisance of the discussions referred to, but that he knew that there can be no question of Great Britain going back on her promises as regards Lebanese independence. The Lebanese had acquired independence because they wanted it, that independence had been recognised by Arab and Allied States and could not now be taken away. His Government would not sign a treaty with anyone, so that they could go to the Peace Conference free of all foreign engagements. This reply was loudly applauded.

3. Syria—Damascus

Recent sittings of the Damascus Chamber have been devoted to examination of the budget. Deputies have accused the Government of extravagance on non-essentials, and have criticised them for the decision to grant one month's pay as gratuity to all civil servants. A Bill on the Agricultural Produce Tax, which produced £S 1,350,000 in the first ten months of 1944, was ratified.

A strike of type-setters has deprived Damascus of Arabic newspapers since the 9th November.

4. Aleppo

Certain commodity prices have now decreased, though not to the levels ruling before recent increases. With decreasing employment by the British military authorities and in the textile trade many classes of workers are in real difficulty.

5. Hama and Hama

A strike of weavers in Hama, due to a shortage of cotton yarn, resulted in demonstrations and a general closing of the town. Supplies of yarn promised

from Damascus failed to arrive, and the Mohafez could only control the situation by allowing a deputation to proceed to Damascus. Some 13,000 men are affected. The trouble has been utilised by local factions for their own political ends.

6. Jebel Druze

The failure of the Syrian Government to give effect to the recent decision of the Administrative Council to abandon autonomy in favour of incorporation in the Syrian State has discouraged the promoters of this motion and encouraged the opposition. As the Emir Hassan el Atrash has gone to Damascus, it is presumed, to discuss this matter.

The Mohafez and the Director of the Bedouin Control have settled a dispute over water rights between the Druzes and the Ruwalla tribes, the former restraining the Druzes whilst the latter ensured that the Ruwalla obeyed the decision jointly given. The French Bedouin Control officer took no part in the settlement.

7. Alauite Territory

Nothing to report.

9. Tribal

An abortive attempt by some 200 men of the Agaidat tribe to raid the Shammar Khirasa about the 31st October has been reported. The Shammar heard of the raid and sent a detachment of 100 men to intercept the raiders and detained four of them.

11. The Lebanon

See under "General" above.

Labour dissatisfaction has again focussed attention on the possibility of a change of Government, and many rumours have been circulating to the effect that Riad Solh intended to resign in order to forestall an adverse vote in the Chamber. He himself has been saying that he wishes to go out, but that no suitable Sunni Moslem can be found prepared to shoulder the responsibilities of office.

A memorial service for the late Lord Moyne was held in the Anglican Church at Beirut on the 11th November. His Majesty's Minister delivered the address.

12. Press and Propaganda

Internal. Reaction in the Syrian press, both Arabic and French, to the news of the assassination of Lord Moyne, was one of horrified astonishment, followed by strong criticism. Most of the Lebanese Arabic press was occupied with the crime and expressing sympathy with the victim, confined itself to reproducing the comments of the foreign press, to the effect that this stupid and abominable crime would result in a serious set-back to the Zionist movement.

The Lebanese French press strongly condemned the assassination as a detestable and monstrously stupid crime, and one paper hints at tacit complicity in Palestine by a certain section of the community.

All the press maintains its intransigent opposition to any extension of Zionism in the Middle East.

The French-inspired Arabic press is obviously very gratified at the Franco-British talks in Paris and at the admission of France to the European Advisory Commission, whilst the French language press is openly jubilant. The nationalist Arabic press in both countries is awaiting developments.

The Syrian Arabic press has been expressing a very favourable attitude towards Great Britain as a result of Mr Churchill's Paris visit.

The press in general is pleased with the result of the American presidential elections.

On the question of high prices, the press generally has been somewhat appeased by a downward trend in Syria and an energetic decision taken by the Lebanese Government to combat speculation and control prices.

1. General.

3. Syria—Damascus

A decision of the Ministry of Supply has set up a committee for distribution and clarification of prices of pharmaceutical products.

4. *A type*

The Mohafez cancelled a football match between a local Armenian club and a visiting Jewish team from Palestine in deference to certain extremist Moslems who had threatened trouble.

G. Jebel Druze

The Mobarez has lodged a strong complaint against the French officer commanding the Druze Squadron, accusing him of unwarranted interference in local affairs and of speaking insultingly of the Syrian President and Government. The Prime Minister is understood to have taken the case up with the French

7 Algonquie Territory

The Mohafez is well in the saddle and is taking a strong line in defence of South-western Anatolia. It would be no wonder if reinforcements by the local French authorities.

The high price of olive oil, following a bad crop, is still a serious matter in this region, although the price has recently slightly declined.

8 *Euphrates and Jezreel*

The French Delegué, Colonel des Essars, has left on transfer for Morocco. During his period of absence, he has been assisted by his British colleagues, while making every effort to enhance French prestige in the areas he has controlled.

10. *Frontier.*

The Syrian Government is reported to have decided to enforce the payment of certain taxes on crops owned in Syria by Turks who subsequently take the produce over the border. The Syrians have little fear of reprisal as the Turks already made it impossible for Syrians owning land in Turkey to repatriate any profit.

11 The Lebanon

At a meeting of the Chamber on the 21st November the Government's income-tax law was passed *in toto*, with much less difficulty than had been anticipated.

There has been little political activity in either State owing to the El-Adha Feast, and no further discussions have taken place between the French and the Governments.

refrains from any discussion on economic matters which could be exploited by ill-intentioned foreigners.

There have been small strikes in both Beirut and Damascus, and it is generally expected that there will be further labour troubles after the feast as a result of a general unrest amongst the workmen caused by the recent rise in the cost of living.

At a meeting of the Syrian Chamber on the 20th November several Deputies pressed the Government to give notice of the termination of the agreement between the Government and the DHP Railway, which is due to expire on the 1st March, 1945, with a view to the Government either taking over the railway or modifying the concession. A motion to this effect was eventually carried unanimously and, according to the press reports, the Government has notified the railway accordingly.

The Director General of Supplies is reported to have resigned because certain projects put forward by him for the reform of his department had not been supported by the Government.

attributes to the Government's action in controlling the transfer of stocks from one place to another within the country.

The Prime Minister is still indisposed, but is making good progress. The Government offices are closed from the 23rd November to the 2nd December on the occasion of the feast.

Tramway workers in Damascus struck for a few hours on the 21st November but returned when their demands for one month's salary as a gratuity were granted. Strikes are threatened amongst employees of the Regie de Tabac, the tobacco company, by the construction workers who are building new roads. A strike amongst OCP workers was averted.

On the 23rd November a reception was held to commemorate the death of Ibrahim Hanano, the Syrian Nationalist leader. Saadallah Jabri made a speech calling on Syrians to unite, repudiating any suggestion that a treaty could be signed with France or any other non-Arab country, and declaring that if the French Government would hand over the Syrian oil fields to the Syrians, the French Government would be regarded as a friend to the Syrians. The speaker then said that he hoped to see the day when the Syrians would be free to elect their own government. He then said that he hoped to see the day when the Syrians would be free to elect their own government. He then said that he hoped to see the day when the Syrians would be free to elect their own government.

Students in the Government schools struck on the 19th November in protest against the failure of their authorities to apply certain reforms recently issued in the educational curriculum, but returned after telegraphing a petition to the Minister of Public Instruction.

The two main spinning factories are stated to have delivered a satisfactory portion of the quantity of cotton yarn due to be handed over to the Government. The same factories have not yet delivered further quantities of yarn to the weavers.

The miners' walk-out has been struck again, and it is the first of autumn here, and the town closed in sympathy. A deputation was allowed to proceed to Damascus to protest direct to the supply authorities. Local political parties have been exploiting the unrest, one party supporting the strike, another violently opposing it.

The Muhafaz, in the hopes of dissipating local uneasiness at the failure of the Syrian Government to legalise the incorporation of the area in the Syrian State, has published a statement he recently made to a deputation to the effect that the Government has welcomed the Provincial Council's decision to demand this incorporation and is preparing the necessary decree. He has added that all necessary legislation is already in force in the Jebel Druze.

The Druze Gendarmerie have seized a quantity of hashish which a Lebanese from Zahlé was bringing from Syria into the Jebel Druze. The Religious Sheikhs have published a statement threatening excommunication of all persons found guilty of selling hashish.

The Political Officer, on visiting notables on the occasion of the El-Adhu Festival, found an undercurrent of anxiety lest the end of the war should see the British leaving the country to the French.

A second quarrel between the Muhafez and the Directorate has been occasioned by the arrest by the Syrian authorities of a Syrian telephonist, employed by the French military authorities, for having shot at an Alawite. The French demanded his release on the grounds that he had shot because his victim had torn up a portrait of General Gaillard. As the Syrians refused to be taken on and the Muhafez has refused his release and insisted that the Syrian courts are competent. The French have moved 200 North African troops into the area and the matter is now being discussed at Damascus.

The land cases brought against Sulaiman Murshid by local peasantry are in a way a pious fraud, says a local official. Sulaiman Murshid, who has gone to Damascus, hopes to induce the Government to take this step which they are apparently reluctant to do for fear of setting a precedent elsewhere, by pointing out that if Murshid eventually returns to the area he will be legally entitled to reoccupy his lands and to claim this year's crop from the peasantry, thereby creating a potentially dangerous situation and weakening the Government's authority.

The question of the abolition of Alsoude autonomy has gone no further. The Muhafez maintains that it would be voted by the local council if put up, but that the Syrian Government would, in the meantime, have to set it aside. If it is not taken soon, it seems probable that the number of adherents of union will diminish and that the measure, which is obviously essential if the unity of Syria is to be achieved, will be more difficult to pass when eventually raised.

Students of the Government school in Deir-*ez* Zor have been on strike owing to the failure of the Government to appoint a science master. The town closed on the 18th November in sympathy. The Syrian Government Council, called by Damascus Chamber on the 20th November that the state of affairs was a scandal.

The anniversary of the return of the Lebanese President and Ministers from internment at Rashaya was celebrated on the 22nd November by a reception at the Government offices in all the principal towns. It was noteworthy that the French authorities attended these receptions and closed their own offices for the day. Little public enthusiasm was shown, but all notables seem to have participated.

At a sitting of the Lebanese Chamber on the 21st November the Government's Income Tax law was passed without amendment, only one Deputy opposing it. Machinery to collect the tax has yet to be set up.

Discussion at present centres around the suggestion alleged to have been put about recently by the French authorities that the Christians of the Lebanon, if they desire French protection in the future, should press for the reduction of the Lebanon to its pre-1914 size, because the French would not be able to protect

them in a Lebanon constituted as at present. The suggestion has found some favour among the more fanatical Christian elements, but is rejected by most intelligent Lebanese on the grounds that in present world conditions a smaller Lebanon would be economically impracticable. The Maronite Patriarch seems to have been convinced by his entourage that the result of the recent Alexandria Conference was "to sell the Lebanon to the Moslems," and the severe criticism made by the Lebanese Government (including a visit by the President to the Greek with a gift of money for Maronite charities) have failed to wean him from this conviction.

There has been a further strike amongst the Shell Company employees which is not yet settled, and a number of other strikes are threatened in the near future unless the cost of living comes down.

The Lebanese Government have issued a decree prohibiting the transport of any merchandise within the Lebanon without a permit from the supply authorities.

There have been further disturbances in the Hermel area where the Government's representatives seem incapable of maintaining order.

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No 47

Extract from Weekly Political Summary No. 140. Secret, Syria and the Lebanon, 6th December, 1944. (Received in Foreign Office, 22nd December)

1. General

THE news of the departure of His Majesty's Minister has gradually become known. Rumours have been circulating to the effect that this presages a change in the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Levant States, and that the Ninth Army are also moving out. The communiqué published in London on the 5th December should do something to counter these rumours, and in some quarters a readiness has already been shown to accept the official explanation at its face value. The Governments have not concealed their sorrow and depression at his departure, but are both resolved to maintain their policy of independence.

It is reported from Ankara that the Turkish Government have invited the Syrian and Lebanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to visit Ankara after the middle of December in order to discuss Turkish recognition of the two States. This recognition would clearly be beneficial from all points of view, not least in connexion with relations on the Turco-Syrian frontier, where the French are tending to reassume more direct control since the departure of British troops, but there appear to be certain outstanding matters to be cleared up before it is accorded, notably that of Syrian claims for the return of the Hatay.

A French suggestion to the Maronites, that the Lebanese Christians should press for a reduction of the Lebanon to its pre-1914 size if they desire French protection in the future, was reported in paragraph 11 of Weekly Summary No. 139. It has now been reported from Damascus that the general line of French policy is to have back the four provinces detached from Syria and added to the Lebanon in 1920. It is pointed out that the Lebanese Government are not anxious to see the most Lebanese realise that the pre-1914 Lebanon would be an economic impossibility in post-war conditions, whilst the Syrians are not anxious to raise the question of the four provinces unless the Lebanese cease to align their policy with the interests of the United Kingdom.

The situation in the Levant is the chief preoccupation of both States, and there have been no reported political developments.

According to the press the Greek Orthodox Patriarch has received an invitation from the Syrian Government to send a delegation to Moscow for the election of the Orthodox Patriarch. The report adds that the Patriarch and the Archbishop of Beirut will probably go.

2. Economic

Following the Syro-Lebanese Conference at Chitaura on the 27th November, a series of discussions were held in Beirut last week between the Lebanese Minister of Finance and the Syrian Minister of Supply in order to settle the allocation between the two States of a number of M.E.S.C. quotas for essential commodities.

The Syrians continue to press that these allocations should be on the basis of consumption, and the Lebanese that they should be on the basis of pre-war imports, the greater part of which were effected through Lebanese merchants. The Lebanese further claimed that the relative consumption of the two States could not be determined with accuracy. Neither side would give way, and it was finally agreed to make *ad hoc* arrangements (i.e. bargains) in respect of each commodity.

Total cereal purchases during the period the 23rd to the 30th November, 1944, amounted to 1,337 tons, a daily average of 167 tons, which brings the total purchases from the 1944 crop up to 169,494 tons.

3. Syria—Damascus

The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister, the Ministers and notables on the 26th November, on the occasion of the Id el Adha, and later entertained the former to lunch. Government offices remained closed throughout the week on account of this feast, and a sitting of the Chamber held on the 2nd December was abandoned owing to lack of a quorum.

The Prime Minister has now recovered and returned to work. Reports in the press that the Minister for Foreign Affairs had arrived in Amman are incorrect, as Jamil Mardam has not left the Levant States. Visitors to Damascus have included the Transjordanian Minister of the Interior and Musa al Alami, the Palestinian representative at the recent Arab preliminary conference at Alexandria, the latter is understood to have come in order to discuss the formation of Arab propaganda bureaux in Washington and London.

The Syrian Government are reported to have abandoned the project of holding a general census on account of the expense involved.

4. Aleppo

Criticism has been heard of the speech delivered by Saadullah Jafri during the Hanano meeting (see Weekly Summary No. 139) on the grounds that, in exhorting Syrians to unite on essentials and to cease to trouble about trifles, he included amongst the latter the cost of living, which is the greatest local problem. He has been asserting in conversation that only the officials were badly affected but this is far from the truth.

A recent order by the Syrian Ministry of Supply prohibiting the transport of cotton or silk even inside the town without a permit has caused considerable inconvenience to the widely scattered weaving industry, and the Chamber of Industry is urging its cancellation. Dr Kayali has stated that the measure is only for purposes of control and is not intended to fix prices. The Ministry of Supply until they closed down for the feast, but none has yet been passed on to the weavers, apparently because of difficulties of fixing the prices.

5. Hama and Hama

Some 10,000 weavers are still out of work in Hama and the majority of the town looms are still idle, as the price of cotton, though it has fallen, is still too high to make operation of the looms profitable. The local Communist party, stimulated by the absence in Mecca of the leader of their rivals, the Shehab Mahomed, are holding frequent meetings with the out-of-work weavers and are reported to have encouraged them to start demonstrations.

The drinking water supply of Hama has been reported as being cut off by both British and French military authorities. It is generally believed that this unfortunate state of affairs arises out of a racket between the President of the Municipality and the contractor who supplied the pipes, which had previously been condemned elsewhere as unusable.

A member of the powerful Barnat family has been arrested after a shooting affray in which a dentist was killed. It remains to be seen whether the family will be able to effect his release, as on a previous occasion.

6. Jebel Druze

The Mohafez has left for Damascus and is stated to be proceeding to Cairo to discuss the fate of his ex-wife, the late Aminah As-Sayid. Rumours are current that he has resigned, and his family are perturbed lest the Syrian Government should replace him by a Syrian official. They intend to insist either that he should withdraw his resignation or that he should be replaced by another member of the family.

7. Alawite Territory

The French military authorities appear to have yielded in the matter of the arrested telephonist (see paragraph 7 of Weekly Summary No. 139), but the 200 North African troops are still in the Massiaf area, where the situation therefore remains potentially dangerous. The *député* is understood to have pressed strongly once again for the removal of the notorious Captain Boussiquet and of his interpreter, but so far at least without success. The Mohafez is still in Damascus.

The Syrian Prime Minister has been urged to proceed with legislation cancelling the registration of Suleiman Murahid's lands. He has agreed to study the case, with which he claims to be unfamiliar, but his attitude does not so far suggest that he is prepared to take action. He is, however, retaining Murahid in Damascus.

9. Tishat

Haj Mohamed el Ayesb, Deputy of Deir-az-Zor, has arrived there on a mission from the Syrian Government to arrange an amicable settlement of the long outstanding dispute between the Baggara, Kikish and Shammar tribes. He proposes to hold a meeting on the 1st December at Deir-az-Zor. The *Mutassarif* of Aleppo and the *Mutassarif* of Latakia are also concerned regarding the abortive raid by the Agaidat against the Shammar Khroussa (see paragraph 8 of Weekly Summary No. 137), each accusing the other of not having enforced the conditions of the agreement come to last June. The Mohafez maintains that the Shammar Khroussa broke the agreed truce and are therefore liable to the fine of 1 D2,000 agreed upon by both parties, but seems unlikely to be able to enforce his view.

11. The Lebanon

Sixteen Deputies are understood to have banded themselves together to demand from the Government the setting up of a series of parliamentary commissions to examine the alleged corruption and inefficiency in each department of the Administration. It is possible that this may lead to the ministerial crisis which has been expected for some time.

The Lebanese Prime Minister visited the Maronite Patriarch on the 30th November and, after a three-hour discussion, succeeded, where his President had failed, in convincing the Patriarch that the Government's policy was in the best interests of the Lebanon. He is understood to have achieved this result chiefly by threatening the patriarch that, if the Maronites did not abandon their claims to the Lebanon, the French would incorporate the Lebanon and seek incorporation in Syria of the areas where they are predominant.

The Minister of Finance is having difficulty in preparing his budget owing to the dilatoriness of several departments in forwarding their estimates. He is making a laudable attempt to cut down unnecessary expenditure, with a view to filling an anticipated deficit. His task has been made somewhat easier by the recent Syro-Lebanese Economic Conference at Chitaura, one of the results of which was a concession by the Syrians on the price of Syrian wheat delivered to the Lebanon, and he is now more confident that the budget will be balanced.

At a meeting of the Chamber on the 30th November Deputies sharply criticised the Government for having allowed the budget to be passed without the necessary amendments. The Minister of Finance, however, stated that the Government had obtained a vote of confidence, which the Government obtained on a vote by a fair majority.

There is still labour trouble among the Shell Company's employees despite an increase of wages recently accorded by the company. There are threats of strikes in other labour organisations, but nothing serious has yet eventuated.

M. Joseph Salem, the new Lebanese Minister to Cairo, left to take up his post on the 29th November.

The Chinese Government has officially notified its recognition of Lebanese independence.

CHAPTER V.—GENERAL.

E 6137 41 65]

No. 48

Memorandum on Arab Unity Conference

FOR some months past Nahas Pasha has been carrying on consultations with leaders of various Arab States with a view to finding out what degree of agreement there is on any form of inter-Arab unity, federation or co-operation.

2. Nahas's consultations resulted in the convocation of a preparatory committee to be held in Cairo, to be followed by a Congress. The preparatory committee met recently in Cairo, being composed of representatives of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Palestinian Arabs were represented by an observer.

3. As regards the general attitude of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said in the House of Commons on the 24th February, 1943, that His Majesty's Government would view with sympathy any movement among Arabs to promote their economic, cultural or political unity. But clearly the initiative in any scheme would have to come from the Arabs themselves. In view of our general sympathy with the Arab cause, and the fact that we have no direct frontiers between them, we have confined our own action as regards the present meeting to impressing on the parties concerned the undesirability of making any public statements which would increase tension in the Middle East, particularly over Palestine or the Levant States.

Foreign Office, 12th October, 1944

E 6137 41 65]

No. 49

Mr. Khane to Mr. Eden—(Received 8th October)

(No. 1897)

(Telegraphic)

Cairo, 8th October, 1944

FOLLOWING is summary of resolutions of protocol of Preparatory Committee for Arab Congress published in the *Journal d'Egypte* this morning:—

Part 1. League of Arab States will be constituted by the independent Arab States who wish to join it. This League will have a Council in which the States will be represented on a footing of equality. Its mission will be to execute agreements which States conclude among themselves to organise periodical meetings in order to strengthen their relations and co-ordinate their political programmes with a view to realising co-operation and to safeguarding by every possible means their independence and sovereignty against aggression and to occupy itself generally with the affairs and interests of Arab countries. The decisions of this Council will bind those accepting them except in the case of a difference between two States of the League which they have referred to the Council for settlement. In this case the decisions of the Council will have to be carried out *in*. In all cases it is forbidden to have recourse to force to settle conflicts between two States of the League. Each State will have the right to conclude with another State, whether or not a member of the League, particular agreements which are not contrary to the text and spirit of these dispositions. In no case will a State be allowed to follow a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League or to the interests of the Arab States. The Council will mediate in every difference susceptible of provoking war between a member State and another member or non-member with a view to reconciling them. A commission will be formed of the members of the preparatory committee in order to elaborate the statutes of the Council and to examine political questions which could be the object of agreements to be concluded between Arab countries.

Part 2. The Arab States, represented on the Committee will co-operate in economics, cultural and social questions such as commercial exchanges, customs, currency, agriculture, industry, communications, cultural questions, nationality, passports, social and sanitary questions, &c. A Commission of experts in each category of these questions will be formed of representatives of the Governments which have participated in the Preparatory Committee in order to elaborate projects determining the means of co-operation.

(b) In these matters a commission of co-ordination will be formed to control the workings of these various Commissions and to put their resolutions in the form of draft agreements for submission to the different Governments. When all these Commissions will have completed their work, the Preparatory Committee will meet again to examine results with a view to the convocation of a general Arab Congress.

Part 3. The Committee hopes that the Arab countries will consolidate this part of their work by leading to institutions which will unite States by closer and stronger bonds.

Part 4. The States represented at the Committee unanimously affirm their respect for the independence of the Lebanon within its present frontiers, which their Governments have already recognised, after the Lebanon has followed a policy of independence proclaimed by its Government.

The Committee also recognises that the Jews, as a people, have a right to a State of their own, and that the progress of the Jewish people towards independence, constitute acquired rights for the Arabs and that the realization of the Jewish State will be a factor in the stability of the Arab States. The Committee also recognises that the Jews, as a people, have a right to a State of their own, and that the progress of the Jewish people towards independence, constitute acquired rights for the Arabs and that the realization of the Jewish State will be a factor in the stability of the Arab States. The Committee also recognises that the Jews, as a people, have a right to a State of their own, and that the progress of the Jewish people towards independence, constitute acquired rights for the Arabs and that the realization of the Jewish State will be a factor in the stability of the Arab States. The Committee also recognises that the Jews, as a people, have a right to a State of their own, and that the progress of the Jewish people towards independence, constitute acquired rights for the Arabs and that the realization of the Jewish State will be a factor in the stability of the Arab States.

(d) The proposal concerning the participation of Arab Governments and peoples in the fund destined to preserve Arab lands in Palestine will be referred to the Commission of Economic and Financial Questions for examination and submission of the result of the Preparatory Committee at its next meeting. The protocol was signed by all the Delegations except Saudi and Yemeni Delegations who postponed their opinion pending reference to their respective Kings.

E 6477 41, 65]

No. 50

PROTOCOL SIGNED AT ALEXANDRIA ON THE 7TH OCTOBER, 1944, AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE MEETING OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE ARAB CONGRESS AS PUBLISHED IN THE PRESS

(Trans. 1944)

Statement by the Committee

THE Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress concluded their deliberations, as they began them, in an atmosphere of perfect mutual confidence, friendship and fraternity, and in full appreciation of the mutual responsibility devolving upon them in these important times in which the course of history is about to be changed. They have been animated by a desire to unite their efforts in the direction of the achievement of all that is in the best interests of all the Arab countries with a view to assuring their future and the realisation of their aspirations.

It was the source of great gratification and happiness that the committee should have been joined by Dr. Musa al Alami, the representative member of the Arab people in Palestine, whose regard to the importance with which the Arab people of this Arab territory is regarded by all the Arab peoples without exception.

The committee adopted, by the unanimous vote of the representatives of Syria and Transjordan and Iraq and the Lebanon and Egypt, many vital resolutions concerning political, economic, cultural and social questions and, in evidence of the agreement of these delegations with the above-mentioned resolutions, their chiefs have signed the protocol attached to this statement.

As regards the delegations of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, these have postponed an expression of opinion until they shall have been able to refer the above-mentioned resolutions to their Majesties King Abdul Aziz al Saud and the Imam Yahya Hamid ad Din.

The committee are happy to avail themselves of this occasion, which in truth constitutes one of the great pages of Arab history, to address to all the Arab countries their best wishes and congratulations and to submit to their Majesties and Excellencies the King and the Imam and the various heads of the Arab world an expression of their appreciation and appreciation being convinced that their endeavours and hopes and the results which they have achieved, and by the grace of God will achieve in the future, merit their highest appreciation and all encouragement and support.

Protocol

The following chiefs and members of the Arab delegations to the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress are signatories to this document:—

President of the Preparatory Committee—

His Excellency Mustapha Nahaas Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and chief of the Egyptian delegation.

The Syrian delegation—

His Excellency al Saiyid Jamil Mardam Beg, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency Dr. Najib al Armanazi, secretary general to the President.

His Excellency Dr. Sabari al Asali, Deputy for Damascus.

The Transjordan delegation—

His Excellency Tawfiq Abul Huda Pasha, Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Transjordan and chief of the Transjordan delegation.

His Excellency Sulaiman al Sakkar, secretary to his Excellency the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The Iraqi delegation—

His Excellency al Saiyi Hamdi al Pashachi, Prime Minister of Iraq and chief of the Iraqi delegation.

His Excellency al Saiyid Arshad al Umari, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency al Saiyid Nuri al Said, former Prime Minister of Iraq.

His Excellency al Saiyid Tahsin al Askari, Minister Plenipotentiary for Iraq in Egypt.

The Lebanese delegation—

His Excellency Riyadh al Sulh Beg, Prime Minister of the Lebanon and chief of the Lebanese delegation.

His Excellency Salim Tqala Beg, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

His Excellency al Saiyid Musa Mubarak, principal secretary to his Excellency the President.

The Egyptian delegation—

His Excellency Naph al Hallali Pasha, Minister for Education.

His Excellency Muhammad Sabri al Din Pasha, Minister of Justice.

His Excellency Muhammad Salah un Din Beg, Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The above mentioned, desiring to give proof of the close and various ties which unite all the Arab countries, and seeking to strengthen and confirm these ties and to develop them in such a manner as to benefit the interests of the Arab countries, to ameliorate their conditions, to safeguard their independence and to realise their aspirations, have agreed to meet at Alexandria, on Monday, the 8th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 25th September, 1944), and on Saturday, the 20th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 7th October, 1944), as a Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and reached agreement as follows:—

I.—A League of Arab States

There shall be constituted a League of Arab States consisting of those independent Arab States who agree to join it. This league shall have a council, which shall be called "The Council of the League of Arab States," on which there shall be represented on a basis of equality all the Arab States who participate in the league.

It shall be the task of this council to supervise the execution of such agreements as these States may adopt, to assemble periodic meetings, to strengthen mutual relations and co-ordinate policies in such a manner that independence may be strengthened and independence and sovereignty safeguarded against aggression, and to give heed generally to the affairs and interests of all the Arab countries.

The resolutions of this council shall be binding on all those who accept them, except in the event of a difference arising between two States who are members of the council and who refer to the council for a settlement of this difference. In that event the decisions of the council must be accepted by both parties.

In no circumstances shall it be permissible to have recourse to force for the settlement of any dispute between any two States, members of the council. Any State may conclude with another State, member or non-member of the council, an agreement which is not in conflict with the text of this document or with its spirit.

Nor shall it be permissible in any circumstances to pursue a foreign policy prejudicial to the policy of the League of Arab States or to that of any State member of the league.

The council will intervene with a view to the settlement of any dispute arising between a State, member of the council, and any other State, whether a member or a non member, which may appear likely to lead to war.

A sub-committee will be formed at once from members of the Preparatory Committee to prepare a draft regulation for the council of the league and to consider the political questions concerning which it may be possible for agreement to be reached among the Arab States.

II—Co-operation in Economic, Cultural, Social and Other Matters

(a) The Arab countries represented on the council will co-operate sincerely in the following matters.—

- (1) Economic and financial matters, including mutual commerce, customs, currency, agriculture and industry.
- (2) Communications, including roads, railways, air routes, navigation, posts and telegraphs.
- (3) Cultural matters.
- (4) Matters concerning personal status, passports, visas, the extradition of criminals, and other similar matters.
- (5) Social affairs.
- (6) Public health.

(b) A sub-committee of experts shall be constituted for each class of these matters on which the Governments, members of the Preparatory Committee, shall be represented. The task of this committee shall be to prepare proposals for the manner in which co-operation shall be organised in these matters and the extent to which such co-operation shall be established.

(c) There shall be set up a drafting and co-ordinating committee the task of which shall be to supervise the work of the other sub-committees, to co-ordinate their activities and progress, to assist in the drafting and preparation of their proposals and conclusions and to submit them to the different Governments.

(d) When all the sub-committees have completed their labours the Preparatory Committee will reassemble and there will be submitted to it the work of the sub-committees as a preparatory step to the summoning of the general Arab Congress.

III.—The Strengthening of these Relations in the Future.

Though they are gratified by the progress already made, the committee express the hope that the Arab States will continue to strengthen their mutual ties by further endeavours, especially if international conditions after the present war should lead to the creation, in general, of closer and more sincere international relations.

IV—Special Resolution concerning the Lebanon

The Arab States represented on the Preparatory Committee reaffirm severally their respect for the independence and sovereignty of the Lebanon within its present frontiers. The Governments of these States have in fact already

recognised this independence and sovereignty after the Government of the Lebanon had declared their acceptance of the statement which received the unanimous approval of the Lebanese Parliament on the 7th October, 1943.

V—Special Resolution concerning Palestine

(a) The committee consider that Palestine is one of the principal pillars of the Arab countries, and that no infringement of the rights of the Arabs is possible without prejudice to peace and security throughout the Arab world. Similarly the committee consider that the undertakings given by Great Britain which involve the termination of Jewish immigration, the protection of the Arab lands and the realisation of independence for Palestine, constitute established Arab rights and that progress towards the satisfaction of these rights would be a movement in the desired direction and towards the strengthening of peace and the establishment of security.

The committee declare their support of the cause of the Arabs of Palestine and their struggle for the realisation of their legitimate aspirations and the defence of their just rights.

The committee announce that they share with all others a deep grief for the horrors and sufferings which have been endured by the Jews of Europe at the hands of certain European dictatorships, but they consider that it would be an error to confuse the question of these Jews with that of the Zionists since it would be a great injustice that the question of the Jews of Europe should be made the cause of a further injustice committed against the Arabs of Palestine of whatever creed or religion.

(b) The proposal for the participation of the Arab Governments and peoples in the creation of an "Arab national fund" for the preservation of the Arab lands of Palestine shall be referred to the Finance and Economic Committee for consideration from all points of view and the result shall be submitted for discussion to the Preparatory Committee at their next meeting.

In proof of what is set forth above, the committee have signed this statement at Farouk University in Alexandria on Saturday, the 20th Shawwal, 1363 (corresponding to the 7th October, 1944).

E 6477 41 65]

No 51

Mr. Shone to Mr. Eden (Received 23rd October)

(No. 1179)

Sir,

Cairo, 10th October, 1944

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1907 of the 8th October, I have the honour to transmit herewith the French version of the Protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress published in the *Journal d'Egypte* of the 8th October, 1944.

2. The Protocol was so fully analysed in the telegram above referred to that I need not dwell on the details in this despatch.

3. It is evident that the resolutions adopted by the Preparatory Committee are of potential importance. Divisions and jealousies as well as the instability of the Arab States concerned may militate against effective implementation of the resolutions, but, nevertheless, it is clear that discussions which have been taking place for over a year between the Arab States have cleared the ground of impracticable ideas such as those of immediate administrative unions or federations and led the Arab States in the more practical direction of Arab co-operation. I have no doubt that the machinery has actually been proposed for giving permanency and method to this political co-operation, i.e., the Council of the League of Arab States, whose main purposes will be to consolidate relations between the Arab States and to safeguard their independence and sovereignty against aggression. It will be noted that the committee expressed the hope that this first step will lead to other results, especially in connexion with any post-war institution for uniting States generally. This is perhaps intended as a sop to the Syrians and Iraqis, who hanker after a Greater Syria or Arab Federation.

4. The particular resolution regarding the independence of the Lebanon within its present frontiers appears to have been due to conflict which arose

during the proceedings between the Lebanese and Syrian delegations. The only reports which I have hitherto received of this incident come from an agent attached to the Palace and from Hassan Pasha, both naturally prejudiced against Nahas Pasha. According to their accounts, Nahas Pasha, in full meeting suggested to the delegates that they should produce the *procès-verbaux* of their separate meetings with him previously. He added that, if any of them wished

The Lebanese and Iraqi delegates said that they had nothing to hide and produced their *procès-verbaux*. Saadallah Jabri Bey, Syrian Prime Minister and head of the Syrian delegation, looked very embarrassed, but finally said that he was a frank man and would not conceal anything that he had said. He then and the Jews and suggesting a Greater Syria and the reduction of the Greater Lebanon to its old Little Lebanon frontiers.

5. Musa Mubarek, head of the Cabinet of the Lebanese President and one of the Lebanese delegates, said that he was the representative of the head of the Lebanese State, who was a Maronite, and that he must protest against this attack on the Maronites. The Lebanese delegates also protested against the proposal to reduce them to their pre-1920 frontiers. A reconciliation was patched up thanks to the intervention of Riad al Sulh, the Lebanese Prime Minister.

6. Subsequently King Faruk received the heads of the Syrian and Lebanese delegations as well as the head of the Transjordan delegation with a view apparently to smoothing over matters between the Syrians and Lebanese. As the head of the Lebanese delegation is a Muslim this step of the Palace seems to have been rather clumsy, for obviously the people who wanted quietening down were the Christian members of the Lebanese delegation. Incidentally, Nahas Pasha, according to Amin Osman Pasha, strongly objected on constitutional grounds to the Monarch's receiving and discussing political matters with the Arab delegates without his Minister for Foreign Affairs being present.

7. The story recorded above may be too highly coloured but its main features were confirmed by the Transjordan Prime Minister in conversation with the Oriental Counsellor. It is suggested that this apparently clumsy intervention of Nahas Pasha may have far-reaching consequences and that the Lebanese will probably now be confirmed in their suspicions that the Syrians are out to devour them. It is further suggested that the Lebanese may revert to the old line of Christian policy instead of that of the present Sacred Union.

such an orientation would be a reversion of Christian feeling in the Lebanon in favour of France. The fear of Muslim domination is always lurking in the minds of the Lebanese Christians.

8. A press telegraphic version of which is enclosed, (1) would seem to be part of the Lebanese reaction to the incident detailed above.

9. In this connexion, I would invite attention to the resolutions in the first part of the Protocol limiting the right of the Arab States to conclude agreements with non-members to such as would not be contrary to the text or spirit of the Protocol and forbidding foreign policies prejudicial to the policy of the League or any one of its members. These resolutions may be aimed at Franco-Lebanese or Franco-Syrian treaties such as France is anxious to conclude.

10. As indicated in paragraph 3 above, it is not yet certain how much practical effect will be given to these resolutions. Nevertheless, it would be imprudent to ignore the fact that the result of this conference constitutes a

(1) Not printed.

step forward towards the political solidarity of the Egypto-Arab world against European encroachment. This political development will not only affect our position in the Arab countries proper but also in Egypt, which is on the verge of putting forward its claims for treaty revision, complete independence, &c. The terms of these resolutions accentuate the unity of attitude to be adopted by the States of the Egypto-Arab world towards States outside it, of which we are the principal one. We are regarded as having promoted this Arab unity movement, and the general feeling still is that we will welcome its fruition. It is not impossible that this solidarity of the Egypto-Arab world may be conciliated with our essential interests of communications and oil supply, provided we are able to adapt ourselves to the new conditions quickly enough. If, however, in addition to securing arrangements for the safeguarding of our above-mentioned interests we have also, in the interest of our world policy to adopt local policies in Syria and Palestine unacceptable to the Arabs, there is little likelihood of our being able to bring a consolidated Middle East into friendly co-operation. In that event, we should have to maintain the essential interests of ours by force against a less disunited Egypto-Arab world.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the High Commissioner for Palestine, Jerusalem; His Majesty's representatives at Beirut, Bagdad and Jeddah and the Governor, Aden.

I have &c

IS I SHORT

Enclosure in No. 31

Le Journal d'Egypte, 24th October, 1944

Les Résolutions du Comité Préparatoire au Congrès Général Arabe

Le Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe a terminé ses travaux, comme il les a commencés, dans une parfaite atmosphère de confiance réciproque de sincère fraternité, de profonde cordialité et de responsabilité communes dans ces graves circonstances où l'histoire est en train de changer son cours.

Dans l'accomplissement de sa mission, il a été animé de l'impérieux désir de grouper ses forces et d'unir ses efforts pour les orienter vers le bien être de tous les pays arabes, afin d'améliorer leur sort, de garantir leur avenir et de réaliser leurs aspirations.

Ce fut un sujet de joie et de satisfaction que M. Moussa El Alamy, représentant des Arabes de Palestine, se soit joint au Comité, étant donné la gravité particulière et l'importance capitale que revêt la cause de ce pays frère pour tous les Arabes sans exception.

Le Comité, à l'unanimité des voix des Délégations syrienne, transjordanienne, irakienne, libanaise et égyptienne, a adopté plusieurs résolutions vitales, des points de vue politique, économique, culturel, social, etc.

En foi de quoi, les chefs et les membres de ces délégations ont signé le Protocole annexé.

Quant aux délégations des Royaumes de l'Arabie Séoudite et du Yémen, elles ont remis leur avis jusqu'à ce qu'elles en aient référé à Leurs Majestés le Roi Abdel Aziz Al Seoud et le Roi Yehia Hamid Fddle.

Le comité saisit cette heureuse occasion qui constitue une des pages les plus glorieuses de l'histoire des Arabes pour adresser à tous les pays arabes ses meilleurs vœux et ses félicitations et présenter à Leurs Majestés leurs Altesses et leurs Excellences les Souverains, Chefs d'Etat et Princes Arabes l'expression de son profond loyalisme et de ses vifs remerciements, convaincu que ses travaux et l'espoir et les résultats qu'il a atteints et qu'il atteindra, avec l'aide de Dieu, mériteront toute leur sympathie, tout leur encouragement et tout leur appui.

Protocole

LES soussignés, chefs et membres des Délégations Arabes au Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe, à savoir :

Le Président du Comité Préparatoire : S. E. Moustapha El Nahas Pasha, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères d'Egypte et Chef de la Délégation Egyptienne.

[30547]

Délégation Syrienne:

S.E. Saadallah El-Jabry, Président du Conseil des Ministres de Syrie, Chef de la Délégation Syrienne;

S.E. Jamil Mardam Bey, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères;

S.E. le Dr. Neguib El-Armanzi, Secrétaire Général de la Présidence de la République Syrienne;

S.E. M. Sabry El-Assali, Député de Damas.

Délégation Transjordanienne:

S.E. Tewfik Aboul Hoda Pacha, Président du Conseil des Ministres et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Transjordanie et Chef de la Délégation Transjordanienne;

S.E. Soliman El-Soukkar Bey, Secrétaire financier du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères.

Délégation Irakienne:

S.E. Hamdi El-Bajahji, Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak et Chef de la Délégation Irakienne;

S.E. Archad El-Omari, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères;

S.E. Noury El-Said Pacha, ancien Président du Conseil des Ministres d'Irak;

S.E. Tahsin El-Askari, Ministre plénipotentiaire en Egypte.

Délégation Libanaise:

S.E. Riad El-Solh Bey, Président du Conseil des Ministres du Liban, Chef de la Délégation Libanaise;

S.E. Selim Takla Bey, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères;

S.E. Moussa Mouharak, Chef du Cabinet de la Présidence de la République.

Délégation Egyptienne:

S.E. Ahmed Neguib El-Hilali Pacha, Ministre de l'Instruction publique;

S.E. Mohamed Sabry Abou Alam Pacha, Ministre de la Justice;

S.E. Mohamed Salah Eddine Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat au Ministère des Affaires Etrangères;

Désireux de constater les rapports étroits et les liens nombreux qui unissent tous les pays arabes;

Soucieux de resserrer ces liens, de les consolider et de les orienter vers le bien-être de tous les pays arabes afin d'améliorer leur sort, de garantir leur avenir et de réaliser leurs aspirations;

Répondant à l'appel de l'opinion publique dans tous les pays arabes;

Se sont réunis à Alexandrie entre le lundi 8 Chawal 1363 (25 septembre 1944) et le samedi 20 Chawal 1363 (7 octobre 1944), sous forme de Comité Préparatoire du Congrès Général Arabe et sont convenus de ce qui suit:

I.—Ligue des Etats Arabes.

Une Ligue des Etats Arabes sera constituée par les Etats Arabes indépendants qui voudront en faire partie.

Cette Ligue aura un Conseil qui sera nommé " Conseil de la Ligue des Etats Arabes " au sein duquel les Etats membres de la Ligue seront représentés sur un pied d'égalité.

Il aura pour mission d'exécuter les accords que les Etats concluront entre eux et d'organiser des réunions périodiques pour raffermir leurs relations et coordonner leurs programmes politiques en vue de réaliser la coopération entre eux, de sauvegarder par tous les moyens possibles leur indépendance et leur souveraineté contre toute agression et de s'occuper d'une façon générale des affaires des pays arabes et de leurs intérêts.

Les décisions de ce Conseil obligeront ceux qui les auront acceptées, sauf au cas où un différend aura surgi entre deux Etats de la Ligue et à l'occasion duquel les deux pays se seront adressés au Conseil pour le régler. Dans ce cas, les décisions du Conseil de la Ligue seront exécutoires et obligatoires.

Dans tous les cas, il est interdit de recourir à la force pour régler les conflits entre deux Etats membres de la Ligue.

De plus, chaque Etat aura le droit de conclure avec un autre Etat, membre ou non membre de la Ligue, des accords particuliers, qui ne seraient pas contraires au texte ou à l'esprit de ces dispositions.

En aucun cas, il ne sera permis de suivre une politique extérieure préjudiciable à la politique de la Ligue des Etats Arabes ou de l'un quelconque des Etats membres.

Le Conseil assurera la médiation dans tout différend susceptible de provoquer une guerre entre un Etat membre de la Ligue, ou un autre membre ou non membre, en vue de les réconcilier.

D'ores et déjà, une commission sera formée de membres du Comité Préparatoire en vue d'élaborer les statuts du Conseil de la Ligue et d'examiner les questions politiques pouvant faire l'objet d'accords à conclure entre les pays membres.

II.—Coopération économique, culturelle, sociale, etc.

(a) Les Etats Arabes représentés au Comité coopéreront étroitement dans les matières suivantes:

(1) Les questions économiques et financières, y compris les échanges commerciaux, les douanes, la monnaie, l'agriculture et l'industrie;

(2) Les communications, y compris les chemins de fer, les routes, l'aviation, la navigation, les télégrammes et les postes;

(3) Les questions culturelles;

(4) Les questions de nationalité, les passeports, les visas, l'exécution des jugements, l'extradition des délinquants, etc.;

(5) Les questions sociales;

(6) Les questions sanitaires.

(b) Une commission d'experts pour chaque catégorie de ces questions sera formée des représentants des Gouvernements qui ont participé au Comité Préparatoire en vue d'élaborer un projet déterminant les modalités de la coopération dans ces matières, la portée et l'organisme d'exécution de cette coopération.

(c) Une commission de coordination et de rédaction sera formée pour contrôler les travaux des autres commissions, coordonner au fur et à mesure leurs travaux et rédiger leurs résolutions sous forme de projets d'accords pour être soumis aux différents Gouvernements.

(d) Lorsque toutes les commissions auront terminé leurs travaux, le Comité Préparatoire se réunira pour examiner les résultats de leurs études, en vue de la convocation du Congrès Général Arabe.

III.—Raffermissement de ces Liens.

Se réjouissant de ce premier résultat heureux, le Comité espère qu'à l'avenir les pays arabes le consolideront par d'autres résultats, surtout si, après la guerre actuelle, les événements mondiaux aboutissent à des institutions qui uniront les Etats par des liens plus étroits et plus forts.

IV.—Décision particulière au Liban.

Les Etats Arabes, représentés au sein du Comité Préparatoire, affirment à l'unanimité leur respect pour l'indépendance et la souveraineté du Liban, dans ses frontières actuelles, ce que, d'ailleurs, leurs Gouvernements ont déjà reconnu après que le Liban ait suivi une politique d'indépendance proclamée par son Gouvernement dans le programme ministériel qui lui a valu l'approbation unanime de la Chambre des Députés libanaise à la date du 7 octobre 1943.

V.—Décision particulière à la Palestine.

(a) Le Comité estime que la Palestine constitue un des importants éléments des pays arabes et que les droits des Arabes ne sauraient y être touchés sans danger pour la paix et la stabilité du monde arabe.

De même, le Comité estime que les engagements pris par la Grande-Bretagne, qui comportent l'arrêt de l'immigration juive, la sauvegarde des terres appartenant aux Arabes et l'acheminement de la Palestine vers l'indépendance, constituent autant de droits acquis pour les Arabes et que leur exécution serait un pas en avant vers le but visé, vers le raffermissement de la paix et de la stabilité.

Le Comité proclame son appui à la cause de la Palestine pour la réalisation de ses aspirations légitimes et la sauvegarde de ses justes droits.

Le Comité déclare qu'il ne compatit pas moins que quiconque aux horreurs et aux souffrances que les Juifs ont endurées en Europe par le fait de quelques Etats dictatoriaux. Mais il importe de ne pas confondre le cas de ces Juifs avec le Sionisme, car rien ne serait plus arbitraire et plus injuste que de vouloir régler la question des Juifs d'Europe par une autre injustice dont les victimes seraient les Arabes de Palestine, à quelque religion ou confession qu'ils appartiennent.

(b) La proposition concernant la participation des Gouvernements et peuples arabes au "Fonds de la Nation Arabe," destiné à sauver les terres de Palestine, sera renvoyée à la Commission des Questions économiques et financières, pour l'examiner sous tous ses aspects et soumettre le résultat de cet examen au Comité Préparatoire au cours de sa prochaine réunion.

En foi de quoi, le présent Protocole a été signé au siège de la Direction de l'Université Farouk I^{er} à Alexandrie, le samedi 21 Chawal 1363 (7 octobre 1944).

[E 6697/41/65]

No. 52.

Lord Moyne to Mr. Eden.—(Received 1st November.)

*Office of Minister Resident (M.E.),
Cairo, 19th October, 1944.*

My dear Secretary of State.

IN his despatch No. 1179 of the 10th October Mr. Shone has analysed the protocol of the Preparatory Committee for the Arab Congress and commented on the implications of its various clauses. In general I am in agreement with the views expressed by His Majesty's Minister. It may be of use if I add a few comments on my own part, from the general Middle East point of view, based on the interviews which the various delegates had with me during their stay in Cairo, and on conversations with them which have been reported to me.

2. I should like in the first place to endorse the summing up of the outcome of the conference given in paragraph 10 of Mr. Shone's despatch. Whether or not the various resolutions are given immediate practical effect, the result of the holding of the conference and of the formation of the "League" or "Commonwealth" of Arab States cannot fail to tighten the ties joining the various States of the Middle East. The existence and strength of these ties was shown by the spontaneity of the reaction against the attempted French coup in the Lebanon in November 1943. To this general feeling of community there has now been added the machinery to give it concrete expression.

3. There is a further fact that emerges from a careful reading of the protocol and from conversations with members of the conference. The protocol envisages that the Arab world (or that part of it with which the protocol deals) should have one orientation, and one only, towards the outside world. This feeling has been expressed more and more in recent years, particularly in regard to the partitions of the Middle East which were carried out after the last war. It is now quite clear that the Arab States are convinced that there is not room for two orientations, taking different parts of the Arab world in different directions. The protocol expresses a growing sense of solidarity among the States composing the "Arab Commonwealth," and a realisation that the deflection of one part of the area from the general line of development must affect the interests of the whole.

4. There is little doubt that the direction envisaged at present is that of co-operation with Great Britain. The Middle East group as a whole is willing, and indeed anxious, to co-operate with Great Britain on a basis of independence and free association. They believe that this will be to the mutual advantage of both, since it gives the best guarantee on the one side of the security of the Arab countries, and on the other side of the maintenance of British imperial communications. All the indications are, however, that a policy of political penetration on the eastern fringe of the Mediterranean, whether by Great Britain herself, or by other Powers with the assistance or acquiescence of Great Britain, would be interpreted as a threat to the essential interests of the whole "Commonwealth." This could not fail to have an effect upon the present inclination of the Arab States to range themselves alongside of us, and might do so to such an extent as to cause them to overcome the misgivings which they probably feel as regards other possibilities and to look elsewhere for the support that they need. In this connexion it is important to recall that the recent recognition of Syrian and Lebanese independence by the U.S.S.R., which gave such satisfaction in the

Levant States, is stated to be conditional on the two States not entering into an agreement which would give a specially favoured or "pre-eminent" position to any one European Power. We must realise, in my view, that, if His Majesty's Government is forced to adopt local policies in any part of the Middle East which are unacceptable to the majority of the Middle Eastern opinion, there is risk of the whole orientation of the Arab bloc of countries being changed to some other direction which might or might not be acceptable to us.

5. It is in this light that the special resolutions relating to the Lebanon and Palestine (clauses IV and V) can be read. It is implied in the former that, if there is any "default" on the part of the Lebanon in allegiance to the objects of the League as a whole—that is, if the Lebanon allows itself to be used as a foothold for undesirable European penetration into the Arab world—the other States of the League would no longer recognise the independence of the Lebanon "within its present frontiers," and would support Syria in taking back the predominantly Moslem, non-Maronite districts at present incorporated in the Lebanese State. This interpretation has been confirmed in conversation with several of the delegates. Similarly, as regards Palestine, it should be noted that the protocol speaks of the engagements entered into by Great Britain as involving the stoppage of Jewish immigration, the safeguarding of Arab land and the leading of the country towards independence (an oblique reference, it would appear, to the principal clauses of the 1939 White Paper). It follows that, unless we are prepared to ensure those objects, we cannot avoid some measure of difference with the Arab world, and the risk which has been referred to is one that we cannot hope altogether to escape.

6. The delegates have, in conversation, expressed definite hopes that there will be forthcoming from His Majesty's Government some sign of sympathy with their achievement, which they maintain is entirely in accord with the declaration made by you, Sir, in 1941. The reception given to the protocol by His Majesty's Government may well be taken as an important "test case" for our future intentions in this part of the world.

7. It is also fair to say that the conference marks a considerable advance in constructive political thinking on the part of the Middle East States. The protocol looks to the future, not to the past. The era of recriminations over such matters as the MacMahon Correspondence seems at last to be over. The delegates have shown in conversations that they are aware of having made a fresh start and that they look for a response in kind from His Majesty's Government. The general spirit in which the conference appears to have been conducted, and the lines of the protocol itself, show, moreover, that the States of the Middle East have not been slow to learn the new technique of international co-operation developed in war-time United Nations conferences such as those at Bretton Woods and Dumbarton Oaks. "Regionalism" is in the air, and it is noteworthy that it should be the newly-developed States of the Middle East who have taken the lead in attempting to work out a practical scheme of regional co-operation. Clause III of the protocol is of interest in this connexion. At the end of the third paragraph of his despatch, Mr. Shone suggests that the reference in this clause to post-war institutions is perhaps intended as a sop to the Syrians and Iraqis. More than one of the delegates, however, has stated in conversation that this clause is intended to leave the door open for the "Commonwealth" as a whole to join in any wider world organisation which may emerge in the post-war period. The Arabic text is obscure on this point, and is capable of either interpretation. A copy of the Arabic, which is the official text, is enclosed⁽¹⁾ with this despatch, and will repay comparison with the French translation, which is in some respects misleading.

8. Since the protocol was signed, there has been a change of Government in three of the signatory countries—Egypt, Syria and Transjordan. Although the coincidence has caused some remark, it seems to be beyond doubt that none of these changes was the result, direct or indirect, of the conference, nor do they imply any dissatisfaction in the countries concerned with the policies formulated at Alexandria. The Governments of Egypt, Transjordan and Syria fell on internal domestic issues which had been pending for some time, and in the two former cases it seems probable that the changes were actually held over until after the conclusion of the conference in order not to interfere with it. "Arab unity" is to a large extent a non-party matter in these countries, and the changes should not in practice have any great effect either way on the development of the project. Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that these three Governments

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

should have fallen in such rapid succession immediately after the publication of the protocol, since I am informed that His Majesty's Government have already been accused on the Axis radio of engineering their fall in order to sabotage the Arab unity movement.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Beirut, Bagdad and Jedda, the Acting High Commissioner for Palestine and the Governor of Aden.

Yours sincerely,
MOYNE.

[E 7213/41/65]

No. 53.

Sir K. Cornwallis to Mr. Eden.—(Received 25th November.)

(No. 517.)

Sir,

Bagdad, 5th November, 1944.

IN paragraph 11 of my despatch No. 510 of the 31st October, I referred briefly to the reception which had been accorded in Iraq to the decisions of the Preliminary Conference on Arab Unity, which met in Alexandria between the 15th September and the 7th October. It may be of interest if I analyse those reactions more fully.

2. Regarding most matters, it is not possible in this country to predicate any one feeling or view as representing "public opinion"; each community tends to regard affairs, both internal and external, primarily from its own sectional point of view and with an eye to its own advantage. The Shia leaders are naturally not enthusiastic about the Alexandria Protocol. As good Arab patriots, they must at least give it lip-service, but as sectaries they are disturbed by the prospect of the Shias becoming a still smaller minority in a still larger Sunni world. They well know that they cannot enlist the support of their Persian co-religionists without appearing unpatriotic, and they are therefore forced into uneasy acquiescence in the official policy. To the Kurds, any step which strengthens, actually or potentially, their secular opponents, the Arabs, is unwelcome; and the Arab tribes are on the whole quite indifferent to what they no doubt regard as just another manoeuvre of their urban rulers. Nor can the Christian and Jewish communities be expected to acclaim the protocol with genuine satisfaction.

3. The general public (by which I mean the politically-minded, newspaper-reading townsmen), like all general publics, is primarily interested in gaining its daily bread. But next to self-preservation there are few stronger stimuli than national pride; and there is to my mind no doubt that the general public were flattered and pleased by the success which the conference attained. It has made them feel that it is something after all to be an Arab; and Arab Unity undoubtedly appeals to the Iraqis very much as the reunion of Christendom appeals to Christians, namely as an ideal which, if incapable of immediate realisation, is nevertheless devoutly to be wished.

4. The fact that the Iraqi delegation was headed by the Prime Minister and included the forceful, if erratic, personality of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and above all (contrary to the wishes of Nahas and Ibn Saud) General Nuri-al-Said, who is the doyen of living exponents of Arab Unity, has naturally made Iraqis feel, not without reason, that their own country is taking a prominent, if not pre-eminent, part in the realisation of the ideal. Moreover, as I have suggested in my despatch under reference, Iraq has a very practical interest in Arab Unity, because she regards the Levant as her natural economic corridor, and is much concerned to see that the exits for her pipe-lines and her trade routes on the Mediterranean do not come under hostile, i.e., French or Jewish, control.

5. In paragraph 4 of his letter No. 48 (2) of the 19th October to you, Lord Moyne has mentioned that the aim of the conference seems to have been to unite the Arab World in co-operation with Britain. I have every reason to endorse this view. Both Nuri Pasha and the Minister for Foreign Affairs have said clearly and definitely that this was the aim of the conference, and that it was this which lay behind the clause of the protocol guaranteeing the present Lebanon frontiers. To me this is the most interesting and important aspect of the conference, because it shows that the Arabs have responded whole-heartedly and

practically to the invitation which you, Sir, conveyed to them at the Mansion House on the 29th May, 1941, when you said:—

"The Arab World has made great strides since the settlement reached at the end of the last war, and many Arab thinkers desire for the Arab peoples a greater degree of unity than they now enjoy. In reaching out towards this unity they hope for our support. No such an appeal from our friends should go unanswered. It seems to me both natural and right that the cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty's Government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval."

This undertaking you reiterated in February 1942, and it has become known as "The Eden Declaration." At the time when it was made, many must have wondered whether the Arab World would ever unite in any practical way or direction, and still more whether they would be prepared to put themselves under the guidance and leadership of Great Britain. In Iraq it certainly seemed most unlikely; but, as you know, the change of feeling here during the past three and a half years has been deep and marked, and it is true to say to-day that the orientation towards Great Britain is popular here. The revolt of Raschid Ali profoundly shocked the pride and confidence of most thinking Iraqis. With their political instinct, whatever their feelings for Britain might then be, they were quick to see that the revolt, had it been successful, would have ranged them on the wrong side, and would have shattered their political hopes for perhaps a generation.

6. Apart from that, the generous policy of His Majesty's Government in this country, both as regards the armistice terms and in many spheres since, has done much to conciliate the people of Iraq besides causing a great impression in other Arab States and particularly in Syria. The Atlantic Charter and similar declarations of the statesmen of the United Nations have also created a new feeling of confidence, here and throughout the Arab World, in Great Britain and her willingness to help the Arabs, and her determination to stand by her agreements.

7. It was this feeling, I am sure, which led the delegates to refer to the White Paper in dealing with Palestine. The declaration was so phrased, I understand, because it was desired to find a form of words which would be not unacceptable to Jamal Hussaini who had actually, despite Amin Hussaini's threats, initialled the White Paper (with trifling reservations), together with Musa al Alami in Nuri Pasha's house in May 1940. It was therefore felt appropriate to make a reference to it. It seems to me that this acceptance of Britain's last official statement of policy by and on behalf of the so-called extremist Palestine party, and its endorsement by the conference, is very significant. It means on the one hand that the Palestinian Arabs are now committed to an acceptance of the White Paper, and that we have the general support of the Arab World for the policy it enshrined. But, on the other hand, it means equally that any serious divergence from that policy will confront His Majesty's Government not only with the hostility of the Palestine Arabs, but with that of all the signatories to the Alexandria Protocol. To them, the solution of the Palestine problem on the basis of strictly limited Jewish immigration, like the guarantee of Syria and the Lebanon, is an integral part of their scheme for Arab Unity, a movement which we have undertaken to support. If we oppose, in any important particular, the plan they have formulated, we shall at once be accused of having gone back on our undertakings. We shall lose the confidence that we have so laboriously built up over the past three years, and with it the friendship which has proved such an asset to us.

8. The Arab World, like the Western World, finds it hard to co-operate on cultural and economic matters, or the promotion of an idea, but an external threat will unite them as it unites us. Thousands to whom the theory or ideal of Arab Unity means little or nothing at all will enthusiastically support and share in any action undertaken to protect or preserve Syria or Palestine from what is conceived to be foreign aggression. Already, before the meeting of the Alexandria Conference, the Arab World had shown surprising solidarity on two occasions: first of all over the Lebanon crisis last November, and secondly over the protests to the United States Congress against the "Wagner Resolution" early this year.

9. There is, however, a profound difference between the reaction to the incidents which have so far evoked, and astonishingly evoked, united Arab action,

and that to be expected should we adopt a policy contrary to the protocol. Hitherto the Arabs have been our friends and have remonstrated as friends. If, having assured the Arabs that their aspirations for unity have our sympathetic support, we now oppose their official plan for its attainment, they will be our friends no longer, and their opposition will be hostile and almost certainly violent. At this moment feeling in Iraq on Palestine and Syria and the Lebanon, though it has not so far expressed itself immoderately, is far more effectively mobilised than it ever has been, and there is no doubt that the Iraqi Government would act at once in support of either country if they felt it to be opportune. In the case of Palestine in particular they would have every Arab Iraqi solidly behind them.

10. I do not wish to sound unduly pessimistic or minatory, and I realise that far wider issues are at stake than can be bounded within the frontiers of the Arab World. At the same time I agree with the view expressed by Sir Harold MacMichael in the second paragraph of his Secret despatch of the 17th July, that these problems must be considered first and foremost from the point of view of British interests, because, as Sir Harold points out, and as the Arab Unity Conference has admitted, British interests are the shield and protector of the interests of all, and if British influence in the Middle East is overthrown, chaos will ensue. It is, I believe, true to say that ever since Great Britain has concerned herself with the Middle East, our interests have demanded that we should maintain easy communications among friendly peoples. It seems to me that the Arab Unity Conference, certainly so far as Iraq is concerned, presents us with a crisis. If we are ready to support the plan fully and openly, and to respond to the invitation which has been given to us to act as the guide and mentor of the Arab World, then I see every reason to hope that Imperial interests in the Middle East will be maintained and safeguarded more surely than ever before, and that a period of stability and prosperity lies before us. If, on the other hand, we are not willing or able to do so, then, whatever advantages we may reap elsewhere, we shall, I feel, suffer in this part of the world a blow which will not only involve us and the Middle East in unrest, violence and confusion, but in the eyes of its inhabitants will abase our honour and prestige irreparably.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's representatives at Cairo, Beirut and Jeddah, to the Minister Resident in the Middle East, the General Officer Commanding-in-chief, Persia/Iraq Force, the Air Officer Commanding and the Combined Intelligence Centre, Iraq.

I have, &c.

KINAHAN CORNWALLIS.